



The BZU Development Studies Programme

The Development Studies Programme (DSP) at Birzeit was established in 1997 as a specialized policy and research-oriented programme for development issues which link the academic and policy-making communities. The DSP grew out of the university-affiliated Human Development Project which produced the first Human Development Profile on Palestine in 1997.

A committee of university academic and administrative personnel supervises the Programme's activities. In addition to its own programme goals, DSP coordinates with local institutions and international agencies on projects requiring research expertise in the development field. The Programme currently receives funding support from the Government of Japan through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Mission

The DSP endeavors to provide and interpret developmental concepts and frameworks which will aid in understanding the political, economic and social changes now taking place in Palestinian society and in prompting sustainable development planning. The programme also aims to raise public awareness of development issues in order to improve individual and institutional capabilities, to enable and empower the community to contribute effectively to the development process.

Objectives and activities

To achieve these goals, the DSP:

- * Conducts academic and policy-oriented research and studies;
- * Prepares and publishes the human development report on Palestine;
- * Provides library and outreach services through the DSP resource center;
- * Encourages academic institutions to integrate development concepts into their curriculum by preparing an academic programme in the field of development studies;
- * Organizes a diversity of community outreach activities, including conferences, workshops and symposia which bring together various sectors concerned with development issues.



Palestine HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002

Chapter One:

The Importance of Establishing an Independent Palestinian State to the Achievement of Sustainable Human Development.

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| Section One : | Themes of The Human Development Report. |
| Section Two : | Objectives and Target Audience of The Current Report. |
| Section Three : | Challenges and Tasks Ahead. |
| Section Four : | The Palestinian Intifada: Characteristics and Features. |
| Section Five : | Report Methodology: A Participatory Approach. |

Half a century on, the suffered continues unabated!

- The Palestinian Intifada erupted on September 28, 2000. Since then, Israeli forces and settlers have committed ongoing and egregious violations of established international law. 120 military checkpoints divide the West Bank and Gaza Strip into 220 isolated, closely-guarded segments. Thousands of kilometers of road are closed by concrete blocks and dirt barricades. Additional examples of Israeli violations of international law through March 2002 are cited below.
- Palestinian deaths total 1,125, including 269 children and more than 25 women. (Using population ratios, this figure is equivalent to the deaths of approximately 90,000 U.S. citizens).
- More than 35,000 Palestinians have been injured, and 2,000 of those are now permanently disabled. (This figure equates to the permanent disabling of approximately 160,000 U.S. citizens.)
- The number of settlers increased by 4.4% in 2001 alone. The increase in settler population is accompanied by the confiscation of thousands of acres of land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this time, bulldozers guarded by army personnel and the settlers themselves have uprooted more than 34,600 agricultural trees in Palestinian orchards.
- Home demolition claimed 580 houses, with an additional 6,534 homes sustaining partial damage. Also, roughly 50 businesses and economic enterprises were destroyed.
- The entire physical infrastructure of the Palestinian security apparatus throughout Palestinian-controlled districts was eradicated.
- The new Palestinian airport in Gaza, an \$18.5 million project, was destroyed.
- The Palestinian harbor and port facilities under construction in Gaza were destroyed.
- The headquarters of Palestine Television and the buildings of Palestine Radio in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were demolished.
- Losses in the Palestinian economic sector are estimated at between \$2.4 and \$3.2 billion, which does not include the costs of physical damage to public and private property. Losses incurred as a result of halted agricultural activity exceeds \$60 million, and daily losses are estimated between \$6 and \$8.6 million.

Section One:

Themes of the Palestinian Human Development Report

- The Palestinian Human Development Report (PHDR) is born of the conviction that active pursuit of sustainable human development must continue. Despite the difficulties they currently face, the Palestinian people, like all the peoples of the world, are entitled to live in dignity within the embrace of freedom, justice and peace.
- Palestinians have the right to strive for sustainable human development that expresses and incorporates the unique cultural and social characteristics of the Palestinian way of life.
- The right to self-determination must be fully realized before sustainable human development

can be achieved. The Palestinian people have not yet secured their right to self-determination in accordance with international declarations and UN resolutions.

- The establishment of a modern, independent and democratic state is a prerequisite for sustainable human development in Palestine. The Palestinian people are entitled to live in security and freedom within stable borders, governed by institutions with a comprehensive vision and commitment to the human development process based on the principles of partnership, institutional capacity building, and justice for all.
- Future development efforts must meet both the challenges and opportunities that globalization imposes and affords, and must strictly adhere to recognized international human law conventions.

The Palestinian people, like all the peoples of the world, are entitled to live in dignity within the embrace of freedom, justice and peace

Box (1 - 1) Quote from the speech of Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the State of Palestine, at the sixth conference of the Palestinian Legislative Council:

“We are determined to continue the reform process and internal development of our national institutions and organizations of various responsibilities. I, from this forum, declare that our National Authority and I personally, posit the issue of legislative and judicial reform and development at the helm of our priorities. This includes the law concerning the independence of the judicial system which has been proposed by the Legislative Council, and is currently undergoing the three required sessions of legislative deliberation. Also under deliberation is the law that will organize and harmonize the operations of our courts of law. Priority will be given to all laws that are concerned with courts and judicial matters, as well as the law that forms a higher judicial council invested with all authority and facilities necessary for proper performance. The rule of the law and the independence of the judicial system are the hallmarks of our civilization and our state. They underscore our commitment to the principle of clearly delineated lines of governmental authority and enable all institutions to work under the law. Therefore, we must ensure that the law receives the highest priority in reform and development.

10/03/2001 Gaza

Box (1 - 2) UN Resolutions:

- Resolution 194 (D-3,) issued on 11 December 1948, grants refugees the right to return to their homes and live peacefully with their neighbors. It also mandates fair compensation for those displaced persons who opt not to return. The resolution proposed placing the city of Jerusalem under the active supervision of the UN and called for disarmament within the boundaries of the city.
- Resolution 242, issued on 22 November 1967, defined two primary principles. The first principle states that the occupation of land acquired through warfare is illegal. The resolution called for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the land they occupied in the June 1967 war. The second principle asserts that the sovereignty of each state in the region must be recognized and respected, and that each state has the right to political independence as well as the right to live securely within internationally-recognized borders.
- Resolution 338, issued on 23 November 1973, called for an immediate truce and demanded that both parties immediately declare a ceasefire and implement Resolution 242.
- Resolution 3236 (D-29,) issued on 22 November 1974, included a declaration by the General Assembly assuring that the rights of the Palestinians are non-negotiable, especially the right to self-determination, the right of sovereignty and national independence, and the right of refugees to return to the land from which they were displaced. The General Assembly reiterated the resolution several times, rendering it obligatory.
- In 1974, the PLO was invited to participate in the proceedings of the General Assembly as an observer.

Section Two: Objectives and Target Audience of the PHDR

Development at its core requires freedom from the shackles of political, social and economic dominance

■ The PHDR covers the years 2000 and 2001, and chronicles an important and sensitive period in the history of the Palestinian people. The report is shaped and guided by the central premise that sustainable human development requires freedom from the shackles of political,

social and economic dominance.

■ This report, like its predecessors, strives to make a contribution to the growing body of sustainable and emancipatory development knowledge in Palestine. The long absence of functioning state institutions created an information gap that newly established PNA ministries are struggling to fill. The PHDR also endeavors to gather empirical data concerning Palestinian institutions in order to build a

historical record for civil society.

- The PHDR recognizes that societies learn from experience and that this knowledge must be employed constructively in future development initiatives. It is also designed to encourage the creation of policies that will foster a development atmosphere in which the Palestinians can concentrate their efforts on building a civil society and on the human development process in general.
- The participatory methodology of the PHDR encouraged interactive dialogue regarding development. It pushed political parties to assume a proactive role in the production of periodic progress reports on human development initiatives and encouraged them to sponsor workshops addressing these issues. Widespread discussions regarding sustainable human development helped raise awareness of the integral and necessary connections between the political and development arenas.
- Despite attempts to isolate the Palestinians and to stereotype them as extremists and terrorists, the PHDR positions Palestine as one of several countries that regularly produces human development reports. The PHDR also emphasizes the conviction that sustainable human development is a means to achieve justice and dignity for the Palestinians and all peoples of the world. Many Palestinians actively participate in open discussions about sustainable

human development in Palestine and throughout the world. The PHDR gives voice to their perspective and reinforces the importance of their role in such discussions.

- The PHDR catalogues the results of a dynamic debate taking place at all levels of society, and attempts to present those results objectively. The data and analyses in the report are derived from the discussions currently underway within the Palestinian society. The PHDR is but one contribution from among many worthy initiatives that deserve attention. The data in the report reflect the sum of professional, public and local opinions; hundreds of Palestinians have offered their personal viewpoints for inclusion in the PHDR through workshops, research projects, questionnaires and newspaper articles, and thousands participated via opinion polls.

- The PHDR presents analysis that strives for balanced honesty in the interest of general national welfare. Its findings are set forth with critical sympathy, and are intended to strengthen the role of the PNA and to support its many achievements. The PHDR also hopes to increase the visibility and scope of both Palestinian civil society and the private sector, as well as to support international institutions offering aid to Palestinian human development efforts.

The target audiences of this report are: the Palestinian people, decision-makers at all levels, and

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members of the public actively involved in development work. The participation of international institutions, donor countries, and non-governmental organizations has had a great impact in shaping the current Palestinian condition,

and this report will enable those parties to more deeply understand the Palestinian perspective with regard to development efforts that have taken place during the past few years.

Box (1 - 3) From the 1996 - 1997 PHDR: De-development.

Palestinian Society is a victim of a process called “de-development.” In general, the forces which promote de-development seek to disrupt the development process, with the eventual aim of halting it altogether. De-development is achieved by preventing a society from using its political and economic potential, and by preventing rational structural transformation of the society through indigenous means. In the case of Palestine, de-development mechanisms include those originating from outside the society, the most important being those employed by the Israeli occupation with its military mechanisms have been extremely injurious to the process of social and political transformation.

From the 1998 - 1999 PHDR: Sustainable human development is not possible under occupation.

The transitional stage under which Palestinian society has been living since 1993 still continues. Despite achievements that took place in recent years, namely the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on Palestinian land, and Palestinian takeover of responsibility for social and economic development, the Israeli occupation continues to maintain its control, in different ways and to varying degrees. Over more than 85% of the lands of the WBGS (about 90% of west Bank lands) remains under Israeli control, and Israel continues to isolate the two regions from each other while closing off Jerusalem to both regions. Moreover, Israel continues to control natural resources, including water and nature preserves. Israel has also maintained its military control over the borders and border crossings, thus perpetuating the dependency of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy, and preventing the building of an independent Palestinian economy, subject to responsible and sound planning. The achievement of sustainable human development in Palestine is conditional on a crucial factor: putting an end to Israeli occupation and Israeli control over Palestinian resources, and enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.

Section Three: Challenges and Tasks Ahead

- The PHDR calls upon all concerned local and international parties to recognize that the liberation of Palestinian society from external control is a prerequisite for the establishment of a modern state. Only an independent state can initiate a comprehensive and balanced development process that broadens the range of freedoms and choices available to the Palestinian people. The PHDR also aims to strengthen the role of the PNA in the development process and emphasizes the need for a strong national government to deter any attempts to deprive Palestinians of their rights in the future.
- The second Palestinian Intifada, which began on 28 September 2000, launched a public debate about the current paths being chosen to deal with political, economic, and social matters. It is clear that the most vital precondition to the realization of an acceptable level of human development is broadened opportunities for all Palestinians, including the right to self-determination and the right to sustainable human development. These goals cannot be achieved under a military occupation which systematically destroys the capabilities of an entire population.
- Sustainable human development requires the presence of a legitimate government with the authority and resources that will enable it to persevere in difficult times. Legitimate governance necessarily entails wide participation from all segments of Palestinian society to help erase the cumulative negative impact of years of occupation.
- Emancipatory development empowers a population to take the initiative in defense of its legal and civil rights and creates a sense of national belonging. Striving for independence and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state are certainly legitimate rights, supported by international resolutions.
- The Intifada and its root causes require responsible assessment of performance since 1994 at all levels. Geographical, social and administrative repercussions from failed processes should be the focus of such assessment in order to catalyze a renewed engagement in the struggle for independence and the quest for sustainable human development.
- Occupation has played a major role in shaping the form and content of development efforts in Palestine. The emergence of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), even if limited in its scope of governance, has also played an important role in the development process. The presence of a national authority offered, for the first time in Palestinian history, renewed opportunity for public participation in the struggle for self-determination and the

Legitimate governance necessarily entails wide participation from all segments of Palestinian society

The Intifada and its root causes require responsible assessment of performance since 1994 at all levels

Box (1 - 4) Impediments to achieving peace and development:

- Israeli occupation of Palestinian land in violation of international resolutions.
- The inability of the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination and development.
- The continuation of the Israeli-imposed siege of the Palestinian people, destruction of the national infrastructure, obstruction of economic activity, and the negative social and psychological ramifications of these actions.
- Deterioration of the overall economic condition, which has lowered living standards and has led to an unprecedented increase in poverty.
- Inadequate internal institutional capacity building and the relative absence of the rule of the law have increased levels of disaffection between the Palestinian public and its institutions.

formulation of policies for dynamic self-development. These opportunities must be maximized to the fullest extent possible.

■ The importance of the role of non-governmental and private sector organizations and its impact on the development process cannot be understated. Civil society and its representative organizations

interact with the local, regional and international communities. The regional and international communities' ongoing provision of financial aid to the development process cannot be ignored. The continuance of Palestinian-Israeli conflict affects the political outlook of neighboring Arab nations as well as the large Palestinian communities that reside within their borders.

Box (1 - 5) Palestinian refugees

The number of Palestinian refugees is estimated at 4.4 million persons living in exile. More than 1.5 million Palestinians live in Israel, 15% of them are refugees. Registered refugees for the year 2000 totaled more than 3.8 million, dispersed throughout the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Most of the refugees are confined to 57 refugee camps. Numerous reports have documented the dire social, economic, and political conditions of these camps, especially those located in Lebanon.

Section Four: The Palestinian Intifada, Characteristics and Features

This section presents a short analysis of the most notable characteristics and features of the Palestinian Intifada and the Israeli occupation.

The results of a failed peace process:

■ Undoubtedly, the Palestinian Intifada resulted at least in part from a failed peace process. Palestinians have never been granted the rights promised to them throughout the course of political negotiations, including the right to pursue sustainable human development that would

guarantee them freedom and an independent state.

■ The destruction of the Palestinian infrastructure, which essentially wiped out all Palestinian governing institutions, and the ongoing siege of Palestinian cities, have resulted in tremendous levels of human suffering. Moreover, repeated attempts have been made to coax the Palestinians to make further concessions on their most important issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the issues of refugees and settlements. The Intifada revealed clearly that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved without a fair solution for the Palestinian people, awarding them the rights for which they have struggled for decades.

The Palestinian Intifada resulted at least in part from a failed peace process

Box (1 - 6) Isolated Jerusalem:

Israel continues to enforce a policy that prohibits Palestinians from reaching Jerusalem and its religious sites despite several Security Council resolutions that have declared any attempt to change the status of Jerusalem unlawful. On 28 October 2001, Israeli forces seized and closed several service-related, educational, political and research institutions, such as the Orient House, the Arab Studies Organization, the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Trade, and the Higher Council of Tourism. Others include the Palestinian Center for Small Business, the Jerusalem Relief Agency, the Palestinian Prisoners Agency, the Palestinian Political Prisoners and Former Prisoners Organization, and other PNA institutions serving Jerusalem in accordance with ratified Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

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The Palestinians .. Continuing efforts to build and develop

The Palestinians have worked tirelessly during the past eight years in an attempt to build an

independent state based on democracy, the rule of the law, and effective institutions. Although the policies and methods of occupation are designed to extinguish those

Poverty threatens increasing numbers of Palestinians, and has dramatically increased levels of reliance on charitable organizations

High fertility rates lead to levels of population growth that often exacerbate poverty and unemployment

dreams, national aspirations for an independent, modern state remain strong, and the justice of the Palestinian cause will ultimately result in the realization of that objective.

Deterioration in human development indicators

- The deteriorating political situation has led to unprecedented regression in economic conditions, as demonstrated by increasing unemployment and poverty rates extending to every segment of society. Many Palestinian families have lost their sole breadwinners, and poverty threatens increasing numbers of Palestinians. Levels of reliance on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other charitable organizations funded by Arab and international countries have dramatically increased, especially in rural locales. Concurrently, the phenomenon of begging, especially among women and children, has also risen markedly.
- The closures enforced on Palestinian areas have negatively impacted school attendance, with checkpoints making the travel of students from remote areas increasingly difficult and denying them the right to seek an education. Also, the physical occupation of many school buildings by soldiers and the shelling of school grounds have led many families to believe that schools are unsafe. A total of 163 students have been killed and several elementary and secondary schools have been
- The expanding economic crisis and rising levels of poverty prohibit many families from sending their children to school. Worsening economic conditions have led to increased school dropout rates as children are forced to work to help support their families. Instances of negative social phenomena such as child labor are on the rise. Children are now at risk for job-related injuries and exploitation, and are subject to pressures that can result in socially deviant behavior such as crime and drug abuse, especially among males.
- As for girls, increased school dropout rates may lead to an increase in early marriages, a situation which frequently deprives young girls of many of their rights. Also, early marriage often correlates with a rise in serious health and social issues related to teenage pregnancy. High fertility rates lead to levels of population growth that often exacerbate poverty and unemployment. In this scenario, competition for already scarce resources builds up and further impedes progress towards sustainable human development.
- The prevailing political conditions have led to deterioration in health care and educational services, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The unprecedented rise in poverty levels and the limited resources of the Ministry of

bombarded. Many university students have been unable to continue their academic studies for the same reasons.

Social Affairs prevented the Ministry from offering adequate assistance to the needy. Similarly, the effectiveness of local charitable organizations which rely heavily on foreign aid also regressed. The Ministry of Local Government practice of dictating the appointments of local council heads has decreased the public level of trust in those organizations. Finally, decreased per capita income has resulted in far fewer voluntary contributions to support the work of charitable organizations.

- The strength of social and family ties has increased, as have contributions by Palestinians living abroad to cover the expenses of families or university students. A large sum of direct financial aid was donated by Palestinians abroad to improve living conditions in Palestine.
- Closure of the Israeli labor market to Palestinian workers has driven many of those workers to accept jobs in the local market at very low rates of pay that they would have rejected under normal market conditions. Many of them have started independent endeavors, mostly vending at checkpoints or driving public transit vehicles on treacherous roads to carry passengers around the checkpoints. It should be noted that these types of business enterprises are unregulated, unpredictable and ultimately, unsustainable.

■ Women's participation in the work force ebbed as men who are no longer able to work in Israel take up available jobs in the local market. Women are left with the choice of staying at home or accepting menial jobs for low pay. Unskilled laborers, owners of small businesses, women and children are the segments of society most harmed by Israeli closures.

■ The number of Palestinian casualties exceeded 1,000 in the first 15 months of the Intifada. More than 25,000 Palestinians have been injured, 2,000 of whom are permanently disabled. The huge increase in the number of disabled persons will clearly impact the effectiveness of existing rehabilitation programs.

■ The Israeli occupation is leaving psychological scars on the Palestinian population. Many individuals have sought treatment for unusual levels of emotional distress and chronic or temporary states of depression. Children are among the most deeply affected in this regard. Daily images of continuing violence translate into a decreased sense of security, as parents seem no longer able to protect them. Also, children have lost confidence in their ability to solve their own problems, with increasing instances of violence among children a growing issue.

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Box (1 - 7) The Psychological Effects of the Siege and Violence¹

A field study conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics between 11 April-15 May 2001 on a random sample of families revealed that 10% of Palestinians were subjected to direct attacks in various forms at the hands of Israeli forces (35% of those attacked were females and 65% were males). Children made up 32% of the total number of people attacked.

The survey showed that 41% of children between the ages of five and 15 experienced uncontrollable bouts of crying during the Intifada and that 45% felt "depressed". A survey poll conducted by the Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University (DSP) on 10 February 2001 regarding the effects of the Israeli siege on Palestinian life showed that almost 70% of children between the ages of four and 14 in the West Bank suffer psychological disorders as a result of Israeli measures, rising to 72% in the Gaza Strip. Also, 78% of women surveyed said that the state of war and the siege have caused them to experience unusual levels of emotional distress. In February 2002, another survey by the DSP revealed that 66% of children in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip suffer clinical psychological disorders.

In addition, 51% of Palestinians reported being exposed to humiliation and abuse, 42% were physically abused, and 20% reported their homes and other property were damaged by the Israeli forces³.

- The displacement of Palestinian families has led to intensified economic, social and psychological problems. Many families have been forced to abandon their homes to escape incessant Israeli shelling or have lost their homes altogether to demolition. Also, several families were broken up; their members unable to gather even for religious or family occasions.

1. For more on the condition of children and the challenges facing them, see: Thahab Misleh, paper contributed to the Human Development Report 2002.
2. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Survey: Effects of Israeli Measures on Palestinian Children, Women and Families 2001, Ramallah, July 2001.
3. DSP poll # 6, February 2002.

Box (1 - 8) Women and children: the victims of a failed peace process⁴

Despite the poverty under which the Palestinians live, many are coping with the crisis in ways that may prove to be positive or negative in the long run. One of the mechanisms employed to alleviate poverty is the encouragement of uneducated or minimally-educated women and children to work or seek assistance, with the support of male family members. The number of women working as house maids or begging on the streets has increased noticeably, but the real danger lies in the increase in the number of children begging or vending on the streets. Farmers interviewed have stated that they have been forced to replace young male laborers with children to cut costs.

Although child labor is widely viewed as a threat to the future of the entire society, it appears to be the only available way for a growing number of families to secure sustenance. Interviews with women and children revealed that fathers, especially those previously working in Israel, force them to look for work they themselves would not accept, considering it degrading for a man.

Women have employed other mechanisms to cope with poverty, such as cutting back on food and clothing expenditures. Several women said they no longer use meat in cooking, and others indicated they use firewood instead of gas stoves in order to save for more important necessities, which has in turn encouraged women in remote villages to cut and sell firewood. In Gaza, women are making mud ovens and selling them.

Wives of men that used to work in Israel mentioned that they sold their jewelry to cover family expenses and after that, came to rely on family aid or assistance from institutions. As for clothing, many women said they no longer buy new articles, but resort instead to the old habit of borrowing from sisters or neighbors when a special occasion arises. There is also a growing trend toward early marriage and interfamilial marriage to cut family expenditures and to save on wedding costs.

Achieving institutionalization and participation

- Several social, economic, institutional and cultural phenomena surfaced or have increased noticeably in the past two years. These phenomena serve as indicators that

Palestinian society possesses certain behavioral resources that might be capitalized upon in an institutional manner and in the context of clear and just legislation. Examples of those strengths are the ability to solve problems, a high degree of flexibility, and a marked resourcefulness in facing unusual

4. This material was prepared by Itimad Mhana, member of the PHDR Advisory Committee, and is based upon data collected to prepare a study on poverty that included hundreds of Palestinian families. The families were interviewed in order to understand their comprehension and definition of poverty and the ways to handle it. The study was conducted in conjunction with the UNDP, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the British Development Agency.

Participation requires potent institution and a leadership in possession of a vision, a strategy and defined institutional standards

Widespread use of violence led to lower rates of participation

- challenges in a short span of time.
- Various data gathered during the Intifada revealed the importance Palestinians place on the concepts of democracy and free elections. The majority of Palestinians are calling for institutional change, especially at the local government level. Public, decentralized participation in governance, management and tax collection could be effectively engaged to achieve Palestinian rights. It is obvious that participation requires potent institutions and a leadership in possession of a vision, a strategy and defined institutional standards to achieve these goals.
 - The Intifada also uncovered weaknesses that must be corrected, such as the failure of leadership to communicate with the people and the inability or lack of preparedness of some PNA institutions to help society to resolve daily economic and social problems.
 - The Intifada led to a rallying of the Palestinian people around their cause and its objectives, beginning with the implementation of international resolutions. Nonetheless, national unity remains a social rather than an institutional concept, thereby preventing the participation of large segments of society. Among the factors contributing to flagging levels of participation was the widespread use of violence.
 - Vocal criticism against practices that are in discord with Palestinian aspirations such as human development, human
- has been weak. Civil society institutions and human rights organizations for the most part stood silent, unable to criticize the use of violence against civilians, choosing instead to promote the rationalization that the continuation of occupation and failure to honor international resolutions were responsible for violence.
- The PNA focus on the Palestinian political agenda as the highest priority resulted in the lack of defined and coordinated economic and social programs. The absence of leadership and direction led to a high degree of chaos within governmental organizations. Many agencies ceased to function altogether. The situation was also reflected in the failed performance of international institutions, which were restricted by measures enforced by the occupation government or those which existed primarily to advance their own agendas.
 - The absence of a long-term development vision and the lack of clear economic, social, and cultural policies led to widespread discord and the exhaustion of resources. It also served to weaken the bonds between the public and its representatives at various tiers of government, such as the Palestinian Legislative Council and local authorities.
- Regression in the rule of law**
- The declaration of a state of emergency by the PNA following the eruption of the Intifada led to regression in the implementation

of the rule of law. The weakness of PNA institutions in the face of external aggression decreased public confidence in these institutions and gave rise to contradictory perceptions of the concept of authority. On the one hand, Israel had control of the situation on the ground, preventing the Palestinians from leading normal lives, and on the other hand, the people expected the PNA to solve all their problems, even those caused by occupation.

- The convoluted Palestinian perception of authority in any capacity resulted from continuing Israeli authority over occupied land and was bolstered as existing Palestinian institutions failed to offer a robust alternative in the areas of personal security and public services. Changing the political status quo by ending occupation and establishing a strong and independent national authority will lay the foundation for reeducating the Palestinian people regarding the role of the state and public's relationship with it with regard to rights and duties. And while removing occupation is necessary, democracy and sound institution-building are equally so in reinforcing the meaning of a state, especially during the time in which the foundations of a new state are being constructed.
- The inability of the Palestinian security apparatus to protect the Palestinians from danger and the ineffectiveness of Palestinian law enforcement bodies has

created a sense of general distrust in the rule of law. The siege and a shortage of judges led to an enormous backlog of cases in the legal system, further weakening the public's faith in its effectiveness. Distrust of the legal system has spilled over into the banking system as well. A program must be created to specifically deal with this social phenomenon, and must be incorporated into the cumulative human development vision.

The regression of the role of civil society

- The vital role played by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was clearly underscored during the Intifada, especially those organizations offering social, relief, and health services; those specializing in expediting agricultural distribution; and those organizing cultural activities. At the same time, some institutions stood completely paralyzed in the face of the crisis, which will necessitate serious examination in the future.

- The second Intifada was accompanied by regression in the performance and credibility of political groups that comprise the PNA and especially those that call for "democracy, equality and human rights," while religious and conservative parties seemed to gain ground. This change could seriously impact not only the political direction of the country, but also make the process of implementing needed changes in the social, cultural and democratic arenas more difficult.

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Some donors simply did not understand the effects of the situation on the ground

- In the context of the current crisis, the Palestinian political leadership failed to offer any meaningful political, social or economic programs to the people and have provided little active guidance in addressing the multitude of day-to-day difficulties that the Palestinians face. The concerns of the people were not relayed to the PNA, although some political representatives have expressed sincere concern for and interest in the need to integrate political and development efforts.
- Several questions arose regarding donor funding from both Arab and Western nations. Arab funding, although vital to the survival of the PNA, was random and occasionally spent to further the objectives of various political agendas. This situation led to the weakening of some PNA institutions and the strengthening of others. In addition, some donors were more interested in media attention than in poverty relief and development of the Palestinian society. Concerns were also voiced regarding fair distribution of international aid, especially to remote and neglected areas.

Chaos in funding development in light of Israeli measures

- The connection between funding and political agendas has recently been made clear, especially in the case of the development process, as some donors fulfilled their promises and others failed to do so. This uncertainty with regard to funding streams has affected the Palestinian political agenda and posited great pressure on the PNA in the negotiation process. Some donors simply did not understand the effects of the situation on the ground, although they did make attempts to amend their programs and working mechanisms to accommodate the new realities. However, increasing Arab financial support played a major role in keeping PNA institutions afloat and in relieving some of the poverty introduced by the siege and destruction of the Palestinian economic infrastructure.

Section Five: Report Methodology : A Participatory Approach

The preparation of the PHDR involved the broad-based participation of many segments of Palestinian society. The following mechanisms were employed in the report preparation process:

Active partnership in steering the preparation process was executed by the three principal partners: the Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University (DSP), the Department of Human Development at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), and the Human Development Unit at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The Development Studies Programme

supervised the production of the report. The DSP conducted research and sponsored organizational meetings of the research and consultation committees in order to arrive at a qualitative, objective and balanced final report. MOPIC assumed responsibility for integration of the principle of human development into the national planning process and also into the operations of other ministries. MOPIC also coordinated the activities of the ministerial committee. The UNDP assumed the tasks of securing funding for the project and providing technical support and consultation throughout the

process.

The Technical Advisory Committee is a scientific committee comprised of select Palestinian scholars. The Committee bore the responsibility of monitoring the quality of the report for content and objectivity. The Committee members presented papers that were invaluable to the preparation of the report, and they actively participated in discussions and follow-up efforts.

The Ministerial Committee included 18 representatives of Palestinian ministries from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who

Box (1 - 9) Strengths of the Palestinian people

- The inherent justice of their struggle and the legitimacy of their claims, which are supported by international protocol and UN resolutions.
- The wealth of experience derived from the tasks of nation-building, and a willingness to learn and benefit from the experiences of other Arab nations and the international community.
- The formation of their own representative governing body (the PNA), and its gradual transformation into an internationally recognized state government.
- The solidarity and support of other Arab nations and the international community for the Palestinian struggle.
- The creation of an effective government infrastructure attuned to the principles of human development.
- The strength of the experience acquired through the pursuit of sustainable human development in an unpredictable and difficult environment.
- The relative strength of Palestinian civil society and its role in the development process and the protection of achievements.
- The advances made in achieving transparency and accountability in Palestinian civil institutions.
- The constructive growth of the education sector and the opportunities it affords for future investment.

discussed the report and reviewed its content. They provided insight and perspective on the substance and content of the report.

Workshops were conducted with representatives from many segments of Palestinian society. More than 30 workshops were organized, attended by more than

800 experts representing hundreds of Palestinian institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The workshops discussed the central themes of the PHDR, as well as its objectives and priorities.⁵ The workshops also served to formulate the research plan for each chapter.

Box (1 - 10) Highlights of the results of selected workshops held in conjunction with the preparation of the PHDR

Workshops attended by political parties:

- The need to issue a periodic report on the subject of sustainable human development in Palestine is evident, as supported by the events of the Intifada.
- Increased attention must be given to health and social affairs in light of growing poverty levels, as well as to key economic sectors such as agriculture.
- It is important to heed privacy issues when issuing the report; care must be taken with the use of primary indicators to avoid subjective interpretation.
- It is necessary to reconcile the sometimes competing objectives of the political struggle and other key initiatives, such as democracy, the nation-building process and the rule of law.

