



---

The Palestine Question Amid Regional Transformations

Source: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Winter 2013), pp. 71-92

Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2013.42.2.71>

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Journal of Palestine Studies*

JSTOR



## IPS ROUNDTABLE

### THE PALESTINE QUESTION AMID REGIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

*For some time, the Journal of Palestine Studies' sister quarterly, Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya (MDF), has held small, open-ended roundtable discussions at the Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS) headquarters in Beirut to address issues of importance to Palestine and the Arab world, with a view to publishing the proceedings. On 15 December 2012, JPS followed suit, and in cooperation with MDF organized an English-language roundtable at the IPS Beirut headquarters to consider the impact, on Palestine, of the regional changes subsumed under the "Arab Spring" rubric. Participants ranged over an array of topics, including geopolitical changes at the global and regional levels; political, social, and intellectual trends from the Maghrib to the Gulf; and internal developments in several states, as well as within Palestinian communities in historic Palestine and the Diaspora. Especially noteworthy is the grounding of current developments in a historical framework evolving since World War I. The roundtable was transcribed by JPS Editorial Assistant Linda Khoury and the transcript edited by JPS Associate Editor Linda Butler.*

#### **Participants:**\*

*Chair:* Rashid Khalidi (RK)

*IPS:* Ahmad Samih Khalidi (ASK), Elias Khoury (EK), Camille Mansour (CM)

*Guests:* Cengiz Çandar (CC), Jim Muir (JM), and Yezid Sayigh (YS)

**RK:** As we've agreed, the theme we're going to address today is how recent changes in the region affect the Palestinian question. I don't want to direct the discussion, which I have no doubt will go in many directions, but obviously we'll have things to say about the changes of regimes, new regional alignments, the latest developments of the U.S.-Iranian and Israeli-Iranian cold war (if we can call it that), the war in Syria, and the changes within Palestine as far as Hamas and the Ramallah Authority are concerned. All these factors are of interest to us, along with larger global issues—energy, U.S. priorities, strategies—and how they affect the region. All of these issues are also of interest to readers of *JPS*. So let's begin.

---

\* Participant identifications can be found at the end of the transcript.

*Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XLII, No. 2, (Winter 2013), pp. 71–92, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.  
© 2013 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, at <http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp>. DOI: [jps.2013.XLII.2.71](https://doi.org/10.1215/0377919X-2013-0071)

**YS:** The two issues within these parameters that I've been thinking about and would like to start with are (1) the Arab Spring, or however we want to label it, which may or may not affect Palestine in the coming years, and (2) developments within Palestine itself, particularly the position of Hamas and what I see as a long-term trend in which it consolidates and even strengthens (though within limits, I think) its position as the dominant political force in Palestine.

About the first, what's very striking is the fact that even in the countries where the transitions have been greatest—such as in Egypt and Tunisia, where the overthrow of their presidents-for-life was relatively swift and painless—the process is at best in the early stages. We are just now getting into the serious business of fundamental struggles over power, legitimacy, symbolism, institutions, and I think we're in for a very long ride. Even in cases like Egypt, where there is an institutional legacy, the idea of a state, and certain limits and modes of interaction that are observed—even there, I think, there will be some very intense struggles. We already see the beginnings of these since Morsi assumed the presidency, with key institutional actors who may start to move from positions of passivity (the interior ministry, say, or the state civilian bureaucracy). There is also the army, which has never been entirely passive, but where we may see a long-term shift from a position of reluctance and grudging acceptance to a more active obstruction to the president and his political allies—the Muslim Brotherhood (and its Freedom and Justice Party) and the Salafist al-Nour party. So that's an example of struggles that still lie ahead in places like Tunis, Syria, Yemen, Libya of course—and that's just at the formal political and institutional level.

If you look at the socio-economic level, you have this massive social and economic crisis, deepening problems of unemployment, marginality of the underclass, the urban poor versus the middle class, and so on. All these divisions are important, but against the backdrop of the immense economic challenges of dealing with debt, future problems of catching up with lost opportunity, and then actually struggling to compete in the region, international markets, attracting foreign direct investment, and so on—it's overwhelming, and success is by no means assured. All these countries will be totally bogged down in these kinds of struggles for years to come—I would say that five years is very much the short term, during which we may see either serious political crises and/or new rounds of elections that could lead to the defeat of some of these “mainstream,” or moderate, Islamist parties, in some cases producing new hybrids or new governing coalitions.

Given all this, the willingness and ability of any of these states to focus in any meaningful way on Palestine is extremely limited.

The most likely case of any involvement is Egypt. It has a short border with Palestine (Gaza) and long border with Israel. There's a lot of

popular sympathy for the Palestinians in the country, and of course a natural affinity between the Muslim Brotherhood, which now appears to be Egypt's dominant party, and Hamas. On the other hand, it has become clear since Morsi assumed the presidency that it is far from certain that he would want any significant change with regard to Gaza. And whatever his actual preferences may be, the armed forces, in particular, are extremely reluctant to change the status quo. Regardless of who's in power, the Egyptian authorities have proven to be very cautious, conservative, supportive of the status quo, with minor modifications, on issues relating to the border with Gaza, relations with Hamas, opening up trade, and so on. I do think there's scope for considerable improvement in terms of movement of goods and so on—fuel and energy, etc.—across the Egypt and the Sinai-Gaza border. But, strategically, I don't think Egypt can significantly realign itself on the Palestine issue. I also doubt this would be a source of strain domestically, again because of all the negative socio-economic indicators mentioned. So I really don't see how Egypt can do much more.

A quick word with regard to Syria, which besides bordering Israel has long-term involvements with the Palestinian movement and its various groups, including Hamas. Most people in Syria, including across the opposition spectrum, are very suspicious of the United States and ready to see an Israeli agenda behind everything. The commitment to Palestine is often mentioned in statements of the opposition, and in general Palestine is mentioned far more frequently, say, than in Libya and Tunisia. In Syria, I think, commitment to Palestine is still very deep, but what that translates into can't be guessed. I also wouldn't make any simplistic assumptions that the rise of Salafism, Islamism, Jihadism, and so on would translate into any particular foreign policy position on Palestine.

