Castañeda's dystopia

Abstract

Among the more vexing problems for a theory of practical reasoning is that of distinguishing the proper terms of practical inferences and providing an account of the semantic values by means of which the validity of those inferences can be characterized. Though, normally, we do not think of an imperative like 'James, extinguish your cigar!' as possessing a truth-value, we can certainly come to accept and issue it on the basis of apparently sound reasons. If such reasoning is at all plausible, then what sort of designated value is preserved or conferred upon the conclusion? 1 Over the past three decades, Professor Castaneda has developed a powerful theory of practical thinking in which this problem is resolved in a novel and systematic fashion, a mega-theory which addresses a wide variety of issues in deontic logic and action theory as well. 2 But the sheer extent and internal unity of his program exposes it to critical scrutiny from many angles, surprisingly, to an objection from the arena of nonnative ethics. In what follows, I will show that Castaneda's semantics of practical language and inference has normative implications of which we have good reason to be suspicious.