



Normalcy and Violence: The Yearning for the Ordinary in Discourse of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

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often a neglected theme, seen as circumventing and perhaps depreciating issues presumed to be of greater political primacy, such as territorial conflict and colonial control.

Thus, normalcy in this debate does not entail a return to a condition that preceded the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, since the social formations in question—Israel as a Hebrew entity and Palestine as a post-Ottoman society split off from Syria—did not exist before that conflict. Even so, the yearning for normalcy expresses itself in terms suggesting the recapture of a past or a “return” to a desired form that is invented and imagined, and always projected to a future condition.

My purpose here is to examine the manner in which the concept of normalcy or normality (I use the terms interchangeably),¹ has been used in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, both to consolidate and create new collective identities, and to reinforce conditions of erasure and exclusion of the other. I would argue that among the most defining features of the discourse on normality in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the manner in which the normality sought for the emergent Israeli society created the conditions for the destabilization of Palestinian society.

DILEMMAS OF NORMALCY FOR THE NEW JEWISH STATE

Barely three months after the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, the German-Jewish philosopher Ernst Simon published a prophetic prognosis of the dilemmas of the Jewish state, in which he identified the search for “normalcy” as a central dilemma for Jewish youth.² His essay specified several challenges to creating the condition of normalcy in the kind of state he envisioned Israel to be—that is, a blending of religious tradition with modernity and possessing a desirable (i.e., Western or European) orientation. His position, which recognized the potential contradictions likely to be embedded within the new Israeli nationalism, anticipated the later tendency to equate Israeli “normalcy” with a struggle against the state’s “Levanticization.” This process, which involves taking on the attributes of the surrounding environment (in sharp contradiction to the Western attributes envisioned for the new state), was intensified by the early immigration of North African and Iraqi Jews, and the creation of what became known as an Israeli Mizrahi subculture. In a striking paragraph—note that this was written in 1949—Simon observed:

This ideological normalization, be it said in passing, preoccupied both Herzl, father of the new Jewish state, who left the choice of territory open, and Eliezer ben Yehuda, herald of modern, secularized Hebrew, who[,] though living in Jerusalem, favored Uganda as the national homeland. Other leaders, who started out as territorialists but later became Zionists in the stricter sense, were similarly much concerned with “normalization.” However, the Zionist

movement did not remain territorialist but became Palestinian. It “burdened” itself with Arab relations and with the immense weight of the historic Jewish landscape and tradition, epitomized in the name of “Jerusalem.” A chemically pure normalization became impossible: the specifically Jewish problems of our nationalism emerged anew.³

The obsessive search for a condition of normalcy within Jewish society, Simon concluded, would inevitably give rise to considerable individual and collective neuroses. Speaking of the late British Mandate period in Palestine, Simon asserted that Jewish terrorism was one of these “collective neuroses” and “quite understandable in a people that has lost more than one-third of its numbers; yet it should never have been treated homeopathically by some leaders—who ought to be physicians of their people.”⁴

The search for “Jewish normalcy” went through several major transformations in Israeli debates, which can be schematized here. During the pre-state period, “normalcy” in the Labor Zionist discourse, as elucidated by Baruch Kimmerling and Yehouda Shenhav, was a catchphrase for the creation of a Jewish society that negated exile.⁵ In other words, the territorialization of the Jewish *Yishuv* was the process whereby Jews became “normal,” similar to that of other (European) societies, and where a class society replaced and ended the conditions of marginalization (in the shtetl) and exile (in Europe). The instrument of this normalization was “Hebrew labor,” a practice promoted by Labor Zionism as of the late Ottoman period and which consisted of excluding Arab labor—in a process of displacement rather than colonization—with the aim of recreating Jewish settler society as an egalitarian social formation.⁶

In the early state period, “normalcy” was redefined to mean the creation of a modern Jewish state from disparate components: hegemonic East European elements and plebeian Mizrahi (Arab) Jews, mostly from North Africa and Iraq.⁷ The incomplete transfer of the Arab population in the 1948 war was a complicating factor, since it created a state with a residual native population that could not be absorbed. The necessary condition for the normalcy of the Jewish state was seen as putting an end to the cultural Levantization underway, thus laying the ground for the creation of a European social democratic state from ethnically disparate components. This de-Levantization was to be achieved by the integrative role of the Hebrew language and the socializing role of the Israeli army. The ultimate objective was to eliminate the *exceptionalism* of the Jewish state as a settler-colonial society by using the mythology and ideology of return of the Jews to their biblical homeland.

