International Theories and Changes in foreign Policy

The Case of US Foreign Policy: 1991 - 2003

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النظريات الدولية والتغيرات في السياسة الخارجية

السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية: 1991 - 2003

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
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
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
The Case of US Foreign Policy: 1991 - 2003

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ODEH KAMEL

MAY 31, 2008

To ...

My Family

My Country

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the demise of the Cold War, it was noticed that the divergence of findings in the US foreign policy attitudes towards multilateralism via the UN and NATO and unilateralism was dominant. Three main wars reflected the US variation of behaviors:

A) Iraq 1990/1991: the US leads a war against Iraq/Saddam approved by the UN. In 1991, the US went positively to highly engage the UN in solving or dealing with the Iraqi conflict.

B) Yugoslavia and the US: the US suppresses Serbia through NATO intervention in 1999 without an authorization from the UN.

C) Iraq 2003: the US attacks Iraq unilaterally. Turning to the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of unilateralism has obviously been prevailing in the US military action against Iraq in 2003.

The US fluctuating behaviors have been challenging the major theories of international relations which created some downsides. Neo-Realists and institutionalists / pluralists have strongly argued over the interrelationship and interaction between a superpower and international organizations. Each theory views such interaction differently and this yields to totally diverse interpretations and findings. Institutionalism contends that international organizations profoundly matter in foreign policy whereas neorealists counteract such allegations claiming that institutions in their best shape have minimal influence on state behavior. Accordingly, a theoretical setback has emerged when it comes to scrutinize the US three wars.

My endeavor here is to find out an answer to the thesis question: **How can we explain the three different paths used by the US: with the UN, with another international organization, and then unilaterally?** The three case studies mentioned above are going to be subjects to explore the applicability and explanatory value of the two theories, neorealists and institutionalists, and which of them is so powerful to better describe the three cases studies. Besides, I would add the democratic domestic politics hypothesis in my analysis. This attempt will cover an important and indispensable aspect in international relations where its contribution was disregarded by the two theories although US political leaders in all cases never ignored such variable in their decision - making process. Moreover, the substantial

analysis will show the major flaws of each theory in terms of their comprehensive coverage of the US behavior. I would suggest the pendulum instrument as a measurable, clarifying tool to substantially demonstrate the interaction among international theories and the US foreign politics. In the end, we will come up with the conclusion whether one of them is pertinent to perfectly and extensively describe and explain the US behavior or rather we wind up to a totally different analysis.

ملخص الرسالة

في أعقاب نهاية الحرب الباردة، لقد بات واضحا سيطرة اختلاف المعطيات تجاه "المؤسساتية" من خلال الأمم المتحدة وحلف شمال الأطلسي، وكذلك تجاه مبدأ "الأحادية" فيما يتعلق بتوجهات السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية. لقد عكست ثلاث حروب هذا التغير في السلوك:

1. **حرب العراق 1991/1990:** قادت أمريكا الحرب ضد العراق بموافقة الأمم المتحدة، حيث عمدت أمريكا لإشراك الأمم المتحدة في حل أو التعامل مع المسالة العراقية.

2. **يوغسلافيا والولايات المتحدة:** قمعت واشنطن صربيا من خلال تدخل حلف الناتو في العام 1999 وهذه المرة دون تفويض من الأمم المتحدة.

3. **حرب العراق 2003:** لقد حاربت أمريكا العراق بشكل أحادي. مع بداية القرن الحادي والعشرين، بدا مفهوم الأحادية مسيطرا في الهجمة العسكرية الأمريكية على العراق.

شكل السلوك المتأرجح للسياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة الأمريكية تحديا كبيرا لنظريات العلاقات الدولية الرئيسة مما نتج عن ذلك بعض الإخفاقات النظرية. لقد فسر كل من الواقعيين

والليبراليين الجدد التفاعل والتداخل ما بين قوة عظمى من جهة ومنظمات دولية من جهة ثانية. فترى كل نظرية هذا التفاعل بشكل مختلف مما يؤدي بالضرورة إلى نتائج وتفسيرات متناقضة تماما. فمن جانبها، تدعي المؤسساتية أن المنظمات الدولية لها أثرّ كبيرّ في السياسة الخارجية بينما يدحض الواقعيون الجدد تلك الادعاءات قائلين إن تلك المؤسسات، وفي أحسن أحوالها، تمتلك تأثير هامشي على سلوك الدولة. بناءا على ذلك، برز بعض التقصير النظري في محاولة فهم حالات الحرب الثلاث.

إن محاولتي هنا تأتي للإجابة على سؤال الفرضية التالي: **كيف يمكن تفسير الطرق الثلاث المختلفة التي استخدمتها الولايات المتحدة: مع الأمم المتحدة، مع منظمة دولية ثانية، وأخيرا بشكل أحادي؟** إن حالات الدراسة الثلاث المبينة أعلاه ستخضع للبحث واستكشاف مدى تطبيق وقوة النظريتين ـالواقعية الجديدة والنيوليبرالية، وأي منهما لديها القوة والقدرة التفسيرية المنطقية لفهم وتفسير الحروب الثلاث. علاوة على ذلك، سأضيف في تحليل الحالات نظرية السياسة الداخلية الديمقراطية التي ستغطي جانبا مهما تم إهماله من قبل النظريتين الرئيستين على الرغم أن جميع الزعماء السياسيين الأمريكيين لم يحاولوا قط تجاهلها في عملية صنع القرار. سيظهر التحليل العميق أيضا نقاط الضعف الرئيسة لكل نظرية في عملية تغطية السلوك الأمريكي. كذلك سأقوم بتوظيف آلة البندول كأداة قياسية وتعريفية في عملية تحليل التفاعل ما بين نظريات العلاقات الدولية وعلاقة ذلك في سلوك الولايات المتحدة عبر حالات الحرب الثلاث.

وفي النهاية، سأخرج في خاتمة تقوم بتحديد أي من النظريتين هي الأفضل في وصف وتعريف وتحليل السلوك الأمريكي، أو ربما قد يفضي البحث إلى معطيات مختلفة تماما عما سبق!

INTRODUCTION

A. Focus of Research

The foremost transformation that took place to the structure of the international system at the beginning of the early nineties provided momentum to the topic of this paper. As a matter of fact, the relations and interactions between states and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have been central and crucial to the assumptions of the major theories of International relations: neo - realism and institutionalism. The world is transforming rapidly and politicians, in addition to political scientists are not in agreement as to whether or not we are presently passing through a uni - polar system. In a way, all the papers of political international relations are newly mixed. This transformation has challenged many assumed truths which doled out as the foundations of the field of international relations for more than forty years. **(Nye, 1992, 83-96)**

I would like to start with the assumption that the interaction and interrelations between states and major international institutions have a major impact on key theoretical debates in international studies. The international political transformation resulted to growing capacity for international cooperation mainly through multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the expansion of the mission of

intergovernmental organization like NATO. My argument springs from both the Institutionalism assumptions concerning the role of international organizations in steering the world along side with states, and at the other side of the scale, the neorealist's view towards multilateralism and how this theory counteracts against institutionalism in terms of their independence, effects and impact on foreign policy and decision making.

⬇ Research Stimulus

The concept of theory is an artful abstraction which directs us to the most important to the case at hand. As Donnelly **(2001, 30)** views them: '*Theories are beacons, lenses or filters that direct us to what is essential for understanding some part of the world.*' Nowadays, the study of international relations could arguably be seen through various lenses due to the abrupt end of the Cold War in 1989-1990. This political and historical shift not only resulted in profound changes within Europe, but had major implications for the international system as well. With this end and its consequences, a new system has come out with the United States occupying a particular place **(Lieber, 2001, 28).** This newly emerging state has generated heated debate among the two major international theorists, and it reached a high level of controversies and created problematic and serious outcomes once it is attached to the United States behavior in dealing with its three wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003

and Kosovo in 1999. Yet, theoretical schools - neo realism and neo liberal institutionalism - don't argue from the concept of substitution i.e. one is a possible alternative for the other but rather as *'competing approaches'* only in the sense that they focus on different strengths and thus may be providing better or worse or at least different approaches in particular cases **(Donnelly 2000, 131).**

Out of this newly dramatic political, historical and theoretical change, that competing approach of institutionalism has emerged in a manner that constituted to the dominant theory of realism, which has been and still the oldest and the most prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations **(Legro and Moravcsik, 1999, 3-8).** It absolutely provided a useful framework for understanding the Cold War period and even the World War Two based on its major five assumptions **(Holsti, 1995, 37).** Although liberal institutionalism literature associated with Robert Keohane and Stephan Krasner **(1983, 13)** tended to accept realism's root assumptions, this acknowledgement wouldn't hinder cooperation among states and interactions with institutions. Keohane, here, contends that despite this recognition of realist's assumptions, the pessimistic conclusions about the notion of cooperation, which are prevalent in neorealist assumption, do not exist.

We are witnessing in the post Cold War era the increasing dependency and cooperation with the UN as an international organization. Other intergovernmental organizations like NATO were becoming crucial to the emerging demands of the new era. This increasing role of international organizations was not practiced during the post World War II period as the Soviet – American rivalry followed on the heels of the World War II. Thus, the United Nations for example was never seriously tested as a collective security apparatus during the Cold War (**Haas, 1955, 40-66**). NATO started to swing its function to execute other missions. Some of the empirical incidents following the demise of bipolarity seemed to generate the most – likely cases for the effectiveness of institutionalist's approach. It strongly examined the changes in the US foreign policy. They include the case of forming international allies against Iraq in 1990/1 under the auspices of the United Nations. Later, the NATO intervention in 1999 also narrowly showed the adoption of collective security premise to curb the Milosevic's regime at the end of the nineties. In this case, the Institutional theory also claimed that the role of multilateralism was very accountable and amenable.

Conversely, realists exclusively consider the state a unitary actor in the international system and concentrate on its power as the guarding mechanism of its security and peace. They claim that '*institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world.*' They are based on self – interested calculations of

the great powers and Mearsheimer (**1994/5, 7**) adds that '*they have no independent effect on state behavior*'. In other words, they are merely tools for executing foreign policy strategic plans. The neorealist's argument contends that multilateralism was a designed tool for the implementation of the US foreign policy in the Kosovo Crisis. Over and above, the Bush administration's attack against Iraq in 2003 was clear substantial evidence which offered a boost and impetus to balance of threat, unilateralism and pre-emptive action hypotheses. The US 'exceptional' aggression against Iraq profoundly curbed the role of the UN being an international peacekeeping body in the international system and it also disregarded the unified Western allies that were established in the previous cases.

No one could deny that both theories of international relations are holding on a reasonable analytical and framework in the post Cold War era. Nevertheless, it is worth asking which of them better explains these case studies. Or are the two theories together applicable to better portray the international relations between the United States and multilateralism? One might further pose the following question: 'Do we still need another hypothesis, along with the above theories, to strongly describe, explain and evaluate the three US wars? The answers of these questions will shape the general picture of the exposition of theoretical debates and will reveal the explanatory value of each theory.

Important to mention, too, is what the central paradigms in the field of international relations ignored: democratic politics approach. Based on the US political democratic structure, this hypothesis is a key pillar in foreign policy decision making. To understand the major issues in international politics such as the US three case studies, democratic politics must be a subsequent approach to both major theories. While neo realism and institutionalism could 'partially' contribute to analyzing the three US wars, it is rather important to consider how much democratic politics affects decision-making processes. As Risse - Kappen argues **(1991, 485)**, '*States structures do not determine the specific content or direction of policies.*' Therefore, political institutions don't decide policy outcome by themselves. Instead, other variables concerning the feature of democratic politics, including public attitudes and legislature would significantly affect and constraint the extent of a state's involvement. Based on democratic states' structure and the way they make their decisions, this complementary hypothesis would be a sine qua non for international relations politics.

As the US political system is based on democratic basis, public opinion and domestic institutions are considered cornerstones in the foreign policy decision making processes. No political leader could provoke public opinion and domestic institutions. He cannot disregard them as he will experience negative consequences which may cost his presidency. Moreover, the concept of the NATO's nature and

structure highly depends on domestic politics approach. NATO is an organization composed of democratic states whose resolutions are carried out in certain procedures and measures. This mechanism signals that policy makers are directed with constraints which will affect their political standing back home. Going to war decisions or getting involved in armed forces is obviously restricted by citizens' approval of NATO's members and political and civilian institutions' stance. The use of force as a sensitive and decisive tool of imposing strategies or even changing status quo of certain issues will not come true unless public opinion of NATO countries endorses and legalizes political leaders' decisions.

In view of that, should we consider the preferences of interest groups and democratic domestic bodies as sources of foreign policy behaviors? Or are they puppets in hands of political leaders of the White House? I think it will be useful to highlight such an approach for various reasons: first, there is no single theory of world politics that has all the explanations of all events in all circumstances and in any time. Besides, this mixture of theoretical assumptions will likely decipher the future foreign policy behaviors of the United States and enable us to predict potential strategies of states.

♣ Thesis Questions

The fluctuating manner of the US foreign policy in the three wars created the empirical paradigms of this work. Institutionalist and neorealist's' assumptions shape the theoretical lenses through which the above cases would be evaluated. Besides, the three case - studies will show the explanatory power of each theory. Certain questions pose themselves when dealing with the main topic of this thesis:

- How can we explain the three different paths used by the US: with the UN, with another international organization, i.e. NATO and then unilaterally?

- How much impact can international institutions have on foreign policy?

- To what extent should we rely on neo realism, which flunked to forecast the end of the Cold War, to understand international politics?

- To what degree does democratic politics have an impact on the ability or inability of political leaders to use military force? And what are the strategies taken by leaders to affect democratic politics institutions?

- Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War succeed to effectively catalyze burden –sharing?

- Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War, move to NATO to catalyze burden - sharing instead of the international community, as it was in the case of the Gulf War in 1991?

- Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War and the prime mover of the NATO intervention against Yugoslavia go to the third Gulf War unilaterally?

Methodology

This paper is made out of two issues: the interaction of the two theoretical schools of international relations along with democratic politics approach in terms of interpreting the complexity of US behaviors in the three wars shape the core concern of the first part. The attempt of depicting the explanatory power of each theory when implementing its assumption to the three case – studies creates the backbone of the second part. The third part contains some lessons to be learned out of this thesis. The application of the pendulum instrument will be an extra analytical technique in part

three to see the constant change of politics in the international system. The dissertation is made of seven chapters that are discussed in three parts:

Part I, Theoretical Framework. It consists of three chapters. This part gives a brief but relevant background to liberal institutionalism, neo realism theories and democratic politics approach. Chapter one concentrates on the neoliberal institutionalism approach from the perspective of how it sees the role of multilateral organizations and the concept of collective action in shaping the US foreign policy. Chapter two depicts the counterargument of the neo realism's premises. Neorealists argue that such institutions are endophenomenal and have minimal influence on the foreign policy of the states. Chapter three focuses on the efficacy of democratic politics and its indispensability in foreign policy decision - making in international relations.

Part II, The three US Case – studies with its three chapters, proposes the empirical aspect of this paper. Each of the three chapters covers a case study starting with the Persian Gulf War 1991, the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the Iraq War 2003 respectively. I apply the collective security, the balance - of - threat and democratic politics hypotheses to the three wars in order to analytically discuss and demonstrate which of these three is the most likely to better explain each case.

Part III, Lessons Learned. This part consists of one chapter. It deals with how much we benefit from the study and the kind of lessons we could we learn. Chapter seven includes the application of the pendulum instrument to the thesis to prove the ever steady oscillation of politics in international relations.

Conclusion: It confirms my initial or basic hypothesis of the non – exclusiveness of one theory in international political system despite the fact that each has its relative explanatory power in explaining events of international relations. The dissertation ends with detailed references of books, magazines, online articles and websites.

PART I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1

MULTILATERALISM IN THE EYES OF

INSTITUTIONALISM

CHAPTER 2

MULTILATERALISM IN THE EYES OF

NEO REALISM

CHAPTER 3

DEMOCRATIC POLITICS APPROACH

CONCLUSION

C h a p t e r   1

Multilateralism in the Eyes of Institutionalism

1.1.   Definition & Concept

Institutionalism is considered as a powerful theoretical and analytical paradigm for the post Cold War era. This competing model relies on the assumptions which assert that multilateralism is a key organizer to foreign politics. This role will maintain and preserve both international security and peace. Accordingly, states' relations are characterized by multilateral framework and are highly institutionalized **(Keohane and Nye, 1993, 106).** This new trend has been endorsed by international mood which demands an implementation of collective action in the 'new world order'. 'Institutions' or as John Ruggie defined (**1992, 570**) '*Multilateralism*' are a set of rules that instruct the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other (**North & Thomas, 1970, 5**). To quote Ruggie again, the term 'multilateral' is an adjective that modifies the noun 'institution'. Consequently, multilateralism represents a nonspecific institutional form in international relations. Multilateralism is an institutionalized structure which coordinates relations among

three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct **(Ruggie, 1992, 570-571).**

Ruggie **(1992, 573)** defines these rules and norms as '*overt entities with headquarters and letterheads, voting procedures and generous pension plans.*' In this respect, Keohane adds that **(1989, 5)** '*Once rules are incorporated into international organizations, they may seem almost coterminous*' even though they are '*distinguishable analytically*'. Young **(1980, 337)** views them as '*recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge*'. In other words, institutionalists don't understand institutions as buildings with professionals but rather as models through which expectations can be exerted.

Norms and rules also represent '*standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations*' and '*they are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action*' **Krasner (1983, 2-5).** He also characterizes procedures taken by policy makers as '*prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice*'. In this case, those norms and rules are tools of an international regime. Keohane **(1984, 237)** envisions rules as 'guideline' for international cooperation. These rules and norms have the ability to create obligations on states and thus they are binding devices for all the states which agreed to follow these norms and rules. Those who

violate principles, certain consequences would fall upon them, including collective action punishment against their aggressive action which will defect their reputation **(Axelrod, 1986, 94).** In the case of Iraq, Saddam's violation of rules and norms agreed upon imperiled his political survival due to the consequences of the international collective punishment. The Iraqi conflict 1991 proved the accountability of international reaction towards Iraq's renege to the international norms.

Pro institutionalists also claim that security and political economy issues could be best portrayed through institutionalism. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin assure that institutionalist theory should be applicable to security issues as its main argument goes around the role of institutions in providing information. In this context, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane wrote **(1986, 227)**:

It has often been noted that military - security issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy than do political –economic ones. Charles Lipson, for instance, **(1985, 38)** has recently observed that *'political – economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than military-security ones. This does not mean, however, that analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks. Indeed, one of the major purposes of the present collection is to show that a single framework can throw light on both.*

In reaction to the previous allegations, Mearsheimer's argument asserts that *'international politics is divided into two realms: security and political economy and institutionalism only applies to the latter'* **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 15-16).** Therefore, security issues can't be explained but through neorealist's assumptions of anarchical structure of political system. The framework that contains the management of international security can't be institutional as it depends on balance of power and states' calculations and not institutions' prescriptions.

1.2.   The Role of International Institutions

Institutional theory looks for a better understanding for the existence of international institutions and how they operate. Based on Keohane's debate, institutions are defined as *'persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations'* **(Keohane, 1989, 3).** This definition offers institutions' decisive role which puts them as independent variables of international decision making. In his book, After Hegemony, Robert Keohane **(1984, 51-52)** contends that cooperation among states happens and develops when it is based on the concept of complementary interests and the institutions' function is to affect patterns of that cooperation and facilitate self-interested cooperation by reducing uncertainty.

Multilateralism reflects cooperation and could have a big impact on a state's behavior. It affects leaders in understanding their role and attitudes towards other states' interests and ambitions, notwithstanding the fact those bodies are states' craft **(Keohane, 1989, 6).** Once states follow the rules and norms of international institutions, they indicate their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation and therefore reinforce expectations of stability **(Keohane, 1993a, 52).** The major event of the nineties – the Gulf War – has shifted the world towards strong inclination of neoliberal norms that generate new demand for multilateralism. They argue that collective action would produce public good for every actor in international system.

Realist critiques of international institutions cause a major and challenging questing to the liberal institutionalism's assumptions: **How much impact and influence can international institutions have on foreign policy?** In his well-known article, 'The False Promise of International Institutions,' Mearsheimer **(1994/5, 7)** develops a strong debate contending that *'Institutions have minimal influence on state behavior.' Institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short - term power maximizes'* **(1995, 28)**. Dominant states' politics is to impede any other power to maximize their capabilities on the account of their predominance. Mearsheimer also argues that institutions are a *'reflection of power distribution and serve as alternative means for states to pursue power politics'*. Consequently, they reject the concept of relative gains as they will create an imbalance in the status quo of the international

system and the state that relatively gains more, will exchange its gain into future military advantage **(Grieco, 1988, 486).** States measure their own gains against those of others **(Waltz 1979, 6).** For realists, concern for relative gains reduces common interests between states. States are the only units of action and therefore can't rely on other 'actors' for their national security. Thus, institutions can be ignored because they rarely exert a significant influence on the interests or interactions of states in anarchy **(Donnelly, 2000, 132).** In other words, the concept of multilateralism has not played an influential role and thus has no room in theories of international relations.

Although neorealists agree that institutions include norms and rules, it is not the institutions' role by themselves to compel states to follow those rules. It is rather the role of states themselves to control or obey the rules they have agreed upon **(Lipson, 1994, 114).**

For Institutionalists, they see international organizations more than the realists' 'narrowed' view. This definition goes beyond power distribution approach.. International organizations mold state behavior and constrain its preferences **(Cupitt and Others, 1997, 10).**

As we delve into institutions' main role and see how much influence they have on the international system, their functions are expected to stipulate acceptable forms of state behavior and exclude improper kinds of behavior. According to liberal institutionalism's statements, institutions are to offer information, make commitments more credible, facilitate issue linkage and found key points for cooperation. All the barriers of trusting each other would be diminished and institutions will have an influence on state behavior and thus cooperation will take place among states and interaction with organizations is getting enforced **(Keohane, 1995, 42)**. Thereby, states' preferences may be directed to maintain security and peace and the state of war would be the least-likely case. Keohane **(1995, 42**) also sheds lights on the importance of institutions in making a difference in relation with power realities. Thus, multilateralism is rooted in the realities of power and interests. It controls the effects of power and power interests. It also has interactive effect depending on the nature of power and interests meaning that their impact on outcomes varies depending on the nature of power and interests.

The skeptical view towards institutions' central role is beginning to lessen as we are scrutinizing its role specifically on the Gulf War in 1991. The higher the functioning level of the institution, the more constraints is imposed on states' intentions. Much literature started focusing on how they limit states' behaviors and thus enhance international stability. John Ruggie **(1992, 561)** argues that '*there seems*

little doubt that multilateral norms and institutions have helped stabilize their international consequences.' In other words, those norms are the platform of managing global changes in the world system.

Neoliberal Institutionalists stress the role of institutions as enduring patterns of shared expectations of behavior that have received some degree of formal assent **(North 1990, 2-4).** On a different level, Griffiths **(1997, 282-308)** sees institutionalization as a reflection of the interests of the dominant powers and he claims that institutions shape perceptions and norms. He adds that states prefer institutions to facilitate verification of compliance of cheaters. Important to mention, here, is also that states favor long-lasting commitments among them. Keohane **(1993a, 53)** considers institutions a powerful force for stability. He proposes that *'avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation.'*

1.3.   Collective Action

Institutionalist theory offers a rich argument about how institutions force states to prevent war, and how to guard themselves against potential aggressors. Far

away from their narrow self – interest, states must respond to burden - sharing. As Inis Claude **(1962, 6)** puts it, the core issue is to manage the problem and not to eliminate it, and thus, the apparatus for this function is institutions.

The assumption of collective security goes beyond self - interest world of realism. It goes beyond balance of power and threat considerations. Despite this, those who are in favor of this hypothesis argue that international institutions are the tools to accomplish the mission of international system which is spreading peace and security even it demands the use of military force. As such, collective action involves group action intended to further the 'interests of the members' **(Sandler, 1992, xvii)**. Scholars of international relations note that international rules influence state behavior through the actions of domestic political actors. Those rules become institutionalized at the domestic level and introduce the beliefs and values of actors within the state **(Nye, 1987, 400)**.

Inis Claude **(1971, 247)** notes '*Collective Security has been appropriated as an honorific designation for virtually any and all multilateral activities that statesmen or scholars may regard or wish to have regarded as conducive to peace and order.*' It could be an alternative to national judgment regarding threats to the

peace. They go in favor with multilateral agreement as an ad hoc recourse to dealing with threats. **(Claude, 1971, 253)**

The domestication of international rules was the central role of Bush's government officials and of other interest groups in 1991. Consequently, the Bush's administration, equipped with international acquiescence decided to invade Iraq.

We could perceive the changing policy towards building a stronger collective security system around the world after the Cold War through various intergovernmental organizations **(Lyons, 1994, 173-199).** International relations scholars started to pay more attention to multilateralism as a set of organizing rules and norms of international political relations. Some of the incidents following the breakdown of the bipolarity system fostered institutionalist's approach. It seems that the US war on Iraq showed some strengths of the UN system of collective security for the entire world to see. It also showed capability to responding to naked aggression as Bush described it **(Hoffman, 1990, A1).**

'When interests are shared, rational actors should prefer to free-ride' **(Mancur, 1971, 3-10)**.This means that all the countries which benefit should pay the

cost of public goods. The securing of the norms and state borders and the stability of oil markets were considered common goods to all countries. This concept was the driving force for many which contributed to the alliance against the Iraqi acts in the early nineties. As for the United States' interests, the value of these 'public' goods was very crucial to its supremacy and preponderance. All findings of the new international system were heading towards one remaining super power. Hence, it was expected that the US administration should excessively pay to secure these goods **(Keohane, 1984, 56),** and, in turn to gain more and to ride free **(Mancur, 1971, 10).**

The liberal analysis emphasizes the relative collectivist response elicited by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The coalition campaign turned into the largest military coalition since World War II. The response of the United Nations and the multinational coalition were perfect illustrations of a 'New World Order', in which the major powers, as well as many of the less developed states, united against an aggressor state. **(Freedman and Karsh, 1994, 215).**

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 seemed to provide the world with what it needed after the Cold War: a just cause to demonstrate the effectiveness of the post - Cold War international community **(Baehr and Gordenker, 1994, 159-183)** and

Saddam Hussein has availed this pretext to the Bush administration to commence applying its doctrine.

Chapter 2

Multilateralism in the Eyes of Neo Realism

Scholars and political scientists have debated the question of how best to understand and evaluate relations between organizations and states. Among these discussions neo realism is very strong and its influential role was dominant and prevailing in the Cold War era. The historical and political events including the end of bipolarity, the Persian Gulf War, NATO intervention in Kosovo and Iraq war 2003 have stimulated other debates to counteract against neo realists' arguments. These events seemed to tip the balance in favor of various theoretical discussions, mainly neo liberalism and democratic politics approach. Nevertheless, as neo realism theory has been one of the most venerable models of international relations, it must be a part of the analytical toolkit of every important event in international relations.