Syria of course is going to have an even messier and more complex long-term transitional process—assuming the bloodshed actually stops—but in the longer term, because of its proximity to Lebanon and Jordan, where there are significant Palestinian refugees communities, and because Syria itself has a sizeable Palestinian refugee community, its involvement in Palestine will be different from Egypt's. For Egypt, the Palestine issue has always been a *strategic* issue, whereas for Syria, Palestine enters into their social and ideological construct in other ways. In any case, should a new power or coalition emerge in Syria, however messily, and if it is, let's say, sympathetic to Islamism, then Hamas is likely to benefit more than the PA structure with Mahmud Abbas. In general, insofar as the long-term trend for Hamas is still upward, and the Arab Spring can be seen as having eased its isolation, it could have prospects for several significant new partners and associates in the region.

**JM:** It seems that throughout the region the role of the so-called moderate Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood, is becoming paramount in all these

places. It's clearly the key player in the Syrian opposition, as in all these situations, not necessarily because they are a majority force, because they're more coherent, cohesive, more organized.

What I'm wondering is whether we can draw conclusions about the Brotherhood's relationship with the secular, liberal, democratic forces on the one side and the Salafists on the other: with which do they have more in common? Clearly they're not very keen on the Salafists. Do they see Turkey as a model? In any case these relationships are obviously going to be very crucial and will affect Hamas and the whole configuration of the region.

But given the likelihood of decades of turmoil ahead, with all these regimes held in place for decades by the *mukhabarat*, and suddenly all these dams breaking at the same time, I think we're in for what I call "necessary chaos" for quite some time. Questions of legitimate representation will need to shake out and new governments will have to figure out their policies, while their publics become more used to the idea of not having a dictator telling them what to think and do.

**ASK:** I think one of the most significant aspects, which people have talked about but which perhaps has not been given enough in-depth attention, is the extent to which what's been happening is actually changing the political boundaries of the states in the region, and the very notion of the state itself.

People have remarked on the demise of the post-Ottoman system, the Sykes-Picot boundaries, and so on. But what this suggests to me is that the kind of states that emerged in the region in the early- to mid-twentieth century, which were essentially defined by borders drawn by colonial powers on the one hand and by fundamentally nineteenth century liberal, nationalist concepts of statehood on the other, are now being significantly challenged. You see forces pulling toward secession in Yemen, Iraq, certainly in Syria. No matter what happens, there's no way the political borders of Syria are going to go back to what they were. The Kurds are in secession—I think it's far more likely that we'll see a new Kurdish state encompassing parts of Syria, Iraq, possibly even Turkey, before we'll see an independent Palestinian state. Under any conceivable scenario, what is most likely for Syria is a weak central government with very strong regionalisms along the lines of Iraq—which is already a federation, and in my opinion itself on its way to potential collapse. Syria is in the process of Iraqization and Lebanonization combined. I'm no Yemen expert, but I don't think the South's secession in Yemen is an unlikely prospect either.

For Palestine, I think Hamas in Gaza is another clear case of political secession, whose consequences have not been sufficiently addressed because they alter the whole shape and contours of the Palestinian national project. If Gaza is taken away from the West Bank, then the

entire concept of a Palestinian state, its borders, its demography, its access to the Mediterranean Sea—everything is changed; including the very terms of a two-state solution as it has been established ever since the mid-seventies. Palestine’s borders have now become more problematic perhaps than any time in the past, not just in terms of the Palestinian-Israeli concept of boundaries, but in terms of the Palestinians’ own internal boundaries.

In fact, the borders of Palestine really were defined by the British. What we call Palestine is to some extent an artificial construct. Of course, all these post-Ottoman Arab states are artificial constructs: the post-World War I system produced nations that were defined by their borders rather than the other way around. The West comes and says, “Here’s Lebanon” and suddenly there’s something called the Lebanese, or “Here’s Jordan” and suddenly there are “Jordanians.” So it was the borders that defined the people rather than the people who defined the borders, and I think that this is one of the new dynamics where people are searching for new forms of attachment and citizenship that can involve new borders which, if they’re ever going to be stable, will have to have some kind of authenticity that springs from the region itself rather than from lines arbitrarily drawn on a map by foreign powers.

**RK:** I think Ahmad may be right that we’re moving toward Lebanization and/or Iraqization in many of these states, especially those in the Arab Mashreq which happen to have grown out of Sykes-Picot. Turkey and Egypt, which have a long tradition of “state-ness” and have developed a strong sense of national identity, may not be affected by the same currents. I agree that the more artificial borders drawn by Europe may disappear or change. Of course Saudi Arabia, being a country that does not have strong, centralized state structures and is wary of its powerful neighbors, would, I’m sure, be happy to see this kind of devolution.

**CC:** I tend to look at when and how border decisions were made after the long centuries when borders as we know them did not exist at all. We needed two world wars to reshape the region: World War I, with the collapse of three empires, redrew borders in Europe. World War II changed the map of Europe again, and while the borders in this region didn’t change at the same magnitude as the first, it was followed by the emergence of the State of Israel on the map. Thus, the fault lines in the aftermath of that second war on a global scale, made a very strong imprint on the region and the destinies of its people.

**ASK:** So do we need World War III to make new changes here?

**CC:** We did have a kind of World War III: the Cold War, which was also waged on a global scale and which effectively ended in 1989–1991 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Once

again, European borders changed: seven states came out of Yugoslavia, fifteen new republics came out of the Soviet Union. In central Europe we had two Germanies that became one, and we had a civil divorce between the Czechs and the Slovaks (which subsequently reunited within the framework of the European Union). Interestingly, nothing changed in our region. But if we keep the “world war” analogy, now may be the time that we may see some radical border changes.

I agree with Yezid that we will see decades of turmoil—there won’t be swift power changes like in Tunisia and Egypt. So what the Arab revolutions might suggest is the inauguration of a new reshaping of the region with new borders. There could be some analogy in the post-World War I years, Lebanon, and so on. So, when we speak of an independent Palestinian state and the quest for an independent Kurdish state, this can only come in the aftermath of such upheaval. As far as I can see, there won’t be an independent Palestinian state if there isn’t an independent Kurdish state, or vice versa, because both would emerge from the same set of circumstances.

