Seeking popular participation: nostalgia for the first intifada in the West Bank

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Ala Alazzeh[*]

Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine

This article analyzes Palestinian nostalgia in the West Bank for the first intifada and anxiety over the lack of mass participation in anti-colonial resistance following the Oslo Accords. I attribute three reinforcing components to explain the lack of popular resistance: shifts in the mechanisms of colonial control, structural sociocultural changes, and discursive representations of popular resistance. Understanding the changes in the post-Oslo period in the West Bank can help us to reflect on why the experiences of the first intifada have not effectively informed political resistance practices.

Among activists in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), there is a strong nostalgia for the first intifada and a great desire to reproduce its experiences in the OPT today. As a Palestinian,[1] conducting fieldwork in the West Bank over the past few years, beginning most intensely in 2009, I encountered great anxiety among activists around the lack of popular participation in the resistance struggle.

In this essay, I discuss this great nostalgia today among Palestinian activists for the experience of the first intifada. Unlike common perceptions and arguments that portray the practice of popular resistance through the binary of violence and nonviolence, I argue that this nostalgia is fundamentally connected to popular mass participation in the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle. The concern with mass-based participation, and the anxiety regarding the lack of it, arises from the loss of agency many Palestinians feel in the face of a new modality of colonial control that emerged at the end of the first intifada in 1992–1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords. Conceptualizations of popular resistance are intertwined with changes in the notion of 'the people'. Under colonial subjection, in Palestinian political discourse this notion shifted from a Third Wordlist and Marxist conceptualization to a neoliberal one with an altered taxonomy. An assemblage of three components that reinforce each other –shifts in the colonial control mechanism, structural sociocultural changes, and formative discursive representations –can inform our understandings of popular resistance in the OPT and help us to reflect on why the experiences of the first intifada have not effectively informed political practice since the Oslo Accords.

In her edited *Living Palestine: Family, Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation* Palestinian sociologist Lisa Taraki urged researchers to rethink the notion of 'prolonged occupation' as 'protracted war'.[2] The emphasis here is on Palestinians being subject to war over a century of colonization. The notion of a war that takes on different intensities at different historical moments is compatible with the logic of settler colonialism as a meta-framework analyzing the

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*Email: aalazzeh@birzeit.edu

past and present of Palestine.[3] Seeing the past and present of Palestine through a settler colonial lens is an important turn in understanding realities on the ground. Such a paradigm challenges the dominant discourse that characterizes the condition of subjection as only a matter of military occupation. Rather, this approach locates the structural and ideological logic of elimination and subordination.[4] One major characteristic of the Zionist settler colonial project in Palestine is the 'colonial geography'[5] it created through the deliberate fragmentation of the Palestinian social body, spatially through constant reconfiguration of the land by bantustanizing Palestinians into territorially fragmented areas, and temporally and socially dividing Palestinians into mutable groups with different legal characterization.[6]

In his study on the legacy of late colonialism in Africa, Mahmood Mamdani analyzes how the mode of anti-colonial resistance is shaped according to the modality of colonial control.[7] In the OPT, following the formation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)[8] in 1994, a clear shift is visible in how resistance to Israeli colonial control is practiced. While a central concern has remained mass participation in direct confrontation with the colonial power, in the form of demonstrations and clashes, I argue that resistance practices today have not been built on a multi-tactical strategy that locates power in the social mass under colonial control.

Unlike the first intifada, where heroism was represented in the *shabab* (children and youth) as a sociocultural category that revolted against direct disciplinary mechanisms of control, post-Palestinian Authority (PA) social identity around resistance has become increasingly ambiguous. It is at times located in 'the people' as a holistic term but most often in the individual hero (*al-muqawim*, which translates as 'resistance fighter') who resembles the *fida'i* of the 1970s.[9] The leading role of the *shabab* in the first intifada was but one of a cluster of other societal categories that engaged in the liberation war without arms. Palestinian categorization of society followed a leftist Third Worldist understanding of society, in other words, a classification of the social mass that included the working class, peasantry, petit bourgeoisie (usually referred to as merchants), refugees, professionals, students, and women. This categorization impacted the process of mass organization that started taking place from the early 1970s, the goal of which was to solidify a national consensus and drive social progress.[10]

