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Author(s): Khalil 'Athamina

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# “NON-ARAB REGIMENTS AND PRIVATE MILITIAS DURING THE UMAYYĀD PERIOD”\*

BY

KHALIL ‘ATHAMINA

Birzeit University

FROM the very beginnings of the formation of the Arab-Muslim military institution during the reign of ‘Umar I, a number of ideological and organizational obstacles were prominent in the development of the institution. Non-Arab ethnic communities and non-Muslim religious communities found themselves incapable of coping with the entrance requirements of this military institution. Even *A‘rāb*, members of the Arab tribes who were both Arabs and Muslims, found that the road to joining the *dīwān* was closed to them as early as a single decade—or two at the most—after the formation of this institution.

The growing need to enlist new soldiers in order to materialize the ambitious expansion plans of the Madina government—and later, of the Umayyad Dynasty—encountered an obstacle presented by the tribal organizational structure of the *dīwān* forces, the very same tribal structure that made the issue of loyalty to one’s ruler the constant dream and aspiration of the Umayyad rulers.

Civil wars, of which there were three during the reign of this dynasty (a reign which lasted less than a century) on the one hand, and the competition for power on the part of rival entities inside and outside the dynasty on the other hand, brought about a gradual attenuation of the extent to which the ruler and their rivals depended upon the *dīwān* forces. Each such entity began to seek ways of gaining military strength that could be relied upon when the time came. The rebellions which frequently broke out on the part of adventurers yearning

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for the throne as well as on the part of political-religious opposition groups, reduced considerably the recruitment potential of certain Arab tribes which had been involved in those rebellions and of certain geographical regions whose population had shown support for or collaborated with one rebel or another.

All of these and other reasons brought about the collapse of the obstacles which had precluded the induction of the *mawālī* (non-Arab converts) and *ḍimmīs* (non-Muslims), paving the way for the mobilization of private militias from every possible source. In this paper I shall attempt to draw a general picture of the formation, specialization, *modus operandi* and enlistment methods of these regiments and militias during the period in question.

## I

From the chronological point of view, the *Asāwira* comprise the first non-Arab group to have joined the Arabs' fighting force.<sup>1</sup> Despite the fact that the *Asāwira* were not the militia of a purely private party, they can be included, somehow, in the list of private militias, for two reasons: first, because they were the clients—the allies—of the Tamīm tribe in Baṣra, and at the same time, because they were subject to the authority of the local governor, who had been sent on behalf of the central regime. But the *Asāwira*'s bond to the Tamīm tribe was sometimes greater than their bond to the regime itself, and they behaved as a private militia on behalf of that tribe.<sup>2</sup> The history of the *Asāwira* teaches us that they were outstanding horsemen in the Sassānian legions, as is indicated by their name<sup>3</sup> The *Asāwira* occupied the highest rank on the social ladder in the days of the Sassanian Empire, alongside the nobility of the royal Persian court.<sup>4</sup> Among all the drinking companions (*nudamā'*) of the Sassanian Emperor, the *Asāwira* were responsible for guarding the curtain which separated the royal throne from those members of the nobility who were present at court. This hereditary position was reserved solely for the members of this group.<sup>5</sup>

The first contacts between the Arabs and the *Asāwira* was an ancient one, going back many years before the invasion of Persian territory

<sup>1</sup> The *Asāwira* joined in 638/17; see Ṭab., I, 2563.

<sup>2</sup> Ṭab., II, 465.

<sup>3</sup> al-Khawārizmī, 71.

<sup>4</sup> al-Ṭāğ, 23-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

by the Muslim army. Even before the advent of Islam, select units of this cavalry used to escort Persian commercial caravans, sent by the king of Persia to Yemen through the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>6</sup> The *Asāwira* always served as a task force sent by the Persian king to aid his allies, the leaders of Arab tribes, in their frequent intra-tribal struggles.<sup>7</sup> With the onset of the Arab offensive against the territory of 'Iraq that had been under Persian control, the occupying armies were confronted by an *Asāwira* garrison at Bāniqyā on the shores of the Euphrates.<sup>8</sup> Another *Asāwira* unit numbering 500 men was stationed at the port of Ubulla on the Persian Gulf.<sup>9</sup> At the battle of al-Qādisiyya (635/16) which determined the fate of the Sassanian front, an *Asāwira* unit fought within the Persian army.<sup>10</sup>

For reasons apparently due to past experience, the *Asāwira* came to evoke fearsome associations within the Arab memory. When the Arabs were summoned by 'Umar I to face the *Asāwira* and the Persian army on the Persian front, they showed signs of anxiety and fear.<sup>11</sup> Their easy victories over the *Asāwira* garrisons at Bāniqyā and Ubulla apparently did not blind them; in the negotiations held by the commander Abū Mūsā al-Aš'arī with Šīrawayhi, their representative, the Arabs accepted all the conditions imposed by the *Asāwira* in exchange for the latter's joining the Arab's war effort.<sup>12</sup>

The *Asāwira* who converted to Islam and joined the Arabs in the year 638/17, were no more than a small segment of the *Asāwira* in the imperial Persian army. There were still other groups of *Asāwira* who had become normal subjects like the other citizens of the occupied territory. Some of them were needed by the Arabs for the renewed attack following the capture of al-Madā'in, the capital city of the Persian kings, as well as for the initial stages of construction of the camp city Kūfa. In light of the situation at hand, 'Umar I ordered his commanders on this front to mobilize the necessary forces from the ranks of the *Asāwira* and in return, to grant them an exemption from

<sup>6</sup> Ag., XXVI, 79.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn Ḥillikān, VI, 355-6; Ag., XVI, 78-9.

<sup>8</sup> Abū Yūsuf, 157.

<sup>9</sup> Tab., I, 2384.

<sup>10</sup> al-Qālī, I, 29.

<sup>11</sup> al-'Uṭmāniyya, 214.

<sup>12</sup> Tab., I, 2563; Futūḥ, 459. On their military role in the first stages of the Arab's attacks on the Eastern territories see: Fred M. Donner, p. 239.

payment of poll tax.<sup>13</sup> Two elements were missing from 'Umar's instructions, which are worthy of mention: first, the lack of any stipulation that the *Asāwira*'s induction depend upon their converting to Islam, and second, the lack of any provision for their fee—in other words, a lack of clarity regarding their admission to or exclusion from the *dīwān*, as had been the case with the enlistment of the first group. Apparently, this group of *Asāwira* were not compelled to convert, and representative members of them appear two generations later by their Persian names, indicating that they had still not converted to Islam.<sup>14</sup>

The *Asāwira* in the first wave served as the model for other ethnic groups within the Persian army. After the battles had subsided on this front, a group of Persian fighters attached itself to the *Asāwira*; these had apparently been mercenaries in the imperial army and had converted to Islam and become a part of that army.<sup>15</sup> The sources do not specify the number of the *Asāwira*.<sup>16</sup> But according to a diagram relating to the scope of responsibility of the *'urafa'* (military overseers who were responsible for a certain number of fighters from their tribes) during that time, the *Asāwira*'s number can be estimated at about 4,000 men.<sup>17</sup> In any case, the *Asāwira* were given a separate residential quarter in Baṣra, in which runs a river canal designed to supply them with drinking water. The canal bore their name: *nahr al-Asāwira*.<sup>18</sup> Their significant number necessitated the construction of a mosque, and the governor of Iraq on behalf of Mu'āwiya, Ziyād b. Abīh, ordered a mosque to be built in the quarter.<sup>19</sup> This was a separate residential quarter, reserved for this ethnic group, in which the language of discourse was Persian, the native language of the inhabitants. And for half a century after they had converted to Islam and settled in Baṣra,

<sup>13</sup> Ṭab., I, 2497.

<sup>14</sup> P. Crone, p. 237 (n. 263).

<sup>15</sup> Futūh, 460.

<sup>16</sup> Aḥmad Ṣāliḥ al-'Alī estimates their number at 2,500, in *Ḥiṭaṭ al-Baṣra*, p. 48, while in *al-Tanzīmāt*, p. 83, he claims that they were about 2,000 men, but their number increased as a result of fresh fugitives from other Sassanian regiments who joined them in Baṣra. Ch. Pellat gives no figures but he states that their number in Baṣra was not so large. See: *Le milieu Basrien*, p. 35. Other works cited in this paper give no figures at all.

<sup>17</sup> Ṭab., I, 2496. It was reported that 100 men from the *Asāwira* were allotted 2,000 *dirhams* each, while six of them got 2,500 *dirhams* each, Ṭab., I, 2563. This writer believes that these men were given the status of *'arif* who took charge of about 40 persons on the average.

<sup>18</sup> *Futūh*, 459-460, 440; Yāqūt, vol. V, 317.