Workshops with Palestinian women, in coordination with the General Union of Palestinian Women and the Women's Affairs Committee:

- Focus on internal issues and emphasize equality between men and women, the rule of law and achieving democracy. Shift institutional priorities from relief to development.
- Bolster a sense of individual initiative among the people by developing personal, social and economic strengths. Reinforce the concepts of strong public management and raise the level of ability to adapt to various conditions.

Workshops in coordination with the Palestinian Network of Non-governmental Organizations and the Union of Charitable Organizations:

- Focus on individual initiative and empowerment as means to achieve development.
- Shine light on primary concerns, such as participation and advocacy of democracy, and furnish options to the people at times of elections.

5. A list of the workshops is available in Appendix (6).

- Work to ingrain the concepts of self-reliance and the development of personal abilities.
-

Workshops attended by institutions working in refugee camps:

- Obstacles continue to impede the formation of a meaningful relationship between the development process and the interests of refugees.
 - The developmental dimension inside refugee camps is absent as a result of the political nature of the issue of refugees. The report must discuss the standing of Palestinian refugees and ways to reconcile the national and political issues of refugees in a manner consistent with their rights.
-

Workshop attended by institutions working in the human rights field:

- Include in the report a vision for the formation of new relationships that reconciles human rights with the rule of law, and the rule of law with the judicial authority, especially in light of the continuing dominance of tribal law and the undue powers of the security apparatus in place of the judicial system.
 - Discuss of the meaning of justice as a developmental pillar that neutralizes tribal favoritism and political and social nepotism. Expand upon development principles that are concerned with the legal system and the equal distribution of justice among the various segments of society.
-

Workshop with representatives from Palestinian media outlets:

- The report must include a message to encourage the pursuit of a better life that would reflect on all societal institutions. To that end, a clear strategy must be devised regarding promotion of development work in Palestine.
 - Focus on the Arab and Islamic dimensions in the funding of the development of Palestine and exercise care to guarantee that international relations concerned with funding be clear and calculated.
 - Focus on the importance of the humanitarian media message, which should be organized, coordinated and well-documented.
-

Workshop with institutions specializing in the care of children:

- Extend the report's vitality by paying attention to qualitative studies and expressing statistics not merely as such, but a meaningful analysis of the numbers and the matters they address. Integrate the issues and rights of children in various chapters of the report in recognition of the importance of this segment of society and its vital connection with the principle of sustainable development planning.

Children's letters: Twenty-eight Palestinian children wrote letters to known personalities and institutions that have an effect on

the children's economic, social and political lives. The letters express only the opinions of their writers.

Box (1 - 11) Selected quotes from Palestinian children's letters regarding human development:

To Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the United Nations:

“...I write to you this letter to ask that you consider the Palestinian cause with more attention and pressure the Israeli government and its Prime Minister into honoring agreements signed by the two sides and international resolutions.”

Ahmed Waleed Hasan, 14, Nablus

To the members of the Palestinian Legislative Council:

“...I am a resident wishing to learn the nature of your work. You have promised the people so much-we will...and will...and will...and will do! I want to ask what it is you have done....? I see the siege and the poverty and the fear and am still patiently waiting. I know you condemn and admonish and explain things to officials, and no one listens. What should we do?”

Dina Sharaf Bakr, 13, Qalqilya

To the Minister of Education:

“...I hear that physical punishment is banned at schools, but we are being beaten and humiliated if we forget something or the like...is it true that beating is banned? And if it is, are you aware of what is happening at schools? Also, there are too many of us in one classroom; students cannot take in the material. In addition, why has headwear been forced upon female students when donning is the choice of the girl? I hope you will examine these issues and reconsider them.”

Areej Abu Huloub, 15, Gaza Strip

Opinion polls: The DSP worked to amplify the voices of the Palestinians, especially communities on the periphery, through opinion polls that

interviewed 8,400 Palestinians of varying age groups and from different locations regarding topics discussed in the report.

Box (1 - 12) Wide support of the process of reform

- 81% of Palestinians believe that reform within the institutions of the PNA is necessary.
- 97% of Palestinians believe in the need to fight corruption, employ on the basis of merit, and achieve an active and just judicial system.
- 89% of Palestinians support the use of democracy in decision-making, and a similar percentage called for wider public participation in formulating and executing government policies.
- 92% of Palestinians believe that the role of municipalities and village councils should be more active.⁶

Research: A team of qualified professionals wrote specific research papers, some of which are included in the report while others were incorporated in its preparation.

Case studies: The research team, in cooperation with the field research crew, prepared 20 case studies regarding the living conditions of the Palestinians, especially the disadvantaged and those living in remote areas. The case studies concentrated on the quality of life, opportunities available to Palestinians, and their perspectives. The data revealed great regression in human rights as defined by international law.⁷ The importance of public participation in discussions regarding the social development was also revealed. In this area, the opinions of the public proved to be responsible and

thoughtful.

Expert opinion: Twelve experts wrote summaries evaluating and expanding upon the most important priorities in their fields of expertise. The papers were integrated in various parts of the report and were distributed at the conference announcing the release of the PHDR.

Committee and expert review: After examination by all concerned committees, the report was evaluated by developmental experts from a wide range of areas.

The media: The PHDR, its implications, its usefulness and utility, and its related activities were discussed in local newspapers and on several television and radio shows.⁸

6. Results of an opinion poll, Development Studies Programme; 18 February 2001.

7. A list of the case studies is available in Appendix (3)

8. The articles were handed out at the conference announcing the PHDR.

Box (1 -13) From articles addressing human development:

- From the article “**The Palestinian Human Development Report and What is Needed of Fateh Before, During and After Statehood.”**

“So the upcoming Human Development Report evades the usual traps of repetition and redundancy, I call for surrendering generalizations and instead allowing for the exploration of specifics in the Palestinian civil society burdened by occupation. We must allow research to deduce the needs of the Palestinian society in its current state. Awareness leads to the proper execution of plans, beginning with simplicity of vision and planting of the seeds for the assimilation of sustainable development plans... In order to guarantee success for sustainable human development, Fateh must work to unite human resources and announce the formation of a team entrusted with designing that role (the role in sustainable human development.)”

- From the article “**Preliminary Reading into the Structure of the Palestinian Human Development Report 2000-2001**”¹⁰:

“The importance of this report lies in recommendations and deductions that could come from it, but most importantly, those recommendations must have execution mechanisms in order to be of tangible value. Thus, it is important that some benchmarks be established to measure the extent to which the recommendations and their execution were achieved in the next PHDR.”

- From the article “**Regarding the Vitality of Empowerment and Development**”¹¹:

“Many Palestinian voices with different directions agree on the importance of empowerment and the bolstering of development in anticipation of the long battle, underscoring the need for the activities undertaken by the Development Studies Programme at Birzeit University. The DSP is preparing the third Palestinian Human Development Report with a primary focus on the issue of empowerment-a word that still carries influence in our current condition.”

Difficulties:

Preparing the PHDR was not a simple undertaking under the

current conditions. It was not easy to monitor field changes in the political arena and their effect on economic and social life; the

9. Naser Damj, Fateh Supreme Council, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, 9 May 2001.

10. Ahmed Majdalani, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, 2 May 2001.

11. Muhsen Abu Ramadan, Civil Work (monthly publication issued by the Palestinian Network of Non-Governmental Organizations), 30 April 2002.

changes were radical, almost daily in frequency, and certainly not patterned. Also, it was difficult to speak about human development under the weight of the deterioration of the basic infrastructure of society and the subjection of the rights of the people and their collective future to danger. Nevertheless, those involved in preparing the PHDR and many others gave voice to the message that resistance, building, and stopping the deterioration should be joined in one complete effort to achieve emancipation on the political, social and economic levels.

The difficult conditions require larger efforts and the continuation of deliberation, discussion and establishment of plans. Sustainable human development is a long-term endeavor comprising individual initiatives whose specific goals and achievements are viewed in the aggregate. Each component of the human development effort is critical to the effort to secure a better future for the children of Palestine.

Preparing the PHDR was a challenging attempt to reach an understanding of a highly complex situation. The PHDR confronts and documents honestly many contradictions, a task which required great determination and devotion. A multitude of challenges arose from the political status quo and the suffocation of Palestinian society as a whole, including universities, research centers and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The siege and reoccupation of parts of Palestinian cities impeded work on

the PHDR. Following are some of the most notable obstacles:

1. The inability of the members of the Advisory and Ministerial Committees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to meet to discuss the PHDR and exchange opinions about the content and focus of their respective contributions. Further, several members of each Committee were unable to attend meetings, denied entry by soldiers at checkpoints. Electronic mail was used extensively, and later video-conferencing was employed to unite the members.
2. It was difficult for research crews to confer or even reach their posts at appointed times. The majority of the researchers were incapable of reaching Jerusalem, home of the UNDP headquarters. The MOPIC building and offices of the DSP were occupied, and a curfew was enforced for an extended period of time. Crews had to meet outside headquarters on several occasions.
3. The closure of the road to Birzeit made use of the university library and other venues impossible and obstructed managerial and financial matters associated with the PHDR.
4. Field work was fraught with danger at many times, and amendments to work plans were needed to enable field researchers to reach their homes at a suitable hour after work. One of our field researchers was struck by a rubber-coated steel bullet while returning home from work, .

necessitating hospitalization, and others were subjected to physical abuse or harassment. Regardless, we were able to conduct field research in 75 Palestinian locations, including villages, neglected refugee camps, and locales under curfew.

5. Conflicting data at times led to difficulty in selecting statistics that best represent the changes and losses incurred by the Palestinian society in recent times. The multiplicity of information resources, especially regarding economic loss and the number of victims were the primary motivation behind using additional means of achieving accuracy before representing the available data.

Despite it all, the participants were determined to fulfill their tasks and produced the PHDR in

spite of the obstacles and frustration. The report came to represent the steadfastness of a people that turn challenges into hope and yearn for a better future for their children. The message of the PHDR is a civilized, humane one, positing Palestine among the ranks of nations that place human rights above all other considerations. The PHDR strives to present Palestinian society for what it is: a society that embraces peace and life and strives to achieve equality between men and women; a society that works to integrate its neglected segments, including persons with special needs, the elderly, and the underprivileged in a development process that they created and from which they will benefit; and a society that longs for freedom and excels at all aspects of life-intellectual, artistic and literary.

Box (1 - 14) Cultural life despite the obstacles

The city of Ramallah, with its many cultural and artistic centers, produced hundreds of cultural events (exhibitions and literature and poetry forums,) artistic affairs (plays and films,) and activities for children and youth. Many of the cultural and artistic events were organized by non-governmental organizations in public spaces and courtyards, where Palestinian and international art and theater groups performed. The activities were patronized by thousands, despite the siege and air raids the city endured. In spite of the importance of such activities under the current circumstances, they were confined to Ramallah.

Chapter Two:

The Human Development Environment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Forward

- Section One :** Deterioration of Human Development Indicators.
- Section Two :** Israeli Occupation and the Systematic Destruction of Palestinian Human Development.
- Section Three :** International Funding and Palestinian Development.
- Section Four :** Arab-Palestinian Relations and the Palestinian Development Environment.
- Section Five :** The PNA: Caught Between Developmental and Political Agendas.
- Section Six :** The Palestinian Private Sector.
- Section Seven :** Civil Society and its Role in Reconciling Resistance and Development.

Forward

This chapter is a study of the environment that defines the possibilities of the development process in Palestine. Analysis of the most significant environmental indicators serves to illustrate development conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the past two years and to place them within a historical context. This chapter also enumerates the external factors and obstacles that endanger the Palestinian development process and threaten it with potentially imminent collapse. The attainment of human development goals, as defined by the United Nations, is a process that assumes added dimensions in a country under military occupation. It is also a process which requires correlation between a society's dual pursuit of the right to self-determination and its quest for sustainable human development.

Section One looks at the overall deterioration in Palestinian human development indicators for the period of time covered by the PHDR. The second section of this chapter examines the impact of occupation as a hindrance to the development process and in the regression of development indicators. Section Three discusses relationship between international funding and Palestinian development, and the fourth section provides an overview of various aspects of Arab-Palestinian relations. The fifth section evaluates the performance of the PNA in the development arena during the past eight years, specifically with regard to its handling of available resources. Sections Six and Seven offer observations on the role of the Palestinian private sector and civil society in development.¹

1. Several studies prepared by Palestinian and international institutions provide additional information on this topic.

Section One:

Deterioration of Human Development Indicators

The primary components of the Human Development Index are: 1) living standards as measured by income, 2) health standards as represented by average life expectancy at birth, and 3) educational standards as represented by illiteracy and school attendance rates. Examination of these components reveals both qualitative and quantitative deterioration in every area. Before presenting the PHDR findings in its analysis of Human Development Index indicators, the following must be noted:

1. The destruction that has befallen the Palestinian political, economic and social environment during the past two years cannot be adequately expressed in strictly numerical terms. We recognize that statistics cannot effectively capture the impact of recent events on the collective human psyche. The current regressive trends are long-term in nature and indicate widespread damage to the infrastructure of Palestinian society. The destruction of the hard-won accomplishments of the past few years will obviously impact the pace of future development efforts. Deteriorating living standards, a decrease in per capita income, inadequate health care, early marriage, and psychological oppression generally result in shortened life expectancy, increased child mortality rates, and a general retrogression in health standards, all of which are expected to become evident in the near term.
2. A similar prediction can be applied to educational standards. School dropout rates are on the rise. Educational funding allotments have decreased. People are increasingly unable to pay taxes that fund the building of schools and support education. These trends, coupled with the general degeneration of the economic sector, are expected dramatically increase Palestinian illiteracy rates in the coming years.
3. Current data may not reflect the true scope and nature of the regression of Palestinian human development. Data cannot accurately depict conditions in a community that has been almost completely stripped of its civil rights as defined by international law. Statistical institutions have been unable to agree on data quantifying the decrease in average life expectancy and illiteracy levels. This situation can be partially attributed to the difficulty of gathering data under the present circumstances.

Box (2 - 1) A Palestinian gender index: A larger gap than expected

Within a study prepared by the Development Studies Programme for unifem, a group of Palestinian researchers suggested gender index by which to gauge the gap between men and women. After intensive deliberation, the group produced an index comprising four basic indicators that reveal the gap between men and women. The survey used for the study revealed the following:

- * Early marriage is the most significant problem: from amid the indicators, early marriage was selected as the best indicator to represent the conditions of Palestinian women. The choice was not surprising; early marriage is, as mentioned earlier, related to with several other indicators. Early marriage leads to a series of regressions in the lives of women, their health and education conditions, participation in political activity (elections and decision-making,) and their economic participation (level of participation in the labor force) This indicator also carries general social repercussions connected with fertility rates, population increase, and the health and educational standing of family.
- * Education as necessary for the advancement of women: There was great attention paid to educational indicators in response to voices that stress the role of education in achieving a higher degree of equality between men and women. Among the top five indicators, three were educational: enrolment rates; illiteracy rates, which are higher among women than among men; and the level of dropping out of school abandonment, especially in the secondary level of schooling.
- * Economic participation: Among 11 indicators considered of priority, four were of economic nature, especially those concerning discrimination against women in the labor force, which rated third in the list of 11. Next came the indicator of unemployment rates, and in seventh place the discrimination in salaries between men and women and the poverty rates in families headed by women.
- * Political participation: There was great focus on women's participation in Legislative Council elections, in which the type of participation was not defined according to actual participation, voting, or candidacy. There was also focus on the representation of women in top government positions and in Councils.

The following table shows that the gap is severest at the level of women's participation in elections as the gap is at -0.959; early marriage, - 0.941 (meaning that 94 out of 100 steps must be climbed to achieve equality between men and women.) As for participation in the labor market, the gap registered - 0.826, dipping in the area of education to - 0.604 (60 steps needed to achieve equality.) Based on the results of proposed index, it appears that women's march toward equality with men does not exceed a fifth of the road (0.177) leaving a distance of about 82 steps on a scale of 100 to reach equality. Clearly, what the Palestinian community achieved in the area of equality between men and women in the field of education is the clearest; according to enrollment in higher education indicator, women have crossed 40 percent of the road, while in the labor market they only crossed 18 steps.

Table (2-1) A gender index for the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Indictor	Women	Men	Gender gap	Nominal weight	Adjusted weight	Value of contribution to the index
Early marriage 19999	36.9%	2.2%	-0.941	0.85	0.267	-0.251
Participation in the labor force 1999	12.3%	70.7%	-0.826	0.77	0.242	-0.199
University education	2.5%	6.3%	-0.604	0.78	0.245	-0.147
Participation in elections	3.7%	96.3%	-0.959	0.7	0.236	-0.266
Total value of gap						- 0.823
Value of gender index (1 - 0.823)						0.177

Although human development indicators are important, the Palestinian condition is exceptional. It requires clarification and expansion in the presentation and analysis of indicators, especially those connected with the development environment. The rest of this chapter will examine additional indicators concerned with the abilities of the Palestinian community and its capacity to develop.

Section Two:

Israeli Occupation and the Systematic Destruction of Palestinian Human Development

The West Bank and Gaza Strip remain under Israeli occupation, despite the passage of seven years and the emergence of a Palestinian National Authority following the

signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993. The occupation continues to isolate the West Bank from the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem from both. The internal and external siege imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip segregates cities and villages from one another. It also prohibits the travel of individuals and transport of merchandise among them. Israeli control of borders and all points of entry and egress effectively dictate Palestinian trade. Israel controls most of the water resources of the Palestinian people and large areas of their land, in addition to the Dead Sea.

Continuing settlements despite the peace process

The Oslo Agreement grants Israel direct control over 60% of the land of the West Bank and about 26% of the land of the Gaza Strip, which accounts for close to 61% of total Palestinian land.² Israel also has security control over 21% of the territories. At present, it has extended its control over more

2. The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, Fifth Annual Report (1999) Ramallah, 2000.

The number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose by 72% between 1994 and the end of 2000 to register 390,039 settlers. In the year 2000

Palestinian land in the West Bank confiscated in the first year of the Intifada totaled 6,130 acres, more than double the area confiscated in the year preceding the Intifada (2,847 acres.)

Palestinian areas through a formal policy of reoccupation of all major urban centers. At the end of 2000, Israeli settlements erected on Palestinian land totaled 150 in the West Bank and 17 in the Gaza Strip. In the same period, Israel built 65 bypass roads on Palestinian property, confiscating a total of 16,250 acres, in addition to constructing several new military installations.

Israel continued to build and expand settlements after the establishment of the PNA, raising the number in the West Bank by 49.52% to total 49,940 units at the end of July 2000. Concurrently, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose by 72% between 1994 and the end of 2000 to 390,039 settlers. In the year 2000, Israel confiscated 1,250 acres of Palestinian land.

The environment and natural resources

Israel occupation controls most Palestinian natural resources and poses a serious threat to the Palestinian environment. Israel controls 81% of Palestinian water³, denying the Palestinians use of it. Since 1967, Israeli authorities uprooted more than one-half million trees, 70% of which were olive trees. In the current Intifada,

and by the end of 2001, Israeli authorities uprooted or destroyed 35,000 fruit trees for the purposes of settlement expansion, building bypass roads, and for alleged security considerations. Internationally banned pesticides and fertilizers enter the Palestinian territories by way of settlements without supervision, reflecting negatively on the quality of crops and the health of Palestinians.⁴

It should be noted that no effective regulatory system is employed by the PNA, which is considered responsible for monitoring the use of such pesticides. Current conditions make it difficult for the PNA to establish and implement effective environmental policies.

A distinct need exists for more careful examination of the environmental practices of some industrial enterprises, especially quarries, given their potential for polluting the environment and endangering the lives of residents.

3. The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights; The State of Palestinian Rights, Sixth Annual Report (2000), Ramallah, 2001.

4. Khalil Tofakji; Israeli Settlement in Palestinian Territories: Reality and Problems; Jerusalem, 2001.

Box (2 - 2) Depriving the Palestinians of water

- The Oslo Accord dictated that Israel supply the Palestinians with 28.6 million cubic meters of consumable water from cisterns in the West Bank, but Israel only supplied about 15 million cubic meters (about half the quantity.) The Palestinian Water Authority has warned of the possibility of severe shortages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially in remote areas inaccessible by water trucks.⁵

Palestinian water consumption does not exceed 65 liters per person per day, compared to more than 274 liters used by the average Israeli settler in Palestinian territories).

Destroying the infrastructure

Israel continues to restrict the Palestinian economy and impede its growth, dictating that the majority of Palestinian trade must take place with or through Israel. For example, Israeli exports to PNA territories in the year 1999 were valued at \$1,759.3 million, excluding power, water and telephone utilities and agricultural products. Palestinian exports were valued at \$454.2 million, discounting agricultural products and Palestinian labor in Israel, which translates into a huge advantage for Israel.⁶ The skewed trade relationship that has evolved throughout years of occupation has greatly hindered balanced economic growth the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The population in the Palestinian territories has developed an over-reliance on Israeli goods and, for lack of other employment options, serves as

asource of cheap labor for the Israeli market.

The Palestinian economy has suffered devastating losses since Israel began its policies of closure and curfew in September 2000. UNSCO estimates Palestinian daily losses during the Intifada at \$10.9 million, a figure which does not include destruction of private property and the infrastructure⁷. Virtually every sector of the Palestinian economy has been affected, including tourism (hotels and restaurants), construction, agriculture, social and health services, and the financial and manufacturing sectors. Losses in the agriculture and fishing sectors registered (73%, hotels and restaurants -89%, construction - 78%, and social services at (68%).⁸ Economic losses in the first year of the Intifada are estimated at \$2.4-\$3.2 billion.

5. Jad Ishaq and Abeer Safar; Applied Research Institute; paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.

6. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Tally (1998,) Basic Results, Ramallah, 2000. Also, see the United Nations Special Coordinator Office report for the spring of 2000.

7. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the Palestinian Economy; 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.

8. See the statistical appendix.

The political situation, the collapse of negotiations, and the eruption of the Intifada also disrupted the investment environment, making it particularly unattractive to potential foreign investors. Under these

circumstances, the Palestinian private sector has been unable to stimulate economic productivity, particularly in terms of manufactured and agricultural exports.

Box (2 - 3) The most significant economic changes during the Intifada⁹

- The closing of the Israeli market-the principal labor market-to Palestinian workers
- A decrease in local work opportunities for Palestinians
- Increased fragmentation of Palestinian markets.
- The surge of ad-hoc, unregistered and unregulated Palestinian business enterprises
- A widening economic gap between rich and poor in Palestine
- A dramatic increase in the number of Palestinian families living below the poverty line.

Unprecedented poverty rates

The siege imposed on the Palestinian territories during the second Intifada has led to a sharp increase in unemployment levels. For the first nine months of the year 2000, unemployment stood at 11%. Between October and November 2001, the unemployment figure skyrocketed to 38 percent.¹⁰ An estimated 82,000 people lost their jobs locally due to the effects of Israeli closure, in addition to the 100,000 who lost work inside Israel, and the 71,000 who were already jobless prior to the Intifada.¹¹ Increases in unemployment levels typically

correlate with rising rates of poverty. In April 2001, a Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) report documented the effect of the siege on the economic standing of Palestinian families. According to survey data, an estimated 64.2% of Palestinian families now live below the poverty line. The percentage rises to 81.4% in the Gaza Strip, as compared to 55.7% in the West Bank.¹² The dramatic increase in the number of disadvantaged families in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is especially discouraging in light of the fact that the Palestinian poverty rate had been steadily declining in recent years, falling from 23.6% in 1996 to 20.2% in 1998.¹³

9. For more, see: Adel Al-Zagha, paper presented to the PHDR 2002, and Mueen Rajab, paper presented to the PHDR 2002.

10. See the statistical appendix.

11. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the Palestinian Economy; 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.

12. The PCBS cautions against relying on the data as absolute figures, because the data was offered by families estimating their standing compared to the poverty line.

13. See the World Bank report, which relied on the poverty line established by the National Commission for Alleviation of Poverty and on the Family Expenditures and Consumption Survey conducted by the PCBS: The World Bank, Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, February 20, 2001 (table 1.2.)

Box (2 - 4) Poverty of Capabilities

A survey conducted by the DSP at Birzeit University in March 2001 revealed that income levels had dropped in 73% of Palestinian families during the first four months of the Intifada. In 46% of Palestinian families, at least one member of the family lost his income entirely. Another survey conducted by the DSP in February 2002 showed that 11% of Palestinian heads of households indicated that their children had dropped out of school, 52% attended school irregularly, and 76% of Palestinian families had difficulty obtaining access to health services.

Section Three: International Funding and Palestinian Development

International aid has served as a primary source of income for the PNA since it was established. Donor countries pledged a total of \$4,847 million in aid to the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the end of the year 2000.¹⁴ \$3,314 million has actually been received (68.3%). Loans make up 12.5% of the total aid received (approximately \$414 million), and the remaining funds are considered as grants. Between 1994 and 2000, the majority of international donor aid was spent in three areas: 37.2% on general investment, 20.5% on technical assistance, and 14.5% on the general budget.

Further analysis of the data for that period reveals that aid was allocated to projects as follows: water and waste water management, \$863 million (17.8%); building institutions, \$713 million (14.7%); education, \$466 million (9.6%); infrastructure, \$376 million (7.7%); and health, \$360 million, (7.4%).¹⁵ Gradually, the amounts of aid being pledged as well as funds received began to decrease. Pledges decreased from \$821 million in 1994 to \$506 million in 1996 and \$364 million in 2000 (27%). Since 1996, the execution of development projects had greatly improved. In addition, while infrastructure improvements accounted for only 10% of total aid in 1994-1995, by 1998 they accounted for 57% of total aid expenditures.¹⁶

*Loans made up
12.5% of the
pledges of donor
countries to the
PNA. The loans
totaled \$414
million*

14. Detailed numbers available in the statistical appendix.

15. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, MOPIC's 2000 Fourth Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donors Assistance; Ramallah, 2001.

16. For further details, see: Ali Shaath, paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.

Funding Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

International aid for Palestinian NGOs peaked in the years immediately preceding Oslo, with estimates of total aid ranging from \$140-\$220 million annually. After the establishment of the PNA, the amount of aid earmarked for NGOs declined steadily to an average of 10% of incoming aid revenue. In 1994, NGOs received \$60 million from foreign donors. Between 1995 and 1998, NGOs were receiving an average of \$45-50 million annually. This decrease occurred in spite of the fact that roughly one-third of the NGOs that exist in Palestine today were started after the establishment of the PNA.

Foreign aid to NGOs is allocated across a variety of programs, most notably health and education. Education received 23.3% of international aid offered to NGOs in the period in question, followed by the health sector at 19.6%, social and cultural services at 8%, and agriculture at 7.4%. The vast majority of the funding was distributed among a relatively small number of larger NGOs with wide outreach capabilities.¹⁷

UNRWA, a vital role

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) provides direct assistance to

targeted groups of Palestinian refugees. In 1997, the agency budgeted \$140.7 million for refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The budget for 2000 totaled \$133.8 million and for 2001, \$137.9 million. The lion's share of the budget goes to the education and health sectors; in 1997, almost 50% of the budget was spent on education, with 22% spent on health, 13% on services and relief, and 7% each on general and employment services. In 2000, the education budget was raised to 57%, but despite the increased budget, UNRWA spending on each student in its schools dipped from \$348 in 1997 to \$324 in 2000 due to the increase in the number of students.¹⁸ The budget for general services and employment services decreased to 5%. The health sector budget witnessed a slight decrease - from 22% to 21% - which meant that spending on each registered refugee dropped from \$23 to \$21¹⁹, while social services and relief remained unchanged. These figures reveal that UNRWA budgets have not kept pace with the rise in the total number of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

While the number of registered refugees increased from 1,308,438 in 1997 to 1,428,891 in 2000, the UNRWA budget decreased from \$140.7 million (\$100.75 per registered refugee) in 1997 to \$133.8 million (\$90.36 per

17. Ibid.

18. UNRWA's education budget in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was \$69.6 million in 1997 and \$75.6 million in 2000. The number of students registered in UNRWA schools was 200,886 in 1997 and 223,258 in 2000.

19. The UNRWA health expenditures for 1997 represented 30.6% of the total budget, and 28.3% in 2000.

registered refugee) in 2000.²⁰ The decrease in the budget of UNRWA and the subsequent decline in its services were discouraging to the residents of Palestinian refugee camps and institutions working in the refugee sector. Despite well-intentioned efforts by the agency,

it is still unclear whether its programs measurably help refugees to realize their individual and collective rights or to significantly strengthen the overall effectiveness of refugee assistance organizations.

UNRWA budget dropped from \$100.75 per refugee in 1997 to \$90.36 in 2000

Box (2 - 5) The Deficit Facing UNRWA

The UNRWA Commissioner, Peter Hansen, said that the agency needs \$150 million to cope with the growing level of need in Palestine, noting that the agency is currently facing a deficit of \$70 million which must be immediately addressed. Hansen indicated that UNRWA services are seriously threatened as a result of the deficit, adding that part of the funds to be collected by UNRWA would be used to rebuild destroyed homes in the southern districts of the Gaza Strip. The UNRWA Commissioner said that calls for increased levels of assistance have failed so far to generate a significant response from the international community, with the exception of medicines provided by Saudi Arabia. He also stressed that Arab countries have shown sympathy and solidarity, saying that in Syria alone, students and teachers donated more than \$500,000, and Syrian women have donated valuable personal effects such as jewelry.²¹

Evaluating international aid²²

Gauging the effectiveness of foreign aid on development programs in areas under the PNA's jurisdiction is challenging for

several reasons. The aid was received during an interim period during which an independent Palestinian state was to be established. However, that period

20. In 1997, refugees registered with UNRWA totaled 3,469,109, with 1,308,438 residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2000, registered refugees numbered 3,806,055, with 1,428,891 of these residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It should also be mentioned that UNRWA budgets did not keep pace with the increases in the numbers of refugees in all its areas of operation. The aggregate number of refugees registered with UNRWA in its operation areas (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) rose from 3,417,688 to 3,806,055, while the budget dipped from \$342.9 million (\$100.14 per registered refugee) in 1997 to \$310.39 million (\$79 per registered refugee) in 2000. UNRWA devised an emergency plan to aid the Palestinian people after the Intifada erupted on 28 September 2000. UNRWA operational budgets were provided courtesy the Public Information Office, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza,) UNRWA in Figures (1997-2000.)