In terms of the Palestinians, the current situation brings to my mind the Palestinian divisions during the interwar years, which makes that period worth reviewing because it could say something about the fortunes of Hamas and the Abu Mazin-led authority. Elias told me that many Arab intellectuals think the Muslim Brotherhood experiment is already doomed. In any case, if Egypt doesn’t align itself strategically with Hamas, as Yezid suggested, for the reasons he outlined, this will surely diminish the standing of Hamas. How can Hamas be on the rise if it is devoid of significant Brotherhood support from Egypt, and if Syria, whatever the sympathies of the opposition and the people may be, is mired in a long, messy, chaotic transitional period and in no position to have meaningful input to the Palestinian question? Hamas will be on the sidelines of the new equation. What will the external dynamics be for the various Palestinian actors?

**CM:** I’d like to tackle the impact of the regional changes on what is most important for our topic —Israel, and the balance between Israel and its neighbors. It seems to me that the regional changes have provoked contradictory trends, with some factors strengthening Israel and others weakening it. Among the strengthening factors, we have the turmoil in Syria and Egypt. There is also the political isolation of Hizballah within Lebanon, and the fact that Hizballah is facing/will face serious difficulties in getting Iranian support through Syria. We haven’t talked about Jordan, but the precarious situation there is also a plus for Israel.

On the Palestinian side, not only are Hamas and Fatah politically divided, but there’s also the geographic division—the physical separation between Gaza and the West Bank, where Hamas may be stronger now. So there is no unified Palestinian polity, no unified policies. And

whereas in the past there was the PLO, which even without territoriality was a unifying force for Palestinians everywhere, today it doesn't even have influence with the Diaspora Palestinians. The overall Palestinian crisis is older than the turmoil in the Arab world, but the Arab turmoil has not alleviated it, and may have aggravated it.

Of course all these factors favor Israel and directly concern the West Bank in that they facilitate the conquest of the land: colonization, E1, settlement expansion inside and around Jerusalem, and so on. And in the face of all this turmoil, the weakening of the Arab actors, and Palestinian fragmentation and division, we have a coherent Israeli actor.

As for the trends that do not favor Israel, in strategic terms there's the fact that around Israel you have non-state actors that are not deterred by classical deterrence. I mean, Israel can deter the Egyptian *state*, but if the Egyptian military no longer controls the Sinai, you have groups there—non-state actors with military means—that can no longer be deterred by classical means. There are probably such groups in Syria as well.

**ASK:** The Golan is the next Sinai. We should anticipate a breakdown in the system of central control and growing infiltration of the Golan by extremist and other groups that intend to use it as a base against Israel and possibly other Arab parties, such as Jordan.

**RK:** The most vigorous fighting groups around Damascus are from the Hawran, the area immediately adjacent to the Golan. When they're finished in Damascus and return to their region, when the fighting in Syria is over, they may well be a threat to Israel . . .

**CM:** But if you take Hizballah, there *is* deterrence. They are a quasi-state, a completely rational actor. The Hizballah-Israel relationship is based on/shaped by deterrence. Hamas is on the way to becoming a rational actor, but there you have the conflict/competition with other Islamist groups, and we don't know how that will evolve in Gaza.

Nevertheless, the fact that non-state actors are not deterred means that the so-called Israeli home front is vulnerable and needs to be defended. We saw the relative effectiveness of Israel's anti-missile missiles in their recent confrontation in Gaza, but even so the situation in Gaza remains a weak point for Israel. Another weak point concerns Egypt. If Egypt doesn't have enough military control over Sinai, the treaty could be in jeopardy, which could mean war. Even without war, the treaty could be in jeopardy because of internal factors in Egypt, maybe demonstrations against Israel, or whatever.

**RK:** Can I add something here? It's not just if the military doesn't control Sinai. It's also if the constitutional crisis is not resolved and there is no clarity about the government in Egypt, then the military won't control Sinai and Egypt will be less and less of a unified actor.



**CM:** Completely.

**CC:** So you're saying that the Sinai accord can become null and void . . . ?

**CM:** Not completely null and void. We don't know what the military will decide. The relevant aspect of the treaty here is the limitations of Egyptian forces and weapons inside the Sinai. But what's important here is the political dimension between Egypt and Israel, and the quasi-military dimension in Sinai.

Other factors that are negative for Israel are weakened ties with Turkey. Also the impasse with the Palestinians. It's an impasse that repeats itself every day. The current visibility of Hamas in the West Bank following the Gaza conflict several weeks ago is a manifestation of this. More broadly, there are millions of Palestinians that have to be governed, including in Israel. Even if you conquer and settle, what's the solution? How long can this continue without Israel being able to say once and for all that the relationship with the Palestinians has been resolved?

Of course, it's possible that the result of the political dynamics within Israel is that the Israeli's don't *want* to have resolution with the Palestinians. If you look at Israeli internal politics since the early 1990s, you find that the Palestinian issue until recently was central in the internal debate and political dynamics. How to resolve the Palestinian issue, how to deal with the Palestinians brought down Israeli governments, led to Rabin's assassination, and provoked early elections time and again . . . . For the last elections and for the one underway, this is no longer the case. The rightward trend this denotes has a negative impact on Israel's image in Europe, where public opinion is against Israel. And possibly, if this trend continues, foreign governments will be less inclined to always follow the Israeli position.

**EK:** Two comments about what I've taken away from the discussion so far.

First, which is a major element, is Israel's total isolation in the region, for the first time since World War II, since Israel was created. If you look back to the 1950s, there's the Baghdad Pact, where you have Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq, all as Israeli allies. Now look at the map. Pakistan is out of the question. Iraq is out. Iran is totally anti-Israeli, and Turkey is on the way to becoming anti-Israeli. So this isolation in the region is a major strategic element.

**RK:** Israel has major bases in Ethiopia and Eritrea (and in Iraqi Kurdistan), but other than that, nothing.

**ASK:** Israel *does* have tacit alliances in the Gulf—the Gulf states, the Saudis. That's their major strategic alliance today, against Iran.