<sup>19</sup> *Ansāb*, vol. 4(a), 201.

they continued to speak Persian.<sup>20</sup> One member of the Arab nobility, who had grown up in that quarter under the care of his mother—the emancipated handmaiden Marḡāna, whom the governor of Iraq had divorced and given in marriage to one of the notables among the *Asāwira* in the quarter—could not express himself properly in Arabic but rather spoke with a Persian accent, influenced by the speech of his neighbors in the quarter.<sup>21</sup>

It was the *Asāwira* themselves who chose to be housed in Baṣra, a decision settled with the Arab commander when they joined the Arabs. In Baṣra they formed a covenant, *hālāfū*, with one of two factions of the Tamīm tribe, Banū Sa'd. This faction had competed with the other faction of the tribe, Banū Ḥanzāla, over the new allies. As a compromise Banu Sa'd contented themselves with the *Asāwira* and let their brothers, Banū Ḥanzāla, form alliances with the Zuṭṭ and the Sayābiḡa.<sup>22</sup> It is worth pointing out in this connection that the *hilf* or *taḥāluf* made between the two parties may be considered to reflect the typical *taḥāluf* of the *Ġāhiliyya* period,<sup>23</sup> not just because of the specific circumstances under which it was made, but also because of the ban placed by Islam on the formation of covenants, as expressed in the *ḥadīṡ* of the Prophet.<sup>24</sup>

Apparently, the first generation of the *Asāwira* maintained their policy of non-involvement in intra-tribal conflicts and did not take part in the civil wars in which their allies, the Tamīmīs, were involved. It is known that when the *Asāwira* made their agreement with the Arabs, they imposed a precondition stipulating their right not to take part in the Arab's internal conflicts.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, they did not join the Tamīmīs in their battle at al-Ġamal (656/35), nor at the battle of Ṣifīn

<sup>20</sup> *Naqā'id*, 113-4; Ṭab., II, 454.

<sup>21</sup> This gentleman was none other than 'Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād, who was the successor of his father in the office of the governorship in Iraq. After his father was divorced, 'Ubayd Allāh was in the custody of his mother, Marḡāna, who was remarried to a certain *Iswār* (pl. *Asāwira*) called Ṣrawayhi. In order to defame 'Ubayd Allāh his opponents used to call him "Ibn Marḡāna". See: *al-Bayān wa-al-taybyīn*, vol. I, 73; vol. II, 210; *Futūḥ*, 440-41; al-Ma'ārif, 347; al-Mubarrad, II, 225.

<sup>22</sup> *Futūḥ*, 459-60; *Ansāb*, 4(a) (ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās) p. 414. According to another version, a non-Arab ethnic group (called *Andiḡān* or *Andiḡār*) joined the *Asāwira* and became allied with Banū Sa'd., *Ibid.*, loc. cit. In another report on the authority of al-Madā'ini, the two leaders of the *Asāwira* had different views on this issue: Ṣrawayhi went into alliance with the Azd tribe (or, in another version, with Banū Bakr), while his colleague Siyāh insisted on allying with Tamīm. See: *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

<sup>23</sup> On the typical *hilf*, *taḥāluf*, consult Goldziher, vol. I, pp. 65-70.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70 (n. 4).

<sup>25</sup> *Futūḥ*, 459.

(657/37), nor in any other internal conflict according to Madā'inī.<sup>26</sup> Apparently, this was the case at the battle of Şiffīn: despite the participation of Banū Sa'd, the allies, in this battle, there is no mention of participation by the *Asāwira*.<sup>27</sup> As for the battle of al-Ġamal, not all the Tamīmīs took part in it; Banū Sa'd in particular obeyed the call of the Tamīmī leader al-Aḥnaf b. Qays, who decided that the members of his tribe should not take part in this civil war and so they maintained their neutrality.<sup>28</sup> Thus, there was no reason for the *Asāwira* to participate in this battle. But later generations of *Asāwira* were involved in all the struggles in which the Tamīmīs took part. They participated in the battle waged by the Tamīmī tribe against the tribe of Azd, the allies of 'Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād, a battle which was known by the name of *yawm Mas'ūd*.<sup>29</sup> They also took part in the battle of al-Rabaḍa, in the ranks of one of the commanders of Ibn al-Zubayr who had departed from Baṣra in order to halt the army that had been sent by Marwān I against Madīna which was still under the control of Ibn al-Zubayr.<sup>30</sup> They also took part in the revolt of Ibn al-Aš'aṭ which broke out in Iraq against al-Ḥaġġāġ in the year 700-701/81-82.<sup>31</sup> It should be noted in this context that the latter three conflicts were directed at the central Umayyad régime in Damascus. It seems that the *Asāwira*, who, during the reign of the Sufyānid branch, were classified as belonging to the pro-Umayyad factions,<sup>32</sup> had changed direction during the reign of the Marwānid branch and moved over to the side of the opposing forces. This transition was harmonious with the change that took place in the stance of the Tamīmīs toward this dynasty during the period in question.<sup>33</sup>

The *Asāwira*'s arena of activity was not restricted to the limits of that of their masters, the Tamīmīs, nor was it always subject to the latter's will or political position. From their beginnings as a military entity fighting in the ranks of the Arabs, the *Asāwira* took part in conquests within Persian territory along with the army of Abū Mūsā al-

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn Muzāḥim, p. 205.

<sup>28</sup> Ṭab., I, 3169; vol. I, 3179, *faiṭaba'at Banū Sa'dīn al-Aḥnaf, fa'tazala bihim ilā wādī al-sibā'*, "And Banū Sa'd followed al-Aḥnaf and kept aloof together with him and retired to Wādī al-Sibā'".

<sup>29</sup> *Ansāb*, 4(a) (ed. I. 'Abbās) p. 408; Ṭab. ii, 452, 465, 454; al-Mubarrad, I, 142.

<sup>30</sup> *Futūḥ*, 460; Ṭab., II, 578-9.

<sup>31</sup> *Futūḥ*, 460.

<sup>32</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa, 201.

<sup>33</sup> Kh. 'Athāmīna, *The Caliph Hisham*, part II, 180 seq.

Aš'arī. They laid siege upon the fortified Persian town of Tustar, but to the Arabs' great disappointment, they did not display a high enough level of fighting skill. When asked to explain why, they attributed this to their lack of religious motivation, *baṣā'ir*, and of idealistic values, two elements which had encouraged the Arabs to fight.<sup>34</sup> The *Asāwira* joined 'Abdallāh b. 'Āmir on his campaign against Ḥurāsān (651/31),<sup>35</sup> and it is quite reasonable to assume that they definitely participated, since the initiative of setting out on this campaign came from the Tamīmī leader in Baṣra, al-Aḥnaf b. Qays, or from another Tamīmī personality whose name is mentioned in the sources.<sup>36</sup>

As was the custom in the days of the reign of 'Uṭmān (644-56/24-36), the Arabs used to leave a task force behind as a garrison in the areas conquered within the eastern province. This custom as followed, in particular, by the *muqātila* of Baṣra, where 4,000 soldiers were left in the region and who were replaced annually.<sup>37</sup> From this, it may be assumed that the *Asāwira* who participated in Ibn 'Āmir's campaign had contributed their share to the garrison, both in that year and in subsequent years. Since the population in the region was Persian from the standpoints of ethnic origin, culture, language, and so forth, it was inevitable that some of the *Asāwira* who arrived there would have considered the area an ideal environment to resettle in and to leave Baṣra, their improvised habitat. In addition, the *Asāwira* took part in the revolt of Ibn al-Aš'aṭ some fifty years after Ibn 'Āmir's campaign, as we have already seen. Al-Ḥaḡḡāḡ, the governor of Iraq against whom the revolt was directed, took stringent punitive measures against those elements who had taken part in the revolt. Among these was the punishment inflicted upon the *Asāwira*, namely destruction of the rebels' houses, reduction of their annual pension, and exile for some of them.<sup>38</sup> While the tradition does not reveal the destination to which they were exiled, it may be surmised that they joined their brethren in the region of Khurāsān, since they do appear on the scene in that region later on.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>34</sup> In response to the question of Abū Mūsā al-Aš'arī, Siyāh al-Iswārī says: "*uḥbiruka annahū laysat baṣā'irunā ka-baṣā'irikum, wa-lā lanā fikum ḥuramun naḥāfu 'alayhā wa-nuqātil*". *Futūḥ*, 459; *Ṭab.*, I, 2563.

<sup>35</sup> *Futūḥ*, 460. With his army were 1,000 soldiers of 'Aḡam, a non-Arab ethnic community. *Ibid.*, 502. There is ample reason to believe that they were *Asāwira*.

<sup>36</sup> *Ṭab.*, I, 2884-5.

<sup>37</sup> Kh. 'Athāmina, "*Dīwān al-'aṭā*", p. 16.

<sup>38</sup> *Futūḥ*, 460.

<sup>39</sup> *Ṭab.*, II, 1550; II, 1606.



And in the same way that they reached Ḥūrāsān, they also reached Siġistān, the adjacent region, where they were placed in charge of guarding the local prison, as attested by one of the prisoners there, the poet Yazīd b. al-Mufarraġ al-Ḥimyarī, in three of his poems.<sup>40</sup> Other *Asāwira* from both Baṣra and Kūfa were relocated earlier in Anṭākyā on the Syrian shore of the eastern Mediterranean seaboard by Mu'āwiya b. Abī Sufyān.<sup>41</sup> This relocation took place within the framework of the settlement and fortification of coastal towns and fortresses of al-Šām, greater Syria, which served at the time as frontier towns facing the constant invasions of the Byzantine fleet.<sup>42</sup>

The importance of the *Asāwira* among all the other Arab forces, is that they were distinguished archers. In this area Arab literature extols their expertise and the marvelous accuracy of their marksmanship. Ibn Qutayba quotes from the Books of the Persians, *Kutub al-ʿAġam*, concerning the *Asāwira*'s custom of writing an archer's name on the arrows he shoots indicating their complete self-confidence.<sup>43</sup> Al-Ṭabarī tells of four hundred *Asāwira* warriors who fought alongside their Tamīmī allies in the battle against the Azd in 683/64 and shot a single salvo of 2,000 arrows at once, each warrior simultaneously shooting five arrows from his bow.<sup>44</sup> It was these arrows which tipped the scales in favor of Banū Tamīm. In the battle of al-Rabaḍa against the Umayyad army, it was Yazīd b. Siyāh al-Iswārī—apparently the son of the aforementioned Siyāh—who shot the arrow that struck and killed the commander of that army, Ḥubayš b. Duġa, thus winning the battle against the Umayyad army.<sup>45</sup> In another account of the course of this battle, al-Balāḡurī reports that the number of *Asāwira* fighting the battle was equal to the number of enemy casualties, because an arrow shot by an *Iswārī* never missed.<sup>46</sup> Because of their military prowess they acquired the prestigious title *fiṭyān*,<sup>47</sup> somewhat parallel to a knighthood in medieval Europe.