This multi-dimensional understanding of society was the basis for the first intifada as a coordinated, mass-based war of liberation that resembled a Gramscian framework for political change that combined the thought of war of position with that of war of maneuver.[11] Framing the first intifada in military terminology, although it was predominately unarmed, shows the particularity of a struggle that aimed to dismantle and decompose the total colonial hegemony of the state of Israel the OPT. After the formation of the PA, the new modality of control through nativist authority and indirect control created obstacles for Palestinian mass participation. These impediments, I show, are a fusion of discursive processes that produced a new classification for understanding society under colonial control and structural transformations of the material conditions of society.

Nostalgia: the collective soul of the first intifada

On 9 December 2011, Mustafa Tamimi, a 28-year-old Palestinian, was shot in the face by an Israeli soldier. The explosion of the tear gas canister, fired from only a few meters away to his head, caused his death.[12] That day also marked the second year his small village Nabi Saleh began its weekly demonstrations against Israeli appropriation of land and resources for the Israeli settlement of Halamish. That day also marked the 24th anniversary of the first intifada.

During Tamimi's funeral in the village cemetery, I heard eulogies that included the common refrain: 'Your death is a continuation of our village struggle. You are walking on the path of the martyrs of the first intifada.' Those from outside the village commented: 'This village sets an

example of resistance as it was in the first intifada and is continuing today.' After the funeral ceremony ended, we started to march toward the main road, but before long, Israeli soldiers fired dozens of tear gas canisters and rubber-coated bullets toward us. I returned to the wake, joining some older men of the village as they drank black coffee, smoked, and began telling me about the village's experience of struggle. For the men, the experience of Tamimi's martyrdom traveled back 20 years or more to the experience of the first intifada. These kinds of narration were not uncommon, as an older generation of men and women watched from afar the younger generation clashing with Israeli soldiers. They recalled the time of their own youth with pride.

What was surprising was that the younger generation who lived through the first intifada as young children shared similar feelings toward it. That period has crossed generations and entered into the collective memory of Palestinian struggle. Talking with activists in Birzeit village, a few kilometers from Nabi Saleh, about the reminiscences during Tamimi's funeral brought more stories of the 'time of the intifada' and a strong sense of nostalgia.[13] Such narration of the past forms and informs the shadows of today's practice of political activism in the West Bank. I intervened to ask if Palestinians today miss those days? A young Palestinian women in her mid-30s responded: 'We miss the feeling of having a role to play in the struggle, a meaning to our life, the collective soul in the [first] intifada.'

The first intifada has been a site not only for recollection but also a source from which resistance tactics can be mimicked and drawn. In 2011, in solidarity with Palestinian prisoners on hunger strike, demonstrations, and subsequent clashes with occupation, soldiers took place beyond the local sites of such villages as Bil'in, Ni'lin, Ma'sara, and Beit 'Umar where demonstrations frequently occur. Predominantly, young activists marched to the major Israeli checkpoints around West Bank cities, such as Qalandia, a border area dividing Ramallah from Jerusalem. Hundreds of young Palestinians coming from Ramallah gathered at the entrance of Qalandia refugee camp, and, joined by youth from the camp, started marching toward the checkpoint. An estimated hundred fully armed Israeli soldiers were waiting for them, blocking the street, standing alongside the Wall by the checkpoint, and occupying the nearby tall buildings. When the front line of demonstrators were within a few hundred meters reach of the soldiers, dozens of tear gas containers and metal bullets started to rain down, injuring the protestors. Many young people ran back, taking shelter in the nooks of buildings, including myself. Hundreds of demonstrators and locals watched the dozens of young males and females throwing stones at the soldiers, which continued for four hours. Later, in a small coffee shop in Ramallah, I met some organizers and activists of the demonstration and heard the comment that their 'work today is a leading step to a new intifada, a popular one'.