21. Al-Ayyam, 31 May 2001.

22. For more, see: Mohammed Shadid, paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.

was marred by instability and confusion, and negotiations with Israel came to an abrupt halt in July 2000. The interim period also saw a rise in Israel's use of collective punishment measures, which closed the Israeli labor market to Palestinian workers and imposed curfews on the local Palestinian labor force. These Israeli practices effectively served to divert foreign aid resources away from development efforts and into welfare and relief efforts. The economic, financial, security and administrative penalties imposed on the PNA by Israel have seriously harmed the foreign investment environment in Palestine and brought several investment and infrastructure projects to a complete halt. Future foreign aid will almost surely have to be directed first toward the rebuilding of Palestine's physical infrastructure and rehabilitation of the Palestinian economy. It may be advisable in the future for donor

countries secure a commitment from Israel that it will not inflict damage on any buildings funded by donor nations, and require financial compensation for future damages. These commitments should be enforced through international courts.

Levels of international aid to Palestine were not established in accordance with a comprehensive development plan created by the PNA. Instead, the donors worked according to studies they prepared themselves, based on a list of potential projects prepared by MOPIC. The decline in levels of PNA spending on health and educational services and the claims of chronic financial distress may indicate that the international community is not willing to compensate the Palestinian people, even partially, for the losses and suffering associated with Israeli occupation.

Box (2 - 6) Workshop on the Intifada's effects on levels of international funding

The Development Studies Programme organized a workshop held on 22 November 2001 on the Intifada's effects on levels of international funding. Participants from international aid organizations and representatives from MOPIC offered assurances that donor funding had helped build many effective administrative, service-related, and political institutions for the Palestinian community. Most of the participants agreed that sustainable development is difficult to achieve under occupation, therefore, the bulk of foreign aid would be directed towards efforts to rebuild the Palestinian infrastructure and economy, now in ruins.²³

23. See : Development Studies Programme, Birzeit University, The Impact of the Palestinian Intifada on International Funding: Reality and Prospects, November 2001.

Perspectives on the Effects of the Intifada on Funding Levels:

“I believe the events during the Intifada influenced funding negatively. It became extremely difficult to complete projects, especially those that require travel among the various cities or the transportation of supplies from one place to another. Unfortunately, some cities are completely closed off and impossible to access.”

Jean Breteche, European Union Representative

“I would like to confirm that the USAID program for the West Bank and Gaza is considered a priority by the U.S. Government, reflecting particular interest in the region. We are determined to exert all necessary effort to realize the program despite the obstacles we are facing, but we must reevaluate how the funds allotted for the program are used in order to ensure proper spending and guard against wastage.”

Larry Garber, USAID

“We believe that people living and working within the crisis are more able to define how funding should be spent and determine the needs of the community. We are now listening to those receiving funding through the Ford Foundation and asking them how we can help offer them more.”

Steven Lawery, Ford Foundation

“It took us some time to adapt and devise a new vision to move forward. One of the faces of adaptation was the direct contact with local councils to ensure promptness in providing funds and a timely provision of assistance to the unemployed.”

Sufian Mushasha, UNDP

“At this time the development process faces major obstacles, and we are studying the available options with our colleagues at Palestinian ministries and donor agencies.”

Hisham Mustafa, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

The preceding quotes confirm the need to reevaluate international funding as a primary means to alleviate the suffering caused by the Israeli occupation. Despite international aid to the PNA and

NGOs, the interim period failed to liberate the Palestinian economy from its almost complete reliance on Israel. The interim period did not yield a final settlement, and the living standards of the Palestinians

There is a need to reevaluate the role of international funding

dropped. Signs of improvement appeared only after 1998, and then quickly disappeared as Israeli military, economic, administrational and security measures were imposed after the eruption of the second Intifada. The GNP dipped sharply between October 2000 and January 2001²⁴, which indicates how integrally the economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is linked to Israel.

For those reasons and others, it can be concluded that international

funding did not facilitate decentralization, as most aid was directed through PNA and NGO programs. Similarly, international funding did not encourage economic growth nor did it increase the outreach or effectiveness of Palestinian social service organizations. International donors generally failed to engage or support the efforts of smaller, more specialized groups, choosing instead to focus on the work of PNA institutions, international demonstration projects, and large NGOs.

Box (2 - 7) Return on aid investment as compared with neighboring countries

A World Bank report for the year 2000²⁵ on the effectiveness of aid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip indicated that aid has had limited success in improving the Palestinian economy. According to the report, foreign aid raised the Palestinian GNP only 1%-2% above what would most likely have been achieved had aid not been available. The report also indicated that general investment as a component of GNP rose by 5.7% in the period between 1997 and 1998, as compared to 2.9% between 1990 and 1992. Foreign aid played a limited role in the improvement of health and education services, but the gains were low relative to the size of investment when compared to similar efforts in Egypt and Jordan.

International aid, in general, did not create the conditions necessary to achieve sustainable human development

International aid to the PNA, in the form of grants and loans with lenient repayment provisions, are certainly an asset to development efforts. However, the growing trend to convert grants into loans may have negative effects on the Palestinian economy and place a large financial burden on future Palestinian generations.

Undoubtedly the Palestinian people deserve international aid as partial compensation for years of occupation and alienation. International aid should not be used as incentive to continue negotiations with Israel, regardless of the bases and goals of negotiations.²⁶

24. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the Palestinian Economy, 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.

25. The World Bank, Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, 2000.

26. Israel received \$5.5 billion from the U.S. Government in 1997.

International aid failed to create the conditions necessary to achieve sustainable human development largely because of the continuance of Israeli occupation. The occupation created an environment where Palestinian dependence on foreign aid and its continuance actually increased. Very little progress will be achieved in the absence of external financial support from donor nations at this stage. Sustainable human development requires the creation of an institutional and physical infrastructure that will encourage "investment in the peace process".

International aid has not been distributed consistently in accordance with a comprehensive development plan with clear priorities and objectives. Reduction or cessation of aid will almost certainly result in immediate further decline in the living standards and health and educational welfare of Palestinians, especially children and impoverished or marginalized segments of society. Also, a reduction in aid levels will affect the performance of many non-governmental development institutions, especially those working in the areas of preschool and post-high school education, health care, and agriculture.

Perhaps an increased level of awareness will characterize the years that follow the second Intifada. The PNA may take a more responsible role in defining

foreign aid. A demonstrated need exists for a sustainable human development strategy whose priorities have been established with the participation of all segments of the Palestinian society, and which reflects a democratic vision for the future of the Palestinian state.

Section Four:

The Impact of Arab-Palestinian Relations on the Palestinian Development Environment

The contributions of Arab nations to sustainable human development efforts in Palestine are still extremely limited. Official Arab support for the second Palestinian Intifada did not extend far beyond repetition of the demand that UN resolutions concerning the conflict with Israel be implemented. Relatively small amounts of financial assistance were provided by Arab governmental and non-governmental organizations to the Palestinian people.

Historically, Arab nations have contributed to the funding of Palestinian NGO activities in the education and health care sectors, prior to the establishment of the PNA. Palestinian NGOs received fairly limited support until 1976, when aid levels were significantly

Some Arab NGOs launched important initiatives to offer financial and moral support for the Intifada

More than three million Palestinian refugees live in Arab countries

increased through the efforts of the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee. A number of relief funds established by Arab NGOs and educational and social institutions were created, and sister-city programs began to spring up throughout the region. Arab support to Palestinian NGOs reached \$33 million in 1978, jumping to \$118 million in 1982.²⁷ After the establishment of the PNA, Arab support remained low as a percentage of total foreign aid. Between 1993 and 2000, financial support from Arab nations did not exceed \$277 million, only 8% of total aid for the Palestinian people from the other countries of the world.²⁸

After the eruption of the Intifada, Arab countries held an emergency summit in Cairo in October 2000. At the summit, participating countries pledged \$1 billion in support of the Palestinian people through the creation of two funds. The "Al-Aqsa Fund" dedicated \$800 million to the preservation of the Arab and Muslim identity of Jerusalem. The "Jerusalem

Intifada Fund," allocated \$200 million to assist the families of Palestinian victims.²⁹ However, follow through on pledges to these two funds was weak. Many who failed to honor pledge commitments blamed a lack of spending oversight mechanisms for the two funds. At the second Arab summit, held in Amman in March 2001, Arab countries promised Palestine an additional \$40 million in loans with lenient repayment terms, to be paid to the PNA over six months.

It should be noted that many citizens of Arab nations voluntarily pledged assistance to support the Intifada and the Palestinian people. Arab leaders at the Cairo summit called on the Arab people to donate one day's work in support of the Intifada.³⁰ Some Arab NGOs launched important initiatives providing financial and moral support for the Intifada, including a very significant effort by the UAE Red Crescent Society. Despite the undeniable value of these aid efforts, public commitment has remained limited and sporadic.

27. Nidal Sabri, The Palestinian Commission for Citizens' Rights, Financial and Legal Aspects of the Palestinian Budget, Ramallah, 2000.

28. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, MOPIC's 2000 Fourth Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donors' Assistance, Ramallah, 2001. Ensuring the accuracy of these numbers is not easy, because a large portion of the funds is distributed without the supervision of the PNA.

29. See the final statement of the Arab summit held in Cairo in October 2000.

30. See the final statement of the Arab summit held in Cairo in October 2000.

Box (2 - 8) Refugees in Arab states

More than three million Palestinian refugees live in Arab countries.³¹ The living conditions of Palestinian refugees span a wide range, with some enjoying full rights of citizenship while others are marginalized and suffer from extreme levels of poverty and deprivation. In some Arab countries, Palestinian refugees are forbidden to engage in certain lines of work and have been subjected to isolation and discrimination. Most refugee camps in Arab countries suffer from overcrowded conditions and lack of vital facilities, in addition to reliance on services provided by the fluctuating budget of UNRWA.

Unquestionably, Arab countries are able to play an influential role in improving the Palestinian human development environment. They can also contribute actively to securing the rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with international agreements. Admittedly, there are political concerns that limit the flexibility of some countries, but their failure to support Palestinian human development in a more significant way is difficult to understand. At a minimum, Arab countries can open their work markets to Palestinians and offer positive incentives for their business communities to invest in the Palestinian territories.

The labor markets of some Arab nations offer significant job priorities and methods for directing

opportunities for Palestinian workers. In the Gulf countries alone, close to 250,000 Palestinians are employed, mostly in professions in the public and private sectors that require specialized skills. Many economic and political factors affect employment opportunities for Palestinians in Arab countries, including the host state's relationship with the PLO and the PNA, market demand for labor, oil prices, income levels, and the restrictions placed on foreign workers.³² Creating work opportunities for Palestinians in Arab countries in coordination with the PNA would help decrease Palestinian economic reliance on the Israeli economy and would furnish a better and more stable development environment.

31. Badil Resources Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *The Right of Return*, Bethlehem, 2000.

32. Abdul-Jaber Tayseer, Employment Opportunities for Palestinians in Gulf Countries, paper presented to the International Conference on Employment in Palestine, Ramallah, May 1998.

Arab-Palestinian trade relations are still limited

Box (2 - 9) Data on Trade with Arab Countries

Palestinian external trade statistics indicate that registered trade transactions with Arab countries totaled \$75 million from an aggregate \$2,620 million in 1997 and \$97 million out of \$2,769 million in 1998.³³ In 1997, Palestinian exports to Arab countries did not exceed 5% of total exports, and in 1998 exports to Arab countries registered only 3%. As for imports, Palestinian purchases from Arab countries amounted to 2.5% of total imports in 1997 and 3.6% of total imports in 1998. Total Palestinian exports to Gulf countries in 1997 registered a mere 9%, rising in 1998 to 20%. Jordan is by far Palestine's largest trade partner, importing 90% of Palestinian goods produced for export (to Arab nations) in 1997 and 70% in 1998. The Egyptian market accounted for a very modest percentage of Palestinian exports in 1997-1998, not exceeding 1%.

Since its inception, the PNA has faced challenges relating to its authority

Arab-Palestinian trade relations are insignificant when compared to the level of Palestinian economic dependence on Israel and to the volume of trade that takes place between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Egypt. Israel controls Palestinian ports and delays the transfer of Palestinian goods at border crossings.³⁴ The Paris Economic Protocol signed on 29 April 1994 imposed significant restrictions on Palestinian external trade. Palestinian trade relations with Arab countries have demonstrated no noticeable signs of improvement in spite of the existence of a number of ratified free trade agreements. Trade agreements with Jordan specify tax and customs exemptions for a wide range of Palestinian imports to facilitate trade. Also, agreements signed with Egypt to encourage

Egyptian investment in Palestine and to facilitate transfer of technological and informational expertise from Egypt to Palestine have been only partially implemented.

Section Five:

The PNA-Caught Between Developmental and Political Agendas

Since its inception, the PNA has faced challenges relating to its authority, its sovereign boundaries and its performance. In addition, the PNA's ability to coordinate political and development concerns in light of the continuing Israeli occupation, settlement expansion and the siege of its major cities has been stretched beyond its limits.³⁵

33. PCBS, External Trade Statistics, 1998 (Main Results), Ramallah, 2000.

34. Tons of perishable produce and cut flowers spoil at border crossings as a result of delays imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian exporters.

35. External challenges are detailed in several places in the PHDR..

Additional obstacles include limited PNA control over its own natural resources, including land and water, and a complete lack of control over ports, as well as the geographical discontinuity of the PNA territories.

These impediments and restrictions, given the relatively short existence of the PNA and its limited governing experience, did not prevent it from achieving tangible progress in many areas. The PNA has created functioning ministries, specialized commissions, and a legislative council. It provides basic services to the Palestinian public especially in the areas of health care and education, and maintains an acceptable level of civil order. A number of successful infrastructure projects were completed, although they relied heavily on external funding. The PNA improved its relationship with civil society organizations after a period of tension and mutual accusations. It has laid the foundations of a working relationship with the Palestinian private sector. A wide range of

important legislation and regulatory policies has been established to create an orderly environment for the Palestinian people.

The PNA and Legislation

Clear delineation of the lines of authority among Palestinian ministries and organization of inter-ministry relations have been pressing concerns of the PNA since its establishment. The constitution remains unsigned by the PNA president although it has been approved by the Legislative Council. The law governing political parties, which provides for plurality and grants the freedom to form political affiliations, is still being debated. The law of publications and printing was enacted, as well as a law that permits foreign ownership of real estate in Palestine. The judicial system law, the administrative structures law, the court system law, and laws concerning investment and finance have all been passed. However, in the absence of a ratified state constitution, they cannot be effectively implemented.

Laws have not been effectively implemented due to the absence of a ratified constitution

Box (2 - 10) Implementation of the Labor Law

Despite adverse conditions, the Palestinian Labor Law was enacted and implemented after being published in the official PNA newspaper. The law's provisions were deliberated upon for eight years by representatives of the Labor Ministry, labor unions, and employers. Although labor unions stated publicly that the law met only the minimum demands of employers and that it was "backward compared to labor laws in neighboring countries," they appreciated that it at least existed. Employers objected to implementing the law at this difficult time and demanded a chance to "organize their affairs." However, the law was executed in spite of these protests. Improvement in the working conditions for Palestinians will be the deciding measure of the law's ability to protect them³⁶.

36. The full statement of the president of Labor Unions, Mr. Shaher Saad, Al-Quds, 5 January 2002.

Fifteen months into the Intifada, most PNA institutions continue to work without an emergency plan

The Intifada presented an additional challenge to the PNA

The absence of a Palestinian constitution is a central obstacle impeding real progress in legislative affairs. Without a constitution, separating the three branches of government is impossible. Human rights and citizens' rights remain unprotected, subject to ad-hoc and arbitrary decision-making. It is also difficult to make progress towards sustainable human development in the absence of truly democratic institutional structures through which popular participation, political plurality, and the freedom of organization and expression are facilitated. The failure of the PNA to open a meaningful dialogue between civil society and the political community on the issue of sustainable human development cannot be overlooked. This formative development dialogue must become a PNA priority if sustainable human development is to be achieved.

PNA Institutions and Adaptation to the Challenges of the Intifada

The Intifada presented an additional challenge to the PNA, as it struggled to simultaneously advance its social and economic development strategies, communicate effectively with the public, and to provide political leadership. Many PNA institutions experienced performance failures, and weaknesses in planning and regulatory abilities in times of emergency appeared. The PNA was

perceived as out of touch with the needs and the problems of the population, especially in remote locales. The conditions introduced by Israeli occupation policies required a resistance strategy to enable PNA institutions to continue operations. Official institutions needed to redirect and reprioritize their efforts in order to meet to the changing needs of the population. The Palestinians looked to the PNA for guidance to help them to cope with the burdens of the siege and persistent military attacks, the high number of casualties and injuries, and material damage to buildings, roads, and businesses. Fifteen months into the Intifada, little guidance has been provided. Most PNA institutions continue to work without an emergency plan and a civil defense program, despite the pressing need to unite the efforts of institutions to defend citizens and encourage their participation in activities of the Intifada removed from chaos³⁷. Generally, the following notes are made concerning the performance of PNA institutions:

- Most PNA institutions lacked an emergency plan and failed to establish one even after the sustained period of Israeli aggression.
- The highly centralized nature and ineffectiveness of many ministries led to the squandering of available resources.
- The siege of the Palestinian territories effectively shut down

37. See the results of the seminar organized by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in May 2001, which were broadcast in some local newspapers (See Al-Ayyam, 15 May 2001.) For further details, please see paper presented to the PHDR by Riyadh Al-Hasan, 2002, and a paper presented by Sameeh Shabeeb, 2002.

inter- and intra-ministry communication. Without emergency or contingency work plans, ministry personnel were left without guidance.

- The ministries had never established self-contained and

self-sustaining management systems, even for normal work conditions. They depended too heavily on centralized authority, and had underdeveloped and poorly managed human and financial resources.

Box (2 - 11) The lack of an economic and social plan

An opinion poll³⁸ revealed that 10.7% of those polled believe that the PNA possesses an economic plan to face the current crisis and 58% believe otherwise. As for a social plan, 18.7% believe the PNA has a plan to address social problems, while 58.5% believe it does not.

The PNA Budget

The PNA budget for 2000 indicates that government spending was concentrated in five fields: police and security (35.14%), education (18.36%), health (9.8%), presidency (6.1%), and social affairs (5.5%). The 2000 budget included a three-year development plan valued at \$1.28 billion, of which \$445 million was designated to be spent in the year 2000. Development spending was noticeably weak, and its geographical distribution was disproportional. In the West Bank, development spending was concentrated in five cities: Bethlehem (the Bethlehem 2000 Project (18.5%), Hebron (15.9%), Nablus (12.4%), Ramallah (7.3%), and Jenin (6.4%). Other cities received far less, such as Jerusalem

(4.7%), Tulkarem (3.9%), Qalqilya (2.6%), Jericho (2.4%), Salfeet, (1%), and Tobas (0.25%). As for the Gaza Strip, Gaza City received 43% of the development budget, followed by the Central District (21%), Rafah (14%), and the northern districts (10%). Khan Younis received no more than 5%; Deir Al-Balah, 1%, and 6% was allotted to several other areas in the Gaza Strip³⁹. It should be noted that the year 2001 witnessed a deficit of \$371 million⁴⁰ as a result of the decline in PNA revenues during the second Intifada and the decrease in foreign aid for development projects.

The grim financial conditions faced by the PNA have paralyzed spending, which should logically prompt an immediate search for

Development spending was noticeably weak, and its geographical distribution was disproportional

38. Birzeit University, the Development Studies Programme; Appendix No. 1, results of a survey about the Intifada, institutions, and the future; (#4.), 31 May-2 June 2001.

39. The PNA, Ministry of Finance, The 2000 General Budget Plan; Ramallah, Palestine, and the Palestinian Legislative Council, Budget and Financial Affairs Report on the General Budget for 2000, Ramallah, Palestine.

40. The PNA, Ministry of Finance, The 2000 General Budget Plan, Ramallah, Palestine.

new revenue sources and a reprioritization of the available resources in a manner that will not

negatively affect human development or the quest for independence.

Box (2 - 12) People - Centered Health Programme

The development process in Palestine must be comprehensive, taking into account the relationship between education, health, agriculture, and local government. Our modest experience in developing the health care sector in Palestine has proven that developing human resources should head the development plans for the health sector. Dedicated people are the decisive factor that enabled us to take on the additional burden of 35,000 injuries in 15 months despite the scarcity of resources.... The Palestinian people, who remain keen to increase knowledge and hone their abilities and are capable of creativity at difficult times, are at the heart of the development process.

Dr. Riyadh Al-Zaanoun, Palestinian Health Minister

Section Six: The Palestinian Private Sector

*The PNA stressed
the importance of
the private sector
in the
development
process*

Although the PNA has adopted a positive stance towards the private sector, recognizing its ability to propel economic development, the business community in Palestine still faces many internal obstacles. The legal environment remains inadequate. Restrictions imposed by the Paris Economic Protocol, whose provisions Israel selectively implemented, still impose barriers to economic growth. Discussion between the PNA and the private sector is an important step on the path to creating the proper atmosphere for a more effective role for the Palestinian business community. However, the PNA is still faced with the challenge of reconciling the needs of the Palestinian people and the

development process on the one hand and the aspirations and interests of the private sector on the other.

The PNA stressed the importance of the private sector in the development process in a series of presidential declarations issued in 2000. At the same time, the PNA asserted its commitment to free trade as an economic policy. Demonstrations of that commitment included forming a Higher Economic Development Council, founding a Palestinian investment fund, activating the role of the High Commission on Investment with the participation of the private sector, and establishing prospects for privatization. The declarations, if fulfilled, will bolster the role of the private sector in a transparent and mutually beneficial partnership with the public sector.

Box (2 -13) Select recommendations from the discussion forum between the public and private sectors

Among the most important recommendations resulting from the inaugural discussion forum between the public and private sectors, held in May 2000, are the following:

First: enacting economic laws, especially funding laws, with the participation of the private sector in an effort to bolster the role of the private sector as a catalyst of the Palestinian economy.

Second: limiting bureaucracy in the public sector and working to establish clear lines of authority in order to prevent unnecessary administrative intervention.

Third: activating the rule of law and improving the functions of Palestinian courts of law, especially concerning trade and financial matters.

Fourth: organizing Palestinian trade relations with Israel to protect the Palestinian private sector from Israeli economic control and working to activate trade agreements signed with several Arab countries.

Fifth: guaranteeing cooperation between the public and private sectors in establishing a national plan to market Palestinian merchandise and working to establish trade centers and offices abroad to market products and attract foreign investment to Palestine.

Sixth: working to restructure the Palestinian tax system (Value Added Tax and Income Tax) to encourage private sector investment.

Seventh: prohibition of monopolies in either sector unless clearly justified for national or economic reasons.

The period after 1997 saw increasing private sector investment in the Palestinian economy. In 1999, 1,841 new companies were registered, compared to 1,517 in 1994. New business registrations dropped in 1996-1997, but rose noticeably in 1998 and again in 1999. In 1996, registered businesses totaled

1,269, decreasing the following year to 1,198. The number rose to 1,370 in 1998 and 1,841 in 1999. The investment encouragement law of 1998 was one of the factors that contributed to the rise in the number of registered businesses. Public companies of those registered totaled four in 1999, five in 1998⁴¹.

41. Information about the number of registered companies in the West Bank between 1994 and 2000 provided courtesy of the General Department of Statistics and Policies, Ministry of Trade and Economy, and in the Gaza Strip courtesy of the Business Registration Department, Ministry of Justice.

The period after 1997 saw increasing private sector investment in the Palestinian economy

The number of registered foreign companies also increased, with 20 registering in 1999 compared to nine in 1998. However, comparison of registered foreign companies in 1999 with those in 1994 and 1995 reveals a sharp drop; there were 31 registered foreign companies in 1994, increasing to 37 in 1995. Generally, registration of foreign companies is considered an indicator of the level of trust in the Palestinian economy and in a reasonable level of political and legal stability. However, the figures should be considered with care, because many of the foreign investors are Palestinians with foreign citizenship. Also, the size of the investment and the area in which the investment is made are also important factors in gauging their relative significance. In the wake of the Intifada and subsequently, the Israeli siege in 2000, investment in the Palestinian economy slowed. The number of registered companies dropped to 1,603 in the year 2000, including 14 foreign businesses, compared to 1,841 in 1999.⁴²

Since 1995, the PNA has actively encouraged domestic and foreign investment. The PNA issued a law to encourage investment, offering tax incentives for development projects depending on the size and

type of the investment. The value of projects approved after the law was enacted increased from \$190.3 million in 1997, of which \$61.2 million (32%) was foreign investment, to \$298.1 million in 1999, of which \$229.7 million (77%) was foreign investment.⁴³

**Section Seven:
Palestinian Civil Society
and its Role in
Reconciling Resistance
and Development.**

The second Intifada brought new interest in the performance of Palestinian civil society. Strengths and weaknesses in addressing current priorities and strategic community needs were revealed through activities designed to achieve national objectives and through its capacity to organize services and activities, made difficult by the siege and military aggression.

The emergence of the PNA brought additional responsibilities for civil society, including a demand for simultaneous participation in occupation resistance and in the human development process. Civil society was called upon to care for disadvantaged and neglected citizens. It was also expected to

42. It should be noted that the number of registered domestic and foreign companies does not necessarily correlate directly to increased investment by the private sector, because several of the companies that were registered in the specific period did not begin actual operation.

43. Information about development projects receiving tax incentives courtesy UNSCO, Report on the Palestinian Economy, Gaza, 2000, and UNSCO, Report on Economic and Social Conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Gaza, 1999.

bolster the functioning of democracy in public life as well as in the internal affairs of institutions, unions and community organizations. In addition, existing programs needed to be adapted after the emergence of the PNA, which began to handle certain economic, political and social affairs in areas under its total or partial control. Civil society's responsibilities were not restricted to the provision of services, but also extended to the promotion of democracy and sustainable human development.

There was no need for a second Intifada to uncover gaps in the performance of institutions and civil society organizations characterized by a diverse range of abilities, programs, internal structures, and target audiences. The gaps had already been identified in several reports and conferences, including previous PHDRs and reports and surveys published by various research centers. They were also revealed in the findings of periodic opinion polls, seminars and workshops.

Directing attention to areas of weakness is only a part of the important role undertaken by institutions and representative organizations of the Palestinian community in its effort to improve performance levels. It is also an opportunity to raise awareness about what is possible.

Civic organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip interact with

the Palestinian community because they are a part of it, influenced by the same factors-military occupation, geographical division, and low levels of economic and social integration. The contradictions afforded by the concurrence of occupation with an existing national authority, combined with conditions of inequality and deprivation, create an environment that limits the work and influence of civil society.

NGOs

A tally of NGOs indicated that 881 organizations were operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the middle of 2000. The organizations were spread geographically between the West Bank (76.6%), and the Gaza Strip (23.4%). Distribution according to community type was as follows: 60.2% in urban areas, 29.3% in rural areas, and 10.6% in refugee camps.

The emergence of the PNA meant additional responsibilities on civil society

Most of the NGOs relied on more than one source of funding, but 78.6% of them relied on one primary source of funding to fund at least 50% of the operating budget. About 39% received some funding from Arab and international institutions through internal income-generating activity. The PNA provides partial funding to 29.2% of NGOs. Slightly more than 19% received donations from the Arab community living in Israel.

In terms of performance assessment, 27.4% of NGOs

10% of the NGOs received 60% of the total funding

maintain that they always meet their strategic goals, 70.3% said they do so sometimes, and 2.2%

admitted they rarely achieve their goals.⁴⁴ Close to 10% of the NGOs received 60% of the total funding.⁴⁵

Box (2 - 14) The national campaign to boycott settlement goods and encourage national industry

"The Palestinian Observatory" was established in 1999, comprising several Palestinian NGOs and private sector institutions, to support boycotting of settlement merchandise, considering that settlements are illegal under international law. The Observatory established commercial relationships with several European companies to activate the boycott effort. In the second Intifada, efforts to boycott Israeli merchandise grew, especially those products for which there is a locally-produced alternative. The Popular Committee for Boycotting Israeli Goods established the middle of May 2001 as the deadline for emptying the Palestinian market of all Israeli goods for which there is a Palestinian substitute. An opinion poll conducted by the DSP in February 2001 indicated that 91% of those polled are aware of the boycott campaign; 57% said that boycott is attainable, and 74% said their use of Israeli goods has decreased during the Intifada.

In the past two decades, and particularly during the 1990s, professional organizations advancing development strategies in the fields of education, health and agriculture appeared. Institutions specializing in the defense of human rights, democracy and women's and children's rights were also established. The organizations achieved a significant level of outreach, which broadened the scope of beneficiaries throughout the West Bank and Gaza. In general, their financial,

administrative and human resources were superior to those of traditional charitable organizations operating in the region.⁴⁶

Although NGOs deserve praise for the quality of their efforts, some areas of weakness in their operations do exist. The enactment of the NGOs and Charitable Organizations Law of 2000 afforded NGOs a high degree independence in managing their affairs, soliciting funding, and establishing strategic plans and outreach efforts. However,

44. Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), NGO Census in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2001.

45. World Bank, Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, June 2000.

46. See: Census of Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2001 (previous reference.)

relatively few NGOs have succeeded in the development of comprehensive strategic plans and visions for the future.

The NGOs and Charitable Organizations Law indicates that Palestinians have the right to engage in social, cultural, professional and scientific activity freely. They also have the right to establish and operate institutions and non-governmental organizations.

Most Palestinian NGOs, with the possible exception of the larger, more technically and technologically advanced players, lack transparency, accountability, and effective regulation of their internal operations. The failure to achieve acceptable standards in these areas prevents NGOs from effectively building upon their experience. Many have failed to establish effective financial and management systems and to create sustainable ties to the communities in which they work. A few NGOs,

particularly larger ones, rely heavily on foreign aid. This reliance has the potential to discourage long-term planning and may stifle creativity and innovation in program development and resource management. Research shows that the relationship between NGOs and local government institutions is "weak"⁴⁷ in all but a few municipalities.⁴⁷

Many NGOs were confused regarding their responsibilities during the second Intifada. Most were unable to introduce the necessary changes at the infrastructure and policy levels to cope with the changing environment. There were some exceptions among organizations active in health, agriculture, and relief work. Levels of confusion were exacerbated by the lack of a comprehensive strategy that should have been discussed and agreed upon by the PNA, political groups, the private sector, and NGOs.

*The relationship
between NGOs
and local
government
institutions is
"weak"*

47. Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS,) Relationships among NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, prepared by Hasan Ladawdeh, Jibreel Mohammed, and Jaber Azzam, Ramallah, 2000.

Box (2 - 15) Partnership between NGOs and governmental organizations

It would be useful for the public sector to enter into partnerships with NGOs and benefit from their managerial expertise, especially in the areas of education and health care. Those partnerships that do currently exist are in fact found in health care, education, and childcare. It is important that the PNA develop a framework to organize the establishment of NGOs as tax-exempt non-profit organizations. NGO activities, which are considered special interest groups, could conceivably come into conflict with political agendas. The challenge lies in encouraging competition and the free exchange of information while fostering accountability. True competition among NGOs may continue if performance evaluation mechanisms are introduced, such as competitive bidding. Also, public disclosure of funding sources and spending patterns through surveys conducted with NGO beneficiaries and through media investigation and public supervision, which are all effective guarantees of accountability⁴⁸, should be practiced.