The *Asāwira* were experts not only in the field of warfare but in other fields as well, as reflected by their activity on the eastern front in Transoxania. They appeared in the battle arena as a task and patrol

<sup>40</sup> *Ibn Qutayba*, 212; *Āġ.*, XVII, 51.

<sup>41</sup> *Futūḥ*, 139; *Ch. Pellat*, 35.

<sup>42</sup> *Kh. 'Athamina, "Arab Settlements"*, pp. 199-200.

<sup>43</sup> *ʿUyūn al-akḥbār*, I, 149.

<sup>44</sup> Ṭab., II, 452; *Ansāb*, VIa (ed. I 'Abbās) 409.

<sup>45</sup> Ṭab., II, 579.

<sup>46</sup> *Futūḥ*, 461.

<sup>47</sup> Ṭab., II, 452, 454.

force, separate from the army and under separate command.<sup>48</sup> On a separate occasion and during another time, they served as a sort of military police on the battlefield.<sup>49</sup> Apparently because of the *Asāwira*'s importance—which added strength and contributed to the superiority of Banū Tamīm in Baṣra—the leaders of the opposing tribe, Azd, were forced to seek an ally from among the local inhabitants, despite the religious ban on such covenants, in order to equalize their position to that of Tamīm.<sup>50</sup>

## II

A considerable portion of the Islamic traditions which refer to the *Asāwira* tie them to two non-Arab ethnic groups: Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa. Al-Balāḡurī, for example, makes this connection, devoting a single title to the first two groups.<sup>51</sup> As for Zuṭṭ, G. Ferrand considers the origin of their name to be that of the Indian ethnic group Jhāt,<sup>52</sup> and there is practically a consensus among Arab philologists and historians regarding the Indian origins of that name.<sup>53</sup> According to the historian Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī (970/360), the king of Persia, Bahrām-Djūr (A.D. 420-438) wrote to the king of India asking him to send him singers; the latter sent him 12,000 people whom he scattered throughout his kingdom and they began to multiply.<sup>54</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, relying on the authority of Sayf b. ʿUmar, reports that Šurayḡ b. Ḍubayʿa, who was known as *al-Ḥuṭam*, revolted in Baḡrayn following the death of the Prophet, within the framework of the *riḍḍa*, the apostasy movement, and that he succeeded in attracting not only members of his tribe, but also groups of non-believers who lives in Hajar and in al-Qaṭīf, including inhabitants of al-Ḥaṭṭ from Zuṭṭ and Sayabiḡa.<sup>55</sup> It is worth mentioning in this context that the area of al-Ḥaṭṭ on the coast of Baḡrayn and ʿUmān was the place from which the Arabs would bring their renowned spears. It was there that the spears were fashioned and sold to the Arabs.<sup>56</sup> The tradition of Sayf is strengthened by another tradition, that of

<sup>48</sup> Ṭab., II, 1550.

<sup>49</sup> Ṭab., II, 1606.

<sup>50</sup> *Ansāb*, IVb, 106.

<sup>51</sup> *Futūḥ*, 459.

<sup>52</sup> "Zuṭṭ" *E.I.*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>53</sup> This can be deduced from the survey done by Ishāq al-Ḥusaynī, pp. 29-30.

<sup>54</sup> Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī, 49.

<sup>55</sup> Ṭab., I, 1961, Agh., XIV, 46.

<sup>56</sup> Yāqūt, II, 378.

al-Madā'inī, according to which these two groups lived in the coastal areas (referring to the Persian Sea) in pre-Islamic times.<sup>57</sup> It may be assumed that the two groups in the area made their livelihood in the arms industry. A separate part of these ethnic groups were located in the areas adjacent to the borders separating the Arabian peninsula from the Persian territory in Iraq—a broad, semi-desert region known as Ṭufūf.<sup>58</sup> This area included a number of guard posts, at which the Persians stationed permanent garrisons. The land and wells were given to these soldiers by the Persian king Sābūr as an *iqṭā'*, and in exchange for their military service they were exempted from paying taxes.<sup>59</sup> This area, as is well known, fell into Arab hands as early as the beginning of the conquest, since the invading Muslim armies passed through it on their way to the heartland of Persian territory. A tradition of 'Awāna b. al-Ḥakam, quoted by al-Balāḍurī, describes Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa as having belonged to the Persian forces which fell prisoner to the Arabs during the first raids.<sup>60</sup> It follows that the contacts between the Arabs and these two ethnic groups took place during the pre-Islamic period, whether through trade in spears or through their membership in the military garrisons of the Sassanian empire.

Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa, which were inducted into the Muslim army, were prisoners of war when they learned of the arrangement that had been made with the *Asāwira*. They converted to Islam, Abū Mūsa resettled them in Baṣra, and they were treated exactly like the *Asāwira*.<sup>61</sup> In the first civil war, they joined the men of Kūfa who had gone out to fight the rebels who had risen up against 'Alī, but apparently under separate command.<sup>62</sup> This practice seems to have become a tradition with them, since one hundred years later we find them in the army of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Manṣūr, fighting under a separate command of their own.<sup>63</sup>

During the term of al-Haḡḡāḡ in Iraq (694-713/75-95), a military force formed from these groups was sent by sea from Iraq to the region of Sind as a reinforcement after the army of Muḡammad b. al-Qāsim had become entangled—from which we learn that Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa

<sup>57</sup> *Futūh*, 460.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>59</sup> Yāqūt, IV, 36.

<sup>60</sup> *Futūh*, 463.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 462-3.

<sup>63</sup> *Ansāb*, III (ed. Duri) p. 250.

were excellent warriors on both land and sea.<sup>64</sup> In addition to their routine military activity, Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa were placed in charge of such institutions of state as the treasury, mosques, and prisons. Al-Ḥawārizmī defines them as *ḥuffāz al-turuq*, the watchmen of the roads.<sup>65</sup> As early as the outset of their settlement in Baṣra, Abū Mūsā al-Aṣ‘arī placed them in charge of the buildings of state institutions in the town.<sup>66</sup> A separate group, which included both Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa, were in charge of guarding the prison in the area of Siḡistān.<sup>67</sup>

Contrary to the *Asāwira*, Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa did not all arrive together. The sources speak of *al-Zuṭṭ wa-l-Sayābiḡa al-quḍamāʿ*, the first ones,<sup>68</sup> as well as referring to a separate quarter in Baṣra built for Zuṭṭ and another ethnic group known as Indiḡār.<sup>69</sup> For reasons apparently connected with the defense policy of the Caliph Mu‘āwiya in the face of the Byzantine threat from both land and sea, the Caliph transferred a group of Zuṭṭ and Sayābiḡa to the Syrian coastal town of Anṭākyā in the year 669/49, where they settled and established a residential quarter that bore their name. Their number increased naturally, and after a generation they expanded beyond the city walls, settling in the neighboring village of Būqā.<sup>70</sup> This trend continued, and another wave of Zuṭṭ was transferred to Antakyā during the reign of al-Walīd b. ‘Abd al-Malik. These were some of the same prisoners of war from Sind who had been taken by the commander Muḡammad b. al-Qāsim in the wake of his campaign to that region.<sup>71</sup> Since these Sindi prisoners of war were significantly numerous,<sup>71a</sup> he settled them outside Baṣra on the plain extending between Baṣra and Kūfa along the Tigris, the *Diḡla*, where they multiplied and became a nuisance which seriously threatened the routes of passage between Baḡdād (the capital) and Baṣra. When the threat became too/great to ignore, Caliph al-Ma‘mūn dispatched soldiers and ordered them to transfer some of the

<sup>64</sup> Ch. Pellat, 36.

<sup>65</sup> Ḥawārizmī, 74.

<sup>66</sup> Ḥiṭaṭ al-Baṣra, 65; *idem*: Tanzīmāt, pp. 84-5.

<sup>67</sup> *Ag.*, XVII, 51. It is worth noting in this context that the prison, the mosque, and the treasury house were an integral part of the main building in which the governor of the province dwelt, the so-called *dār al-imāra*, Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, 240.

<sup>68</sup> *Futūḡ*, 463.

<sup>69</sup> *Ansāb*, III (ed. Duri) p. 92.

<sup>70</sup> *Futūḡ*, 1912, 263.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>71a</sup> There were about 10,000 prisoners who were captured from that country, *Ibid.*, 536, 538.