PACIFICATION, NORMALIZATION, AND RESISTANCE AFTER 1967

The turning point in Israel’s process of normalization, which has been eminently successful at the institutional level, was the 1967 war, which

brought the remaining parts of Arab Palestine into the borders of the expanded Israeli state. The unintended consequence of the war was to incorporate, or rather reintegrate, the Palestinian peasantry of the West Bank and Gaza into the political economy of the Jewish state through Moshe Dayan's strategy of economic integration. This reintegration entailed the demise of Hebrew labor as an instrument of normalization: Palestinians—in all three regions of historic Palestine—became the essential underclass of the Israeli state, occupying the critical position in its labor force.

The occupation gave rise to a fierce armed resistance in Gaza, which lasted more than three years. With its brutal suppression in 1971, Israel succeeded in pacifying the Palestinian population in the newly occupied territories. Henceforth, normalcy was redefined as a strategy of coexistence between a largely disenfranchised Palestinian population and a colonizing Jewish society.⁸ An eerie normalization of relations between occupiers and occupied assured the free movement of (Palestinian) labor and (Jewish) goods between Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Palestine became “hummus and falafel-land” for weekend Israeli visitors seeking cheap thrills and clean air.⁹ Meanwhile, one aspect of the quietism that by and large characterized the period was the transformation of the nature of settlements from the initial Nahal frontier outposts and quasi-military encampments to a suburban dormitory habitat able to accommodate a far larger segment of the Israeli population. Within a few years, the language of “coexistence” was adopted by the settlers, who saw Gaza and “Judea-Samaria” as a Jewish patrimony that happened to have a Palestinian population that needed to be contended with.¹⁰

Notwithstanding, there did exist some Palestinian resistance to the normalcy of colonial coexistence, albeit without threatening the overall quietism that endured for well over a decade. The resistance took two forms—the first originating outside the boundaries of the Israeli state and occupied territories, the second originating within those boundaries. The first involved cross-border guerilla raids by Palestinian armed groups launched from the surrounding Arab countries against the state that denied them the right of return. Though largely ineffectual in military terms, these attacks nevertheless succeeded in augmenting within Israel an atmosphere of encirclement, reinforcing the notion of a Western cultural enclave in a sea of Arab-Islamic hostility. The resistance within the occupied territories consisted of sporadic acts of resistance against Israeli military targets.

This second form of resistance witnessed a dramatic surge in the mid-1980s in what came to be called the “knifing campaign.” It consisted of attacks by militant bands of youth—not affiliated with any political group

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within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—against Israeli settlers and merchants conducting business in Palestinian urban centers. This campaign was the enraged, raw violence of a subdued and disarmed society. Although the incidents remained uncoordinated and lacked support or backing from organized political factions, they did muster a substantial amount of panicked reaction, leading to a considerable decline in Israeli “normalized” presence in the occupied territories. Israeli observers likened the random attacks to the Sicarii campaign waged by the Jewish Zealot rebel rising against Rome in the second century CE whose fate was eventually sealed at Masada.¹¹

Josephus in his *The Jewish War* describes the Sicarii, the Herodian-period Zealots who knifed their opponents in Roman Judea (Hellenized Jews, priestly collaborators, and wealthy Jews who were pillars of the “collaborationist” Herodian regime).¹² The most notable Sicarii/Zealot leaders at Masada were Eleazar ben Ya’ir and Simon Bar-Giora.¹³ In recent Israeli academic work, such as that of Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, these two figures are seen as precursors of the Palestinian suicide bombers of the new millennium. The objective of the Palestinian sicarii of the mid-1980s was seen as destabilizing the regime of Israeli normalcy under occupation and dissuading Palestinians from working in Israeli construction and industry.¹⁴