Charitable organizations, which comprise the majority of NGOs, contributed to poverty alleviation

Undoubtedly, the PNA policy concerning NGOs showed weak understanding and appreciation of the importance of such organizations, which had gained the trust and support of the Palestinian public before the emergence of the PNA. Official institutions, such as the Ministries of Health and Agriculture, the Legislative Council, and the Palestinian Children's Secretariat, to name a few, called on experienced NGOs to cooperate with them, and the endeavor proved surprisingly successful.⁴⁹

Palestinian NGOs actively

participated in creating an atmosphere that successfully linked resistance and human development efforts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but the effort was confined to professional and specialized organizations.⁵⁰ Charitable organizations, which comprise the majority of NGOs, contributed to poverty alleviation by offering assistance to needy families. Their activities expanded to include youth activities (sport clubs) and cultural activities (performing arts centers) at the local level. Palestinian NGOs are considered highly active compared with their counterparts in neighboring

48. Ishaq Diwan and Radhwan Shaaban (editing,) Development Despite the Difficulties-the Interim Track of the Palestinian Economy (summary,) Palestinian Economic Research Studies center (MAS,) and the World Bank, undated, page 20.

49. More details in the paper presented to the PHDR prepared by Izzat Abdul-Hadi and Tayseer Mheisen about the role of NGOs in the Intifada, 2002.

50. Izzat Abdul-Hadi, Palestinian NGOs-a Congested Work Schedule; paper prepared for the PHDR, Birzeit University, 1998.

countries and elsewhere in the world.

Political groups, labor unions, and professional federations

The second Intifada did not generate the levels of popular participation that characterized the first Intifada, particularly in its early stage. The presence of the PNA as a representative government and legitimate negotiator on the people's behalf may be considered one of the reasons behind the limited participation. Opinion polls indicate that a general decline in the relative influence of political parties and unions, as well as decreased public support for them, were also factors.

The PNA needs to forge a relationship with the NGO community that respects its autonomy, understands the demographics of its varied constituencies and clearly delineates lines of authority and jurisdiction. The Palestinian political system calls for political plurality, but mere plurality is not enough to create a functioning political democracy. Institutionalizing democracy requires separation of powers to prevent the executive branch from controlling the political landscape. It also requires the presence of a multiple power bases in the community, such as unions, federations, public interest groups, NGOs, chambers of commerce and trade associations. These players must abide by the rules of the political game, which specify that

authority be transferred peacefully through free, organized elections. Also, it is impossible to achieve plurality in power bases within the community if they do not enjoy reasonably high levels of public support and if they fail to enjoy political, organizational, and financial independence. Political interest groups and organizations were unable to achieve any significant shift toward democracy in the Palestinian political system. This is true even though most of them adopted, in addition to the ideology of Palestinian independence, the concepts of democracy and human development and folded them into their social and economic programs, along with their political goals. Popular support of these groups, therefore, remained very limited.

Discussion of democracy in the absence of freely formed groups and organizations that represent the political aspirations of the community is difficult. However, it is fair to say that despite the relative decline in the influence of political parties since the Oslo Accord, more than half the public in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continues to support one of the seven political organizations that continually appear in opinion polls. Although the percentage of truly active political organizations is small, not exceeding 1% of the total, their limited size does not necessarily translate into limited influence, because some of them possess great outreach and impact.

Palestinian NGOs are considered highly active compared with their counterparts in neighboring countries

Institutionalizing democracy requires separation of power

Many community leaders were employed by PNA institutions, which reduced community organizations' independence from official institutions

General evaluation of the role of civil society

The role of community groups regressed after the first Intifada and the rise of the PNA in light of the continuing occupation and the division of Palestinian territories into isolated areas. Many community leaders were employed at PNA institutions, which reduced community organizations' independence from official institutions. It also expanded the distance between their activities and the public, which perceived them as subject to PNA intervention. In fact, the rise of the PNA may be assessed by looking at the chance that was missed. The PNA had the opportunity to introduce radical changes to the structure of political parties and social movements, to bolster the practice of democracy through conferences and periodic elections, and to strengthen internal regulation and management. Implementation of these changes would also help promote independence and apply pressure to unify the laws of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and implement a national constitution in accordance with new political and social realities. Of equal importance is the new critical awareness that has begun to appear among political organizations, unions and NGOs and is repeatedly voiced in seminars and workshops. It calls for democracy and adoption of development strategies to be integrated into the resistance

strategy. However, a big gap still exists between awareness and practice.

The revival of unions and federations will require democracy and independence. It will also necessitate a reexamination of protocols, programs and internal regulations in accordance with the aspirations and interests of the public. Resistance programs of these groups will need to be revitalized. Lobbying groups must be formed to support the work of the PNA in achieving national goals. It is perhaps necessary for the unions to cultivate self-reliance in funding through investment projects, membership fees, and unrestricted aid from individuals and institutions.

It may also be necessary for members of Palestinian civil society to create a coordinating body entrusted with the task of presenting a unified vision that supports the PNA and its fight for the rights of the Palestinian people, supporting local, regional and international initiatives to that end. They must, at the same time, pressure responsible institutions to widen civil and political freedoms and practice democracy. Finally, they must formulate a sustainable human development strategy that conforms to the requisites of building a modern democratic state and a vital Palestinian community characterized by equality and justice.

Chapter Three: Community Participation in Local Government and Development.

Forward

Section One: A General Framework of Participation in Local Government.

Section Two: The PNA and Community Participation.

Section Three: Relationship between Local Councils and the Ministry of Local Government.

Section Four: Local Government in Practice.

Section Five: The Boundaries and Constituents of Participation and Development (Case Studies).

Section Six: General Conclusions

Forward

This chapter addresses participation, delegation of authority, and advancement of human development in local communities under the current conditions in Palestine. Delegation of authority in the context of the PHDR means the full involvement of local councils and institutions as decision-makers in the development process. Those who have followed the general course of Palestinian development during the past seven years and specifically the progress made in building and empowering local government councils will notice that new challenges have arisen. The development process still faces many difficulties, some of which are caused by political instability and others caused by the management methods employed by the Palestinians to address them.

Section One:

A General Framework of Participation in Local Government

This chapter, like the rest of the PHDR, assumes that resources are available to resolve problems faced in the process of enjoining local councils to advance the cause of sustainable human development under the current conditions. Development requires the activation and enhancement of the abilities of Palestinians. The Palestinians must help to determine the course of their own lives, and make maximum use of available freedoms and mobility. Palestinians must resist not only the occupation, but also many self-imposed hindrances to their active participation in the development process.

This chapter also discusses the factors that weaken Palestinian community participation, especially in local government. Levels of community participation in the activities of official institutions and local councils are explored. Case studies illustrate the role of local councils and NGOs currently active in areas of PHDR research. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the importance of community participation in local government organizations and its relationship to the success of the development process.

Palestinians need to increase their participation in the securing of their rights more than ever. Under the pressures of the continuing Israeli occupation, many institutions stopped providing services and some fell into a state of general chaos. Potent, professional governmental institutions derive legitimacy from the public, directing assets and organizing human and institutional resources to advance sustainable human development in the full emancipatory sense. An equitable partnership cannot be achieved without the presence of local government institutions whose operations are based on the rule of law and democratic work mechanisms. The degree to which centralized institutions are desirable is a topic of debate. PNA institutions have been strongly encouraged to amend their operations to conform to recommendations embraced by the PNA before the Intifada.

Local government in the fullest sense includes various development, democratic, and institutional aspects. It requires a high degree of delegation of responsibilities to local councils in matters of making decisions, executing them, and assessing results. The work of local councils requires them to engage in the social, economic and political arenas. It also demands a high level of community participation, public lending of legitimacy to councils, and accountability of local council representatives.

Development requires the activation and enhancement of the abilities of Palestinians

Local government in the fullest sense includes various development, democratic, and institutional aspects

In 1980, the Israeli authorities prevented new municipal elections, and actually dismantled some municipalities

The PNA failed to build a relationship based on confidence and mutual respect with the Palestinian community

Reclaiming part of the initiative

The Palestinians invested a large portion of their limited resources in the restoration of their social, political and economic fabric. The Palestinians, after 1967, established a network of human relationships, economic activity, and political efforts in the occupied territories. They also established a network of NGOs that provided services to the people in the fields of human rights, education and health care. These efforts reinforced the concepts of patriotism and the Palestinian identity. Partial autonomy was achieved, and the community began to participate in decision-making. In addition, community interest in education and cultural activities was raised. Efforts in these areas became increasingly flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. The results paved the way for limited Israeli withdrawal under the Oslo Accords and laid the foundation for the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority.

Factors affecting local government and participation

The Israeli occupation of Palestinian land in 1967 represented a time of marked inconsistency. The Palestinians had political representation in the occupied territories (the PLO), but they enjoyed no legal rights, political influence or decision-making ability. Two sessions of local council and municipal elections were held in the West

Bank, but not in the Gaza Strip due to complexities in its legal system. The next elections, held in 1976, provided a better chance for local and political participation (National Steering Committee, High Council of Education, and others). In 1980, the Israeli authorities prevented new municipal elections, and actually dismantled some municipalities and appointed alternate councils, some of them headed by Israeli military commanders.

Section Two: The PNA and Community Participation

The role of the PNA in achieving sustainable development is positive, but generally modest and greatly affected by external circumstances. Self-imposed factors influenced both the successes and failures of government and civic performance. The Oslo Accords limited the authority of the PNA in the eyes of most Palestinians. The agreement weakened PNA control over the future of the Palestinian land. Oslo tipped the balance of power largely in favor of Israeli interests, and gave Israel the chance to create new realities on the ground¹. The PNA failed to build a relationship based on confidence and mutual respect with the Palestinian community, local councils and NGOs. Support withered for the positive aspects of the Oslo Accords. The PNA's

¹ . Mustafa Al-Barghouthi, NGOs and their Role in the Future, paper presented at a conference at Birzeit University on 13-15 May, 1994.

mandate to negotiate on behalf of the people eroded in subsequent years.

One of the PNA's self-imposed obstacles was the failure to provide policies of good governance and a balanced framework under which to organize key Palestinian initiatives. A number of Palestinian ministers accepted their appointments solely for the sake of prestige. Many lacked any relevant experience in the areas of governance for which they were responsible.

The PNA similarly failed to recognize the relationship between development and resistance. Government officials separated development from politics and both from community participation. The political agenda consumed the lion's share of human resources and available assets. Decision-makers at the PNA failed to assess the Palestinian condition. They did not grasp the concept that to a large degree, resistance efforts take place at the local community level. This failure is partially attributable to inexperience in local community affairs. Decision-makers did not establish defined and institutionalized tools to arrange the priorities of the community. The professional experience needed to properly address those priorities was at times absent. Decision-makers did

not exhibit ample understanding of the practical aspects of human development and in general, did not take it seriously².

As a result, Palestinians in the occupied territories expressed disparate levels of satisfaction with the national authority's governance, and were dissatisfied overall with their quality of life. The mixed feelings were intensified with the eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada at the end of September 2000 and the widespread failures of official institutions. The leadership exhibited in the handling of ensuing legal, security, service, and supply crises was inadequate to nonexistent. The community demonstrated its dissatisfaction by demanding increased democratic access and permission to guide their own community affairs. A general call was raised to resolve the political and developmental crises and to abolish the central control of the PNA over local affairs. Demands were made to stimulate the relationship between local government institutions and NGOs to empower the latter to perform. Criticism was leveled at the increase in the number of local councils, such as municipalities and town councils. Few receive adequate funding to allow them to assume their tasks and most are not delegated sufficient authority to participate in decision-making.³

Decision-makers did not exhibit ample understanding of the practical aspects connected of human development

Demands were made to stimulate the relationship between local government institutions and NGOs

2 . Mustafa Miree, Legislation in Palestine: Mechanisms, Objectives and Priorities; Ramallah, Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, May 2000, pg. 49.

3. See for example: Abbas Abdul-Haqq, Urban Schemes and Building Permits in Palestine; Development Affairs, Volume Ten; first and second issues, pg. 52.

A consensus appears to exist on the philosophical basis and the desirable organizational structure for local government

Strengthening the institutional, political, judicial and executive infrastructure of the PNA is a first step toward achieving competent local government

Local government in practice

The official local government system includes development planning institutions, including the Higher Council for Urban Planning, regional planning committees, local planning and building committees, and other permanent and temporary bodies entrusted with addressing issues or executing specific tasks. At the community level, the local government system includes local councils and NGOs of various types.

A consensus appears to exist on the philosophical basis and the desirable organizational structure for local government and its relationship with the central government. Various constitutional provisions lay out a framework for this structure. Article 176 of the Temporary Palestinian Constitution Project⁴ provides for “organizing relations between the administrations of local units on the basis of non-central democracy in managing units of local government.” Article 168 provides that “local councils should enjoy authority, be elected according to the law, and practice their legally established authorities. Local councils shall not be forced to sign commitments or agreements except in their area of specialty and in coordination with the Ministry.” Article 95 of the Constitution Draft⁵ provides that the law shall establish “the tasks of local councils, their financial resources,

and relation with the central government, as well as their role in preparing and executing development plans and supervising various activities. Distribution shall be based, as much as possible, on the number and distribution of residents.”

In practice, Palestinian governmental institutions and local councils remain subordinate to a central management system in which decision-making is made at the highest levels. Thus, the legislation delegating authority to local councils and administrative entities mentioned in the three legal texts above and accountability concerning their performance in the governmental framework is moot. A constitution that defines the boundaries between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government and organizes relations among them has not been ratified. Legislation to delegate authority and allow for accountability has not been passed. Community participation is therefore restricted to receiving and executing decisions, without the right to participate in making them. Strengthening the institutional, political, judicial and executive infrastructure of the PNA is a first step toward achieving competent local government, bolstering participation, holding elections, and following professional methodologies in making decisions, planning, and appointing personnel.

4 . Issued on 1 September 2000 by the drafting committee formed by the Central Council in October, 1999.

5 . The Fourth Draft of the Constitution for the Interim Status Stage, a document prepared by the Palestinian Legislative Council and published on 22 January, 1996.

No constitutional provision designates the body or bodies responsible for making development decisions within the PNA. After the PNA arrived in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the only call for the establishment of a development planning council was the Presidential decree issued on 10 January 2000, calling for the establishment of a high development council headed by the President. The decree was issued after the publishing of the “Rokar Report,” which was widely embraced by the donor community. It is difficult to gauge the performance of the development council in light of the lack of information about its activities.

Preparing plans and budgets

There are indicators that point to the absence of a development vision to guide the work of Palestinian governmental and non-governmental organizations. These indicators also highlight a lack of community participation, a recognized and enforceable system of laws, management systems, and ample monitoring provisions and follow-through. The role of the Legislative Council and local councils in creating plans and establishing priorities and distributing budgets is inadequate. Guidance from the Ministries of Finance and Planning is noticeably absent. For example, the Palestinian Development Plan for 1999-2003 was not presented to the PLC for deliberation and approval, and the presentation of the 2001 budget was delayed until five months after the established

October deadline, which is a violation of the third article of the budget law. Also, the year-end budgets for 1998, 1999, and 2000 were never presented. This, of course, assumes that the budget law is a legal framework for the development plan, and requires that the PNA, community development organizations, and donors adhere to it in their work. Community participation, however, in the review of the year-end budget and establishment the general budget was practically nonexistent. The general budget for the financial year 1996-1997 presents an example of flawed development decision-making processes within the PNA. The third article of the law provides that income in the form of grants and foreign aid can be used to fund development initiatives only after “prioritized projects funded by external aid receive Cabinet approval, based on recommendations from the Finance Minister. The aid should be distributed fairly according to sector and geographical distribution.”

In addition, there are several examples of disregard for provisions of the general budget law despite enforcement mechanisms the law provides. For example, the Ministry of Finance is still unable to cover the budgets of ministries and fails to publicize local council budgets, as the law requires. Ministries that do not have budgets fund their activities from loans granted by the Ministry of Finance. The situation is different for other ministries; the

Community awareness of the importance of budgets is still weak

Ministry of Education, for example, has operated with an established annual budget since 1996, covering expenses incurred in the prior period (1994-1996) with Ministry of Finance loans. It is interesting how loans provided by donor countries and other financiers are handled; in most instances, the loans are transferred between donors and the governmental institution without the oversight of the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and without commitment to the provisions of the development plan and the budget law.

Community awareness of the importance of budgets is still weak. Civil society institutions and various interest groups fail to follow up on the preparation of budgets. They do not attempt to influence them in favor of neglected segments of the community, or advocate the importance of investing in sustainable human development.

There is a gap between the stated objectives and what was actually implemented

Section Three: The Relationship of Local Government Councils with the MOLG

The Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) was formed by a decision from the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia on 25 February 1994. The

Ministry was to implement a limited version of a local government structure and to ensure that “local government consists of local councils in the form of municipalities, town councils, and joint service councils that work for the benefit of the residents. Each local committee has an area of jurisdiction within the boundaries of the state”.⁶ The Ministry adopted a general policy based on the following four basic objectives:

1. Advancing the concepts of local government and decentralized management, and to create local government institutions that support the national objective of building Palestinian local communities that embrace democratic elections.
2. Raising the quality of services in the Palestinian rural community to bridge the gap between rural and urban areas.
3. Developing the abilities of local councils.
4. Reviewing the performance of local councils established before the inception of the PNA in order to arrive at a local government vision concurrent with the Palestinian agenda.

Nevertheless, there is a gap between the stated objectives and what was actually implemented.

The recurrence of terms such as centrality, decentralization, and participation in the literature of

6 . The PNA, MOLG, no publication date.

7 . Local Government, Issue 1, September 1999.

8 . See for example: Hasan Al-Araj, Deputy Minister of Local Government; The Development of the Palestinian Local System.

Box (3 - 1): A comprehensive approach to local government

“The MOLG pursues the general goal of developing, uniting, and achieving comprehensiveness in local government and realizing high quality local government, thereby nurturing democracy and the participation of citizens in the building and development process. It is responsible for organizing regional planning and drafting laws and regulations for local councils and developing the councils to the level of securing infrastructure services to all areas.”

Saeb Erekat, Minister of Local Government⁷

local government is interesting⁸, in the absence of a clear context for interpretation. The legal system's references to local government are marked by a high degree of ambiguity. Some officials at the MOLG objected to the phrase “appointing members of local council,” explaining that forming the local councils was accomplished not through “appointment” at President’s orders, but rather through “selection meant to steer the affairs of the residents and with the help of the residents themselves.” The officials also insisted that the terminology represented a middle ground between “election and appointment”.⁹ Regardless of the words used, the phrasing did not agree with any legal texts or with the publicly avowed commitments to decentralization, which were designed to ensure free elections and professional basis for “selection,” or with the concept of community participation. In addition, the Minister of Local Government issued decisions

regarding internal policies that conflicted with the authorities delegated to local councils by law¹⁰. Also, the appointment mechanism revived and strengthened tribal system and favoritism.

It can be said that the circumstances surrounding the inception of the PNA and its failure to implement human development in the broader sense, in addition to the absence a national policy of local government within a comprehensive political vision explains the lack of planning, allotment of funds, and delegation of authorities¹¹.

The Intifada affirmed that implementation of the principles with which most Palestinians agree and which the MOLG supports - decentralization, local and community participation, strengthening of local councils, and others - was and still is a decisive factor in empowering the Palestinian community to resist and develop.

Appointment mechanism revived and strengthened tribal system and favoritism

The legal system's references to local government are disabled by a high degree of ambiguity

9. In an interview with the Local Government magazine, “Erekat confirms the formulation of a national strategy for urban planning that challenges settlement;” Local Government; Issue No. 1, September 1999.

10. Previous reference, pg. 12.

11. Tareq Toqan, Report on Decentralization and Local Government in Palestine; Ramallah, the Independent Commission for Human Rights; May 2001; pg. 23-30 and 35-37.

The Intifada affirmed that decentralization, local and community participation, are decisive factors in empowering the Palestinian community

Box (3 - 2): The Higher Planning Council

The Higher Planning Council and its affiliate bodies are considered vital to the work of local councils. The Council was established by presidential decree issued on 21 August 1995 and is headed by the Minister of Local Government. Council membership comprises representatives from the Ministries of Planning, Public Works, Transport, Housing, Health, Labor, Tourism and Antiquities, Industry, Agriculture, Trade, Culture, and Environment, in addition to the Attorney General, the Jerusalem Custodian, the Chief Engineer, and the general director of Urban Planning at the MOLG. The council works to enforce the modified temporary (Jordanian) Law No. 79 issued in 1966. The council is noted for “centrality, especially in financial affairs¹².” Examining the composition and performance of the council, the absence of community participation is evident, especially considering that the “Jerusalem Custodian” does not actually exist and that the Chief Engineer is the only elected member from the engineering community as per the law. Also, the Executive Council plays a dominant role in formulating planning policies that directly affect the community. Preserving the laws that restrict the role of local councils and their desire to develop, especially those concerning the responsibilities of governors, further strengthened the centrality of the Executive Council and limited community participation. The administrative structures law reinforced centralization and failed to clarify administrative policies. Although Articles 12 and 13 of the law suggest that the authorities of the governor focus on security affairs, Article 15 nonetheless grants the governor authorities that should be delegated to local councils.

12. Consultation Group for Rural Development (ARD Decentralization in Local Government in Palestine; Study of the Opportunities and Possibilities of Implementing Decentralization in Local Government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (draft;) February 2000, pg. 13.

Section Four: Local Government in Practice

The law defines a local council as a financially independent entity, but it does not define its level of independence. In practice, the financial independence of local councils is limited, as will be later shown, and the same applies to the level of administrative independence.

Comparing the condition of local councils under occupation to their condition under the administration of the PNA, a positive change appears. Under the PNA, local councils have been freed from the numerous Israeli policies that worked to weaken their ability to serve the community¹³ and from the unfairness inherent in the Jordanian law. The rise of the PNA protected areas under its control from Israeli settlement expansion, but the PNA, despite its other accomplishments, failed to involve the community in local administration and in development efforts. The PNA did not delegate authority or create mechanisms to enable local councils to fulfill their potential role in the development and administrative processes. Central PNA institutions currently find themselves unable to work harmoniously with local councils and other community institutions and appear increasingly bureaucratic in their outlook and function. The people find

themselves confused as to institutional jurisdiction issues, as authority remains vested in high-level officials and in specific geographical areas, such as Ramallah and Gaza, both according to the law and in terms of actual practice.

An analysis of indicators helps introduce a discussion of the relationship between local councils and the performance of the PNA. Foremost among those indicators is the great discrepancy in living standards between rural areas and urban centers, between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and among the north, center, and south of the West Bank. Also, the status of the council, its relationship with official governmental institutions, its authority, and its source of income as defined by the local councils law of 1997 are important indicators, as is the relationship between living standards and the authority of the council in addressing them. Available information shows that 25% of the West Bank suffers lack of local representation. The percentage varies from the north of the West Bank, and to its center and its south; while 25% of locales in the Jenin district are not represented, only 6% of Ramallah locales are not represented, rising to 44% in Hebron. The same applies to education; 74% of locales in Tobi in the northern West Bank lack elementary schools, compared to 25% in Ramallah, 17% in

The law defines a local council as a financially independent entity

Central PNA institutions currently find themselves unable to work harmoniously with local councils

Great discrepancy in living standards between rural areas and urban centers exists

13. Anthony Cone, Urban Israeli Planning of the Cities of the West Bank--the Law and the Bulldozer in the Service of Jewish Settlement; Palestinian Studies Center; January, 1995. Also see Addendum No. 2 of Military Order No. 418 concerning the urban planning and building code, issued 23 March 1971.

Jerusalem, and 61% in Hebron in the southern West Bank. This situation also applies to water and power utilities.¹⁴ Case studies, which will be presented later, reveal strong correlation between the power of the local council and the power of civil community institutions, meaning that the strength of one also strengthens the other.

Another noteworthy indicator, albeit titular, is that most local councils use the letterhead of the

MOLG, which promotes the perception of the ministry's dominance. Other local councils, especially bigger, richer ones connected politically with decision-makers, do not use Ministry letterhead. Also, the presence of several mayors and local council heads in high-level posts at legislative and executive institutions lends their councils greater weight in political and economic decision-making and in obtaining funding compared to their counterparts.

Box (3 - 3): The relationship of local councils with the MOLG, residents, and project implementation

In a study of the relationship of the MOLG with ten local councils and the residents, it was revealed that meetings with the MOLG usually invite the minister, the deputy minister, the assistant deputy minister and the ministry director. The visits of the minister and the deputy minister differ from the others; while the attendance at meetings of the first two were marked as "several" and "never", attendance of the assistant deputy minister and local council director were marked as "often". As for the Allar Municipality, the assistant deputy minister never visited it, while the local government director visited "often". Local council contact with the residents differs, ranging from periodic meetings to invitations to limited meetings or open meetings with limited objectives. According to polled residents, the best ways to initiate projects are to attend official and non-official meetings, to make continuing requests, and to foster personal relationships with decision-makers. In Turmusayya, the residents believed that "nothing was useful".¹⁵

14 . World Bank 2001 (*Ibid*)

15. From: Nasr Yaqoub, Hussein Al-Araj, and Suheil Khalileh; The Palestinian Experience in Formed Municipalities; Schedule No. 6, Arab Thought Forum, February 2001 (Beit Lahia, Al-Qarara, Tammoun, Al-Sumua, Allar, Burqueen, Aseera Al-Shamalieh, Turmusaa, and Abasan.)

Local councils, as per Article 2 of the law, are obliged to conform to general policy defined by the MOLG and to abide by its financial and administrative supervision. According to the law, the council does not have the authority to represent the interests of the town, directly or indirectly, at the Higher Planning Council, although it must abide by its decisions. As for the relationship with governors, local councils must heed the administrative structures law. Often, the authority of the council and that of the governor entangle, and authority extended local councils is unclear due to the vagueness of governor authority. The administrative structures law, in its form presented to the PLC for a second reading, added to executive centrality by diminishing the role of councils in bolstering community participation in decision-making, shrinking the role previously extended them by the law. The administrative structures law “obliterates the council and strips it of all authority, turning it into an employee of the district”¹⁶. The law diminishes local councils’ authority and prevents them from exercising authority spelled out by the law. The abilities of local councils to play a partnership role in decision-making vary according to council reliance on self-sufficient funding and on its relative influence within the ranks of the executive authority, decision-making powers, and donors.

Some larger municipalities, whose reliance on executive authority ministries, especially the Ministry of Finance, is limited, are able to overcome obstacles that seem insurmountable for smaller municipalities, aided in doing so by their great ability to influence decision-makers and donors, which enables them to avoid complications. On the flip side, smaller, weaker municipalities, especially newer ones, do not enjoy such influence and resources, increasing the gap between them and their bigger counterparts.

Also, the overlapping of the roles of ministries and other institutions regarding their relationship with local councils confuses the latter, causes conflict within the authorities of the ministry itself, and also wastes resources because of the lack of ample coordination.

Financial revenue of local councils

Article 22 of the local councils law defines three sources of revenue for local council income: taxes and fees determined in Palestinian laws, donations and grants, and the budget of the executive authority. However, local councils do not have the authority to collect taxes and fees or determine spending; they are obligated to obtain Ministry approval to do so according to the law. Municipality budgets are subject to the approval of the Minister of Local Government. Articles 8 and 11 of the financial system of local

The law diminishes local councils’ authority

Local councils do not have the authority to collect taxes and fees or determine spending

16. Nasr Yaqoub and Hussein Al-Araj, previously cited reference, pg. 63.

Media, NGOs, and governmental organizations are to spread awareness about development and participation

councils issued on 4 March 1999 provide that the council does not have the authority to amend budget articles without the approval of the Minister. Local councils also do not receive their share (90%) of local property taxes and professional

licensing fees collected by the Ministry of Finance. As for donations, they come from four sources: the residents, residents living abroad, sisterhood projects, and other donors.

Box (3 - 4) : Failure of residents to pay fees

Municipalities suffer budget deficits due to the failure of residents to pay their dues from time to time and from town to town. Before the Intifada, no more than 70% of the people paid their bills, dipping to 30% during the Intifada.¹⁷ The regression is attributed to worsening economic conditions and negligence caused by other factors, such as the belief of some that taxes and fees are not invested into development projects for the benefit of the residents and the dissatisfaction of some with the structure or performance of the municipal council.

Residents and residents living abroad offer monetary donations as well as non-financial contributions, such as land, schoolrooms, clinics and mosques. In a study about municipalities, the researchers urged the municipalities to cooperate with the Ministry of Waqf to regulate mosque building, to decrease the high cost of constructing them and using the

savings to build schools or health centers.¹⁸ Participation is not possible in absence of raised awareness of these issues. It also necessitates diligent work by the media, NGOs, and governmental organizations to spread information about development and participation and its mechanisms.

17 . Meetings with municipality officials.

18. Previous reference, pg. 62.

Box (3 - 5): Community participation

Community participation is a characteristic of the Palestinian local communities, and many of them proved they are able to cooperate in building schools, donating land, and providing funds, equipment and labor. For example, in 1999-2000, the local community in Hebron and the area to its south donated 483 classrooms, compared to 187 offered by the Ministry of Education. In Nablus, the municipality offered 34 classrooms, and a city resident donated \$1 million to build a school, with other donations coming from “education taxes.” Several municipalities in the West Bank collect donations from students at instructions from the Education Ministry as per a Jordanian law that is not implemented in the Gaza Strip. One shekel (less than 25 cents) was collected from every student monthly in Hebron and Nablus. The money collected is used to buy land, maintain buildings and buy equipment. However, the system is not employed uniformly across the West Bank, and everybody needs to exert more effort to raise the standing of education in the territories. Also, official institutions must revitalize the cooperative community spirit among residents, which develops with the belief in belonging and partnership in the responsibilities and rewards of development work.¹⁹

“Twin cities” programs with cities abroad are not a significant source of income, usually restricted to cultural exchange and exchange of

technical expertise. Because most local councils are not involved in these programs, they do not benefit from this resource.²⁰

Box (3 - 6): UNDP Local Rural Development Programme

The philosophy of this program relies on community participation in determining needs, establishing priorities, and planning and execution. To that end, regional planning committees were formed that included representatives from the local community and the MOLG. Community participation covered 17.6% of the cost of 123 projects executed in the West Bank. Communities of 39 villages also participated in determining the development needs of their villages by way of questionnaires.²¹

19. Dag Aarnes, Ibrahim Dakkak, Romi Khoslam, and Amjad Yaaqba; Joint Review of School Infrastructure, Development Programme in the West Bank and Gaza, Commissioned by the Education Sector Working Group; Ramallah/Oslo, 2000; pg. 33.

20. Workshop: The Geographical Relationship of Municipalities in the Bethlehem District with the MOLG and Refugee Camps; Bethlehem, 10, July, 2001.