In February 2012, the *Aljazeera* Arabic website reported on these demonstrations in support of the prisoners' hunger strikes with the title: 'The West Bank Recuperates the Atmosphere of the First Intifada'. The environment of the demonstrations is described as comparable to the atmosphere of the first intifada, also called *Intifadat al-Hajar* [the intifada of the Stones]. Similarities include stone-throwing, mass demonstrations, and 'overall political conditions', which, according to the report, are 'helpful as never before' for a third intifada to break out, an intifada that is 'armed only with stones', the report clarifies.[14] While the title evokes the first intifada, the content of the report focuses on the possibilities of a new intifada. Activists on the ground in the West Bank have often spoken very positively about the first intifada, particularly what is described by many as '*wa'iy al-intifada*' [the consciousness of the intifada]. One activist described this consciousness as a 'collective ethical understanding of the responsibilities and reasons for why people are revolting'.

Throughout my fieldwork, I encountered a common narrative among activists: the story of the first intifada, where commitment, collectivity, and creativity, among other factors, consolidated in mass movement of the whole population of the OPT. In strong contrast, the second intifada, also

known as al-Aqsa intifada, is memorialized as a painful experience that was elitist and lacking popular participation, costly on Palestinians and ineffective. For activists, the two intifadas are sites of memory and not of history. As Pierre Nora put it: 'Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.' An important distinction Nora makes between memory and history lies in the characteristics of memory being 'in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations', and being 'affective and magical, [it] only accommodates those facts that suit it'.[15] In other words, according to Nora, memory and the recollection of the past function within the realm of the sacred, while history functions as secular production that is subject to analysis, reflection, and criticism.

The difference between the sacred and the secular in the distinction between memory and history can be located in the social production of each. History-writing as a representation of the past or 'complete event' as 'fact' and 'actual' is a process of objectification. History as object becomes an essential component in the exercise of power by institutions with authoritative experts (state, education, and research establishments). It reflects the teller's authority over events and the way the event is being used. Memory exists in a more democratic sphere of one's ability and willingness to narrate.

The relationship between narrative and memory is clear in the Arabic linguistic tradition, as the word *thakera* (memory) comes from the root *thakar*, which is the past tense of 'to say'. The canonical Arabic dictionary *Lesan al Arab* in one entry explains the word *thakera* as: 'what flows on tongues.' A similarity between an individual's memory and their personal narrative lies in selectivity, whether deliberate or unconscious, for in both there is a reconstruction of the past in order to make sense of it. Victor Turner argued that:

> the narrative component in ritual and legal action attempts to rearticulate opposing values and goals in a meaningful structure, the plot of which makes cultural sense. Where historical life itself fails to make cultural sense in terms that formerly held good, narrative and cultural drama may have the task of poesis, that is, of remaking cultural sense.[16]

In conversation with a 22-year-old female activist at Birzeit University about the ways of organization and mobilization in the newly formed activists circles, she explained that she did not learn anything about the first intifada from school or the university.[17] Everything she knew and shared with her friends, she said, was based on the memory and narration of others. The narrated memory of the first intifada not only functions to remake cultural sense of the experiences of the past, but has also been used to formulate a future vision.

The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC), for instance, states on its webpage that the 'Popular Committees present a unique form of community based organizing and resistance in the tradition of the first [1987] Palestinian intifada.'[18] Transforming memories into futuristic vision appears to be in contradiction to the idea of nostalgia. Nostalgia is commonly used to describe a state of longing for a place and/or time in the past. Often represented with negative connotations vis-à-vis truth, nostalgia tends to glorify the past. The selectiveness of narrative and the dialectic of remembering and forgetting work in favor of 'good' memories while suppressing negative experiences. In the words of Monika Palmberger, 'Nostalgia has been dismissed as remembering through rose-coloured glasses and therefore being devoid of any claim for truth.'[19] However, narration of nostalgic memory does not function in a void, for as with all modes of memory it is informed by the context of the act of recollection.[20] In the case of activists of the popular resistance, nostalgia for the first intifada is not a question of the past, but rather a question of a particular moment that can be reproduced, a replicable event. The search for collectivity and popular participation has made the first intifada an important 'site of memory' to be visited and narrated.