POST-OSLO NORMALCIES

With the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, the discourse on normalcy shifted gear. The eruption of the first intifada several years before had demonstrated the failure of pacification to achieve its goal: control of the Palestinians in the absence of a territorial solution. Meanwhile, with the fall of the Likud government and the return to power of Labor in 1992, concern over demographic encirclement had also become a burning issue within the Israeli polity.¹⁵ It became clear that normalcy under occupation was no longer possible. The Israeli solution to intifada violence, and to the demographic dilemma of a growing Palestinian presence in their midst, was to create separate autonomous Palestinian areas under Israeli rule, which would be consolidated through a separate legal system (for Palestinians and for Jewish settlers), separate road networks, and segregated zoning laws. This division was the political objective of the Oslo accords as conceived by the Labor party.¹⁶ The semblance of “normal” coexistence between the two populations came to an end.

The violence that erupted during the second intifada in late 2000 was another benchmark in defining the absence of normalcy, even while the new conception of normalcy was being highlighted. On the Palestinian side, the concept of normalcy had long oscillated between a territorial solution to the Palestinian problem on the one hand, and the restoration of a society lost by war and transplantation on the other. With the second

intifada, two contrasting debates on normalcy emerged within Palestinian society. For the Palestinian citizens of Israel, the search was for a normality in daily living that had been denied them since 1948, and expressed in the struggle for equal citizenship, parity of services, and, potentially, the transformation of Israel from a Jewish state to a state of its citizens.¹⁷ For the Palestinians in the occupied territories, normality (*bayat tabi'yyiah*)—as opposed to normalization (*ta'tbi'*)—became the watchword for restoring to their lives a sovereign existence and for the building of an economy not subject to checkpoints, closures, curfews, and army regulation of their lives. At the quotidian level, this normality was expressed in the slogan *bidna in'ish* (“we want to live [a normal life]”), often heard in popular songs and seen on graffiti.

The Palestinian writer Hassan Khader has examined notions of normalcy in these conceptual terms in several essays. In his autobiographical “Identity Anguish,” he articulates the search for normalcy among Palestinians as a yearning to escape the destabilized and destabilizing life in the camps. Like many Palestinian intellectuals, he found freedom in Beirut, where the multiplicity of sectarian identities ensured that everybody was a stranger.¹⁸ Khader’s condition of alienated freedom ended with the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, but he regained it briefly in 1994, when he returned to his boyhood town in Gaza, Khan Yunis, as a PLO returnee and a “citizen” of the Palestinian autonomous areas.

This freedom was very short-lived, however, “soon replaced by an absolute loss of freedom, unprecedented, even by Palestinian standards of exile, in addition to the sense of disappointment and letdown created by the new conditions of living [under the Palestinian Authority].”¹⁹ In another essay, entitled “Testimony,” Khader wrote of Yasir Arafat’s return to Palestine in 1994 as “the time for rebuilding our daily lives under conditions of normality.”²⁰ In this essay, the term conveyed the sense of integrating the exiles with the Gazan and West Bank “natives” who had remained in the homeland. It was a reunion accompanied by the euphoria that came with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) before it was overtaken by the second intifada. The intifada triggered the abrupt end of a “normalized society,” potentially free of Israeli control, which the creation of the PA seemed to promise.

Within the occupied territories, the increased confinement of daily life that resulted from an all-pervasive system of checkpoints and blocked roads restricting the movement of the population gave rise to informal resistance forms through subterfuge. The purpose of this resistance was the affirmation of life through the “sabotage of the military-bureaucratic system of control.”²¹ For women in particular, the system of military confinement was reinforced by enhanced social segregation in both Gaza and the West Bank. Toward the end of the first intifada, and again after Hamas took power in Gaza in 2007, this segregation often took the form of religious diktat. Sophie Richter-Devroe has examined case studies of women

in rural and urban areas who engaged in such “acts of resistance” as affirming life in the “pursuit of normalcy and joy.” She writes:

Israeli policies of occupation, dispossession and fragmentation of Palestinian living spaces not only target physical space, but also the fine grain and mere possibility of an ordinary joyful life. With their everyday tactics of crossing Israeli-imposed physical borders women cannot permanently change the reality of the occupation, but only temporarily and individually subvert power relations. On an ideational level, however, acts of trespassing physical borders to [enjoy] life might be a more long-term strategy to resist the *effects* of Israeli *spaciocidal* policies by creating and maintaining [their] own alternative cultural spaces.²²