21. Drafted by LRD - MOLG.

Members and heads of local councils are appointed by the PNA

Assessment of the performance of local councils

In an opinion poll focusing on community participation in the work of local councils, only 21% of those polled believed that local councils involved the community in decision-making, while 56%

thought the opposite (67% in the Gaza Strip). Dissatisfaction with the performance of local councils seems higher in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank.

Table (3-1): Participation in Local Government according to Public Opinion

	West Bank and Gaza	West Bank	Gaza Strip
1. Do you believe that the local council in your community represents more the interests of the residents or the government (PNA)? (Percentages)			
1) Represents the interests of the community	33.6	37.4	27.7
2) Represents the interests of the government	15.6	13.5	18.7
3) Represents the interests of segments or individuals	36.4	36.1	36.8
4) Undecided	14.5	13.0	16.8
2. Does the local council in your community involve residents in making decisions regarding important projects that affect your community? (Percentages)			
1. Yes	20.5	23.6	15.6
2. To an extent	14.5	17.8	9.3
3. No	55.9	48.5	67.5
4. Undecided	5.1	5.0	5.4

A possible explanation for the levels of dissatisfaction indicated by the opinion poll may be that members and heads of local councils are appointed by the PNA, and appointment is reliant more on tribal and factional interests than on the input of the average citizen and is not based on

professional standards. Although no elections were held for local councils as per Law No. 5 for the year 1995 since the inception of the PNA, there is a level of satisfaction with the performance of the PNA in terms of community participation.

Box (3-7): The MOLG and the participation of women

There is some indication that the MOLG is keen to involve women in its operation and in local councils, although only limited participation was achieved, and in general membership, not positions of leadership. The Ministry established the Women's Program in order to involve women in the planning process and its programs and to increase women's membership in local councils. As a result, the number of women in local councils totaled 52, compared to 3,535 men, with one of the women occupying the post of head of the village council of Khirbet Qais in the Salfeet District, which was an unprecedented occurrence.

It should be mentioned that some local councils refuse female participation, basing their rejection on religious and cultural reasons. Also, many councils in the Gaza Strip and in several locales in the West Bank do not have female members. The manner in which women were appointed to local councils was inappropriate and frustrating for many women, because tribal and factional connections superseded merit and the desire to represent neglected segments of society, as there was clear preference to appoint people of certain clans that made up a robust percentage of the local community. Many appointments were made amid disputes and struggles in which women could not engage for social and political reasons. Although men were appointed directly, without the need for consensus and the approval of the Minister of Local Government and the President, women needed the approval of the local council members to become members, and a single objection could result in the rejection of membership. In many instances, women were required to hold elections among themselves to choose a candidate.

Many appointments were made amid disputes and struggles in which women could not engage for social and political reasons

From a practical standpoint, women were faced with obstacles and impossible conditions meant to keep them from becoming members. Some officials play a negative role in appointing women because their interests are connected with those of residents opposed to the idea of involving women. For example, most of the women in the village of Kufr Ein signed a petition demanding that vacant posts at the village council be filled by women they had chosen, but the appointment was never made because several members of the council disapproved and the council director agreed with them. Generally, women's participation remains limited due to the absence of a clear and enforceable decision on the part of concerned PNA institutions.

As for employment, female employees of the Ministry make up 19% of the total workforce, 52% of them working as housekeepers, switchboard operators, and secretaries, with a visible lack of female representation in leadership positions and middle and high administrative posts.²² Most local councils have no female employees.

22. See the statement of the Minister of Local Government on 10 February 1999, in which he said that "work must be done to involve women in the membership of local councils in order to activate the role of women in the Palestinian society." Refer to Local Government, Issues two and three, first year.

In some cases, the conditions of donors do not correspond with the priorities of local communities

There is a need to develop the capabilities of local councils

The role of donors in community participation

Donor countries are the most important source of funding to local councils. In many cases, the councils are restricted to the agendas of the donors themselves. In some cases, the conditions of donors do not correspond with the priorities of local communities. In many instances the donors require the participation of residents in funding projects at a rate of 10%-25% of cost.²³

Government grants, when available, are a source of income for local councils. The grants are few and are not distributed according to the number of residents, the size of the town, or the demonstrated need for it. However, the PNA President, by virtue of his authority, provides support for some local councils based on local or national political considerations²⁴ concerned with protecting certain areas from Israeli settlement expansion or aggression.

A World Bank report²⁵ about the flaws in the donor performance indicates weakness concentrated in four areas:

- Allowing beneficiaries to play a more active role in sustaining projects in addition to involving them in determining their own needs and making them believe that they are part of the

development process.

- The donors did not adequately support the process of developing the capabilities of local councils in order to maintain the pace of progress on existing projects, sustain results, and launch new projects. The same applies to resources.
- The donors should have coordinated their poverty relief efforts and developed a unified strategy.
- The donors overemphasized the funding of projects with tangible results, such as infrastructure, and while these projects are important, they often came at the expense of needed improvements in health and social services.

The problem is not caused only by the factors listed by the World Bank. There are other reasons that play a role in creating the defect, such the difficulty of cooperation between the donors and the recipients due to differences in culture, values, and work style, and the discord in the work mechanisms of the donors themselves and their inability to unify them.

The absence of a unified, consistent legal fabric to govern the various activities of the Palestinian community adds another problem. Matters are further complicated because the PNA failed to adopt standards, which allowed donors to

23. Source: MOLG.

24. Consultation Group for Rural Development (ARD) Decentralization in Local Government in Palestine, a study to examine the chances for implementation of - decentralization in local government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (draft); February 2000, pg. 14.

25. See: The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza-Social Analysis of the Rural Sector within the CDF Framework (unpublished mimeographed draft.)

push their own agendas to the forefront, without heed for Palestinian priorities.²⁶

Section Five: Participation and community development (case studies)

Five local councils were selected as cases representing, to a degree, the patterns of local government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the sample studies do not offer details about similar cases, they do provide important insight about other councils and about local government in general. It was obvious that local councils suffered due to the unclear relationship with the central PNA institutions. Most of them suffered lack of funding and inequity in allocated budgets. Consultation between the public and local councils was limited in all cases, and discrepancy in the ability of councils to make decisions clearly relied on their size, years in operation, experience, managerial and political aptitude, and influence at the level of Palestinian decision-making. Mechanisms of strengthening participation depend

greatly on the effectiveness of local community institutions working in the locale and their influence and ability to move projects. There was no effective framework, in almost every case, to institutionalize the participation of the local community and its organizations in local government, both in terms of consultation and execution. Additionally, women, the segment of society most affected by the work of the councils, were far from represented, and youth and children were ignored to a large extent in the planning and execution of projects. Several Palestinian institutions emphasized the need to integrate the opinions and interests of children in the work of local government councils in order to push forward participation and sustain development.

First: larger councils with influence (Gaza Municipality as a model)²⁷ Gaza City is one of the biggest Palestinian cities, with a population of close to 400,000, 57% of them under the age of 19. The city is renowned for political and hierarchical diversity and population variety. A large majority of its citizens are refugees from 1948 Palestine, and it is home

The PNA failed to adopt clear standards, which allowed donors to push their own agendas

Strengthening participation depends on the effectiveness of local community institutions

Youth and children were ignored to a large extent in the planning and execution of projects

26. The President's Adviser for Economic Affairs, Maher Al-Kurd, said the following, "The economic goals of the international aid program were modest (or realistic from the standpoint of the donors,) limited to rehabilitation of economic conditions to restore them by 1998 (at the end of the five-year interim period) to the indexes of 1987 that preceded the first Intifada.... More than 25% of the funding offered for infrastructure projects was spent on research, as was the case with the housing sector, which received \$110 million, more than half of which spent on studies and consultation. Likewise, half the spending on the production sector went to research and studies, and most of the funding allotted for developing the industrial sector (\$32 million) went to studying industrial zones." Al-Quds, 9 July, 2001. Also see the first part of the study published in Al-Quds on 8 July, 2001.

27. Data about the priorities of children presented in box No. (3-9) and about the Gaza Municipality obtained from a study about children and local council budgets prepared by Nader Said for the Palestinian Children's Secretariat in 2000. The indicated workshops involved 48 children from Gaza and Salfete.

to one refugee camp. The city of Gaza was among the most attractive cities for Palestinian returnees because of the abundance of PNA institutions in it.

The Gaza Municipality receives the largest share of allocated budgets because of its size and because of the power of the municipal council in reaching decision-makers. In 1998, the development budget of Gaza City reached \$14 million.

The municipal council was appointed in 1994 by presidential decree and included personalities that represented the most notable families in the city. Gaza is the center of the PNA and is home to all ministries and PNA councils. Also, many international institutions make headquarters in Gaza City, most notably UNRWA, and the majority of NGOs in the Gaza Strip are concentrated in Gaza City. This leads to many advantages terms of the scope of activities in the city and the potential for interaction among institutions, but lack of focus, weak coordination, conflicting authorities lead to ineffectiveness and waste of resources.

The Gaza Municipality undertook a limited number of activities to involve the community in assessing priorities. Nine meetings were held in 1999 with prominent citizens of the community to discuss problems and determine priorities, and despite the value of the meetings, they are not considered an institutionalized manner of interaction. Also, the majority of the members of neglected segments of society, such

In 1998, the development budget of Gaza City reached \$14 million

Lack of focus, weak coordination, conflicting authorities lead to ineffective and waste of resources

as women, children and youth, have little access the municipality and do not participate in decision-making.

The municipality does not discuss the budget with the residents, instead determining its operating budget internally and development budget with the donors. NGOs have no role in this process.

Second: Councils connected geographically (Bethlehem District municipalities as a model)

Five local councils/municipalities are connected geographically: Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala, Al-Doha, and Al-Khader. Two were recently established: Al-Doha (1996) and Al-Khader (1997). Boards that comprise 62 members and mayors appointed by the MOLG, including seven women, none at Al-Doha, operate municipal councils. The participation of women in this district is noticeably higher than in others, and the councils are geographically responsible, directly or indirectly, for the refugee camps of Dheisheh and Aida.

The municipal councils represent political and tribal factions. Nonetheless, there is a consensus among the residents that decision-making is still internal, and the representatives of the political factions and tribal groups play a large role in affecting the nature and work of the councils. There is as yet no serious effort to involve the community in decision-making, with the exception of one or two councils that coordinate with the residents and community

representatives before making major decisions. Thus, the relationship between council and community varies from council to

council, and despite the presence of many NGOs in the area, they do not try to influence the policies and programs of the councils.

The municipal councils represent political and tribal factions

Box(3 - 8): Selected results of a workshop with mayors and local council members²⁸

Cooperation and coordination among area municipalities is very limited, usually confined to consultation on very specific issues that still require the approval of the MOLG and other concerned parties. The weak levels of cooperation among municipalities are a result of the nature of the residential areas and the way in which they are connected by vague geographic borders that blur the jurisdictional authority of the municipalities. This geographical convergence leads to conflict because of the intertwining of authority among the municipalities and with the responsibilities of UNRWA in refugee camps.

There was not enough coordination among the five municipalities to resolve their problems in the past. However, conditions that emerged in the Intifada prompted the municipalities to renew efforts to coordinate in order to overcome the siege imposed by Israeli authorities. As a result, the municipalities jointly established a solid waste dump and are currently discussing the founding of a cooperative services council after realizing the economic value of such a council and its importance in the provision of services. The project is currently awaiting the completion of cost-profit analyses. Officials of the five municipalities who attended a workshop in Bethlehem expressed interest in the idea of turning the five areas of jurisdiction into one contiguous development area.

Available funding resources are clearly inadequate and cannot support the number and size of governmental institutions providing services in each jurisdiction.

Various groups are engaged in development projects in the five municipalities, some local and some relying on international support. Some of the most visible and active parties in the five areas are the Bethlehem 2000 Project, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), and several ministries and NGOs. Joint ventures between the institutions are rare. Municipal councils establish their budgets individually, without conferring with one another.

Despite the interest expressed by workshop participants in preserving membership in the General Union of Local Councils, most of them considered the achievements of the council limited and felt that the council needed reinvigoration and should provide better representation of the interests of local councils.²⁹

28. Interviews with mayors and a workshop attended by mayors or their representatives. Bethlehem, 10/07/2001

29. Workshop, previously cited reference.

The council has held one meeting with the residents in the past three years

Third: recently-established councils (Tammoun as a model)³⁰ Tammoun is located in the northern West Bank and is under the administration of the Tobas District, but it still relies on scattered administrative and service-related support from Nablus, Jenin, and Tobas. The original Israeli plan for the town was 250 acres, but it has grown well beyond those boundaries to its present size of 1,412.5 acres. The population stands at 11,000 and the town contains 1,900 homes. The Tammoun Municipality was founded in 1997.

- Because of historical neglect of Tammoun, the local council received considerable attention from official PNA representatives as well as from donors, largely because the local council proved able to pressure them. Despite the presence of representative at the PLC, the representative visited the town only once in four years, and none of the town residents occupies an influential post at the PNA. Members of the local council express dissatisfaction with the council relationship with the Ministry, believing that the council heeds only the Minister, not the entire Ministry, and that the nature of the current relationship hinders their ability to work.
- The council has held one meeting with the residents in the past three

years inviting the “prominent” members of the community. The council established a services committee made up of residents and town institutions entrusted with offering opinions about the priorities established by the council. However, the council did not remain true to its agenda during the past three years, and its performance dispirited the residents and convinced them that the services committee was founded at the behest of the donors, not because of any intent to involve them in decision-making. In short, as is the case at many councils, the Tammoun local council does not see the involvement of the residents as a priority at present, especially in light of the lack of institutional mechanisms to guarantee the participation of the community in local government and decision-making. This situation can be partially attributed to the newness of the council and the lack of awareness on the part of its members of this issue.

- Eight NGOs operate in the town with varying levels of productivity, three of them women's groups. Nevertheless, civil society organizations in Tammoun endure many problems, at the heart of which is the sporadic activity of the NGOs, their relative lack of experience and democratic organizational structure, the ambiguous relationship between

30. Data obtained from a study prepared by Nader Said for the World Bank about poverty and rural development (1999) and from Nasr Yaqoub and others (previously cited reference) and a World Bank report (previously cited reference.)

the NGOs and the PNA, and the local council's ambivalent attitude towards the NGOs.

■ The council does not adequately represent the majority of the town citizens. Children, women and youth are not represented in the membership of the council, although women are very active in NGO activity.

■ The council suffers from serious financial problems, with revenue of 603,865 shekels and debts exceeding one million shekels (approximately \$250,000).

Fourth: village councils (Nouba as a model)³¹

■ The village of Nouba is one of 156 residential locales in the Hebron District. Its population is estimated at 4,000 (in 2000), and it is bordered by the villages of Kharas, Beit Oula and Khirbet Hatta.

■ The Nouba Village Council was appointed in 1996 by the MOLG and comprises seven members that almost resigned at the time the Development Studies Programme was conducting fieldwork for this study. The council director and the members work as volunteers, and the director does not receive a salary, which renders him unable to assume his tasks on a full-time basis. The absence of an active village council may have played the biggest role in the deterioration of conditions in the village, the disorganization of programs, and the lack of community

participation.

■ The absence of a local council or any other institution appears in the attempts to influence decision-makers. Part of the negligence is attributed to the isolation of the village and the feeling among the residents that they are neglected because of the small size of their village compared with others.

■ The majority of the residents, including the council members, views the council as part of the PNA and expects it only to provide water and power and collect refuse.

■ NGOs in Nouba play no important role; there are only four such organizations in the village, mostly inactive. According to the participants of a workshop held in the village, negligence in this regard is caused by the intervention of the security apparatus in the work of the NGOs and the refusal to license them for political reasons.

■ Only the heads of families were consulted when the council was formed, and not the rest of the residents.

■ Women in Nouba do not participate in public life and are not represented at the council. Women do not have an organization tending to their affairs or expressing their ambitions. There are no health or education services for women, with the exception of very limited prenatal care. There are also no institutions providing

The absence of an active village council may have played the biggest role in the deterioration of conditions in the village

The majority of the residents, including the council members, views the council as part of the PNA

31. Data and analysis from a study mentioned above (Nader Said, for the benefit of the World Bank.)

***Refugee camps,
with the exception
of a few in the
central Gaza
Strip, have no
councils affiliated
with the PNA***

- services for youth and children.
- There are two kindergartens in Nouba; one operated by a charitable organization and one a private enterprise.
 - Nouba representatives agreed to form a service council to serve the village and others nearby, but implementing the idea was difficult due to tribal conflict and a lack of constructive ministry involvement. However, there is a level of cooperation with neighbor villages in the area of refuse collection services.
 - Nouba does not attract local attention or international funding; it does not lie in the most disadvantaged section of the district (the south), it is not one of the bigger cities that enjoy political influence, and is not home to a strong community capable of placing pressure on decision-makers.
 - **Fifth:** refugee camps (Al-Jalazoan camp as a model)³²
Refugee camps, with the exception of a few in the central Gaza Strip, have no councils affiliated with the PNA, nor do they have internal councils to lead community efforts. Popular committees/service committees are the semi-representative bodies in refugee camps, serving as the counterpart to local councils in cities and villages.
 - Al-Jalazoan camp was established in 1950, northwest of Ramallah. The 8,382 residents (according to UNRWA resources in 2000) of the camp came from 36 villages destroyed in the war of 1948. There are approximately 2,040 families in the camp.
 - The camp is run by a manager appointed by UNRWA who enforces the agency's decisions and programs, upholds the law, and examines the needs of the camp and the concerns of the residents to convey them to UNRWA in the hopes of having them included in the UNRWA annual budget.
 - There are a few active NGOs in the camp that in one way or another follow UNRWA. There is the camp manager's office (UNRWA representative), the public committee (or services committee, which coordinates between UNRWA and the PNA), a youth center, a women's center, the Local Committee for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled, and the Friends of the Elderly Committee.
 - The camp residents express concern about the continuing decline in the level of UNRWA services in all fields. In the field of education, the camp schools are in dire need of renovation, suffering congestion and lack of students' supplies, such as stationery. Another problem is the salary cutbacks endured by new teachers.

32. DSP meeting with the UNRWA office manager at the camp (Mahmoud Radhwan) on Saturday, 23 June 2001, and camp residents.

■ The public committee³³, or services committee, operates in the camp and is considered the cornerstone of potential municipalities or village councils. The committee is comprised of political groups and institutions inside the camp and of prominent residents (15 members, including two women.) The popular committee coordinates with institutions inside and outside the camp to provide services and projects and collect donations to improve the infrastructure. UNRWA established guidelines to organize interaction between the two groups. The guidelines dictate that the camp manager cannot be a member of the popular committee. UNRWA employees are permitted to join the committee as long as it operates within its jurisdictional boundaries. The committee is not allowed to interfere in UNRWA affairs. UNRWA also demands that the UNRWA-appointed manager and his office are the primary coordinators of interaction between the committee and institutions. The agency has recognized the committee and awarded it operating space inside the camp, but the camp residents feel UNRWA is trying to limit the activity of the committee and other institutions in the camp. Some residents expressed concern about possible abuse of power among UNRWA employees and about discrimination between camp residents working at the agency

and non-residents, who hold various positions, which has created an atmosphere of distrust between the residents and the agency. Nonetheless, the relationship is generally cooperative and coordinated on the matter of providing services for the camp.

The popular committee coordinates with institutions inside and outside the camp to provide services and projects

Section Six: General conclusions

- It is clear from the models above that the conditions of local councils vary according to the living standards of the communities that they serve and the ability of civil society institutions to influence funding sources and decision-makers. There is also a disparity in levels of experience, with some councils enjoying long histories while others have only limited expertise as a result of a long period of dormancy under occupation. In addition, establishing a large number of councils without preparation or council member training further widened the performance gap between new councils and older, more experienced ones.
- The scope of public participation in government generally and in local government specifically is narrow. This phenomenon is detected at all levels of Palestinian institutions. It is manifested in a uniform lack of development vision, failure to promote a philosophy of involving the

33. Meeting with popular committees (the camp services committee). The meeting was with four members of the committee, held by DSP on 26 June, 2001. The idea of popular committees was formulated at a conference organized by the MOLG in cooperation with the Refugee Affairs Department at Palestinian camps in Jericho in 1997.

Establishing a large number of councils without preparation or council member training further widened the gap between new councils and older, more experienced ones

Participation levels are linked to the general political and economic conditions

Funding is one of the most important challenges facing local councils

community in bearing the responsibility for development and reaping its rewards, and by the prevalence of overly centralized, ineffective work coordination methods.

- Participation levels are linked to the general political and economic conditions, especially the spread of poverty, which keeps most people busy fending for themselves and renders them often unable to pay dues to local councils.
- Social and cultural restraints dictate the level and nature of participation. The role of women, youth, children and the disadvantaged in the development process and in local government is neglected.
- The centralization of authority in a ministry or minister reinforces the perception that local government councils are obliged to heed ministry officials, not the people, which in turn bolsters the influence of tribal and political factions.
- Funding is one of the most important challenges facing local councils. The income of councils, mostly from taxes and fees, especially for smaller, newly established ones, does not meet their basic needs. The councils suffer meager budgets and insufficient tax revenue. Financial difficulties are attributed to the absence of steady support from the Ministries of Finance and Local Government. The loss of fuel taxes

(an important source of income) and a decrease in the number of citizens who paid their taxes further reduced revenues. (The PNA failed to enforce the law against citizens who refused to pay taxes.) Participants in a workshop about local government held in Bethlehem agreed that solving the financial crisis could be achieved by adopting the following three measures³⁴.

1. Ministry of Finance and MOLG commitment to providing budgets that would enable local councils to provide services.
 2. Restructuring tax collection mechanisms and enforcement measures.
 3. Raising public awareness about the importance of supporting local councils considering their role in providing services and giving the public incentives for community participation.
- The low level of authority extended to local councils and the meagerness of their financial resources are reflected in the living standards of residents. Statistics and studies about the living standards of residents reveal that 43% of the poor live in rural areas, 33% in cities, and 25% in refugee camps.³⁵ Poverty rates in the Jenin area are nine times higher than in Jerusalem and threefold the poverty rates in Ramallah. In general, there is direct correlation between local councils' lack of empowerment and paucity of financial resources on the one hand, and the debilitated

34. Workshop; previously cited reference.

35. See: National Commission for the Alleviation of Poverty; Palestine: Poverty Report, 1998 and data from the PCBS, 2000.

conditions of residents on the other.

■ The situation is different in refugee camps from the prevailing conditions in cities and towns. Camps are locales established after 1948 inside the Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as temporary settlements that in time became permanent. Development, at the planning, organization and management levels, was therefore random to a great degree. Relationships between UNRWA on the one hand and adjacent municipalities and PNA institutions on the other are defined by agreements UNRWA signed with the concerned parties. The agreements provide that the agency is the body responsible for the affairs of the camp with the exception of security and also that the PNA becomes a host country, not entitled to interfere in camp affairs, except security, without prior coordination with UNRWA. Also, no person has the right to intervene in camp affairs or visit it without the consent of UNRWA, even if the camp lies within municipality jurisdiction.

■ Coordination is needed between the camps and adjacent municipalities in several areas, including environmental issues, general rights, and emergency programs to address the current political situation. For example, UNRWA and the Birzeit and Al-Bireh Municipalities cooperated to connect the sewage systems of both cities and also coordinate

concerning real estate deeds and the alleged boundaries of building space outside the camp limits. In addition, personal relations play a major role in defining relations between municipalities. However, municipality support of camps remains nominal, such as spraying pesticides or periodically offering fire department aid. However, politics plays a role in determining interaction with camps and their institutions.

■ Some camps in Gaza (Al-Maghazi, Al-Bureij and Al-Nuseirat) are marked for turning into municipalities offering the full scope of services expected of a city municipality. There are camps inside cities or adjacent to them and others isolated or in rural areas, which is expected to have an effect on future elections in which camp residents participate. It is unclear whether the isolated camps would be treated as separate entities or part of the electoral process within the city.

■ The strength of the local community is connected with the strength of the local council and its ability to convey the needs of the people to concerned authorities. It was also noticed that the weight of the local council is connected with the weight of local institutions and vice versa, because communities that featured capable NGOs also featured capable local councils.

■ Achieving active community participation in the development process and local government requires the fulfillment of five basic requirements³⁶:

There are camps inside cities or adjacent to them and others isolated or in rural areas

36. Workshop; previously cited reference.

Holding periodic PLC and local council elections

Encouraging local community institutions to take on an active role in raising public awareness of the duties and rights of citizenship

1. Holding periodic PLC and local council elections in a free atmosphere.
2. Making the necessary reforms to developing PNA institutions, enabling them to cope with the requisites of sustainable human development. Such development would also give rise to a central authority that possesses the confidence and the ability to relegate authority to local councils.
3. Encouraging local community institutions to take on an active role in raising public awareness of the duties and rights of citizenship.
4. Enacting laws and taking measures to institutionalize participation through periodic meetings of local councils and resident councils and activating the supervisory role of NGOs and the PLC over the work of local councils.
5. Recruiting civil society to form lobby groups to pressure decision-makers in support of NGOs and founding neighborhood committees.

The following letter, written by children from Gaza, and recommendations, prepared by children from Salfeet, expresses the essence of activating participation through local councils.

Box (3 - 9) Recommendations of children regarding local councils

Sustainable human development requires the integration of the needs and interests of children in planning and executing the work of local councils and evaluating them. Several children from the Gaza Strip wrote the following letter about their aspirations regarding the work of local councils concerning participation and development.

“We the children of Palestine...come here, together, to support democracy and women’s rights and to bring joyful life to children where their dreams could come true. We would like to achieve cooperation, solidarity and love. We strive for a better life for all children, poor and rich, by consulting them in democracy and in a community that respects children’s rights.”

In workshops conducted by the children, they asked municipalities for the following:

- * Raising community awareness of the role of local councils.
- * Reinforcing the sense of belonging, cordiality and cooperation among residents.
- * Establishing mechanisms to develop ties between municipalities and the people.
- * Establishing educational, cultural and recreational venues for children, including playgrounds, clubs and kindergartens.
- * Encouraging creativity among children by paying attention to artistic and literary activities.
- * Establishing programs to help poor children.
- * Training municipality members and staff to be more sensitive to the needs of children and ways of dealing with them.
- * Avoiding discrimination among residents³⁷.

37. The National Children’s Secretariat has a group of 40 children and youth working closely with local councils.

Chapter Four:

Education and Human Development

Forward

Section One : Education in the Palestinian Context.

Section Two : General Education (1 - 12 Grades).

Section Three : Higher Education.

Section Four : General Conclusions.

A letter from a Palestinian child to the world:

“Sir, I have a grandmother whose diary has collected layers of dust and whose yellowed papers were eaten by moths, as if they were trying to delete some of what my grandmother has witnessed over the years. I rifled through the pages, my eyes racing to read what her shaking hands wrote. While I flipped the pages questions nibbled on my mind, ‘Why, why is my grandmother Palestinian? Why is my father Arab? Why is that man black? Why am I female? The repetition of the questions made me feel grief for the discrimination that my grandmother endured. The world seems to be in the hands of a great dictator, saying to those not to his liking or from a different ethnicity or color or religion, ‘Go to the valley, go the abyss and dive into the depths of the world, for that is the place of servants,’ and to his own people, ‘Ladies and gentlemen, climb onto the magical carpet so I can take you to my palaces, for that is the place of the masters.’ My God! Do you enjoy seeing humiliation in the eyes of people or when you see civilizations and cultures and peoples wither! All that to maintain your name held high and known to all. What is the fault of an Arab created by God as such or a Negro made black by God? What is the fault of a woman created female? Are we not all from mud?

What if the scales of the world were turned and males became female, whites black, and Arabs European? Perhaps after such an inversion people’s dignity would be restored and people would feel human, or maybe the oppressed would seize the chance to take revenge on those that oppressed them, and history would cycle again. I see, Sir, that there is no answer to the questions, or even to the problem of discrimination, unless mercy and humanity defeated the love of domination and humiliation and our vision became so acute as to see the insides of people and their emotions and grow to respect them. Why not instill this principle in our old before the young so that we may be their example, and we could construct a safe community whose personality is coined to shy away from war and its destructive results.”

Nour Jihad, 15 year old

Foreword¹

The experiences of many nations under various circumstances have shown that education is one of the main pillars of progress. The connection between education and human development depends on the specificity of each nation, but there are some general bases and common denominators.

First: Education has become a necessity, much like food, shelter, health, and work. Therefore, affording suitable education opportunities has become a community priority in which governments, institutions, groups and individuals cooperate.

Second: The availability of qualified human resources is important for economic development in any community or country. It relies on the condition of the country in terms of natural resources, geographical location, the relative competition in economic sectors, and the heritage and interests of the country.

Third: Education, in the inclusive sense, shapes the identity and culture of the community and guarantees the protection of the identity and the continuation of culture. Culture is the element that

distinguishes a community from others and connects communities with one another.

Fourth: The increasing connectivity of the various parts of the world has created international standards that no educational system can ignore. There are deep and intertwined circumstances introduced by globalization and its effects of economic and cultural dominance; therefore, an educational system must keep abreast of rapid changes and embrace modernization.

Fifth: Globalization has led to a deep educational crisis for countries with limited income, with potentially catastrophic implications. Such countries need competent human resources to achieve prosperity but lack the basic foundations and practical mechanisms to establish a sustainable education system capable of producing an educated citizenry. The crisis is all the more difficult to escape because the cost of education, especially higher education, has come to be connected with the international economy. The budgets that poor countries can allocate to education remain at the level of local economy, far lower than the international economic level.

Education is one of the main pillars of development

Globalization has led to a deep educational crisis for countries with limited income

1 . Parts of this chapter have been published in specialized journals by Ramzi Rihan, the principal author, and forwarded to governmental and non-governmental organizations.

Statistics indicate that the Palestinian education sector would continue to be a huge one requiring attention

The educational challenge in Palestine is qualitative and quantitative

Section One: Education in the Palestinian Context

The state of Palestine, regardless of what its final borders will be, is small and limited in natural assets. Its people are its primary resource, which renders demographic data highly important. Accurate information in that regard is now available and forecasts have become possible after the population census was conducted at the end of 1997. The results of the census registered the population of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip at about 2.9 million.² The population is estimated to reach 4.9 million by 2010, 6.7 million by 2020, and 7.4 million by 2025.³ The predictions indicate that increases in the population may be among the top challenges facing Palestine, but at the same time indicate that the human resources necessary for progress would be available, provided that suitable economic and social strategies are implemented. Human beings are simultaneously producers and consumers. Reaching equilibrium between production and consumption is a vital precondition for political stability based on a firm economic and social foundation that guarantees growth and sustainability.

Among the population issues directly connected to sustainable

human development are the low average age of the population due to high fertility rates and the continuing migration of young adults in search of employment. Population between the ages 5-19 (school age) made up 39% of the population in 1997 and the percentage is expected to decrease slowly to reach 38% in 2010 and 35% in 2025⁴. Statistics indicate that the Palestinian education sector will assume enormous dimensions, requiring the attention of the state for at least a full generation. The growth of the education sector embodies the population challenge in both its aspects: providing the necessary resources to educate such a large population, and laying the basic foundations for development and prosperity by developing a modern education system. Education is a community investment in human resources whose benefits are not only economic, but also cultural and social. The educational challenge in Palestine is both qualitative and quantitative.