In the amalgam of complex political situation which converted the picture of international system, neo realism is still likely to generate a baseline for evaluation and to produce findings to international relations. Realism is likely to be a research

theory that contains a core set of statements from which a variety of theories and explanations can be developed **(James, 1993, 123-148).**

2.1. Definition & Concept

Despite the proliferation of challenges to realism, it remained pervasive and pro realist scholars, nevertheless, assure its dominance. For example, Rosenau et al, show the continuing dominance of realism. They portray the world as centered on nation-states, the lack of attention to domestic politics and the relative neglect of international organizations **(Rosenau et al, 1977, 319).** Institutionalists themselves like Robert Keohane **(1986, 164-5)** see that state-centrism and rationality are also core premises of realism. Harrison Wagner **(1974, 467)** also points out the premises assuring that states are unitary and the sole important factors in international politics. They have been *'the most important starting points for serious analysis in the international relations field.'*

Human selfishness and the absence of international government 'anarchy' are major limitations on international politics. Both constraints are key basic qualities of neo realism assumptions. This requires the *'primacy of all political life of power and security'* **(Gilpin 1986, 305).** Thus, the difference between realists and neo liberal

approaches to cooperation lies in their different interpretations of the basic interpretation of international anarchy. For realists, anarchy means the absence of the *'overarching authority to prevent others from using violence to destroy or enslave them'* **(Grieco, 1988, 485-507)**. This environment stipulates declaring wars where the principle interest of states is survival **(Grittersova, 2000, 73)**, which represents the core premise of realism.

The environment of neorealist's major assumptions assures that international relations are *'a state of relentless security competition with the possibility of war always in the background'* **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 9)**. This environment holds many confusing attitudes and the most prevailing feeling among states is suspicion. Trust is not valid in the realm of neo realism. The reaction of Britain and France to German reunification at the end of the Cold War illustrates the dangers of a united Germany project even though those three countries had been allies for more than forty three years **(Armonk, 1993, 203 - 205)**. Add to this, states cannot depend on others for their security. Thus, as Kenneth sees it, states operate in a 'self-help' system, yet, it doesn't preclude forming alliances which doesn't create any sort of contradiction with neorealist analysis **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 11)**.

Nevertheless, some neorealist international relations literature shows that there is little room for cooperation among states although in a limited way. Krasner indicates **(1999, 336-366)** that much of international politics is '*life on the Pareto frontier*'. This simply implies that states have been cooperating to such a limit where no one can go further. The perpetual state of peace can't exist within the neo realism's text **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 9).**

2.2. The Role of International Institutions

Many realists underestimate the significance of institutions as suggested in Mearsheimer's article in 1995. They can be expected to have independent effects only in minor issue areas **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 13).** For realists, the balance of power creates war and peace causality where institutions are the mirror of the power distribution in the system **(ibid, 1995, 13).** Dark **(1998, 12)** argues that international institutions are found to serve states' needs. Consequently, the balance of power is the independent variable and other variables are dependent or, at their best shape intervening ones.

Mearsheimer contends that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post Cold War

world. If there is cooperation among states, it has its own limits because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition which no amount of cooperation can eliminate. Neo realists conclude that institutions are '*arenas for acting our power relationships*' (**Evans & Wilson**, **1992, vol. 21**).

A challenging question was raised to neo realism in the nineties: **to what extent should we rely on neo realism, which flunked to forecast the end of the Cold War, to understand international politics?** The historical record provides little support for the efficiency of organizations especially in the period after the World War II. The United Nations was established in the aftermath of WWII to provide collective security around the globe. However, the two super powers competition followed on the heels of that war, and the UN was therefore never seriously tested as a collective security apparatus during the Cold War. (**Haas 1955, 40-62**)

In the context of crises and wars ranging from the Gulf War to Iraq War, there has been much talk about building the collective security system. This debate consumed the post Cold War foreign policy's attention (**Chalmers 1990, 215-250**). The US, during the George W. Bush administration has seriously considered implementing collective security after the War. Washington was totally aware of

taking a rational choice of achieving its national interests and supremacy through a collective action where the international community was responsible for enhancing stability all over the world. In this regard, the case of Iraq war in 1991 pushed out by the American - led coalitions and endorsed by the UN resolutions proved that the United Nations might finally be ready to operate as a collective security institution. For the first time, the UN could be an international organization which had influential role along with major states. Yet, this case is classified *'unusual'* and is exceptional as no true effort has been made to reform the UN as a collective security institution **(Roberts, 1993, 3-30).** According to neorealists, collective security notion cannot be a long lasting tool for many obstacles would exacerbate relations among states.

2.3.   Collective Action

Collective security major theory aims at moving beyond realists' self help world of realism where states have no trust and fear each other and are motivated by balance of power considerations. The key to accomplish collective security assumption goes through institutions. Interest in collective security peaked and appeared very possible following the US – led coalition in the Persian Gulf War. In light of this successful evidence, collective security is depicted as a source of stability **(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991, 114-117)** George Downs **(1994, 18)** defines

collective security as collective self – regulations. He says that it occurs when '*a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms*. This definition offers coalition members to take punitive action against states which refuse to follow collective standards.

Some neo realist' scholars reject this claim and counteract against how much it addresses international issues. For example, Mearsheimer **(1995, 26)** defines collective security as incomplete theory as it lacks explanations for how states overcome fears and how to learn to trust each other. As the world is anarchic, states fear each other and have offensive military capabilities. There is always the concept of uncertainty about states' intentions. No state would trust each other as there is constant desire for power maximize and superiority. Proponents of the theory say that the purpose of a collective security is to deal with states that have aggressive intentions although it admits that no state can ever be completely certain about another state's intentions. This allegation would lead us where states have no trust to each other which brings us back to the realist theory.

There are many variables which hinder implementing collective security. Of which, it doesn't guarantee a rapid response to aggression. Besides, coordination

problems associated with getting a large coalition of states to fight would stand against the effectiveness and efficiency of such strategy. Therefore, it took more than six months for the United States to assemble a coalition to 'liberate' Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion **(Hudson, 1966, 177)**.

Although collective security is necessary to pursue public good, self – interested actors always follow incentives not to join coalition and simply free ride off the benefits provided by the others **(Dantiki, 2005, 3)**.

In the wake of the Cold War, the success of the US - led coalition against Iraq was one of the very little empirical evidence that put the United Nations as a leading collective security organization **(Flyn and Sheffer, 1980, 77-101)**. As for the Kosovo war in 1999, there was a blurred explanation of the collective action as both major theories tried to explore and analyze the case in favor of their interpretations.

2.4. The Balance - of - Threat

The balance - of - threat is one of the three pillars this study is profoundly considering. It provides a rich opportunity to examine the three US cases. This

hypothesis was developed by Stephen Walt **(Walt, 1987, 1-10).** He **(1987, 21)** argues that balancing behavior is most usefully understood as a response to threat. Neo realists believe that the nineties era could be powerfully explained by balance of threat hypothesis. Walt justifies his statement by showing a variety of factors to which states appear as threatening to others, of which, the aggregate power resources of the state, geographic proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. For him, *'States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them'* **(Walt, 1987, 25).** The logic of balance - of - threat theory suggests that whether or not states balance a dominant state will depend at least in part on the foreign policy behavior of the dominant state.

The major concern to the US strategies is the loss of the unipolarity position. It fears bipolar world or multipolar system. Therefore, the US grand and global strategy would strive to extend the 'unipolar era' and suppress any action even from regional powers like Iraq to change the status quo of the international system. Besides, the US was trying multilateralism in the Gulf War as a reaction to potential threat which may erupt from states like Japan and Germany. The hidden objective of engaging the two countries in the Gulf War was to keep them partial great powers. Moreover, Mandelbaum **(1995, 13)** argues that NATO is still needed although its existential justifications vanished in the wake of the fall down of the Soviet Union. The hidden strategy behind this is to *'reassure Germany that it need not arm itself*

more heavily to remain secure, something that would make Germany's neighbors feel less secure'. Other evidence is worth mentioning. The attempt to integrate Russia and China was also to contain these powers and keep them within the US - centered international order. The US have responded to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Kosovo crises because, according to US criteria, both Saddam Hussein and Milosevic had revisionist agendas against the US global hegemony and exceptionalism **(Lake, 1994, 45-55).** Besides, balance - of - threat would suggest US quick intervention in conflicts that threaten regional stability and carry the potential for other major powers to develop and project independent military capabilities.

Mearsheimer **(1990, 6 & 11)** argues that *'the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace'.* He identifies three factors that led to peace: *'the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons.'* It is also said that balance - of - threat explains *'an effort to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers'* **(Mastanduno, 1997, 51).** This hypothesis justifies a dominant penchant in US security policy to preserve its global position at the top of international hierarchy **(Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999, 2).**

I share Posen's and Ross' views concerning the US - ever pursuing primacy after the Cold War: both Presidents Bush and Clinton's grand strategies were characterized by persistent decision to preserve unipolarity and maintain US preponderance and supremacy. This strategy has shaped US relations with Japan, China, Russia and Germany **(Posen and Ross, 1997, 100-134).** There is no doubt that President George W Bush's doctrine was pursuing exceptionalism and hegemony in his unilateral action against Iraq in 2003.

C h a p t e r   3

Democratic Politics

There is no doubt that democratic domestic politics is a key variable which decisively affects foreign policy decision making. The ability of a state's leader to assume a military action in the international system heavily depends on the capacity of a democratic state leader to generate democratic political institutions support for implementing such military force action. When it comes to the US political system, the decisions taken by the executive institution must be ratified by Congress. In this regard, the current situation and arrangement of democratic political institutions are key variables through which a state's leader can be directed or delegated to use military force.

The primary objective of this chapter is to assess the effective role and explore the explanatory power of democratic politics approach in steering foreign policy decision-making and to add more insights and predictive contributions to explain some findings which both competing theories seemed unable to cover.

Neorealists assume that a state's strategies and interests are determined by the search for security in an anarchical system and restricted by the international distribution of power capabilities. Any societal factors as democratic politics or public opinion would be left outside this framework. Realists believe that decision makers either ignore democratic politics or utilize it to enhance their position **(Schweller & Priess, 1997, 7, 14, 24).** Kenneth Waltz disregards internal or domestic policies when explaining the state's foreign policy choice. He argues that *'the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures.'* Likewise, Fareed Zakaria **(1992, 198)** concludes that *'across time and space, states' positions in the anarchic international system prove to provide the simplest, shortest guide to international relations.'*

Although realists forfeit that public opinion has sometimes caused difficulties for decision makers, scholars conclude that elites of the political system usually either ignore the public's preferences or trick the public to support their chosen policy through spreading falsified and exaggerated events. Neo realists suggest that policymakers develop policy with attention only to national security requirements **(Holsti, 1992, 439 - 66).** They believe that policymakers ignore public opinion when making a decision and dictate the public to support their selected alternative.

Conversely, neoliberal theory stands in contrast to neo realism by proposing that the interaction between the state and society forms the basis for the state's behavior by determining its preferences. Accordingly, democratic domestic politics can significantly alter national security policies.

Neoliberals argue that democratic politics should affect foreign policy formulation. Woodrow Wilson believes that democratic leaders should determine and implement the public's will. He believes that democratic politics and public opinion lead the government to select the policy the public prefers **(Nichloas, 1968, 184).** In Foyle's book, James Fearon argues that all democratic leaders are equally sensitive to a potential loss of support and that all democratic leaders are more sensitive to this variable. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman contend that decisions regarding war are largely driven by domestic political institutions' authorization. **(Foyle, 1999, 280).**

Neoliberals see a wide-ranging linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. However, this influence may vary because of information limitations or falsified allegations leaders of democratic states may dictate or educate both public opinion and political institutions.

The structure of the United States political system offers an explanatory value of democratic politics. The decision - making process is shared between the Executive and Congress organizations. Since the Vietnam War, there has been a shift in Congress's presence in terms of directing US foreign politics. Congress has become more assertive and its members demanded a central role in the co-determination of foreign policy which will lead to a decentralized political system **(Foot, 2003, 9)**.

Co - determination of formulating decisions by the two political branches thus must have a major impact on United States foreign policy behavior towards international issues and multilateralism. According to the three US cases of this study, my findings suggest that there is an indispensible reliance on democratic politics in terms of decision making processes. Yet it also depends on how the state leaders react to potential domestic variables, how they lobby states' centers of decision – making to be in favor of their policy and how they respond to their pressures.

A democratic constitution can be considered as a decision rule and the citizens of a country as a decision making group. In a democratic state ruled by law, political institutions of the state, such as the legislature and the executive, have power in a

very different sense than other actors in the community. Within this perspective, the question about democratic politics impact is pertinent. Nevertheless, I want to flag the following questions: **To what degree does democratic politics have an impact on the ability or inability of political leaders to use military force? And what are the materials taken by leaders to affect democratic politics institutions?**

It was obvious that the US administration was able to recruit the allied countries to fight against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. There was 'clear' empirical evidence which offered the US Congress a pretext to assume to go to war. The Gulf War was not a hard test to convince the public opinion to go to war. Yet, how to go created a heated debate between the two political decision making institutions. In the second case, the democratic character of the NATO allies did not prevent consensus on the use of military force to achieve its objectives. They skillfully dictated the public opinions with some fallacious allegations against the Serbian regime, Unlike the previous cases, President Bush was very concerned about public opinion consent. The US tactics to get its public opinion and political institutions endorse the war strategies was through total reliance on flagrant lies. Therefore, it meant that President Bush was equipped with legal and public authorization to - go it alone - with very few allies. The Bush government claimed that that Iraq had chemical weapons and was in close relation with Al-Qaida, both of which were far away from the truth.