Resisting “normalization” underlined opposition to what was seen as Oslo’s false semblance of sovereignty under Israeli colonial rule, the attempt to create a “business as usual” atmosphere of coexistence between the increasingly confined Palestinian population and the Israeli state. Enhancing this negative notion of normalcy was the readiness of several Arab states to confer legitimacy on Israel by establishing “normal” economic and diplomatic relations before justice was restored to the Palestinians. Critics contended that normalization should be the incentive for, and conditioned upon, Israel’s ending the occupation, not a reward for promising to do so.²³

AN INSULAR NORMALCY

On the Israeli street, the rocket launchings and suicide attacks that accompanied the second intifada, carried out mainly by Hamas, triggered a widespread nostalgia for the normalcy of an earlier era when Palestinian resistance had been confined to the occupied territories. In particular, the suicide bombing at Café Moment in the Rehavia neighborhood of Jerusalem on 9 March 2002 was a pivotal moment in crystallizing the yearning for normalcy that expressed itself as the desire for the physical disappearance of the Palestinians from the Israeli midst.

Ari Shavit, writing in *Ha’Aretz*, commented on the event in language that echoed the rhetoric of many politicians and public intellectuals. The essence of Israel’s search for normalcy, he suggested, was

the morning espresso and croissant in the neighbourhood café . . . [now the war was brought] here right among us, in the middle of Rehavia, near the Terra Sancta Monastery, just opposite the prime minister’s residence in the heart of Jerusalem. The heart of the last attempt to preserve a semblance of sanity in Jerusalem, a hint of sophisticated European *joie de vivre*.²⁴

Responding to leftist demonstrations against the settlements, Shavit added,

Exactly one week ago, a peace demonstration was held outside. The “War of the Settlements’ Peace,” they chanted. But when the police sapper walks among the dead youths, searching for another explosive device, it does not seem so. It seems very, very different. Maybe the War for Moment [Café]? Maybe the War for the chance of a Western society to survive in the Middle East? True, it is not a particularly sublime war. It is not war over exalted ideas. And we are still there, in the territories that prevent us from returning to ourselves. But we can no longer keep fooling ourselves. This war is about the morning’s coffee and croissant. About the beer in the evening.²⁵

Three elements converged in this formulation of Israel’s search for normalcy: “being left alone,” “being European,” and disengagement from the occupied territories. On this theme, at least, a unity emerged between the Israeli left and the Israeli right, reinforced by the suicide bombing. The desired normalcy expressed did not necessarily entail a disengagement from colonial control over the Palestinians, but disengagement from cohabitation with the Palestinians. What was missing from Shavit’s heartfelt lament for ordinary existence was any recognition that the Palestinian attacks had been triggered by Israel’s transformation of the West Bank and Gaza into one large arena of confinement. This was a process that began during the second phase of the Oslo process—long before the onset of the bombing campaign. It was ushered in by the “Oslo II” interim agreement of 1995, at the heart of which lay the creation of physically separated Palestinian bantustans.²⁶

For Israelis, the normalcy desired did not necessarily entail a disengagement from colonial control over the Palestinians, but disengagement from cohabitation with the Palestinians.

This was the regime of control created by Israel’s implementation of the Oslo accords, in which separate road systems for settlers and Palestinians sliced the occupied territories into segments, and in which two parallel legal systems governed the lives of Palestinians and Jews. Zones of separation were enforced by checkpoints and barbed wire, a process later to culminate in the building of a separation wall inside the “border zones” of the West Bank.²⁷ Yet, the violence did not begin on any significant scale until several months after the collapse in July 2000 of the Camp David final status talks, which under the Oslo accords were ostensibly to lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. From that time forward, Israel blocked the path of over 150,000 commuting workers—almost 40 percent of the total Palestinian labor force—from entering Israel, precipitating the most devastating crisis in subsistence that Palestinian households had ever experienced.²⁸