The situation in Palestine is complicated by a convergence of several problems. The failure of political negotiations after an entire decade had discouraging effects on the organizational and planning activities of the Palestinians. The long years of waiting dashed many of the aspirations that Palestinians had come to hold at the peak of the first Intifada, which was a reaction to attempts to destroy the Palestinian existence through

2 . See: Final Census Results, summary; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 30 November 1998.

3 . Population in Palestinian Territories, 1997-2025; PCBS, September 1999.

4 . Previous reference.

occupation. The unstable conditions, embodied in the intermingling of interim and permanent status solutions, intensified the conflict between meeting immediate needs and working toward future goals.

The rise of unemployment is one of the primary examples of the contradiction of priorities. The crisis was relieved to an extent by broadening employment in the public sector and by rising enrollment in higher education institutions. The first phenomenon led to decreased productivity and higher production costs in the public sector, with salaries consuming almost 60% of the PNA budget, a burden that cannot be borne in the long-run. As for the second phenomenon of rising university enrollments, it can lead to deferred unemployment with effects that may be far worse than those of current unemployment levels.

The Palestinian economy is a problem that has evaded solution for many years. For half a century it has relied on external sources of income, making it feeble and highly prone to instability. At the beginning of the 1950s, the UN established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Soon after, employment in the Gulf States became available. With the Israeli occupation of 1967, work in Israel became a primary source of income, and Arab aid provided via

the Jordanian - Palestinian Committee supported many vital projects. Other international aid began to flow into Palestine after the establishment of the PNA. The PNA was entrusted with responsibilities that outweighed its abilities in many economic sectors. The excessive reliance of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy made it structurally unstable. Also, land confiscation and control of water sources deprived the Palestinians of a large portion of the few natural resources they possessed.

The intermingling of interim and permanent status solutions, intensified the conflict between meeting immediate and lory-term needs

Section Two: General Education

The primary education sector in Palestine is relatively large and is continually growing. The number of students in the West Bank and Gaza in the year 1967-68, the beginning of occupation, was close to 220,000. When the PNA assumed responsibility for the education sector at the beginning of the scholastic year 1994-1995, the number had climbed to 650,000, tripling in 27 years. The number of students at present is about one million, and is expected to reach one and a half million in ten years.⁵

The number of students at present is about one million

Schools are categorized according to the supervising body as governmental, private, or UNRWA. The situation is different in Jerusalem, which has schools

5 . See: a) Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, No. 19, PCBS. b) Annual Statistics Education 1994-1995; PCBS and Ministry of Education, September 1995. c) Five-year Education Development Plan, Palestinian Ministry of Education, September 2001. d) Predictions of General Education in Palestine 1999-2000 to 2009-2010, PCBS, December 1999.

officially operated by the Islamic Waqf Directorate, although they are connected with the Palestinian Ministry of Education. Others are operated by the Jerusalem Municipality or the Israeli Education Department. Some

private schools also operate kindergartens, but demand is low due to the fact that kindergarten lays outside the official education sector, although enrollment is constantly rising. There are boys' schools, girls' schools, and coed schools.

Table (4-1): Number of students in schools and kindergartens according to area

Area and school year	Kindergartens	Schools		
		Primary*	Secondary	Total
Palestinian territories				
1994-1995	36,829	572,529	45,339	654,697
2000-2001	69,247**	830,765	76,363	976,375
West Bank				
1994-1995	35,768	355,269	27,678	418,715
2000-2001	46,728	495,364	45,484	587,576
Gaza Strip				
1994-1995	1,061	217,260	17,661	235,982
2000-2001	22,519	335,401	30,879	388,799

* Primary level comprises grades one through ten; secondary level comprises grades 11 and 12.

** The number of kindergarten pupils increased to 77,402 in 1999-2000 then decreased the following year due to security and economic reasons.

Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Book (2) November 2001, PCBS.

In ten years, 75% of all children are expected to complete grade twelve

No substantial discrepancies are detected between the enrollment of males and females of school age

The continuing increase in the number of students is attributable to two factors: first, high fertility rates and the resulting low average age of the population, as mentioned earlier; and second, the constant increase in demand for education.

In the 1970s, roughly half of all children attended school through basic education, and one-third remained to complete secondary level. Today, enrollment in the middle years is almost at 100% and

more than half of Palestinian children complete grade twelve. In ten years, 75% of all children are expected to complete grade twelve.

It is worth mentioning that no substantial discrepancies are detected between the enrollment of males and females of school age, with male students making up 50.1% of the student base for the scholastic year 2000-2001 and female students 49.9%. The number of female students exceeded the number of male students in the secondary level,

which is a worrisome indicator, attributed partly to the trend of school abandonment (dropping out) among male students in the secondary level (16 years and older,) most probably in order to accept menial jobs in light of the economic crisis.

It is interesting to note the high rate of kindergarten enrollment, especially in Gaza. It serves as a potential indicator of radical social changes in the development of educational aspirations and awareness in the family, the regression of extended family, which previously was a primary source of childcare, and the increasing number of working mothers. The time is now for kindergartens to be brought into

the core of official Palestinian educational planning.

Undoubtedly, the growth in the size of the primary education sector will gradually decrease with a decrease in fertility rates and total enrollment of the school age population, but both of these elements will not come into play before 2010. Therefore, contending with the size of Palestinian educational needs, which is a problem and an opportunity at one and the same time, will remain a challenge for at least another decade. In addition, the number of returnees may not match the prediction upon which assessments were made, which poses an unknown element that may confuse expectations and impede implementation of plans.

Table (4- 2): Number of Kindergartens and Schools in 2000-2001

Area and school year	Kindergartens	Schools		
		Primary*	Secondary	Total
Palestinian territories				
1994-1995	436	1,141	333	1910
2000-2001	811	1,316	519	2,646
West Bank				
1994-1995	423	842	294	1,559
2000-2001	596	967	448	2,011
Gaza Strip				
1994-1995	13	299	39	351
2000-2001	215	349	71	635

Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Book (2) November 2001, PCBS.

This unprecedented demand for education carries some negative effects; overcrowding in schools is much too high for a sound education process to be

maintained. More than 100 schools employ a two-shift system. There are also a number of schools housed in unsuitable buildings. This situation is a leftover from occupation, which did not tend to

Table (4-3): Average Number of Students per Classroom

Level	Supervising body		Private	General average
	Government	UNRWA*		
Kindergarten				
1994-1995	-	-	28.6	28.6
2000-2001	11**	-	25.0	25.0
Primary				
1994-1995	35.9	43.6	27.8	37.1
2000-2001	36.1	46.1***	25.6	37.3
Secondary				
1994-1995	31.9	-	19.6	30.2
2000-2001	31.5	-	17.7	30.2

* UNRWA schools offer only primary level education.

** One governmental kindergarten.

*** The average number of students per classroom at UNRWA schools in 1999-2001 reached 47.7.

Source: previously cited under table 1.

build schools or hire teachers.

Tables 2 and 3 show that the number of schools, which increases by 100 each year, has not been able to cope with the increasing number of students.

While conditions improved at private schools, which require high tuition, governmental schools remained as is and conditions at UNRWA schools worsened, with congestion reaching levels unacceptable under any set of standards.

Table (4 - 4): Ratio of Students to Teachers

	Kindergartens	Schools*	Total
Aggregate			
1994-1995	1,211	19,843	21,054
2000-2001	2,743	32,502	35,245
Governmental			
1994-1995	-	13,533	13,533
2000-2001	3	22,953	22,956
UNRWA			
1994-1995	-	4,370	4,370
2000-2001	-	6,129	6,129
Private			
1994-1995	1,211	1,940	3,151
2000-2001	2,740	3,420	6,160

*Comprise grades one through twelve.
Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Log (2) November 2001, PCBS.

The numbers of teachers and the ratio of students to teachers portray a better picture than the actual conditions in overcrowded classrooms. The situation improved slightly in kindergartens

and private and governmental schools, but regressed to an extent at UNRWA schools. There are complaints among teachers regarding low wages, especially at governmental schools, where salaries average \$350 per month, forcing many to take second jobs to increase income.

There are complaints among teachers regarding low wages, especially at governmental schools

Table 4-5: Ratio of Students to Teachers

Area and school year	Governmental	UNRWA kindergarten	Private	Private	Total
Palestinian territories					
1994-1995	39.9	36.9	19.5	30.5	31.1
2000-2001	26.8	37.9*	17.3	25.2	27.7
West Bank					
1994-1995	29.9	32.9	19.1	30.3	28.9
2000-2001	25.4	33.7	17.2	25.3	24.9
Gaza Strip					
1994-1995	34.0	38.7	25.4	33.2	36.0
2000-2001	30.7	39.5	18.0	25.1	33.3

The student -to-teacher ratio at UNRWA schools registered 39.5:1 in 1999-2000.
Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Log (2) November 2001, PCBS.

There are serious efforts underway to improve education

The conditions and trends illustrated in these tables may cause the education process to become a passing or trivial matter in the lives of students and teachers. It is impossible to predetermine the thin line between marginal improvement and collapse. The real danger may lie in the direction that seems to enjoy the widest backing on the political front, which is to allow the quality of the educational system to deteriorate to an unsalvageable level. Despite this grim possibility, there are serious efforts underway to improve education.

The handing of full responsibility for maintenance of the education sector to the Palestinians in August 1994 was a major turning point that occurred with unexpected speed. The Palestinians were informed

that the responsibility was in their hands only a month before it was handed over, and the 1994-1995 scholastic year began three days after the transfer. The transfer was pulled off without a hitch, although the Israelis held back some information and files. The entire process came immediately on the heels of the Intifada and its disruption of attendance, which had left the educational system in a state of chaos. Added to that are the results of negligence of the sector by occupation authorities over many years.

Palestinian curricula

West Bank schools used to employ Jordanian school curricula and Gaza schools featured Egyptian curricula. It was important to eradicate the duality and establish Palestinian curricula designed to create a united

Palestinian identity and distinguished culture, especially with the return of many Palestinian students of different ages, grades, and educational backgrounds. The issue was raised at a conference held in 1990 under the auspices of UNESCO, and The Palestinian Curriculum Development Center was established in 1995. The curriculum plan was realized in 1995 and work is underway on finishing details, composing textbooks, and training teachers.⁶ New curricula were taught in the first and sixth grades beginning in the scholastic year 2000-2001 and the second and seventh grades in 2001-2002. Implementation will continue to include additional grades every year until completion in 2004-2005.

According to the Palestinian curriculum plan, curricula will be harmonized in all Palestinian schools. The plan divides study years into two parts: primary, from first to tenth grades, and secondary, which comprises grades 11 and 12. The primary level is in turn divided into two stages, lower primary, grades one through four, and higher primary, from fifth to tenth grades. The three stages have been assigned the titles preparation, empowerment, and initiation, respectively, which seem to be quite expressive and suitable should their implications be truly achieved.

As for the primary stage, the National Education Committee introduced the subject of social sciences and created a subject called

national education for grades one through nine. These are positive developments that may help the education system improve its citizens' ability to push forward the wheels of social progress. Technology and applied sciences are taught from the fifth grade until the eleventh, which is an important step in facilitating a trend toward vocational and technical education, which will be discussed later. Also, one class period per week is reserved for free activity, which agrees with the evident tendency toward decentralized management in schools and allows students and teachers an opportunity to be creative. Arts and crafts are taught in the primary level, focusing attention on a field that has until recently suffered utter neglect. One elective subject is offered in the empowerment stage (grades five through ten,) which could be a third language (English is taught in all schools beginning in grade one), home economics, health sciences or environmental sciences. A variety of technical classes are offered in tenth grade from which the student must choose two. The classes are agronomy, industrial sciences, management, and tourism sciences.

The methods of the plan seem sound and its objectives positive, because it expands and modernizes study subjects and allows for a degree of flexibility, but at the core it relies on the traditional method of rote memorization more than on developing skills. This weakness starts in the first grade, considered the foundation.

The Palestinian Curriculum Development Center was established in 1995

curricula will be harmonized in all Palestinian schools

6 . See: The First Palestinian Curriculum Plan; General Administration of Educational Curricula, Ministry of Education, July 1999.

It is no longer possible to deal with children as objects

Box (4 - 1) First grade curriculum

The first grade curriculum contains 30 classes per week distributed as follows: Arabic Language (eight classes), Mathematics (five), Islamic Teachings, English Language and General Sciences (three each), Social Sciences and National Education, Arts and Crafts, and Physical Education (two each), Civil Education and free activity (one each). This curriculum was born from purely academic thinking that fails to understand the nature of a child when he/she joins school. It neglects the student's mental needs, abilities, and interests. It also fails to address the level of professional competence with which the curriculum should be implemented. Finally, it perpetuates the deeply rooted traditional approach that considers a child an empty pot to be filled with dictated information and tested on the ability to memorize information.

It is important, then, to delve deeper into the issue of education and raise questions that have yet to receive proper attention at the official level in Palestine. The first question concerns the educational philosophy at the lower stages of schooling, because everything that follows relies on it. Social changes have made children primary, dynamic participants in the education process, and it is no longer possible to deal with children as objects whose abilities are limited to reaction, without the capacity for action. This change poses a challenge to educators and parents and is the foundation on which to raise a generation able to handle changes.

The most important change concerns the lower stages of schooling and requires redefining

their mission from one of conveying information to one of personal development and social upbringing of children. It means that the learning and teaching process must change from a unilateral process in which the teacher is the only party with direct influence to a joint venture based on the interaction of teacher and pupil. While the change means delaying the delivery of some information to the child in the first years of study, he or she will be better equipped and more highly motivated to learn in later years, resulting in an information and skill base at the end of schooling superior to the one achieved at present. Consequently, the proposed change reorganizes priorities in a manner that would lead to a more effective investment over the years of growth.⁷

7 . This direction is presented with better detail in: Ramzi Rihan; Contemplation of Palestinian Education in the 21st Century; The Inaugural Five-year Education Development Plan for the Period 2000-2004, first edition, Ministry of Education, July 1999.

Box (4 - 2) The new curricula and discrimination against women

Analysis of textbooks for the first and sixth grades, prepared by the Palestinian Ministry of Education for the first time in the history of Palestine, revealed that they are still models of discrimination against women.

- Jobs held by women are extremely limited and considered secondary compared to those reserved for men. The sixth-grade Arabic language book mentions one job for women, besides that of being a mother, by mentioning educator Sameera Azzam, and only once. Men are allotted more than 40 jobs, including educator, inventor, discoverer, physician, athlete, governor, and farmer. The book mentions no fewer than 70 "great" men.
- Activities and hobbies connected with women were connected with a woman's place in the home. Women are said to make the food, clean, sew, knit, and supervise the study of the children, while men are portrayed as politicians, presidents, artists, and athletes. In Jordanian curricula, women are mentioned as part of the audience at athletic events, while the Palestinian curricula omitted even that part, detaching women from any sports activity or one connected with movement, even from a strictly scientific perspective. Science books contain no pictures, examples, or experiences connected with the matter.
- Women are shown with head cover and long gown, and nowhere do they appear wearing anything different.
- The percentage of mentioning male personalities is far greater than that of mentioning female personalities in all the books. Mathematics books were ranked the worst in this regard, followed by science and Arabic language. Compared with Jordanian textbooks, the percentage of mentioning male personalities is much higher in Palestinian books.
- The Arabic language was adapted in some textbooks, such as Arabic language, science, and civil education, to be used in a neutral manner that avoids discrimination, using personal forms (we draw, I read, we think) or passive forms. Other books, such as mathematics, technology, and arts continue to use masculine imperative forms, indicating that discrimination still exists.⁸

As for the secondary stage plan, one of its features is that it divides the stage into two tracks, academic, and vocational/technical. The academic stage contains basic requirements and

three science subjects (physics, chemistry, and biology), of which the student must choose two, and three literary subjects (economics and management, history, and geography), of which the student

8 . From an unpublished study by Tafida Jarbawi about curricula and gender, 2001.

**Only one-quarter
of students enroll
in the scientific
track at present**

must select two. The academic track is completed with the secondary school final examinations, tawjihi, at the end of 12th grade. The plan cancels the division of the academic track into scientific and literary tracks, which is a positive development because

the division has become vertical instead of horizontal and because many considered the scientific track superior. It should be mentioned that only one-quarter of students enroll in the scientific track at present.

Box (4 - 3) Electives and the true freedom of choice

There are conditions that must be met to guarantee that students are able to choose elective courses in the 11th and 12th grades in a manner that would not make the philosophy backfire. Schools must be improved from the scientific and logistical perspectives to accommodate many class branches according to the choices the students make, and students must be properly counseled in 10th grade when they are making the choices. As an example, it is expected that only a few students would choose Physics, which means that an insufficient number of competent educators would be available at the higher education level to teach Engineering, Technology, and precise sciences. The result of advanced curricula would then be regression in the human resources necessary for economic development in Palestine. Also, the discrepancy in resources from one location to another may affect the availability of resources necessary to allow students the freedom of choice, especially in disadvantaged and neglected areas where qualified teachers are scarce, which would further increase hierarchy in society.

The questions discussed above have prompted reconsideration of the Palestinian curriculum plan. Work is now underway at the Ministry to issue an addendum that contains some changes to the original plan. One of the main changes expected is the return to the system of scientific and artistic tracks, which could be viewed as a step in the wrong direction. This, however, does not deny that the plan was ambitious. The problem lies not in the objectives of the plan, but in determining the timeframe required to implement it. It has become clear that the original plans, both qualitative and

quantitative, require far more time than was initially calculated, for three reasons: self-imposed difficulties intrinsic in any radical change process, limited human and financial resources, and the continually deteriorating conditions since the original plan was conceived.

At the same time, textbooks that were used in the "curriculum enrichment program" are improved based on the remarks of teachers who have used them. The first edition of any book is considered a first trial edition and the second a second trial edition. Hence,

textbooks will undergo two stages of editing in addition to the vast process of deliberation and review that they enjoy when first published.

Despite many justified criticisms that could be targeted at curricula and textbooks, they deserve appreciation. The reason is twofold: first, the curricula and books proved to be of good-not excellent-quality, although they were created in a short time and with limited resources and experience. Second, the curricula and books could be seen from a dynamic perspective in that they continually interact with changes instead of being rigid.

Vocational education and training

Vocational and technical education and training represents a qualitative step forward in Palestinian educational thinking.⁹ The Ministries of Education, Labor, and Higher Education, and other parties participated in planning for this track. Bureaucratic barriers were overcome to shed needed light on the issue, which enriched discussion and achieved a comprehensive vision. This track comes as the natural result of the size of the population and the educational and economic standing in Palestine. Population growth and the increasing demand for education make the steady tendency toward the academic track a cause for imbalance in Palestinian society. The centrality

of human resources and the scarcity of natural assets in Palestine position vocational and technical skills as an integral part of economic development.

Several characteristics distinguish the vocational and technical education and training plan. Students join the track after finishing 10th grade, and tutelage is offered in the form of complementary units, which allow for flexibility and quick change according to need, in addition to encouraging rehabilitation when needed. The curriculum offers training based on a connection to domestic industries, and students receive a diploma when finishing secondary school after two years or two and a half. The track offers closed programs that do not allow for continuing official studies and open ones that permit students to go on to vocational and technical colleges. A goal was set of raising attendance in the vocational track from the current rate of 3% to a rate of 7% by 2004-2005.

Despite many justified criticisms that could be targeted at curricula and textbooks, they deserve appreciation

Vocational and technical education and training represents a qualitative step forward in Palestinian educational thinking

The Five-year Education Development Plan

The Ministry of Education constructed a five-year comprehensive development plan that stretches from 2000-2001 to 2004-2005.¹⁰ The plan targeted five main areas for development:

The Ministry of Education constructed a five-year comprehensive development plan

1. Raising enrollment to about 74% in the secondary stage by the year 2004, building new schools, and

10 . Five-year Education Development Plan, 2000-2001 to 2004-2005, Ministry of Education, October 1999.

Lack of necessary resources is not the only obstruction to developing the education sector

The quantitative requirements of the plan are enormous

- cancelling the two-shift system.
- 2. Improving the quality of education by implementing the new curricula in full by 2004-2005, increasing the number of teachers, decreasing the number of students per classroom, and renewing school furniture and equipment.
- 3. Developing formal and informal education. This includes enacting the education law, developing technical and administrative aspects of school management, encouraging preschool education, and expanding vocational and technical education.
- 4. Developing managerial skills, which include planning, management, finance, and striving for a decentralized educational system.
- 5. Developing human resources in the education system by improving programs to train teachers before and during service.

The quantitative requirements of the plan are enormous, although the objectives are reasonable. In the governmental sector alone, without UNRWA and private schools, the objectives mean that the number of students from 1998-1999 to 2004-2005 would increase by 43%, and would require a 61% increase in the number of teachers and 67% more classrooms. Costs for implementing the plan were estimated at \$1.9 billion, including \$1.4 billion in operating expenses, mostly salaries, and the remaining \$0.5 billion for capital expenses,

mostly buildings. This requires that the Ministry of Education budget for the year 1999-2000 be twice what it was for the previous year and doubled again for the year 2004-2005, reaching \$480 million, close to 10% of the GNP.

The plan was proposed and discussed at an international conference on education held in Ramallah on 20-21 October 1999, when it was determined that the funding requirements of the plan were impossible to achieve. Therefore, the Ministry of Education began reviewing and reassessing the plan within the framework of comprehensive development. The reassessment included examining all possible alternatives and studying the cost-benefit analysis of each element in the immediate and long-term ranges, and an amended plan was published in September 2001. The amended plan clung to the principal bases and general guidelines of the original but decreased the desired percentage of enrollment in the secondary level in 2004 to 68%, ruled out the option of doing away with the two-shift system, and reduced some activities. The necessary budget dropped to \$1.5 billion, including \$1.2 billion in operating expenses. The amended plan was slated to be unveiled at a second international conference, but the political situation did not allow it, and the plan was temporarily suspended.

The distinguished professionalism that marked the planning process at the Ministry of Education, be it in

determining priorities, setting goals, or calculating quantities, deserves recognition and praise. However, the deterioration of economic conditions in Palestine, with the rise in unemployment, the spread of poverty, and the destruction of infrastructure and businesses, looms heavily over the possibility of realizing the amended plan. The conditions that have been nothing less than abysmal for over a year require enormous resources for rebuilding and will increase the competition between meeting immediate needs and achieving educational goals. The education sector, by virtue of its size, is the first candidate among sectors that will not receive development funding at the current stage.

The education sector has suffered directly from the lack of security in Palestinian daily life. One hundred fifty schoolchildren have been killed and 148 school buildings hit with Israeli rockets. It has become extremely difficult and dangerous for students and teachers to reach school on a daily basis due to the hundreds of military checkpoints on roads. In 1994, the Palestinians constructed a strategic plan to rebuild and develop the education sector as well as many other sectors, but the current crisis dealt that plan a severe blow, jolting it backwards in many respects. Consequently, preventing further deterioration and reconstruction of the sector have become critical priorities, which will necessarily delay further development.

Lack of necessary resources is not the only obstruction to developing the education sector in Palestine. The human factor is no less significant, as it is the focal point of any radical change. The education outlook prevalent in Palestine is characterized by traditional ways of thinking. The Ministry of Education is engaged in several endeavors, including preparing curricula, training teachers, and building schools, and has recently been very active in training teachers and other educators, to improve their professional skills. However, the Palestinian education system is still blemished by authoritarianism in a community controlled by hierarchical relationships, with team-based, interactive relationships still noticeably weak. The Palestinian educational system desperately needs a clear vision that can adapt to the current situation and meet the challenges of a new century.

The deterioration of economic conditions looms heavily over the possibility of realizing the amended plan

Palestinian education system is still blemished by authoritarianism

Section Three

Higher Education and Development¹¹

The Palestinian higher education sector has grown at a very high rate during the past two decades, particularly in the past five years. Statistics compiled at the end of September 1997¹² indicate that 41% of people with baccalaureate degrees obtained them from Palestinian universities, 46% from

The Palestinian higher education sector has grown at a very high rate during the past two decades

11. In 2002, the Ministry of Higher Education formally became an integral part of the Ministry of Education.

12 . See final results of the census; Summary, PCBS, 30 November 1998.

other Arab universities, and 13% from international universities. Statistics also show that 18% of people age 25-44 have finished high school and that about 36% of those who finished high school are specialized in scientific fields (6% of the total age group in question). An indicator of the trend towards enrollment in literary and human-interest fields, just as in the case of high school, is that only one-quarter of students at Palestinian universities major in scientific fields. In recent years, overall enrollment levels in higher education in Palestine have noticeably increased.

Important achievements for the Palestinian higher education sector:

Establishing universities in the shadow of occupation speaks to the ability of the Palestinians to succeed under the most taxing of conditions. This raises their self-esteem, contributes to producing political, social and economic leaders, and attracts human and financial resources to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The biggest accomplishment was graduating students on a scale that exceeded expectations. According to the results of the general census in the West Bank and Gaza, conducted in December 1997, the numbers of people obtaining post-secondary degrees were as follows (Jerusalem excluded)¹³:

- Diploma degrees (two years college): 72,000, including 51,000 (71%) from Palestinian

institutions.

Bachelor Degrees: 66,000, including 27,000 (41%) from ■ Palestinian institutions.

Graduate education degrees: 6,100, including 1,000 (14%) ■ from Palestinian institutions.

Clearly, Palestinian institutions have supplied the Palestinian community with a substantial percentage of university graduates. It is not an exaggeration to say that without an educated citizenry, the Palestinian economy, with its public, private, and civic sectors, could not have faced the situation that arose after the inception of the PNA nor successfully managed the responsibilities and opportunities that emerged. There is no doubt that the percentage of people choosing to pursue higher education locally compared to those who choose to go abroad is increasing, which means Palestine is steadily stepping in the direction of developed or moderately developed countries, where most students enroll in local institutions. This positive change increases the status of Palestinian higher learning institutions and posits on them the responsibility of upholding international educational standards of vision, content, and quality.

As for females, the number of higher education degrees awarded, regardless of the place of study, equals 58% of those awarded to men, but the gender gap rate is decreasing among younger segments of the population (under

13 . Previous source

age 30) and will perhaps disappear entirely in time. Undoubtedly, the greater availability of local higher education opportunities encouraged more women to continue their studies. The distribution of graduates among the various fields of study reveals some imbalance, with less than one-third of higher education graduates specializing in scientific fields (natural sciences, mathematics, computer sciences, medical professions, engineering and agronomy). Palestinian higher education institutions have contributed to increasing the number of graduates in social sciences and other art fields due to the ease of establishing these programs compared with scientific programs. Perhaps the biggest gap in the Palestinian higher education sector is the overall lack of

technical education opportunities, which remain extremely limited.

Students are still choosing Palestinian universities in growing numbers. Annual increases in the numbers of matriculating students average 8,000, and the aggregate number of university students jumped from 28,000 in 1994-1995 to more than 75,000 in 2000-2001, expected to top 130,000 by 2009-2010 if growth holds steady. The general impression among many professionals in the higher education field is that rapid and sustained enrollment increases have negatively affected the sector. By comparison, the number of students at community colleges rose slightly in the same period, from 4,000 to 5,000.

The gender gap rate is decreasing among younger segments of the population

The biggest gap in the Palestinian higher education sector is the overall lack of technical education opportunities

Box (4 - 4) Multiple universities and poor coordination

There are ten universities operating in Palestine, and the low levels of coordination among them is attributed to four factors: the persistence of unnecessary and counterproductive competitive attitudes instilled during occupation, the undue emphasis on political considerations as opposed to organizational considerations at the PNA, limited management capabilities of the education ministry and its affiliated groups, and a lack of revenue streams for higher education institutions, which forced them to cover deficits using any means, without regard for consequences.

The goals of higher education go beyond the economic dimension

Rigid centralized planning for education is both impossible and inadvisable

Human resources are main pillars of the Palestinian economy due to lack of natural resources

Higher education as an investment in human development

Higher education is considered a socioeconomic activity designed to meet the needs of the community as well as respond to the desires of individuals. Economic growth and cultural development are achieved through skills and abilities that individuals acquire. Higher education can be viewed as an investment with dividends manifested in increases to the gross national income by raising the productivity of educated people. However, the goals of higher education go beyond the economic dimension to include social advancement and scientific and cultural productivity in all its forms. Scientific advancement was preceded for centuries by political and economic globalization, and it is difficult to separate any scientific activity (in the broad definition of science) from what is happening across the world. Informational globalization has increased the degree of competition in this regard, and all these points deserve study.

Determining the needs of a community for high levels of professional competence is a very difficult task under the best of conditions, and is all the more difficult in the Palestinian situation, considering the volatility of its political and economic condition. The current students of Palestinian universities will work well into the middle of the current century, and no one can predict

what the conditions of the state of Palestine will be then. Therefore, rigid centralized planning for education is both impossible and inadvisable. The Palestinian educational system must cultivate the ability to calculate the effects of and adapt to an ongoing process of rapid and cumulative change.

Students choose a major field of study based on self-determined goals and external factors. Students have certain preferences and aspirations with regard to the quality of their lives and will necessarily pursue different paths to realize their dreams. Just as decision-makers cannot always accurately predict the needs of the population, individual students may not always be able to quantify their goals.

Reconciling the needs of the community to its abilities and helping individuals develop their own abilities to achieve their goals are core responsibilities of the state, but the higher education environment in Palestine is highly sensitive. Human resources are the main pillars of the Palestinian economy due to the lack of natural resources, and making those resources available qualitatively and quantitatively will be the strategic determinant of the Palestinian economy. Considering the weakness of the Palestinian economy at present, there is a pressing need to spend wisely on higher education. In the eight years of the PNA's tenure, expectations were that matters would be handled better than before due greater latitude in internal governance.

This expectation was accompanied by the perception that Palestinian socio-economic policies would be clearly defined over a long time horizon, and were therefore granted great weight.

The difficult period that the Palestinian people have endured for almost two years could be considered a lesson for higher education. The sector emerged under occupation and was able to develop in spite of the difficulties imposed by the first Intifada. The difference is that the current situation, despite the presence of the PNA and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, poses a challenge more serious than before. The increases in the number of higher education institutions and students, increases in required human and financial resources, and heightened competition for those limited resources has vastly complicated the planning and development process, rendering traditional approaches obsolete. Development of the sector requires a double-pronged strategy: unified acceptance of the national strategy at the Ministry of Education in conjunction with other ministries and the various segments of society, and a decentralized and comprehensive execution of the strategy by all affiliated educational institutions. Management skills in the higher education sector must mature and develop to achieve positive coordination and to avoid suffocating rigidity on the one hand and lack of structure and discipline on the other.

The economics of the Palestinian higher education sector

When discussing the economics of higher education, focus was placed on the financial crisis suffered by Palestinian universities, especially tuition and the official support allocated by the government budget. This attention, however, remains superficial, failing to delve into the foundations of the economics of higher education. The quantitative and technical details of the economics of education are beyond the scope of the PHDR, but several summary points must be made.