Zuṭṭ to Baġdād and Ḥānqīn and the rest to 'Ayn Zarba and to the border towns on the Byzantine frontier.<sup>72</sup> But the problem was not solved by al-Ma'mūn's having relocated them: they continued to endanger the access routes between the South and the North, which prompted Caliph al-Mu'taṣim to move a significant number of them to that same town of 'Ayn Zarba in 835/225.<sup>73</sup>

These intensive acts of exile and transfer apparently had an effect on the number of Zuṭṭ in the marshlands; by al-Ġāhiz's (869/255) rough estimate, their number in this region was less than the number of people in an average Arab tribe.<sup>74</sup>

In addition to the three ethnic groups mentioned thus far, Baṣra came to know another ethnic group, known as al-Buḥāriyya. Their arrival in Baṣra was linked to the campaign of 'Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād across the Exus in 673/54, which was the first year of his office as governor of the eastern province.<sup>75</sup>

The sources do not present an unequivocal opinion regarding the status or number of this group. Al-Balāḍurī, for example, does not specify a number, but the expression he uses, *ḥalq*, seems to indicate a significant number.<sup>76</sup> Al-Ṭabarī, on the other hand, establishes that their number was 2,000.<sup>77</sup> The author of the *Tārīḥ Buḥārā* reports that there were 4,000 of them,<sup>78</sup> while the poet Abū Tammām (850/236) raises their number to 12,000.<sup>79</sup> The numbers given by al-Naršāḥī and al-Ṭabarī seem more reasonable, given the short sojourn of 'Ubayd Allāh in Ḥurāsān—barely over a year.<sup>80</sup> At the same time, Abu Tammām's account cannot be rejected out of hand just because it quotes a higher number than the others. As we know, 'Ubayd Allāh served as governor of Iraq for nearly a decade, and it is not impossible that during

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 462. In Ṭabarī the removal of the Zuṭṭ from the marshland of Kaskar took place in 835/220 during the reign of al-Mu'taṣim. Their number was estimated at 27,000, among them 12,000 warriors. *Tab.*, III, 1169.

<sup>73</sup> *Futūḥ*, 203; Yāqūt, IV, 178. Twenty years later, 'Ayn Zarba suffered a Byzantine attack which ended with all the Zuṭṭ being taken as prisoners of war, along with their families and cattles.

<sup>74</sup> al-Burṣān, 49.

<sup>75</sup> *Tab.*, II, 167-169.

<sup>76</sup> *Futūḥ*, 463, 507.

<sup>77</sup> *Tab.*, II, 170. The same number is mentioned by Ch. Pellat, p. 36, and by al-'Alī in *Ḥīṭat al-Baṣra*, 48.

<sup>78</sup> al-Naršāḥī, p. 62.

<sup>79</sup> Abū Tammām, p. 7.

<sup>80</sup> *Tab.*, II, 170.

this period reinforcements were added to the contingent he had brought with him to Baṣra, whether of the same or different origin, and continued to bear the same name as the original contingent.

In this context, attention should be drawn to the fact that during the years in which Ibn ʿĀmir served, and a few years earlier, male and female slaves were brought to Iraq originated in the area from which the Buḥāriyya came, in the framework of the stipulation signed by Ibn ʿĀmir with some of the towns across the Exus. They were paid to him as tax in lieu of the poll tax which the residents did not have the money to pay.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, fighting units which bore the name Buḥāriyya existed even before those sent by ʿUbayd Allāh, predating them by at least four years. They had been sent by ʿUbayd Allāh's father together with a police force to apprehend the leader of the Šīʿite opposition in Kūfa, Ḥuḡr b. ʿAdiyy, in 671/51.<sup>82</sup> What is more, traditionists sometimes confuse names: a prominent example of this is the well-known mistaken reference to a unit of archers from the Qīqān in India,<sup>83</sup> actually Zuṭṭ by origin, as being Buḥāriyya.<sup>84</sup>

Traditionists also differ as to the status of the Buḥāriyya. Al-Balāḍurī presents three versions. According to the first of these, the Buḥāriyya were prisoners of war; the second asserts that ʿUbayd Allāh had acquired them in accordance with the terms of surrender he had imposed upon them, i.e., he had captured their country, or their town, with no battle; and the third version states that he offered them *amān*, a promise that no harm would be done to them, as well as admission to the *dīwān*, and they accepted his offer, joined him, and were settled by him in Baṣra.<sup>85</sup> As is typical of al-Balāḍurī in such cases, he does not rule in favor of any of these versions when he does not have the means to do so.<sup>86</sup>

Al-Ṭabarī, reporting ʿUbayd Allāh's campaign, quotes al-Madāʿinī, the most trustworthy source with regard to the history of the eastern province,<sup>87</sup> and mentions the names of two villages which ʿUbayd Allāh conquered, adding: *fa-min ṭamma aṣāba ʿl-Buḥāriyya*,<sup>88</sup> "and from there

<sup>81</sup> *Futūḥ*, 502, 504.

<sup>82</sup> Ibn Saʿd, VI, 152.

<sup>83</sup> *Futūḥ*, 544.

<sup>84</sup> *Maqātil*, 141, read Buḥāriyya and not (naḡḡāriyya) as it appears in the text.

<sup>85</sup> *Futūḥ*, 463.

<sup>86</sup> Kh. ʿAthāmina, "*Baladhuri's Sources*", pp. 244-245.

<sup>87</sup> Rotter G., pp. 103-133.

<sup>88</sup> Ṭab., II, 169.

he took the Buḥāriyya captive".<sup>89</sup> It was apparently this group in particular which became the private unit of 'Ubayd Allāh, as opposed to other units of Buḥāriyya which had existed before.

Abū 'Ubayda reports, in his account of the events at Baṣra following the death of Yazīd I, that when 'Ubayd Allāh, the governor of Iraq, wanted to contend with the rebels in that town, he ordered these units to set upon the rebels, but they refused him.<sup>90</sup> The tradition refers to two distinct groups of Buḥāriyya: *Buḥāriyyat al-sultān* and to a mere *Buḥāriyya*. The first must certainly have been his private Buḥāriyya, while the second refers to those who belonged to the general military framework, who had made their entry into battle conditional upon the approval of their commander: *faqālū: in amaranā quwwādunā qātalnā*.<sup>91</sup> This group must have been the same unit which had been enlisted beforehand by the governors of Iraq on behalf of the central regime, and it was subject to the authority of the governors, who represented Damascus. Evidence of this lies in the fact that they were transferred from Baṣra to Kūfa when that town became the seat of the governor of Iraq during the term of Ziyād; there they were under his authority and acted in concert with the police to maintain order in the provincial capital.<sup>92</sup>

Another version, also by Abū 'Ubayda, says that the governor had summoned the Buḥāriyya and those who were *min aṣḥāb al-sultān*, "of the Sultan's fighting company".<sup>93</sup> In other words, this phrase was considered by al-Balāḍurī (who took the material from his predecessor, Abū 'Ubayda) as a substitute for the original phrase *Buḥāriyyat al-sultān*. In the narrative of al-Ṭabarī, who relies on the same source, the substitute terminology seems more concrete: he refers to "the commanders of the private units of the Sultān", *ru'asā' ḥāṣṣat al-sultān*.<sup>94</sup>

Despite the textual contrasts regarding this tradition, all versions have a single common element, viz., the refusal of both groups of Buḥāriyya to obey the call or the instruction of 'Ubayd Allāh, the

<sup>89</sup> The verbal form: "*aṣāba*" is sometimes used in Classical Arabic to connote "to take prisoner of war". See, for example: *Ṭab.*, I, 2031; *Yāqūt*, IV, 423; *Usd al-Gāba*, II, 224; they are described as slaves in *Narṣaḥī*, 62.

<sup>90</sup> *Naqā'id*, 724.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibn Sa'd*, VI, 152.

<sup>93</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa, p. 102. *Aṣḥāb*, in this context are the most trustworthy warriors belonging to the ruler or prince. The explanation of this term given by P. Crone is inaccurate, p. 55, because they are not the man's companions but his soldiers or adherents.

<sup>94</sup> *Ṭab.*, II, 440.

provincial governor. This may seem surprising at first, but under the circumstances and conditions which existed on the imperial plane in general and in Baṣra in particular, this refusal can easily be understood. Mass rebellion had already broken out in Baṣra against the governor when rumors were confirmed that Caliph Yazīd b. Mu‘āwiya had died in Damascus and that no successor had been appointed. This was a great embarrassment to the entire dynasty, which in turn brought about a rift in the family which in turn brought about a rift in the family which almost developed into a sort of civil war.<sup>95</sup> What is more, the very same Buḥāriyya were the first to know of their master’s intention to abandon Iraq and flee for his life to Damascus, and they were unwilling to risk a hopeless campaign for his sake.

There as at least one other unit in Baṣra, distinct from the Buḥāriyya of ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād, which was of the same ethnic origin—the group which bore the name of ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abdullāh b. ‘Āmir.<sup>96</sup> This militia was active on the scene in Baṣra during the period of turmoil which took place between the collapse of the Umayyad regime and the subjugation of Iraq to the authority of Ibn al-Zubayr. ‘Abd al-Malik would move through the streets of Baṣra surrounded by bodyguards from the Buḥāriyya.<sup>97</sup> During this period, he sent soldiers from this unit to drive away the chief of police in Baṣra, who wanted to invade one of the private palaces which was owned by a person close to the dismissed governor; the soldiers accomplished their task without difficulty.<sup>98</sup>

Since this ‘Abd al-Malik was not a man of power and held no official post, it is very reasonable to assume that he had inherited his private militia from his father, who during his term as governor in Baṣra would set out on military campaigns across the Exus to bring back slaves in exchange for the *ad hoc* taxes and levies he would impose on the areas he attacked.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Wellhausen, 137-150.

<sup>96</sup> His father was appointed to the governorship in Baṣra during the reign of ‘Uṭmān, the third caliph. He lost this job during the caliphate of ‘Alī, but was reappointed by Mu‘āwiya. See: Ṭab.; Aḡ.; Ibn Ḥayyāṭ (index). ‘Abd al-Malik held no official position during his lifetime. Although it was reported that he was appointed to the governorship in Baṣra by Ibn al-Zubayr, it seems that this tradition is unreliable. Ibn al-Kalbī, p. 56.

<sup>97</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa (ed. I. ‘Abbās) p. 405; *Ansāb*, IVb, 105; Ṭab., II, 464.

<sup>98</sup> *Ansāb*, IVb, 105; Ṭab., II, 464.