NORMALCY THROUGH SEPARATION

Israel's attempt to consolidate its control over the occupied territories has encountered two major rebellions since the occupation began in 1967. During the first intifada (1987–91), Israel was confronted with an occupied society that rose to challenge its rule through strikes, sabotage, and non-cooperation with the military government. In parallel with Prime Minister Rabin's notorious "break their bones" policy against youthful stone throwers and protesters, Israel responded by attempting to impose business as usual—in other words, policies of normalization. Hence, the forced opening of shops, the breaking of strikes, and the efforts to restore law and order through the Village Leagues, a collaborationist network created in the 1980s under the sponsorship of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and its Civil Administration.²⁹ The conversion of the military government into a "civil administration" back in 1981 had itself signified an effort to normalize the occupation, even if only at the discursive level.³⁰

Israel's response to the second intifada (2001–06) was exactly the opposite, particularly after Ariel Sharon became prime minister in the early months of the uprising. Thus, instead of attempting to impose normalization, the Israeli military initiated a policy of sustained pacification. The suicide attacks—spearheaded by Hamas—in Israeli urban centers were met by a scorched-earth policy aimed at making "normal life" impossible in the Palestinian autonomous areas. Collective punishment in the villages or towns from which the attacks originated became the order of the day. When the government felt that Arafat and the PA were not sufficiently curtailing the Palestinian militants, and later when Palestinians initiated armed clashes with the Israelis, the "de-normalization campaign" reached full swing and became comprehensive. Elements of de-normalization included tightening the economic blockade against Palestinian areas, sharply curtailing movement of the population from one district to another, and sealing off both the Arab city of Jerusalem and all areas in surrounding Israeli settlements to Palestinian access.

The separation wall—the concrete and barbed wire barrier built to encompass the "frontier areas" and major settlement blocs in the West Bank along the green line—was the logical extension of this strategy. The wall was first approved by Labor, but its construction began only after the Likud came to power in early 2001; it thus represented a shared vision uniting the left and right wings of the Israeli establishment.³¹ Although Israel justified the wall in terms of security considerations, it was effectively conceived as a way to insulate Israel from the "messiness" of its colonial possessions: while the bulk of the Jewish settlements—and some rich Palestinian agricultural land—were safely tucked behind the concrete wall on the Israeli side, the wall was routed in such a way as to keep the largest possible number of Palestinians out, often separated from their lands. The architects of the wall saw it as a means to give back to Israel the normality

it had lost through decades of physical integration with Palestinians. Inevitably, the wall, the first phases of whose construction coincided with the unfolding of the second intifada, triggered violent responses and a new wave of suicide bombings.

The main opposition to this apartheid policy of separation came not from the left, but from elements within the Israeli business community. Their fear was that the wall would harm the Israeli economy by denying access to Palestinian markets and labor, which had become crucial to the Israeli construction and service industries.³² Another concern was that the wall would destabilize the Oslo agreements and the peace process. These objections were largely resolved, however, by the importation of foreign labor on a large scale to replace Palestinian workers, and by the ascendancy of the Sharon/Netanyahu governments, which had been opposed to Oslo all along.³³

It was at this juncture that the word “normalization” began to gain wide currency in the Palestinian political lexicon. Its use as a term of opposition against policies promoting “norms” of coexistence—in a context of continuing occupation—had begun in the mid-1990s with growing doubts about Israeli intentions; it acquired particular salience during the second intifada. In particular, the anti-normalization campaign was directed against the PLO/PA strategy of negotiating with Israel while settlement expansion was proceeding unabated.³⁴ More generally, the term “normalization” was applied by critics to four activities being carried out during the post-Oslo years that contributed to creating an atmosphere of normalcy: the PA’s ongoing negotiations, which provided cover for Israel’s settlement building; the conclusion of commercial and diplomatic agreements with Israel by Arab regimes (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Morocco); cultural activities, including visits by Arab tourists and intellectuals to Israel (and the occupied territories); and finally, economic deals (e.g., business partnerships, joint ventures, industrial zones) forged between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The anti-normalization campaign was initiated by a number of cadres, from both Fatah and leftist parties, who saw the economic features of the Oslo accords, especially the Paris Protocol of 1994, as constituting a neocolonial enterprise. The campaign took the form of exposing joint business ventures, attacking Israeli-PA security coordination—especially when it involved the arrest and harassment of Israeli-wanted militants—and later boycotting Israeli goods; in fact, the beginnings of what came to be known as the BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) cannot be separated from the anti-normalization campaign. Anti-normalization was strongly supported by the Palestinian intelligentsia and political groups, both inside Palestine and in the Palestinian diaspora, where there was a sense of betrayal and conviction that the terms of Oslo had marginalized the refugee problem.³⁵