**EK:** These are entities, not states. Besides money, this is not a serious alliance. It's an American alliance—the Gulf needs to be *protected* by the Americans, even Egypt. The important thing is that Israel has lost the major nations of the region, which is essential for understanding the new strategic situation.

My second remark concerns a post-Sykes-Picot tendency—there were two opposing trends that grew out of Sykes-Picot, one toward regional fragmentation or separation (such as the Kurds), the other toward unity. I'm talking about the one toward unity. For the first time since the Nasirite discourse, you feel that something is taking place across the region with the same language—in Tunisia and Egypt it's unbelievably similar. In Syria and Libya, even with the outside interventions and the extent of the destruction, it's very similar. When the Syrian regime falls its impact will first be felt here in Beirut, and I don't mean the degradation of Hizballah's status. I don't know what it will be exactly, but even now Tripoli in northern Lebanon is virtually part of Syria; I wonder whether it will insist on going back to its original name, Tarablus al-Sham. In any case, what's happening there is absolutely part of what's taking place in Syria.

We're now facing the questions that we refused to face one hundred years ago, when legitimacy was totally destroyed following the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, they forged a new legitimacy when the forces massed by Mustafa Kemal pushed out the British-backed invasion of Anatolia and the Kemalist republic was born. But in the Arab world none of the newly created regimes recovered the legitimacy they lost after the Ottoman collapse. Now I think we are returning to this profound question; people are searching. On the level of political theory, this legitimacy question is extremely important, and Arab intellectuals are going to have to take this into account if we want to deal with the turmoil of the Arab revolution and its fallout.

One last point, about Palestine. We see Israel as coherent and all powerful, but they launched the last Gaza war with the aim of pushing Egypt to control Gaza, and it didn't happen. Morsi changed the discourse a little, which must have frightened the Israelis, but in the end they understood that they could not hope that the Brotherhood, with its supposed links to Hamas, would take charge of the Strip. Still, the change of discourse and of attitude was enough to give the feeling that something profound was changing. If we put all these elements together, I think we can be optimistic. I don't agree that the situation is bad. To the contrary, I think, it needs a lot of work and there are profound questions of legitimacy that Arab intellectuals—mainly in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, the major centers of the Arab revolutions—must address for the first time.

**YS:** I wanted to come back to Cengiz's comparison of the Palestinian situation today versus that during the interwar period. I personally think

that the Palestinian situation as it has evolved since the year 2000 has much more in common with the 1948 period. For me, the second intifada paralyzed the Palestinian Authority in much the same way that the 1948 war destroyed what had been a political structure. This last decade or so has been characterized by competing formulations of what constitutes the Palestine national project, the state project. Was it one state, two states, an Islamic state? These same currents were in the air after 1948, and it took at least until 1965 and arguably until 1967 for these questions to resolve themselves. It's my reading that after the second intifada we've been moving into a sort of drift period as well.

But whether we choose the interwar period or the post-1948 period, there is one major difference today. And that is that there are now *two* Palestinian institutions. There is the PA, which whatever we want to say about it still survives somehow as a nominal structure with a certain substance, and the Hamas government/political structure in Gaza. These are two institutional realities that differ in very significant ways from what existed in either of those earlier periods. There are two conclusions one might draw from this, which are divergent if not contradictory. On the one hand, you could put a positive spin on things: thanks to the presence of these two institutions, the Palestinians may be better able to resist further damage or loss and to articulate, define, and debate national agendas and to struggle over them until they can reach a particular majority vision.

But the other possibility is that the institutional, territorial logic or imperative that grows out of this divided situation means that these two institutions have a vested interest in maintaining, consolidating, and reproducing themselves separately, in a way that didn't exist in the interwar period or after 1948.

It's like what Ahmad was saying earlier. The boundaries of Sykes-Picot are being called into question. We've been treating the notion of Palestine (after the creation of the PLO and everything) as sacred: the word "sacralization" has been used. Well, now we're in the process of desacralization, which already started at least as far back as Oslo in 1993. To turn the notion of Palestine's borders from something sacred and untouchable into territorializing your claims—that's what of course the PLO did at Oslo. Actually this started in 1974 when the PLO first adopted what became the two-state solution, based on setting up a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Since then we've had one ongoing process of territorializing the idea of Palestine, from all Mandate Palestine to the "mini-state" of 1974 to the fully formed two-state idea of 1988, with the non-contiguous territories of the West Bank and Gaza forming one unit. Today, we have taken it even further, with Gaza being the new *de facto* territorial embodiment of Palestine—in effect there is one political, institutional reality for Hamas in Gaza, and one for the PA, fragments, or whatever is left over in the West Bank.

There is a paradox. The Palestinians have agency in a way that they didn't in the earlier periods thanks to these institutional structures. But these structures are also in the process of responding to regional transformations and responding to opportunities and challenges in ways that may deepen their divergent trends. Consequently, this may not serve what we see as the national interest in the long term.

**RK:** I agree with most of what you said. Concerning the institutional logic you mention, that of course is true. But these institutions are linked to the Palestinians' subordination to Israel, to their integration into a "normalized" occupation. The self-interest of both the so-called Hamas "Authority" and the so-called Ramallah "Authority" is entirely at odds with any kind of liberationist logic, with any kind of national logic. It's entirely self-interested, it's entirely institutional and is completely compatible with the continuing expansion of Israeli control and settlements. In fact, it is a precondition for the continuation. As far as I can see, for all the contradictions between them and Israel, these two "Authorities" are both in their own ways faithful agents of Israel.

**YS:** This is part of the institutional territorial imperative. Colonialism has never succeeded, whether in India or Ghana or anywhere else, in establishing control mechanisms except because local actors not only collaborated but were active agents, who established their own networks, their own spheres of influence, resources, etc., and had adapted to the colonial structure in place.

