No. 1 OCTOBER—DECEMBER 1946

JOURNAL of the MIDDLE EAST SOCIETY

JERUSALEM

JOURNAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST SOCIETY

No. 1 OCTOBER—DECEMBER, 1946

CONTENTS

SUBSCRIPTIONS

	M.E. Countries	U.K.	U.S.A. & Canada
Annual Subscription	LP. 1.—	22/6d.	$ 4.50
Single Copies	285 mils	6/-	$ 1.25

The Journal is available to all members of the Society at a reduced price.

Published by The Middle East Society of Jerusalem
P. O. Box. 7050, Jerusalem.

Introduction

The Middle East Society of Jerusalem was founded in January 1946 to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas and opinions on the problems of the Middle East. One of the Society's objectives is to publish a periodical which will reflect the scope and range of the Society's interests. Publications dealing with these subjects are mostly edited in western countries by specialists who have no direct current link with the area they investigate. But proximity, like detachment, has its virtue; and it would be surprising if men and women, who were able to contemplate the Middle Eastern scene from its very centre, had nothing of merit to contribute to the general pool. This Journal, while welcoming those afar, is pre-eminently the expression of those close at hand. Orientalists, archeologists, antiquarians, sociologists and historians are living here amongst their own material which they can scrutinise without impediment of distance. They can attune the process of research to a sense of local urgencies, and are well placed for a comparative study of Middle Eastern conditions. The object of this Journal is to provide them with their opportunity.

This Journal will accept for publication all opinions while committing itself to none; and certainly no contributions which have merit as research will be excluded on any grounds of political predilection. Controversy is in the Middle Eastern air, but it is possible to rise above it into clearer realms of honest thought where men of diverse views can meet in harmony.

The geographical purview of this Journal is limited to the Arabic speaking countries, Turkey and Persia; but conditions and events on the fringes of this area must affect its life directly, so that no physical frontiers can be rigidly defined.

The Editors have devoted much anxious thought to the question whether the turbulence of our present state offers a congenial occasion for launching this project. They have considered that the difficulties of the times should be interpreted as a challenge, not as a deterrent. The habits of objective thought may assist the peoples of the Middle East to achieve a deeper harmony amongst themselves and a clearer sense of kinship with the wider world.

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY

Members of the Council for 1946

Chairman: *Major Aubrey S. Eban.*
Honorary Secretary: *Mr. N. N. Nimri.*
Honorary Treasurer: *Mr. Stanley Goldfoot.*
Members: *Mr. Robert Newton.*
Mr. J. A. Hilton.
Nageeb Bey Abu Shaar.
Dr. A. Bonné.

NOTE

THE MIDLLE EAST SOCIETY OF JERUSALEM is an unofficial, non-political body founded in January 1946.

The objects of the Society are:—

a. To promote research into specific problems of Middle Eastern life.
b. To study the political, economic, social and cultural affairs of Middle East countries.
c. To provide a forum for authoritative discussion of matters falling within the Society's scope of interest.
d. To exchange ideas, opinions and information with other Societies and Institutes elsewhere, which specialise in these interests and studies.

All trends of opinion and all categories of experience relevant to these purposes may be represented in the Society, which is committed to no specific line of policy.

It is intended to publish periodically the **Journal of the Middle East Society** in order to endow the public with a wider knowledge of the Middle East. Every communication published by the Society becomes the property of the Society in so far that the author may not, save with the permission of the Society's Council duly recorded, republish it until an interval of six months shall have elapsed after its publication by the Society.

Membership of the Society is as follows:—

	Entrance Fee	Annual Subscription
1. Founder Members (those who join the Society in 1946)	LP. 10.—	LP. 2.—
2. Life Members	50.—	nil
3. Ordinary Members	1.—	2.—
4. Student Members (from Colleges and Universities)	0.500	1.—
5. Associate Members (not residing in Jerusalem)	1.—	1.—
6. Honorary Members and Foreign Extraordinary Members (elected by the Society)	nil	nil

The Rules of the Society will be sent on request. Applications for Membership will be received at the Society's address: **P. O. Box 7050, Jerusalem.**

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH CONSULATE IN JERUSALEM*

W. HOUGH

AS far back as the year 1583 we have record of a Mr. Richard Forster, who was appointed Consul 'in the parts of Aleppo, Damasco, Amman, Tripolis, Jerusalem and all other parts whatsoever in the provinces of Syria, Palestine and Jurie.' It is hardly possible to regard this Elizabethan consul as being the first British Consul in Jerusalem, as, although Jerusalem fell within his jurisdiction, there is no record that he ever resided there. In the absence of positive evidence, we may take it that he almost certainly resided at Aleppo, where the Honourable Levant Company had one of their principal "factories". This is referred to by one of the witches in "Macbeth":—

'Her husband's to Aleppo gone,
The Master of the Tiger.'

The history of the British Consulate in Jerusalem, properly so called, lasted for 76 years, between the year 1838 and the 1st November, 1914, when war broke out with Turkey, the first incumbent of the post being Mr. W. T. Young, who held the post for seven years, and the last being myself.

From the start, and for many years afterwards, the functions of the Consulate were entirely political. I must say a few words on what used to be called the system of Capitulations, in order to make the work of consuls in those days understandable. When the Ottoman empire began to flourish and expand, the Turks found within their territories, foreign traders whom they were quite willing to tolerate, but whose disputes were quite unintelligible to them. It was therefore agreed, and confirmed in treaties, that matters affecting the status of foreign residents should be looked after by their Consuls. Afterwards, when the Turkish Empire began to crumble, and other powers became stronger in proportion, these arrangements were turned more and more to the advantage of the foreign powers. Under the capitulatory system in its later phases, the Turkish authorities had practically no jurisdiction whatsoever over foreign residents, and the simplest police measures concerning them could only be taken by permission of their Consuls. This situa-

* A Lecture delivered on June 26th, 1946, at a meeting of the Middle East Society of Jerusalem, under the Chairmanship of M. R. Neuville, the French Consul General in Jerusalem.

tion gave the word 'capitulation' a humiliating sense, which it did not have at the begining. The original sense of the word was simply the heading of a treaty.

Jurisdiction

I have been unable to refer to Foreign Office archives, but it is practically certain that the decision to create a British Consulate in Jerusalem was connected with the political situation in this part of the world in the 1830's. The story begins in Egypt. That country, which had been conquered by the Turks in 1517, had become, by the beginning of the 19th century, sufficiently independent to own no more than nominal suzerainty. The vassal state made a bold bid under the redoubtable Mohammad Ali to reverse the rôles of vassal and overlord. The armies of Egypt in rebellion against Turkey completely overran Palestine and Syria and penetrated deep into Asia Minor, threatening to reverse the conquest of 400 years previously. Great Britain took a strong line in this conflict on the side of Turkey, possibly because a strong Turkey was considered to be an essential to the balance of power against Russia, possibly swayed by the predominating French influence in Egypt. In these conditions it was decided to create a British Consulate in Jerusalem.

The British Consuls had jurisdiction over British subjects in all matters short of life and death. Questions involving capital punishment had to be referred to Malta. In addition to the jurisdiction over their own nationals, foreign consuls began to acquire what were known as "Protected Persons". These included natives of the country attached to them for official service, foreigners whose national status was doubtful and fell under their protection by agreement, and many others.

The system of protected persons spread until it became a nuisance. By a treaty concluded in the days of King Frances I, France became the protector of all Roman Catholics in the East. The treaty confined itself to mentioning spiritual protection, but between spiritual protection and material protection the line was often rather hard to draw. It is interesting to note that almost from the outset the British Consulate in Jerusalem was officially charged with the protection of Jews, irrespective of nationality. This was done at the suggestion of Lord Shaftesbury, the great philanthropist, who seems to have made the suggestion in a spirit of pure benevolence, and acted on by Lord Palmerston, who was then Foreign Secretary, with the latter's characteristic impetuosity in foreign affairs.

One can so well hear the great Palmerston saying 'What, Shaftesbury, you mean to tell me those poor devils have no-

body to look after them? I remember, we've just appointed a Consul in Jerusalem. I'll tell him to protect them... the shoulders of England are broad enough.'

Like all state decisions taken impetuously, it led to complications later on. It was, of course, impossible for the British Consul to protect Jews of foreign nationality who were recognised by their own Consuls, but even this was not such a simple matter as one might think. The Russian Government only granted passports to their Jewish subjects to travel abroad for a limited period, after which they were supposed to return to their country. Otherwise their nationality would lapse. One might have thought that from then on they were eligible to be protected by the British Consulate, but there were interminable arguments between the British and Russian Consuls as to whether their protection had entirely lapsed, or was merely dormant. Such discussions took pages and pages of state papers. As regards Jews who were Turkish subjects, it would have been too optimistic, even on the part of Lord Palmerston, to suppose that the Ottoman Empire would agree to a section of its own subjects being under the protection of a foreign power for all matters, although a gallant attempt was made to get the Sublime Porte to agree to this. The Ottoman Government did, however, go so far as to promise that it would attend to reports from the British Embassy on all attempts that might be made to oppress the Jews. This protection of the Jews by the British Consulate lasted in theory for a great many years, and does not seem to have been formally abolished until nearly the end of the 19th century, although after the retirement of Consul Finn in 1863, of whom we shall hear more later, it seems to have become more or less a dead letter.

Protection of Visitors

The protection of Jews was, naturally, not the only function of the British Consulate in its early days. The number of English visitors of distinction to the Holy Land was increasing and the Consul was responsible for making arrangements for their safety as well as the usual arrangements for their journey in the absence, in those days, of our well-known friends, Messrs. Thomas Cook & Son. Possibly the most distinguished visitor who was entertained by a British Consul in Jerusalem was the late King Edward VII, who visited the Holy Land as Prince of Wales in 1862. Another interesting visitor was Lynch, the American explorer. Arrangements for him were made by the British Consul, as there was no American Consulate at the time in Palestine. Captain Lynch was the first explorer to map the Dead Sea properly in the year 1848. He discovered its great

depth and handed to the British Consul some small crystals of salt, which they had fished up unmelted from the bottom. A picturesque detail about this expedition is that it was financed by American dollars, which arrived in chests of coins, the use of bank notes being, as yet, unknown locally. As recently as 1925, while I was in Aleppo, the beduins trading with Iraq across the desert would look at nothing but gold for their transactions.

If visitors wished to travel to the Dead Sea or other parts where the beduins ruled the roost, the Consul would make contact with the head of the tribe and get them safe conduct under Arab tribal law. There was also a growing current of feeling in England in favour of the establishment of an English church in Jerusalem, and the first appointment of an Anglican Bishop coincided very closely with the appointment of the first consul.

I have but little information about Mr. Young, who was first Vice Consul and afterwards Consul in Jerusalem between 1838 and 1845. It appears from official documents that he had spirited quarrels with the Anglican Bishop, which, one may say, was running true to form and setting a good key for the future history of the post. As the Anglican Bishopric and missionary work generally had a good deal to do with the work of the Consulate, a few words regarding its history may be interpolated here. It was founded in 1840 under a joint arrangement between Queen Victoria and the King of Prussia, whose reasons for making the proposal seem to have been a mixture of politics and religion. The understanding was that the Bishop should always be in Anglican Orders, and that he should be nominated alternately by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the King of Prussia. The Bishopric was jointly endowed by England and Prussia. This extraordinary looking arrangement lasted for 40 years, there being two British nominees and one Prussian nominee. The latter, by a trick of fate, occupied the see for 33 years out of the 40. He was the celebrated Bishop Gobat, so much of whose work still endures in Palestine. The Bishopric then fell into abeyance for seven years and then was reconstituted on the solid lines which have lasted to this day.

Mr. James Finn

Palestine reverted to the Ottoman Empire about 1840, and Mr. Young then came under the superintendence of the Consul-General in Beirut. Consul Young left Jerusalem in 1845, and was succeeded, early in 1846, by Mr. James Finn, who held office for more than 17 years. Mr. Finn was perhaps the most remarkable personality who ever held the post, and we shall have a lot to say about him. Mr. Albert M. Hyamson who wrote

a book on the British Consulate in Jerusalem in relation to the Jews of Palestine, has the following words to say about him:-

'An enthusiastic pro-Jew, who had studied and written on Jewish history, and was able to understand and speak Hebrew.*) He remained in Palestine for 17 years, in his zeal often exceeding his instructions, considering himself the official protector and, to some extent, the ruler of the Jewish population, to whose welfare he and his wife, who died as recently as 1921, consistently devoted themselves. Finn's services to the Jews of Palestine, falling short of the unattainable, did not protect him from complaints and charges on the part of his proteges, some of which were taken up with inadequate knowledge by Sir Moses Montefiore, the acknowledged head of Anglo-Jewry and the London Committee of Deputies, its representative body. These complaints, appearing and re-appearing over a period of years, were in the end a contributory cause of his departure from Palestine, although when this departure had been finally decided, the Jews of Jerusalem petitioned for his retention. The floridness of the style of this petition of the Ashkenazi rabbis of Jerusalem renders it unique in the archives of the Foreign Office.'

We are also indebted for a beautiful and lively picture of conditions at the time to the reminiscences of Mrs. Finn, who in 1913, at the age of 88, dictated to a stenographer her memoirs, going back almost as much as seventy years with a clearness of mind which is a marvel. Her long dead husband had, of course, by then assumed heroic proportions in her mind, but from her memoirs and the official papers, the true character of the man emerges clearly. Somewhat over-serious, at times a little ridiculous in his own self-importance, but a man of strong religious convictions, a fire-brand for righteousness, and in the pursuit of justice, indefatigable and fearless.

It is clear that the prestige of a British Consul in those early days was something which, in the present year of grace, is hardly conceivable. We are told that foreign Consuls were officially entitled to wear a white turban, to ride a horse, and to carry a bow and arrows. It is quite certain that they availed themselves of the second of these privileges, as the horse was the only available means of transport in those days.

I joined the Consular Service in 1904, and many years later met a colleague, who on his appointment to Mosul, reached his post at the end of a seventeen day ride on horse-back from Alexandretta. As for the turban and bow and arrow, one may assume that these were an antique form of words, corresponding to a grant by the Turks of a patent of gentility, giving the bearer the standing of an armiger, a gentleman entitled to bear coat armour. An incident which not only illustrates the prestige of

*) I may interpolate that both he and his wife later became equally brilliant Arabic scholars. — W. H.

Consuls, but Mr. Finn's personal prestige in particular, is that of a local governor of Hebron in the early fifties, who had started as a highway robber and conducted his governorship to match, who is reported to have said that he feared only one thing in life, and that was Mr. Finn's notebook.

First visitors to Dome of the Rock

It was in Consul Finn's time that the first foreigners were allowed to visit the Dome of the Rock. This first visit is so remarkable that I shall describe it at some length. My account is based on Mrs. Finn's reminiscences. In 1855, the Duke and Duchess of Brabant came to visit Jerusalem. (The Duke of Brabant afterwards reigned as King Leopold II of Belgium). There was no Belgian Consul in Palestine, but, the Duchess of Brabant being an Austrian, Their Royal-Highnesses were received by the Austrian Consul-General. The Sultan, being grateful to his Western Christian Allies for their help in the Crimean War, had granted to the Duke an Imperial Firman permitting him to enter the Haram al-Sharif. Their Royal-Highnesses' visit took place when the Pasha of Jerusalem was a young and liberal-minded man, namely Kiamil Pasha, afterwards three times Grand Vizier. The Royal visit to the Temple Area was fixed for the 7th April and the Duke expressed the hope that the Consuls of other nations would accompany them with a few friends. 'Never before', says Mrs. Finn, 'had so many pairs of yellow morocco Turkish slippers been bought, for all had to put their shoes off, and put on new slippers'. As we know, the guardians today will hire out a pair of overshoes for a moderate fee.

The Pasha was perfectly willing to obey the Sultan's order to permit the party of Christians to visit the Temple Sanctuary, but he was in a most difficult position because the hereditary guardians of the great enclosure were a tribe of Sudanese blacks, the Takroori, under a chief of their own. They are described as being powerful men, six feet or more in height, carrying clubs nearly as long as themselves, ready to kill anybody violating the sanctuary. A pilgrim of rank from India, a Moslem, was one day kneeling at his prayers when these men, who did not recognise his dress as Moslem, fell upon him and killed him. The question was what to do with these men on the occasion of the contemplated visit of the party of Christians. The Pasha chose the hour of 3 o'clock for the visit, when most of the Moslem worshippers had left. Before that, he directed all these black men to assemble at a certain house to hear a letter from the Sultan. When they assembled, he told them he had forgotten to bring the letter and must go and fetch it. He

then posted soldiers with fixed bayonets at the doors with orders to keep the Takrooris prisoners until the Royal visit was over. The party assembled at the Pasha's house adjoining the Temple Area and entered the sanctuary from the North-West corner. Immediately, the whole company were surrounded by a hollow square of infantry with fixed-bayonets and side-arms and were quickly marched to the steps leading to the North side of the great platform. While the company were rapt in contemplation there arose suddenly the howling of a derwish who had managed to get in. The troops surrounded him and got him safely out, but haste was necessary. The party were rushed through the rest of the area and the Mosque of El Aqsa, and got safely out. As they passed into the streets, the Moslems began to understand what had happened. There was some ill feeling but, for the most part, this unprecedented visit of foreigners was accepted as "kismeth".

Later on the temple guardians discovered that foreign visits were a lucrative source of income and visits became more frequent and easy. The enlightened policy of the present guardians of this great shrine is that its beauties shall be open to all with eyes to admire them, and the fee they pay for the privilege goes towards its maintenance and restoration.

The Finn Case

When the Crimean War broke out, the local population at a great distance from the capital did not know what was happening and rumours started that a Holy War was about to open. A panic arose in Jerusalem which Mr. Finn was able to quell by the threat that anybody who spoke of an impending massacre or offered to deposit his valuables at the Consulate for safe-keeping would be visited with imprisonment. He was thanked by the Foreign Office for his energetic action. At the same time, the wild tribes thought the time had come to take up arms not only on behalf of Islam, but to enjoy themselves after their manner by settling tribal disputes. Mr. Finn and his wife were then in Summer Camp at Talbieh where they had a good view over Jerusalem and the Dead Sea. The tribal war came distressingly close to their encampment whereupon Mr. Finn ran out of the enclosure and requested them firmly and politely to go and fight their war elsewhere, where they would not disturb the British Consul. The warriors complied.

I am bound to say that one gift not possessed by Mr. Finn was a sense of business. His purchase of Abraham's Vineyard and of the plot of land for his country camp at Talbieh in addition, no doubt, to his private benevolences, put his money affairs in such an inextricable tangle that a Judge of the

Supreme Court at Constantinople had to come to Jerusalem and sort them out. An arrangement was made, which was recorded by Mr. Finn, but, I believe, unfortunately was not transmitted by the Judge to the Foreign Office. There was also hopeless confusion over the title deeds of the properties. All this led to the famous Finn Case, probably one of the most voluminous files with which the Foreign Office has ever had to deal. I remember seeing about 1912 a precis of it made at the earnest request of the chiefs at the Foreign Office by some young clerk. The precis covered 104 pages of print.

Mr. Finn's successors seem to have been mainly distinguished by the length of their tenure of office. One may suppose from this fact alone that they were capable and patient officials. Mr. Noel Temple Moore was Consul from 1862-1890. He was a distinguished Oriental scholar. Mr. John Dickson carried on from 1890-1906, so that these three Consuls account for 61 years of the 76 for which the Consulate was in existence. Mr. Dickson died at his post in 1906. One of his daughters died recently in Jerusalem, and another is the wife of Archdeacon Maxwell.

The 20th Century

We have now reached the present century, and are within eight years of the outbreak of the war, which led to the final closing of the Jerusalem Consulate. During the period since its opening, vast changes had taken place, not only in the work of the Consulate, but in the whole life of Jerusalem. Important reforms had been effected in the Turkish system of Government. The old system of pashaliks still prevailed in the early years of the Consulate. The Pashas were rather like the ancient Persian Satraps. They were left in, as it were, vice-regal command of their districts and left to administer them without interference from the Sultan, so long as they sent money to the Treasury and created no incidents. This system was afterwards replaced by one based on Napoleon's internal administration of France, namely a number of departments under prefects who were plain civil servants and took orders from the Sublime Porte.

Public security had improved out of all recognition. In consequence of this, the Old City, outside which not a single house existed in the early days of the Consulate, was no longer favoured as a residential quarter and the great development of the city outside the walls began. The British Consulate, which was the first to be opened, was followed by the establishment of more and more Consulates of other powers until practically every country of importance was represented. Missionary enterprise on the part of all sects grew. Communications improved

— the railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem was opened in 1892. The number of pilgrims increased to such an extent that large buildings were put up for their accommodation by the various Churches.

The size and importance of institutions in the Holy Land acquired the character of national prestige and led to international competition. A notable example was the state visit of the German Emperor in the year 1898, among the results of which were the erection of the massive and not very beautiful German Hospice on Mount Scopus, and the knocking down of Jaffa Gate to let the Royal carriage into the Old City. Jaffa Gate has never been rebuilt, and remains the only open entry into the City. The German Emperor showed his gratitude to the Holy Land by the gift of a peculiarly hideous clock-tower, which used to stand near the open Jaffa Gate. It has since been removed.

Some Reminiscences

When I first came into contact with Jerusalem as a Consular post, I found it had acquired intense unpopularity. A certain Consul who had held the post some years before the war used to say that, after his transfer to another post, he had a distressing habit of waking up in the night with a scream and explaining to his alarmed wife that it was only a nightmare: he had dreamt he was back in Jerusalem. I think the reason for this was that consular work had grown more and more into the settling of disputes which, on the face of them, were ordinary questions of property and personal matters, but which turned out, on examination, to be firmly rooted in odium theologicum. In fact it might be argued, not too seriously, that the best chance for a Consul was to have a strong theological bias of his own, like Mr. Finn, which would give him solid ground to work on. Otherwise he would be at a loss in the presence of feelings he could not share. I do not know why, but the whole history of Jerusalem seems to show it as an extremely quarrelsome place. It was also, when I first knew it, largely inhabited by queer cranks. These were not all disagreeable.

The functions of the Consulate had, by this time lost much of their old political importance and had resolved themselves into the more normal routine of the protection of British subjects and British interests. Protection of Jews, as such, had not only long lapsed, but had been entirely forgotten. Capitulations, however, were still in existence, and we still had judicial and other rights over British subjects. We alone could register their births, marry them, and register their deaths. We could put them in jail or

give judgement against them in a law suit. Capitulations were not abolished until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924, and survived even after that in countries other than Turkey. One incident which comes back to me is that of an Indian subject who had been settled in the country for a long time, and who was brought to me by the police as a confirmed eater of hashish. It was not that alone the police objected to, but when he was in hashish mood he would grow quarrelsome and beat up his wife and neighbours. A rather hopeless case, I thought, but to please the police I would do at least something: I bound him over to keep the peace. My clerk translated into Arabic pompous words of binding over 'the peace of our sovereign lord, King George, his heirs and assigns' etc. and I noticed that, when I mentioned the king, he glanced up at a portrait of His Majesty which was on the wall behind my chair. After the ceremony was over, I did not anticipate that any good would come out of it, but I was rather surprised to hear a long time after that my Indian friend had sworn off hashish, and was telling his friends that he had promised King George he would not take any more.

I was appointed Vice-Consul at Jaffa at the beginning of 1912, the first and only career officer ever appointed to that city. Tel Aviv was then a small Jewish suburb of Jaffa, separated from it by a walk across the sand after the Manshieh Quarter had come to a straggling end. I suppose the reason Jaffa was made a career post was its increasing commercial importance. A combine of Liverpool ship-owners had recently found out that, as Jaffa orange had a thick skin, it could be rushed to England by fast cargo boats before it went rotten. Refrigerated space was then unknown. This was the beginning of the citrus boom, too sad a subject for me to dwell on.