<sup>99</sup> *Futūh*, 502, 504.



Even before that, and before this man had been appointed governor of the eastern province, he had shown an interest in purchasing slaves. In one transaction, together with a partner, he bought some slaves from Caliph 'Umar I (the same prisoners of war whose ownership reverted to the state and who were known as *raqīq al-ḥums*, because 20% of all prisoners of war had been handed over to the state treasury).<sup>100</sup> The two partners paid a portion of the sum due and remained owing the huge sum of 80,000 dirhams. Since they did not make good on their debt, 'Umar commanded that they be imprisoned until someone else volunteered to pay for them.<sup>101</sup> For such an enormous price, the new buyer, Ibn 'Āmir, was able to purchase an immense number of slaves, and since the prisoners of war had to have been enemy soldiers, it was easy and even preferable for them to serve their new master as a fighting militia.

Buḥāriyya who belonged to the military framework of the state were by definition subject to the authority of the officials or representatives of the central régime and served its interests accordingly. Al-Ḥaḡḡāḡ transferred most of the Buḥāriyya in Baṣra to the garrison town of Wāsiṭ,<sup>102</sup> which he had built in 702/83 especially for the Syrian garrisons in Iraq.<sup>103</sup> They will appear once again in 739/122 at Kūfa under the command of the governor of Iraq on behalf of Caliph Hiṣām b. 'Abd al-Malik, who sent them to put down the Šī'ite rebellion of Zayd b. 'Alī.<sup>104</sup> They continued to exist as an elite fighting unit until the final days of the Umayyad dynasty in power. The last event in which the Buḥāriyya appear took place in 749/132 in the town of Wāsiṭ, together with the last governor of Iraq on behalf of the Umayyads, who was known by the name of Ibn Hubayra. Following the signing of the agreement between the latter and the Abbasid prince and heir Abū Ġa'far al-Manṣūr, Ibn Hubayra left the besieged town to meet the prince, surrounded by 1,300 soldiers of his Buḥāriyya.<sup>105</sup>

The Buḥāriyya became renowned as professional soldiers. Their activity was not limited to the city; there were also fighting units in the field, whose name was known far and wide, and whose destructive power and skillful bowmanship rained terror upon the local inhabi-

<sup>100</sup> al-Mawardī, 126-8; al-Amwāl, 424-431, Abū Yūsuf, p. 19.

<sup>101</sup> Ag., VI, 126-7.

<sup>102</sup> *Futūḥ*, 463.

<sup>103</sup> Wellhausen, 203.

<sup>104</sup> Ṭab., II, 1708; Maqātil, 141.

<sup>105</sup> Ibn Ḥillikān, VI, 316; Ṭab., III, 67.

tants. All of this may be deduced from a description quoted from one of the inhabitants of Yamāma who wanted to warn his fellow tribesmen of the dangers that might befall them when he learned that the Sulṭān had sent a fighting unit to attack them from the Buḥāriyya of Ibn Ziyād.<sup>106</sup> They were both horsemen and infantrymen,<sup>107</sup> but the true secret of their strength lay in their outstanding skill as *naššāba*, archers.<sup>108</sup> Thanks to their arrows, they always defeated their enemies and saved the honor of the imperial army.<sup>109</sup>

#### IV

One example of private militias *par excellence*, with no connection at all to the ruling dynasty, its institutions or representatives, was the Šākiriyya. Arab lexicographers have not given sufficient explanation to this term, claiming it is derived from the Persian word *dzākīr*, meaning a salaried caretaker.<sup>110</sup> W. Barthold suggests that they were the personal guard of the local princes and chiefs of the land-holding nobility—*dihqāns*—in central Asia, and that they served as a sort of honor guard.<sup>111</sup> A very impressive description of the Šākiriyya, their noble origins, and the pomp which characterized its activity does appear in the *Tārīḥ Buḥārā*.<sup>112</sup>

Emulating Persian nobility, the Arab noblemen and princes would take Šākiriyya with them to the battlefield as escorts who would sometimes take part in battle and even tip the scales in favor of their masters.<sup>113</sup> In fact, the Šākiriyya of the Islamic period were private fighting units, as reported in the sources.

In 696/77 the Šākiriyya of ‘Attāb b. Warqā’ proudly brought about the defeat of Šabīb, commander of the well-known *ḥārīḡī* rebellions, forcing him to flee the region of Kūfa which he had so recently seized.<sup>114</sup>

<sup>106</sup> al-Ḥayawān, VII, 175-6.

<sup>107</sup> Ibn Ḥillikān, VI, 316; Ṭab., III, 67.

<sup>108</sup> Yāqūt, I, 355; Ṭab., II, 170.

<sup>109</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa (ed. I. ‘Abbās), 139; Ṭab., II, 1708; Maqātil, 141.

<sup>110</sup> *al-Qāmūs* V. (sh.k.r.). Taḡ al-‘Arūs, Further explanations are suggested by modern scholars, but they are far from introducing a satisfactory solution to the ambiguity of the term. C.E. Bosworth reviewed the different views concerning the issue. See: *The History of al-Ṭabarī*, vol. 35, p. 179 (n. 506). Further details on Šākiriyya are produced by the author in the article: “Šakiriyya”, *EI*<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>111</sup> Barthold W., 180.

<sup>112</sup> Naršaḥī, 23-4.

<sup>113</sup> Wellhausen, 392.

<sup>114</sup> Ṭab., II, 965.

According to the description of the attack launched by 'Attāb and his Šākiriyya, we may conclude that these were a sort of commando unit which infiltrated the camp of the *Ḥawāriǧ* in mid battle and burned it to the ground.

But the Šākiriyya's arena of activity during this period was not only Iraq, but rather their birthplace in Transoxania. Particularly prominent in this region were two brothers, Tābit and Ḥurayt. These were two commanders of Persian origin who had converted to Islam and become *mawālī* of the Ḥuzā'a tribe. While these brothers did collaborate with the imperial army, they always maintained their independence.<sup>115</sup> They acted proudly and with self-confidence, never willing to overlook any attempts to humiliate them.<sup>116</sup> The Šākiriyya unit they owned numbered a few hundred fighters, among them fighters of Arab origin.<sup>117</sup> The Arabs in the ranks of the Šākiriyya of Tābit and his brother joined them as individuals, having found their way into the area for one reason or another.<sup>118</sup> Their number was not inconsiderable, and when their master Tābit b. Quṭba was murdered, they continued to operate within the Šākiriyya, but under a separate command from that of the Persians.<sup>119</sup>

In another instance in which Arab nobility had their own Šākiriyya, also in Transoxania, the Šākiriyya displayed particular skill in surrounding the enemy and surprising him from the rear.<sup>120</sup> The activity of Šākiriyya units in this region continued throughout the entire Umayyad period. The last report of such activity was about ten years before the decline of the dynasty.<sup>121</sup>

But that was not the end of the Šākiriyya units, which continued to operate vigorously during the 'Abbassid period<sup>122</sup> until the classical institutions of the army framework were dismantled and replaced by a new entity, of which the Šākiriyya was the central pillar.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Ṭab., II, 1023, 1027.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1080-81.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1802, 1155.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1557.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1159.

<sup>120</sup> The patron of the Šākiriyya in this area was called 'Ašim b. 'Amr al-Qaysī. Ṭab., II, 1528.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1609.

<sup>122</sup> al-Ġāḥiẓ, the contemporary scholar, says that even Christian subjects had acquired their own Šākiriyya. *Rasā'il al-Ġāḥiẓ*, III, 317.

<sup>123</sup> Mas'ūdī, VII, 291. About the new military system and the identity of its soldiers, see: *al-Tanbih*, 361-2.

## V

When al-Muḥtār inaugurated his pro-Šīʿite propaganda campaign, which centered around the call to avenge the blood of al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī who had been murdered by the Umayyads, most of those who answered his call and joined his ranks came from among Persians of Kūfa, who were known as *al-Ḥamrāʾ*. Their community in Kūfa numbered about 20,000.<sup>124</sup>

Another tradition reports that these Persians—like those in Yemen—were given the epithet *Abnāʾ*—the progeny of the first generation. And in the same way those who were in Baṣra were known as *Asāwira*, while the Persians in Kūfa became known as *Aḥāmira* (plu. *Ḥamrāʾ*).<sup>125</sup>

Yet another tradition reports that they first came to Baṣra and afterward settled permanently in Kūfa.<sup>126</sup> Al-Balādhurī establishes that they were *Asāwira* who before the advent of Islam had been stationed in Qazwīn on the border of the Sassanian empire together with the Turkish tribes in the southwest of central Asia in order to halt the penetrations of the Turks. In 644/24 the Muslim occupation army reached the area. The inhabitants preferred to convert to Islam rather than pay poll tax, and they were accordingly given the same status that was given to the *Asāwira* in Baṣra. Most of them preferred to stay where they were, while others went to live in Kūfa, where they became allied with Zuhra b. Ḥuwayya of Tamīm and were given the epithet *Ḥamrāʾ al-Daylam*.<sup>127</sup> According to the arrangement that was made, they must have been admitted to the *dīwān* just as the *Asāwira* had been in Baṣra; consequently, the figure specified by al-Dinawarī seems astronomical unless one takes into account the thousands of prisoners of war who over the course of time became enslaved to private individuals and to institutions of state, and whose number thus steadily increased.

The epithet *Ḥamrāʾ al-Daylam* was intended, in the opinion of this author, to distinguish between this group and the other Persian elements who had settled in Kūfa. In any case, the group in question carried out policing activities in the town during the early stages of

<sup>124</sup> *al-Aḥbār al-ṭiwāl*, 288.