Social hierarchy and colonial control

In his analysis of popular memory with regard to the first intifada generation, anthropologist John Collins identified six rhetorical modes that dominate the narrative on the experiences of the intifada, the first being heroism.[21] Heroism is a historically dominant rhetorical mode among Palestinians whether in literary production or official and popular national narration. While the notion of the hero is dominant in anti-colonial national movements, in the case of the popular memory of the intifada, the notion of the hero, according to Collins, is assigned not to individuals but rather to a whole generation. Here I identify certain shifts in this logic. The representation of the heroism of an entire generation during the first intifada needs to be understood not only within the prism of patriarchy in Arab society or as a by-product of mass participation, but also within the complexity of colonial control mechanisms that manipulated local cultural practices to solidify its disciplinary power.

The 'generation of the stones', 'children of the stones', and *shabab* are common signifiers in Palestinian reflections on the first intifada, where the narrative of heroism evokes the novelty and exceptionality of what the 'generation' of the first Intifada was able to achieve in confrontation with the colonial power.[22] The poetry and songs of the intifada highlight the role of coming generations. For instance, a widely distributed collection of songs popularly referred to as 'the intifada cassette' includes a song with the following opening: 'Oh world, look at me in camp, village and city/see the Palestinian army of *Zahrat* and *Ashbal*'.[23] *Zahra* (singular of Zahrat) means flower, referring to coming-of-age teenage girls, and *Shibl* (singular of Ashbal) means a lion cub, referring to males close to their own coming of age, roughly around 12–16 years. Another song by a local band opens with the lines: 'The *Sabaia* (females roughly between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five) and shabab went out to challenge the army jeeps/the flames of the intifada set the West Bank on fire.' The term shabab took on an empowering signification.[24]

Concern over the age grouping in representations of the first intifada is related not only to the large percentage of youth participating in daily protests and organizing against the occupation army, but also marks a socio-cultural shift in a 'traditional' society, an indication of the change of power and authority within kinship dynamics. As one activist told me:

> We [*the shabab*] revolted against the occupation alongside our traditional parents' generation, who seemed to us at the time to be cowards only caring about [making a] living. They were *taqlideen* (traditional) in one way or another, and we felt they accepted the occupation.

The pluralization underscored by the activist's use of 'we' is a key element in many narrations of the first intifada, as the imagination of a collectivity is attributed to the nature of the protests, which are dependent on the social mass and popular participation, on one hand, and a reference to a whole generation of youth and children, on the other.

Kinship becomes either a prism through which social transformations in Arab societies have been seen through or a model in which political and social practice has been shaped accordingly.[25] In a classical text that has been taught for the last 13 years in all Palestinian universities as the sole canonical text on Arab society, *Al-Mujtama'a al-'Arabi fi-l Qarn al-'Ashreen: Bahth fi Taghir al-Ahwal wa al-'Alaqat* (Arab Society in the Twentieth Century: Research on the Transformations of Conditions and Relations),[26] Halim Barakat states that society is a mirror image of the family. Such representations of familial social structure have been reflected onto Arab society as a whole as an 'analytical category, an ideal type or model, an interpretive principle, a formal theory' applicable on macro and microstructures.[27]

Hisham Sharabi's work on 'neopatriarchy',[28] the patriarchal values and social relations that exist within a facade of 'modernity' and 'modern' institutions in Arab society is useful in unpacking the analogy between family and society. Sharabi writes that in patriarchal relations

> between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings
> the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both the society and the family by a forced consensus
> based on ritual and coercion

Unlike Orientalist accounts on the concept of culture that treat cultural practices as ahistorical, essential, and supraorganic to society, such analyses of patriarchy in Arab society are framed within global dependency theory[29] and put stress on the Marxist notion of production relations to show that family as a cultural unit consolidates as a socio-economic unit.[30]