I was interested in Cengiz's comment, quoting Elias, about the consensus among Arab intellectuals that the Muslim Brotherhood had its moment and is on the decline. I'm not completely convinced, but I do think, very briefly, that looking at Hamas after 2006 could give an idea of where things in Egypt might go. Hamas won the elections and then was blocked in various ways ranging from the "indirect" —for example, resistance to the Hamas cabinet within the civil service, the security forces refusing to take orders, etc.—to overt confrontation. Egypt is sort of like that. You have the elected president linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and then what you could call the "deep state"—the huge interior ministry, the massive civil bureaucracy, the armed forces—all resistant in somewhat different ways and ranging from passive resistance to outright hostility. Why do I compare this situation to Hamas? Because Hamas is still there. It held on. So I wouldn't dismiss the Brotherhood as over in Egypt.

**JM:** What's the basis for the resistance in Egypt by the "deep state"?

**YS:** Inertia. A range of things. For the army, I think it's just fundamental distrust of the Brotherhood or Islamist dogma. But with them, the way they see the challenge and respond to it differs. The interior sector, on

the other hand, was the front line against the Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood in every way for decades. Not just with repression and torture, but also with manipulating elections and forging the vote. However, what the resistance to the Brotherhood in Egypt lacks is a clear political leadership.

But what I'm getting from people in Egypt who are "secular" is that the resistance to the Islamists in power is mainly bureaucratic. It may just be that the bureaucrats are massively underpaid, and that this government is fundamentally unable to win them over without radically shifting standards of pay and career prospects when the government obligations are just overwhelming.

I want to come back once again to what Cengiz said. I agree that Palestine has been hugely shaped by these conjunctures in history, World War I, World War II, the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the longer historical sense, Palestine was the last leftover of the eras of Ottoman dissolution and post-World War II decolonization (along with the Kurds). But in terms of going from these conjunctures and broad trends in the region to projecting how that affects Palestine, I don't see the Arab uprisings of 2011 as a harbinger of a new global shift, but rather as the very late ripples of 1989–91. What allowed the two-state solution to become a political reality in the early 1990s was the intersection of three levels: the end of the Cold War, the strategic shift inside the region (e.g., the Iraq-Iran war, the Kuwait war), and the internal Palestinian shift between Fatah and Hamas. But the window of opportunity of the two-state solution closed or has been closing from the start of the second intifada. By that time, 2000–2001, the dust had already settled in terms of Europe, German reunification, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the triumph of neoliberal capitalism, all these things. Previously, Cold War politics had been the last opening for the Palestinians; they had their foot in the door (of achieving statehood) but the second intifada closed that door. The Palestinians weren't the only ones responsible, but they closed it on themselves.

The implication is that Palestine doesn't benefit, at least for the time being, from the intersection of international, regional, and local factors except insofar as Gaza becomes a political enterprise of its own. My reading is that Khalid Mish'al hopes to become Arafat II, the Palestinian national leader, even though practically speaking Hamas has no way of gaining a foothold in the West Bank unless they play a very different game politically and diplomatically. If they don't have a viable West Bank option, then what we're left with is the possibility that within the next ten to fifteen years, quasi-statehood will be consolidated in Gaza, with the border with Egypt becoming more porous and open (more trade and movement of capital, etc.). Whatever the rhetorical commitments to the rest of Palestine, if Hamas succeeds in consolidating its rule in Gaza, the bottom line is that Gaza becomes a quasi-state.

**ASK:** Just to go back and reexamine some of the things we've discussed. If the fundamental drivers of change are these external apocalyptic events, one such event on the horizon is the question of what happens in the event of war against Iran. That may be the context of convulsive dynamics unleashed in the region, not just strategic and military but political and demographic. One immediate impact would be on Iraq. Also on the Kurds—and if there is this linkage between Kurdistan and a Palestinian state that Cengiz talked about, it seems to me a war with/on Iran would suffice to unleash a new situation in Iraq that would spread to Syria, depending on what happens there in the meantime. So we have Iraq, the Kurds, and also the Shi'a in the south and by extension the Shi'i populations in the Gulf states. All this could result in another convulsion and a new redrawing of borders.

But concerning Camille's question about the strategic balance with Israel, I think that if you were sitting today in the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, you'd feel pretty comfortable overall. I agree with Camille that not everything is to Israel's advantage, but if you take Egypt, for example, no matter what happens, Brotherhood or no Brotherhood, they're not going to be an active force in the sense of Egypt moving militarily against Israel. True, Israel's relationship with Turkey has deteriorated very significantly, but this may be on the mend as Tel Aviv finds common grounds with Ankara over Iran. In the past, Syria, though not a major player, still had to be taken into account strategically by Israel, at least they had to keep in mind the several hundred chemical weapons/warheads while calculating scenarios with Iran or Hizballah, and Syria's potential role, direct or otherwise, in a conflict. Now, they can be at ease: Syria is out of the picture as a strategic adversary. And of course Iraq was knocked out before that. So the whole notion of the Eastern front is essentially reduced to Hizballah, which is isolated and rationally deterrable through [this kind] of balance of power.

And to complete the picture, you have the new situation in Gaza where the deal is very clear: security for Israel in exchange for greater leeway for Hamas and a green light for leaders, such as Mish'al, to visit. That's it. If this deal holds, Hamas would have effectively sealed the last active Palestinian military front with Israel. This was, in essence, the result of the last Gaza war through a deal brokered by the Americans and the Egyptians.

If I'm sitting in Tel Aviv, my concern more than anything else would be Jordan, Israel's main regional ally since before the 1930s, its buffer against the changes coming from the east. They may not have the kind of situation that they have in Sinai today, but they do have to consider the potential changes in Transjordan extending all the way to the Iranian border. Meanwhile, Hamas is looking toward Jordan, and this is what they're thinking, in my view: We have done this security deal with Israel in Gaza, effectively bypassing the peace process and exchanging

consolidation of our rule in return for security for Israel. The peace process has failed, okay? If I'm Hamas, what does Israel want that I can offer? Security. So that's what I'll give them. I'm talking about a certain concept, a mindset. But Hamas also thinks it will eventually take over in Jordan, that's their long-term project. Much is contingent on what happens in Syria, but if Asad goes inevitably they'll think that they can take Amman. And through their presence on the East Bank, they think they'll be able to exert their gravitational pull on the West Bank: Just as Cairo exerts its influence and draws in Gaza, so Amman will draw in Ramallah. This is all grounded in and rationalized by Hamas's concept of a long-term *budna*, where you can offer Israel security for a defined (and renewable) period of time in return for a certain amount of freedom of action. We have to keep in mind that they're not nationalists, they're Islamists and they have a different project. Land for them is a secondary issue . . . .