Outbreak of War

The Consuls at Jerusalem no longer spent so many years at their post. After Mr. Dickson died in 1906, the next incumbent, Mr. Black, was transferred in 1909, the next, Mr. Sutow in 1912, and the next, Mr. McGregor, was still in titular charge of the post at the outbreak of the war, although he fell ill in the summer of 1914 and I was rushed out from leave at home to relieve him. In the months between August and November we all saw the war with Turkey coming, and I reported as early as September 1914 to my Ambassador at Constantinople that the Turks intended to attack the Suez Canal. The Ambassador hardly believed it but, nevertheless, quoted my report in one of his official communications to Government.

There were a good many British subjects in the town, some

of whom left, but the others decided they would wait until relations were broken off and leave when I did. This seems very foolish nowadays but in 1914 nobody had experience of war with an important nation and it never occurred to anybody that the civil population would be interned en masse. On the 30th October 1914, I had a code telegram informing me that diplomatic relations had been broken off with Turkey, and that I was to destroy all cyphers and confidential archives. The Consulate was then in Queen Melisande's Way, in the house now occupied by Mr. Marmura, the clergyman of the Arab Protestant Church. I remember having a huge bonfire in the garden after dark, which I fed with kerosene and poked with a long stick. A local policeman looked over the wall at me quite unconcernedly. The next morning, I called on the Turkish Governor with whom I had always been friendly and asked for a safe conduct to leave the country. This was granted with mutual expressions of regret that our two countries, which had always been friends, had fallen out. The only way of getting out of the country, in those days, was by steamer from Jaffa, and as there was none leaving on that day or the next, I postponed my rail journey to the coast. That same evening, the Turkish Governor's dragoman came to see me and informed me, with polite regrets, that the Governor had had instructions to withdraw my safe conduct. He added that he did not in the least know why these instructions had been given. I found out afterwards that Turkey would not agree to release Consuls until the British Government had released certain members of the Turkish Royal family, who were living in Malta. As I did not know this at the time, I, perhaps not unnaturally, fell into a considerable state of panic, and, after a rather poor night, fled early next morning to the American Consulate for sanctuary. I had been instructed to hand over British interests to the protection of my American colleague. The American Consulate was already then in the building it now occupies in Mamillah Road, but it was then thought to be at the other end of nowhere. It was said at the time that the Americans had transferred their Consulate to an ungettable at spot half way on the road to the Convent of the Cross. The parts of Jerusalem inhabited in those days by foreigners were in the neighbourhood of the Street of the Prophets and the American Colony. There was nothing south of Jaffa Gate and Princess Mary Avenue, and St. Julian's Way were still open country. Mamillah Road ran without a cross-road from Jaffa Gate to the Monument of the Cross, fading into a track on the spot where it now crosses King George Avenue. The American Consul, after communicating with the Governor, told me that there was no intention of molesting me

but that I was on parole not to leave town. I was allowed to go for short rides outside the city, if I would report to a sentry coming and going. I found this too uncomfortable, however, and did not take advantage of this permission.

Of course, all sorts of ridiculous rumours flew round during this time, and there was a good deal of uneasiness, but no panic. I spent this period as a volunteer worker in the American Consulate, and on one occasion, called on the Governor to ask if anything had been heard of Dr. Sterling of Gaza, for whose safety fears were entertained. The Governor looked rather blank at my behaving in this consular manner after war had broken out, but I explained blandly that I was now a member of the staff of the American Consulate, at which he smiled in a friendly way.

The question which had detained my release was finally settled and I was allowed to leave Jerusalem on the 16th November, 1914. I had passage on an Italian steamer as far as Port Said. The other British residents were detained for a time, but I believe that, in the end, practically all were allowed to leave. I cannot speak for certain about this as, by that time, I had joined the Army and was on the Peninsula of Gallipoli. British interests remained under the protection of the American Consulate until America also broke off relations with Turkey. They were then put into the hands of the Spanish Consul. Later, when our army under Allenby, to which I had the honour of belonging, occupied Palestine, the enemy consulates also absconded, and the Spanish Consul became consul for the entire planet, a very remarkable consular Pooh-Bah.

After the Mandate there was, of course, no question of appointing British Consuls, and British interests were looked after by the District Commissioners.

THE AUTHOR

Mr. W. HOUGH, a member of the Levant Consular Service from 1904 until 1937, was the last British Consul in Jerusalem before Turkey's declaration of war in 1914. When he left the Consular Service, Mr. Hough joined the British Commercial Diplomatic Service. Since 1944 he has been Deputy Controller of Light Industries, Government of Palestine.

A YEAR AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN PALESTINE*

The Hon. M.M.C. CHARTERIS

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is only my impending departure that gives me courage enough to stand here in front of you this evening. The title of my talk is in the nature of a cover plan. I use the term not in its usual sense, implying intent to deceive, because as you know, Intelligence Officers never try to do that, but in a less common sense: as an umbrella. Just as the function of an Intelligence Officer covers a multitude of sins so the title "A Year as an Intelligence Officer in Palestine" will, I hope, decently cover my remarks. If what I say is too much concerned with things military or has too much in it that is personal, it is because those are the only things about which I am qualified to speak. My knowledge of the Middle East and its affairs is much less than yours, and if I spoke about those things, I should be repeating other people's ideas, or telling you of matters with which you are already well acquainted, and that would be a waste of time. So I will speak of something which I know about, or should, at any rate, know about. I want to talk about the Army's attitude to Palestine, and its problem in so far as it affects the life of an Intelligence Officer in the country.

What, first of all, is an Intelligence Officer? And is he in any way a different variety of the species in Palestine than elsewhere? Well, my experience is that everything and everybody in Palestine is slightly different, and an Intelligence Officer is no exception to the rule. In certain aspects, the more boring ones, he is no different, he studies topography, climatic conditions, communications, statistics of population and so on for Palestine as for anywhere else in the world. But when it comes to the more exciting side, things are rather different. By the more exciting side, I mean that which deals with people. In war, it is a question of studying the enemy and trying to discover in advance what he is going to do, and to know all about his organisation, his strength, his morale and his dispositions. But here in Palestine there is no "enemy" except for the terrorists, and although they are very serious, they must not be overestimated. In so far as they are concerned, the job is quite

* Address delivered at a meeting of the Middle East Society of Jerusalem on September 23rd, 1946, under the Chairmanship of Lt. Col. P.L.O. Guy.

usual, one must try to decide what they are going to do next, but they are only the beginning. There are many people, Jews and Arabs and English, who, though they may sometimes be described as the "opposition", for the Army they are not an "enemy", and should by all means and by all accounts be friends. As I see it (and others would no doubt think differently), it is this that makes the difference. I consider that one of the main functions of an Intelligence Officer in Palestine at this moment is to interpret the people of this country and their feelings to the Army, and to a certain extent also to interpret the Army to the people. It is not always an easy task, but it is worth while, because understanding on both sides, if it was really there, could not fail to grease the wheels which do not always run smoothly.

As I say, it is not always an easy task, nor is it always a happy one. If it is sincerely attempted, it must lead to seeing other people's point of view. Of course, any Intelligence Officer has to do this if he is worth his pay. I remember once in the desert before the battle of Alamein had been fought and won, I was working at 13 Corps HQ — not as an Intelligence Officer, but as an ordinary and less aristocratic stooge — and each evening we used to have a conference at which the Intelligence Officer used to lay before us the fruits of that day's crystal gazing. One evening he was visibly perturbed, worried and unhappy, we waited, expecting an announcement of some impending thrust by the Afrika Corps. 'It is dreadful,' he said, Rommel has appointed Von Stoomf, (or whoever it was), to command the Ninetieth Light Division, it is a thoroughly bad appointment which he will live to regret'. My story is only partly apocryphal. Of course, in war it is all right because even an Intelligence Officer must be pleased when the enemy commander makes a blunder, and the destruction of the enemy he really hates is brought nearer by it. But here in Palestine it is not so. In Palestine it is often painful to see too clearly "the other person's point of view".

You may disagree with me in my analysis of the function of an Intelligence Officer in Palestine, but I believe it to be right, and it is about that particular aspect that I wish to speak.

Let us now imagine an Intelligence Officer arriving to take up his functions. He is probably straight from the Staff College, or from some other theatre like Germany or Italy, he may know a good deal about Palestine, or equally well he may know nothing except what he has read in the newspapers. I was lucky in having been here before, but that was only a subsidiary qualification. His experience is probably not very different to that of most "enquirers" who come here. In the first

few days he reads an enormous accumulation of books, reports, pamphlets, memoranda, statistics and opinions. After six days of work and one of rest, he wakes up on the morning of the eighth day with the solution to the problem crystal clear in his head; he knows all the answers; what is all the talk about? Why don't they get on the job and do the obvious thing? He may even, if he is very bold, contribute his own drop to the vast quagmire of assorted literature in the shape of reports or appreciations.

Then slowly comes flooding in "the dawn of ignorance". Gradually he begins to appreciate the great intricacies of the problem which he is expected to explain to the Army; he realises the interlaced layers of history which lie behind. He realises as well the world-wide repercussions of what goes on. That comes fairly quickly when he finds out that upwards of thirty high grade newspaper correspondents are waiting, if not like vultures around a dying animal, at least like hungry guests at a dinner table waiting for the soup to be served. He understands that what he puts on paper, however unimportant he may be himself, may have importance beyond the borders of Palestine. And there is the weight of prejudice which is depressing and the tangle of controversy, which is bewildering. He has the strange experience of hearing someone he respects calling something black, whilst someone else, whom he also respects, calls it white with equal conviction and sincerity. And there is the temptation to say and write what everybody wants to hear, or alternatively — if he is another type — an equal temptation to say what nobody wants to hear. It is extremely complicated. However, he probably acquires before long a decent humility, and a fair idea of the picture that he wants to put across to the soldiers.

So we see him like a keeper at the London Zoo, standing on a rock with a basket of fish to throw at the seals. Let us now consider the seals.

He speaks primarily to the officers, and through them to the men. I think the first thing to realise is that they are politically unconscious, not only about affairs in Palestine, but also in their own country. During the war, of course, all sorts came into the Army, and amongst them many who were well-read and experienced in affairs. But they are going, and I am speaking chiefly of the regular soldiers and the young intake who are arriving. The officers are probably even less politically aware than the men, though when they do become aware, their awareness has more meaning. The popular figure of the Machiavellian Englishman, spinning subtle schemes and thinking a long way ahead, is, as far as I know, complete nonsense.

He certainly does not exist in the Army. Sometimes I come across reports in which someone or other is reputed to have spoken about "the policy of the Army". It is usually a pretty subtle one, incidentally, and I always sit and wonder at the cleverness of it all, and wish I could have thought it out myself. The Army are not politicians: the fact that the Army is non-political certainly prevents them from appreciating the finer points of a political problem, but this is by no means a bad thing provided they receive clear and wise directives from the politicians. Political armies are dangerous things. England is fortunate in that she has been spared them. Nor is the Army a set of Imperialists; certainly not in the accepted sense of the word. I know when I was in England a short time ago, I was struck by the general desire among the people for England to evacuate Palestine; that desire exists among many people in the Army, and has force added to it by the fact that they want to go home. The approach of a great many soldiers to the Palestine Problem has as its background their release groups; it has also uncomfortable camps, lack of amenities, long hours spent on guard or on patrol, uncomfortable hours erecting barbed-wire and even more uncomfortable hours living behind it.

There is another way in which the approach to the problem is differently engendered than that of almost all others who live in Palestine. The soldier is a bird of passage. At the most, he is here for three years, probably much less. His profession is soldiering, not the Palestine Problem. Most people in Palestine are here for their lives, or at least for their working lives. The Zionists who live here and those who want to live here; the Arabs who live here; the Government Servants who will make their career here, and the other civilians, are all more or less professionals at the Palestine Problem. It is their life. But for the soldier, it is largely a "fatigue". It is additional to his life of training for war and, generally speaking, it is a great interference to it. There are, of course, many exceptions to this rule, many people in the Army study the problem because they are interested or because they feel that it is their duty to do so; but for the general run it is as I have said. For the non-regulars it is "waiting to go home"; for the regulars it is another job of Imperial policing which interferes unduly with the real job of soldiering. There is no real incentive to get to the bottom of the problem.

This is not very promising soil in which to plant the seed of a reasoned and balanced approach to the Palestine Problem.

How does the problem strike the average officer and man when they arrive? First of all I want to make one point clear.

I have often seen it written and heard it said that soldiers arriving in this country are carefully and systematically conditioned, as a definite policy, to be anti-Zionist before they arrive. This is not true. The odd officer who may have anti-Zionist views may possibly talk to his men; of that I know nothing, but of policy in this regard there is none. Soldiers who arrive in this country are conditioned mainly by what they have read in the newspapers. The serious terrorism, which has been blazoned across the front pages, of course has an effect, it is one of the great misfortunes that minorities make the most noise. But on the whole they arrive with open minds. Indeed before terrorist activity occupied so much space, most of them arrived pro-Zionist because they had seen the horrors of Europe. The very fact that they are unpolitically minded makes them fair, because they have few pre-conceived ideas and few prejudices. A really politically-minded Army would be a very different pair of ammunition boots.

I think when the soldier arrives and has had time to look around, he is enormously impressed by what he sees on all sides. Perhaps he arrives with a superiority complex; well, that gets a bit of a shock when he finds that most of the people who live in this country are "super-intelligent"; they make rings round him with their apologetics. He finds that when it comes to argument they have him tied up in a tangle of knots. This leads to bewilderment because although the arguments are all convincing, as like as not they are completely contrary. The same thing happens when he studies the press; this, of course, is brought to him through the digest of the press produced by the Public Information Office. He finds that the Army and the Government are always wrong. He finds that half the press says one thing and the other half says the opposite. He notices that the only point in which everyone is in agreement is in blaming him and his Government for their inefficiency, dishonesty and self-interest. So he says: "What the hell?" — He is irritated by the continual reiteration of the same theme — different facets of it of course — played by all. Please do not mistake my meaning. I am not criticising the Press for saying what they say, even if I do not agree with them. All I am trying to describe is the effect it has on the Army. There is every reason why a Zionist and an Arab Nationalist should keep on stating their case; for them it is life and death. But the soldier has not a true appreciation of this, at least to begin with, and he is irritated.

Of course, in the very nature of things, it is the terrorist activity which makes the greatest impression. You must remember that he is not in a position to evaluate it at its true worth.

As far as the soldier is concerned, it is inclined to fill the whole picture because he spends so much of his time on activity which is directly or indirectly connected with it, guarding against it, sweeping up the mess, or taking part in retaliatory action.

This retaliatory action increases friction on both sides. On the side of the Army as well as the civilians'. From a military point of view, one of the hardest things about terrorism is that the terrorists look much the same as everybody else. Perhaps we all rubbed shoulders with some in the street today, or sat next to one in the bus. They are hard to find, and so in retaliatory action, inevitably, many innocent people get pushed around, and their property is tampered with. This leads to hard things being said on all sides, and some of the things are not always true, just as some of the things are badly done or had been better left undone. Anyway, the result is friction, the soldier becomes irritated and angry with the civilians, and remember, it is not always easy for him to separate the terrorists from the others in his mind, and the civilian becomes even more irritated with the soldier, who, God knows, can be a nuisance! A wicked and vicious circle is started.

One of the main functions of an Intelligence Officer in this country at this moment is, I believe, to make sense for the soldiers out of the tangle of the Palestine Problem, so that they may see things in their true perspective. Sometimes it seems as if everyone and everything is working in the opposite direction.

I said that I thought that an Intelligence Officer in Palestine should also, as far as possible, interpret the Army to the people. Certainly if he can do so he is doing a valuable service. The trouble is , "How can he do it?" Well, his only way is through the medium of the Press. You must have heard it said that Intelligence Officers get all their information from the Press, that may or may not be so, but it is certainly true that they are dependent on the Press for explaining the Army, and what it is trying to do, to the world at large and Palestine in particular. I have discovered during the year I have been here that if the Press are allowed to see everything there is to be seen, the truth comes out. This is, I know, not in any way an epoch-making discovery, it is more in the nature of a platitude, none the less I have found it out for myself through experience. The trouble is that the Army are instinctively afraid of the Press, and this makes them brusque in their dealings with them. It may be as well to consider for a moment the reasons for this shyness. Soldiers are afraid of publicity and afraid of being quoted. For reasons of security and because in every service the cogs must be impersonal, the Army's dealings with the Press are hedged with difficult restrictions. It is partly because

the people on top want to "cover themselves", what we call putting up an umbrella. It is like the pre-war Army restrictions that had to be obeyed before anyone was allowed to let off his revolver in the open. It was like an elaborate ritual. By the time you had put up red flags, cleared the area for miles, filled in half a dozen forms, and stood yourself oblique to the target, you were in such a condition of jitters that you always missed the target and were lucky if you also missed your own foot. All that was done so that if there was an accident, the chap in charge could be decently court-martialled. It is the same with the Press; if there is a breach of security or too much publicity, the soldiers are afraid that they will take the can back. Then there is another point. Here, once again, please understand that I am not speaking in criticism, but merely telling what I know to be fact. The Army, or at least a fair proportion of it, are firmly convinced that the Press as a whole are hostile to them. They only read what is printed in this country, and they consider that a good deal written there is prejudiced. They may be wrong, but that they believe it is true, I know, because I have their reports and their comments on my desk daily. They ring me up and I am the one who takes the rap. I get the raspberry for what is considered an unfair report. I am a buffer state, because you see, being an Intelligence Officer, it is my duty to see both points of view.

If I can persuade the Army to allow the Press to see what they like, I find that in the end the Army comes out of it pretty well, and naturally so, because I firmly believe that not only is the British Army the finest in the world, but it is the only Army in the world that could do what it has to do in Palestine with so little loss of life, and so much humanity.

Of course things happen which are regrettable, and which are wrong, and in discussing these "incidents", there is, I believe, one factor which must be taken into consideration. I mean that instinct which exists in the makeup of many Gentiles, which goes by the name of anti-Semitism. I use the word instinct because I believe it is primarily psychological. Nobody likes it, or thinks it clever or right, if he is himself worthy of consideration. Anybody who thinks at all must realise that it is one of the abiding evils of the world, but equally well anybody who thinks at all must realise that it exists. If you agree with me that this spirit is there, in people's minds, you will also agree that it cannot be ignored. Every man has to deal with it somehow or other. He can master it, and indeed turn it into affection, or it can master him. During the year that I have been here, I have been continually afraid of this instinct, which I believe is the more dangerous

because, generally speaking, it is not realised. If it is understood and realised it is all right. I believe the psychologists say that we have to make friends with our evil instincts; we certainly have to realise them. They are dangerous particularly where they are unconscious and unrealised. The soldier, generally speaking, is not a deep thinker, and he is certainly not introspective; he does not analyse himself. Sometimes this vicious beast "anti-Semitism" gets the better of him.

Perhaps the remarkable thing about it all is how seldom it happens. If you have followed me so far, you will realise that the soldier here in Palestine, in the very nature of things, cannot appreciate and understand what it is all about. He cannot — unless the Intelligence Officer is supernaturally good at his job — really evaluate an incident like the blowing up of the King David Hotel, and view it in its true proportions. He wants to go home, to live a normal life with his wife and family instead of seeing them every other year; or he wants to go home and marry the girl who is beginning to wonder how much longer she can wait. He is full of unexpended energy and boundless youth. His life is made wretched by guards, fatigues, alarms and excursions. Some of his friends get killed, and, being as I say unthinking, he inevitably allocates the blame in his own mind on a broader basis than is really justified by the facts. It is not altogether surprising that sometimes things happen that everyone regrets. Remember too, that they are regretted as deeply by the vast majority of soldiers in this country as they are by anyone else. I have often been told, and I know it to be true, that the terrorists form but a small minority in this country. Well, the same is true about the Army. The rowdy element is a very small minority.

I am not trying to make excuses, though I may sound like it. I am trying to explain what I believe happens in the mind of the soldier in Palestine. To those who condemn the Army, I would say: "Try another". The other day an American Press correspondent was talking to me, and he said that whilst he thought the Army was sometimes a bit rough out of school, he was sure that any other Army, including the American, would be a very great deal worse. I believe that was right. The British soldier is one of the most tolerant creatures alive; I believe, further, that he is the only soldier in the world who is fit to carry out that delicate, intricate and uncomfortable operation of semi-war known in the text-books as "Internal Security Operations".

Well, there is the business, and in the middle of it sits the Intelligence Officer, trying to make everybody see everybody else's point of view. I am well aware that during the last year

it has been done all too inadequately. Indeed, it was not until I had been here for some time that I appreciated that this should be one of my main functions. It is not easy.

You may think from what I have said, that my life here has been a trial. It has been nothing of the sort. It has been full, interesting and vivid. One thing is certain about an Intelligence Officer in Palestine; he will never be bored. I suppose the last year in Palestine has been as full of interest as any year could be, and I count myself more than lucky to have been in the centre of it. I have made friends amongst Arabs, Jews and British, and that is worth a good deal. As always in life, one regrets the things one has not done, and not the things one has. I regret that I have not got to know more people, and that I have not seen many of the places of interest that there are in Palestine. It may act as an illustration to what I have said about the soldier's approach to Palestine that one of the things that has interested me most and given me the greatest pleasure has been shooting wildfowl on Lake Huleh. We are not, you see, a politically-minded people.

That is all I have to say. Whilst I am glad to be leaving, I am sorry to go. It seems to me that everyone in this country at this time who is in any way in a position of responsibility, should be very careful in what he does. The atmosphere is strained and difficult, and opportunities for misunderstanding are practically limitless; but so also are the opportunities for friendship. That friendship can only come through understanding of the problems and difficulties of others.

THE AUTHOR

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THE HON. M.M.C. CHARTERIS, O.B.E. was an instructor at the Middle East Staff College, Haifa. Before he returned to the United Kingdom in October 1946, he was Chief Intelligence Officer at Headquarters, British Troops, Palestine and Transjordan.

THE ORIENTAL STATE:
FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

A. BONNÉ

I.
THE CHANGE IN THE CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

THE contemporary Orient offers politicians and historians alike the dramatic spectacle of new-born modern national states. Communities or groups which only yesterday still had the character of clans and tribal associations are being transformed into Nation States of a modern type. Oriental despotisms, which only yesterday were still successfully resisting the drive of the new forces, are now crumbling. Though these changes constitute often scarcely more than an external dress and have only little affected the social and economic consciousness of their peoples, it would be wrong to belittle their potential significance. A development which covered a period of a thousand years in Europe is here compressed into a few decades, producing political potentialities which may transform the entire Oriental world.

It would be false, however, to regard the development from tribal association to state as an entirely new phenomenon. The growth of states in the Islamic Orient began in the early Middle Ages and subsequently reached a high level of development. From its very beginnings the Islamic Orient has evinced state-forming powers of considerable strength, and nothing would be more incorrect than to deny to these political patterns of the past all the criteria of a state form, even though the concept and character of the Islamic State cannot be identified with those of the West.

Meanwhile, however, disintegration has set in. Most of the Mediaeval states have perished or retained only vestiges of their erstwhile development prior to the World War of 1914—1918. Even the great Ottoman Empire was, apart from its brief period of efflorescence, a loose conglomeration of countries, the central state power of which rapidly degenerated, to recover again only temporarily.

A definite renaissance of the state idea in the Orient occured only at the beginning of the present century. It was borne on the wave of national feeling which passed through all

countries and found its sustenance in the Orient, no less than elsewhere, in the rich traditions of the past. Yet the great change for the entire Orient is not to be found merely in the resuscitation of an old historical tradition during the first decades of the Twentieth Century. This process did not exhaust itself in its attachment to historical forms and their revival, nor in the realisation of an urge towards renewed existence in independent states. Important changes have also been introduced and are at present effective in the dominant ideas, and in the entire internal structure of the Oriental States.

In order to understand this transformation it is first necessary briefly to compare the foundations of the modern European State with those of the Islamic Oriental State. Lord Acton, in his "History of Freedom" has aptly summarised the achievements of Western State development:—

> **'Looking back over the space of a thousand years, which we call the Middle Ages, to get an estimate of the work they had done, if not towards perfection in their institutions, at least towards attaining the knowledge of political truth, this is what we find: Representative government, which was unknown to the ancients, was almost universal. The methods of election were crude; but the principle that no tax was lawful that was not granted by the class that paid it — that is, that taxation was inseparable from representation — was recognised, not as the privilege of certain countries, but as the right of all..... Slavery was almost everywhere extinct; and absolute power was deemed more intolerable and more criminal than slavery..... Even the principles of the Habeas Corpus Act, and the method of the Income Tax, were already known. The issue of ancient politics was an absolute state planted on slavery. The political product of the Middle Ages was a system of states in which authority was restricted by the representation of powerful classes, by privileged associations, and by the acknowledgement of duties superior to those which are imposed by man.' ***

From these foundations, through a protracted and often embittered struggle, the modern democratic Constitutional State of the West emerged.