As depictions of Arab society have been framed within the dichotomy of modern versus traditional, notions of authority within the family continue to play a major role in analysis of the generations in the first intifada. Mass participation of the shabab (this includes young women) in confrontation with the occupation army was perceived as a challenge to patriarchal authority. As Salim Tamari, a leading Palestinian sociologist, writes: 'One consequence of the first intifada is the manner in which generational conflict has been re-defined and the traditional normative behavior towards elder members of the family by younger ones has been disrupted.'[31] He argues that during the intifada young males and females found nationalist justifications to legitimize their long absences from the family house. The unit of the family lost its authority in the face of political parties that were perceived by youth as holding a higher national interest.[32] Other scholars have represented this phenomenon as liberation from all forms of authority including the traditional patriarchy and the military occupation.[33]

In my fieldwork, some activists saw the mass participation of shabab in the first intifada as a deliberate action to dismantle the colonial authority that mobilized local cultural values to maintain its control. According to some, the manipulation of local culture was part of the disciplinary mechanism used even before the first intifada and thus must be confronted. When I asked a group of first intifada activists in Bethlehem, aged in their 40s, about the question of generations, one of them replied: 'It was not about fathers but about the overall network of relations, from the father to the *hamula* (clan) to the mukhtars.' Another commented that everything they 'thought was an obstacle to the Intifada was a target'. He then added: 'But, you know, I feel sad for our fathers. I don't know what I would do if my twelve-year old son would do this to me? But it was different. They [our fathers] represented *al-wa'i al-muhtal* (to have an 'occupied' consciousness).' This representation of the fathers complements a dominant analysis of the Palestinian father who loses his authority, on the one hand, because he feels helpless as he is not able to provide security for his family in the face of Israeli soldiers,[34] and, on the other, because children and women take visible roles participating in the intifada.[35] For many activists, their fathers' generation represented, in the words of one activist, a 'defeated consciousness'. Challenging them was therefore seen as a challenge to the occupation. Understanding this challenge as a nationalistic political act is connected to a form of colonial control that did not depend on sheer military power alone but rather on a complex set of disciplinary practices. One of these practices was the manipulation of local cultural practices formulated through an Orientalist gaze and a one-dimensional modern–traditional axis.

The mobilization of local cultural traditions in Palestinian society was a common practice of the Israeli occupation. The social category of the mukhtar, for instance, was used by the Israeli occupation to play a liaison position. Usually the elder of the biggest family/clan, the mukhtar in Palestinian Arab society, is expected to resolve local societal disputes and mediate between the community and the state. Because under the Israeli occupation everything required permission from the Israeli military administration, such as building a new house, official documentations, and commercial licenses, the mukhtar facilitated nearly every aspect of peoples' life in the OPT. As anthropologist Ted Swedenburg noted about Palestinian villages in the West Bank in the 1980s, the occupation army struck hard at nationalist activities and organizations by

buttressing conservative elements such as landlords, mukhtars, and the head of hamulas.[36] This strategy was not limited to rural areas but extended to all of the OPT.

A clear example of this understanding by Israel and use of the modern–traditional binary was in the 1976 municipal elections and provides a strong exemplary precursor to what was combatted by the *Shabat* in the first intifada. Since the early days of the 1967 occupation, three entities fought to gain popular support in the OPT: Israel as the new occupation state, Jordan as the administrator of the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, and the PLO in exile. Jordan and the Israeli 'civil administration' depended on the traditional structure of hamula elders and appointed mukhtars. The PLO faction, in contrast, worked to organize grassroots nationalists outside the 'traditional' family/hamula structure. Before the 1976 municipal election, Israeli security was estimating that the pro-PLO nationalists would win the election but the government went on with the election based on the opinion of the Prime Minister's advisor on Arab affairs. He was an Orientalist scholar who insisted that 'tradition would win out and that the interests of the Hamula is still more powerful than modern politics'.[37] Although nationalist candidates predominantly won the election, the same Orientalist colonial gaze continued to drive disciplinary strategy. After deporting most of the elected members and the 'unsolved' murder of others, Israel created 'villages leagues' that consisted of appointed mukhtars who aimed to play a nativist authority within the colonial control mechanism.[38]