**CM:** Let me understand: I guarantee your security in Gaza but am free to do whatever I want in Jordan against you?

**ASK:** No. Once I take over in Amman, that's when I'll give you peace in the West Bank. This is what Hamas has in mind. The PA is on its way out anyway and the Israelis will have no one else to talk to.

**YS:** I just want to ask if what you're saying is based on your own strategic logic or . . .

**ASK:** My reading is that when the moment is ripe they believe they'll move into the West Bank via Amman. The Jordanian Brotherhood also believes that with Hamas's extensions in the West Bank they will eventually take over *both* banks of the Jordan. This is fundamentally what the conflict in Jordan today is about. If you talk to the East Bankers, this is precisely their concern because they don't want to be drowned in a Palestinian sea. They are actually accusing the Jordanian Brotherhood of concocting a plot whereby Jordan becomes the "alternative" Palestinian homeland and, in fact, in some sense this is true. This is exactly what the Brotherhood wants. They do want the East Bank to join the West Bank as the "alternative" Palestinian state. This is the Brothers' strategic vision of their "two-state solution."

**EK:** Just this morning I read that, three days ago, Abu Mazin was talking about a confederation with Jordan, so it seems that Fatah and Hamas are in competition for Jordan! I think it's a point worth analyzing . . .

**RK:** I think we have clarified, or at least discussed, many of the issues Yezid laid out and other people amplified, under the headings of the Arab Spring's impact and issues relating to Palestine, including the wider

regional dynamics. I agree with the consensus that the changes coming out of the uprisings will be painful and long and probably won't lead to a clear situation in most of these countries for a very long time. But I also think that whatever optimism some (myself included) may have had that the popular sovereignty emerging in some places, coupled with the natural sympathy many have for Palestinians, might change government positions concerning Palestine is, perhaps, premature.

I have two comments, one that could make a positive impact on Palestine more likely, and the second one less likely. For the first, I believe we are almost certainly on a post-Cold War path to greater public involvement in government decision making. This has taken place in Latin America, Eastern Europe, some parts of Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, where authoritarian regimes have collapsed by the dozens, actually by the scores, since the end of the Cold War—the period Cengiz referred to. The only exception has been the Arab region, and sooner or later it has to happen here too. It might take, as Yezid suggested, five to ten years, or more, but eventually we're likely to have governments more responsive to the popular impatience at U.S. bias toward Israel and strong sympathy for the Palestinians. Whether the governments will act with more cohesion or more vigorously is anybody's guess.

My second comment is that this wave of revolutionary change is not uncontested—it's not shaped solely by the forces within the individual states. The capitals of reaction in the Arab world will do whatever they can to subvert changes favoring the emergence of strong states, as well as to ensure that the most conservative, least progressive forces are in power. The sums of money they are funneling into the countries in the throes of change are certainly sufficient to seriously compromise the likelihood of the first scenario I mentioned. There was no Riyadh or Doha or a comparable actor meddling in the changes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, and so on. This kind of actor seems to thrive in the Arab context. The main enemy of these Arab Gulf regimes is Iran and Shi'ism, and their primary ally the United States/Israel.

I think that what Ahmad referred to as the "tacit alliance" between Israel and Saudi Arabia is more than tacit. From the Israeli perspective, this alliance is a factor of great importance, because Israel is worried about European and U.S. public opinion. But also it's concerned about its own strategic interests, and it knows that for the U.S., the most important strategic interest is Saudi Arabia—America's most important link in the Middle East, established in 1933, fifteen years before the creation of Israel. If anything, Saudi Arabia is more important today than it was in the past. If Israel and the Saudi royal family are on the same page, the Israelis have very little to worry about as far as the U.S. is concerned, at least in the short term, because it's not just the Israel lobby that makes Israel's policies so easy to sell in the U.S., it's the fact that there's no



contradiction between U.S. support for Israel and America's most important interests—the aerospace and the defense lobbies, the oil industry, the petrochemical industries—in other words, the Saudi lobby. So I think that's an important consideration in terms of regional balance. It's a major factor for the status quo.

**ASK:** Except that the U.S. won't be relying primarily on Middle Eastern oil—it's supposed to be energy self-sufficient by 2020 . . .

**RK:** It doesn't matter. What's important to the Americans isn't just Saudi oil, and in fact the U.S. is already importing very little oil from the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is important because it buys from the U.S. aerospace and defense industries and invests in U.S. treasury bonds, right after China. It's one of America's biggest customers. It supports the U.S. economy—its oil revenues are recirculated to New York's capital markets and to U.S. industry and that's a guarantee of so much stability in the region. So having that kind of a regime—a non-state with no national interests as we usually understand them and little concern for the views of its own people, and all this money going from the royal family to Washington, well, all this is an enormous boon for the entire capitalist economy, especially the U.S. economy. That's why the Americans are so concerned about upholding the regime.

**CM:** Rashid, you just opened up the question of the role of external factors, especially the U.S., and their impact on the changes in the region, specifically whether these interventions intentionally or otherwise strengthen the states as coherent actors or not. My impression is that they do not, except maybe Saudi Arabia. And also perhaps, as Yezid mentioned, by keeping the PA going as an institution. Otherwise, Syria is a failed state, Iraq is a failed state, even Egypt, and none of this is of concern for the U.S. So what does it mean for the Palestinians? Does it first mean the marginalization of the Palestinian issue in Washington or the European capitals? Probably yes.