Although the objective of anti-normalization was to undermine coexistence with the occupying power and to intimidate potential collaborators

with colonial rule, the campaign regrettably was often extended to solidarity movements and joint Israeli-Palestinian resistance against occupation. It was also used to dissuade Arab intellectuals from visiting the occupied territories on the grounds that such visits “conferred legitimacy” on the Israeli-controlled border crossings at the Allenby Bridge, the Shaykh Husayn bridge, and (at the time) Rafah.³⁶ In the 2008-11 protests against the wall, however, Israeli and Palestinian activists successfully launched joint actions that attracted considerable public support. Jewish and Israeli activists similarly worked together in international efforts to break the naval blockade on the Gaza Strip, and in other international campaigns.

SPECTACULAR VIOLENCE AND NORMALCY

In writing about the reactions of Western intellectuals to terrorism, Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek made an insightful observation. He noted that Western publics have been so saturated by images of random and mindless violence in the media that they have become desensitized, muting their responses to *actual* violence in the third world.³⁷ He further noted that within the third world itself, spectacles of violence are seen by the local people as fireworks, extravaganzas, displays, and interruptions in what is for them “normal life”—the dreadful and persistent weight of grinding poverty and the hopelessness of daily existence.³⁸ This is a Fanonian frame of analysis applied on a global scale.

What is missing from Žižek’s observation, however, is recognition that the very people for whom spectacles of violence can be a distraction from the crushing reality of their lives can, at the same time, yearn for a life of mundane normalcy. Millions of people who are denied the security and predictability of a regularized existence have such longings to an intense degree. This desire could appear to be a contradiction, but it is not. For it is precisely among these people—those mesmerized by bombings almost certainly experienced as a catharsis for their own inner suffering—that we witness most clearly the radical oscillation between enraged rebellion and submission to the routinized institutional violence of colonial rule.

The Palestinians are one example, perhaps extreme, of such a condition. In this analysis, I have suggested ways in which the concept of normalcy and its derivatives, normality and normalization, simultaneously reflect and influence political behavior among Israelis and Palestinians.

For Israelis, normalcy in the first instance signified the desirable objectives of ending the diasporic Jewish condition of physical and intellectual exile and building a stratified “normal” existence in Palestine through “Hebrew labor.” Normalcy in the second instance expressed Labor Zionism’s struggle to create a European cultural hegemony in an effort to stave off the Levantization of the Jewish state by the permeation of Arab and Mizrahi culture. Finally, through the processes of conquest and colonization, normalcy came to mean insularity from the violence of the occupied.

To the Palestinians, the struggle to be normal often implied an anti-normalization stance. That is, living a normal life was seen as the sine qua non of resisting Israeli rule, hence the campaign against normalization with Israel, its institutions, and often its intellectuals, which was seen by its advocates as tantamount to legitimating the regime of inequity. The decisive moment in this conflicting discourse was the building of the separation wall by Israel. The conditions of creating normalcy for the Israeli public, through a regime of segregation and insularity, was predicated on making life abnormal for Palestinians through a system of separation, confinement, and control. In this process, the vocabulary of coexistence and of normalcy itself has been subverted and trivialized.