While the collective action presented the most-likely hypothesis when it comes to the US war against Iraq in 1991, it is also essential to consider how democratic politics approach affected the leaders of the US - led coalition. It was clear that the US president needed approval to go to war as well as all states' whose system is democracy - based structure. Furthermore, NATO also follows this structure; it needs consensus among its members which technically means that any individual member can veto the initiation of military force. NATO members are directed by domestic variables including opposition political parties, legislature and the electorate **(Putnam, 1998, 427- 460).**

Conclusion

At the beginning of this part, I was very concerned to expose three different theoretical lenses to see how each views international politics. The three approaches have different debates and interpretations of certain concepts and behaviors. Chapter one argued that neo liberalism was a competing approach to international relations theories because it favors a world where institutions are of great importance in steering foreign policy decision making. Its challenge is to promote the effectiveness of multilateralism. To put it in another way, liberals believe that democratic society can have an international system with more than one unitary actor. They see international institutions as connected sets of rules that frame expectations. Institutionalists also believe that institutions are tools to accomplish the mission of international system. They also contend that collective action is very possible to maintain peace and security.

Neo realists understand the world from a very different angle arguing that this world is anarchic and centered on nation-states. The role of international institutions is no valid here in neorealist realm. Additionally, they also ignore domestic politics or to its best they would use it to achieve their strategies. The above elements are limitations on international politics and thus they see it as a state of relentless security

competition with the possibility of war always in the background. Neorealists consider collective action incomplete theory as it lacks explanations for how states overcome fears and how to learn to trust each other. They show many obstacles towards achieving collective action. The case of Iraq was exceptional in neorealists' literature.

As for the third chapter, domestic politics approach was a third alternative to both major theories. It concentrates on a perspective both major theories ignored and took advantage of. As the United States foreign policy is going to be the case study by which the three theories would be evaluated according to their explanatory power, democratic politics seemed to be an important beacon through which certain behaviors could be described and evaluated. This chapter argues that the ability of political leaders of democratic states heavily relies on the structure of US political system and NATO democratic arrangement.

Throughout this part, the core issue was to depict the assumptions of each theory of international relations - neo liberalism, neo realism and democratic politics approaches. It was also an attempt to reveal their strongest and weakest points. Multilateralism, collective action, democratic politics and balance of threat were the basic hypotheses used to show the explanatory value of each theory of the

international relations so as to best explain and analyze the US three wars in the wake

of the Post Cold era till the year 2003.

PART II

THE UNITED STATES THREE CASE – STUDIES

CHAPTER 4:

THE US WAR 1991:

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

CHAPTER 5:

THE WAR IN KOSOVO 1999

CHAPTER 6:

THE IRAQ WAR 2003

Part II

THE UNITED STATES THREE CASE – STUDIES

⁋ Introduction

In the first part, three theoretical premises have been portrayed as a cornerstone component of my dissertation by which we could see, analyze and evaluate international politics behaviors. In this part three US wars are explored by first giving a historical background for each case and then examining the applicability and powerfulness of the three approaches through using three different hypotheses. Chapter four discusses the US war against Iraq in 1991. I apply three hypotheses to this case study, beginning with collective action, balance of threat and democratic politics. This chapter explores collective security action as the most – likely hypothesis for best analyzing the US war 1991. Chapter five examines how much each one of the three hypotheses affected the US foreign policy in the context of NATO intervention against Kosovo in 1999. It seems that the Kosovo War has been affected by mixed variables. This war touched the collective action hypothesis from two different interpretations i.e. each major theory sees this collective action from its

angle. In this war, the policy makers of NATO members and the Clinton government educated public opinion to endorse their policy through disseminating exaggerated allegations against the Serbian regime. Chapter six explores balance of threat hypothesis as the most – likely approach in dealing with the US War 2003 against Iraq. The US unilateral action totally ignores collective action and started fabricated certain claims to recruit the public opinion and domestic political institutions. The Bush's administration believed unilateralism per se was the tool to impose its interests, preponderance and hegemony as a mere superpower in this world.

Part II compares the explanatory value of the three different theoretical approaches across the US Wars. We find that the role of international institutions, the structure of democratic system and the balance - of - threat and unilateralism explain the US practices in international relations in different levels: once, the collective action and the role of the UN played an important role in the international politics to assume military action; on the other occasion, the relative ignorance of the collective action via the UN was dominant and instead NATO intervention was 'hired' to execute the mission of the US with its few allies; the third case simply depicted the exclusive dependency on the Bush doctrine which seeks to change the rules of the game. Positioned at the top of the hierarchy, the US decided to go it alone ignoring collective action, the role of international institutions.

Chapter   4

THE US WAR 1991 - The Persian Gulf War

4.1.   Background

The US interest in the Gulf region has always been one of the top priorities of the foreign security policy. The Persian Gulf War 1991 was considered the first serious conflict the US highly involved in the aftermath of the Cold War era. The main objective of this attitude is straightforward which is to maintain and control the oil industry and reserve so as to get it at a reasonable price to meet its requirements, and sustain monopoly through precluding any other states to share this vital resource **(Khan, 2001, 1).**

President Bush weighted the Gulf region as the *'nerve center'* of the industrialized and developed Western economies **(Keesing's, 1990, 37696).** Controlling the oil region would offer the US power and advantage over its competing states. Any objection to the US access to this region will create a security problem and an economic dilemma as well. The Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990

strongly offered the US administration the pretext lost to declare war against the Saddam regime.

Stein **(1992, 155)** suggests that *'Iraq had unquestioned military capability to engage in expansionism in the Gulf; it was by far the preeminent military power in the region'*. Despite the economic and military losses of the Iraq - Iran war which lasted more than eight years, the former remained the largest military power in the Arab world and thus Saddam Hussein was intending to build his own position as a regional dominant power **(Murden, 1995, 101)**. The Iraqi occupation of some Iranian land and subsequent victory made Saddam a nationalist Arab leader who was cautious and concerned about Arab interests. He didn't accept peace following the August 1988 ceasefire and instead, he blocked the peace process and began seeking regional hegemony notwithstanding Iraq economic deterioration due to the last war against its neighbor, Iran **(Halliday, 1991, 226)**.

The Gulf War pretext started on the 2nd of August 1990, when the Iraqi army invaded and then occupied Kuwait. The invasion started a long and negative argument between the two Arab countries over oil production quotas. Baghdad had criticized Kuwait for producing more than its quotas as allotted by the Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), thus driving down the price per barrel and costing Iraq more than $ 7 billion in revenues.

The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, also accused Kuwait of trying to extract more than what has been agreed upon its share of the output of the Neutral Zone (**Spencer, 1998, 23**). Moreover, Iraq tried to justify the attack taking advantage of a historical argument, that Kuwait was an artificial state, a product of the British colonial occupation and that Iraq had a historical and geographical claim to this area (**Freedman and Karsh, 1994, 42-43**).

The US government decided to commence an international massive campaign against the Iraqi unjust and unlawful action. It favored utilizing the United Nations for regaining the former status quo. It succeeded to pass many UN Security Council Resolutions, starting from (678, 687, 713, 715, and 986) to pressure the Iraqi Government to get back from its objectives and actions. These resolutions both aimed at compelling acquiescence and compliance to the International consent, and to dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction and ballistic missiles (**Cooley, 1991, 125-139**). The most important UN resolution was 678 which was passed on November 29th 1990. It actually gave Iraq a deadline of 15 January 1991 to withdraw its troops from Kuwait and issued an authorization to '*all means necessary to uphold and*

implement Resolution 660' which signals a diplomatic form authorizing the use of force (**Spencer, 1998, 23**).

Taking advantage of the presence of the United Nations, the US offered two key justifications for involving in the Iraqi conflict. First, the missing but promised reason to this interaction which embodied in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990: a flagrant violation against Kuwaiti territorial integrity. Second, the US government was so anxious of the Saudi Arabia security as it is the key ally supplier of oil in the Gulf region. In this regard, President Bush assured this concern in his speech:

'Within three days, 120, 000 Iraqi soldiers with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that' (**Bush, 1990**).

The Iraqi invasion to Kuwait was first met with economic sanctions. However, the UN embargo failed to generate an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait despite its severe impact on the Iraqis' lives. Consequently, the coalition forces launched the so-called operation 'Desert Storm' on the 16th of January 1991.

4.2.   The US War against Iraq and the Norms of Collective Action

A central question has been raised here showing this policy in decision – making system: **Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War succeed to effectively catalyze burden –sharing?** I would argue here that the appeal of collective security norms or rules by the policy makers and societal interests groups can affect domestic national policy choice. The most - likely hypotheses that affected the US decision to assume a military action were: the collective action norm and the democratic politics of the United States. I would examine this argument through an analysis of how collective security rules have affected US foreign policy choice instead of going it alone and the impact of democratic politics on decision – making.

The case of US war seemed the most-likely case for the collective action hypothesis (**Eckstein, 1975, 79-131**). Therefore, it has to bear the heaviest burden, militarily and financially. The Bush's administration's strategy towards the Gulf War supported the collective action predicting that the US would take the leading responsibility with its heavy burden. Consequently, the largest share of the size of the troops sent to Saudi Arabia on 6 August 1990 belonged to the US. This action has

been taken before taking assurance from his allies to support his mission (**Bennett and eds., 1994, 50**).

The immediate impact of collective security was depicted through the suspension of national reaction towards threats of peace and its surrender in favor of international coalition (**Claude, 1971, 253**). The case shows a US strong commitment to the assumptions of collective security standards. President Bush repeatedly used collective security approach in his statements to educate public opinion and national institutions with his government attitude to justify a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait along with other allies.

Keohane (**1984, chap.10**) argues that Hegemonic theory suggests that '*a global hegemon will pay more to assure the stability of the world oil markets...*' As the US was the dominant state, measured by its economic size and military capabilities, it will bear most the burden in Gulf War.

The neo liberal analysis emphasizes the relative collectivist response elicited by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The coalition campaign turned into the largest military coalition since World War II. The response of the UN and the multinational coalition

were perfect illustrations of the 'New World Order', in which the major powers, as well as many of the less developed states, united against an aggressor state **(Freedman and Karsh, 1994, 215).**

Democratic politics seemed to be very influential in this case. It created a sort of combination between the two variables to better explore the details of taking a force action. By engaging collective security norm, Congress forced the President to abandon a unilateral strategy and instead seek UN auspices and authorization to initiate an offensive action to drive Iraq from Kuwait. This seems puzzling as norms play a limited role in security affairs **(Waltz, 1979, 126-30).** Krasner **(1978, 86)** also notes that *'the points of access for interest groups can be hundreds of times greater for a decision involving tariffs than for one about diplomatic or military action.'* In fact, the influence of such rules and norms was so extensive that puzzled many scholars in international politics. This impact was due in part to democratic structure of the American political system. Both Congress and executive have some authority over decision - making which makes it decentralized **(Corwin, 1948, 208).** Consequently, I would suggest that it is a hard task to get a political decision when it comes to US politics.

4.3.   The Gulf War and the Balance - of – Threat!!!

Stephen Walt argues that balancing behavior is most usefully understood as a response to threat (**Walt, 1987, 21**). For him, '*States that are viewed as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them*' (**Ibid, 25**).

As we mentioned before, the Gulf region has a geopolitical and economic significance in the US foreign policy agenda. Bush's strategy was to preclude and counter any hostile foreign in the region from gaining control and influence. Thus, it has evolved a series of alliances, security relationships and arms transfer agreements with Gulf States (**Al-Mutrif, 1998, 20**).

As for the threats they perceived, United States leaders focused on the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia or to be more exact, the global oil supply arena. In a speech to Pentagon staff on 15 August Bush argued,' *Our jobs, our way of life, our freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein.*' (**Hoffman, 1990, A1**).

It is also said that balance of threat expresses *'an effort to preserve America's position at the top of the international hierarchy by engaging and reassuring other major powers'* (**Mastanduno, 1997, 51**). US security policy since the end of the Cold War has conformed to the prediction of balance - of - threat theory. The US administration tried to preserve America's dominant position through efforts to convince other countries to be US – centered international order. Consequently, they have started emphasizing multilateral coalitions and decision - making processes in cases of military intervention (**Mastanduno, 1999, 60**).

The Bush's Government has responded to threats that might, if left unattended, created incentives for other countries like Japan to develop independent military capabilities. The US led - war in Iraq served multiple purposes, one of which was to maintain predictable access to Persian Gulf oil, on which Japan depends far more for its economic prosperity that the United States does (**Mastanduno, 1999, 60-70**).

As far as the realist thought is concerned, Washington convinced other governments most importantly of Japan, Britain and France, that it was also in their respective national interest to oust Iraq from Kuwait and punish Iraq for aggressive action (**Mingst, 1999, 84**). In other words, it is the duty of all democratic states to

stop any aggressive intentions of a 'rogue' state from implementing its ambitions. In the case of Iraq, it would be unprecedented action if the international community didn't move to defend their interests and preserve the oil reserves area which stands for the backbone of the Western civilization and prosperity.

It also indicated that the international system of anarchy imposed few effective constraints on national power save other states. Notwithstanding the major and incomparable standards between the US and Iraq, both countries were acting out of their interests (**Mingst. 1999, 84**). Iraq saw its vital security in access to the Persian Gulf and the US acted according to its own national interest and its global strategy.

This war was an exceptional case according to realist's view. It was too early for conclusive judgment as to whether the collective action was an international tool to be realized. No reform has been taken to the UN to be able to perform collective security missions (**Roberts, 1993, 3-30**). Although it wasn't clear that the US would behave unilaterally in the process of preparations on the ground before the war, US leaders' statements reflected that they were inclined to go it alone, if need be. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft argued that *'we have to begin our deliberations with the fact that this war is unacceptable'* (**Woodward, 1991, 237**).