The basic functions of this type of State are as follows:—

(1) The guarantee of security for the citizen and his property;
(2) Creation of Legislation and Protection by the Law;
(3) Provision for, and promotion of, the cultural and material interests and common needs of the citizens (health, elementary education, communications, economic and social policy);
(4) External security for the existence of the State.

* In "History of Freedom and Other Essays" London 1919, p. 19.

Its most important means for achieving these objects are the introduction and maintenance of:—

(a) police and military forces;
(b) an independent judiciary;
(c) a civil service loyally attached to the State and, in particular, an honest financial administration;
(d) a currency system and monopoly of money issue.

There is general agreement regarding these minimum duties and functions of the State vis-à-vis its citizens, even though the limitation of the state rights and state powers in respect of the individual may find vastly differing interpretations according to various political philosophies. With all such deviations, however, one basic principle is regarded as decisive for the modern idea of the State: that of the sovereignty or supreme authority of the State over all inhabitants of its territory. Thus the modern State claims recognition of its authority and its legal and administrative order not only by the individual and all those finding themselves members of the "State Association" mainly by birth, but also to a very considerable degree in respect of all **actions** taking place in the region under its rule. Hence it does not merely expect a loyalty of person and of personal opinion, but it also aims to control any actions touching upon the community within the area under its rule. The Western State, which derives its claims from the concept of sovereignty and has won its position following the rupture of old universal extra-state ties, has abrogated the right of the groups within its area to realise their separate aims and demands; or has at least opposed and restricted those rights with decided success. At times this struggle aimed at the removal of even the most personal restrictions, which were set up, for example, by the religious creed. This "great process of expropriation of powers, introduced into and subordinated to the State, by the State itself" which, according to Jellinek, is the particular feature of our own times, characterises the structural process of all modern national states. The growing political dispossession of separate groups and dominating individual personalities, in brief the strengthening of the modern State, is accompanied by the development of the individual who accepts and affirms this new State; by the protection of the individual who consciously accepts the State demands and advances from the mere town dweller, ducal subject and feudal serf to citizen of the State. His legal position becomes ever more strictly defined, more firmly established on the basis of written and mutually secured rights. Finally, the constitutional and democratic State of the Nineteenth Century led to a general and equalitarian shaping of rights and duties, aiming at

the transformation of the citizens of the State into a homogeneous body.

At the same time, however, when this development approached its climax, another stratification evolved, in which the extent of property, the actual and potential possibilities for rising which constituted the new social and economic position, decisively influenced the relation between the individual and the State. As the stability of income and the chances of advance are steadily reduced, the relation of the masses to the democratic-capitalist state becomes steadily cooler, and a fresh evaluation of the rights offered by the democratic state commences.

The Oriental State Concept

In the genuinely Oriental State we stand on entirely different ground. Here a fundamentally different structural principle has controlled the life of the State up to the present. The principle of personality held sway instead of the national and frequently confesssional homogeneity of the population which the Western State showed, or had at least aimed at since the Counter-Reformation. The Oriental State respected the status which the individual had acquired through membership of a certain religious or national community, regardless of the frequently far-reaching political or social consequences deriving therefrom. As a result, there was maintained here until present times the remarkable form of plurality of constitution which, whether **de facto** or **de jure,** permitted various national realms and correspondingly varied systems to live a national life within the framework of the State Association. The personal status was stronger than the edict of the State. On the basis of the principle of personality there developed from early times in all Oriental territories separate groups of various national and religious allegiances, the so-called **Millets,** which conducted a life of their own separated from that of the dominant Islamic State people, who were later likewise constituted in the form of a Millet.

The principle of granting other population groups far-reaching powers of self-administration, derives from pre-Islamic times, and was already current in the Byzantine Empire. The Turks took it over out of apathy, greater convenience in administration and, to use the words of Luke, as 'a skilful application of the principle "divide et impere" '.

These reasons, however, are undoubtedly supplemented by the fact that the political and social concepts of the Orient held the segregation of communities within a territory on the basis of creed to be permissible or obvious, even if, as a result, the

population of that territory came to be separated into several sections divided from one another. Intervention in the internal affairs of these autonomous communities was contrary to the social ideas of Oriental society.

Here also can be found the roots of the development and expansion of the Capitulations, those special rights which were granted to the citizens of Western countries in a number of Oriental lands. The first of these agreements between the Turkish Empire and a Western power was the Capitulations of 1521, a Treaty between Suleiman the Magnificent and the Venetians, in which the privileges already granted to the latter by the Byzantines were confirmed and in some degree expanded. The Treaty with Venice was followed by further Capitulations Treaties with France, England, Spain and other countries. The outside Power's rights of jurisdiction over its subjects on the basis of the Capitulations were considerably expanded in the treaty with France, when the King of the latter country arrogated to himself a right of protection over all Roman Catholics of non-Turkish nationality.

Nothing can make the difference of approach clearer than a comparison of this practice with the principle of **cuius regio eius religio,** which was decisive for a long time in determining the State form in Europe after the Reformation. In Europe developments since then have led, despite enlightenment, liberalism and their reduction of the religious factor, to an increasing uniformity of the people of the State. In the Ottoman Empire, during the same period, there came about an increasing division of the areas of the State into autonomous units, i.e., population groups divided from one another.

If we sum up the marks of distinction of the Islamic Oriental State, we find the following in addition to the criterion of the personality principle which takes first place:—

(a) The close connection between religious and political community, which in early periods found expression in a complete identification of their mutual interests and spheres of influence and led to the development of a legal system common to both of them.

(b) The absence of a State conception and State theory in any modern sense. The Islamic State did not know the concept of the State as an independent political institution after the fashion which at that time had already been developed in Europe here and there. In Islam the State was not a community or an institution, but the sum of those governed (Umma), with the Imam as their leader.

(c) As a result of this, the Oriental State did not know of citizens in the modern sense. This concept is as alien to

Islam as is that of the State. * Similarly, there is no civic equality in regard to taxation. Regular sources of State income consisted at first only of the taxes paid by the protected non-Moslems, called **Dhimmi**, in the form of poll-tax **(Jizia)** and land tax **(Kharaj)**, while the Moslems paid whatever they did pay at first only as alms **(Zakat)**, placing it in the "Treasury of God" or handing it over directly to the needy; this **Zakat** subsequently developed into one of the main taxes collected from the Believers.

(d) For the period of the Ottoman Empire it was true, even more than for the period of the preceding Arab Empires, that, following the Turkish invasion of Europe, its dominion extended over predominantly non-Turkish areas and citizens. The Turkish sultans ruled over an exceedingly varied group of peoples of differing languages, races and religions.

(e) The development of the Islamic Orient soon led to the replacement of the original warrior and military community organised as an aristocracy, which had set its stamp on the earlier Islamic States, by the Oriental despotism native to Western Asia. The chief of the State was raised high above his subjects, was supplied with the aura of a divine ruler and was separated from ordinary mortals by a protective wall of ceremony and officialdom. At the same time the continued expropriation of the lower classes and the negation of their political rights was made possible by the unparalleled alliance between "church", state bureaucracy and large landed proprietors.

As contact between the Oriental world and the West grew closer, countries with this flaccid political structure could not withstand the superior power of the expansive European national States. The inner difficulties and contradictions which were increasingly called out by the maintenance of the theological foundations of State life and the "legitimate" intrusion and expansion of foreign — primarily economic — interests on the basis of the Capitulations, prepared the ground in the Ottoman Empire of the first half of the Nineteenth Century for a penetration of the new views of State and Society deriving from Europe. By the middle of the Nineteenth Century the traditional foundations of the Oriental State had collapsed, and a number of new and weighty principles for the reorganization of the State structure had already been proclaimed.

* The Arab language has no word of its own to express the notion of "State". The terms "Hukuma" or "Daula" mean "Government" primarily, even though the word "Daula" has more recently been used for "State".

Effect of the Changes on the Constitution

The changes in the Oriental State were bound to find their expression in the changes of the constitutional documents. First came the creation of requisite conditions. The feudal state field, so to speak, was cleared by the elimination of feudalism and the subjugation of local potentates, as well as by the extermination of the Janissaries, those convenient instruments of despotism who had become an unbearable power in the State. The introduction of the Constitution itself in the year 1876 was meant to remove despotism and to enable the participation of representatives of the people in the Government. The encroachment of modern legal thought, the law of nationality and the Article in the Constitution which proclaimed the equal rights and duties of all citizens, laid, theoretically at least, the foundations for the development of a Turkish nation in a modern state. It needed, however, another thirty years and revolution, to restore the Constitution and Parliament, which, after only two sessions, had been dismissed in 1878. The dividing walls which the Millet system had raised between the various communities and the State nation as such could certainly not be removed overnight; the antipathies, animosities and social differences which had been nourished for centuries on end, the ill-feeling which had developed as a result of political and economic privilege, could certainly not vanish at such short notice. Nevertheless a considerable step had been taken on the road to the homogeneous state inhabited by citizens possessed of equal rights. The relations between state and "church", which had become acute as a result of the reforms, also entered on a new stage. The old associations were still powerful, but the liberation of the political apparatus from its association with the spiritual powers had begun, and temporarily achieved tempestuous speed.

Unlike the constitutions of Western countries, the Oriental constitutional texts of that time were completely silent regarding the necessity of satisfying common requirements by means of the State. The development of such common requirements and their satisfaction imply conditions which were not yet present in the Orient at the turn of the century. In the nature of things the State can only satisfy common requirements which are mass requirements, that is, which imply a certain uniformity of demand. Requirements of this kind are: an educational system, public health measures, provision for old age, traffic facilities, etc. These demands had scarcely yet been realised by the population of Oriental countries at the time under discussion. There was no inducement in this direction. Whatever was left in the Orient in the way of common impulse

and expression of will deriving from the past had become petrified. As a result the people gained nothing but abstract rights to begin with.

The signs of the complex processes which mark the Oriental State in transformation became increasingly manifest in the administration of the State, the legal system, public affairs and finances during the decades before the First World War. It was an unfortunate coincidence that during this identical period the expanding Western Empires increased their activities within the region of the Near and Middle East. While the statesmen of the Ottoman Empire endeavoured to steer their country by means of reforms into a new era, the Great Powers discovered the potentialities of the huge territory for economic exploitation, and by means of the continued expansion of their political and economic interests in the Orient almost succeeded in undermining the foundations for an independent existence of the Ottoman Empire. A support of no small weight in these attempts was found among many of the non-Turkish elements of the population who, under cover of Capitulations and other privileges, succeeded in extorting for themselves and their national protectors remarkably far-reaching economic and political rights of exploitation.

The obstinacy with which these rights were claimed, and the inadequate driving force of the Young Turk movement in respect of social and economic reforms and measures, can be regarded as the cause of the collapse of this first attempt at national reorganisation.

It is a sign of the uncommon vitality of Turkey that, despite extreme pressure from without and grave injuries and defects from within, she was able to salvage from these decades of trial, filled as they were with continuous warfare, the prerequisite conditions for the establishment of an independent State during the post-war period.

II.

THE ORIENTAL STATE AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Consequences of the Liquidation of the Ottoman Empire

The First World War established a number of fundamental political facts which altered the State structure of the Orient from the very base. At the same time it would be false to regard this transformation as the effect of the war exclusively; indeed, the war may be regarded as merely the factor which started the avalanche. The peace treaties just set a seal on what had long been envisaged in more or less vague outlines by the

national movements and currents in this part of the world. Hence the significance of the war for the political fate of the Orient lies in the fact that it proved to be a kind of plunger which detonated the explosive force of the national idea within the Orient. The victorious powers, it is true, succeeded in utilising these forces likewise for the attainment of their own objectives.

The event that started the latest phase of transmutation of the Oriental state was the collapse of the group of powers to which the Ottoman Empire belonged. When the Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918, the framework which held together the centrifugal countries and peoples of the Empire was broken. The English, French and Russian Agreement of February 16, 1916, regarding the partition of Turkey, had drawn up the guiding lines for the reorganisation of the Ottoman area following the termination of hostilities, and had prepared the way for the establishment of potentially independent successor states. The first to crystallise was the establishment of a new Turkish Rump State which, with the exception of a small European area, was practically restricted to Anatolia proper. Mustapha Kemal's withdrawal to Ankara, which took place in December, 1919, symbolised the change. Its purpose was to shift the centre of gravity of the new State to the centre of the country, which was difficult of access, and away from Istambul, which had hitherto been the focus of European influence. The consolidation of this new State, from which the powerful young Turkish Republic was later to develop, took several years. It received its most effective impulse at the time when it was most gravely threatened, namely when the Great Powers, on the one hand, and the then ambitious Greece, on the other, believed that they could establish a foothold in Anatolia, but by doing so called out the forces of Turkey to a last victorious resistance.

The rise of a new Turkey in the old Homeland of the Turks constituted a bitter disappointment for Greece, which had regarded the realisation of her old dream for the establishment of a new Byzantine Empire as already fulfilled. Greece, supported by England, endeavoured to realise her plans by force of arms, but suffered decisive defeats in the famous battles of Inoenue and Sakaria. When the repeated attempts to reach peace with Greece proved unsuccessful, the Greeks were completely defeated on August 30, 1922, at Dumlupinar, and soon after, Ismir and Western Anatolia were liberated of all Greek troops. Then followed the conclusion of the Mudania Armistice on October 11, 1922, and, on July 24, 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, which latter provided the definite founda-

tions for the establishment of the new Turkish State.

The remaining countries of the one-time Ottoman Empire were transformed into a number of new, and for the time being dependent, countries which were placed under Mandatory régime. There were Syria and Lebanon, the Mandate for which was entrusted to France, and the territories of Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, which were placed under British Mandate. The result of this, if reduced to figures, was as follows: the former total area of 1,794,900 square kilometres, with a population of more than 20 millions, was divided into the following territorial units: Anatolia and European Turkey, 763,000 square kilometres; Iraq, 453,500; Syria, 202,500; Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 117,000.

Egypt's status as a vassal state of Turkey, which even before the war existed only on paper, came to a definite end. Cyprus, which was likewise bound to the Sublime Porte by the payment of tribute, became a British Crown Colony.

New Principles of State Development After World War I

The development of the Oriental State after the First World War was largely determined by the realisation of the following three principles:—

(a) The principle of nationality;
(b) The safeguarding of the interests of the victorious powers;
(c) The realisation of special commitments towards certain nationalities.

What did the establishment of the principle of nationality mean for State development in the Orient? To begin with, it replaced a large and comprehensive state-mosaic by a number of so-called successor states in which, partially at least, there lived a nationally homogeneous population. The division of a large area into smaller political units led, as everywhere else, to the establishment of new customs and administrative frontiers, within which autonomous cultural and economic interests grew up. It also led to the formation of new State centres which endeavoured to develop a maximum of independent State life in their own new territorial units.

Egypt constituted an entity of her own, and the path of her development differed from that of the afore-mentioned areas. In the degree of her dependence, Egypt occupied a kind of intermediate stage between the independent Turkish Republic and the Arab successor states which, by the criteria of international law, were then still considered incapable of enjoying sovereignty.

III.
THE NEW TURKISH REPUBLIC

The measures for the Westernisation of the Oriental State were until the First World War incapable of producing more than an external adaptation to the European model; even though this degree of adaptation in itself constituted a considerable advance compared with the preceding situation. The overwhelming majority of the population remained entirely alien to the new ideas. They were too strongly tied to their long-established political and religious forms and traditions to be able to constitute a nation in the modern sense of the word. It was here that the revolutionary ideology of the new Turkish leadership set in with a view to bringing about a change. There was the vertex and the administrative apparatus which needed to be transformed; over and above this, however, a population was required which was capable of understanding the objectives of the new State and was prepared to identify itself with them and become a willing partner in the foreign and interior policies of its country. The frequently extreme and tempestuous measures, aiming at the arousing of a new national feeling, a new Turkish state enthusiasm and a new Turkish culture, have to be understood in this sense. These objectives are clearly mirrored in the constitutional development of post-war Turkey. Prior to this, however, another undertaking was decided upon which, more than any other, served to create the necessary conditions for the establishment and growth of a national homogeneous State.

The Exchange of Population

The measure, which was of signal importance for the entire interior and exterior policy of the new Turkey, was the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. It was in scope the largest, albeit not the sole, case in which one of the complicated national problems of Oriental lands was solved by population transfer. The Graeco-Turkish exchange of population is the logical exploitation of the experience gained by the Ottoman Empire and the young New Turkey in connection with the existence of a large Greek minority within their boundaries. The success of these extraordinary measures was largely due to the fact that the idea of population transfer was made an essential component in the Peace Treaty between Greece and Turkey. The number of Greeks leaving Turkey during the initial period was 1,300,000; the number of Turks brought back to Turkey was 400,000. Even prior to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne proper, the exchange of populations

had been provided for as obligatory in a separate Convention, dated January 30, 1923. The elimination of the Greek population from the territories of the new State solved the grave problems involved in the presence of an influential and numerically strong national group, whose economic alertness and understanding were frequently far higher than those of the Turkish element.

Important Aspects of the New Constitution

The Great National Assembly of the New Turkish State rightly recognised that without a new Constitution its political work would lack its most important foundation. The constitutional Committee of the National Assembly therefore immediately began considering a draft Constitution, but owing to the influence of conservative elements could not come to any unanimous conclusion for a long time. Finally, on January 20, 1921, the Basic Articles of the Constitutional Law of "the Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey" were fixed and adopted. These Articles still show the efforts to take into account certain traditional and conservative currents. Thus Article 7 provides that in drawing up laws and ordinances the provisions... of religious and profane law, as well as custom and practice, shall be taken as groundwork. On the other hand, Articles 1-3 unequivocally state the prerogatives of the Great National Assembly and the sovereignty of the nation * :—

(1) **Sovereignty belongs without restrictions or conditions to the Nation. The system of government is based on the principle that the people personally and actually direct their fate.**

(2) **The executive power and the legislative power are unified and vested in the Great National Assembly, which is the sole and real representative of the Nation.**

(3) **The Turkish State is ruled by the Great National Assembly. Its Government bears the name, "Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey".**

Though it adopted these Articles, the National Assembly refrained from abrogating entirely the Ottoman Constitution, or from abolishing the Khalifate and Sultanate, the most important institutions of the past. None the less the procedure of the Assembly showed that it regarded itself as entitled to appear as a constituent body, an attitude which was all the more important as at that time the Sultan and his ministers, the actual

* The text of the Constitution and its amendments is included in the official history of the Turkish Republic published by the Turkish Society for Historical Research.

wielders of State power, were resident in Istanbul and were recognised by the outer world as the Turkish Government. A comparison of the above Articles 1-3 with the corresponding Articles of the earlier Constitution leaves no doubt as to the seriousness of the will to reform on the part of the new directors of the State.

The following period was characterised by a number of further changes, which completed the constitutional work of the National Assembly.

If we try to grasp the nature of the new Turkish State, on the basis of its constitutional documents and other reform acts, and with due consideration to the criteria given above as the characteristics of the Oriental State, we may summarise our findings as follows:—

(a) The new Turkish State has realised the principle of "territoriality". The population resident within the territory of the State is overwhelmingly Turkish, and regards itself as such by reason of origin, language and national spirit.

(b) The association of Religious Community and State has been completely dissolved. The Turkish Republic is based on a markedly secular foundation; religious life has been banished into the private sphere, and, by the accentuated negation of all religious tradition, has rapidly fallen to unimportance in scale and influence. The abolition of the Khalifate Institution as the religious apex of the Moslem Community which was based on personal union with the secular ruler, was a logical consequence of this policy of secularisation.

(c) The state idea and the meaning of the state for the development of modern Society has been pressed home vigorously on the Turkish population. Within a brief span of years the Turkish Government has created a nation, out of a governed multitude it has established state-minded citizens of an aspiring Republic.

(d) The Turkish Government rested satisfied with the restriction of its dominion to purely or overwhelmingly Turkish territory.

(e) The replacing of the Monarchy by the Republic simultaneously led to a remarkable shift in the general structure of power relations. True, the substitution of the monarchic apex by a State President provided with dictatorial powers has not done away with all the features of a despotic form of State. Yet the banishment of the Sultan and his Court and the rise of a new official class within the country has definitely deprived the previous ruling classes of their position. At the same time these changes have created the

prerequisite conditions for the establishment of a new Society upon which the burden of the youthful State shall primarily devolve.

(f) Lastly, the abolition of the Capitulations has put an end to the former dependency of the country in the economic and legal sphere.

There can be no doubt that the forces which were able to master the immense tasks of any such regeneration of the Turkish State could only have been called forth by the continuous state of tension resulting from the threat to Turkey's national existence after the First World War and during the war of independence. Seldom has a statesman recognised this state of affairs more clearly than Kemal Ataturk did in his speeches to the Turkish nation, in Parliament and on many other occasions, when he constantly advanced the education of the Turkish people to state thinking as a primary postulate. The clarity with which this objective is formulated in official accounts is impressive. Thus the "History of the Turkish Republic" issued by the Society for the Investigation of Turkish History states the following:—

'The basic principles of the objectives pursued by the Republic in instruction and education are:—

(a) The raising of nationalist, race-minded and revolutionary citizens of the Republic who are staunch supporters of the secular State.

(b) A genuine extension of elementary education to the entire population and the instruction of all citizens in reading and writing, to the last shepherd living alone in the mountains.

(c) General provision of the new generation at all stages of education with practical knowledge, in order to fit them primarily for successful activity in economic life.

(d) To replace the morality in social life which is based on fear and punishment in this or the next world by the true morality and virtue which is supported by the concepts "freedom" and "order".'

There is a remarkable difference between the spirit of this programme, in which a naive faith and a boundless will to reshape personality by means of education finds expression, and the fear and concern of the parents of the new Turkish leaders lest their sons studying abroad might have their religious feelings disturbed by the education they receive there. About a century ago, an Oriental despot had found it necessary to punish the wealthy inhabitants of Alexandria for having sent the children of other people, poverty stricken porters, to study in Paris in lieu of their own sons; today the large-scale appearance of Oriental youths at Western Universities demonstrates better than anything else the transformation of mentality within a few generations.

The far-reaching Turkish reforms are in no way underrated, when it is pointed out that even during the period of tempestuous progress between the two World Wars there has remained a broad gap between the programmes and intentions of the reformers and the actual results achieved. The tasks which the youthful Turkish State set itself were not without ambition, and its expectations rather high flown. In order to carry them out satisfactorily in view of the "difficult conditions of the modern world", to quote the words used in the Preamble of the League of Nations Statutes for the Turkish Successor Territories, a well-informed and educated class of collaborators and officials was necessary. The culture and training which these circles could acquire in so brief a period frequently remained superficial or was limited to the relatively easily appropriated skills in technical subjects and sciences. It will be necessary to wait and see whether the class summoned to lead the Turkish State in the future will develop the capacities required for the purpose. There are quite encouraging signs. Modern Turkey was carried to her political achievements largely by the national impetus which followed the war of liberation. Now the Second World War has set free new social forces, which are felt in all the backward areas of the Middle East. The new agrarian reform in Turkey in 1945 is significant as the first measure of this kind in Oriental regions. It shows that there exist in the young republic an understanding and elasticity towards the great social and economic issues of the present which may help her to face the difficult times ahead.

THE AUTHOR

Dr. A. BONNÉ is Head of the Economic Research Institute and Lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He is author of "The Economic Development of the Middle East", "State and Economics in the Middle East", "Palestine, The Country and its Economy", etc.