<sup>125</sup> Aḡ., XVI, 75-6; Ḥawārizmī, 73, al-Tāḡ, p. 24 (n. 1).

<sup>126</sup> *Tāḡ al-ʿArūs*, III, 154 (*infra*), “*wa-ʿl-aḥāmīratu qaumun min al-ʿaḡami nazalū bi-al-baṣratī, wa-tabannakū bi-al-kūfaḥ*”.

<sup>127</sup> Yāqūt, IV, 342-3; *Futūḥ*, 394-5.

the term of Ziyād as Mu'āwiya's agent<sup>128</sup> and comprised the only source of man power in governor Ziyād's police force.<sup>129</sup>

As for the fighting units who bore the same epithet *Ḥamrā'*, these were units in the Persian army who had surrendered to the Muslims or deserted the imperial army and joined the occupation army during the early stages of the Muslim offensive. The first battle in which they took part was al-Qādisiyya in 635/14.<sup>130</sup> Two years later, another group of *Ḥamrā'* appeared, to whom a Persian—originated commander by the name of Qubād was appointed. This later group participated in the chase carried out by the Muslims against the remnants of the defeated Persian army; later, they were sent as a garrison to the town of Ḥulwān.<sup>131</sup> Another group of non-Arab fighters who bore the epithet *Ḥamrā'* appeared on the scene in Egypt, though their ethnic origin has not been unequivocally established. One version establishes that they entered Egypt with the occupation army under 'Amr b. al-ʿĀṣ and that some were of Greek-Byzantine origin and others of Persian origin. According to another version, they were originally descendants of the Persians that were in Yemen. The Persian and Greek communities among the *Ḥamrā'*, each obtained a separate quarter within the garrison town of Fuṣṭāṭ and were treated like the fighters who originated in the Arab tribes.<sup>132</sup>

## VI

In a letter sent by 'Abd al-Allāh b. al-Zubayr to the Umayyad caliph Mu'āwiya, he complained that Mu'āwiya's slaves who had been working a parcel of land next to a plot owned by Ibn al-Zubayr, had scuffled with his own slaves. Among other things, he writes derisively: *faqad ḡalabtānā bi ḥumrānika wa sūdānik* ("you have already overcome us thanks to your *Ḥumrān* and *Sūdān*").<sup>133</sup> Al-Ġāḥiḡ refers to these two terms in a treatise, establishing that the expression *Sūdān* is a generic term including all Negroes, both Ethiopian and Sudanese.<sup>134</sup> Slaves and prisoners of war from these ethnic groups were constantly streaming

<sup>128</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa, 216; *Ṭab.*, II, 118.

<sup>129</sup> *Ṭab.*, II, 148.

<sup>130</sup> *Ṭab.*, I, 2261.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 2473.

<sup>132</sup> Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥakam, 129.

<sup>133</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa, p. 42.

<sup>134</sup> *Rasā'il*, I, 210.

into the Islamic state, whether by way of the slave trade<sup>135</sup> or as a result of military raids into the regions bordering upon the Muslim territory, in which prisoners of war were taken by way of pacts made with the inhabitants of these regions.<sup>136</sup> The overwhelming majority of these slaves were absorbed in domestic service or agricultural work, as we have already seen. But certain other groups were used for military purposes. As such, they were given a separate quarter in Baṣra.<sup>137</sup> But there is little available information as to their military performance, or whether or not they were under separate command, or the nature of their missions.

In contrast with these, there was a fighting unit made up of Ethiopians which served in the ranks of Ibn al-Zubayr during the siege which the Syrian army laid upon Mecca, where he entrenched himself during the uprising.<sup>138</sup> Later this unit was transferred to the army of Muṣ'ab, the brother of the insurgent, who was active in another part of Iraq.<sup>139</sup>

There was a unit of *Sūdān* which belonged to Marwān b. al-Ḥakam, the governor of Madīna during the reign of Mu'āwiya.<sup>140</sup> The army sent by Yazīd b. Mu'āwiya to put down the riots that broke out in Madīna in the year 682/63, included a large number of *Sūdān* who apparently belonged to the *dīwān*; after the defeat of the people of Madīna, the army was given a free hand to do as they wished with the inhabitants and their property.<sup>141</sup> As a result, 800 babies were born nine months later, who became known as *awlād al-Ḥarra*.<sup>142</sup> The *Sūdān*, and particularly the Ethiopians among them, were experts at javelin-throwing, or *mizrāq*. When the Ethiopian unit under the command of Muṣ'ab b. al-Zubayr failed to resist the Syrian army and were forced to retreat from their positions, they blamed their failure on the pretext that they had not been able to fight an open battle using the conventional weapons of the day, since their expertise was throwing javelins and thus overcoming the enemy while he was in retreat.<sup>143</sup> The infamous Ethiopian slave who according to Arab literature was the murderer of

<sup>135</sup> Ibn Buṭlān, *Nawādir*, I, pp. 352-89.

<sup>136</sup> *al-Amwāl*, 215, 266-7.

<sup>137</sup> *Tanzīmat*, p. 87.

<sup>138</sup> *Ansāb*, V, 360-361.

<sup>139</sup> *Ansāb*, IVb, 51.

<sup>140</sup> *al-'Uymāniyya*, 237.

<sup>141</sup> *Rasā'il*, I, 201.

<sup>142</sup> Yāqūt, II, 249; Ibn Taḡrī Bardī, I, 160-161.

<sup>143</sup> *Ansāb*, IVb, 51; Ibn Ḥillikān, VI, 36.

*Hamza*, the uncle of the Prophet, at the battle of Uḥud, supposedly used the same type of weapon, known as the *ḥarba*.<sup>144</sup>

## VII

In the words of praise attributed by al-Ġāḥiẓ to the orator at Ḥurāsāniyya, who was actually of the second generation of those known as al-Abnā',<sup>145</sup> the orator glorifies the loyalty of the soldiers of this army to the 'Abbasid dynasty and enumerates their prominent military achievements. Among these he refers to their crushing victory over the private militias that were in the service of the last of the Umayyad rulers, Marwān II. In this context, he mentions the names of four such militias: al-Ṣaḥṣaḥiyya, al-Dāliqiyya, al-Dakwāniyya, and al-Rāšidiyya.<sup>146</sup>

As for the third group, al-Dakwāniyya, this militia was linked to the name of the prince and warrior Sulaymān b. Hišām, son of Hišām, the Marwānid caliph (723-742/105-125) and numbered some 5000 soldiers,<sup>147</sup> most of whom were *mawālī*, not of Arab origin.<sup>148</sup> There is also indirect evidence that they belonged to the *mawālī*. One such piece of evidence proves that there were *Sūdān* among them, of Ethiopian origin.<sup>149</sup> The methods by which they were enlisted were no different from the methods that were common for the enlistment of other ethnic militia during the Umayyad period.<sup>150</sup> It is very reasonable to assume that their master, Sulaymān b. Hišām, had a principal position in the enlistment and consolidation of this unit, since he was appointed governor at Raqqa in 727/120<sup>151</sup> and approximately ten times was placed in charge of the two-year campaigns against Byzantine territory, known as the *ṣā'ifa* campaigns.<sup>152</sup> But there is no evidence that it was he who founded this militia. On the contrary: There exists a tradition according to which the Dakwāniyya was founded by the

<sup>144</sup> Ibn Sa'd, II, 49; Ibn Hišām, 590.

<sup>145</sup> Sharon M., pp. 105-143.

<sup>146</sup> al-Ġāḥiẓ, "*manāqib al-turk*", pp. 175-6.

<sup>147</sup> Shaban, 165; P. Crone, p. 53 (n. 393); Ṭab., II, 1834.

<sup>148</sup> Ṭab., II, 1890.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1912.

<sup>150</sup> There is no evidence in the sources that the retinues of the Dakwāniyya were recruited from the *mawālī* of al-Ġazira (Mesopotamia) as suggested by Shaban, *loc. cit.*

<sup>151</sup> al-Azdī, p. 40.

<sup>152</sup> Ibn 'Asākir, VI, 288-9; Ibn Ḥayyāt, II, 508, 517, 520, 526, 528; Ṭab., II, 1561, 1573, 1588, 1635, 1727.

caliph and father, Hišām, as one may understand from the reports of Balāḍurī.<sup>153</sup>

As a separate militia, the *Dakwāniyya* had a separate command. Mentioned as the bearer of this post is the name of Muslim b. *Dakwān*,<sup>154</sup> who evidently gave his name to the militia. Another commander whose name is mentioned in connection with the command over this militia, was the *mawlā* of Sulaymān b. Hišām, named Badr al-*Dakwānī*, who was placed in charge of Sulaymān's militia on behalf of al-*Daḥḥāk al-Ḥārīḡī*, after Sulaymān and his *mawālī* joined the *ḥārīḡī* rebellion.<sup>155</sup>

Al-*Dakwāniyya* was particularly active in the third civil war following the murder of al-Walīd by Yazīd, they were fighting alongside their master Sulaymān, in the opposition against the imperial army of Caliph Marwān, and later in the ranks of the *ḥawārīḡ* after their longtime master changed sides and became loyal to the insurgent *ḥārīḡī* leader.<sup>156</sup>

After the departure of Sulaymān b. Hišām from the scene in the wake of the victory of Marwān over the *ḥawārīḡ* in 745/128,<sup>157</sup> the al-*Dakwāniyya* militia appears among the ranks of Caliph Marwān b. Muḥammad, at the battle of al-Zāb, in which its fate was sealed, as was that of the Umayyad dynasty, which withdraw in favor of the opposing house of 'Abbās.<sup>158</sup>

The change that took place in the stance of this militia does not represent a change in loyalty from one master to another. Rather, as *mawālī* to the former caliph Hišām b. 'Abd al-Malik (as most of them were), they owed their loyalty to the current ruler, and when he died, their loyalty went to the new ruler. What is more, being the *mawālī* of a certain Umayyad prince, they felt and acted, as prescribed by law, loyal to the entire house of Umayya.<sup>159</sup>

The very fact that the speaker at *Ḥurāsāniyya* mentioned the names of only four militias that fought alongside Marwān at the battle of

<sup>153</sup> "fa-ḥallafa fihimā Sulayman qauman min al-*Dakwāniyya*, wa-akṭaruhum mawālī Hišām". *Ansāb*, MS, II, fol. 178a. ("Then Sulayman left in them a group of al-*Dakwāniyya*, of which the majority were Hišām's *mawālī*").