Secretary of State's James Baker referred to similar concerns when he testified to Congress in 1990 that *'we remain the one nation that has the necessary political, military and economic instrument at our disposal to catalyze a successful response by the international community'* (**Woodward, 1991, 252**). Similarly, Bush stated that *'among the nations of the world only the United States of America has had both the moral standing and the means to back it up* (**Cooper et al, 1991, 393**). On another occasion, President Bush was willing to go it alone. Answering a reporter's question regarding the unilateral enforcement of the UN trade sanctions, he remarked: *We have all the authority we need. And the world leaders I've talked to particularly Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher agree that we have all the authority we need.. at this juncture I'm not prepared to say whether we're going to insist on UN action before we go any further* (**Woodward, 1991, 284**).

4.4. The Persian Gulf War and Democratic Policies

It was assured earlier that the structure of the US political system offered a positive atmosphere to adopt collective security strategy. I would argue that both collective security hypothesis and US democratic politics together play a decisive role in foreign policy decision making. In this context, decentralization of US decision making enabled the Congress to use collective action to increase its

influence in the policy debate. Members of Congress emphasized the plea to the norm of collective action in an effort to restrain the President. Clairborne Pell, the Senate Foreign Relations committee chairman said: '*I want the record to show that I, for one, am not giving advance approval of US unilateral military action*'. He assured the collective action move under the UN framework: *if military action is required, the President should act under the UN mandate*' **(Goshko, 1990b)**. The President also had to repeatedly assure that the collective security should guide the response to the Iraq invasion: '*I view very seriously our determination to reverse this aggression. There are an awful lot of countries that are in total accord with what I've just said. We will be working with them all for collective action*' **(Friedman, 1990a)**.

Regarding President's policy and character, Bush was a powerful autonomous actor. He used his ability to set US policies in the United Nations to pressure Congress for authorization to go to war; once the United Nations Security Council had set an ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal, Congress couldn't refuse to authorize force without badly undercutting US credibility. Congress's role in the Gulf War came in its 12 January vote to authorize the use of force shortly before the UN deadline and months after the deployment of hundreds of thousands of US troops **(Bennett and eds., 1994, 51)**.

Moreover, public support for Bush policy towards Iraq was an easy test. It never decreased less than 60% from 1990 through January 1991 and rose to 80 % once the war began **(Hedges, 4/3/1991).** It was also unclear that the US would have adopted an offensive strategy to free Kuwait if it had not received allied contribution of over $50 billion and 150,000 troops because the US public was unwilling to act singly. This attitude would prevent the temptation for other states to ride free at some point **(Bennett and eds., 1994, 74).**

The most important bureaucratic factor was that Bush was an influential actor vis a vis his own bureaucracy as well as society. Bush pushed strong action from the start, consistently favoring the most ambitious military options under consideration in the National Security Council in early August. He deployed his men with no strong recommendation from his National Security Council **(Woodward and Atkinson, 1990, A1).** But the stance of Congress created a major hinder to accomplish Bush's intentions **(Woodward, 1991, 284).** We could make out that in response to the congressional criticism, President Bush had to change his words later and began a round of urgent diplomacy to win the United Nations' approval of the use of military power to enforce the trade sanctions at sea **(Rosenthal, 1990a).**

4.5.   Summary and Conclusion

Each one of the three hypotheses helped to explain the Gulf War case, and still we couldn't say either of which holds the most explanatory value. There has to have more than one case to judge on whether a theory has the best explanatory value or not. This war seemed to be the collective action hypothesis's most- likely case for a contribution. It succeeded in catalyzing the burden - sharing of the Persian Gulf War through assuring the shared interests among states.

On the other hand, Collective action didn't show us how the alliance leader recruited states to get involved. The balance of threat theory helps explain the lack of free riding. The US succeeded in preserving its position through efforts to convince countries to be US centered international order. I think both hypotheses add more detailed analysis of the War.

The inability of both the collective action and the balance of threat hypotheses to count for public opinion add more weight to democratic domestic insitutions' pressure on decision making process. Thus, when the war for oil rationale proved unpopular, Bush had to change his words to argue that the war is about naked aggression and not for preserving oil reserves (**Hoffman, 1990, A1**). This proves that

the President of the US was highly responsive to domestic pressure. His attempt was to get the country decide with him through taking Congress authorization to go to war.

The historical record over many years provides little support for collective security. The success of the American - led coalition under the auspice of the Untied Nations might finally consider the latter as a collective security institution and might stand as an alternative to the US (**Mearsheimer, 1995, 29**). On the other hand, there is a difficulty to guarantee a rapid response to aggression and a coordination of assembling a large coalition of states to fight a war in a collective security system. It took more than six months for the US to put together a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein (**Mearsheimer, 1995, 28**).

Realism's premises cannot by themselves explain the Bush administration strategy and thus they cannot be a source for US foreign policy. The Realist explanation for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to respond to the Iraqi crisis unilaterally rather than in a multilateral fashion (**Krauthammer, 1990-91, 25**). Thus, what is missing here is the reliance of democratic politics as an independent variable for the US foreign policy. One hardly analyzes the trend of US policy without taking into account democratic domestic politics. Thus, it is not surprising that the two

political institutions of the US system endorsed collective security action simply because public opinion was not ready to go it unilaterally.

The Gulf war provided multilateralism an international legitimacy as a result of using collective action enhanced with democratic politics. In the case of US system, both President and Congress ratified the using of collective action as a resort to attack Iraq.

Chapter   5

THE WAR IN KOSOVO (March - June 1999)

5.1.   Background

As shown in the US War 1991, the function of the UN was no more under the influence of the bipolar rivalry and the US was able to recruit many countries to form international coalition against Iraq. It managed to effectively catalyze burden sharing among states concerned. The Kosovo War 1999 was different in terms of the nature of intervention, alliances, and its allegations. Before delving into these subtitles and scrutinize how effectively international theories described and evaluated such aspects, a brief synopsis of the major events of the War would be necessary.

The resentment between the ethnic Albanians and Serbians has been in existence since 1389 **(Buckley and Cummings eds, 2001, 13)**. According to the Serbs, they interpret the conflict as a decisive event in their history that demonstrates the significance of the Kosovo land in historical, cultural and religious terms for the Serbian people **(Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, 6-7)**. It became a center of Serbian

culture in the 14th century. After the Serbs suffered a great defeat by the Turks at Kosovo Polje in 1379, it became a key symbol in the Serbian national consciousness. Throughout the centuries, such event has been creating conflictual feelings yielding to foster intolerance between the two parties. In 1912, Serbia gained control of Kosovo after both had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire.

When Tito came to power, he gave sort of ethno national responsibility over certain areas including Kosovo. This moderate policy gave Kosovo relative autonomy in the 1974 constitution (**Buckley and Cummings eds, 2001, 15**). Although it was given all of the same rights that the six other Yugoslav republics enjoyed, it lacked the official statehood status that the other republics had (**Calpan, 1998, 748**).

As soon as Milosevic came onto the political scene in the late 1980s, he changed the status of the Kosovo province, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, this move was strongly opposed by the Kosovar Albanians (**Troebst, 1999, 47-62**). He was able to manipulate and capitalize on Serbian self - identity movement. Not only did he eventually wipe out all the rights given to Kosovo by 1990, but he also abused and oppressed the Albanian Kosovars (**Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, 8**).

This inhuman state the Kosovars have been experiencing under Milosevic rule has put the region in alert and perilous situation. The international community realized that Ksosovo was a 'powder keg' ready to explode into ethnic violence at any moment during the 1990s **(Schnabel and Thakur, 2000, 7).** Despite the serious stress of the situation, they ignored this severe situation and acted inconsistently. The European community at that time established the ad hoc Badinter Commission, whose mission was to examine the legal status of the various entities of the dissolving Yugoslav federation. It backed the demands that those entities were seeking, i.e. new states save Kosovo. No support was given as it had never officially been given republic status **(Caplan, 1998, 747)** although it was a very ethnically homogenous unit **(Taras and Ganguly, 2001, 259).** The Albanians reaction was taken immediately for international community denial of their political and ethnic rights. Consequently, they had to build up their parallel state institutions **(Buckley and Cummings eds, 2001, 18).**

The situation was getting worse and remained at stake. It was not until 1998 when the Serbian massacre of Albanians took place and in which eighty five people were murdered did NATO seriously consider taking explicit action against Milosevic regime in Kosovo **(Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, 11).** The March 1998 massacre gave an indication to the US to take substantial action to halt the hostilities in the province. The Clinton's government took the initiative, sending a representative,

Robert S. Gelbard to Belgrade for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement **(Buckley and Cummings eds., 2001, 19).**

The immediate causes of war against Serbia could be understood as a retaliation of the decision of Milosevic regime in Serbia to eliminate the autonomy of its Kosovo province in 1989. Therefore, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacks on Serbian police and Yugoslav army troops. The war began on 24 March with a very clear aim of NATO to *'avert a humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting the violent attacks currently being carried out by the Yugoslav security forces against the Kosovar Albanians and to limit their ability to conduct such repression in the future'* **(Morrison, 1999, 1).** NATO's operation has significant notions. For the first time, it embarked on a military campaign to protect humanitarian concerns outside its borders. For the first time too, it fought to protect the values on which the alliance was founded **(Solana, 1999).**

The deteriorated situation on the ground led the international community to agree on January 29, 1999 on a draft peace plan for Kosovo. They invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near Paris to start peace talks. The draft peace plan called for three-year interim settlement that would provide a greater autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia and the deployment of a NATO – led international force to help

implement the agreement. On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation to the peace singed the plan, but the Yugoslav delegation rejected it.

NATO began air strikes on Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999. After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage on Yugoslavia's infrastructure and its armed forces, President Milosevic had to agree on June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of Eight countries. It called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the deployment of an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-raging autonomy within Yugoslavia. Negotiations would be eventually opened on Kosovo's final status.

Due to the changing policy of the US foreign policy and the re functioning of NATO's mission in the international system, a major question should be considered here: **Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War, move to NATO to catalyze burden - sharing instead of the international community, as it was in the case of the Gulf War?** How can we read the NATO intervention instead of the international community alliance, as a burden-sharing symptom?

This chapter will be an attempt to contribute to understanding the reasons behind the NATO operations in Kosovo. I will examine the democratic politics hypothesis as the most - likely theory to this case. I would also examine the case study from the other two hypotheses to cover the event from different lenses. In other words, the strategies for the American foreign policy could be figured out in the sense that they provided an opportunity to enter that area in Eastern Europe to further expand the expansionist project the US had drawn before, starting with the Gulf War, if not years earlier.

5.2.   NATO Intervention and Democratic Politics

From a realist perspective, the United States insisted to make NATO as an institutional tool to pass its own expansionist mission. Regarding the War in Kosovo, Washington sought to make it its assistant, NATO by altering its role from a defensive into an all - purpose alliance that could be used for achieving US interests and strategies **(Alyson, 1996, 55-64),** and reflected the US expansionist vision of preserving values and interests not just territory **(Roth, 1999, 1-3).** This situation has put NATO's future into a threshold of a new function in the international system. NATO intervention in Kosovo was totally a new trend as this area is outside its 'territories'. Nevertheless, this realists' view per se seemed incomplete in evaluating

the whole scene. Democratic politics processes strongly intervened in the procedures of making the war decision and in the development of the war events as well. Next came collective security action, though in a narrowed fashion, and a lesser degree to deal with the Kosovo War.

Assuming a military role depends on the political capacity of NATO member states to generate a domestic support. The interaction between NATO leaders and domestic institutions is decisive. They have to go back to these political organizations to get their approval or they might block the leaders' intentions. It is not a matter of option as NATO is a democracy - based organization which demands public opinion consensus, mainly the issue of going to war **(Putnam, 1998, 427-460).**

The concept of maintaining alliance unity was the top priority for NATO in the Kosovo War even more than the war itself **(Auerswald, 2000, 781-2).** General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander for NATO, assured that '*at the political level the measure of merit is to retain Alliance solidarity and the full support of our regional partners* **(Clark, 2001, 184).** This message signaled that there was a great deal of restrictions on assuming military action and which form of military operations to take among NATO members. The avoidance of extending the war from air strike to send ground troops was one of the limitations democratic politics imposed. It was

shown by the stance of the three big states of NATO: Britain, Germany and the US. At the beginning of the conflict, Blair declared no objection to sending ground forces while Schroeder of Germany was in great opposition of such escalation. The attitude of Clinton was hesitant. Each one of the three leaders had his own influential background to justify his reaction **(Silverstone, 2002, 10-11).** I think that going into details of these justifications would be rather out of debate in this paper while focusing on the issue as an example of democratic politics influence on foreign policy will serve my argument.

Going back to US stance in the Kosovo War, the US administration was between conflict; it didn't advocate for a ground assault or using any kind of force, nor threatened to veto any such NATO action. Behind this averse attitude, the Clinton's government was reluctant to deploy ground forces in Kosovo. The US reluctance was due to the following point:

1. No support in Congress or the US public opinion for deploying yet more troops at the very beginning of the war to the Balkans.

2. The scenario of ground forces would have created major fractures within the NATO alliance and posed particular problems for key allies such as Germany

and Italy, both of which were facing a transition in government and a great opposition from certain parties like the German Green Party.

Russia opposed the use of force under any circumstances and would have gone completely off the reservation if US and NATO troops entered Yugoslavia without Belgrade's consent **(Daalder, 2000, 8).** The US was hitherto cautiously trying to avoid any direct confrontation with Russia although it became out of the global game and competition.

In order to avoid a public debate and negative reaction from Congress, the leader's mission has to keep the prosecution of the war below the threshold of ground war. Later, when the war consequences were getting off the track for the NATO's strategies and the US deliberations, the US Congress, which has the institutional power to have a direct impact on the president's ability to prosecute the war, voted in support of escalating the war **(Dewar, 1999, A5).** In other words, President Clinton was not insulated from any domestic pressure and political risks; he had to get Congressional approval before assuming any further move towards fighting a war.