SOME NON-LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SULTAN ABDUL-HAMID LAND CASE

NORMAN BENTWICH

THE decision of the Palestine Land Court, given in January 1946, dismissing the claim of the heirs of Sultan Abdul Hamid to the lands of a village in the Gaza sub-district, marks another stage of the long-drawn litigation which has already been protracted over 20 years, since the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified. This was a test action brought in the Courts of Palestine about a relatively small area; but the claim implicitly involves vast stretches of State lands in the whole length of the Jordan Valley, from the Huleh marshes to Jericho and the Dead Sea. All of these lands had been registered once in the name of Sultan Abdul Hamid, known to our fathers as the "Unspeakable Turk"; and much larger areas were so registered in Syria, Iraq, and other parts of the former Ottoman Empire.

The Palestine action itself has already had a long and chequered history. It was initiated in 1934 before the same Court as has just given judgement. It was then tried by a Court of two judges, one British and one Arab, who gave diametrically opposite judgements: the British judge found for the Plaintiff, who was one of the heirs of the Sultan, and the Arab judge for the Government. A long argument followed whether, in accordance with the rules of procedure, the two should call in a third judge and re-hear the suit. They decided that they were not bound to do so; and that as the onus of proof had been put on the defendant Government, and that Government had not satisfied both of them, they should give judgement for the Claimant.

On that point of procedure the Supreme Court of Palestine, to which the appeal was taken, without going into the merits of the claim, held that the judgement of the Land Court was wrong and ordered a re-trial. A further appeal on the point of procedure was taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, and was heard there during the war in 1941.

The Privy Council dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the order of the Supreme Court directing a fresh trial before the Land Tribunal. An appeal by the Plaintiff from the judgement of the Land Tribunal was then lodged with the Higher Court in

Palestine and dismissed. The ultimate resort has been made again to the Privy Council, which this time will be asked to pronounce on the merits.

Before the test case about the land in Palestine was lodged, the Claimants had pursued their suits about the former Imperial Estates in Syria, in Iraq and in what was then Italian Tripolitania before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, Anglo-Turkish, Franco-Turkish and Italo-Turkish, which were set up under the Treaty of Lausanne in Constantinople. All those suits were rejected by the Tribunals on the grounds of no jurisdiction.

While the case is pending before the appellate court, it would be improper to go into the specific legal pleas which are raised and dealt with in the judgements of the Land Court. There are however, certain political, economic and social issues, that can be examined without touching on the legal points.

History

Sultan Abdul Hamid ruled as an absolute despot over the Ottoman Empire from 1877 till the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. It was during that time that he acquired vast areas of land amounting altogether to some 10 million acres, which were registered in the Land Books in his name. When he came to the throne in 1876, succeeding his brother, Murad V, who had been deposed, he introduced indeed a constitution devised by the liberal reformer, the Vizier Midhat.

The constitution, which set up a parliamentary government and cabinet, and purported to assure the rights of man, was proclaimed by a decree or Iradeh, of the Sultan in December, 1876. A few weeks later, however, Midhat was dismissed from office. At that time, the Eastern Question again loomed large in Europe and the Great Powers were in conference with the Turks in Constantinople. Russia, then as now, seeking expansion to the Mediterranean, declared war on Turkey. The new Ottoman Parliament was dismissed and, when the war ended, was abolished. The Powers at the Congress of Berlin required the Sultan to assure equal civil rights to his Christian subjects, but they did not require the restoration of a constitutional regime. In fact, no parliament was summoned again till 1908; the Sultan's ministers became Imperial secretaries; and the Sultan concentrated the whole administration in his own hands. He tried to form a Pan-Islamic policy against Europe, and to finance it from his own revenues.

After thirty years, discontent against the despotism and the financial chaos came to a head. A Committee of Union and Progress was formed by the Young Turks at Salonica in 1907; and from that centre a peaceful revolution spread in the following

year to the capital. Abdul Hamid undertook to restore the constitution. He issued Royal Decrees (Iradehs) abolishing the censorship and the spying system, and in December 1908 convened the Parliament. Before Parliament met, he had issued another decree, transferring to the State properties in all parts of the Empire which had been administered by the Private Treasury (Khazeene Khassa).

The Sultan had established the Private Treasury (often referred to as the Civil List) as a ministry directly under his control, for the purpose of administration of his estates. The revenue of the properties was used for the maintenance of his court. It was simple enough for the absolute ruler to acquire both land and personal property. A great part of the cultivable land was not then registered in the name of any private owner, but was of the class of "miri", that is land held by the State which could be alloted to any person who would cultivate it. At that time no exact distinction was made between the properties of the State and the properties of the Sultan, nor was there any exact distinction at that time between the expenses of the State and the expenses of the Sultan. From the Private Treasury were paid the salaries of a vast number of officials of all kinds, and although the annual income from the lands transferred by Abdul Hamid in 1908 was estimated at over £400,000, that revenue was inadequate to meet the liabilities. As it is said by an Austrian, Charles Morawitz, who wrote a book on the Turkish Finances in 1903, and who was in general favourable to the Sultan's government: '...The Turks had never known how to make an exact distinction between the expenses of the Sultan and those of the State which the Sultan embodied in his person.....: The Civil List is the most important of the obligations of the Treasury. It stands at the head of all its tasks. For the rest, the Minister need not be in a hurry.' In fact, the Sultan had borrowed large sums, and still constantly incurred fresh debts. The transfer to the State in 1908 of the Imperial Estates purported to be made in connection with a fresh loan.

The Sultan was relatively a fair landlord, as compared with the other owners of the latifundia, who had little or no regard for the well-being of the tenants. He was not concerned to extort money from the fellaheen, and using the resources of the State, he could carry out public improvements to increase the value of his properties. For a long time then, no popular opposition was made to his rapacities in land. But when he turned to dispossess private owners in order to add their lands to his Imperial domain, and to substitute fresh tenants to take the place of the old possessors,

feeling grew. Another public grievance was caused by the Sultan's taking to his Private Treasury the tithes and taxes as well as the rent from the land.

In his book on the Ottoman Empire, Dr. Mandelstam, who was formerly dragoman of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, and watched these events, quotes a statement of Charles Laurent, the financial adviser of the Ottoman Government in 1909: 'The debts were continuously increasing, by repeated loans; there was no budget, the receipts were uncertain, no limit was placed on the expenditure and in all the services there was arbitrary action.'

The Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, as soon as it was convened in December 1908, discussed means of cleaning up the financial chaos. In March, 1909, however, a counter-revolution was started by Sultan Abdul Hamid or his friends in Constantinople. But then the army under Mahmud Shevket moved from Salonica on Constantinople; the National Assembly met at San Stefano and, having received a Fatwa from the Mufti which denounced the misdeeds of the Sultan, proclaimed the deposition of Abdul Hamid, and named his brother, Mohammad Rashad, as Sultan in his stead.

Transfer of Estates

It was one of the first acts of the violent, as of the peaceful, revolution to transfer the properties of the Civil List, which were still registered in the name of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, to the State. That act was carried out by an Iradeh of the new Sultan in May 1909. An Iradeh was simply an expression of the will of the Sultan. All the affairs of state during the period of despotism were carried out through Iradeh. The expression might be verbal, but it was the practice to record any important matter in a written rescript, which was sent by the Private Secretary of the Sultan to the Grand Vizier or to the Ministry concerned. Laws affecting the whole population as well as small administrative affairs were equally prescribed by Iradeh.

In the case brought before the Palestinian Courts, the Claimants have urged that the Iradehs transferring Sultan Abdul Hamid's properties were not legally proved according to the Rules of Evidence, and moreover, that they were not constitutionally valid.

It was, however, urged by the Government of Palestine, and accepted that the Ottoman Government applied to the State Treasury the revenues from Sultan Abdul Hamid's properties which were the subject of the two Iradehs. From 1909 onwards a regular budget was published in the Official Gazette and enacted, and these budgets for the years till the outbreak of

the first World War, included items of revenue derived from the late Sultan's immovable properties and from certain movable properties that were transferred. The Ottoman Parliament further enacted a law in 1909, transferring to the State the responsibility for the debts of the Civil List, which were previously charged on the revenues of these properties. The transfer of the Sultan's estates was part of the constitutional revolution which the Young Turks carried through.

Effects of War

Turkey was involved in almost continuous warfare from 1911 till the end of the European war in 1918: first with Italy about the province of Tripoli, then with the united Balkan states, and then, after a few months' hesitation, with Great Britain and her Allies. In those wars she lost the greater part of her Empire: Tripoli and Egypt in Africa, Macedonia and almost all her remaining territory in Europe, the Dodecanese Islands, and finally all the Arab territories in Asia. Estates of the former Sultan were scattered in all these ceded territories, and the treaties of peace which were made at the end of the wars provided for their disposal. In the treaties with the Balkan states it is stipulated that private property of the Sultan and of the members of the Imperial dynasty shall be upheld and respected. But private properties of the Ottoman State situated in the ceded territories passed to the successor governments. Any question between the Ottoman State and the successor state should be submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal at The Hague. In the Treaty of Athens between Turkey and Greece, express mention is made of a dispute relating to the property and possessions which passed from the Civil List to the Ottoman State. In the Treaty of Lausanne, which was made in 1923 between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and which replaced the abortive Treaty of Sèvres drawn up in 1920, more specific provision was made about the properties of the Civil List ceded to the State. The disposition of these properties was one of the moot points between the Allied and the Turkish delegates. Not unnaturally, the Turkish Government was anxious to restrict as much as possible the landed property which should pass as State domain to the victorious successor states. Its representatives then claimed that the estates of the former Sultan were private property of the Crown, and should not be ceded gratuitously. During the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz, who was not much more than a puppet sovereign after the Allied occupation of Constantinople, a decree was passed which purported to restore the former properties of the Civil List from the State to the service of the Crown. That decree, however, was impugned

as unconstitutional, and the Allied delegates at Lausanne stuck to their claim to all the properties that were dealt with in the two Iradehs of 1908 and 1909. Express mention was made of the Iradehs in the Article of the Treaty of Lausanne, which dealt with the cession of state domain. Words however were inserted about the successor states being "subrogated" to the rights of the Ottoman Empire, and also about the maintenance of Waqf rights in the ceded properties. That mention is another of the points which has been and will be the subject of forensic debate.

That the Turks themselves had no regard for any claims of the Sultan's heirs was manifest as soon as the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified. They then passed a law transferring to the State all the Sultanic properties whatsoever.

Palestine Estates

The Government of Palestine knew of no claim of the Sultan's heirs until the actions were lodged before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. Following the military occupation, they had treated the mudawrara, that is, the transferred estates of the Jordan Valley, the Huleh plain and elsewhere as state domain. It was that domain which, the Palestine Mandate particularly directed, should be made available for close settlement of the Jews. But the property was encumbered by claims established before the British occupation. The Huleh marshes had been granted under the Concession to a Syrian Company; and in the Jordan Valley the former Sultan's and the former State's tenants had equitable claims for consideration. The Palestine Government in the end, confirmed the validity of the Huleh Concession. But a Jewish enterprise obtained the assignment of the Concession from the Syrian owners, and a large scheme of reclamation of the marshes, draining of the Lake and irrigation of the area of some 100,000 dunams awaits execution. As regards the land in the Jordan Valley leased to the cultivators, the Government of Palestine in 1921 agreed to recognise the claims of the tenants and squatters to become owners of their holdings on terms of easy purchase. When that measure was carried out, the areas left for Jewish settlement were disappointingly small. At the same time experience of the last 20 years has proved that the areas which the Arab cultivators acquired were in many cases larger than they could put to profitable use, and the new owners have disposed of considerable portions — at great profit — to the Jewish National Fund and other Jewish bodies.

What is striking about the claim before the Courts, is the attempt to upset transactions which appeared to be consecrated

by the continuous action of the Ottoman State, and then by international treaty. The claim of the heirs seeks to impugn acts of a rebellion on the ground that those acts were not carried out in accordance with the Ottoman constitution. Revolutionary acts do not normally have a constitutional character, and significantly no attempt was made to challenge the acts in the Courts of the Ottoman Empire. But the English Rule of Law is a tempting bait to persons who had grievances derived from another regime.

What was submitted to by Turks in a Turkish state is challenged by Turks and the backers of Turks in a British Mandated territory. The Courts of Palestine are asked to apply English rules of justice and English rules of evidence to actions which were carried out 35 years ago under different circumstances and under altogether different conceptions of law. The present suit, when it reaches the final instance in the Privy Council, may, it is hoped be the end of the litigation. For the Latin maxim holds: It is in the interest of the State that there should be a term to suits.

THE AUTHOR

PROFESSOR NORMAN BENTWICH, M.C., O.B.E., HON. LL.D., was formerly Attorney General of Palestine and appeared as legal expert for the Government of Palestine in the land case of Sultan Abdul Hamid's heirs. He is Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and one of the founders of the Middle East Society. He has written many books and monographies on International Relations and Law, and on Palestine and Jewish subjects. His latest books are: "From Geneva to San Francisco" and "Wanderer in War".


DJEBEL DRUZE and ENVIRONS
Scale 1:1.000.000
0 10 20 30 40 Kms.
Saida
Joun
Jezzine
Damascus
Rashaya
Hermon
Catana
Nahr Litani
Marj Uyun
LEBANON
Metulla
Banias
SYRIA
Syrian Desert
Quneitra
HOURAN
Leja
DJEBEL DRUZE
Safa
Krao
Safad
Ezraa
Ahire
Shahba
Bostra el Hariri
Sheikh Meskine
Mazraa
Tiberias
Fiq
Qanawat
Soueida
Nazareth
Yarmouk
Tell Ginne (1800m)
Ressas
Aare
Kafer
Shaaf
Deraa
Afula
Kharaba
Mjemer
Qreia
Mellah
Irbid
pipe line
Bosra eske Sham
Salkhad
Bekka
PALESTINE
Jenin
Aanz
Imtane
Dibbine
Ghariye
TRANS-JORDAN

THE WARRIOR PEOPLE OF DJEBEL DRUZE

A MILITANT MINORITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

N. N. NIMRI

PART ONE

ORIGIN AND HISTORY

A strange thrill overcomes one on approaching the two pyramid-shaped concrete pillars on either side of the first-class tarmac road that connects Soueida, the capital of the autonomous Druze province, with the main Damascus-Deraa road. It is one of the most ancient highways in human history, which witnessed the rise and decline of Eastern and Western civilisations throughout the millenia of human progress. In large, black-painted letters on both pillars, the bold inscription "Djebel Druze" indicates that the mountain looming ahead some 20 miles to the east is the legendary Mountain of the Druzes (*). The border lies between Houran, the fertile plain inhabited by the servile Houranis, and the barren mountain-fastness of the fierce, proud and fearless Druzes.

In an area of about 6800 sq. kms., bordered by Transjordan in the south, the Syrian desert in the east and north, and by the province of Houran in the west, live over 65,000 Druzes in their three towns and 114 villages (**). They enjoy semi-independence and autonomy, and are feared and respected by all their neighbours, friends and foes alike.

In their midst resides the legendary Sultan Pasha al Atrash, hero of the anti-French revolt in 1925, whose military exploits won him ever-lasting fame in Syria, and whose victories gave him a prestige similar to that acquired by Abdel Kerim in Morocco after the defeat of the Spaniards. Another Druze character who became famous was the ambitious, voluptuous but charming Princess Amal al Atrash, who, under her screen-name Asmahan, became known to the cinema-going Arab world as an actress and cantatrice. Her charms ensnared the princes

(*) These two frontier-pillars were removed in 1945.

(**) There are 3 additional villages in the Djebel Druze territory, inhabited by Christians exclusively. The total settled population amounts to about 75,000 souls. There are also about 20,000 semi-nomad Beduins, who migrate between Syria and Transjordan.

of Arabia, and proved the undoing of many a British and French officer in the early forties. She was killed in a mysterious car accident in July 1944.

The people who produced these characters are a separate ethnic, national and religious group, whose strong feudal organisation, bound together under a singular form of theocracy, has remained unchanged — a historical anomaly — throughout the last nine centuries. The Druze religion, which had its roots in Moslem soil and incorporated a number of Judeo-Christian and Zoroastrian ideas as well as Hellenistic philosophies and Buddhistic mysticism, constitutes a striking phenomenon in world history.

Most of the sects, schools and systems which fed the Druze religion have disappeared, but Druzism and its adherents remain a living and virile force, attracting the World's attention from time to time through their intransigent and aggressive attitude to whoever happens to be the suzerain power over their territory. This trait caused the question to be asked on the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations "whether there was anything in the Druze teachings that was inimical to organised government and to state authority".

The origin of the Druzes and their religion is a matter of speculation, partly due to the lack of historical data and partly due to the secrecy with which the Druzes guard their religion. As one probes into the origin of the Druzes and their secret religion one enters a web of conflicting opinions and theses. Similarly varied are the interpretations of their religious practices and beliefs. When carefully knitting together, however, the available historical fragments, and observing closely recent Druze history, one arrives at certain conclusions which help create a coherent picture. But the fullest understanding of their character can only be acquired after a continuous stay amongst them, when one has had the opportunity of entering into their inner councils and winning their confidence. This, however is a privilege seldom afforded a stranger.

The Progenitors of Druzism

In Egypt, towards the end of the tenth century, a feltmaker of Persian origin called Hamza began preaching a heresy that was meant to be within the Dar-el-Islam, but which contained important irreconcilable elements. These elements finally prevailed and caused the complete severance of the new religion from the body of Islam. The Fatimid Khalif, ruling in Cairo at the time, was Hakim-bi-Amr-Allah ("Ruler-by-God's Order", 996-1020 A.D.), an extraordinary character who has been

reviled by Moslem historians as a cruel heretic. A mediaeval Nero, a tyrant with an unbalanced mind, he started his career as a fierce Shi'ite ruling a Sunni Egypt. After nearly losing his throne in a revolution which derived its impetus from religious feeling, he became a full Sunni. Whichever sect he favoured, he manifested a tender and passionate consideration for the welfare of the people, which had nothing to do with his typically cruel and despotic oriental methods in the conduct of public affairs and dealings with officials.

Hamza's message reached Hakim chiefly through al-Darazi, who gave his name to the new religion, and is by many considered the real founder of this cult, although he was later cursed by Hamza and referred to as "the insolent one, the Satan". Secret practices between al-Darazi and Hakim resulted in the proclamation of the divinity of Hakim and the belief that Universal Reason, a philosophical conception, had become incarnate in Hakim, who was portrayed as the final and most perfect manifestation of God's incarnation.

Druze Tenets and Doctrines

Hamza, on behalf of Hakim, absolved his followers from the obligations of Islam and nullified the Five Pillars of Islam (including fasting, pilgrimage and almsgiving). He offered instead Four Articles of Faith related to the Knowledge of God, Hamza, the Ministers and the Seven Moral Precepts. The number "7" is a sacred number showing Kabbalistic influence of Pythagorean origin. Thus the belief in seven heavens, seven seas, etc. The recognised seven major prophets are: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammad and Mohammad ibn Ismail.

The seven precepts of Hamza were:

1. The love of truth in speech. (This precept was only to function among the believers; it is circumscribed by the law of dissimulation, which for self-preservation and personal security becomes the duty of every Druze. Thus one finds in predominantly non-Druze areas Druzes dissimulatingly professing Christianity and even Islam, although the latter is by far the most hated religion to the Druzes. Dissimulation also causes some Druzes to call themselves Arabs.)

2. Protection and mutual aid to brethren of faith. (This is the most important precept and is responsible to a very large extent for the survival and preservation of the Druzes, by instilling in them a sense of solidarity which unhesitatingly calls for immediate aggressive action on their part in defence of an individual or community threatened by strangers, or in retaliation of a hostile act committed against one of them.)

3. Renunciation of all forms of former worship and false belief (except when forced by circumstances to dissimulate).

4. Repudiation of the devil and all other forces of evil.

5. Recognition of the existence in all ages of the principle of divine unity in Hakim.

6. Acquiescence in the acts of Hakim no matter what they be.

7. Absolute resignation and submission to Hakim's divine will.

The dogmas of Hamza were:

1. Confession of the unity of God.

2. Successive manifestations of the Deity in human form.

3. Hakim is the last and most perfect of these divine incarnations.

4. Recognition of the five superior ministers who partake of the divine essence.

5. Hamza, the first minister, is the supreme Ruler of the Age.

6. Concept of predestination.

7. Transmigration of souls.

8. Observance of the Seven Precepts of Hamza.

The Druzes consider themselves — "Muwahhidin" (Unitarians, believing in the one and only God). They recognise Judaism, Christianity and Islam as forerunners of their own religion, which supersedes all others and excels them. In their religious writings prominence is given to many of the Old Testament characters, in particular to King Solomon and to the prophet Daniel. The Druze tenets are incorporated in a few secret holy books, copies of which are all handwritten in Arabic, the language of the Druzes. The style, the grammar and the diction are, however, different from the Koran. These books contain many completely incomprehensible passages and words, which are said to be understood only by the "initiated" or adepts. The most important of these books is the "Kitab el Hukma" (The Book of Wisdom), which was stolen two centuries ago from a Druze elder and was presented to Louis XIV. Copies of this book are said to be found in the libraries of Paris and the Vatican. A fuller account of Druze religious tenets may be found in Hitti's authoritative work on this subject (*).

Cradle of the Druzes

After the mysterious disappearance of Hakim (some say he

(*) **"The Origins of the Druze People and Religion"**, with extracts from their sacred writings, by Philip K. Hitti, Ph.D., New York, Columbia University Press, 1928.

committed suicide, others believe he fell victim to a court intrigue), Hamza proclaimed him the Messiah — probably with an eye on the Copts whom he hoped to win over to his teachings — and prophesied his triumphal return which would bring wordly rewards to all his adherents.

During Hakim's Period of Concealment (zaman el sitr) Druze teachings and practices remain secret to all except the initiated. Before his death Hakim sent missionaries and apostles to Northern Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia and other parts of the Near and Middle East. None of the proselytes converted in those countries survived, except the Druzes of Lebanon, who responded to Darazi's mission in 1016 A.D., assumed his name and became the faithful and fanatical followers of the new cult. In 1031, with the death of Baha-ed-Din, Hamza's main propagandist, the period of propagation and conversion ended and no new proselytes were to be admitted into the fold of the new religion; neither was there a possibility to cease being a Druze. The religion assumed a strictly national character. This measure of safety was taken primarily to preserve the homogeneous community of Wadi Taym, in the south-eastern corner of Lebanon, against foreign and treacherous elements who might betray and destroy from within the new cult. It was also useful for the strengthening of the morale of the followers, who now came to regard themselves as the privileged few, entrusted with a priceless treasure to be jealously and zealously guarded against the profane. The religion became a sacred hereditary privilege. Baha-ed-Din considered the "day of grace" offered to an unworthy world by the divine Hakim and the supreme Hamza as having passed forever.

Remaining a numerically weak minority surrounded by an overwhelming hostile majority, the Druzes soon resorted to shrewdness and cunning. Combining these qualities with their physical courage, they succeeded in winning a dominating position in Syria, which they have maintained until the present day.

The earliest Druze community was heard of about the beginning of the 11th century. It was situated in Wadi al-Taym, at the foot of Mount Hermon in the Anti-Lebanon. This, therefore, is regarded as the Druzes' birthplace and distribution centre. From Wadi al-Taym they spread to the mountains of Lebanon in the north-west, to Djebel al-A'la in the north (west of Aleppo), to the hills of Galilee and Carmel in the south and to Djebel Druze in the south-east. One notes from this distribution a characteristic of the Druzes: a choice of residence in mountainous countryside which is difficult to approach and easy to defend. This is another explanation for the survival of

the small minority of the Druzes among a hostile majority for over nine centuries. It also explains partly how they succeeded in preserving their old traditions and maintaining, untouched by progress, their feudal system and patriarchal-theocratic organisation.

Origin of the Druzes

The early historians maintain silence on the origin of these mountain people found in the south-eastern corner of the Lebanon. It is not known what religion was formerly held by them, or exactly what racial stock they were sprung from. But it seems likely that they were a sect that had been preserved in a hill fastness and more or less by-passed by the outward surge of orthodox Islam. They are believed to be basically of Arab-Yemenite extraction with a strong admixture of Persian and Kurdish elements acquired during an early pre-Islamic migration from southern Arabia to northern Mesopotamia. Their settlement in the Lebanon cannot be historically established. Some anthropologists maintain that the Druzes together with Maronites, the Nusàriyeh, Armenians, Yezidis and some other south-Caucasian races are the remnants of the Hittites. Among the Druzes prevails the opinion of their Arab origin. This, however, should be treated with reserve in view of the Druzes' propensity to dissimulate and feign other religious and racial origins in order to conceal their own race and religion for security reasons. Other hypotheses of their origin are not worthy of serious consideration, for lack of any historical data to substantiate them.

