Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11889/4225
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTaweel, Adel-
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-13T10:54:38Z-
dc.date.available2017-02-13T10:54:38Z-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11889/4225-
dc.description.abstractIn many cases, intermediaries play a major role in linking between service providers and their target users. Yet, attracting intermediaries at a marketplace to promote a service to their existing customers can be very challenging, since they are usually very busy and would incur additional cost as a result of such promotion. In response, this paper presents an information-based incentivisation framework, which combines financial rewards with other motivating information, in order to incentivise intermediaries at a marketplace to undertake service promotion. Specifically, the intermediaries are associated with a group of incentivising agents, capable of learning the individual motivational needs of these intermediaries, and accordingly target them with the most effective incentives. The incentivising agents collaborate with each other to gather motivational information, by sharing their observations on intermediaries. The proposed incentivisation approach is evaluated through a corresponding agent-based simulation, and the experimental results obtained demonstrate its effectivenessen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.subjectArtificial intelligence - Educational applicationsen_US
dc.titleInformation-based incentivisation when rewards are inadequate.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
newfileds.departmentEngineering and TechnologyEngineering and Technologyen_US
newfileds.item-access-typeopen_accessen_US
newfileds.thesis-prognoneen_US
newfileds.general-subjectnoneen_US
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.languageiso639-1other-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
Appears in Collections:Fulltext Publications
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
FAIA263_0591.pdf283.92 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record

Page view(s)

95
Last Week
0
Last month
1
checked on Apr 14, 2024

Download(s)

26
checked on Apr 14, 2024

Google ScholarTM

Check


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.