In this war, Clinton had to work through NATO, keeping the Western coalition together. Kosovo was a test of the alliance political capabilities, mainly to

generate political support for using military force. It's essential to consider how democratic domestic politics of NATO members will affect alliance decision- making on a range of potential mission.

NATO didn't find any great difficulty in assuming an air strike on Kosovo. There was no real threat of blocking the war decision from democratic politics but the major states leaders were cautious in escalating towards a ground war which might create a hurdle to get the public opinion's approval and official political institutions' ratification. The more the level of risk on human causalities gets high, the more reluctant public opinion would be. Nevertheless, NATO leaders referred political, economic and strategic merits over other variables.

5.3.   The Kosovo War and the Collective Security Action

The theory of collective security directly deals with the issue of how to cause peace **(Morgenthau, 1993, 293-306),** and the key to enhancing stability in this world is the proper management of military power **(Claude, 1962, 6).** Collective security hypothesis refers to activities that require coordination of efforts by group actors intended to further the interests or well-being of the members **(Sandler, 1992, xvii).**

Kosovo was one of the catastrophes that called for new approaches to the art of conflict management - NATO's bombing campaign being a prime example of that management **(Evans, 2001, 7).** NATO couldn't have gone to intervene in Kosovo crisis if it had not got the authorization from its political system institutions and public opinion. Besides, collective security action was still apparent even this time it took a Western color. The question here is: **How did NATO justify such intervention?** The Kosovo War demonstrated the fragmentation of international unity and created a new collective action environment colored only by Western major countries such as the United States, Britain, France and Germany. Milosevic was a ferocious dictator and given terrible titles as the term 'fascist' who caused 'humanitarian catastrophe' to the Albanians. They deftly used such term to influence the public for this image had been stuck in their mind for so long. The argument NATO delivered was misleading in the sense that it fabricated events to fit its justification to go to war. The conflict was there and drastically worsened between the Yugoslav government and the ethnic Albanians when NATO actually started the war. Civilians began to flee after the bombing because NATO bombs pushed 6000,000 Kosovars into safer ground or even expelled from the province rather than Serbs attacks. This alarming action didn't take place before March 20th. So one can argue that the human crisis henceforth started deteriorating. This severe situation appeared to be attributed to the NATO air strikes **(Blum, 2000, 166).** NATO political leaders were trying to exacerbate the situation to justify their military intervention

through spreading the concept of 'humanitarian crisis in Kosovo'. But, there was only one problem in the NATO's claims: it was a complete fabrication.

On another level, prominent academics and media began to provide justifications for a NATO intervention. They framed this attack in terms of a humanitarian intervention against Milosevic's fascist regime. For example, Serge Schmemann described 'a democratic West, its humanitarian instincts repelled by the barbarous inhumanity of Orthodox Serbs'. Even Samuel Huntington made an appearance in the New York Times article described the situation as '*A New Collision of East and West*' **(Chomsky, 2000, 49).**

The Western Media were striving to mold the situation in favor of their foreign politics strategies. They portrayed the action of intervention as a must to do job for the sake of humanitarian sake. Chomsky **(2000, 45)** notes that the major examples of 'humanitarian intervention' in the 20th century were carried out by Japan in Manchuria, Italy in Ethiopia, and Hitler in Czechoslovakia. Here we could add the Israeli severe and inhumane measures against Gaza as an explicit empirical evidence of manipulating the Palestinian rockets on the area of the illegal Israeli settlement 'Sderot' to commit war crimes against the Palestinians. All of these countries held the humanitarian aims of fighting poverty and slavery and protecting innocent people.

Thus, under humanitarian principles, many people were killed and expelled from their homes.

Under these fabricated allegations, the Western public had to push the political leadership to take actions on the ground to stop these savage actions executed by the Milosevic's regimes and the Serbian army against the ethnic Albanians. Without these falsified claims of refugee crises and genocidal crimes, NATO couldn't have been able to get united and determinant to endorse the intervention.

5.4.   The Kosovo War and the Balance - of - Threat Hypothesis

In the wake of the Cold War era, the US has been facing a fierce confrontation in its economic strength from the European Union and East Asian economic of Japan and China. The immediate response to face such confrontation was through military intervention as it happened in Iraq 1991 and now in Kosovo. This is one central reason why military power is so often the choice in the US administration agenda **(Gokay, 2002, 51).**

The NATO intervention is better perceived in terms of US objectives. NATO's current functions were steered to suit the demands of the new world order. The area of Kosovo enjoys a geopolitical and economic base which is located at the backyard of the former Soviet Union and an essential oil line vital to US hegemonic sustainability.

The Caspian region was called *'the area of greatest resource potential outside of the Middle East'* (**Gokay, 2002, 52**). The Vice President of the States, Dick Cheney commented on this area saying: *'I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant as the Caspian'* (**Cheney, 2001**). The Balkans is considered to be central to the 'pipeline map' because oil destined for Western Europe must pass through them at one point or another (**Yannopoulos, 2001**). In 1997, British Petroleum Corporation 'BP' and the Texas Halliburton Company proposed a pipeline that would go from Burgas in Bulgaria through Skopje in Macedonia to Vlore, a port in Albania (**Monbiot, 2001**). I would argue that this would be a necessity of security in the Southeastern Europe which was standing behind bombing Yugoslavia in 1999. As we have seen, Kosovo was considered the attraction of enormous oil reserves in the Caspian sea basin which has made the region the focus of fierce competition between multinational companies and the governments of powerful states presided by the United States.

In regard to mineral resources, as Lydall **(1989, 196)** briefly noted, Kosovo is home to 'substantial deposits of lignite and non-ferrous metals. Indeed, Kosovo's mineral possessions in the Trepca mining complex are quite substantial, and have continuously been a focus of ethnic conflict. Describing this focus a year before NATO intervention, New York Times columnist Chris Hedges **(1998).** labeled northern Kosovo's mines, rich in 'lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and silver,' as the 'Kosovo war's glittering prize'.

From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration condemned Serbian human rights abuses and called for autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, while opposing independence. It was delivered to the press and media that Washington pushed for air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet accords in March 1999.

The Kosovo conflict occurred in the context of broad US objectives in the Balkans. But before the war, the Clinton administration said that US troops would participate in Kosovo peacekeeping forces if a peace agreement were reached. So, on the Media level, there was room for peaceful solution but on the ground, military preparations have already been taken to commence the war. NATO came to the

negotiating table with three basic economic objectives in Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999 **(Chossudovsky, 2003, 259 - 260):**

1. to dismantle Yugoslavia's competing socialist economic system.

2. to gain control of valuable mineral resources

3. to command the site of future energy distribution network.

Chossudovsky **(2003, 260)** argues that NATO sought to dismantle the socialist economic system in Yugoslavia. He notes that Western intervention in Yugoslavia prior to the Kosovo Crisis was not limited merely to the diplomatic maneuvering. Consequently, Ignatieff **(2003, 306)** claims that NATO intervention in Kosovo occurred not just for humanitarian reasons but also to implement stability and assert American dominance over NATO and the Eastern region of Europe.

United States strategic plans are heading to contain the Eastern Europe where the influence of the Soviet Union had vanished. Through NATO, its own imperial ambitions necessitate the elimination of sovereignty and competing systems in geopolitical strategic zones throughout the world. NATO intervention came as a

preemptive reaction to paralyze Russian ambitions to get from the Kosovo province wealth and strategic opportunity. The region of Kosovo has a significant economic, political, and geographic consideration. It is identified as the bridge between Asia and Europe to the east of Turkey. Kosovo contains a prize of such potential in the oil and gas riches of the Caspian Sea, valued at up to 4 trillion US dollars (**WSWS Editorial Board, 05/24/99**).

The balance - of - threat theory since the end of the Cold War has been steering the US security policy trend. US major concern was to seek America's predominance and hegemony through different efforts, most frequently militarily, to maintain the new status quo of itself first, and then for the other countries such as Russia, Germany, China and Japan. US policy was planning to incorporate those countries into US sphere (**Mearsheimer, 1990, 173-76,**). I would say that one of the reasons why the Bush and Clinton governments adopted collective action in the cases of Iraq 1991 and in Kosovo War 1999 sprang from the concept of integration of the above potential states to be future rivals of US hegemony. This grand strategy of the US was to preclude any challenges to the current position of America. It was clearly laid out in 1992 when a paper done by Defense Planning Guidance led to the press assuring that: *'our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future global competitor'. 'The United States must establish and protect a new order*

that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role **(Schwarz, 1996, 92-102).**

The balance – of - threat theory would anticipate US intervention in Kosovo conflict as it would threaten regional stability and carry the potential for other major powers to develop and project their independent military capabilities. The US administration had to act collectively bouncing on humanitarian issues but relative dominance of neo realist's major premises were looming strongly over the grand strategies of the US foreign policy.

Chapter 6

The US War against Iraq 2003

6.1. Background

Both Iraq 1991 and Kosovo 1999 wars can be looked upon as milestones in the search for institutions, international or Western consent and norms to conflict management conflicts among nations and the maintenance of both international security and peace. The Gulf War and Kosovo crisis imposed certain constraints and strategies on the US to use a workable system of collective security among states. The American government under the senior Bush heavily endorsed dependency on the UN to 'rejuvenate' its role. At a less degree, the Clinton administration depended on 'selective' collective security with no direct auspices by the UN and instead, the US used this time the Western NATO ally to accomplish the mission in Kosovo province. Paradoxically, the US War against Iraq in 2003 is totally different from the aforementioned wars for many certain reasons. First, it came in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. This historical turning point bestowed Washington an impetus towards waging wars against many countries in the world, mainly Afghanistan and

Iraq. Then, the US neoconservative leadership decided that the moment for applying the 'Bush Doctrine' has come. The US has given itself the grand authority to attack Iraq without the previous mechanisms of UN authorization, and the collective security action with its allies. Eliminating terrorism threat was its rationale for the US national security strategy and preemptive attacks in the name of self-defense were also its utmost objectives and ambitions **(Wilkinson and Christopher, 2004)**.

Destroying rogue regimes that harbored, abetted terrorists and had designs to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and replacing them with democracies that are less intersected in waging wars were the mere justifications of US invasion of Iraq in 2003 **(Lafeber, 2004, xiii)**.

Accordingly, when George W. Bush came to power, he brought with him what was called 'the Bush doctrine'. Bush, by mid - 2002, contends that 'pre-emptive self-defense' allows the United States to get the rightful use of force with referring to the United Nations Charter **(Allain, 2003, 13)**.

With the war in Iraq, the US government put its new strategic doctrine into practice. Backed up by faulty allegations, the administration decided to intervene

preemptively to stop Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction that would danger the whole region or even the current world order. The intervention showed all the signs of an imperialist strategy. This was conducted without explicit United Nations' authorization and against the protest of its allies and other powers such as Russia, China, France and Germany. Such countries opposed a preemptive military intervention in Iraq and insisted that the UN inspection team should be given more time to establish the existence of a program to develop weapons of mass destruction. It was an attempt offered to diplomatic solution but it didn't work out. When the US began air strikes on March 20, 2003, France, Germany, China and Russia led international protests against the attack **(Henley, Walsh, and Gittings, 2003).**

The Bush security policy has definitely destroyed the vision of 'the New World Order' which was based primarily on collective security governance. Although the September 11 events were worldwide condemned, and thus required an international reaction, the US preferred to take the Iraq conflict unilaterally and moved away from institutionalist's paradigm. The US appeared to be in line with the traditional theoretical neorealist premise **(Krahmann, 2005, 532).** Ironically, President Bush addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2003: *'No government should ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way gives terrorism the chance to regroup and recruit and prepare'* **(Pena, 2003, 1-2).** This planning was actually profoundly adopted by the US government when it attacked

Iraq. Moreover, President Bush accused Saddam Hussein of breaching United Nations Security Resolution 1441 and this material breach, a term used in diplomatic circles, formed casus belli i.e. which means a direct cause for war **(Bush, 2003).** Ironically again, if Iraq were in violation of US resolutions, it would be the United Nations' duty to perform its job!

The central question which showed this shift in decision – making system is the following: **Why did the United States, the alliance leader in the Gulf War and the prime mover of the NATO intervention against Yugoslavia go to the third Gulf War unilaterally?** This chapter contributes in one way to our understanding of unilateralism as the most - likely hypothesis. It also compares the explanatory value of the other hypotheses formed in the above two cases across the US war.

6.2.   Unilateralism and the Iraq War 2003

In the wake of the Cold War, President George H Bush made his first attempt at remolding the US foreign policy toward multilateralism framework of security under the auspices of the United Nations. This new world order was short - lived. Its fall was due to the United States inability to act effectively outside of its own national interests **(Ostergard, 2006, 43).**

The invasion of Iraq represented a clear sign of the Bush doctrine. President George W. Bush entered office with full endorsement of a unilateralist approach to dealing with international conflicts. He was against many treaties which were supposed to be signed by the US government during the nineties (**Caldwell, 2007, 1-10**).

Conversely, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Bush was gradually moving far away from multilateralism. He announced an adoption of preemptive framework of his move, to be more exact, a preventive war. In his commencement address at the US Military Academy at West Point in June 2002 he made this speech: '*We must take the battle to the enemy ... In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act* (**Bush, 2001, 86**).

A major pillar of the Bush doctrine is that the world is now facing not only a time of opportunity but also great threat posed mainly by terrorists and rogue states. These states threat and blackmail the US and its allies, and thus, its duty is to deter those actors or/and non actors with all means possible (**Jervis, 2003, 369**). Bush believed that such threat could not be deterred but with preventive action. He was fully aware that Iraq would never ever create a menace to the US and will do to it a great harm. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies' Military

Balance 2002-2003, Iraq's defense expenses were $ 1.4 billion in 2001, and the majority of its army was ill-trained and the army was outfitted with older Soviet and Chinese equipment **(IISI, 2002, 241-279)**. This means the army wasn't much of an army and thus a real threat to international security including the US. Nevertheless, Bush put it like that '*the United States must be ready to wage preventive wars and to act against emerging threats before they are fully formed* **(Litwak, 2002-03, 53-79)**.