<sup>154</sup> Ṭab., II, 1833. He was a freedman (*mawlā 'atāqa*) of the Umayyad caliph Yazīd b. al-Walīd, who was known as *al-nāqīs*. Ṭab., II, 1852-3.

<sup>155</sup> al-Azdī, 70.

<sup>156</sup> Ṭab., II, 1830, 1833, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1892, 1913; al-Azdī, pp. 68-76.

<sup>157</sup> al-Azdī, p. 76.

<sup>158</sup> Ṭab., III, 40.

<sup>159</sup> On the hereditary loyalty of the *mawlā* consult the passage: 'Arab and 'Aḡam in Goldziher, vol. 1, pp. 101-104.



al-Zāb, indicates the degree of prestige these militias enjoyed. As already mentioned, one of the four was al-Şaḥṣaḥiyya, which indeed fought in this battle within the ranks of Marwān.<sup>160</sup> Shortly before that battle, this militia had appeared in the Persian town of Işbahān under the command of Mālik b. Adham al-Bāhili,<sup>161</sup> having arrived there during the chase organized by Marwān against the remnants of the forces of al-Ḍaḥḥāk, after the latter had been murdered. To this end he chose three of his most senior commanders, whom he placed in charge of three separate units of horsemen. He then sent these units as reinforcement to Ibn Ḍubāra, another commander, who was engaged in combat activity in Iraq against the aforementioned *ḥawāriğ*. One of the three senior commanders was an Arab by the name of Muş'ab b. al-Şaḥṣaḥ. According to one version, Marwān placed a thousand horsemen at the disposal of each of the commanders,<sup>162</sup> while a different version quotes this figure at 10,000 horsemen each.<sup>163</sup> The pursuit of the *ḥawāriğ* took a long time, since Marwān's order was to chase them wherever they went and not to let them get away. In the course of the chase, the *ḥawāriğ* were driven away from Iraqi territory and penetrated deep into the mountainous region of Persia, but Marwān's forces did not cease the chase, and the insurgents departed from Persia.<sup>164</sup>

It is not impossible, therefore, that this group of Şaḥṣaḥiyya that appeared on the scene at Işbahān despite the fact that they were not under the command of Ibn al-Şaḥṣaḥ, reached that town in the course of pursuing the *ḥawāriğ*, and that their commander, Ibn al-Şaḥṣaḥ, had been forced to leave them in Persia and return to Marwān as part of his redeployment plan in light of the Şi'ite-ʿAbbasid rebellion at Ḥurāsān under the leadership of Abū Muslim.

As for the identity and ethnic affiliation of the Şaḥṣaḥiyya, it is clear that some of them were *mawālī* and there is reason to assume that they, too, included Arab recruits from among the inhabitants of al-Ġazāra. This assumption is based on Hişam's policy of increasing his number of fighters in light of the military pressure being imposed from outside, a policy which Marwān was obliged to enforce.<sup>165</sup> Given this

<sup>160</sup> Tab., III, 40.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 2.

<sup>162</sup> al-Azdī, pp. 75-6; *Ansāb*, MS II, fol. 178b.

<sup>163</sup> Tab., II, 1945.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1945.

<sup>165</sup> Shaban, 162.

framework, it is not impossible that Arab fighters were enlisted from among the Tamīmī sub-tribe Banū Sa'd, fighters who became known as *Ṣaḥṣaḥiyyūn*.<sup>166</sup> Whether the Ṣaḥṣaḥiyya militia took its name from this epithet or from the name of one of its commanders, Muṣ'ab b. al-Ṣaḥṣaḥ, the origin of this name will remain a mystery until new material is discovered.

In one of the historical poems of the poet Ğarīr which denounces his colleague and adversary al-Farazdaq, Ğarīr lauds the role played by one of the Berber commanders, named al-Waḍḍāḥ, in furthering the esteem of Islam and praises the *ġihād* wars he led.<sup>167</sup> This al-Waḍḍāḥ was a *mawlā* of Caliph 'Abd al-Malik and commander of the al-Waḍḍāḥiyya militia which bore his name.<sup>168</sup> This unit took part in putting down the Iraqī rebellion which broke out in 720/102 under the leadership of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab. In the decisive battle that developed between the Syrian army and the rebels, it was al-Waḍḍāḥ and his unit who undertook the complex and dangerous mission of crossing the river in full sight of the enemy in order to burn the bridge. When al-Waḍḍāḥ had completed this mission, panic and disconcertment struck the rebels, whose escape route had been blocked. This greatly aided the victory of the Syrian army.<sup>169</sup> Al-Waḍḍāḥ was sometimes placed in charge of the *sā'ifa* campaigns, and fulfilled his mission successfully.<sup>170</sup> It was perhaps for this reason that Caliph Hišām gave him the task in 724/106 of setting out on reprisal missions in the heart of Byzantine territory, which he penetrated deeply, burning crops, farms, and villages of the Byzantines.<sup>171</sup>

From the moment it was founded by 'Abd al-Malik, the Waḍḍāḥiyya continued to exist throughout almost the entire Umayyad period: it appears together with the army of the last Umayyad caliph, Marwān b. Muḥammad, in 744/127, when the latter besieged the town of Ḥimṣ (Emessa), whose inhabitants joined the Great Revolt in which all inhabitants of Greater Syria (*ahl al-šām*) took part. Al-Waḍḍāḥiyya were the first to break through into the besieged city. They numbered about 3,000 horsemen. But their commander was not al-Ḍaḥḥāk, but his son, 'Amr,<sup>172</sup> who had evidently taken command in his father's stead, since

<sup>166</sup> Ibn Durayd, 258.

<sup>167</sup> *Diwān Ğarīr*, I, 473; *Naqā'id*, 995.

<sup>168</sup> *Ansāb*, MS., II, fol. 108b.

<sup>169</sup> *Ṭab.*, II, 1401-3.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1306.

<sup>171</sup> al-Ya'qūbī, II, 328.

<sup>172</sup> *Ṭab.*, II, 1893.

al-Ḍaḥḥāk had either grown old or died. From there, Marwān sent 'Amr b. al-Waḍḍāḥ and another commander, together with a large force, to put down the rebellion in Damascus and the surrounding region. This mission, too, was completed with great success.<sup>173</sup>

The induction of Berbers became a tradition in the Umayyad dynasty. From the earliest conquests in the region, the Muslims would impose upon residents who had not converted to Islam (which was true, as we know, of the overwhelming majority of the Berbers) an annual tribute collected in the form of young men and women in lieu of the normal poll tax.<sup>174</sup> This was also the practice in other areas and with regard to other ethnic communities.<sup>175</sup> But this levy was not intensive and did not include all sectors of the population in question. More serious for the Berbers was the so-called *raqīq al-ḥums*, (or "one-fifth levy", *kāna al-wulāt qābla Hišām yuḥammisūna al-barbar; man lam yuslim minhum*) which the rulers preceding Hišām would carry out on the non-Muslim Berber population.<sup>176</sup>

*Mawālī* were sometimes purchased *ad hoc* when a need for manpower arose. One example of this was the order sent by Caliph al-Walīd I to his representative in Egypt, that 2,000 men and women be sent to him from among the Egyptian Copts.<sup>177</sup> The almost incessant supply of slaves, obtained using these methods or others, made it easy for the caliphs and princes of the dynasty to enlist fighters and establish private and imperial militia at their discretion. The sources reveal various types of such militias which were sometimes identifiable by the specific names they bore, as explained above. Generally, however, they were known as "the *mawālī* of so-and-so".<sup>178</sup>

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 1894.

<sup>174</sup> *Futūḥ*, 265; Ya'qūbī, II, 156; al-Amwāl, 267; al-Ḍaḥā'ir, 15.

<sup>175</sup> *Futūḥ*, 245, 280, 281.