Persian Influence

The Druzes must have been a homogeneous community prior to the arrival of Darazi into their midst. Their social and intellectual make-up must have been composed of elements which predisposed them to a favourable reception of the new doctrines. It is recorded that Hakim said to Darazi: "Go to Syria and spread the cause in the mountains because their people are quick to follow". The new religion was essentially an incarnational one of the extreme Shi'ite type, previously developed in Persia and Mesopotamia. The inhabitants of Wadi al-Taym were probably under such influences before the rise of Druzism. Darazi himself was of a Turco-Persian origin. Hamza, his teacher and the intellect behind the movement, was a Persian. The Fatimid dynasty, of which Hakim was a scion, was presumably also of Persian origin. Several expressions used in Druze liturgy are Persian in meaning and origin. Most of the leading Druze families are of a full Kurdish and Persian origin or of Persianised

Arab origin. The genealogy of Tannukh, Maan and Talhuq families shows their descent from Arab tribes of northern Mesopotamia. The Imad and Junublat(*) families are of Kurdish origin. The name of the famous Arselan family points to a Persian origin, although they claim Arab descent probably for reasons of dissimulation and expedience. (The Emirs Amin, Adel and Shakib Arselan played important rôles during the last few decades in the Arab awakening). It may therefore be summarised that the natives of Wadi al-Taym were racially a mixture of Persians and Persianised south-Arabs, well fitted for the reception of Druzism.

Early Druze History

When the Crusaders arrived in the Lebanon, the Druzes are said to have been given the task of defending that country against the advancing Knights of the Cross. But, hating their Moslem neighbours as they did, a large proportion of them are reported to have helped the foreign invader. This political move — the first in which Druzes are recorded historically — evinced their acute sense of opportunism, which they found necessary to ensure their survival as a numerically weak minority. In nearly every armed conflict in their area since then, they have been found to have representatives on both sides and probably a neutral party in addition, which ultimately favoured the winning side.

The Tannukh and Arselan families were early at the head of the Druze feudal organisation, the Tannukh family succeeding in holding Beirut against the Franks for a considerable time. They were soon, however, at loggerheads with their Moslem neighbours from Damascus, and after being driven out from their district near Mount Hermon, they made an alliance with the Crusaders at Banias, and helped the latter to defend the passes of the Anti-Lebanon against the Moslems. In the second half of the 12th century the Druzes under the Ma'an family were granted feudal jurisdiction by Sultan Nur-ed-Din of Damascus and established their headquarters in Baaqlin, between Beirut and Sidon in the mountains overlooking the maritime plain.

Again they fought against the Crusaders under the banner of Islam; but as soon as the danger of the Crusades was removed the Mameluk Sultans of Egypt started an extermination campaign against all unorthodox Moslem groups, including the Druzes. By allying themselves with the Ismailiyeh, the Druzes managed to repulse the attackers, but finally, in 1305, they were forced back into their mountains.

(*) Also pronounced Jumblat although in Arabic جنبلاط

THE ATRASH FAMILY *

Genealogical Table of the ISMAIL Branch **



Key to the Genealogical Table

* The **ATRASH FAMILY** is divided into three main branches. The most important is the **Ismail Branch,** sub-divided into eight "Houses", known by the names of the villages, where their heads, the sons of Ismail, settled in the latter part of the 19th century. Other branches of the family are the **Najm Branch** and the **Hamud Branch.** Closely related to the Najm Branch is Ali Mustafa of Imtane, Deputy in the Syrian Parliament and one of the richest and most influential members of the Atrash family. The present heads of the Hamud Branch are Ibdi and Berjez of Mjemer and Sayah of Bekka. The latter is the Qaimakam of Salkhad.

** This Genealogical Table of the Ismail Branch shows the inter-relation of some of the more important members of this branch. It does not include, however, all members of this branch.

1 First Druze Minister (Defence) in the Syrian Cabinet in 1941.

2 Deputy in the Syrian Parliament.

3 Film actor and singer. Resident in Egypt.

4 Princess, film actress and cantatrice known as Asmahan. Married and divorced Emir Hassan twice. Killed in Egypt in 1944.

5 Director of Finance in the Djebel Druze Administration. Acting Governor during Emir Hassan's tenure of office as Cabinet Minister in Damascus.

6 Married Hsein ibn Hamad Azzam, Mudir of Ahire (Leja).

7 National hero and leader of the Revolt in 1925/6.

8 Commandant of Gendarmerie in Djebel Druze.

9 First Emir.

10 Married Zeid, son of Emir Hassan.

11 Second Emir.

12 Dissident members of the family. Fawzi, Magistrate at Salkhad, was educated in France and is holder of the Legion d'Honour decoration.

13 Third Emir, Governor of Djebel Druze, formerly Minister for Defence in the Syrian Cabinet. Married lately the daughter of Sitt Nazira Junublat of Mukhtara (Lebanon).

14 Married to Yusef ibn Hillal and to Zeid ibn Tuqan, both of whom are great friends and supporters of Emir Hassan.

15 Commandant of Gendarmerie in Damascus, previously in Djebel Druze.

Rise of the Great Feudal Lords

The growing power of Druze organization and individualism was beginning to make itself felt, and every event with which they were connected tended to increase their unity, which was in no way affected by the gradual migration of the Maronites from the Orontes valley into the Lebanon in the 14th and 15th centuries. The latter part of the 16th century saw the greatest expansion of Druze power under the two Fakhr-ed-Dins and Korkmas of the Ma'an family, who were recognised as Emirs by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, to whom the Druzes rallied after his conquest of Syria. Their dominion extended from the edge of the plain of Antioch to the hills of Galilee in Palestine, including parts of the Syrian Desert, which was dominated by Fakhr-ed-Din's fort at Palmyra, where its ruins are still visible. Fakhr-ed-Din II (1585—1635) introduced Western influence to the Lebanon. In its wake came a Florentine consulate, a French hostel and many Christian missionaries, as well as a commercial treaty with the Duke of Tuscany.

This agreement contained certain secret military clauses for use against the Turks, on whom Fakhr-ed-Din had sworn to take revenge for their treacherous murder of his grandfather, Fakhr-ed-Din I in 1544. His deep-laid and carefully prepared plans, however, led to disaster; for the revolt he staged ended, after some initial successes, in his defeat and flight to Tuscany in 1614. On the death of his grandnephew, the elected Emir of the Mountain in 1705 came from the Shihab family, of Hejazi-Arab origin, who settled in Wadi al-Taym in the 12th century, claiming blood relationship with the Prophet Mohammad(*) The Emir Beshir II who became Druze leader in 1788 after a war with his uncle, which he won with the aid of the Turks, Maronites and the Druze Junublat family, was reigning when Napoleon laid siege to Acre in 1799. Maronites and Druzes joined Napoleon, but Beshir remained neutral. When the siege was raised, Jazzar Pasha, who commanded the Turkish forces, sought vengeance on Beshir for having failed to help him, but Beshir succeeded in winning the friendship of Sydney Smith, the British admiral, and having himself evacuated to safety. He returned later, established himself again by a series of murders, and after some remarkable vicissitudes during the wars between Turkey and Mohammad Ali, he emerged as the strongest Druze war-lord since Fakhr-ed-Din II.

After welcoming the victorious Egyptians of Ibrahim Pasha, the Druzes soon found themselves in conflict with their new

(*) The Shihab Emirs have remained until now, one of the leading families in Lebanon. Branches of this family profess Christianity, Islam and Druzism respectively.

overlords. Ibrahim Pasha's insistence on conscription to his forces and disarmament of the population, together with heavy taxation and general oppression, soon led to an armed uprising, in which the Druzes played a prominent part. Having withdrawn to the inaccessible fastnesses of the Leja, which today is within the boundaries of Djebel Druze, they harassed the armies of Ibrahim Pasha. At last, having driven out the Turks and the Egyptians in turn from Lebanon, Beshir incurred the enmity of both and surrendered to the British, when the latter arrived with the avenging Turks(*).

After the final defeat of Ibrahim Pasha, the Turks sought to punish the Druzes by the traditional method of inviting their leaders under a false pretext to a conference and murdering them there. Eighty Druze leaders came to Damascus and lodged with Mr. Wood, the British Consul, pending the arrival of the Firman from Constantinople confirming the amnesty they were to receive. It transpired, however, that the Firman contained the death sentence of all the Druze leaders.

In spite of threats of attack, Mr. Wood refused to deliver them to the Turkish authorities, and held them safely until the arrival of the amnesty from the Porte. This courageous act created among the Druzes a lasting gratitude towards England.

The 1860 Massacre and Exodus

During Ibrahim Pasha's attempt to subdue the Mountain of the Lebanon, the Druzes, who had friendly relations of long standing with the Maronites and the Metwaleh, cooperated with their weaker neighbours against the outsiders; but their traditional policy of "I with my brother against my cousin; my cousin with me against the stranger" was disjointed by the returning Turks, who — seeking to re-establish their suzerainty over the Lebanon — incited the Druzes to dominate the Maronites, and the Maronites to outgrow their long subjection to the Druzes. The old and well tried formula of "divide et impera" was applied with exemplary success. The result was an intermittent conflict between the two communities which in 1860 culminated in the massacre of some 6000 Christians in the Lebanon by the stronger and better armed Druzes. French troops promptly intervened with the Turks on behalf of the Maronites and, in spite of the protests of their champion, the British Consul, the Druzes were forced gradually to retreat from the Lebanon under pressure of a French column which advanced from Beirut.

(*) For fuller details of Druze history in the Lebanon see "Les Druzes", by C. N. Bouron.

This was the starting-point of a mass migration of Druzes from the Lebanon to Djebel Houran, which in consequence came to be called the Djebel Druze. The new warrior-settlers established themselves in the southern and eastern parts of Djebel Druze, since the Leja and the northern part of the Djebel had already been occupied by earlier Druze settlers. These were the followers of the Yemenite party which suffered a decisive blow after their defeat by the Qaysite party in the battle of Ain Darah in Syria in 1711(*). They settled in Djebel Houran, where some thirty or forty years earlier the first of their co-religionists had arrived, laying the foundation for future Druze domination in that area.

The Atrash Family

Since 1685 the chief Druze feudal authority in the Djebel was in the hands of the Hamdan family. After 1860, however, a new Druze family rose to prominence, the Atrash family, which having produced a series of fighting leaders with a domineering character, soon acquired a position superior to all other families, and have maintained this status till the present day.

The Atrash family are of a Kurdish-Yemenite origin and came to the Djebel after 1860 from the Shouf district, south of Beirut. It was Ismail al Atrash (head of the Ismail Branch of the Atrash family) who led the Druze contingents from the Houran against the French, and returned crowned with glory. Nine years later his son, Ibrahim, founder of the Soueida House (see Genealogical Table), chased the last Hamdan chief out of Soueida, and since this triumph the history of the Atrash family has been the history of Djebel Druze.

In 1880 there was a successful rebellion against Ibrahim led by his brother, Shibli, founder of the Aere House, but the clan feeling proved too strong for him, and Shibli fled to the Houran, where he was arrested by the Turks. This act reconciled the Druzes to Shibli and they attacked the Turkish garrison in order to release the prisoner. A compromise was subsequently found whereby, on the death of Ibrahim, Shibli succeeded him as leader. A series of revolts against the Turks followed in 1896, 1906 and 1910. In 1914 Selim al Atrash, grandson of Shibli, was the leader. After organising guerilla warfare behind the Turkish lines, he was persuaded, however, into quiescence

(*) With the Moslem conquest of Syria in the 7th century, two factions were introduced into the country: the Qaysites from Hejaz and the Yemenites from Yemen. In the course of time the population of Syria became divided into followers of one or the other of these two factions. Long feuds between them terminated in the decisive battle of Ain Darah with the utter defeat of the Yemenite party.

by secret promises from Jamal Pasha. Most of the other Druze leaders remained neutral, with the notable exception of Sultan al Atrash, who went on harassing Turkish convoys and finally with his cousin, Nassib, entered Damascus with the victorious British troops.

In 1919, the Turks having been disposed of as a factor affecting their community, the Druzes were quick to realise that the French and British, although Allies, should be wooed separately if the maximum benefit were to be derived from their presence. Faris al Atrash of the Dibbine House and Mut'ib al Atrash of the Ressas House, together with certain others, proclaimed themselves Francophiles, but other Houses of the family, notably the Soueida and Salkhad Houses and especially Sultan al Atrash, worked towards Great Britain and sided with Feisal. Faris met General Gouraud on the latter's arrival in Damascus and assured him of the sympathy which the majority of Druze leaders had for France. In 1921 an agreement was signed by Robert de Caix for France and the religious sheikh Mahmud Abu Fakhr on behalf of the Druzes, conceding the Druzes a large measure of autonomy under their own ruler. Selim Pasha al Atrash was made governor and the title "Emir" conferred upon him; a French officer-interpreter was appointed to him as adviser. Sultan Pasha promptly objected to the intrusion of a foreign government into his feudal domains; but the first serious trouble for the French was caused in 1922 when a man, having been arrested and accused of attempting to assassinate General Gouraud, claimed sanctuary in Sultan's house at Qreia. Sultan demanded the man's release and when his request was ignored, he and his followers put out of action three French armoured cars which were on the way to fetch the prisoner. He then fled to the mountains until granted an amnesty by the French.

Sultan Pasha's 1925 Revolt

The Emir Selim died in 1923 without male descendants, and in view of the fact that three members of the Atrash family, Abdul Ghaffar Pasha, Mutib and Hamad, were each working to become governor, Captain Carbillet, the adviser, was appointed temporary governor. In 1925 a delegation of Druzes lodged with General Sarrail complaints against the tyrannous regime of Carbillet and demanded a native governor, in accordance with the agreement of 1921. General Sarrail, whose political officer was Dentz (later Vichy High Commissioner in the Levant States), refused their demands and followed a Turkish precedent by inviting five chief Druze leaders to meet him in Damascus, with the intention of arresting them. Three of them fell into the trap,

and this act touched off the smouldering fire of revolt in Sultan's heart. His successes were quite sensational and brought him tremendous prestige throughout Syria. The defeat of French armed columns and capture of their guns with ammunition, the rising in Damascus and arrest of six leaders of Shahbandar's party, the escape of other leaders to Djebel Druze, their proclamation there of a National Syrian Government, and the heavy shelling of Damascus by the French, were main events of the insurrection which did not peter out until February 1926. Sultan Pasha took refuge in Transjordan and was not allowed to return to the Djebel Druze until 1938.

Since 1938 Sultan Pasha has lived the retired life of a country squire in his village, Qreia, south of Soueida, but no decision on important matters affecting the Djebel or the Atrash family is ever taken without hearing Sultan's counsel first. By his achievements and personal integrity he stands out as the natural leader of the Druzes and their national hero by reason of his exploits during the rebellion. Numerous songs, verging on the legendary, extol his heroic deeds. His character is strong. He is straight and just, but shrewd. He possesses the fierceness of conviction and the reasoning power to give these qualities full play, not allowing them to act in a restricted self-interested way. He is about sixty, of medium height and weight, with a bristling moustache. There is however an air of wistfulness about him which, with his customary introspective silence, creates a certain impression of mystery. This mystery is not completely dispelled even on closer acquaintance. His proverbial generosity and hospitality have made people love and adore him. To his call would rally the entire youth of Djebel Druze, and followers would flock to his banner from all parts of Syria. Although uncompromisingly anti-French he has always been well disposed towards Great Britain.

Emir Hassan and Princess Amal al Atrash

In 1936, after a short period of disorder in the Djebel, Emir Hassan al Atrash was appointed governor, having succeeded to the title in 1926 on the death of Emir Mahmud, the brother of Emir Selim. His father Yihya settled together with his uncle Shibli in Aere, a few miles south of Soueida. Since Shibli's assumption of the family leadership, the House of Aere remained the leading House of the Atrash family, and on the extinction of Shibli's male descendants, the succession passed to his nephew, Hassan. His importance as the nominal head of the Atrash family, the Emir, and as governor of Djebel Druze, led the British to adopt a novel method of gaining Druze support during the Syrian campaign of the Allies in 1941. Amal, known as Asmahan,

the Druze film star, had been married to her cousin, the Emir, at the age of fourteen, but divorced him eight years later, and became a famous actress and film star in Egypt, to the gross embarassment of the Atrash family and the religiously virtuous Druzes. Before the Syrian campaign began, she attracted the attention of some high G.H.Q. staff officers in Cairo, who considered it expedient to enlist her charms and her family connections to gain the Druze support for the Allied cause. Consequently her remarriage to Emir Hassan was celebrated quietly in Damascus, shortly after the Allied occupation. The religious function, however, was performed by a Moslem Qadi, since the Druze religion forbids re-marrying a divorced wife. "The Emir is above religion" — was the explanation put out among the Druzes, but the whole affair was a striking illustration of how religious practices become subordinate to political expedience. After a short period of harmony, Amal persisted in continuing her gay life of intrigue and dissipation, and once again divorced her husband when the objectives of her remarriage were attained. She returned to Egypt and was killed in a mysterious car accident in 1944, before reaching the age of thirty.

During the Syrian campaign a few hundred Druzes joined the British-officered Druze Legion, later called Druze Regiment. But the bulk of the Druzes did not turn against the Vichy forces and remained inactive, pocketing the British goodwill coins and waiting for the outcome of the fighting in their immediate vicinity. Another group of Druzes was indirectly in communication with the Germans, thus preparing for all eventualities. With the conquest of Syria and the Franco-British declaration of Syrian independence, a complete autonomy and semi-independence of Djebel-Druze within the Syrian state was assured. Soon after the entry of the Anglo-French Forces into Soueida in June 1941, the Druzes hoisted their multi-coloured flag on their Governorate headquarters and demanded a ministerial seat in the new Syrian cabinet, formed under the presidency of the French-appointed Sheikh Taj-ed-Din al Hassani. Towards the close of 1941, after the death of the old patriarchal and picturesque Abdul Ghaffar Pasha al Atrash, his portfolio for Defence in the Syrian Government was given to Emir Hassan. Hassan, though a minister now, remained the nominal governor of Djebel Druze, which was administered during his absence in Damascus, by Toufiq Bey al Atrash, the Director of Finance in the Djebel Druze Administration. In January 1942 a new constitution was published curtailing some of the Druze autonomy and re-incorporating the Djebel into Syria. The "Independent Province of Djebel Druze", as

it was called hitherto, ceased to function as a separate territorial entity; the Syrian flag replaced the Druze colours in Soueida. Essentially, however, the Druzes retained a wide measure of administrative and fiscal powers which were to be exercised by the Governor, whose appointment was made by the Syrian President; the latter also having the right to approve the Governor's recommendations. The Emir Hassan remained Minister for Defence (*) until the general elections which brought the extremist National Bloc of Shukri Kuwatli into power. The new cabinet no longer included a representative of Djebel Druze, where dissatisfaction with the new government was mounting; in fact strained relations with the present Syrian government have continued till now.

In any future re-shuffling of territorial boundaries, or in the not unlikely event of an internal revolution in Syria, there can be no doubt that the Druzes will follow their predilection for King Abdullah, and secede from Syria in his direction.

(*) Similar posts were given to Druzes in the Lebanese cabinets, the Junublat and Arselan families holding consecutively the Defence portfolio.

THE AUTHOR

MR. N. N. NIMRI, who has travelled extensively in the Arab East, is a keen student of Middle Eastern affairs. He was attached to the British Forces in the Middle East during the years 1938-42. One of the founders of the Middle East Society, he is also its Honorary Secretary.

PART TWO, describing Druze customs and practices, their feudal-theocratic organisation as well as their present political trends and relations with others inside and outside Djebel Druze — will be published in the next issue of the Journal. This part will also include detailed features of Djebel Druze such as: climate, topography, roads and water sources, population figures and notable families, education system, economy, archeological sites, beduins of Djebel Druze.

AFFORESTATION AND SOIL CONSERVATION

G.N. SALE

It is necessary to define the limits of forestry in a Mediterranean country. Those of us who were brought up in western countries, particularly those who fell under the spell of Grimm and Hans Anderson, started life with the narrowest conception of a forest. The high dark woods of spruce and silver fir, the oak and beechwoods of France, have no counterpart in Palestine, though fine high forests can and must be grown here. We must, however, widen our ideas on the subject to include the proper management of all uncultivated land, and it is in this sense that the subject should be considered. Proper use and management of uncultivated land occupy the greater part of the field of soil conservation. It may help in the clarification of our ideas to state at once that the soil of all agricultural land, including orchards and groves, vineyards and ploughlands, must be conserved by proper agricultural methods. The Mediterranean forester is concerned with the remainder of the land of rural districts. It is then necessary to consider first the wider subject of soil conservation, before we touch upon the use of trees and the part which forests themselves can play in the campaign.

In a few words, we shall try to explain why this pleasant garden of a country has been reduced to the status of an artificial desert. It is often said that the soil is the skin of the country. The skin is a very thin layer, but of the greatest importance, and if it is injured or removed, the whole body sickens. We hear of the rocky hills of Palestine, and tend to forget that all hills are rocky, but that most are decently covered with soil and vegetation.

If we imagine our mountains covered with a thin layer of soil one metre in depth, we shall be seeing a completely different picture. In place of the barren and denuded slopes which now depress all but the most romantic, we should have great stretches of hillsides bearing a beautiful and valuable vegetation. Owing to the proximity of the Arabian Desert, too many people are apt to consider Palestine as a natural desert or semi-desert. This view is a weed which must be rooted out of all minds. Palestine is a natural garden, and must be restored to its original condition.

Fluidity of Soil

What then are the processes which have led to the present unsatisfactory state of affairs? When dealing with the details of soil erosion and conservation, we must abandon the simile of soil as a skin. For practical purposes, soil is a fluid. When lying on a slope of rock, it will not remain in place unless induced to do so. The natural protection is the cover of roots, and the organic litter of leaves and twigs, which in various ways reduce the mobility of the soil. Owing to the mixture of organic material, a natural soil is usually dark in colour and moderately adhesive when wet. When dry, it forms clods which break up not into grains, but into nodules. Thus nature tends to prevent the destructive forces of wind and rainfall from removing the soil which is needed for the support of vegetable and animal life. Any small loss of soil, due to occasional disturbance of the normal conditions, is fully counterbalanced by the formation of new soil. New soil is produced by the splitting, weathering and rotting of rocks, and the subsequent decay of the subsoil into finer and finer fragments. These mineral fragments mix with organic litter from the vegetation, to form a true soil, inhabited and fertilised by microzoa and bacteria.

Destruction of Safeguards

Our Victorian ancestors inform us that "peace hath her victories no less renowned than war", and it is sad to have to parody this by observing that man is almost as destructive in peacetime as in wartime. Ignorant of natural processes and instinctively more acquisitive than cautious, man upsets the balance of nature, to the detriment of himself as well as of his fellow creatures. For various reasons he removes the natural vegetation, cutting down trees and even pulling out the roots. Intentionally or accidentally he burns the ground cover, not only destroying the small binding roots, but burning much of the organic content, leaving a mineral soil, which is inferior in all qualities except mobility. His ploughing and hoeing continue the change, and he becomes the possessor of a stretch of soil ripe for dissipation. The same results are obtained by overgrazing. When animals feed upon the young shoots of a scrub forest, they find a great volume of food per dunam, and are likely to leave untouched many twigs upon each tree. They do not need to move far or rapidly, so that their trampling of the soil is not very harmful. From the damage which is done, the forest can recover in one season's growth. When the same flock invades an area already overgrazed, the result is much more serious.