The Bush's approach for preventive action is highly connected with the concept of unilateralism. Due to ineptitude of taking a consensus form even the close allies on the preemptive wars, the Bush's government took the initiative of carrying the full burden of the war on Iraq in 2003.

At least two major variables affecting the United States to behave in a unilateral fashion: first, the terrorists attack on the US and the election of George W. Bush who brought to the office a more unilateral outlook than President Clinton or even Bush the senior. Bush believes that fighting terrorism is the reason why he was put on this earth **(Woodward, 1991, 102)**.

The balance - of - threat was a clear mechanism for the preservation of international order as it happened with the previous cases. George W. Bush rather preferred to adopt a policy of preventive war, as a sign of the collapse of the logic and policy of deterrence (**Jervis, 2003, 315-337).**

One of the main objectives why US attacked Iraq was to serve the aim of reestablishing the credibility of the US deterrence capability in the wake of September 11, 2001. The credibility of the preemptive policy is only established and rooted through actual usage (**Schelling 1966, 72),** and the Iraqi case was a good model and choice for war. This country had the potential reasons upon which the Bush government would rely to take the war decision. This choice was partly due to the consequences of September 11 and the war on terrorism. One side of the American strategies was to bring the state back in instead of fighting a non state actor, portrayed by Al-Qaida (**Barnathan, 2004, 202).**

Daalder and Lindsay (**2003, 13-14)** noted that the Bush revolution was based on both the concept of that the only way to protect the US in this world was to *'shed constraints imposed by alliances, international law and international regime', and the neoconservatives who handed over the US government saw their country from a*

unique angle that would allow them to use its power to serve US interests and make the world more free and peaceful.'

During the senior Bush and Clinton administration, neorealist scholars, like Mearsheimer viewed the world governed by cooperation, integration and the spread of liberal values and institutions **(Mearsheimer, 1990-1, 56)**, but in the wake of September 11, 2001, the concepts of US unilateralism and hegemony were getting dominant in international relations. According to neorealists, states have to deter other states from threatening or attacking them. Their reaction has to depend on their national military economic and political capabilities. Besides, states can enhance their power by forming temporary alliances with other states as it was the case in Kosovo 1999 **(Waltz, 1979, 126f)**. Conversely, the invasion of Iraq unilaterally assured that the threat and preventive war in addition to American hegemony are major paradigms of the Bush foreign politics for this ear.

6.3. Collective Action

After the Cold war, it was clearly proven that the neo liberal institutionalism's assumptions were prevalent and dependable in evaluating international politics. The thirty three countries shared the burden of the Persian Gulf War. This coalition was a

substantial evidence of such claim. With a gradual shift in level and nature of dependence, the NATO intervention in the war against Yugoslavia offered another face of the concept. It can be classified as another neorealist empirical evidence but with rather different nature. the collective action is indispensable in international relations and offered momentum to the golden age for this theory.

The Collective security hypothesis took various shapes. In the US War 19991, the concept was endorsed by the Bush administration completely with no reservation. In the Kosovo War, it took the form of Western alliance which jumped to the neorealist track of using temporary alliance as tools to achieve goals and objectives. Undeniably, the big shift happened when the US went to war against Iraq in 2003. The decision was taken unilaterally with support only from the United Kingdom, Australia, and a number of smaller countries. At this point, no other countries came close to match the United States preponderance. Therefore, its willingness to go it alone was constantly prevailing with clear immunity to the pressure of other countries (**Foot, 2003, 27**). The dominance of hegemonic doctrine and the tendency of going it alone are becoming apparent in the US foreign policy. In the wake of September 11, 2001, this trend left little space for collective security action and put the US policy in line again with neorealist premises. In this case, there is no much to say about the efficacy of collective security action. The Bush's doctrine demolished this concept to be even a least - likely hypothesis in analyzing the US war.

The Collective action hypothesis doesn't reach the minimum of explanatory value criteria. Thus, I would rather completely disregard it from analyzing the US invasion against Iraq in 2003. It failed to explain the case as it did to the Gulf War in 19991 and to a certain degree in the NATO intervention in Kosovo 1999.

The US war in 2003 created a collective action problem. In the war 1990/1, it has been agreed that collective action was necessary and indispensable to pursue a public good for all the states concerned. However, powerful incentives remained dominant in 2003. As the US position is getting preponderant, Washington was inclined to behave as the only remaining superpower, putting its own interest on top of priorities. The United States here had an incentive not to contribute to the group efforts and simply adopted the policy of free ride.

This strategic shift in the US foreign politics relaxed the neo realist approach where the US war on Iraq has offered the most - likely case to show its explanatory power. Mastanduno **(1997, 49-88)** assures that the post Cold War world is a US - dominated unipolar system. Thus, it is strongly inclined to practice its unilateralism, exceptionalism and hegemony.

6.4.   Democratic Politics and the War in Iraq

The events of September 11, 2001 have driven the foreign policy of the United States to move towards the consensus for the use of military force to create its empire. It was shown in October 2001 when more than ninety percent of the American people endorsed President Bush's policies. His policy was to declare war against terrorism and its networks and even the states which refuge terrorists as well. He was given the public's support for any action he saw important to preserve the nation's security and dominance (**Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, 48**).

I would argue that internal politics is important to put an impact on the US foreign policy to seek for dominance. As Mearsheimer **(2001, 1-10)** put it '*Even states that find the status quo acceptable have to worry about the future.* Thus, taking advantage of the September events, the preferences of the US administration and some interests groups in the US society created the environment in which President Bush always warned that the people of the United States have to be totally alert of the coming danger.

Bush never denies the importance of democratic domestic politics and how it determines the foreign policy. He took advantage of disseminating 'American' values

of democracy and human rights. He argued that toppling Saddam Hussein will give the American people the opportunity to produce democracy in Iraq and then to other neighboring states. Public support for Bush policy towards Iraq was an easy test. It never decreased under 60% from 1990 through January 1991 and rose to 80 % once the war began (**The New York Times, 4/3/1991**). It was also unlikely clear that the US would have adopted an offensive strategy to free Kuwait if it had not received allied contribution of over $50 billion and 150, 000 troops. The US public was unwilling to act singly that other countries took seriously the risk of abandonment by the US and avoided the temptation to ride free.

By October, 2001, ninety percent of the American people endorsed President Bush's policies which he defined as not only to destroy terrorist networks but also moving globally to attack sovereign states harboring terrorists (**Daalder & Lindsay, 2003**). I argue that both internal and structural factors are important to influence the US to seek for dominance. As Mearsheimer put it (**2001, 10-15**), 'even *states that find the status quo acceptable have to worry about the future.*'

Bush also never ignored the importance of domestic policy and how it determines the foreign policy. Bush argued that toppling Saddam Hussein will

produce democracy there and give a great model to spread all over the world. Therefore, more democratic states will create a more stable world.

In the end, I would rather ask the following question: **To what extent will the US democratic politics political system enhance and sustain the Bush doctrine?**

6.5.   Conclusion

The balance of threat and preemptive action highly explain why the US went it alone. The invasion of Iraq was the most likely case for showing the extensive use of unilateralism hypothesis. This approach demanded the US to bear the full burden. The US attack against Iraq showed the end of the system of international governance established in San Francisco in 1945. Multilateralism was no longer applicable and collective action to maintain peace and security was also dead (**Allain, 2003, 26).**

This created a new challenge to the US foreign policy. It also created a test case of the value of international institutions like the UN as an independent tool for maintaining international order. First, the US tried to act multilaterally through recruiting the international community via the United Nations. Later on, it turned to

NATO as a Western tool to deploy its strategy in the Eastern part of Europe. When it comes to Iraq 2003, I would argue that this war totally ignored the international institutions or even the concept of the alliance and rather moved unilaterally so as to achieve its interests. This ignorance of the international community refers to the fact that the United States had less power than the United States Administration thought.

The UN was unable to stand against the war and some states, encouraged by the 'inability' to support a war, stood bluntly against the war but no actions on the ground that could have altered the situation (**Barringer, 2003**).

PART III

PROBLEMS OF EXPLAINING

US FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES

## CHAPTER 7:

LESSONS LEARNED

C h a p t e r   7

LESSONS LEARNED

Throughout the three war cases, each of our three hypotheses explains its most - likely case(s), and this study has shown every hypothesis's strong points which successfully describe, and analyze the events of the case(s). On the other hand, the study also depicts the inapplicability and the pitfalls of each hypothesis which doesn't offer logical explanations for US foreign policy in the three case - studies. As a matter of fact, the approaches of multilateralism, balance of threat / power and democratic politics have been swinging from one angle to another. Each one tried to offer the best beacon to view and interpret the US foreign policy with. Equally, this study also demonstrates that there is no variable per se, no matter how major it is, that could be influential and decisive in the process of decision - making. In each case of the US wars, the form of contribution to decipher the events is largely determined by more than one hypothesis. Consequently, every hypothesis partly determines how we make contributions and assessments. Proponents of both neorealist and institutional theories and democratic politics approach have be striving hard to impose the US three war cases on the belief that suits their own theoretical premises and to show the drawbacks and pitfalls of the other competing theory. But, in any case, the US three

case-studies cannot be seen but through a form of hybrid hypothesis. This mixture could best illustrates the fluctuating and conflicting behaviors of the US foreign policy.

I would suggest the pendulum instrument as a measurable, clarifying tool to help figure out the requisite interaction and interrelations among international relations theories so as to overcome the deficiencies of, so to speak, a uni - hypothesized system. By definition, '*a pendulum is a weight that is attached to a pivot, from which it can swing freely. This object is subject to a restoring force due to gravity that will accelerate it toward an equilibrium position. When the pendulum is displaced from its place of rest, the restoring force will cause the pendulum to oscillate about the equilibrium position*' (**Wikipedia/pendulum**).

According to our cases, the ball stands for US decision to go to war, and the right side **(A)** represents the institutionalism paradigm, whereas the left zone **(B)** stands for the neo realism's. The stick(s) which strike(s) the ball signifies (a) hypothesis (es). Finally the rope which holds the rope represents US foreign policy. This instrument simply describes the situation of each case, what the decision of the US foreign policy is affected by, and which applicable hypothesis(es) best assess the US war case(s).

7.1.   Problems of Explaining US Cases

Of the cases we studied, collective action hypothesis came closest to being most - likely approach for the Gulf War 1991. Then, a blurred mixture of both collective action and balance of threat were the most flanking hypotheses for the Kosovo War 1999 with a greater relative weight for the latter. Dramatically, unilateralism and balance of threat were best classified the most relevant hypotheses for the Iraq War 2003. Actually, it was the Bush government, influenced and inspired by the neoconservative doctrine that flagrantly disregarded the previous approaches of multilateralism and decided to go it alone to impose its hegemony and show the world its preponderance. Therefore, one could conclude that each theory has its own

relative contribution with some shortages of its comprehensive explanation for all cases.

7.2.   Collective Security Hypothesis

In the Gulf War 1991, pro institutionalism scholars claim that collective security action via the United Nations per se was the dominating utensil through which we could analyze the US foreign policy in the Persian War. Since the end of bipolarity, the United Nations' presence and interaction was considered unprecedented and a success by itself. The UN authorization of managing the Iraq conflict by way of an international collective security action was never practiced before, mainly during the Cold War era. The US - led coalition that ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait seemed to depict the reemergence of operational function of this international organization which, supposedly represented the international consent in world system and endorsed multilateralism as an essential means of sustaining both international peace and stability.

Chart (1): The Gulf War 1991

As the pendulum chart (1) shown above, Collective security action was considered the major intervening variable in mobilizing the ball of the pendulum to the side of institutionalism.

Although the collective theory recognizes the centrality of military power in international politics, it argues that the point is how to manage this military power as Inis Claude noted in chapter one of this dissertation. On the other hand, the theory disregarded the significance of balance of power and traditional alliances. The best US president who expressed this aversion was Woodrow Wilson when he described pre World War I Europe: '*the day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of 'every nation take care of itself or make a*

partnership with some other nation or group of nation to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world' **(Claude, 1966, 81).** Claude **(1966, 116)** also added that the collective action approach represented a trademark of international morality immensely superior to that integrated in the balance of power system. Collective security premise went ahead of the realist's assumptions. Its objective goes beyond the balance of power and threat considerations. It works beyond self help believing that the public goods belong to all. The Gulf case has been the collective action hypothesis' most-likely case for a contribution. It was unique and 'unusual case' evidence that put collective action in its highest rank of powerfulness and effectiveness of evaluating international politics **(Mearsheimer, 1995, 31).**

Based on our analysis of all the cases together, and despite the fact that Collective Security Action was the most – likely hypothesis to analyze and weigh up the Gulf War, there are major empirical examples which show that the Collective Security hypothesis is incomplete and flawed. First, a major variable that the theory totally ignored in the Gulf Persian War was the role and utility of democratic domestic politics. This was crucial in the decision - making process of the foreign policy of the Bush administration. Collective security ignored the democratic politics hypothesis as a precondition of ratification of any political decision the government would suggest. It strongly intervened between international pressures and US

interests. Both the political legislative and executive institutions constitutionally take the decision whether to go it alone or multilaterally. Thus, a political decision, mainly to fight a war, in part is affected by great consideration of US public opinion stance.