<sup>176</sup> al-Qayrawānī, 109.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>178</sup> One can find numerous groups of such *mawālī* linked to the names of the various rulers, regents or princes of the ruling dynasty. The outstanding examples are the following: "*mawālī*", *Ansāb*, V, 301-302, there were about 10,000 men at the battle of Maḡ-Ṛāḥiṭ, Naqā'id Ḡarīr, p. 15. Sometimes we see the "*ḥisyān Mu'āwiya*" numbered 4000 men, *Ṭab.*, I, 3091. Or "*Mawālī 'Abd al-Malik*", *Futūḥ*, 190. Or "*Mawālī Hišām*", Ibn al-Abbār, I, 34. Or "*Mawālī al-'Abbās b. al-Walīd*", Ibn 'Asākir, MS. fol. 468a. Or "*mawālī al-Miswar*", *Ansāb*, IVb, 48. In some cases, the recruited militias got their names from the name of their homeland or from their previous legal status, as one can learn from the names of the following: "*raqīq Uṭmān*", who were recruited from the ranks of the prisoners of war brought from the front to Madīna, *Ṭab.*, I, 2988. Or "*ḡilmān Uṭmān*", al-'Iṣāmī, II, 403. Or, "*ḡityān 'Abd al-Malik*", i.e., the freedmen of 'Abd al-

During the reign of Hišām, the Šīʿite revolt broke out, associated with the name of Zayd b. ʿAlī. Kūfa was the arena of this rebellion. In the course of the encounter with the rebels, the horsemen of the Syrian garrison were repelled by the rebels. The commander of the Syrian units requested the intervention of the archers, *al-nāšiba*, who quickly arrived. These were the bowmen of the unit known as Qīqāniyya, under the command of a man named Sulaymān b. Kaysān, a freed man of the Kalb tribe. They were 300 in number, all archers, and their intervention in the campaign put an end to the rebels' resistance, since the leader of the rebellion was struck by an arrow in the head and died shortly thereafter.<sup>179</sup> The name Qīqāniyya attests simultaneously to the country of origin and ethnic identity of this group, who had come from Qīqān in the Sind region of India,<sup>180</sup> the inhabitants of which belonged to the Zutt.<sup>181</sup>

Another ethnic unit in Marwān b. Muḥammad's army was that of the Ṣaḡāliba, freed slaves of Slavic origin who had been enlisted from among the non-Arab elements in Anṭākiyā and the surrounding region. The commander of this unit, named Sulsāq, took part in putting down the uprisings that had broken out against Marwān in Syria.<sup>182</sup> Other Slavic units were stationed by him as garrisons in the outlying towns bordering on Byzantium.<sup>183</sup> Marwān apparently had great and unconditional faith in these Slavs: he trusted them as his personal guards; furthermore, he appointed one of them, a man by the name of Ṣuqlāb, to be his chamberlain.<sup>184</sup>

From the earliest days of the Umayyad dynasty in power, a cavalry unit called *rābiṭa* was established in Iraq to deal with the sudden uprisings by the *ḥawārīg*. The first to establish this unit was Muʿāwiya's representative in ʿIrāq, Governor Ziyād. The unit consisted of some 500 men, based in the area of the mosque, under a separate command.<sup>185</sup> Evidently, as the danger posed by the *ḥawārīg* increased on the one hand, and their uprisings became more frequent on the other, it became

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Malik, *Ansāb*, V, 300. Or "*farḡāniyyat ʿAbd al-Malik*", those who came from Farḡāna in Central Asia, *al-Bidāya*, IV, 28.

<sup>179</sup> Tab., II, 1708; *Maqātil*, 141, 137; Ibn al-Aʿīr, IV, 246.

<sup>180</sup> Yāqūt, IV, 423.

<sup>181</sup> *Futūḥ*, 544.

<sup>182</sup> Tab., II, 1910.

<sup>183</sup> *Futūḥ*, 177, 197.

<sup>184</sup> *Ansāb*, III, 121.

<sup>185</sup> *Ansāb*, IVa, 192.

necessary to streamline and improve the operation of these units. To this end, a special framework was established, headed by a military commander known as *šāhib al-rawābiṭ*. Several such units were established in sensitive places, none of which numbered more than 500 horsemen and each of them under a separate commander. These units became a separate entity during the reign of Hišām b. 'Abd al-Malik, although they did exist during the reign of earlier caliphs.<sup>186</sup> Toward the end of the dynasty's dominion, these units increased in number, and the number of horsemen assigned to each unit doubled to 1,000 men. In Mesopotamia alone there were seven or eight such units, all commanded by 'Abdallah b. Marwān, son of the last caliph.<sup>187</sup>

In an utterance attributed to Abū Ġa'far al-Manšūr, the 'Abbasid caliph (736-58/753-74), Abū Ġa'far refers to the rulers of the Umayyad dynasty, singling out only three of them whom he considered worthy of being called kings in every sense of the word. Among these three he mentions Hišām, adding: "whose *mawālī* would do anything for him", *wa-kafāhu mawālīh*.<sup>188</sup> Summarizing his remarks on this caliph, he says, *inter alia*, that he enlisted many fighters for himself, *wa ištana'a al-riġāl*.<sup>189</sup> In other words, he established fighting units from among the *mawālī*. This reminds us of the combat units of the princes in the protectorates (*Hīra*), which were known as *al-Šanā'i'*.<sup>190</sup>

*Mawālī* were acquired extensively during the Umayyad period. They were thought of as an additional force, more reliable and safer than the Arab tribesmen, whose loyalty to the rulers was doubtful at best because their true loyalty lay solely with their tribes. The rulers from the house of Umayyad were aware of the waywardness that characterized the tribesmen, and therefore did not think twice about purchasing *mawālī*, whom they considered an alternative that was more loyal, more gracious, and more indebted.<sup>191</sup> Furthermore, Arab literature emphasizes and even lauds the unconditional obedience and loyalty of the *mawālī* toward their masters.<sup>192</sup> A quotation has been preserved,

<sup>186</sup> Ibn Sa'd, VII (2), 67; *al-Ġamhara*, MS, fol. 140a; *Ansāb*, MS, II, fol. 680b.

<sup>187</sup> al-Azdī, 69, 75-6; Tab., II, 1945.

<sup>188</sup> Ibn al-Abbār, I, 34.

<sup>189</sup> al-Mas'ūdī, V, 466.

<sup>190</sup> M.J. Kister, "al-Hīra", *Arabica*, 15 (2) 1968, pp. 143-169.

<sup>191</sup> Once Mu'āwiya sent a letter to his deputy in Iraq, Ziyād, in which he complained of the ill treatment of his relatives. In his response, Ziyād says: "*alayka bi-al-mawālī, fa-innahum anšaru wa-aġfaru wa-aškar*". *Ansāb*, IVa, p. 23.

<sup>192</sup> See for example the commentary of al-Ġāhiz concerning their obedience and loyalty. *Rasā'il*, vol. 1, pp. 28, 30.

attributed to one of the members of the ruling nobility, in which the *mawālī*, particularly the private military units, are described as a fortress in which shelter may be found in times of danger.<sup>193</sup>

The Umayyads thought of the private militias that had been enlisted from among the *mawālī* as an additional measure of power and strength, which in turn boosted their own self-confidence and their ability to cope with the high-spirited temperament of the tribesmen. This is the interpretation given by the Abū Tammām to the step taken by ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Ziyād in enlisting the Buḥāriyya.<sup>194</sup> In a speech given by Qutayba b. Muslim, the military commander and governor of the eastern province during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik, Qutayba refers specifically to the valor and strength provided by the units of the Ṣuḡd that were subordinate to him. He considered them a counterforce offsetting all the tribesmen in the province, who were estimated to number tens of thousands of fighting men.<sup>195</sup>

#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abu Tammām	=	<i>Naqā’id Ġarīr wa-al-Aḥḥal</i> (ed. A. Ṣaliḥānī al Yasu’ī, Beirut 1922).
Abū Yūsuf	=	<i>al-Ḥarāğ</i> (4th ed. Cairo 1392 H.).
Ag.	=	Abū al-Farağ al-Iṣfahānī, <i>Kūṭb al-ağāmī</i> (ed. Būlaq, Cairo 1285 H.).
<i>al-Aḥbār al-tiwāl</i>	=	al-Dinawarī, <i>al-Aḥbār al-tiwāl</i> (ed. ‘Āmir and al-Šayyāl, Teheran 1960).
Amwāl	=	al-Qāsim b. Sallām, <i>al-Amwāl</i> (ed. M. Harrās, Cairo 1968).
Ansāb MS	=	al-Balāḍurī, <i>Ansāb al-ašraf</i> , MS. ‘Āshir Efendi, nos. 597, 598, Sulaymāniyya, Istanbul.
<i>Ansāb</i> (III)	=	(ed. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Dūrī, Beirut 1978).
<i>Ansāb</i> (IVa)	=	(ed. M.J. Kister, Jerusalem 1971).
<i>Ansāb</i> (IV pt. 1)	=	(ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās, Beirut 1979).
<i>Ansāb</i> (IVb)	=	(ed. M. Schloessinger, Jerusalem 1978).
<i>Ansāb</i> (V)	=	(ed. S.D. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936).
‘Athāmina, Hišam	=	<i>The Umayyad Caliph Hishām b. ‘Abd al-Malik</i> (Unpublished dissertation in the Hebrew University 1981).

<sup>193</sup> al-Qayrawānī, 138, “*hum ḥiṣnun lanā*”.

<sup>194</sup> “*ittahada minhum iṭnā ‘asara alfan ya’izzubihim*”, *Naqā’id Ġarīr*, 7; *al-Imāma wa-al-siyāsa*, II, 21-22.

<sup>195</sup> Ya‘qūbī, II, 295; *Futūḥ*, 520.

- 'Athāmina *Arab Settlement* = *Arab Settlement During the Ummayyad Caliphate*, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 8(1986), pp. 185-207.
- 'Athāmina Balādhuri's Sources = *The Sources of Baladhuri's Ansāb al-ashraf*, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 5(1984), pp. 257-262.
- 'Athāmina Diwān = *The Socio-Political Aspects of Diwān al-'atā'*, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 14(1981), pp. 1-39.
- Azdī = *Tārīḥ al Mauṣil* (ed. A. Ḥabība, Cairo 1967).
- Barthold = *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion* (2nd ed. London 1928).
- Bayān* = al-Ġāhiz, *al-Bayān wa-al-tabyīn* (ed. A. Hārūn, 4th ed., Cairo 1975).
- Bidāya* = Ibn Kaṭīr, *al-Bidāya wa-al-Nihāya* (ed. Cairo 135 H.).
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