Management skills in the higher education sector must be promoted

The primary indicator of the health of an educational system is the amount of total spending, public and private, on the education sector as a percentage of GNP and which is low in Palestine compared to other countries. Justification exists for increasing spending on education on the condition that the education system will be judged by its future dividends. The second indicator is government spending on education as a percentage of the national budget; here, too, disparities exist, with the Palestinian figures low compared to those of other countries. Another indicator is the ratio of public to private spending on education within the context of an analogous economic policy. An analogous system is one in which tax increases translate into higher spending on education and lower tuition costs, and where decreased tax revenues translate into lower levels of support for education and higher tuitions (free market economy).

However, the call for increasing spending on education, particularly higher education, must be accompanied by fulfillment of the necessary conditions. Continuing increases in the demand for quality higher education at the current rate would certainly require more financial resources than the national economy can provide through its public and private sectors. In this situation, quality of education will eventually drop below minimum requirements, rendering spending on higher education useless.

There are also questions about the ability of the Palestinian higher education sector to survive

There are also questions about the ability of the Palestinian higher education sector to survive. For a quarter of a century, this vital sector relied on external aid, beginning with Arab assistance and then European. The financial crisis appeared immediately after aid ceased. Sustainability of the Palestinian higher education sector requires the fulfillment of two conditions: spending must be within levels that the national economy can afford, and economic growth resulting from increasing levels of competencies through higher education must be at a level that can sustain future spending. Although external aid could be relied upon to cover developmental needs for a time, the previous two conditions must be met at least to cover operating expenses, which necessitates a strategic direction, political will, and competent management for execution.

There is a perception that the number of Palestinian universities is large compared with the population

Organizing the Palestinian higher education sector

The model of a higher education ministry was chosen to organize higher education in Palestine without considering other organizational options to determine the model most suitable for the local condition. Several models rely on councils, governmental or non-governmental bodies, or independent entities rather than ministries. The justification for forming the ministry was the failure of the Palestinian Higher Education Council, established in 1977, to coordinate among universities and guide the development of higher education. However, the performance of the ministry so far suggests that the causes of failure or success do not depend only on the organizational model, but on other factors as well, such as the lack of political will.

Higher education in Palestine embraced the model of multiple independent institutions when it was established. There is a perception that the number of Palestinian universities is large compared with the population, while vocational and technical colleges are scarce. The success of the Ministry in encouraging the growth of vocational colleges and halting the establishment of new universities is considered an indication of the success of the chosen organizational model.

Attracting students to vocational education requires awareness and a different set of incentives. It is possible, for example, to transfer a large portion of aid allotted to higher education to the students rather than institutions by establishing a national scholarship fund that offers financial assistance to deserving students who choose to major in fields of study encouraged by the higher education sector. Also, tuition may be raised in fields of study with surplus numbers of students and lowered for majors in which student numbers are scant. It should be noted that the system employed in the Palestinian higher education sector has been the opposite of the recommendations above from the start, with tuition determined as a percentage of the estimated cost of the program. Therefore, tuition in scientific fields, which are in need of student encouragement, is much higher than tuition in literary fields, where students are abundant. As mentioned earlier, central planning of community needs must not be overemphasized, but it is possible to guide and direct the process of higher education without jeopardizing the people's right to choose the type of education they desire.

The Ministry of Higher Education, in addition to being the supervisor of higher education, may assume other constructive roles, such as the role of mediator nurturing the spirit of cooperation among universities. Also, the entire higher education sector, represented by the Ministry and the universities,

may face social and political pressures to achieve equilibrium among the size of the sector, the size of spending it receives, and the quality of its production. It should be noted that the Ministry of Higher Education became the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in 2001.

Attracting students to vocational education requires awareness and a different set of incentives

Higher education: between law and reality

Enactment of the higher education law in December 1998 did not clarify the confusion within the education sector. The law defined the objectives of higher education and the authorities and responsibilities of the Ministry. It also guaranteed academic freedom and the independence of institutions and maintained the sanctity of the university campus. It categorized institutions as governmental, operated by the ministry; public-non-profit institutions operating with PNA financial support, -and private, institutions operated by companies.

There was a compelling need to enact a law to organize the function of the higher education sector, but several remarks could be made about the law that was enacted. The law adopted the model of a higher education ministry without considering the alternatives, and granted the ministry some authorities in supervising institutions that at times cross over into interference. There is also a question about including private Palestinian universities in the sector, which already suffers from an inordinately large number of

The financial crisis at the higher education level appears insignificant in light of the potential crisis that may occur

Most graduates could be described as educated, but not aware

institutions. In addition, the law did not determine special objectives that warrant the establishment of governmental institutions and did not address the historical situation of higher education in Palestine, nor did it analyze the chief factors affecting it. In the end, the law functioned as another bureaucratic framework layered on top of others. Implementation of the law has been impeded because not all the necessary regulations and instructions for it have been issued.

The quality of higher education

The quality of Palestinian higher education receives enormous attention, especially due to the widespread perception that its quality has declined in recent years. Higher education relies on primary school education, which suffers lack of resources necessary to keep abreast of the rapid quantitative growth. It must be kept in mind that controlling enrollment rates in primary schools is impossible, whereas it is possible at the university level. The financial crisis at the higher education level appears insignificant in light of the potential crisis that may occur if population growth continues at the current rate, which exceeds growth rates in the national income.

Despite improvements in curricula and venues, the school system has not changed much. The authoritarian system continues to

thrive, relying on dictation and rote memorization without attention to the importance of nurturing character, integrity and the development of interpersonal skills. Implementing radical reforms in educational methods will take several years. Therefore, the impact of primary school education on higher education will remain unchanged for the immediate future.

Higher education must bear additional responsibilities toward students, especially in the first stages of their tenure. Among the responsibilities is to counsel students socially and academically, broaden their horizons, encouraging them to excel and be creative, and raise their linguistic skills, especially in the Arabic language. What happened in Palestinian universities was the exact opposite; there is more attention on core subjects in the major field of study than on basic skills, general education, and development of personality. As a result, higher education also embraced the dictation and rote memorization methods, and was forced to do so due to the limited abilities of the students. Therefore, most graduates could be described as educated, but not aware. This description applies at the baccalaureate level in addition to the higher education level, and although the situation is similar in many other countries, this is no excuse for failing to correct the Palestinian situation.

In May 1997, the Ministry of Higher Education issued the "Rationalization Plan for Higher Education 1997-2001"¹⁴. The plan comprised many provisions, some of which have been implemented. It was followed by the "Proposed Direction for Palestinian Higher Education," issued in October 1997¹⁵. Work on a "Palestinian Strategy for Higher Education" was underway but was delayed because of the situation. Until now, the basic structural problems of the sector have not been remedied.

Education professionals agree that raising the quality level of the product of higher education without considering the poor quality of ingredients is an impossible task. At the same time, there seems to be a pervasive reluctance to address the problem openly and to treat it radically, which may be attributed to the social pressures to expand university education in the absence of necessary funding. It could also be attributed to competition among universities to introduce new programs, which is one of the factors that led to erosion of the priorities of higher education.

Section Four: Conclusion

The current stage may represent a rare opportunity to raise the quality of education in Palestine despite the magnitude of problems

inherited from forced regression under occupation. Handing Palestinians responsibility for education, the attention given to the issue by official and civic groups, external aid, the limited size of the Palestinian education sector and the availability of education development experts form a strong foundation for progress.

Progress requires following two different paths simultaneously; the first is immediate action despite the situation, which includes most of the accomplishments made to date. The second path requires implementation of cumulative radical change in the entire education sector. This path begins in the first grade and continues gradually year after year. It cannot be expected to pay dividends before 15-20 years at the primary school level and 20-25 years at the university level. Continuing immediate improvement is important, but pursuit of short-term solutions in the absence of a comprehensive vision for the future is not helpful, leading in the long-run to further regression in the education process.

Implementing the two-path system is based on two requirements: first, the bases of radical change must be determined in accordance with the current situation and modern educational methods, while considering that the bases themselves are constantly changing. Second, calculated balance must be maintained at

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14. Rationalization Plan for the Higher Education Sector (1997-2001) Ministry of Higher Education, May 1997.
 - 15 . Proposed Direction for Palestinian Higher Education: A Vision for the Future; Ministry of Higher Education, October 1997.

Genuine reform at the core means changing perceptions and attitudes

The primary shortcoming of the current educational system is that its objectives remain mostly academic

Education is to develop the capabilities of student

every stage between the requirements of development and the requisites of reform within the limits of available resources, human or financial. The following is a brief analysis of some of the basic areas of needed reform, which should later be examined in detail by experts and working groups to assure the integrity of the recommendations as well as the plans needed to implement them.

Genuine reform necessitates changing perceptions and attitudes, which in turn will require the reeducation of professionals at every level of the system. This long-term reeducation effort will require more financial resources than those needed by the program of short-term improvements currently in place. However, the difference in levels of financial resources required for the two paths is minimal and should not represent the decisive factor. The need to expand and improve school buildings and equip them, supply textbooks and teaching aids, and train teachers all exist whether the path of radical reform has been chosen or not.

Spending on radical reform is a more useful investment than spending on immediate improvement. It eventually leads to a more productive population from the economic standpoint, in addition to making them more advanced on humanitarian, social and cultural levels. The issue of securing adequate funding must also take into consideration difficulties in implementation. The

process of changing attitudes and perceptions is not a simple task and requires a long-time horizon in order to be fully achieved. The primary shortcoming of the current educational system is that objectives remain mostly academic. In the past, students were praised for simply “memorizing the lesson,” while all other potential benefits of education are theoretically and practically ignored. Developing a clear vision derived from a modern educational philosophy is essential, especially at the current stage, in which foundations are laid for a new future free from the burdens of the past.

The Palestinian education strategy should be based on the following basic concepts. First, a student is a human being with free will and is at the center of the education process. Second, education is interaction between the students and their surroundings. The teacher is a very important factor in this equation, but not the only one. Third, the goal of education is to develop the capabilities of student, and while academic knowledge is one of those abilities, there are others no less important. Among those abilities are use of knowledge, integrity and decency, psychological and emotional development, interactive skills, and dedication to a robust work ethic.

Efforts to modify the course of our current educational path should be based on harnessing the strengths of the Palestinians and steering them towards the desired objective.

Those strengths will enable us to realize our objectives, if the political will is present.

The small size of our land and population makes the educational development requirements in Palestine modest compared to international standards. Development can be achieved by formulating a realistic strategy that concentrates on quality instead of quantity and focuses on content, not form. The Palestinians, inside and abroad, possess a bounty of human and financial resources that have not yet been properly utilized for the benefit of the national welfare. Palestinians can potentially derive much more benefit from the enormous levels of international attention and external aid they are given.

Although there are hidden agendas behind the aid, Palestine could avoid the extremes of submission and rejection and could handle the situation more wisely. Success in this struggle depends on clarity of objective, reasonability of plans, seriousness in execution, and honest assessment of progress. Undoubtedly, the Palestinians are ready at this stage to accept genuine changes to their conditions, and are in fact eager to participate in new beginnings after a generation of occupation. This resilience of spirit is an important element for development that should not be disregarded. A philosophy that clings to the status quo is no longer acceptable. We must reach for and embrace a policy of “new beginnings.”

Chapter Five:

Emancipatory Human Development: Conclusions and Future Prospects

Foreward

Section One: Adopting and Implementing the Concept of Emancipatory Human Development.

Section Two: Institutionalization and Organization of Community Participation and Local Government

Section Three: Toward a Developmental Education System.

Section Four: Toward Emancipatory Human Development.

Forward

***The PHDR,
suggests a vision
and framework
for development
and emancipation***

Continuing Israeli incursions into the Palestinian territories have destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian community and its institutions. The practice of isolating cities and districts from one another has made interaction difficult and at times, impossible. A comprehensive sustainable human development plan is needed to provide guidance and a framework for progress during these trying times, and for the future. This plan must be flexible enough to adapt readily to political change. It must be consistent with realities on the ground. Finally, it must further the Palestinians' pursuit of the rights that are enjoyed by citizens of the world's free nations.

The PHDR does not offer detailed recommendations; rather, it suggests a variety of mechanisms that will help to develop recommendations for the various sectors according to general principles.¹ The PHDR stresses the need to organize the Palestinian community along the lines of an institutional and legal framework that will lead to the emancipation and complete sovereignty of the Palestinian territories. In addition, as we prepare for the future, we must lay the foundation for a state committed to the principles of democracy, and equality, and to the effectiveness of our governing institutions. These efforts will require radical changes to the sustainable human development process.

This chapter reiterates many of the points mentioned in previous sections of the PHDR and presents them in a comprehensive context. It does not provide a strategy or working plan or detailed program. Those tasks are the responsibilities of the leadership of the development process in the community, concerned PNA institutions, civil community organizations, and financiers of development. The PHDR does, however, suggest a vision and framework for development and emancipation. Concerned institutions, official and non-official, must internalize these concepts and translate

1. The DSP assigned 18 research teams the task of formulating recommendations for every sector that were presented at the conference launching the PHDR and are available upon request.

them into clear and finite policies and programs. New policies should both sustain and complement the work of other institutions and continue to advance the development process until national goals are achieved. The internalization process could be realized by employing several steps, including:

- * Holding community discussions about the results of the PHDR. Its recommendations should be shared with the leadership of all concerned institutions, with the intent to incorporate them into a comprehensive sustainable human development strategy.
- * Raising awareness about the priorities and agendas of concerned institutions and the effects of those priorities at the official and community levels.
- * Convincing concerned Palestinian ministries to adopt comprehensive development strategies and prompting international groups operating in Palestine to adopt a perspective in that is in accordance with those strategies through community participation at all levels.
- * Legislative, executive and judiciary institutions must integrate the concepts and methodologies of sustainable human development, as spelled out in this report, into their policies and legislation.
- * Embracing the concept of emancipatory human development in all Palestinian governmental and civic organizations. This will require clear leadership directives to train personnel to fully understand the concept and the means by which it is advanced.
- * Achieving emancipatory human development requires that laws, plans, programs and projects connect 1) political objectives with development objectives, 2) social goals with economic goals, and 3) immediate relief with long-term development
- * Achieving sustainable human development is a multi-faceted process with multiple stages including design, planning, execution, and assessment.

Achieving sustainable human development is a multi-faceted process with multiple stages including design, planning, execution, and assessment

Section One: Adopting and Implementing the Concept of Emancipatory Human Development

The pillars of emancipatory human development

Sustainable human development equally and properly integrates the goals of liberation and human development, viewing them as a united entity whose elements rely on one another. Emancipatory human development posits the welfare of human beings at the center of political, social and economic decisions. Human rights, such as the right to development and the right to self-determination, cannot be separated from the concept of human liberation.

PHDR recommendations concentrate on three elements that would enable the Palestinian community to continue its pursuit of national objectives and realize its development goals under all political conditions. The first of the elements is concentration on human welfare as the axis on which all development efforts revolve. It acknowledges the relationship between development and social and economic perseverance, be it “under occupation” through the “rebuilding process” or under an “independent state.” The second element is community participation and systematic decentralization, and the third is investment in education. While these elements do not comprise all the elements of the development process in totality, they do lay the foundation for action within the Palestinian community.

Box (5 - 1) Human development as a means to transcend the crisis

“If we contemplate our social condition and the various forms of Israeli aggression to which we are subjected, we would find that we suffer weakness in judicial performance, in terms of the failure of the judicial system to realize respect and effectiveness, weak public awareness of the importance of the law in the lives of communities, and the problems arising from negligence of the law. I believe that human development activities must be directed at caring for women and concentrating on school and kindergarten teachers. I also believe that efforts should be made to adopt a full development scheme that strives to hone the personality of the Palestinian people, rendering them qualified to build a community based on law and respect of human rights, in addition to confirming organization as the means to achieving goals and limiting personal interests for the benefit of the greater good.”

Haidar Abdul-Shafi

PLC membr

The implementation of emancipatory human development, as outlined in the PHDR, involves the following:

1. Adoption of a comprehensive development framework: A comprehensive development framework will minimize the long-term losses that jeopardize human development, threaten sustainability, and do injustice to coming generations by denying them improved opportunities. In this regard, it is important to avoid contradiction between striving for sustainable human development and working to realize political goals. Heightened focus on community participation and social services spending will increase the chances for self-determination, for both individuals and the nation as a whole.

2. Full integration of resistance and development concepts:

The PHDR emphasizes that these are unified as well as parallel concepts. Resistance efforts can only succeed in a community that possesses the awareness and ability to participate. The community must also provide acceptable living standards and healthy internal relationships. The PHDR stresses that people cannot achieve sustainable human development in the absence of their right to self-determination. It also urges the Palestinian community not to succumb to external forces that strive to destroy its abilities, and to dedicate themselves to action as well as appropriate reaction. Communities based on emancipation at the individual and

institutional levels do not fluctuate in their choice of direction and they develop clear strategies to guide them through difficult times.

3. Activating human resources: Adopting the concept of emancipatory human development is a call to action at all levels. The resources of the Palestinian people have not been fully engaged, and institutions, governmental and non-governmental, are urged to mobilize all resources at their disposal as well as the power of individuals and local communities within a united framework.

4. Increasing efforts: The PHDR calls for a heightened effort on the part of Palestinian institutions. Coping with widespread destruction within the Palestinian community requires resolve and the gathering of efforts and resources. Preserving the Palestinian will to achieve requires solidarity at the psychological and emotional levels and cannot be accomplished in an atmosphere of pessimism. Our suffering cannot be used as an excuse for inaction.

5. The importance of social and economic programs:

Emancipatory human development means the integration of the political process with economic and social development goals. Therefore, leading Palestinian institutions must formulate comprehensive, forward-reaching social and economic programs at every stage, and the PLC must assume a leadership role and shoulder its tasks fully. Having the PLC and other PNA institutions work exclusively toward

Adopting the concept of emancipatory human development is a call to action at all levels

One of the most important elements of emancipatory human development is the preservation of the rights of future generations

development under any circumstance is the way to ensure that the Palestinian community is able to persevere in the face of current and future obstacles.

6. Developing PNA institutions to empower them in all conditions: To empower our institutions, we must help them to build strong foundations based upon the professional recommendations of local and international experts in community work that would place the right person in the right place and ensure active community participation.

7. Bolstering social spending: Concentration on development, with its institutional, social, economic and organizational ramifications, requires increased focus on social spending, which includes the health, education, social welfare, and housing sectors. Our limited resources must be distributed according to a comprehensive budget which supports the national and community agendas through proper allocation of tax revenues and encouragement of the private sector. The chance for success is greatly expanded if the other elements of the framework, education and community participation, are also realized.

8. Preserving the rights of future generations: One of the most important elements of emancipatory human development is the preservation of the rights of future generations, heeding their interests when making decisions in the present and planning for the future. The current generation is not entitled to jeopardize the

national, social or economic rights of coming generations. Among the defined policies that protect the rights of future generations are those concerned with balanced population distribution. Fertility rates in the West Bank and Gaza are still among the highest in the world, and if the trend is not treated immediately in accordance with the concepts of sustainable human development, coming generations will pay the price in a greatly deteriorated living standard and further exhaustion of limited Palestinian natural resources. The effects will also be manifested in rising unemployment, deteriorating health and education conditions, and a sharp increase in poverty rates. Further deterioration in these areas will have disastrous implications for the future of the Palestinian community. Preserving the rights of coming generations requires balanced environmental policies that limit pollution and guard against overuse of resources. It also necessitates working to achieve economic self-reliance by adopting policies designed to decrease dependence and by lessening the number and size of loans that will have to be paid off by future generations.

9. Enabling Palestinian women: This is one of the most important elements of emancipatory human development. Palestinian women are citizens with full rights under the law and the law must treat them as equal to men in all aspects. Also, the Palestinians are bound by international protocols that provide for equal rights for men and women. Raising the legal marriage age, educating women, considering

their needs and perspectives in decision-making, formulating plans that contribute to strengthening the Palestinian community, and enacting family laws based on human rights and equality will preserve the rights of women and protect the Palestinian family.

10. Activating the rule of law: Respect for human rights and the rule of law forms the basis for all modern legal, educational and governmental systems. Strengthening the Palestinian judicial system and guiding the work of our security forces is a critical first step in the advancement of this principle. The rule of law has an educational

dimension that seeks to decrease traditional influences such as tribal law in state institutions. The Palestinian electoral process still draws a disproportionate number of its national and local leaders from a specific social echelon. Our government still neglects basic laws, ignores rules and regulations, employs the policy of execution, including public executions, arrests without trial, and stifles the natural activism of Palestinian universities and selected individuals. These practices have contributed to chaotic conditions, reintroduced a system of tribal favoritism, and placed the personal interests of certain individuals above the community interest.

Respect for human rights and the rule of law forms the basis for modern legal, educational and governmental systems

Box (5 - 2) The importance of investing in social development

Progressive social attitudes greatly influence long-term social and human development. Regression in social attitudes has been noted in Palestine recently. The deteriorating economic, social and legal status of women is a primary indicator. Concurrently, despite the pressing need to improve education and increase levels of participation in local government, there is still no education minister (although the efforts of the ministry personnel deserve commendation). The Minister of Local Government is busy with his responsibilities as the chief Palestinian negotiator. Other indicators of regression include the descent of small towns and villages into social and organizational chaos. Their isolation due to the lack of balanced development policies has returned the “social contract” to its traditional definition, which places little value on the economic and cultural welfare of small towns and villages. In addition, the rise of an “informal” or underground economy does not contribute to the foundations of a developmental economy, albeit it is the only alternative for many. This clear regression in several key areas requires a clear policy that embraces and protects our small towns and villages guarantees equilibrium between private interests and the greater good.

Building centralized and decentralized institutions based on community participation.

The PNA PNA must address immediate needs while creating a long-term development vision

Section Two: Institutionalization and Organization of Community Participation and Local Government

The second pillar of emancipatory human development concerns community participation, the ability to influence government, and the building of centralized and decentralized institutions through community participation. National government must delegate legal, financial and administrative authority to local councils. Proper delegation of authority allows them to independently handle their affairs. It also encourages them to contribute to the advancement of sustainable human development at the national level within the framework of emancipatory human development. Local institutions must serve as the catalysts for the Palestinian community's efforts to build a modern democratic state. The current Intifada and its consequences have highlighted the need for strengthening community participation. Effective local government institutions will shore up the foundations of the PNA within a framework of mutual respect and faith in the importance of joint participation. Effective local government will revitalize the relationship between the central authority and the local community.

Active participation in the development process requires the

involvement the community in developmental decision-making. Local communities must participate in the creation of flexible development vision that responds to changes determined by progress within and around the community and in the world at large. All participants must be welcomed without discrimination on the part of local government officials, whether it be based on gender, religious or political beliefs, family, or place of residence. In addition, active participation allows the community to help supervise execution of strategy and to question decisions through democratic practice. Developmental decision-making carefully considers the philosophy, strategies, policies and programs that affect all aspects of human life.

The PNA is facing many challenges to its leadership of the Palestinian community. In addition to the pressure of occupation, the PNA must address immediate needs while creating a long-term development vision. The PNA must meet high performance expectations nurtured by the Palestinians since 1967 with very limited resources. Undoubtedly, the PNA faces an array of obstacles, among them geographic dislocation and the division of the Palestinian territories into isolated cantons, as well as checkpoints and barricades that serve as daily reminders of the military occupation. If the status quo is allowed to persist, relations between the Palestinian local community and the PNA will disintegrate. This outcome is more likely if local councils are forced to continue without a development

plan, adequate authority or appropriate levels of funding. The sense of initiative cultivated over more than three decades is not enough to sustain them in such adverse conditions.

Institutionalization and organization of community participation and local government must be rebuilt on new foundations. The critical areas of needed change are:

1. Honest assessment of institutional performance: The many weaknesses of existing institutions were revealed under the pressures of the Intifada and the burdens of the siege. These institutions must now make honest and responsible assessment of their visions and work mechanisms. It should be noted that the ineffectiveness of some Palestinian institutions predated the Intifada. In some cases, poor management strategy and inefficient work systems had been in place for years.

2. Administrative reform: Community participation is also integrally connected with the administrative reforms that are being recommended by many local and international institutions². Reform attempts stopped at the outset of the Intifada. Ironically, the Intifada's progression further exposed and underscored the need for administrative and legal reform that would ensure participation, professionalism, and technical standards in institutional work. Matters were made worse by regression of the performance of

several key institutions, at a time when the Palestinian community desperately needed its institutions and the services they provided. Some used the Intifada to justify substandard performance and others to hide their incompetence, all to the detriment of resistance and development efforts. The PNA demonstrated administrative and financial inadequacies that shook the community's confidence in its ability to stop further deterioration. Local councils relied heavily on donors and tended to accept their conditions without proper oversight by the central authority. NGOs followed the same pattern, furthering threatening the status of the central authority.

3. Building trust between citizens and the PNA: the PNA has done little to stem the loss of public confidence in its capabilities. Its efforts to establish a sound government based on the rule of law are still weak. The PNA still fails to connect the political process, development, and active community participation. It purports to possess a development vision, but the absence of the rule of law in a widely institutionalized framework guarantees its failure of that vision. The lack of a legally supportable development vision will yield the same result, because the relationship between development and sustainability and the rule of law cannot be disregarded. The current PNA stance toward NGOs and their role in the community is unjustifiable, even if concerns with some of their operational strategies are valid.

Institutionalization and organization of community participation and local government as the basis for development

2. Such as the report published by the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Rokar Report, reports of the Independent Commission for Human Rights, and previous PHDRs.

Mechanisms to increase levels of coordination between NGOs and PNA institutions must be improved

4. The failure of centralization: Centralized decision-making has undergone a difficult test, and the results are discouraging. The Palestinian people must be engaged in community administration to help it surmount obstacles on the path of achieving national objectives. NGOs must adopt a standardized development vision embraced by all NGOs, official institutions, and donors and to which they may be held accountable. Funding sources should be monitored according to established legal parameters. It is recommended that the PNA coordinate with NGOs in the service of development rather than isolate them. Mechanisms to increase levels of coordination between NGOs and PNA institutions; and facilitate networking, cooperation, and consultation among NGOs and with the PNA must be developed.

5. Local government and active participation: The true meanings of these concepts require that local councils and NGOs be allowed to participate in decision-making and to question authority. A legal framework governing the activities of local councils and NGOs must be established. The following steps will help to establish this framework:

- Understanding the community process and the needs of the community under fluctuating political conditions and integrating comprehensive community thinking into the decisions and plans of concerned institutions.

- Working in every way to remove the sense of alienation wherever it exists; between Palestinians and the PNA, its institutions, or with other individuals.
- Working to hold PLC elections based on inclusive practices and the principles of freedom and democracy and according to an electoral system that considers past experience.
- Holding local council elections to encourage delegation of authority.
- Addressing the issue of refugee camps and its relationship, present and future, with the functions of local government.
- Expanding community participation in resolving disputes within the boundaries of local councils in non-violent ways.
- Including in the agendas of local councils and community institutions the needs of youth, children and the underprivileged.
- Integrating women into local councils and expanding their role.
- Providing incentives to donate land and money necessary to establish operating venues within the jurisdictional areas of local councils.
- Encouraging local councils to cooperate with NGOs and local communities by increasing the number of public meetings, possibly making them institutionally required and governed by clear rules of operation and function.
- Empowering and encouraging NGOs to spread awareness of the

- community's need to interact with and monitor the functions of local councils;
- Encouraging unions and student bodies in schools and universities to resume their proactive roles.
 - Encouraging the educated and affluent segments of Palestinian society to bear their responsibilities toward the larger community.
 - Expanding the authorities of local councils in the broader sense by inviting them to participate in planning, enacting laws, execution, monitoring, evaluation, and directing the educational process, health care provision, social affairs, and other human welfare matters.
 - Reenacting the Law of Local Councils and holding them responsible for participating in formulating the development vision and following up on execution, in addition to employing the law with a positive spirit.
 - Lending local councils the needed skills to perform their duties toward citizens and participate in human development with emphasis on sustainability, and facilitate the exchange of expertise with internal and external groups.
 - Providing government financial support for local councils to undertake projects within their geographical boundaries, remanding property taxes and redistributing fuel taxes to the councils.
 - Expanding the construction of joint service centers to serve local councils in close proximity and empower them to supervise the execution of human development strategy in their areas.
 - Forming joint city councils from local councils with geographical connections, as in the case of the Bethlehem District and the Ramallah and Al-Bireh areas, to facilitate the formation of complementary agendas .
 - Pressuring donors to unify procedures for donating and transferring funds, monitoring, simplifying reporting and presentation requirements, paying attention to developing local levels of technical expertise, and supporting Palestinian priorities within the jurisdictional areas of local councils.
 - Promoting the role of the Finance Ministry as a general coordinator to direct financial support in accordance with Palestinian human development strategy.
 - Help the private sector to initiate local projects and encourage the private sector to contribute to community development.
- Providing governmental financial support for local councils is needed***
- Help the private sector to establish local projects***
- ### **Section Three:**
- ### **Toward a Developmental Education System**
- The third pillar of emancipatory human development is connected with the importance of education from the qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Investing in education was and still is the

Institutions must push forward the wheel of educational development

primary catalyst that will enable the Palestinian community to persevere and progress at all levels. Therefore, the PHDR proposes an inclusive, developmentally oriented educational model as one of the top priorities of sustainable human development. This educational model is one of the most effective methods to realize the objectives of the Palestinian people and protect the future of their children.

For Palestinian education to be in harmony with the principles of emancipatory human development, and to advance the objectives of the Palestinian educational system, several directions must be considered. They are:

1. Early childhood and preliminary education: The preliminary education stage is the foundation on which subsequent stages rely. It also serves as the starting point for any radical change in the education system. It therefore deserves detailed examination of many of its aspects.

■ Encouraging kindergartens to define their curricula. Due to the rapid rise in levels of kindergarten attendance, the Ministry of Education must define both the curricula and goals for this important educational stage. The Ministry licenses kindergartens that meet certain staff and facilities criteria. The Ministry also offers a guide to aid directors of kindergartens, but direct ministry oversight of

kindergarten operations is almost nonexistent.

Kindergartens are beginning to compete with first grades and even second grades in the teaching of reading and writing, arithmetic, and English. However, socialization issues are sorely neglected, as schools and parents alike are unaware of their importance. In this environment, it becomes important for the Ministry to adjust the focus of kindergarten education and to educate schools and parents about the real objectives of kindergartens.

Helping children to develop personality and character. Without a doubt, the home is the first place to achieve this, but schooling plays a tremendous role in shaping and broadening the world of a child. Schools must work to instill self-assurance in all children instead of nurturing a weak or distraught personality, which leads to adaptation difficulties, decreased productivity, and violent behavior.