In fact, it was not a big test for the Bush administration to recruit and convince US public opinion to attack Iraq as the flagrant aggression was very apparent when Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait in 1990. The bottom line was how to go to such war. As a matter of fact, the US public opinion was not ready to take unilateral action; specifically, the US Congress warned President Bush not to go it alone and instead its members favored to get involved in the first post Cold War under an international coalition. I would counterfactually argue that if the Congress had not directed the decision of going multilaterally, the Bush government, prejudiced by the ecstasy of the demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold war, would have gone it alone. Even in the wake of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US reiterated more than once that it had the right to reserve the decision on using force under the right of self - defense for Kuwait. Moreover, the US viewed the UN as an obstructionist, non dependable organization. Second, Collective Security premise suggests escalation of the conflict and prefers to transform the domestic conflicts into international as it was done with Yugoslavia at the beginning of the early nineties **(Walt, 1993, 169-195).** This would make countries reluctant to participate, get involved in domestic conflicts and encourage them to ride free. Third, the structure of

international coalition swiftly took another shape as we moved to the second US war in our thesis. The case of Kosovo War 1999 suggested that such international 'collective' action was minimized to be only Western under the auspice of NATO. The NATO's intervention remained another example claiming that Collective security as the most – likely hypothesis moved back to be an auxiliary notion and that of neo realist's concepts of multilateralism, and balance of threat were relatively getting more significant as the pendulum chart (2) illustrates.

Chart 2: The Kosovo War 1999

These 'neorealist' variables started pushing the pendulum ball to the other side far away from the institutionalism's zone. Fourth, the Iraq War 2003 was totally disappointing and peaked the Collective Security's inapplicability and powerlessness. The US policy had been highly responsive to the constraints of neorealist's premises. According to George W Bush, the time of being the only remaining hegemonic and

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
State

Variables' Effect

Collective Action

Democratic Politics

Balance of Threat

Political Decision

Chart 2: The Kosovo War 1999

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preponderant state has come and this will depend on America's military and economic capabilities. In this war, the US surrendered to the arrogance of power and framed itself of the temptation of going it alone, striking the international consent and even some of its allies.

7.2. The Balance - of - Threat and Unilateralism

The Gulf Persian War 1991 brought some severe criticisms and challenges to the neorealist's model towards institutionalism and the balance of threat. Not only did the theory failed to predict some future events like the end of the Cold War and the peaceful transition to a new era **(Kegley, 1993, 131-146),** but it also stood speechless in terms of its contribution in this war. The conditions that made international relations in the early nineties very responsive to security governance or collective Security were related to the changing nature of contemporary international relations **(Krahmann, 2005, 537).** This profound shift was strikingly contradictory with the neorealist's claims. Moreover, the structure of the US government and domestic politics made it hard and even impossible to fight a war without the auspices and authorization of the United Nations. Consequently, the false promise of neo realists for the future predictions led critics to the conclusion that this *'theoretical paradigm's days were numbered'* **(Mastanduno, 1997, 49).**

Gradually and swiftly, the previous conclusion started to take a new trend. The role of international institutions turned to be of less importance. The Kosovo War in 1999 showed that the structure of the international coalition and the concept of collective action had shattered down and instead a Western ally was established. The existence of international organization, like the US and NATO as instrumental bureaucratic devices for the dominant state surfaced again. Once the US saw that the UN was no longer an international body to satisfy its interests, it moved to NATO to achieve its objectives and global interests. The US government held impression that NATO was a US – controlled organization and it was easy for it to control and direct. The United States is the strongest member of NATO and it is naturally that the US interests would be so dominant and reflection to US way of thinking and acting **(Mattiesen, 2004, 17).** The form of coalition remained but this time far away from the international community. NATO was seen as a military executive organization to the US foreign policy. Based on chart (2), the weight of collective security began to decrease and the ball 'decision' started to go back to neorealist destination yet still in the middle of the way. The chart also depicts certain obstacles which preclude the reader to conclude that this war was exclusively amenable to neorealism. It is important here to mention that the US political leadership was very cautious about two variables: to sustain the unity of a Western ally and preserve the concept of collective action even through NATO per se, and to be fully aware of both political domestic institutions and the public opinion of all NATO countries. As for the first concern, neorealists argued that NATO represented the '*arena for acting out power*

relationships' **(Evans and Wilson, 1992, 330)** and the dependency on NATO reflected the realist thinking of the role of institutions. The lack of democratic politics support would simply curb the President of America from executing his objectives. Thus, President Clinton was very cautious to fabricate allegations to get their approval to go to war with the way he had drawn. These two factors put the US foreign policy behavior neither on the track of institutionalism nor on the neorealist side.

The third US war case seemed to stir the ball to the extreme side of neo realism. Based on the assumption that international system is anarchic and the states are unitary **(Waltz, 1979, 1-5)**, states have to deter other states from threatening them. States give themselves the right and the green line to take actions on the ground in a unilateral way. Their ability to effectively do so rests on their national military, economic and political capabilities in addition to their influence on international institutions such as the UN and NATO. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the US politics has moved to a fundamental unprecedented shift. In this regard, Robert Jervis **(2003, 83)** wrote:

The United States today controls a greater share of world power than any other country since the emergence of the nation-state system. Nevertheless, recent US

presidents George H. Bush and Bill Clinton cultivated allies and strove to maintain

large coalitions... By contrast, the fundamental objective of the current Bush doctrine

- which seeks to universalize US values and defend preventively against new,

nontraditional threats - is the establishment of US hegemony, primacy or empire.

We can conclude that the Bush government decided to take a new dimension in US politics, seeking universality, hegemony and primacy of America over the whole world. This doctrine would absolutely lead him to adapt an alternative vision of maintaining US interests and position in the new international order. Additionally, the international mood has succumbed to the concept of uni polarity. This privilege has pushed President Bush with no big hesitation to implement his doctrine and thus attacked Iraq to stop the latter from what he lied about in terms of developing weapons of mass destruction that would imperil the region and the whole world.

In this case, unilateralism and hegemony were the most - likely hypothesis that would add much explanation to the US politics. Before Bush came to power, the US was committed to multilateralism **(Nye, 2002, 154-163),** but the unilateral toppling of Saddam has broken international institutions' efficacy and jurisdiction over international conflicts and fractured the Western consensus as it was the NATO

intervention in Kosovo. Until this moment, the ball 'decision' peaked the neorealist zone leaving little space for alternatives.

Chart (3) below shows the shift of the US foreign policy to be a reflection of neo realism's major premises of unilateralism and hegemony.


Variables' Effect:

Collective Action

Democratic politics

Balance of Threat / unilateralism

State

Political Decision

Chart 3: the Iraq War 2003

As for Democratic politics, its effects were not limited to one case of the US Wars. It applied to all the three cases. In the Gulf War, public opinion and domestic political institutions of the US were not hesitant at all to ratify and endorse the

decision to go to war multilaterally. They supported the reemergence of the UN through implementing its function and management of the Persian War. As the political decision had to pass through Congress which went for US sponsorship, it was challenging to George H Bush not to ignore international community involvement and went it alone. He cared about both international mood and US public opinion stance and the Congress view. The Saddam invasion of Kuwait created the first challenge to the new era that propelled the whole world to stand against his action. The world started to look for an expected era of peace in the wake of the Cold War.

In the second case, the prime objective of NATO members was the unity of the organization. They couldn't accept any action which would threaten their harmony. Therefore, the NATO political leaders realized that without forging certain events, they couldn't have convinced NATO countries to offer their approval. As the NATO leaders are accountable to democratic procedures, many variations come out among NATO countries. The most important point is that there will be no decision if one country doesn't want to agree on a decision. Thus, they were very keen on taking a decision. As for the Iraq War 2003, the public opinion was also important and crucial. The Bush administration had to lie to pass its hegemonic and expansionist vision. They alleged that Iraq had been developing weapons of mass destruction and that would be a real threat to the whole world system.

In conclusion, democratic politics plays a significant role in foreign policy decision making process. I could argue that this variable is indispensable as it exists in all cases. Yet, it doesn't reach the level of being a major international theory simply as it doesn't explain how the decision is made and can't evaluate political events.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of which party controls the US executive institution and Congress, the nature of the US foreign politics has been influenced by pragmatic measures leading to different findings. Evaluation of international theories, the three US case - wars, lessons learned and the application of the pendulum instrument have contributed to improvements in showing the strengths and weaknesses of both major theories – neo realism and institutionalism and democratic politics hypothesis. Across the three US Wars, the major theories have been stuck by the Presidents' behaviors in dealing with international conflicts. We have explained, described and examined the major events of each war through three theoretical lenses: collective action, balance of threat and democratic domestic politics hypotheses. The study has depicted the explanatory value of the three theories across the three US case – studies and came up with the conclusion proving which theory be the most – likely case for each US war.

How can we explain the three different paths used by the US: with the UN, with another international organization, i.e. NATO and then unilaterally? In order to reach the best answer for our thesis question, I put forward various questions aiming at exploring the different angles of the main question: How much of impact and influence can international institutions have on foreign policy? To what extent we rely on neo realism which flanked to forecast the end of the Cold War to understand international politics? Why did the US the alliance leader in the Gulf War succeed to effectively catalyze burden sharing? Why did the US the alliance leader in

the Gulf War move to NATO to catalyze burden sharing instead of international community as it was in the case of the Gulf War? Why did the US the alliance leader in the Gulf War and the prime mover of the NATO intervention against Serbia go to the third Gulf War unilaterally? all the answers of the above question created the framework of my dissertation and came up with certain findings in terms of explanatory power of each international theory.

The collective action hypothesis best explained the Gulf War as its most – likely case. It succeeded in showing the burden - sharing notion among the states involved in the war. In the Gulf War 1991, the United Nations was the empirical test and practical application for the usage of Collective Security action and the efficacy of neo liberal institutionalism. After years of negligence and marginalization during the Cold War era, the UN was considered an interesting and unusual case of international institutions' role in the international relations. Collective Security action anticipated in scrutinizing the international consensus towards the first case in the wake of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War created a new attitude where the realm of peace and collective action started to prevail. The mood of teamwork and working together controlled public opinions of most developed countries and affected political offices and institutions of the US and other Western capitals.

Coning to the Kosovo War in 1999, both collective action and balance of threat shared the explanation of the NATO intervention to be their 'most' – likely case. Even though collective security action remained dominant, the nature of its effects and function varied. The sense that the UN was a real mediator, contributor and played a major role in international system was transformed into an instrumental device to serve US interests and primacy. The Clinton administration reemphasized the importance of 'multilateralism' in international relations but this time it took the shape of 'Western' ally. Neorealists have deftly portrayed the justifications of the NATO's operations against the Milosevic regime. According to NATO political leaders, it was virtually a 'humanitarian intervention' so as to recruit democratic domestic approval to go to war. The deficiency of the collective action to see the war in the sense of what institutionalists believe enhanced the neorealist's assumption. This pitfall led to the belief that the balance – of - threat intervened to add more insights to the description and analysis of the incidents. The Kosovo case lied in between of the road; one could see the event from a closer way to institutionalism; another may think it suited the neorealist explanation. But I would contend that the second war case was better illustrated by neorealist paradigm as two variables or hypotheses met to analyze the case: the utilization of institutions as a tool of the foreign policy and the increasing presence of the balance of threat.

The balance – of - threat hypothesis exclusively added much to explaining the Iraq War in 2003. The function of the UN was disturbed and completely paralyzed by the attitudes of George W Bush doctrine. Unilateralism and hegemony were dominant here. There is no doubt that neo realism's premises were exclusively dominant and prevailing.

The pendulum instrument added much to the analytical aspect of the three cases in light of theoretical premises. In the Gulf War, the ball 'decision' of going multilaterally peaked the institutionalism's zone. The most dominant variable that led to this behavior was the effect of multilateralism in the sense they strongly mattered in managing international conflict and stabilizing peace and security. As for the second case, the ball swung back and settled in the middle where other neorealist variables had their gravity. I would think that the effect of collective action practically started to decline as we have evaluated the intervention through neorealist beacons. Significantly, in the third case, the ball of the pendulum hit the highest point of neorealist zone. There was no doubt that the huge effect of balance of threat, primacy and hegemony preoccupied the Bush mentality.

Nevertheless, neither the neorealist theory, with its dominance of evaluation and analysis over two of the three cases, nor neoliberal institutionalism, with its

powerful insight in the emergence of the role of international institutions in the first case and to some extent in the second case, could be alone and independently a useful, powerful lens and a guide to understanding US foreign policy politics. Both theories need to be supported all the time by democratic politics hypothesis.

Regardless of how one perceives the US foreign policy with its unilateral global hegemony, I would ask the following question: **Will the ball 'decision' of the US administration be applicable, with its unilateralism and hegemony for other emerging conflicts and for a long period of time in the future?** Based on the pendulum's rule, the ball of a pendulum will always swing back and forth under the influence of gravity and strike. Consequently, it provides us with a conclusion ensuring that no single theory could illustrate and evaluate international relations. International relations are a reflection of that stability of change. The study of international relations is in a constant state of change where there are different domestic and external variables which play relative significant role in decision - making process.

The symptoms of this swinging immediately became apparent in the wake of the Iraq War 2003. The preceding analysis has illustrated why the US politics moved unilaterally within the context of neorealism. The current unipolar, and unilateral

international system has encouraged the US to sustain its behavior to maintain its hegemony and preponderance.

Politics always change. Accordingly, I would suggest here that there will be a change on both levels: first, some key competing states such as Russia and China and even the European Union would react against US doctrine. This can be clearly seen through the recent gestures expressed by these countries. Russia is now opposing the US Missile program to be planted at the back yard of its frontiers. Second, there will be a relative dependency on international institutions after the war. The immediate request to the UN to take certain role immediately would refresh the role or interaction of the international institutions. Perhaps, it might be so hard to the US foreign policy efforts to restore a good reputation and trust due to the Bush's strategies to deal with several issues in the world. Therefore, this grim picture of US politics can't be restored for long and in this circumstance; the ball will swing back towards the middle or even to the other side of the pendulum.

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