In two separate yet similar accounts, one from a village and the other from a refugee camp, I was told how the Israeli military authority officers (officially titled 'the Israeli civil administration') used to hold meetings (usually in the mukhtar's house) with elders of Palestinian communities 'giving them lessons' on how to prevent their kids from taking part in nationalist activities and keeping them out of 'trouble'. One activist told me how he lost respect for his father when he saw him going to such meetings. At the beginning of the first intifada, Israeli authority officers turned to their network of local collaborators, largely the appointed mukhtars, in order to stop what seemed to be a massive national revolt. A landmark moment in the intifada occurred at the start of 1988 in the village of Obatia (near Jenin) when a group of activists assassinated the village mukhtar, hanging his body from an electricity pole.[39] As such, the modern/traditional binary as an explanation for the role of the family in Palestinian society fails to account for the way Israeli occupation also employed the intergenerational divide as a means to maintain control.

Following the formation of the PA, the family social structure was subjected to more indirect control by the colonial mechanism as it became an object of social categorization and legal codes produced by the PA. The traditional sociocultural system of Arab Palestinian society became part of the new control mechanism of the PA, which reproduced and capitalized on kinship relations to maintain its political legitimacy. In the second intifada, for example, society as whole was represented as a network of support for *al-muqawama* (the resistance). Acts of resistance became the daily practices of 'getting by the occupation'.[40]

The family and household, while not given a direct political marker,[41] regained its signification as a shock absorber and a major social unit in its ability to adapt during the intensities of the second intifada,[42] as well as reproducer of national subjectivities and acts of resistance through actions of solidarity and support for its members and others affected by the occupation.[43] The transformations in the role of the family and kinship relations between the two intifadas are directly linked to the various forms of colonial control used over the years. As I have argued, prior to the first intifada, kinship relations were often manipulated by Israel in order to reinforce colonial control over the Palestinian people. The new generation that emerged during the first intifada challenged the occupation as it did against familial power hierarchies, becoming a national signifier. New forms of control in place during the second intifada located the family itself as an

integral part of resistance practice. Resistance as such was not constituted by confrontation with the occupier but rather the ability to survive colonial measures.

The family unit and kinship relations are examples of the shift in the way society is classified in the post-Oslo era in the OPT. The pre-Oslo classification of society into sectors (working class, peasantry, students, merchants, and so forth), which was viewed directly vis-à-vis the colonial mechanisms of control, disappeared from a Palestinian national lexicon. In its place, a liberal system of classification became hegemonic, one based on categories such as civil society, state institutions, non-governmental organization, the poor, women, businessmen, and the private sector. With this new classification, a structural shift impacted the potential and practice of mass-based popular participation in the resistance.

Seeking popular participation: the people

In his study of the role of the family in preserving [national] identity, anthropologist Sharif Kanaana argues that Israeli and Western representations of the first intifada in both the media and among scholars represented widespread revolt against elders and disobedience against traditional authority. Palestinians and other Arab scholars, he continues, were persuaded by this framing and adopted it in their analyses. Kanaana, however, argues the contrary. He writes that the intifada created a mutual understanding among the generations because all of Palestinian society took part although in different ways and to different degrees. For Kanaana, it is important to differentiate between visible and active forms of the intifada, the former being the shabab who confronted armed Israeli soldiers with stones and public demonstrations, and the latter being the wider invisible network of support from society.[44] These included elders and the family structure in supporting the new generation. While Kanaana's argument holds merit as it addresses how all parts of society took part in the uprising, it does not explain what society is. In other words, what were the sectors of society involved in the first intifada and in what capacity? How did they come to exist as social actors? What kinds of tactics were they a part of?

While representations of the new generation being the leading force in Palestinian society dominate accounts on the first intifada, during the second intifada, the notion of the heroism of a generation disappeared from public discourse and representation of the resistance. In its place, a relatively new national signifier emerged, *al-muqawim* (the resistance fighter). The image of a young man aged in his late 20s or early 30s holding a gun became the most widely circulated representation of the active Palestinian fighter against the Israeli occupation. Taking on many of the characteristics of the *fedayeen* of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1970s and 1980s who represented young Palestinians who became armed revolutionaries, committed and ready to die for the cause. The new term *muqawim* replaced the term *fida'i* (singular of fedayeen), which disappeared following the signing of the Oslo agreement and the formation of the PA. In addition, it also replaced the term *mujahid*,[45] the term widely used in the 1990s that was associated with Islamic ideologically inspired groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.[46] The usage of the terms *muqawim* and *muqawama* (resistance) takes on the connotation of a position of defense, in contrast to *fida'i* and *mujahid*, who represent figures on the offensive. All connote fighting for the nation against foreign invasion. As a signifier, *muqawim* is constituted in opposition to colonial occupation.