The volume of green leaves per dunam is very small, and the goats are driven to consume everything which they can find. They eat the first new shoots of young plants beginning to grow, and the last remaining leaves from badly-damaged plants, which have been eaten back almost to the roots. As a result, the young plants may be killed outright, while the old rootstocks may have no strength left to shoot up again. In addition, the goats must move rapidly over the land in order to find enough to eat, and in one day, a flock of goats, driven by hunger, will do as much harm by their trampling as by their eating. The soil is made hard and unfertile, while on a hillside, stones and pebbles are dislodged and erosion so accelerated.

On land thus stripped of its safeguards, the summer sun dries the surface, and the hot winds blow away the valuable topsoil, which contains most of the remaining organic matter, and the beneficial microzoa and bacteria. Wind erosion is almost unnoticeable, but the effects are cumulative and eventually very serious. Land covered with permanent vegetation has to a high degree the power of absorbing water, and most of this absorptive power is lost when the vegetation is removed, particularly if the land is ploughed or trampled. In heavy rain most of the water runs across the surface instead of sinking into the ground. When a small volume of surface drainage is augmented by similar flows from neighbouring plots, it soon forms a stream of dangerous volume.

Erosion in Hills

On sloping land, all these processes are intensified. The summer winds swirl round the mountain in gusts, which snatch away handfuls of dry topsoil, and winter rains soon pick up and transport a large volume of the same material. The power of water to carry soil varies with its speed: if the speed is doubled, the quantity of soil removed is multiplied by at least four. The united streams from several plots of bare land form a torrent which roars down the hillside, cutting out a deep channel for itself, and sweeping away anything which stands in its path. The soil which is carried away is usually swept out to sea, the subsoil is scattered far and wide over the plains, while the pebbles and boulders are deposited in riverbeds, which fill up so that the stream changes its course and extends the area of its damage. There is little wonder that the simple peasant who removes the vegetation from a hillside fails to understand the forces he has set in motion.

Quite apart, then, from the damage done by the united torrent, as it smashes its way from side to side of the previous-

ly fertile river valley, we can see how runoff has removed a film of topsoil from each field, and has gullied its way down the hillside. A look at the hillsides of Palestine will confirm this form of destruction.

History of Erosion in Palestine

Let us briefly follow the processes of destruction through the ages, as they can be reconstructed with fair accuracy, even though the dates are not recorded. The land was originally covered with a forest which varied in height and composition. It is likely that pine forests occupied the site of Jerusalem, and many other localities, but that the greater part of the country was oak forest, garnished with many subsidiary species of trees and shrubs. Multitudes of flowers were visited by the bees which provided wild honey, one of the foods of early man. In due course, as we know from ancient literature, man evolved from the stage of hunting and honey collecting, and began to keep domestic animals. The changes in the vegetation and in the condition of the land dated from the time when the land was flowing with milk as well as honey. At first, no doubt, little damage was caused by the small flocks of goats and sheep which wandered in the great forests: constant toll was taken of their numbers by enemies and wild beasts, and it was not until man became more completely master of his environment that he enlarged his flocks to dangerous proportions. Another stage in development was the spread of cultivation, which involved the complete destruction of the natural vegetation over comparatively small areas. There is little doubt that the dangers of the forest tended to press in upon the villagers, who confined their agriculture to very small plots near their houses.

Incidentally, this desire to concentrate their cultivation, coupled with the remarkable prevalence of horizontal stratification of the rocks, led to the discovery and practice of terracing. I am prepared for any archaeologist to dispute this view, but from what I have seen, it appears to be the obvious explanation. The same dangers of the forest kept the flocks small in number, and in the vicinity of the villages. Constant wars and misgovernment, inadequate clothing and bad housing, prevented any great increase of population. The practice of conservative agriculture, involving the terracing of the slopes, stood the inhabitants in good stead when their numbers increased and their activities expanded. For a long time their enemies prevented them from using the maritime plains, and the wheat and barley for large numbers of people must have been grown on terraces in the hills. This production would not have been possible over the course of centuries without terracing, as all soil would have

disappeared from the slopes, and the hill population would have been starved out. The increase of population owing to the development of civilisation led to an extension of terracing up to Byzantine times, when a considerable, though unspecified, proportion of the hill country was terraced and therefore highly productive.

Breakdown of Rural Life.

Subsequently, the invasions of less civilised races, unversed in the agricultural arts, led to the neglect of the terraces, which rapidly decayed. Particularly was this the case in times of trouble, when the scared peasants found it better to possess flocks of goats, with which they could vanish into the remaining forests, rather than immovable fields of grain, which too often they sowed for others to reap.

Few things destroy terraces more rapidly than the frequent passage of herds, often aided, I observe, by the picking activities of the shepherd boys, whose fingers, unaccustomed to construction, lend themselves readily to the extraction and casting-down of masonry and loose stone walls. This dreary process of deterioration went on through the centuries, agriculture and rural life in general reaching a remarkably low level. In spite of the small population, the destruction of the vegetation permitted flooding and erosion to strip the soil from practically all the hillsides, and to deposit it over the surface of the plains, where it did more harm than good. The excavation of deep gullies in the hills was followed by the filling up of the river-beds in the plains, so that each flood spread out over the countryside and did widespread damage. The destruction of the vegetation near the seashore allowed the sand to blow up into high dunes, which impeded the free flow of the rivers, and resulted in a line of swamps roughly parallel with the seashore. The oak forests which existed until very recent times from Hadera southwards to Jaffa, held up the spread of these dunes, but deforestation during the past century permitted the dunes to extend in places to a dangerous degree.

Economic Importance of Erosion

It now seems possible for us to consider the economic importance of these destructive agencies which have been released by man's ignorant interference with nature. From what has been said, the results can be visualised. In a walled garden where neither wind nor water is allowed to carry it away, the soil continues to mature and to improve in fertility and productivity for about a century. Under these conditions, the frequent cultivation of the ground is a beneficial process, and

the yield obtained from such a mature soil is very greatly in excess of what can be gained from an equivalent area on which the forces of erosion have been allowed to operate.

It is necessary here to touch lightly on the subject of conservative agriculture, and the various methods by which the peasant could prevent the physical loss of soil, and could build up a stock of soil which would increase and improve from year to year. The value of a deep soil, apart from the plant nutrients which it contains, lies in its water-holding capacity. If a field is covered with soil to the depth of a metre, it can hold and retain enough water for a complete crop of wheat. When such a field has been soaked by good early rains, it can pass through a severe drought towards the end of winter and still produce a good crop. This contrasts with the precarious fortune of a crop on a shallow soil, which must be wetted every few weeks. The most striking and obvious result of erosion is the decreased productivity of agricultural lands, due to the reduction in quantity and quality of the soil. Farming on subsoil and rock-fragments is a dreary and profitless business. I have said that soil erosion is caused by man's ignorant interference with nature. Herein lies our great advantage. In our conservation work we have to ally ourselves with nature. The flood which sweeps down the valley is not a natural process. Nature herself is anxious to avoid such a phenomenon, and we can count on her assistance in our efforts. We must endeavour to put a stop to the mistaken actions which have removed the natural safeguards, and permitted the free play of destructive forces.

Cultivation in Plains

Even in the plains, very little land is exactly horizontal, and rains which fall too rapidly to be absorbed start to flow and to damage the soil. The real danger there is that the runoff from a considerable area may unite to form a stream of great destructive power. This can be prevented by a general practice of constructing a shallow ditch and low bank round each field, so that in the heaviest of rains the water lies as in a pond until the storm abates and the water can soak into the ground. If surface flow has thus been prevented, a storm may then do more good than harm. If such banks are planted with suitable trees or hedgerows, the velocity of the wind is so much reduced that no topsoil is blown away in summer. We must then aim at the eventual breaking-up of the great agricultural plains into a chessboard of fields surrounded by low banks and windbreaks of trees and hedges, where the soil is allowed to mature and agricultural production rises to new levels.

Cultivation on Hillsides

What then of the hillsides, with which must be considered the frequent steep slopes occurring even in the plains? There we have the curious phenomenon of peasants taking pains annually to deprive themselves of 10% of the soil which still clings precariously to their fields. It is as if a grocer were to strive for wealth while keeping his goods, in glass bottles, on sloping shelves. The sanest of his friends would certainly counsel him to construct new horizontal shelves on which his goods could stand in safety. So we must deal with the peasant who wishes to grow any crops on hillsides. The principle must be "no ploughing except on the level". I will not go into the details of terrace construction, but the fact is that terraces can be made either where boulders are plentiful or where no stone is available for construction. The United States, during the years before the war, sent out a steady and beneficial flow of literature, instructing how terraces could be made under any conditions, climatic, geological or topographical. By means of terracing, a vast capital can be built up throughout the country, without any heavy capital investments. No peasant need refrain from working, with his own hands and his own family, throughout the summer months, when he might otherwise remain unoccupied. The only materials he needs are his usual farm tools, and the rocks which too often litter his land. As a result of his labour, he safeguards his soil, and ensures that the new soil which is formed is retained on his field and allowed to mature to full fertility. There is no reason why he should cease the process even when he has completed the terraces. In Portugal, where some of the finest grapes are grown, the peasants dig out silt from the riverbeds and carry it on their own backs, and on the backs of their donkeys up to their terraced fields. Since all the riverbeds of Palestine contain large quantities of silt, we might do well to copy the frugal Portugese peasant in this respect.

Uncultivated Land

So much for the agricultural side, and for the precautions needed to build up a mature fertile soil. There remains the uncultivated land on which most floods form. Apart from the damage which these floods can do elsewhere, we must not overlook the value of the land itself. Palestine is not so wide a country that we can afford to leave any part of it completely unproductive. We must strive without ceasing to make the best use of the whole area which is blessed with a satisfactory climate. We must not only prevent further damage to land still capable of production, but we must take steps to repair the

ravages of past neglect, and to restore the fertility of land which has been ruined by erosion. The most important means of controlling erosion on uncultivated land is the restoration of a complete cover of natural vegetation. The breakdown of the rocks is accelerated by root penetration, and the rock fragments and gravel weather into a soil mixed with leaves and other organic matter. The restocking of a piece of hill land helps to collect the soil and greatly increases the absorption of rainwater. Subsequent heavy rains are followed by no runoff of water and no erosion of soil. No flooding starts on such protected lands, and if all the hills are so treated, no floods will form. The only way of dealing with floods is to prevent their formation, which can usually be simply done by improving the vegetation of uncultivated land in the hills. This is often a slow process, but fortunately need not involve expenditure without reward. The growth of vegetation always improves the site qualities of the land, and usually yields in addition products of some economic value. It must not be supposed that the regeneration of great areas will be effected by the direct plantation of forest trees. Planting on ruined land is an expensive operation, unjustified except on small areas where early results are specially desirable. In place of this method, which may be termed "agricultural forestry", we tend more and more to favour the alternative method of "natural forestry", that is, studying the natural succession of plants and merely accelerating the process of nature. On badly eroded land, a considerable period of rest is absolutely needed, during which time the forester would do no more than sow the seeds of grasses, perennials and low shrubs. At the end of this period of recuperation, larger shrubs could be grown, and their root action and leaf-fall would continue the process of soil formation. The land is then ready for the establishment of high forest, or alternatively for terraced agriculture. The operation is usually simple and not unduly expensive, but it requires time and continuity of policy.

Forest Policy

I will now attempt to summarise the forest policy of the Government of Palestine. Where solid blocks of reasonably productive land are available, particularly if forest vegetation still exists, production forests are instituted, to be managed on silvicultural principles. The maintenance and improvement of the soil are the prime aim, the second is the growth of the most valuable produce. Smaller blocks of similar land in the vicinity of villages are set aside as "village forests" to be managed by the Forestry Department, and designed to grow the

small materials most required by the peasants. Other lands are closed for the sole purpose of improving the soil, in order that as soon as the slopes are sufficiently covered, they should be taken over by peasants for terracing and subsequent cultivation. The remaining blocks of land are temporarily set aside as grazing grounds, the aim being to limit the number of animals and the period of grazing, so that the vegetation and the soil may continue to improve. These arrangements must be of only temporary duration, since extensive grazing in the Mediterranean region is a dangerous and uneconomic use of the land. Every effort will be made to guide rural practice so that leaves, twigs and grasses are cut from uncultivated land and hedgerows, and carried to the village to be hand-fed to tethered animals. Thus the Government plans to use State Domain in the interests of the rural community, which will benefit as much from employment in the production forests, and the receipt of small produce from the village forests, as from the privilege of grazing some of its domestic animals in the grazing grounds. Another aim of the policy is the encouragement of private forestry by means of advice and the issue of suitable plants for afforestation. Further, in order to benefit state forests, private forests, and rural development in general, it is realised that legislation is needed.

Goats and Overgrazing

It may have been noticed that throughout this article, two figures have been in evidence, both sinister and pathetic: the shepherd and the goat. The various stories of antiquity have shown Palestine as a country peculiarly subject to blessings and curses. The blessings are apparent in the remarkable fertility of the soil, and the way in which it clings to the hillsides until whipped off by the frantic blows of wind and rain. The main agent in the execution of the curses has been the goat, fitting symbol of all that is devilish and futile. The individual goat is an object of pity, destined to wander through life vainly searching for a square meal, only to fall in the end to the butcher's knife. The goat population, taken as a whole, succeeds in revenging the miseries of its members by impoverishing the human race. The peasant may eat the goat, but the goat consumes the land from under the feet of his master. The peasant who imagines the goat to be his best friend, has, as his sole means of support, the goat which has destroyed all his hopes of prosperity and comfort. Just as the resurfacing of the soil of the ruined hillside is a matter which will need the close attention of years, so the reform of rural practices cannot be carried through in less than a generation. This involves

steady pressure throughout a long period, designed to discourage the keeping of goats under the present system. Whereas the wandering goat is an agent of destruction, the tethered goat, fed by hand, is a valuable citizen. She falls into the same respectable category as the cow, ancestral friend of man. Those who have seen or may see the educational film on soil conservation will remember and should proclaim the depicted fact that while the miserable black wanderer yields one cup of milk, the dainty white domestic animal produces four cupfuls of the same size. It can be said that the present system of extensive grazing is the cause of all the trouble, and now stands as the greatest obstacle to soil conservation measures and the revival of rural prosperity. It behoves all intelligent citizens to speak at every opportunity against any extension or continuation of this calamitous practice. When I see villagers carrying on this system which they have inherited from their ancestors since the time of Abraham, I realise that they do not know how much they need our help to break the vicious circle. But when I find new communities, backed by all the knowledge and agricultural science of the twentieth century, taking steps to ruin their hopes of future prosperity by purchasing and maintaining a flock of black, agile, cynical, uneconomic goats, my spirits sink. There are many methods whereby the curse of extensive grazing may be removed from individual localities, and from the country as a whole. All are being studied by Government, with a view to the adoption of this reform in a manner most effective for the community, and least hurtful to individuals. Concurrently with Government action, it is hoped to pursue the campaign of propaganda and education throughout all classes of the population, so that opposition to the change may be weakened and the forces of support organised. There are in Palestine many progressive and intelligent people, who will soon realise the necessity of reform, and even the peasant, if Government perseveres, will eventually come to see that there are better means of livelihood than chasing a herd of goats over miles of eroded rocks.

Effects of Protection

As soon as extensive grazing has disappeared from any locality, changes will become evident. Natural and planted hedgerows and roadside trees will begin to grow, each strip and corner of uncultivated land will become covered with vegetation, amongst which soil will collect and remain. Ditches will be densely carpeted with small perennial plants, and will no longer be ripped out by every winter storm. Stream beds will no longer be filled up with debris, and the growth of trees and

bushes along the banks will aid in the formation of a permanent channel. The clippings and prunings from the hedgerows and the windbreaks around the fields will afford ample fodder for the tethered animals from which the peasants will obtain meat, milk and leather. I will check myself before I picture too Utopian a countryside, but I must confess to a firm conviction that the abolition of wandering animals in the hills and plains of Palestine will be followed by remarkable and fundamental benefits.

Comparative Data

So that the matter may be seen in the right proportion I give a few figures which may not be exact, but will serve to indicate the extent of various types of land.

The total land area of the country is	26 million dunams,
of which climatic desert occupies some	11 million dunams,
leaving a cultivable extent of	15 million dunams,
Of this, land in use for agricultural, urban and other purposes, totals	9 million dunams,
leaving an uncultivated extent of	6 million dunams,
The forest, natural and planted, is estimated at about	200,000 dunams,
while ruined forest occupies possibly	1,300,000 dunams,
There remains wasted land, that is grazing grounds to the extent of	4½ million dunams,
The Forest Reserves, land brought under the management of Government, total some	700,000 dunams,
of which Closed Forest Reserves total	70,000 dunams,

or approximately one quarter per cent of the total area of Palestine.

This compares unfavourably with the figure recommended by German foresters who believe that 16% of a country should be afforested. The figure should be somewhat higher in a Mediterranean country, where about 20% should normally be under forest. The present forest policy of Government aims at dealing with all the uncultivated land of the country, that is 6 million dunams, or 40 per cent of the cultivable area, using afforestation as a means rather than an end.

Forestry as an Agent of Soil Conservation

I have but one word to say on the relationship between the two subjects of this article. It will be realised that while the lack of forest produce in Palestine is sufficient justification for an energetic forest policy, an examination of the condition of the land reveals urgent problems on a much wider scale. Even forest produce cannot be grown on ruined land, and any land

used for this purpose must first be reconditioned. The first forest crop to be grown will of necessity be of comparatively low quality and volume. There remains the much wider and more fundamental problem of the complete regeneration of the ruined countryside. The denuded hillsides have to be changed into agricultural land, for which there is so wide and pressing a need. In spite of the great wealth of industrial experience and knowledge in modern Palestine, it is still true that the only major **natural** asset of the country is its soil. I think that agricultural experts will not disagree with me when I say that practically all agricultural land is more or less damaged by erosion, while I am satisfied that no extensive areas of uncultivated lands in good condition are to be found.

No problem more fundamental can face an agricultural country. No task could be more worthy of strenuous and continuous effort. There is a great future for the forester in Palestine. He might well concentrate upon growing the forest produce so greatly needed. He is, however, willing and proud to devote himself with equal energy to the campaign of rural development and regeneration, of which soil conservation is the first and greatest part.

THE AUTHOR

MR. G. N. SALE, formerly Conservator of Forests, Government of Palestine, left the Middle East in July 1946 to take up a new appointment at Trinidad.

MIDDLE EAST DIARY

JANUARY TO JUNE 1946

AFGHANISTAN

13.6.46 Agreement signed in Moscow by M. Molotov and Sultan Ahmad Khan, the Afghan Ambassador, re-defining the Soviet-Afghan frontier, notably along the Amu-Darya and Panja rivers, and providing for the incorporation in the U.S.S.R. of the Kushka district, which was ceded to Afghanistan under a frontier treaty of 1921. This re-establishes the frontier which formerly existed between Afghanistan and Tsarist Russia.

(Le Monde)

ALGERIA

11.2.46 Many casualties and severe damage caused in the Constantine Department by an earthquake. 276 persons killed, 70 injured, five villages razed.

(Le Monde)

EGYPT

1.1.46 Decree published banning Zionist goods.

4.1.46 White Paper issued in London announcing that the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 11.1.45. for supply of foreign exchange is to be extended till 31.3.46.

(Financial Times)

5.1.46 Sir Amin Osman Pasha, former Minister of Finance, a leading Wafdist and prominent Anglophil, assassinated by Hussein Toufiq Ahmad, son of the Under-Secretary for Communications. The murderer admitted having previously made an attempt on the life of Nahas Pasha, he belongs to a Society one of whose members killed Ahmad Maher Pasha. The Society is believed to be responsible for a series of attacks and assassinations of British troops and pro-British Egyptian statesmen.

(Akhbar el-Yom)

10.1.46 King Ibn Saud arrives in Egypt on a state visit.

16.1.46 A joint declaration made by Kings Ibn Saud and Farouq in support of the Palestine Arabs.

30.1.46 British Government publishes a Note stating its willingness to revise the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

8.2.46 It is announced that the last 80 Britons will shortly leave the Egyptian Police Force.

9.2.46 Anti-British riots in Cairo, lasting three days and spreading to Alexandria. Press attacks on Government result in widespread closing down of newspapers.

16.2.46 Ismail Sidki Pasha forms new Government after a cabinet crisis which led to the resignation of Nokrashi Pasha. The new cabinet includes Armad Lutfi Sayyid Pasha (Communications), Liwa Ahmad Bey (Commerce, Industry and Supply), Abdel Kawi Ahmad Pasha (Labour), Mohammad Abdel Galil Samra Pasha (Social Affairs), Ibrahim Dassuki Abbaza Pasha (Waqf), Hafni Mahmud Pasha (Communications), Liwa Ahmad Attaya Pasha (National Defence), Mohammad Kamel Mursi Pasha (Justice), Mohammad Hassan al Ashmawi Pasha

(Education), Hussein Inan Pasha (Agriculture), Dr. Suleiman Azmi Pasha (Health), Ismail Sidki Pasha, the Premier, also holds the portfolios for Interior and Finance.

18.2.46 Lord Killearn, British Ambassador, transferred after 12 years' service in Egypt.

18-22.2.46 Violent demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere for the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and for the unity of the Nile Valley, followed by extensive rioting in which 15 are killed and 111 wounded. British Military installations attacked and British property damaged. The Anglican Cathedral and St. Joseph's Church also attacked. British and Egyptian military units intervene and restore order. (Al Masri & El Kutla)

19.2.46 Ahmad Hassanein Pasha, the King's Chief Chamberlain, killed in a car accident.

23.2.46 Al Azhar students resolve to boycott study of the English language for ten days. (Al Ahram) In reply to a British Note, the Egyptian Government declines to accept responsibility for the events of the preceding days, but agrees to pay for damage caused if Britain will pay compensation for the victims killed by British troops.

2.3.46 Arab League demands complete evacuation of the British from Egypt, including the Suez Canal Zone.

The Anglo-American Inquiry Committee on Palestine holds its first public meeting in Cairo.

4.3.46 Renewed rioting in Alexandria.

7.3.46 King Farouq appoints members of the Egyptian Delegation for the forthcoming Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for a revision of the Treaty. The Wafd Party is not represented on the Delegation. The Moslem Brotherhood offers reserved support to Sidki Pasha. The National Party remains opposed to the Talks.

25.3.—13.4.46 Third Session of the Arab League Council.

6.4.46 Foreign Exchange Agreement extended to 31.3.47.

14.4.46 British Delegation for Anglo-Egyptian Talks arrives in Egypt.

28.4.46 Elections for the seats of half the Deputies in the Egyptian Parliament.

3.5.46. It is officially announced that Sir F. Leith-Ross will be new Governor of the National Bank of Egypt.

5.5.46 Bomb explosion in Cairo wounds several British soldiers and A.T.S. girls.

7.5.46 Mr. Attlee announces British intention of withdrawing troops from Egypt, but reserves the right to fall back on the Treaty of 1936 if negotiations are unsatisfactory. Severe criticism of the Prime Minister's statement from the Opposition in the British Parliament.

9.5.46 After preliminary talks, lasting a few weeks, the official negotiations between the British and Egyptian Delegations start. Lord Stansgate and Sir Ronald Campbell, the new British Ambassador, head the British Delegation.

10.5.46 Election of the Coptic Patriarch.

19.5.46 Renewed anti-British rioting against Services personnel.

28.-29.5.46 Conference of Arab Heads of State and Crown Princes at Anchas near Cairo, at the invitation of King Farouq. Subjects discussed are: Palestine, Libya and the

Saudi-Hashemite dispute. Support given to Egyptian national aspirations.

31.5.46 British Embassy announces that Lord Stansgate has been recalled to London for consultations owing to difficulties in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. (Al Ahram)

11.6.46 F.-M. Montgomery arrives in Cairo for discussions prior to the assumption of his duties as C.I.G.S.

16.6.46 Egyptian Government announces the signing of an air pact with the United States and the purchase of surplus material left in Egypt by the U.S. Air Forces.

18.6.46 Haj Amin El Husseini arrives in Egypt after his escape from France and is received by King Farouq.

ETHIOPIA

16.6.46 In a press interview the Emperor Haile Selassie claims Eritrea. (Manchester Guardian)

IRAN

16.1.46 Iran asks UNO to deal with the Azerbaijan issue, the complaint being of Russian interference in her internal affairs.