**YS:** Picking up on the issue of Saudi Arabia—which is rather peripheral but it does lead us back into where the Americans are headed—I was going to tease you, Rashid, about the way you've been making this argument about the Saudi non-state for almost thirty-nine years, ever since I've known you! I don't have direct knowledge of the subject, but from people I respect who've done work on Saudi Arabia, I think this non-state image is rather static, and I suspect that it's not a non-state, say, like Libya was. The princes and key players each have their own patronage systems, institutional fiefdoms, and so on that are replicated across the state sector. So it's a particular form of state rather than a non-state: there's a certain consistency, cohesion, institutional logic. As opposed

to Libya under Qaddafi, which really *was* a non-state. But that's just a sociological aside.

What I really want to say is that I'm not as certain as you are about what the Saudis want and what role they're playing. I mean, from what I hear from people very well connected in the kingdom, Syria is one case where the Saudis really don't have an agenda, or if they do, they don't know what to do about it. It's not entirely clear. It's not that they haven't been involved, but no more than others, such as the Qataris.

Getting back to the U.S., and what their long-term goals are. There was a time when the U.S. looked to Saudi Arabia to act as a proxy for them, a regional pillar. There have been convergences, some divergences. But the question here for me is: what is the U.S. strategic trend? Starting from 1990 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. attitude on oil supply in the global market has been tremendously lax, partly because it was no longer the tighter market of the 1970s. As long as the Americans are confident that there's a lot of supply, they don't try to control the market in a geopolitical sense. From talking about this with experts, my sense is that we should be a little bit more cautious in our understanding of the extent to which the U.S. is directing oil politics or the manner it does so.

What seems more important is the declared U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific. I was in Bahrain last week for the Manama Dialogue at which John McCain and William Burns and members of the congressional intelligence committee spoke. They insisted that "pivot" is a very unfortunate word, that the U.S. is still very committed to the Gulf and hasn't abandoned them. But my sense nonetheless is that the U.S. is partially disengaging from the Middle East across the board, though more in some places than in others. It's not like they're pulling out entirely—not at all. But there's a strategic shift which is related to energy supply, to the Asia-Pacific, to things like the fact that the Obama administration has finally come round to support modernizing/upgrading the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal—initially the administration wasn't interested in this, but now they've said that they're going to commit massive financial resources to it.

So there are these long-term structural trends. What I think they translate into with regard to the Middle East is—bottom line—the U.S. doesn't like Bashar al-Asad, but Syria is a sideshow for them. For Europe, too, I think. If you look at Egypt, it has become embarrassingly obvious that all the U.S. cares about there is the Gaza border and the Camp David peace treaty with Israel. With Iran, however, I've been told by people working on the nuclear file that a deal looks more likely than it has for a long time. All of these things allow the U.S. to take a lower posture and to lead from behind. With regard to Palestine, for all the reasons that we already know, the bottom line is that for the next four years the U.S. has no reason to invest or reengage with the peace process in any meaningful way.

**EK:** Concerning the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, I think it's worth mentioning the classical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Egypt that's existed from Muhammad Ali's time through Abdel Nasser all the way to the *Ikhwan*—because it's clear that Saudi politics is in total or near total contradiction with the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood, who are now ruling Egypt. What's the impact of this on American policy in the region? If the Americans are relying on both Saudi Arabia and Egypt (because it's clear that there's a relationship of sorts between the *Ikhwan* and the U.S. administration), how will they deal with this contradiction, which I believe is very profound? I think this element must be taken into consideration if we are to understand the extent to which all the elements of what we think constitutes stability are unstable. Also, nobody is talking about the regional role of the Emirates, which is different from that of the Qataris and Saudis, but which is there, still evolving, and very important.

**RK:** I agree that the Saudi-Egyptian rivalry is very important, and can be linked to what Cengiz said last night about neither Egypt as a state nor Turkey as a state having any use for the Wahhabi project or the Saudi model, both seeing Saudi Arabia as an inferior competitor. The Saudis themselves have a 200-year-old hatred of Egypt. An Egyptian friend told me that Amir Talal ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was complaining to him about something Ibrahim Pasha did in Riyadh in 1807 or 1812, or whenever it was. The Saudis don't forget and the Egyptians don't forget.

But getting back to what Yezid said about Saudi Arabia as simply a different kind of state. I don't fundamentally disagree. It has great institutional cohesion in certain ways. It's a regime that has acquired enormous legitimacy through 250 years of patronage of Al al-Shaykh, which is to say the family of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, and of his radical Wahhabi doctrines, and of the religious establishment. All this, together with the money and the patronage networks that were talked about, makes for a remarkable stability and allows for a powerful kind of internal cohesion.

But it's not the kind of cohesion that a modern nation-state produces. That's the difference. It's an effective structure for Saudi Arabia as it exists, but because its every major ministry—defense, interior, national guard—is a fiefdom, it resembles England before 1215, before the Magna Carta, when the barons were still all-powerful, before there was any kind of reduction of their powers by the king and before the creation of a central state. Thus, there's not any sense of citizenship: the people of the Kingdom are subjects, not citizens, the state belongs to the Saudi royal family, not them. . . . So where the state is concerned, we're talking about twenty mini-Saudi Arabias: a major decision needs the assent of twenty or so of the most important members of the family. It's like a very large ship with multiple pilots, albeit, in many ways, very cohesive internally.

**ASK:** One important aspect of the Saudi role that we haven't looked at here, and which I think is more important than any other, is the manner in which Saudi-Qatari, Sunni-Islamist activism in its various forms has redrawn the fault lines between Sunni and Shi'a across the region. This is not a temporary or passing phenomenon, and it's going to have very profound effects for a very long time to come. In the case of Syria, certainly Iraq and Lebanon, and in the Gulf itself—anywhere where there are significant Shi'i minorities—I think the long-term legacy of this particular facet of the Arab spring will be deeply, deeply divided societies, where the notion of sectarian and confessional allegiances will be primary and take precedence over any other allegiance. This will then reflect itself in the political aspirations and the actual identity of the state. So if you look at, for instance, Syria, and you try to imagine the Sunni and Shi'a or Alawites, in Syria—or Iraq—finding effective formulas for coexistence in the long term—it's going to be very hard. I think that the Saudis and Qataris bear an enormous responsibility for destroying the social and religious fabric in these countries, as well as the notion of coexistence. You can go back and argue that this is a reaction to the Iranians and Hizballah and so on and so forth. I'm not trying to blame the Saudis alone. I'm saying that the long-term consequence of their policies has been to create this fundamental fault line that, for a time at least, seemed to have been blurred by other things as well. (It is also worth noting that there are growing differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates over the former's support for the Muslim Brothers.)