Today, yet another mode of representation among activists is being used. The 'people' in the OPT as a holistic term encompasses imaginations and narrations of the first intifada. Activists who call for unarmed popular uprising use the term in a broad sense to speak about national heroism.[47] The terms *an-Nass* and *as-Sha'b* (both of which refer to 'the people') that I encountered in activists' speech, however, were not used in a glorifying manner but rather as an indicator of mobilization and participation – as an active agent in what is described as 'popular resistance'. The

question of popular participation has been their crucial concern as they maintain nostalgia for *al-intifada al-sha'biyyah al-kubra* (the grand popular intifada). The question that I imagined would be answered by activists was, however, continuously asked back to me: 'Why aren't *the people* participating in popular resistance today?' To understand the activists' desire for popular resistance, we need to grasp the concrete meaning for them of 'the people'.

As one thinks about today's small-scale protests and protest actions taking place in the OPT, the puzzling question of the participation of *the people* is reflected upon through the past. The two intifadas have become the prism through which today's protests are being analyzed and contextualized. Unlike the rhetorical dichotomy of violent/nonviolent that is used by scholars, the Western media, and the PA, among others, as an analytical framework, the activists I encountered focus on popular participation and its absence. The lens is one of popular participation versus guerrilla tactics, which are restricted to a small number of participants, rather than a violence/nonviolence oppositional binary.

The century-long Zionist colonial project in Palestine and the variety of anti-colonial practices used over the years open up a space for historical analogies. The resistance tradition undertaken in previous eras offers rich material for Palestinians to make use of their past for the aim of answering today's questions. What makes the two intifadas prominent is not only their historical and national significance but also their proximity in time. A minority of leading activists have lived through both intifadas, while the majority experienced the second as children and young adults. Additionally, the social and political conditions that preceded and produced each intifada still resonate today, and most importantly the quest of popular participation is fundamental in making the analogy.

In intellectual circles, including research institutions, journalistic accounts, and articles and debates among activists, the act of reflecting on the two intifadas is not for mere historical review, but rather for questioning how to mobilize the population to actively resist the Israeli occupation. Recollecting and analyzing the past are thus not a historical or intellectual exercise, but rather a strategic task to answer a contemporary question. Throughout my fieldwork, I encountered several perspectives on the reason why the second intifada (unlike the first) lacked popular participation.

Reactions

One argument which explains the lack of mass participation revolves around the use of arms by Palestinians. A common explanation I encountered during my fieldwork for this lack was that the Israeli establishment intentionally pushed Palestinians into a second intifada characterized by armed clashes. This argument cites the Israeli media and the one million-bullet policy.[48] In the first month of October 2000, thousands of young Palestinian men marched in the streets toward the Israeli checkpoints that surround Palestinian cities. Demonstrations and stone-throwing resulted in blood for Palestinians with hundreds dead and thousands injured. Activists cite the head of Israeli military intelligence at the time who claimed that Israeli forces fired more than 1,300,000 bullets in the OPT in the first month alone.[49] According to this argument, the Israeli army defined the terms of the confrontation implicitly declaring that a popular uprising was not permissible.

This argument was used in conversation with a 40-year-old activist from Bethlehem, who recalled his imprisonment during the first intifada. He said: 'We [Palestinians] have always been a *people* of reaction; they [Israelis] plan everything and we follow according to their plan.' Despite the generalizations commonly made about Palestinian politics, such a feeling of being crippled in the face of a stronger opponent could be sensed in most encounters with Palestinians as they narrated personal experiences with the colonial mechanism of control. A feeling of

frustration arising from the inability to make change on the ground most often redirects blame onto a given group, that is, the people, excusing individual actors. Thus, the I/subject is hardly visible with regard to responsibility, and replaced by the 'we' as a collective representation of the Palestinian people. Denial of the self in favor of collective blame furthermore induces desire for popular participation and underscores the notion of popular participation in imagining an anti-colonial emancipatory project.