18.1.46 Kurdish Democratic Party proclaims independence of a Kurdistan republic.

22.1.46 Ibrahim Hakim's cabinet resigns.

23.1.46 Arab tribesmen from southern Iraq under Sheikh Abdullah cross the Iranian frontier of Khuzistan Province (Arabistan) and create a frontier incident. The move is directed from Iraq.

25.1.46 Ghavam Sultaneh appointed Prime Minister.

28.1.46 UNO Security Council opens deliberations on presence of British troops in Greece and Indonesia and of Soviet troops in Iran.

4.2.46. It is announced that an Iranian mission will go to Moscow.

5.2.46 Ghavam Sultaneh states that he is ready to recognise the fait accompli of Azerbaijani autonomy.

15.2.46 Britain denies the Russian accusation that Imperial troops were sent to Teheran. The new Iranian cabinet is presented to the Shah.

18.2.46 Ghavam Sultaneh leaves for Moscow for negotiations.

2.3.46. British troops leave Iran. Russians withdraw to "disturbed areas" of Iran, causing apprehension in Iranian circles.

6.3.46 The Tudeh Party prevents the attendance of a quorum in the Majlis, thus helping Ghavam Sultaneh by making the prolongation of the present parliament impossible.

7.3.46 Ghavam Sultaneh leaves Moscow.

19.3.46 Iran lodges a protest with UNO against the presence of Russian troops on her territory.

20.3.46 Russia insists on the postponement of the Security Council's examination of Iran's protest.

24.3.46 Russians announce their intention of leaving Iran within six weeks.

4.4.46 Security Council postpones consideration of Iran's protest after Ala, Iranian Ambassador to U.S.A., requested the postponement in view of Russia's promise to leave Iran by the 6th May. Ghavam Sultaneh, the Prime Minister, addresses a Note to the Russian Ambassador in Teheran consenting to the formation of a Soviet-Iranian oil company in Northern Iran. An agreement based on this Note would be submitted for ratifica-

tion when the new Majlis opens but not later than 7 months after 24.3.46.

8.4.46 Soviet-Iranian agreement published. (Izvestia)

23.4.46 Agreement of mutual assistance signed by the Governments of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. (Saut al-Ahali)

29.4.46 Talks in progress between Djaffar Pishevari, Prime Minister of the autonomous Azerbaijan, and Ghavam Sultaneh for the re-establishment of Iranian authority over Azerbaijan.

6.5.46 Withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran completed.

14.5.46 Skirmishes between Kurds and Azerbaijanis in the North-Western Frontier districts.

21.5.46 Fighting between Iranian and Azerbaijani troops.

It is announced in Teheran that Soviet troops left Iran within the prescribed period.

22.5.46 Security Council of UNO considers situation in Iran in the absence of the Russian delegate.

13.6.46 An agreement signed between Iran and Azerbaijan, restoring Iranian authority in the province. Iranian Government will recognise the recently elected Azerbaijan Majlis as a Provincial Council. Azerbaijani language to be equal to Persian in schools; Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian also to be recognised.

14.6.46 Djaffar Pishevari, Democratic Party leader and Premier of Azerbaijan, resigns.

16.6.46 Salamullah Djavid, former Iranian Minister of Interior, becomes Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

IRAQ

6.1.46 Iraqi troops mass on frontier with Iran as precaution against the spread of trouble from Azerbaijan and to prevent new outbreak of the Kurdish Barazan revolt.

8.1.46 Jewish-made goods from Palestine seized in accordance with the decision to enforce a boycott of Zionist products.

9.1.46 At a session of Parliament severe criticism is directed against the Government for maladministration of the Kurdish districts. The administration is accused of being mainly responsible for the latent unrest among the Kurds, and their opposition to the central Iraqi Government. The debate started on the Financial Committee's proposal to increase the 1945 Government budget to cover the expenses incurred through the revolt of the Barazanis. (Al Sa'a & Al Balad)

15.1.46 Foreign Exchange Agreement with U.K. extended till 31.3.46. (Financial Times)

17.1.46 It is announced that the Government intends to build a state refinery at Baija, on the Tigris, 130 kms below Mosul.

29.1.46 The Cabinet of Hamdi al Bachachi resigns because of 'lack of coordination among the ministers'. The beginning of a long Cabinet crisis. (Al Alam al Arabi)

Feb. 1946 Transjordanian and Iraqi delegates headed by Emirs Abdullah and Abdul Ilah meet at Shune in Transjordan to discuss the Federation plan between the two countries. (Al Urdun)

15.2.46 Iraqi Government asks for the extradition of Rashid Ali, who found sanctuary with King Ibn Saud after his escape from Europe. Iraq's request was not granted.

22.2.46 "Al-Iraq" newspaper attacks Iran and calls for the annexation of the Arabistan province of

Iran, inhabited by Arab tribes.

23.2.46 New cabinet constituted under Toufiq Sweidi, who also holds the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. Other members of the new ministry are: Saad Saleh (Interior), Abdel Wahab Mahmud (Finance), Omar Nazmi (Justice), Ismail Nameq (Defence), Ali Mumtaz (Communications and Labour), Najib al-Rawi (Education), Ahmad Mukhtar Baban (Social Affairs), Abdul Hadi al-Zaher (Economy), Abdul Jaber al-Jalabi (Supply). (Al Nida)

26.2.46 The Information Office announces that the Iraqi Delegation to Turkey under Nuri al-Said will negotiate for cooperation in commercial, economic and financial matters, the improvement of communications, cultural matters and the regulation and exploitation of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. This announcement is made to check "untruthful rumours". (Al Iraq)

4.3.46 Kurdish unrest reported from Northern Iraq.

7.3.46 Iraq's desire to revise her treaty with Britain is voiced. British quarters do not give evidence of any intention to enter into negotiations for the revision of the Treaty. (Al Sa'a)

10.3.46 An economic and cultural treaty between Turkey and Iraq is announced.

14.3.46 Rumours of Russian troop movements in Iran cause widespread alarm.

17.3.46 The Tigris overflows its banks and breaches dams, rendering thousands homeless and causing extensive damage, particularly in the Basra region.

21.3.46 British troops take defence positions in the Kirkuk oilfields owing to general unrest in the area, and the revolt of the Iranian Kurds across the border.

9.4.46 Foreign Exchange Agreement with U.K. extended till 31.3.47. (Financial Times)

28.4.46 Additional troops despatched to guard the Iranian frontier against Kurdish guerillas operating in Azerbaijan.

30.5.46 Toufiq Sweidi resigns after extensive Cabinet reshuffles.

31.5.46 Iraq recognises Transjordan's independence.

1.6.46 New Cabinet formed under Arshad al-Omari, with Fadel al-Jamali (Foreign Affairs), Abdullah al-Kassab (Interior), Yusef Ganima (Finance and Supply), Mohammad Hassan Kuba (Justice), Said Hakki (Defence), Abdul Hadi al-Jalabi (Communications and Labour), Nuri al-Kadi (Education), Baba Ali al-Sheikh Mahmud (Economy), Dr. Abdul Hadi al Bachachi (Social Affairs).

28.6.46 Communist demonstrations in Baghdad. The Police disperse the demonstrators, firing into the mob, five killed, several injured. (Saut al Ahali)

LEBANON

2.1.46 Protest strike in Syria and Lebanon against the Anglo-French agreement on the Levant. (Alif Ba)

4.2.46 Joint Syrian-Lebanese Note sent to UNO, requesting withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant States. (Al Nahar)

16.2.46 Security Council of UNO expresses confidence in Anglo-French decision to withdraw troops from the Levant at an early date, the dispute is considered settled.

22.2.46 Lebanese delegation proceeds to Paris for negotiations with

the French Government, in the presence of a British representative, regarding the withdrawal of the Anglo—French forces. (Saut al Ahrar)

2-6.3.46 Franco-British military talks in Paris regarding withdrawal of troops from the Levant States.

6.3.46 Turkey recognises independence of Lebanon.
(Neue Zuericher Zeitung)

13.3.46 Moslem "Charity Committees" in Beirut form a Supreme Council to represent their interests. This step calls forth increased activity among the Maronites.
(Asia & Al Ittihad al Lubnani)

21.3.46 Lebanon accepts French proposals for withdrawal of troops. (Asia)

22.3.46 Commemorating the first Anniversary of the Arab League, King Farouq brings up the question of common citizenship. This provokes indignation in Maronite quarters in the Lebanon.
(Al Ittihad al Lubnani & Al Diyar)

3-4.4.46 Cabinet reshuffles owing to dissensions among the parties forming the Coalition Government.

8.4.46 Formal recognition of Lebanon by the Vatican, effected through exchange of letters between Pope and President Bishara el Khouri.
(New York Times)

1.5.46 Further Cabinet reshuffles.
(Saut al Ahrar)

9.5.46 At a Parliament session an incident between Emir Majid Arselan and Kamel Junublat (both Druze Deputies) takes a violent form following an exchange of accusations; Police intervene. (L'Orient)

18.5.46 Sami Sulh submits the resignation of his Cabinet.
(Beirut)

22.5.46 New Cabinet formed by Saadi el Munlah, who also holds the portofolio for Economy. Other Ministers are: Jibrail el Mur (Vice Premier and Labour), Ahmad el Husseini (Justice), Emir Majid Arselan (Defence, Health and Social Welfare), Emil Lahud (Finance), Philip Taqla (Foreign Affairs and Education), Saib Sallam (Interior), Yusef al Harawi (Agriculture, Posts & Telegraphs).
(Al Diyar)

June 1946 President Bishara el Khouri pays friendly visit to Turkey. Simultaneously, Nuri Pasha Said of Iraq is also present in Turkey.

LIBYA

1.2.46 Azzam Pasha, Secretary of Arab League, demands full independence for Libya.

28-29.5.46 At the Anchas Conference of Arab rulers, a decision is adopted calling for the independence of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and pledging support.

8-12.6.46 At the Bludan Conference of the Arab League a resolution is adopted demanding the independence of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and a plebiscite in these countries under the supervision of the Arab League.
(Alif Ba)

PALESTINE

The detailed diary of events in Palestine has been compiled with the kind assistance of G.S.I., H.Q., British Troops in Palestine & Transjordan.

IZL — "Irgun Zevai Leumi" (Military National Organization), a Jewish underground organization, responsible for most of the acts of sabotage and terrorism committed.

LHI — "Lohamey Heruth Israel" (Fighters for Freedom of Israel), also known as "Stern Group", extremist offshoot of IZL.

JRM — Jewish Resistance Movement, also known as "Hagana".

1.1.46 Boycott of Zionist goods begins.

Greek-Orthodox Patriarch His Beatitude Timotheus Themelis is knighted. (New Year Honours)

3.1.46 Arab Higher Committee which was constituted in November 1945, is recognised by the Government.

6.1.46 Anglo - American Inquiry Committee on Palestine holds its first meeting in Washington.

8.1.46 Instrument granting a concession for the projected Saudi-Arabian pipeline to cross Palestine territory is signed by the High Commissioner and Mr. W.J. Lenahan of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company.

12.1.46 IZL attack railway pay train and make off with LP.35,000.

16.1.46 A joint declaration made by Kings Ibn Saud and Farouq in support of the Palestine Arabs.

17.1.46 Ship carrying unauthorised Jewish immigrants intercepted by Royal Navy.

19.1.46 IZL and LHI attack Central Prison in Jerusalem.

20.1.46 Coastguard station at Givat Olga blown up by JRM.

Attempt to blow up RAF Radar station in Haifa foiled.

28.1.46 New Emergency Regulations enacted granting wide powers to the Police and Military authorities.

IZL raid RAF station at Aqir and make off with large quantities of arms, which are subsequently recovered.

31.1.46 Jewish protest strike.

Jan. 1946 Other events included extensive military searches in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Jewish settlements, and imposition of night curfew on roads.

4.2.46 LHI attack on Alamein Camp.

5.2.46 Jamal eff. el Husseini returns after years of exile.

6.2.46 Arms obtained from military camp near Tel Aviv.

15.1.46 Attempt to assassinate Police Spuerintendent of Haifa.

18.2.46 LHI radio transmitter captured.

20.2.46 RAF Radar station at Haifa blown up by JRM.

21.2.46 Sarona Police camp attacked by JRM. Four Jews killed. Police stations at Shafa Amr and Kefar Vitkin also raided.

23.2.46 Dr. Ch. Weizmann arrives in Palestine.

25.2.46 RAF stations and landing grounds at Qastina, Lydda and Kefar Sirkin raided by IZL and LHI. About 20 planes damaged and destroyed.

5.3.46 Anglo — American Inquiry Committee arrives in Jerusalem.

6.3.46 IZL raid Sarafand military camp and make off with a quantity of ammunition which is subsequently recovered. 11 Jews captured.

9.3.46 Jewish driver disguised in RAF uniform arrested whilst driving truck loaded with Sten guns, ammunition, bombs and military equipment. Believed to be proceeding to rendez-vous for raid.

14.3.46 About 2500 Jewish settlers re-establish settlement at Birya after its occupation by British troops a few days earlier. 24 original settlers of Birya are charged with possession of arms.

22.3.46 LHI assassinate former German Burgomaster of Sarona.

24.3.46 Yibna railway station attacked.

25/26.3.46 Incidents in Tel Aviv by JRM to cover expected disembarkation of unauthorised immigrants. Ship carrying these immigrants is intercepted, however, and brought to Haifa under escort of the Royal Navy.

March 1946 Telephonic communication with Great Britain restored.

2/3.4.46 IZL attack Isdud-Yibna railway line. Several bridges blown up. About 30 attackers captured, several wounded.

9.4.46 About 3000 Post Office employees begin strike for increased pay.

11.4.46 15 Jewish leaders begin hunger strike in sympathy with refugees arrested at Spezia (Italy).

13.4.46 IZL attack military leave camp at Natanya.

15.4.46 Strike of Arab and Jewish junior personnel of the Palestine Railways, Ports and Customs departments.

General protest strike by the Jewish population against the arrest of refugees at Spezia.

16.4.46 About 20,000 Second Division civil servants join strike against Government. Mixed Arab-Jewish pickets demonstrate identity of action between Jews and Arabs.

Road curfew lifted.

23.4.46 Government officials' strike ends in compromise.

IZL attack Police Post at Ramat Gan.

25.4.46 7 British soldiers killed in raid by LHI on W.D. car park at Tel Aviv.

27/28.4.46 Incidents between troops of 6 Airborne Division and Jews at Nathanya and Beer Tuvia.

1.5.46 Anglo-American Committee Report published.

3.5.46 Arab General strike in protest of the findings of the Committee.

5.5.46 Lieut. General Sir H.E. Barker arrives in Jerusalem, succeeding Lieut. General J.C. D'Arcy as G.O.C. British Troops in Palestine and Transjordan.

8.5.46 Soviet Vice-Consul at Beirut, M.B. Agronov, arrives for a few days' tour of Palestine.

13.5.46 Punitive evening curfew in Tel Aviv lifted after 14 days.

14.5.46 Vessel carrying unauthorised immigrants lands her passengers.

15.5.46 Shooting incident near Qastina camp.

Wagon on RAF train found broken into with loss of 134,000 rounds of ammunition.

19.5.46 Two more ships with unauthorised immigrants escorted to Haifa.

20.5.46 Barclays Bank at Nablus raided.

Arrival of two ships with refugees from Spezia.

21.5.46 U.S. State Department announces that the United States has begun consultations with Arab and Jewish interests and also with the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen.

23.5.46 Setting up of new Department of Commerce and Industry announced.

28.-29.5.46 Arab Rulers meet at Anchas (Egypt) and discuss Palestine problem.

31.5.46 Glubb Pasha's interview with

the London Daily Mail causes wide comment and resentment in the Jewish press.

1.6.46 Moscow radio says Palestine question should come before UNO.

Sentences on captured Birya settlers announced by Military Court.

3.6.46 Cornerstone of Weizmann Institute for Bio-Physics and Physical Chemistry laid at Rehovoth.

LHI announces resumption of radio broadcasts.

Military Court sentences 3 LHI members for possession of arms.

6.6.46 Military Court passes sentence on girl-member of LHI for illegal broadcasting.

7.6.46 Troops withdraw from Birya.

8.6.46 Arrival of refugee ship escorted to Haifa by R.N. units.

8.-12.6.46 Arab League Council meets at Bludan (Syria) and passes resolutions supporting the Arabs of Palestine. Representatives of the Arab parties from Palestine attend the Conference.

10.6.46 Publication of the news of the escape from France of Haj Amin el Husseini.

10/11.6.46 IZL wreck by sabotage three passenger trains in Lydda district and cause damage to railway line north and south of Lydda.

13.6.46 Two IZL members who took part in raid on Sarafand camp sentenced to death by Military Court.

16.6.46 F.-M. Montgomery arrives in Palestine during his tour of the M.E.

A military truck runs into an Arab crowd at Gaza hitting 9 people; outraged Arabs attack the truck and kill two British soldiers.

16-17.6.46 Widespread attacks carried out by JRM against rail and road communications, 8 frontier bridges destroyed on Lebanese, Syrian, Transjordanian and Egyptian frontiers. 15 of the saboteurs killed during the operations near Acre. IZL attack Lydda Railway station. LHI attack Railway workshops at Haifa, several killed, wounded and captured, including girls.

17-19.6.46 Widespread Military searches of Jewish settlements. Settlers offer passive resistance. Many arrests made. Several Jews wounded and two killed in Kefar Giladi in the course of the Military searches. Night curfew on roads.

18.6.46 IZL shoot and kidnap British officers in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. One of them escapes two days later, two others are released on 22.6.46. The remaining three are kept as hostages for two IZL members sentenced to death by Military Court.

19.6.46 Jewish premises in Palestine put out of bounds to troops until the return of kidnapped officers. 19 hours' curfew imposed on Tel Aviv.

20.6.46 British officer shoots Jew in Tel Aviv.

21.6.46 Arms cache found in Potash Works area.

24.6.46 Arms cache found near Rehovoth.

26.6.46 A refugee ship escorted into Haifa port.

27.6.46 31 IZL members sentenced by Military Court to 15 years' and life imprisonment.

29.6.46 Operation "Agatha" commences: curfew in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, High Commissioner issues proclamation, Jewish Agency

offices occupied and leaders arrested, 25 Jewish agricultural settlements searched in face of settlers' passive resistance, 5 Jews killed, thousands arrested necessitating the establishment of new detention camp at Rafa.

30.6.46 At Yagur a number of arms caches were found during search.

SAUDI ARABIA

10.1.46 King Ibn Saud arrives in Egypt on a state visit.

1.2.46 King Ibn Saud announces that he will not surrender Rashid Ali to Iraq.

2.2.46 Saudi Arabian delegate to UNO announces that Saudi Arabia will shortly lay claim to Maan and Aqaba in Transjordan. (Arab News Agency)

28-29.5.46 At the Anchas Conference, at which Saudi Arabia is represented by Emir Saud, the strained relations between Transjordan and Saudi Arabia are discussed. (Al Hadith)

SUDAN

26.3.46 Mr. Bevin states that there will be no change in the status of the Sudan until the Sudanese have been consulted through constitutional channels. (Times)

SYRIA

2.1.46 Protest strikes in Syria and Lebanon against Anglo-French Agreement on the Levant. (Alif Ba)

10.1.46 An incident occurs in Parliament between Akram el Hourani and Sheikh Trad el Milham, when the former demands the suspension of subsidies from Government to Tribal Chiefs. Shots are fired, the Police intervene. (Al Ittihad al Lubnani)

Sheikh Trad el Milham, Chief of the Hassana Tribe, killed by 2 Bedouins of the Naim Tribe, the alleged cause being a blood feud between the two Tribes. (Al Kabas & Al Insha)

12.1.46 It is reported from Paris that the Syrian Government is closing all French schools throughout Syria. (Le Monde)

13.1.46 Naim al Antaki resigns from Cabinet. (Al Kabas)

24.1.46 Students demonstrate in Damascus against teachers and lecturers who associated themselves with the arrested Trade Union Leaders in Egypt. (Al Kabas)

4.2.46 Joint Syrian-Lebanese Note sent to UNO, requesting withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant States. (Al Nahar)

16.2.46 Security Council of UNO expresses confidence in Anglo-French decision to withdraw troops from the Levant at an early date, the dispute is considered settled.

5.3.46 Turkish Consul in Damascus confirms Turkish desire unconditionally to recognise the independence of Syria & Lebanon. (Saut al Shaab & Neue Zuericher Zeitung)

11.3.46 British and French troops begin withdrawal from Syria.

13.3.46 Faris el Khouri, head of Syrian Delegation to UNO, expresses Syrian desire for simultaneous evacuation of British and French Forces from the Levant, their respective proposed dates for completion of the withdrawal being at present 30.6.46 and 1.4.47.

11.4.46 A delegation from Djebel Alawite arrives in Damascus to submit to the President of the Republic a demand for an Alawite Minister in the Government, an Alawite

Governor for Djebel Alawite and an amnesty for Suleiman el Murshid. They threaten to secede from Syria if these demands are not met.

17-18.4.46 Celebrations in Damascus commemorating the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Syrian territory. Representatives of Djebel Druze absent from the celebrations. (Al Ahbar and Al Djebel).

27.4.46 New Cabinet formed by Saadallah al Jaabri, who also holds the portofolio for Foreign Affairs. Other Ministers are: Khaled al Azzam (Justice and Economy), Sabri al Assali (Interior), Ahmad al Sharabati (Education), Edmond el Homsi (Finance), Mikhail Alian (Labour), Nabih al Azma (Defence). (Al Kifah)

13.5.46 Interior Minister dissolves all Political Organisations, (Al Arab)

8-12.6.46 The Arab League Council meets at Bludan near Damascus. Delegations come from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria. Representatives of the Palestine Arab parties also present. Prof. Ph. Hitti from U.S.A. is among the guests. Brigadier Clayton in attendance. The main resolutions are in support of the Palestine Arabs. Other resolutions recommend to the Arab governments to assist Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to attain their independence, and to support Egyptian national aspirations for the unity of the Nile Valley and the evacuation of foreign troops. An appeal to Britain for an Anglo-Arab conference on Palestine is also made. (Alif Ba)

16.6.46 Nabih al Azma resigns from Cabinet. Emir Adel Arselan enters the Cabinet as Education Minister, Ahmad al Sharabati taking the portofolio for Defence.

TRANSJORDAN

17.1.46 Mr. Bevin announces to UNO Britain's decision to make Transjordan an independent state. (Beirut)

30.1.46 Emir Abdullah's Memoirs published, causing stir among the Arab public outside Transjordan.

Feb. 46 Transjordanian and Iraqi delegates headed by Emirs Abdullah and Abdul Ilah meet at Shune in Transjordan to discuss the Federation plan between the two countries. Palestine and the situation in the Arab East also discussed. (Al Urdun).

2.2.46 Saudi Arabian delegate to UNO announces that Saudi Arabia will shortly lay claim to Aqaba and Maan. (Arab News Agency)

22.2.46 Emir Abdullah and Ibrahim Pasha Hashem arrive in London for treaty negotiations.

22.3.46 Treaty of Independence signed with Great Britain in London. By the provisions of an appendix Britain retains the right to hold military bases in Transjordan.

7.4.46 During a debate in the U.S. Senate the view is expressed that the Transjordan Treaty is a violation of the Mandate.

23.5.46 The Legislative Council of Transjordan passes a law changing Transjordan's constitution of 1928. The words "H.H. The Emir" will be replaced by "H.M. The King", the name "Transjordan" will become "The Transjordanian Hashemite Kingdom".

(Official Gazette of Transjordan)

25.5.46 Emir Abdullah proclaimed King of independent Transjordan.

31.5.46 Iraq recognises Transjordan's

independence.