The question is: how far is this going to rebound on Saudi Arabia itself and the other Gulf countries as well? Are we going to see new forms of extremism, whether Shi'a or Sunni or by al-Qaeda affiliates or new forms of Shi'ite extremism that manifest themselves across the region and in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia itself? I think this is one likely scenario. Thus, one of the main manifestations of the Arab Spring is the reemergence of active and potentially destabilizing Sunni-Shi'i fault lines—except to an extent in Lebanon, where the existing tensions have not upset the established rules of the game so far. But we need to see what happens in Syria to know how that affects Lebanon on the sectarian front.

On the Palestinian marginalization that Camille talked about: If there is in fact a systemic secession of Gaza, then the remaining area for dispute between Israel and the Palestinians is fundamentally the West Bank. The Palestinian national project (in its mid-1970s formulation) will have moved from liberating the whole of Palestine to sovereignty in the West Bank/Gaza Strip/East Jerusalem to, basically, either confinement within [Zone] Area A plus/minus, or some kind of link with Jordan. This seems to be where we're heading.

I think this is matched by some other very serious developments. We now have refugee problems all across the Arab world, enormous refugee problems emerging out of Iraq and now Syria. These are refugees who,

we hope, can and will return to their homelands, so in that sense the problem is not of the same nature as the Palestinian refugee problem where the refugees are denied return as a matter of principle. Nonetheless, that aspect of the Arab conscience and consciousness has eroded, not because the moral underpinning of the Palestinian cause has been lost, but because it may be increasingly difficult to mobilize sympathy for Palestinian refugees when you have hundreds of thousands of other refugees. So the experience of homelessness, which in the Arab world was uniquely experienced by us, is being dissipated and eroded. What I'm wondering is to what extent this affects our standing as a cause.

*[Voices of disagreement in the room, unintelligible]*

**ASK:** Maybe I hope I'm wrong on this, but let me make two final points. First, I think the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel today represent, increasingly, the likely frontline, as the other elements of our struggle recede, even if temporarily. I think their fight for equal civil and political rights have taken on much of the weight of the Palestinian cause and in a sense brought it back to its origins. Their discourse, language, and demands are more understandable to many in the outside world: the demands for equality, rights, equal citizenship, a state for all its citizens [these demands] have universal appeal. It's hard to argue against them as a matter of principle. My question is to what extent will this sector of the Palestinian people, who so far have played a secondary role, now be picking up the mantle of the struggle?

My final point is that the Palestinian Diaspora is boiling over, it's seething. This may not be very visible because there's too much confusion and no coherent means of expressing discontent. We mustn't forget that the Palestinian revolution came out of the Diaspora, not out of the West Bank. Historically, it fermented and was incubated in Gaza, but its natural home is among the dispossessed of the Diaspora. This may be an optimistic note, but I think there is a certain logic to the notion that, when the internal project diminishes, the external dimension takes on greater salience.

**RK:** What has been the impact of the transformations of the Palestinian national project that Ahmad talked about on Palestinian identity?

**CM:** Palestinian identity continues to be extremely strong.

**EK:** What people are talking about as a crisis of Palestinian identity is very real, but not more real than it was in the 1960s when the Palestinian identity reemerged. If you remember in 1965, when Fatah began launching armed attacks, everyone was against these mad guys. They were called Zionist agents, enemies of Arab nationalism, and on and on. But then it became clear that these guys represented something very profound in Palestinian consciousness, which is, precisely, the need for

a Palestinian identity. Now coming back to what Ahmad said about the Palestinians of Israel, which is very, very interesting, it seems to me that they may be replaying the role of their fathers/forerunners in the 1950s, like Emile Habibi, all the people involved in *al-Ittibad*, in reforming Palestinian identity before it was reformulated in the Diaspora. So I think this earlier role of the Palestinian citizens of Israel needs to be restudied, not only their political role, but also the cultural one.

\* \* \*

#### **PARTICIPANTS:**

**RASHID KHALIDI**, editor of the *Journal of Palestine Studies* and member of the IPS Research Committee, is the Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University. He is the author of many books, including *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, and, most recently, *Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East*.

**AHMAD SAMIH KHALIDI**, co-editor of IPS's Arabic journal, *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, and a member of the IPS Research Committee, is a senior associate member of St. Antony's College, Oxford. He has written widely on Middle East political and security issues and is co-author of *Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation*, *Track-2 Diplomacy: The Middle East and Beyond*, and *A Framework for a Palestinian National Security Doctrine*.

**ELIAS KHOURY**, co-editor of IPS's Arabic journal, *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, and a member of the IPS Research Committee, is a well-known Lebanese writer, critic, and political activist whose many novels include *Gate of the Sun*, *The Little Mountain*, *Yalo*, and *The Journey of Little Ghandi*. He also teaches literature at New York University.

**CAMILLE MANSOUR**, chairman of the IPS Research Committee, is the founder of Birzeit University's Institute of Law and was professor of international relations at the Sorbonne. He is the author of a number of works, including *Beyond Alliance: Israel and U.S. Foreign Policy*, and several volumes of *The Palestine Yearbook of International Law*.

**CENGİZ ÇANDAR**, senior columnist of the Istanbul daily *Radikal*, is one of Turkey's foremost experts and commentators on the Middle East. Fluent in Arabic, which he learned while serving in the Palestinian Resistance, he is the author of many books, including, most recently, *Mesopotamia Express: A Journey in History*.

**JIM MUIR**, veteran Middle East reporter who has covered the region since the 1970s, has been a Middle East correspondent for the BBC since 1995 and is based in Cairo.

**YEZID SAYIGH** is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Earlier positions include professor of Middle East studies at King's College in London and head of the Middle East program of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is the author of, among other works, *Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993*.