Getting children accustomed to dealing with their peers as equals. Children at home deal with people older than they are or younger, and a difference of one year in children's ages is considerable in terms of ability and cognizance. At school, a child encounters many age-mates, and treating them as equals is an important part of social upbringing. "The authoritarian personality" is

Encouraging kindergartens is vital

greatly adept at dealing with superiors, mainly through adulation, and with inferiors, by oppression, but dealing with an equal proves very difficult. This particular personality type occurs frequently in our society. It is a personality type that views human relations exclusively from the perspective of a power and authority hierarchy. Our collective tendency toward this type of behavior may have played a large role in the realities of our political history.

- Educating children on the importance of citizenship and the value of public or common interests, both tangible and moral. Wide segments of the Arab nation were raised on the highly individualistic and defensive concept, "this is mine, that is yours," while "this is ours, that is theirs" seems to be more important and appropriate. Undoubtedly, this way of thinking hinders progress and can only be overcome by educating children about the value of public interest.
- Nurturing moral values and behavioral traits in children, including work ethics, because although honesty and decency are appreciated values, dedication and readiness to work must be encouraged and developed. Our standing in the modern world depends heavily on developing the work ethic in our community.
- Integrating the concept of gender in education when planning, executing and evaluating the education

process. This includes presenting positive pictures of Palestinian women in the labor force, including traditional, political work and modern professions, such as medicine and engineering, and other positive and effective models. We must also present male role models that support gender equality and man's familial duties. A developmental education system provides the basis for mutual respect among children of both genders at school. It also requires special attention to practical and strategic needs of students and workers in the education sector. Suitable facilities must be built and technical resources distributed equitably, including laboratories, computers and teachers. Special attention must be given to existing disparities between boys' schools and girls' schools.

- The world has become a connected unit, and each community now has to deal with all others. We must instill the basic values of tolerance in our children. Tolerance does not necessarily imply agreement. Tolerance means granting others the rights we expect to enjoy ourselves. We must mutually respect our differences and resolve conflict through discussion and non-violent means. The authoritative nature of our traditional community does not lend itself easily to the principles of tolerance. Respect for others begins with self-respect. Adults must respect children, which is not common

Educating children on the importance of citizenship

Integrating the concept of gender in education

Schooling plays a tremendous role in shaping and broadening the world of a child

Encouraging Mutual respect of differences and understanding based on discussion and non-violent treatment.

The higher stages of education still employ rote-learning methodologies

in our upbringing. One of the tasks of the coming period is to move from specificity to generality, because harping on the Palestinian specificity may turn into an excuse for negligence and a narrow horizon and consequently a cause for failure. Overemphasis of the Palestinian identity in our children's upbringing belies a defensive attitude and may lead to an undermining of the importance of universal issues. This requires more attention to the issues of human rights and the environment.

2. Secondary education: In an environment that embraces the concepts described above, academic tutelage takes a backseat to psychological and social objectives, which are introduced in the early stages of education and should gradually assume a wider role in later years.

The higher stages of education still employ rote - learning methodologies and limit the knowledge and skills of students to what is available in textbooks. The concept of instilling self-motivation in students is often neglected, and the teacher is still viewed as the central figure in the educational process, rather than the student. Therefore, higher education has not yet arrived at the stages of 'empowerment' and 'motivation' mentioned in the Palestinian curriculum plan. It is likely that radical changes cannot be achieved in the higher years of education unless they are based on

radical changes in the early stages. These are long-term objectives that may require more than a decade to be realized.

The main problem in higher education may be the clear contradiction between its objectives and content, both of which were defined more than 50 years ago. At that time, higher education was reserved for a very limited segment of society. Today, higher education must serve a much broader range of students from many different socioeconomic backgrounds. The school system is marked by three inter-connected shortcomings: congestion, limited objectives, and low standards. Broadening objectives is at least part of the solution, and expanding opportunities for vocational education in schools may help to achieve that goal.

3. Possible changes:

- Clearly, achieving the aforementioned objectives requires radical changes in school atmosphere and teaching methods. Perhaps the entire educational process needs to be redefined, including school management and the structure of the educational system itself. The school must be transformed from a conflict arena to a cooperative haven for administrators, teachers and students. Teachers must treat students as the center of free thought and will, not as empty pots to be filled without regard for individual personality. The transformation must be considered a top priority as we

seek to redefine education, for it is the primary element of a modern education system. From this base, we can work to achieve our community's social and economic goals. The prospects of securing the financial resources necessary to implement this change are very disheartening. Most of these changes require revamping the training programs of teachers and supervisors to include pre-employment as well as in-service training programs. A reexamination of teacher performance evaluation at the university level should also be undertaken. It is important to note, however, that realizing radical change requires reducing the size of classrooms, which is considered one of the priorities of the Palestinian education sector.

It must be noted here that the hostile, authoritative atmosphere of most Palestinian schools is also found in many Palestinian families. Schools will not be able to make the necessary reforms if the family atmosphere remains unchanged. Therefore, improving the relationship between school and the home becomes a significant element.

- Palestinian universities and colleges graduate large numbers of education students every year in various areas of specialty. However, the Ministry of Education has yet to define the minimum required course load and level of practical experience for schoolteachers. Developing the quality of our teachers in

Palestine is impossible under these conditions. Reconciling educational curricula requirements with ministry regulations will take several years. Defining minimum standards for teacher certification must be a priority of that process.

- Developing vocational and technical education heads the list of Palestinian educational objectives for late primary and higher education. However, execution is moving very slowly due to several interrelated reasons. The Palestinian community does not value vocational and technical training. Official emphasis is placed on the needs of academic study programs at the expense of vocational and technical studies. Few resources are available to develop vocational training. Changing this situation requires that educational leaders direct more attention and resources to vocational training, even at the expense of academic education programs. Increased opportunities to pursue vocational training would encourage more students to enroll. Primary education should, however, remain available to all.

- Developing the role of educational counseling. The quality of educational and psychological counseling at schools is low. A qualitative leap forward is required in the way of content, human resources, and methodology. Educational counseling plays an important role in ensuring the success of

The quality of educational and psychological counseling at schools is low

Simple measures would vastly improve the atmosphere of existing schools

***An allocation of
7%-8% of GDP for
Education may be
sufficient***

the newly-introduced vocational track. Students will initially face social pressure to avoid vocational education and will need encouragement to overcome that obstacle. If the vocational track is to succeed, we must promote the fact that all educational tracks are equal, and are not arranged from best to worst. The vocational education plan proposed for the higher education level includes the possibility of transferring from the vocational track to the academic. However, the converse is not true, which suggests that the vertical categorization of tracks is still influencing the attitudes of those who proposed it. In addition, encouraging transfer from the vocational to the academic track may have undesirable consequences further down the road that will limit the effectiveness of the track itself.

- Buildings and school facilities comprise the physical infrastructure of the education process. Schools truly function as a student's "second home." However, many buildings look more like prisons than schools, with their long hallways, multiple identically configured classrooms, uncomfortable furniture, and neglected courtyards. The situation could be radically changed in older buildings using various aesthetic measures, including applying colorful paint, planting trees and shrubs in courtyards, and choosing better furniture. Such simple measures would vastly improve the atmosphere of

existing schools, which probably require more attention and awareness than money. As for newer schools, it is important to consider their architectural and social attributes in addition to their function.

- The Palestinian education budget should consider additional sources of income. First, external aid for expansion and development projects should be pursued. Second, income generated from tuition, book sales and other means, which, although small at the primary school level, is a substantial source of income at the higher education level. Third, the general budget allocation must contain a fixed amount for education. A common method for determining the general education budget ties it to a percentage of GDP. If external aid is available, an allocation of 7%-8% of GDP for education may be sufficient in Palestine. Currently, educational expenditures account for less than 5 percent of GDP.
- Enacting the Palestinian education law. A comprehensive law on education does not currently exist, although the higher education law was enacted in 1998. The PNA may be averse to enacting the law because of the financial obligations it implies for the state. However, further delay of its enactment may have long-term negative consequences for educational development. Therefore, the law should be enacted as soon as possible while granting the government some

financial flexibility.

4. Higher education: Higher education will contribute to sustainable human development needs in Palestine by:

- Striving to prepare students to face the new challenges of the 21st century.
- Intensifying efforts to organize higher education and supply it with the necessary human resources.
- Studying the “economics of higher education” to develop an understanding of the capabilities of higher education in Palestine and distributing funding fairly and in a manner that guarantees stability and sustainability.
- Continuing to concentrate on modern technical and scientific fields.
- Addressing the problem of unemployment radically instead of using higher education to mask it.

matters heated up, laws were enacted, institutions built, NGOs set to work, education rates increased, and certain aspects of health care and environmental protection improved.

Three chief objectives should be established in order to fully activate Palestinian resources and to engage the entire community in efforts to overcome the challenges we face.

First, we must end the Israeli occupation that continues to hinder sustainable human development, drains the resources of the Palestinian community and deprives it of its basic rights to self-determination and development. The perseverance of the Palestinians and their continuing resistance confirms their commitment to the realization of those rights.

Second, we must create a flexible development vision that paves the way for the future and which can handle states of uncertainty. This development vision will form a national standard endorsed by Palestinian official institutions, NGOs and donors. In the context of this vision, conditions of funding and their monitoring will be defined according to the law.

Palestinian resources must be activated and engaged to their fullest limits. Palestinians must create an atmosphere that reconciles the goals of politics and development. We must engage in our entire community in a discussion that identifies the rights of individuals and the community at the political and developmental

Necessary steps

1. Ending Israeli occupation

2. Creating a flexible development vision

3. Adopting a democratic framework

Section Four: Toward Emancipatory Human Development

Much of the Palestinian journey toward achieving emancipatory human development still lies before them, although great strides have been made in recent years. The span of years between 1994 and 2000 represented a historic turning point for the Palestinians. It was an era in which the establishment of a modern, independent state moved close to realization. Discussion in all

4. Establishing a “development council” at the highest possible level

levels. We must also seek to realize that which is possible under the current circumstances and establish mechanisms that allow change to be introduced to development plans and policies as needed. Flexibility must be inherent in the planning and execution of any sustainable development program, and especially so in the Palestinian context, which faces the added burdens of the pressures and changes brought to bear by the Israeli occupation.

Third, we must adopt a democratic framework created and implemented through the provisions of enforceable legislation. The framework must allow for delegation of authority. Local councils must function as representative local governments with independent revenue streams as well as financial support from the central government through an approved development plan. Such a policy would liberate the dormant resources of the community, provide structure and organization for their capabilities, and increase in the value of their contribution to the development process. Palestinians in the occupied territories have grown accustomed to developing their resistance and development methods to meet the challenges continually imposed by Israel.

5. Enacting laws to organize the function of security forces

In addition, there are five general steps that require examination and consideration. They are:

1. Generate support for the enactment of a basic law that organizes relationships and creates equilibrium between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities and allows citizens to practice their rights freely within the boundaries of the law. In addition, we must encourage the establishment of the rule of law and create an independent judicial authority capable of overseeing its application.
2. Promote transparency to increase trust between citizens and the PNA and raise awareness in the Palestinian people; revealing to them existing problems, clarifying their dimensions, and preparing people psychologically to face them. This requires activating the general monitoring authority to supervise budget distribution, government agencies and monopolies and the production of reports to guarantee legal and administrative accountability.³
3. Establishing a “development council” at the highest possible level in which official institutions and the civil and private sectors would participate and whose responsibilities would be to define the path of development and follow-up on development policies and performance.
4. Bolstering the role of official institutions, such as ministries, especially the Ministries of Local Government, Planning and International Cooperation,

3. The Independent Commission for Human Rights; “The State of Palestinian Citizens’ Rights; Sixth Annual Report“, Ramallah, 2001.

Finance, and Justice, NGOs, and the private sector, as well as individuals involved in decision-making and execution. Delegating authority would achieve this correctly, especially at the highest levels, accompanied by effective accountability and feedback mechanisms. This requires establishing proper structures for PNA institutions and clarifying the expertise and boundaries of authority of each governmental body in a manner that would minimize duplication of effort among government agencies, specifically ministries.

5. Enacting laws to organize the function of security forces and grant them legitimacy in order to protect the rights of citizens and guarantee the security of the community.

The establishment of the PNA should not be considered the end of our journey; instead, it should be regarded as a real chance to begin serious and effective handling of accumulated basic problems. As soon as an acceptable political settlement is reached, the state of Palestine, from the first moment of its birth, will face “the double whammy” of a growing population and a weak economy. Thus, one of the top priorities for state leadership will be to formulate long-term social and economic strategies that consider that international aid may be available for some time but not forever and not at the same levels. It may be difficult for the leadership to execute some

policies that do not meet public expectations of their new state of independence.

In conclusion, flexibility is a necessary requirement of the proposed Palestinian development vision. Healthy strides must be taken to overcome political obstacles and serious efforts made to maintain equilibrium in our progress. At all levels, Palestinians must pursue their vision within clear and professional managerial standards and mechanisms of accountability and transparency. Resistance in the cause of liberation and sustainable human development can no longer be separated. Sustainable human development must balance its social, economic, and institutional requirements with the needs and abilities of the public in order to engage dormant human resources in bearing the burden of developmental emancipation as well as to share with them the fruits of the development process. Integrating the notion of human development into the institutions of the community will serve the liberation process in the most inclusive sense. A sustainable human development vision will not be realized until the Palestinian community is granted its right to self-determination.

Palestinians must pursue their vision within clear and professional managerial standards

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(Appendix 2)

Definition of terms¹

The economy

- **Gross National Product (GNP):** The market value of all the final goods and services produced during a specific period of time (usually one year).
- **Net payments from abroad:** Payments to foreign factors of production used locally minus payments for Palestinian factors of production used abroad.
- **Gross Domestic Product (GDP):** Gross National Product minus net transfer payments.
- **Real per capita GDP in dollars according to Purchasing Power Parity:** Per capita GDP of a country converted to US dollars to equalize purchasing power to the currency of a country. The UNDP has used Purchasing Power Parity for international GDP comparisons. These comparisons will be more accurate than comparisons based on exchange rates which are extremely unstable.
- **Real per capita GDP:** Real GDP for a given year divided by the population of the country during that year.
- **Rate of inflation:** Measured by the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each given period of time.
- **Trade balance deficit:** Occurs when imports of goods and services exceed export of goods and services.
- **Purchasing power:** The quantity of goods and services that an amount of money can purchase.
- **Remittances:** Funds that workers abroad send to their families living in the WBGS.

- **Labor force:** Total number of people aged 15 and over and below the age of 65 who are able and willing to work (both the employed and the unemployed).
- **The employed:** Whoever is aged 15 and over, and who has worked for a wage for at least one hour during the week prior to the survey, or who has worked for no wages in a family establishment or in a voluntary institution.
- **The unemployed (or job-seekers):** Those aged 15 and over who do not have work and are actively searching for jobs.
- **Official employment in Israel:** Palestinian workers who are working in Israel with permits.
- **Unofficial employment in Israel:** Palestinian workers who are working in Israel without permits.
- **Government expenditure:** The expenditure of all central and other government offices, administrations and institutions. It includes current expenditure and capital or developmental expenditure, but does not include regional, domestic or private expenditure.
- **Public sector:** Includes all productive activities and services provided by all branches and at all levels of government (central government, and local councils).
- **Gross capital formation:** (or what is known as investment) is the combination of the following three components: Gross fixed capital formation, change in deposits, and net holdings in valuables; investment is measured by the purchasing price, as is the case in measuring consumption.

1. Definitions of terms were adopted from international statistical definitions used by the UNDP Human Development Reports, or those used by the PCBS. Where definitions were not available from these sources, experts were consulted

- **Final consumption expenditure:** The final consumption of families (made up of expenditure on all goods and services, with the exception of expenditure on construction of housing); the final consumption of the government and non-profit institutions (measured by the value of production minus the value of payments from sales).
- **Average consumption: Total individual monthly consumption of the following items:**
 1. Money spent on purchase of goods and services for daily consumption.
 2. Value of goods and services that the family receives from the household wage-earner, and which is used for the consumption of the family.
 3. Goods that are consumed during a specific period of time, and that are produced by the family.
 4. Estimated house value (in the event of ownership).
- **Average expenditure: Total individual monthly expenditure on the following items:**
 1. Money spent on purchase of goods and services for daily consumption.
 2. Value of goods and services that the family receives from the household wage-earner, and which is used for the consumption of the family.
 3. Expenditure on fees and taxes (non-investment), charity (Zakat), donations, gifts, interest payments on debts, and other non-consumption items.
- **Consumption of food as a percentage of total family consumption:** Consumption calculated from the details of GDP (expenditure at market prices at the national level) specified in United Nations System of National Accounts, mostly included in the fourth (1980) and fifth (1985) stages of the International Comparison Programme.
- **Percentage of poor families:** Percentage of poor families from the population.
- **Abject poverty:** As estimated in the **Palestine Poverty Report**, for a 6-member household (for the year 1997).
- **Severity of poverty:** A mean indicator for total consumption deficit.

- **Poverty gap:** The percentage of decrease in the average income of the poor from the poverty line.

Education

- **Literacy:** A person is considered literate if he/she can read and understand a short and simple paragraph on his/her daily life.
- **Basic education:** The foundation of education and the basis upon which other stages of education are based. Its duration is 10 years (age 6-15).
- **Secondary education:** Scholastic education which follows basic education. Its duration is 2 years (age 16-17).
- **Higher education:** Education provided in universities and community colleges. The prerequisite to enroll in higher education is completion of the secondary stage, or its equivalent, and obtaining the General Secondary Education Certificate (Tawjihi), or its equivalent. It is considered to be for the age group of 18-22 (5 scholastic years).
- **Total enrollment rate:** Number of students enrolled in any educational level, whether or not they belong to the appropriate age group, as a percentage of the population who come under the appropriate age group.

Health

- **Crude birth rate:** Number of live and still births per every 1000 of the population for a given period of time.
- **Crude death rate:** Annual number of deaths per every 1000 of the population.
- **Infant mortality rate:** Annual number of infant (under 1 year of age) deaths per every 1000 of the population.
- **Child mortality rate:** Annual average number of child deaths below the age of 5 per every 1000 of the population, who were born live during the past five years. (the probability of death during the period between birth and the fifth birthday).
- **Life expectancy at birth:** Number of years that a newborn child is expected to live,

under the prevailing mortality patterns at the time of his/her birth.

- **Fertility:** Actual reproductive (childbearing) performance of an individual, couple, group, population or society. (The **actual** number of births a woman had during her reproductive life).
- **Total fertility rate:** Average number of live births a woman has during her life, if she could reproduce at each age period according to the fertility rates prevailing for all stages of life.

Miscellaneous definitions

- **Rest of the West Bank:** The West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem.
- **East Jerusalem:** The eastern part of the city of Jerusalem (the part that was under Jordanian rule) occupied by Israel in June 1967 and annexed on June 28, 1967.

• **Zakat** committees: Voluntary institutions that collect the Islamic alms tax (Zakat) and donations from those able to contribute, and distribute the alms to those in need according to a specific social survey mechanism.

• **Occupancy rate:** Average number of persons per room living in a house. It is calculated by dividing the number of people living in a house over the number of rooms.

- **Dependency rate:** Average number of persons supported by a person who works, or is able to work.
- **Gender:** A term that indicates social differences between males and females.
- **Percentage of women to men (gender gap):** It measures the gap separating what has been achieved by men and women in the same field. The participation rate in the labor force (the percentage of women to men) is 16.1%, which means that in order to achieve equality, women should accomplish achievements at a rate of 84% to catch up with the achievements of men.

(Appendix 3)

List of Case Studies

1. Poverty cases:
 - Unemployed head of household
 - A head of household who lost work in Israel (2 cases)
 - A head of household who lost work in the Palestinian private sector (2 cases)
 - Low-paid worker
 - An extended family under the poverty line
 - Poor family from a village
2. A female headed household
3. The impact of the latest events on a small business
4. The impact of roadblocks on a youth searching for work and trying to his interview in a different region
5. A student who left the university because of roadblocks and poverty
6. The environment in a village
7. A girl who got married at a young age
8. A Bedouin family
9. An innovative small project in response to economic hardship
10. A farmer who lost his land because of settlement activities
11. A farmer who witnessed the destruction of his farm
12. Fishers in Gaza
13. A Gaza student separated from her family for years because of the closure
14. A day in the life of an ambulance driver
15. A family that had to flee its home because of continuos shelling
16. A disabled child who was hit by an Israeli bullet
17. A family lost home because of demolition by the Israeli forces
18. Children in a refugee camps (Dheisheh)
19. Living conditions in a refugee camp (Jalazoun)
20. Local councils in various regions

(Appendix 4)

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(Appendix 5)

Speakers at the activities of DSP, 1999 - 2001

Yaser Abed Raboh	Hassan Asfour	Omar Abedel Razaq
Ibrahim Dakkak	Ghazi Al-Surani	Majed Sabih
Salim Tamari	Ali Shaath	Mohammed Al Masrouji
Baian Tabara ¹	Mohammed Ishtieh	Carmela Armanious-Omari
Joan Heblar ²	Mohsen Abu Ramadan	Nabil Shaath
Annar Brathen ³	Faisal Al Horani	Randa Sanyoura
Amin Madani ⁴	Ahmad Majdalani	Samir Abdullah
Ken Cole ⁵	Alia' Al Yaseer	Norma Masriyeh
Yousef Abu Safeya	Hisham Mustafa	Ali Jarbawi
Ronald Krimar ⁶	Sana' Al Assi	Sufian Mushasha
Khalil Nakhla	Khalil Mahshi	Faroq Dawas
Jean Breteche ⁷	Itimad Mhana	Islah Jad
Else Owen ⁸	Hisham Awartani	Said Al Mudalal
Larry Garber ⁹	Zeyad Jarghon	Abedel Karim Ashour
Victoria Waltz ¹⁰	Mohammad Zuhdi Nashashibi	Abla Nashashibi
Steven Lawery ¹¹	Izzat Abdul Hadi	Laila Atshan
Othman Othman ¹²	Muntassir Hamdan	Bahjat Eid
Jerome Segal ¹³	Iyhab Abu Ghosh	

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- 1 . UN - ESCWA
 2 . Journalist – Germany
 3 . CROP
 4 . UN special Representative for Human rights
 5 . University of East Anglia
 6 . Western Michigan University
 7 . European Union
 8 . Bergen University – Norway
 9 . USAID
 10 . Lecture – Germany
 11 . Ford Foundation
 12 . Minister of Planning (Egypt)
 13 . University of Maryland

(Appendix 6)

Workshops with community leaders, unions, and NGOs

Group- West Bank	In cooperation with
Political groups	Fateh Headquarters
Academics	Department of Sociology & Institute of Gender Studies
Youth organizations	Youth Union/Ministry of Youth
Women's organizations	General Union of Women/ Women's Affairs Technical Committees
NGOs	NGOs Network & Union of Charitable Organizations
Human rights Organizations	Independent Commission for Citizens Rights & Human Rights Organizations Council
Media institutions	-----
Children's institutions	National Secretariat for Children
Local councils	Union of Local Councils
Private sector	Paltrade
Group/Gaza Strip	
Academics	-----
Women	WATC
Environment	Ministry of Environment
Political groups	-----
NGOs	NGOs Network
Refugee organizations	Local Refugee Committees
Human rights organizations	Independent Commission for Citizens Rights
Labor unions	General Union of Workers

(Appendix 7)

Ministerial Committee Members

MOPIC, coordinator	Moh'd Ghadeyeh
Ministry of Health	Ghaleb abu baker, Faisal Abu shahla
Ministry of Justice	Hanna Issa, Moh'd Abu shawish
Ministry of Education	Said Assaf, Haifa' Al-Aghah
Ministry of Agriculture	Adel Breghet, Mahnoud Abu Samra
Ministry of Social Affairs	Abdullah Hourani, Hani Saba
Ministry of Sports and Youth	Rabiha Deiab, Jamileh Abu Samhadaneh
Ministry of Industry	Osama Al Teybi, Sami Abu Zareefa
Ministry of Public Works	Majdy Abu Ghareebeh
Ministry of Housing	Afnan Ayesh, Abedel Karim Abdeen
Ministry of Local Government	Hani Al-Horob, Hasan Abu Samhadaneh
Ministry of Finance	Nabhan Othman, Issa El Danaq
Ministry of Awqaf	Moh'd Al-Qawasmi, Mahmoud Al-Nayreb
Ministry of Culture	Issam Al-Batran, Yousef Sha'ban
Ministry of Economy and Trade	Maha Abu Issa, Ghazi Al-Sourani
Ministry of Labor	Ghazi Al-Khalili, Abedel Aziz Qudih
Ministry of Interior	Sajeda Tareq Zaki
Ministry of Higher Education	Ribhi Abu Snina

(Appendix 8)

National Conference on Human Development – June 2002

About the Conference

A Palestinian team of researchers and practitioners has completed work on the preparation for the Palestinian Human Development Report (PHDR) – 2002. The PHDR is the outcome of a long process of quantitative and qualitative research, where data from various local and international sources were utilized. Focus groups, case studies, intensive interviews were utilized. Young people and children have also participated through providing their perspective on development issues.

The PHDR provides an indigenous Palestinian perspective on development, and best means to move beyond the current crises. The PHDR offers an approach to the organization of Palestinian Society and directions for future action.

The National Conference on Human Development (Toward A Viable State) provides an opportunity for informed and focused debate on the most salient elements in the reconstruction period and in way of state building. The Conference has the following objectives:

1. Presentation of the key arguments and data in the PHDR (2002)
2. Presentation of a Palestinian perspective on human development, rebuilding, and future action
3. Dissemination of a human development approach that is tailored for Palestinian needs
4. Facilitation of an informed debate among local governmental and non-governmental institutions based on objective analyses of development approaches
5. Provision of an opportunity for international donor governmental and non-governmental organizations to become more familiar with Palestinian points of views and to discuss these views
6. Relating the human development approach to the current debate on institutional development
7. Making available specific recommendations and courses of action concerning over 20 sectors
8. Merging the points of views of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank in a coherent form.

The Conference will include presentations in a number of areas including:

1. Political, economic, social, and institutional implications of the human development approach proposed in the PHDR.
2. A gender analysis of the PHDR.
3. Palestinian institutions with a focus on Ministries, the PLC, the Judiciary, Security Agencies, local councils, election law, and the role of communities in governance.
4. Economic development (economic policies, private sector, and international governmental and non-governmental funding).
5. Social development (education, health, environment, and the role of women in development).
6. Palestinian civil society (NGOs, political groups, and professional and workers' unions)
7. The role of the media.

Preparations for the Conference included the organization of scores of workshops with experts, community leaders, and representatives of various marginal and interest groups. Over 25 background papers were prepared. Another 40 recommendation papers will also be made available for the conference attendants. The proceeding of the Conference will be made available shortly after the presentations are completed through our homepage. The PHDR will be finalized after the recommendations of the participants are considered.

The Conference is being organized through a number of specialized committees: a committee of sponsors, a media committee, an advisory committee, an administrative committee, an information committee, and a technical committee. The proceedings of the Conference will be covered by various media outlets; and the PHDR itself is currently being the subject of debate through the local media.

Invited to the conference are representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions, local and international. Decision-makers and other staff members of various institutions, PLC members, NGOs are also invited. Young people will also participate.

The Conference will be simultaneously held in both the West Bank (Ramallah) and Gaza Strip (Gaza City). The recommendations resulting from both conferences will be integrated.

The following documents will be distributed during the Conference:

- A summary of the PHDR.
- 25 background papers.
- Over 40 recommendation papers from the West Bank and Gaza.
- DSP's publications.
- The publications of other relevant research centers.
- A poster on human development in Palestine.
- The DSP Activity Report for 1999-2001.
- The DSP latest opinion poll – survey.

National Conference on Human Development (Toward A Viable State)

Sunday June 16, 2002		Speakers	
Time	Title	West Bank & Gaza	
9:00 – 10:30	Opening Session	His Excellency President Yaser Arafat Birzeit University MOPIC UNDP Technical Advisory Group Summary of the PHDR	
		Moderators: Albert Aghazerian & Itimad Muhana	
10:30 – 11:00	Break		
11:00 – 12:45	Session One: Implications of the PHDR Political Implications Economic Implications Social Implications Institutional Implications The PHDR from a Gender Perspective	Gaza - Ghazi Sourni - Mariam Abu Daqa - Moein Rajab - Nahed Al Rayes - Nahda Younes Moderators - Sami Abu Zarifa	West Bank - Bassam Salhi - Islah Jad - Naser Abdel Karim - Ramzi Rihan - Zaheera kamal - Zuhair Sabbagh
12:45 – 13:30	Lunch Break		
13:30 – 15:00	Session Two: Roundtables – working groups to discuss proposed sector recommendations		
15:00 -16:30	Session Three: Issues in social development Education Environment Health Social Spending	 - Moh'd Zeyada - Dima Zomor - Moh'd Zeinelden - Andalib Odwan	 - Tafeeda Jarbawi - Moh'd Said - Fathi Abu Moghli - Cairo Arafat
	Commentators Moderators	 - Itemad Mohana - Kamal Astal	 - Khalid Nakhleh - Jihad Mishal

* Each Session will be followed by discussion, question-answer period.

Monday June 17, 2002		Speakers	
Time	Title	Gaza	West Bank
9:00 – 10:30	Session Four: Economic Policies & Funding Practices Economic Development The role of the privet sector International & Arab Funding The role of international NGO's Commentators Moderators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gazi Sourani (Mahmoud Ja'fari paper) - Moein Rajab - Basem Khaldi - Rajy Sourani - Ali Sha'th - Omar Sha'ban 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mahoumd Ja'fari - Samir Abdallah - Moh'd Shadid - Izzat Abdelhadi - Moh'd Ishtaieh - Moh'd Ghadeieh
10:30 – 10:45	Break		
10:45 -12:15	Session Five: Palestinian Civil Society Political groups NGO's Professional & Workers' Unions Commentators Moderators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Khalid Khatib - Tayseer Mhaisen - Talal Okal - Ramzi Rabah - Issam Younis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tayseer Arouri - Randa Sanyora - Na'em Naser - Jamil Hilal - Majdi Malki
12:15 – 13:00	Lunch Break		
13:00 – 14:30	Session Six: Community Participation Community participation in local governance Palestinian Elections The role of the media in participatory development Commentators Moderators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ibrahim Khashan - Ziad Abu Amr - Hani Habib - Ismai'l Abu Shamala - Ahmad Abu Shawish 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fadia Salfiti - Adnan Odeh - Samih Shibib - Saleh Abdeljawad - Sufian Musha'sha
14:30 – 14:45	Break		
14:45 – 16:15	Seventh Session: PNA institutions Ministries PLC The Judiciary Security Agencies Commentators Moderators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hasan Kashef - Hamdi Shaqora - AbdelRahman Abu Elnaser - Sobheyeh Jom'ah - Reyad Al Hasan - Jamila Sydam 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ahmad Majdalani - Azmi Shua'ibi - Ali Safarini - Ali Jarbawi - Ghanya Malhees - Liza Traki
16:15 – 16:45	Closing Remarks		