19.6.46 The Anglo - Transjordanian Treaty ratified by both sides. (Official Gazette of Transjordan)

TURKEY

7.1.46 The Turkish Prime Minister, M. Sarajoglu, rejects Soviet claims to Kars and Ardahan.

8.1.46 Formation of new Democratic Party under Jelal Bayar announced (first opposition party in Turkey since Ataturk). (Times)

15.2.46 Reciprocal Air Agreement announced between U.S.A. and Turkey, whereby Pan-American Airways receive right to land for traffic at Istanbul and Ankara. (N.Y. Times)

10.3.46 An economic and cultural treaty between Turkey and Iraq is announced.

14.3.46 Anglo-Turkish Air Agreement announced providing for BOAC to run London-Ankara service with stop at Istanbul. (N.Y. Times)

5.4.46 U.S. Battleship "Missouri" pays official visit to Turkey.

1.6.46 A number of villages destroyed in earthquake N.W. of Lake Van. Over 1,000 dead. (Sunday Times)

9.6.46 Dissolution of the National Assembly voted.

YEMEN

11.5.46 Col. William Eddy, U.S. Minister to Saudi Arabia, establishes diplomatic relations with Imam Yihya of Yemen. (N.Y. Times).

BOOK REVIEWS

"LAWRENCE THE REBEL" by Edward Robinson. (Lincolns-Prager, London 1946, pp. 228, 12/6).

The value of this book is that it supplements all others about Lawrence by providing a clear bird's-eye view of the historical setting of the Arab revolt. The author states the aims which he wishes to achieve, which are to help the man in the street to understand Lawrence, and to understand the "reasons for the present tangle of troubles in the Middle East".

He does not achieve his first purpose, perhaps because, as he clearly and frequently admits, he himself did not understand Lawrence, but also because no other book, not even "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom", has been able satisfactorily to explain him. Of Lawrence's methods and activities no analysis or description is attempted. For instance, when it is mentioned that Lawrence stopped an incipient brawl between a force of Beduin nomads and an Egyptian Army unit, who were apparently criticising each other's fighting methods and courage, we are not told what he said to each side. Personal observations are uniformly external, as they are bound to be of a man who did not or could not give himself away, yet the Lawrence of this book is familiar because the author nowhere commits the indelicacy of trying to offer us a new Lawrence.

There is some indication of the setting of the famous story, for mention of the poisonous reptiles in the Wadi Sirhan, winter death from exposure on Abu El Lissan, and the cliff avenue of Rumm stir memories of the magical and lovely savagery of the country which has been described elsewhere, but, superimposed on this pocket history are the objectively presented details of the political antics which followed Lawrence's stirring up of Islam's inert centuries of subjection to the Turk.

The true purpose of the book, which is listed second by the author, is undoubtedly achieved. The evidence against secret diplomacy is simply marshalled and devastatingly complete. Ample quotations from State documents confirm that time and time again a policy was initiated, with some small community, whose interests were in no way considered, as a pawn. The remarkable outlook on foreign affairs current in European Great Power circles is exemplified by a quoted telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Moscow in March, 1916: "It is clear that by utilising the Zionist idea important political results can be obtained". And when the Sherif of Mecca complains that there are five British policies emanating respectively from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, the Egyptian Protectorate and the Indian Government, we are bound to sympathise with him, as on the occasion when he says he realises there must be changes in the situation, necessitating the modification of agreements, — "Only inform me fully and frankly". The McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration and the squabbling for spheres of

interest after the capture of Syria are all seen as born of a political ideology that never thought for a moment of the people whose lives these decisions would affect. The facts are presented in a detached manner that convinces absolutely. The diagrammatic political maps clarify several points, but the selective index is of doubtful value, and several rather important typographical errors might have been avoided.

In the last few pages, the deep disgust felt concerning the political machinations which surrounded Lawrence's unique achievement is cleverly projected into a description of the post-war years, when the mystery man was hounded by a strident and ruthless press campaign from job to job, and from continent to continent, although his real desire seemed to be for a Clouds Hill existence. The book ends fittingly with the quotation of the royal platitude after his death.

B. H. Stone

"IRAN" by William S. Haas. (Columbia University Press, New York 1946, pp. 273, $5).

Critical admiration is the correct attitude of a biographer, and Dr. Haas has achieved it admirably in his portrait of the Iranian people. Persian character is drawn against the background of historic perspective and some features of unity are traced through all the phases of a turbulent record. Of these, the most striking is a tenacious sense of individuality which kept this gifted people from being submerged in successive wars of conquest and invasion. The Persians were always strong enough not only to preserve their own ethos intact, but also to impose it upon their conquerors. They taught mysticism and handicrafts to the Arabs and fine arts and architecture to the Mongols. During the Arab period they were the leading partners in a cultural renascence not their own, and when the Caliphate receded they passed immediately to an equal florescence in their own Persian medium. A people which can produce an Arab poet such as Mutanabbi and its own Firdausi and Hafiz in such swift transition must be credited with resilience. And the same story is true in all the fields of artistry and grace in which the Persian hallmark is of wide renown.

Dr. Haas considers that Persia never submitted wholeheartedly to the mentality of Islam. It is characteristic of her temper that she chose the dissident branch of Shi'ism and eccentric Sufi expressions in preference to orthodox Sunna and rationalism. Dissidence was also her political attitude, and she was most peaceful under the Samanid, and later the Safavid, dynasties, which expressed a specifically Iranian personality. Dr. Haas shows how even Persian social history has a different character from that of other Muslim politics. The specific feature is the arbitrary monarchy which had no intermediate class of nobles and courtiers between itself and the people. This was as true of Riza Shah as it was of Achaemenians and Sassanians. In an interesting passage Dr. Haas speculates on whether the conception of a divine king may not have been Iran's gift to the Roman world. He has an excellent chapter on Persian psychology which he reads in terms of history. The

swift collapse and resurgence of empire instilled a sense of transience and with it the desire to grasp a moment of happiness "in annihilation's waste".

Many readers will turn avidly to the chapter on Riza Shah, to whom Dr. Haas awards the palm of greatness for his drastic steps of modernisation. The man was elementally great: there were no adventitious aids. He understood neither the old civilisation which he was bent on transforming, nor the new patterns of the West which he was determined to introduce. For this reason 'the suffering and anguish he caused troubled him not at all, for he was himself untouched'. Doubtless a radical operation was under the circumstances preferable to more gradual treatment. He was 'the scourge of the nation' as Dr. Haas admits, but nothing less than despotism could have set up a momentum of change against the old inertia. If Iran had to undergo this operation at all, it is a pity that it was never completed.

The outlook is beyond Iranian control, for it lies in the behest of the world powers. Geography is too strong for national independence: how to keep her sovereignty alive against the rivalry of Russia and Britain will test Iranian statesmanship in this generation as exactingly as in the nineteenth century. Should she be enabled to achieve the miracle 'her genius again will contribute lavishly to civilisation, as it has done in the past'.

A.S.E.

"PALESTINE: PROBLEM AND PROMISE" — An Economic Study by Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Gass and Daniel Creamer. (The American Council on Public Affairs, Washington 1946, pp. 675, $5).

The struggle for the future of Jewish Palestine has produced, as an important by-product, the most comprehensive and searching study to date of Palestine's economic and social problems. The literature on Palestine includes an imposing array of treatises on economic subjects, written mainly by Palestinians. There was only one case when a complete team of non-official surveyors was sent to Palestine in order to complete their report on the spot. It was the report of the experts submitted to the Joint Palestine Survey Commission, which visited Palestine in 1928. But it should be said from the outset that the Nathan-Gass-Creamer Report carries incomparably greater weight than the expert survey of 1928, not only because the present authors were all trained economists of note, and that a qualified staff of assistants in the U.S.A. helped in the preparation of the material and analyses, but also because our knowledge of Palestine's potentialities and the sources of information in Palestine have now reached a level not anticipated at that time. It is largely owing to these favourable changes in the Palestine vista that the authors were able to write, in a relatively short time, an extremely comprehensive survey, and to apply their outstanding analytical capacities to a problem of such a complex character as that of Palestine.

The survey is divided into four parts, as follows: —

Part I — Summary of Conclusions.

Part II — Perspective in Time and Space. — This part deals with the geographical and historical background of the modern Palestine question and dwells in particular on the Middle-Eastern scene.

Part III — Palestine Today. — In this part a searching account is given of the country's present economic and social structure, with due regard to geographical and natural factors. The main weight rests on analyses of present-day agriculture, industry, housing and construction, transport and services, trade relations and finance.

Part IV — Palestine in the Next Decade — examines the development potentialities of Palestine. It proceeds from an estimate of between 600,000 and 1,500,000 as the immigration potential of the coming ten years. The main chapters in this part cover the water and power potentialities, agriculture, housing and construction, commercial policy, services and finance during the postwar decade.

Every account of Modern Palestine has to start with an appraisal of the line taken by the Mandatory. Many readers will find themselves in hearty agreement with the authors in their treatment of this issue. The Palestine Government is accused of having been deficient in the fulfilment of its positive obligation to develop to the utmost the resources of the country. Comments like 'It cannot, in all candour, be said that the Government of Palestine has been imbued with more than the faintest conceptions of the large and bold innovations in domestic and international economic policy that will be required if rapid economic growth is to be assured in the next decade,' express precisely what numerous students of Palestine affairs felt when contemplating the role of her Government. Yet it should in fairness have been added, in connection with this and similar strictures, that the responsibilities of the Mandatory were assumed at a time when the interpretation of the duties of governments in the economic and social sphere were quite different from that of the thirties, which ushered in the "Planning Age". However the new trends remained without effect upon the Palestine Government. There are frequently pat remarks on such questions of policy and illustrations to be found in the various parts of this book, and although the Palestinian economy and its conditions are in a state of flux, this penetrating analysis of a major issue will hold true for quite a while.

The most balanced and important part of the book is that devoted to an analysis of existing conditions in Palestine. Here a genuine and deep understanding of the issues involved is revealed. The author stresses the essentially sound structure of the Palestinian economy and its remarkable achievements in recent years, when the war provided a chance and a stimulus to demonstrate the country's productive forces. There are many remarkable details that have been brought to light in this part, not the least among them being the picture given of the growth of Arab agriculture during the inter-war period in consequence of the reciprocal relations between the Jewish and the Arab economy. This Arab-Jewish inter-dependence is a feature, which, especially in its quantitative aspects, has not always been sufficiently appreciated by foreign students of

the Palestine scene.

There cannot be many communities in the world that would be able to produce such a record within a relatively short period. An appropriate note of warning is sounded in the repeated references to the necessity of raising the competitive power of Jewish production, notably industrial, if future schemes of expansion are to materialise.

The new American Report means a great stride also in methodology, if compared with previous attempts at measuring the economic potentialities of the country. Palestinian economists have for some time employed similar methods with a view to arriving at certain quantitative ideas about the requirements of a large Jewish mass immigration. The problem in itself is not new. Time and again Zionist experts were called upon to furnish particulars regarding the economic preconditions of such a mass immigration and its effects from the viewpoint of a balanced economy. The entire fourth part of the book under review is devoted to this problem. In a most interesting and stimulating manner, the authors discuss the possibilities and preconditions of such an expansion in the various fields, arriving at thoroughly satisfactory conclusions.

It is only natural that so comprehensive a study should provide ample opportunity for comment and criticism. Apart from the views of the authors on admittedly controversial matters, there are chapters where the impression of a somewhat airy and presumptuous treatment is produced. This applies in particular to the sections dealing with the Middle Eastern background of the Palestine problem. Even the imposing—and somewhat arbitrary — bibliography used by the authors cannot do away with this feeling. There is a measure of unreality in the proposal to introduce new methods of immigration control. According to this proposal, Jewish immigration into Palestine should be made dependent upon calculations proving that the standard of living of Jews and Arabs in Palestine has not declined below a certain level.

There are also some minor slips and misquotations that require to be set right, because they have a bearing on certain findings. The condition of most prospective Jewish immigrants into Palestine is described as being weakened and destitute, and therefore large non-income-earning expenditure would, according to the authors, be required. To judge from the arrivals in Palestine during the past ten months, the bulk of the immigrants are in quite a good shape and in an immediate position to do physical work.

That the Soviet Union should now be inclined to favour Zionism is a somewhat premature statement, even if some Russian Trade Union Delegation in London has dropped a few benevolent remarks. In the chapter on financial and fiscal problems, the authors discuss the newly introduced taxation of capital gains from sales of land and real property, commending the Government for this step. Unfortunately, this praise is given in vain, no such tax having so far been inaugurated.

The authors overrate the significance of the sterling balances for the finance of the new development. A large proportion of the sterling assets has already been earmarked for investment not only in order to re-

plenish stocks and equipment but also to finance the tremendous housing needs of the resident Palestinian population. The amount of the balances actually available for new development purposes is thus considerably lower than 90 to 100 million pounds, as put by the authors (to say nothing of the question of England's policy with regard to the utilisation of such balances).

However, as said before, these are but minor deficiencies in this otherwise excellently composed and written survey. There is no glorification of Zionist achievements in Palestine nor any tendency to condone or explain away Zionist mistakes or blunders. Certainly, the authors do not conceal that they take a positive and very firm stand indeed in the matter of the Jewish reconstruction effort in Palestine. But they do not identify themselves with the Zionist viewpoint, neither do they ignore the political considerations and all the other factors involved in Jewish mass immigration on a large scale. It is therefore, all the more gratifying to note that the Report confirms, in principle, the views previously expressed by Palestinian economists on the feasibility of such an economic development, given certain prerequisite conditions.

The positive answer, coming as it does from so authoritative a source, will go far to dissipate the doubts still entertained with regard to the country's possibilities for mass immigration, and to carry the whole issue from the stage of a theoretical discussion of Palestine's economic absorptive capacity to the next ones, those of planning and implementation.

A.B.

"AN ARAB TELLS HIS STORY" by Edward Atiyeh. (John Murray, London 1946, pp. 226, 12/6).

This is something more than a straight autobiography. Mr. Atiyeh's aim is to illustrate from his own experience the impact of a western culture upon an eastern background. The process is now admitted on all sides to be salutary, but it is not without its embarrassments. The Arab, exposed to the full brilliance of European thought feels a conflict within himself between the old tradition and the new potentiality. In political terms this may become a problem of divided loyalty, with the semi-westernised Arab living in two worlds and finding himself at home in neither. Instinctive attachment to his own inheritance competes with the blandishments of a new and broader world. The Arab world regards him as an exile and the West declines to accept him without reserve.

Mr. Atiyeh's story portrays this dilemma with sensitive feeling and subtlety. As a student of the Victoria College in Alexandria he shared the motives and outlooks of his English mentors far more than the incipient stirrings of Egyptian nationalism. He became superior to his environment and slavishly enamoured of the English values. By this account he must have been an appalling prig, and the reader sighs with relief to see him become liberated from his self-immolation. At Oxford the western imprint became even deeper, the alienation from Arab life more conscious and deliberate. The turning point was

service in the Sudan, where discrimination against the "native" shocked Mr. Atiyeh and stirred his pride towards an enthusiastic nationalism. Once embarked upon this road he has never looked back, the prodigal son has a deeper sense of affinity with home than those who have never strayed, and Mr. Atiyeh has become the spokesman of a people whose aspirations once raised no echo in his heart.

The psychological and social problems of westernisation are more easily grasped in this simple and factual pattern than in more abstract descriptions. As long as Mr. Atiyeh sticks to his last he has a fascinating story to tell, his views on general political problems are less worthy of attention and the exposition is sometimes marred by exclamatory hysteria. But these faults as well as many other virtues may be symptoms of the condition which Mr. Atiyeh describes so well.

Abdullah H. Kissawi

"LE PANARABISME" by Jean Lugol. (Scribe Egyptien, Cairo 1946 pp. 307, 850 mils).

As the author says in his foreword, 'the need was felt for a long time of a practical book easy to read, devoted to the great religious, political, social and diplomatic problems which disturb the Arab world at present.'

Does the book, which the author, chief editor of the "Bourse Egyptien", presents to us, answer this need? Is it, as the author puts it, 'a synthesis of what we know of the Arabs and the Arabised nations'? Frankly, we don't believe it, and though the author gives us credentials of knowledge of the Arab world, we are afraid he has missed the mark.

The title is deceiving: Panarabisme. Three quarters of the book are in fact devoted to the Arabs, but it surveys specially the development of Islam, and of Pan-Islamism. We think it makes one suspect, and not wrongly, that Pan-Arabism is only a new name given to an old notion — Pan-Islamism. Under the excuse that there exists a vast semitic linguistic group, the author embraces in the semitic races, and particularly in the Arab group, all the people of very different origins who, on one side speak Arabic and on the other side, profess Islam.

Leading up from his postulate that Arabs and Islam are the same thing, the author speaks continually of the "Arab Empire" when he should speak of the Arab, Egyptian and Turkish Empires. These empires and their rulers have a common link, a very strong one too: Islam! But to speak of Mohammad Ali as an Arab, when he was an Albanian, or of a Turkish Sultan like Bajazet as an Arab, seems to us a hasty generalisation. Till recently, moreover, Egypt claimed a kinship with Pharaonic antiquity, and its ruling class was in the great majority formed of Turks and Albanians. Zaghloul Pasha himself said once on a famous occasion: 'We are not Arabs, we are Egyptians'.

Regarding Palestine, the author has analysed some documents relevant to the Mandate, which show that the leaders of the Arab "Nahdah" (Renaissance) did not look askance on the Jewish aspirations in Palestine. As the author says, these documents show

'that if Arabs and Zionists had followed their deep feeling, they could have built up a Palestine very different from what we see now'.

The last chapters of the book are devoted to analysis, which is much too rapid and summary for our taste, of the different Arab kingdoms of the Middle East. Amongst the interesting documents which are quoted by the author, we find the Alexandria Protocol, the first document of the Arab League, and the Pan-Arab Pact of Cairo. Finally we shall quote Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, General Secretary of the Arab Leauge, whom, we are astonished, the author, who is learned in Biblical scriptures, has not contested: 'This nation (the Arab Nation) is proud not only of its first ancestors, but also to have given to the world the greatest prophets, the greatest reformers. We have only to quote Moses, Jesus and Mohammad...' We believed, till now, that Moses and Jesus were Jews. The author's conclusion is pervaded by a deep faith in the destinies of Pan-Arabism.

Maxime Piha

"PILGRIM IN ARABIA" by H. St. John B. Philby. (Robert Hale, London 1946, pp. 198, 16/-).

A thrilling and captivating account by one of the few Europeans who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Philby's gift for observation and presentation of things seen, turns seemingly dull objects into centres of interest. The reader partakes of the author's thrills. He gracefully intertwines historical background with his scenery, and produces a work of value for students of the Arabian Peninsula. Philby, the traveller and explorer of great renown, has again given full vent to his literary qualities.

A chapter on his trip to Persia, which opens with a tirade against British diplomatic practices in the East, though interesting as a journey narrative, has no actual relevance to the main theme of the book.

Shibli Karameh

"ARABIA PHOENIX" by G. de Gaury. (Harrap, London 1946, pp. 169, 10/6).

Another specimen of those east-glamorising booklets that have flooded the market during the last two years. A dull and very dry description of a journey across central Arabia from Al Hassa in the Persian Gulf to Jedda. The author, who spent a considerable time in the Arab East, seems to have travelled with his eyes half-opened, and the account he gives reminds one of "Alice in Wonderland". Several of his descriptions and historical digressions are only partly accurate. His dilettantism is particularly noticeable in his appendices. One would have expected that an author, with de Gaury's background, could produce a work of greater value.

Shibli Karameh

"MIND ON THE MARCH" by Somerset de Chair. (Faber & Faber, London 1945, pp. 125, 10/6).

"TIME IN THE EAST" by Evan John. (Heinemann, London 1946, pp. 230, 15/-).

Two junior intelligence officers, inebriated with their own importance, describe supercilliously their personal reactions during their trips undertaken while on furlough and sick leave in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. Having served for some time with the Middle East Forces, they credit themselves with intimate knowledge of conditions in this part of the world, and gloss superficially over aspects affecting these conditions. They also believe they have literary talent, which obviously prompted them to write these books.

Ahmad S.

"THE BIG THREE" by J. Dallin. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London 1946, pp. 232, 8/6).

Mr. Dallin has evidently been devoting intelligence and care to his newspaper reading. The result has been to present us with an admirably concise account of what must be already familiar to any other intelligent reader of the daily and weekly press Such an account will neverthless be of great value to the rest of us, who have acquired a certain importance through the sheer weight of our numbers. And there is always some value in having a clear and readable statement, however superficial, of the main facts of our situation and of its evolution.

The fight for bases, power, oil and the usual concomitants of this time-hallowed struggle would have made a dismal story. But it has acquired a certain Sophoclean grandeur from its awful inevitability. One year ago we might have imagined that atomic explosives had broken the chain of events, but today few people believe it. Rightly or wrongly the world has relapsed into the traditional outlook which will make this book again relevant. Britain's policy as a continuation of the old "Balance of Power" concept, American policy as the struggle for naval supremacy, security on land, oil and more oil, Russian policy as the continuation of Tzarist expansionism, all this is very familiar. The picture of Russian and British expansion as two torrents rolling towards each other and the inevitable climax is only marred by the mixed metaphor on page 107 in which the torrents are described as 'hating, fearing each other'.

The readers of this Journal will be more interested in the author's analysis of the impact of the Big Three on the Middle East. Here our confidence in the facts is shaken by his taste for relying on newspaper articles. The June 1944 issue of "Fortune" may or may not be the best authority on the oil resources of the Middle East. Somehow one wishes that the author had gone to some more original source for the purpose. However, we are given a useful analysis of the different ways in which oil has attracted the great powers to the Middle East and how they have acted in the context. Communications too are accorded their due importance. One feels, however, that no picture of the Middle East can be complete which ignores the real if pitiably unequal

social struggle in the Arab world, or which views the Palestine problem merely as that of a conflict between Jews and Arabs. And yet these issues are very relevant to the theme of the book, since by no stretch of the imagination can the great Powers be regarded as neutral in either struggle.

In so far as the author has provided us with an intelligent description of what we ought in any case to have known we are grateful. The omissions and distortions arise from a particular outlook on history rather than from any lack of objectivity. The author has given us an honest account of the situation as he sees it, our complaint is that he has not troubled to use the right end of the telescope.

J. Gillis

"PERSIA AND THE POWERS" by A. H. Hamzavi. (Hutchinson, London 1946, pp. 125, 7/6).

An interesting documentary account of diplomatic relations between Persia and the Great Powers during the war years until the beginning of 1946. In spite of obvious partisanship of the author, who is the Press Attaché of the Persian Embassy in London, the book sheds interesting light on the relations among the various parties involved in the Russo-Persian dispute. The exchange of Notes and the speeches made at the sessions of the Security Council illustrate clearly the technique adopted by Russia. This dispute was also one of the first tests of the elasticity of the newly created international machinery, which was called upon to intervene in what may have become a major conflict. Although such conflict was averted, yet it is too early to say whether the strain on the new machinery would leave it without cracks. Mr. Hamzavi's account also reveals that Russia has completely adapted herself to the niceties of diplomatic parley and has taken full advantage to force her view dialectically whenever an ambiguity of expressions used in Notes allowed it.

Proceedings of the Middle East Society of Jerusalem

12th March, 1946:	*British Interests in the Middle East* Read by: Major M. COMAY Chairman: Dr. A. BONNÉ
12th June, 1946:	*Abraham's Religion** Lecturer: Dr. H. von den STEINEN Chairman: Major A. S. EBAN
26th June, 1946:	*History of the British Consulate in Jerusalem* Speaker: Mr. W. HOUGH Chairman: M. R. NEUVILLE
30th July, 1946:	*Arab Technical Education*** Lecturer: Mr. W. A. STEWART Chairman: Mr. AHMAD S. KHALIDI, M.B.E.
22nd August, 1946:	*Towards an Efficient Press Organisation in Palestine* Speaker: Mr. R. B. DURRANT Chairman: Dr. IBRAHIM B. GEORGE, M. Sc., D.D.S.
23rd September, 1946:	*A Year as an Intelligence Officer in Palestine* Speaker: Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. M. M. C. CHARTERIS, O.B.E. Chairman: Lt. Col. P. L. O. GUY
31st October, 1946:	*Recent Research on the Text of the Koran**** Lecturer: Prof. A. JEFFERY, Columbia University Chairman: AREF BEY EL AREF, O.B.E.

* This lecture will be published in the next issue of the Journal.
** This lecture was cancelled owing to curfew in Jerusalem.
*** This lecture will be published in the next issue of the Journal.

Printed in Palestine
at the
Ronald Press, Jerusalem.