ENDNOTES

1. In his lexicon of common usage errors, Paul Brians wrote the following under his entry for "Normalcy": "The word 'normalcy' had been around for more than half a century when President Warren G. Harding was assailed in the newspapers for having used it in a 1921 speech. Some folks are still upset; but in the US 'normalcy' is a perfectly normal—if uncommon—synonym for 'normality.'" *Common Errors in English Usage*, 2d ed. (Sherwood, OR: William James and Company, 2008), p. 221.
2. Ernst Simon, "What Price Israel's 'Normalcy?'" *Commentary*, (April 1949), pp. 42–76.
3. Simon, "What Price Israel's 'Normalcy?'" p. 47.
4. Simon, "What Price Israel's 'Normalcy?'" p. 53.
5. Baruch Kimmerling, *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 203.
6. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 50.
7. Franklin Adler, "Israel's Mizrahim: 'Other' Victims of Zionism or a Bridge to Regional Reconciliation?" *Macalester International* 23, article 13 (2009); Yehouda Shenhav, *The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
8. Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 213.
9. See Anton Shammas, "West Jerusalem: Falafel, Cultural Cannibalism and the Poetics of Palestinian Space," *An-Nabar Cultural Supplement*, 23 August 1997.
10. Isabelle Humphries, "Coexistence and Mixed Cities: A Microcosm of Israeli Apartheid," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (January-February 2009), pp. 15, 37.
11. Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger, and Leonard Weinberg, "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 24, no. 4 (2003), pp. 405–23.
12. Sicarii, derives from Latin *sica*, "curved dagger." "The Enigma of Masada," *Doing Zionism*, accessed on 3 October 2012, <http://www.doingzionism.org/resources/view.asp?id=1029>. I am grateful to Geoff Schad for his insightful remarks on the Sicarii.
13. "Bar Giora," *Jewish Encyclopedia*, consulted on 2 June 2011, <http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=233&letter=B>.
14. Israel W. Charny, *Fighting Suicide Bombing: A Worldwide Campaign for Life* (London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 78.
15. Sergio Della Pergola, "Israel's Existential Predicament: Population, Territory, and Identity," *Current History* 109, no. 731 (December 2010), pp. 383–89.
16. Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 24–40.
17. Amal Jamal, *Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: Politics of*

Indigeneity (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 243.

18. Hassan Khader, "Qalaq fi al-Hawiyyah," *al-Karmil* 86 (Winter 2006), pp. 197–205.

19. Khader, "Qalaq fi al-Hawiyyah," p. 205.

20. Hassan Khader, "Shadat, Hal Kunta Huna?" *al-Karmil* 51 (Spring 1997), pp. 115–24. A shortened version of this essay was published by the *Journal of Palestine Studies*:

"Confessions of a Palestinian Returnee," *JPS* 27, no. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 85–95. See also testimonies by Muhammad 'Ali Taha, Murid Barghuti, Zakariyya Muhammad, Elias Sanbar, and Ghassan Zaqtan in the same issue of *al-Karmil*.

21. Rema Hammami, "On the Importance of Thugs: The Moral Economy of a Checkpoint," *Middle East Report* 231 (Summer 2004), pp. 26–34.

22. Sophie Richter-Devroe, "Palestinian Women's Everyday Resistance: Between Normality and Normalisation," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 12, no. 2 (special issue, 2010), pp. 43–44.

23. Shafiq al-Hout and Bilal al-Hasan, "The Future of the Exiled Palestinians in the Settlement Agreements," 21 October 1993, available at <http://www.prc.org.uk/Books/90-the-future-of-the-exiled-palestinians-in-the-settlement-agreements.html>.

24. Ari Shavit, "The War for a Moment's Peace," *Ha'Aretz*, 3 November 2002.

25. Shavit, "The War for a Moment's Peace."

26. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue see, Robert Brym and Bader Araj, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing Revisited: A Critique of the Outbidding Thesis," *Political Science Quarterly* 123, no. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 485–500.

27. Described by Eyal Weizman, in *Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation* (London: Verso Books, 2007).

28. Leila Farsakh, "Palestinian Labor Flows to the Israeli Economy: A Finished Story?" *JPS* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002), pp. 13–27.

29. On the Village Leagues, see Salim Tamari, "In League with Zion: Israel's Search for a Native Pillar," *JPS* 12, no. 4 (Summer 1983), pp. 41–56.

30. I owe this observation about the Israeli Civil Administration to Geoff Schad.

31. Jonathan Rynhold and Gerald Steinberg, "The Peace Process and the Israeli Elections," *Israel Affairs* 10, no. 4 (2004), pp. 181–204.

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