On another occasion, a younger activist challenged the previous analysis. Smiling, he stated: 'That is what we are good at, blaming the occupation for our failures'. He added rhetorically: 'Are our streets not clean because of the occupation?' As his sarcasm located responsibility with the Palestinians and not the occupation, it also endorsed a collective lens through which to view the situation. In other words, seeking popular participation is not a mere strategic or pragmatic goal, but rather a central national cultural value for activists who solidify the sense of nationhood. In the post-Oslo OPT, activists express their feeling of frustration as such: 'En-Nas mish farqa ma'hom' (it doesn't matter to people) or 'el-Ihbat el-'Am' (collective depression). What activists perceive as 'La mobalah' (indifference) on the part of the majority of the population today translates into a source of anxiety, producing a reading of the past, particularly from the first and second intifadas, that looks for guidance and answers to the question of popular participation.

The notion of 'reaction' itself is another form of anxiety. In narrating the political history of Palestinians, many activists stressed the lack of agency, strategy, and initiative – the tendency simply to respond to particular Israeli policies. As an example, one activist highlighted the protest-oriented form of activism as a dominant modality of resistance among Palestinians:

> The tunnel intifada was a reaction to the Israeli act of making a tunnel under Al Aqsa mosque; the second intifada was a response to the failure of the peace process and Sharon's provocative visit to Al Aqsa; today's popular resistance is in response to the building of the Wall. It's the same with the protests in solidarity with prisoners in Israeli jails and with the people of Gaza. The only time we had initiative was in the first intifada.

What is important to note here is not the historical accuracy of such an account, but the way of narrating history via the angle of agency and the unpleasant anxiety of its absence. As today's practice is informed by the past in numerous ways, the question of agency remains a central component in Palestinian political culture and (collective) self-reflection.

Back to the future: the quest for a strategy

Prior to Oslo and the emergence of the PA, the history of the Palestinian national liberation movement was based on incorporating the majority of Palestinians into the liberation struggle. Organizing the 'masses' and arming the people was seen as an emancipatory response to the 20 years (1948–1967) of dependence on Arab states to liberate Palestine that climaxed with the 1967 defeat of the Arab states and Israeli *de facto* annexation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.[50] Locating power in the hands of the people was a strong driving force in PLO political culture. Organizing and arming the refugee populations in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria were part of the grand vision of liberation, and the notion of a people's war was a major conceptual and political project dating to the formation of PLO factions in exile. Within only a few years, however, the PLO developed a more hierarchical, less democratic form of organizing in the form of a state-like bureaucracy, and the political project that started with national liberation and self-determination slowly shifted toward creating a political entity in the form of a state.[51]

Approaches to mass organization differed between the PLO in exile and pro-PLO activists in the OPT. In the OPT prior to the first intifada activists organized sectors of society in an effort to

create social institutions parallel to the ones controlled by the colonial authority. In other words, the focus lays on creating a self-reliant organizational structure with emancipatory political consciousness that would transform into daily resistance practice in the first intifada.[52] This routinized mass-based resistance practice functioned on symbolic and structural levels to challenge the colonial modality of control. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, however, several economic and political structural changes and a discursive paradigm shift regarding the notion of 'the people' obstructed mass-based mobilizations.

Mass organizing in the OPT started in the early 1970s with voluntary work committees, voluntary professional organizations, labor unions that included workers and professionals, women's and students' organizations.[53] In the 1980s, PLO factions capitalized on these organizations, known as *al-Munathamat al-Jamahiriyya* (mass organizations) or *al-Munathamat al-Democratiyya* (democratic organizations), as they were more accessible to the local population, in contrast to the party organizations which were more selective at that time. These self-reliant organizations and networks paved the way for the first intifada through a process of political consciousness-raising and most importantly building an organizational structure for a sustainable intifada.[54] As Nasser Aruri accurately wrote, the first intifada's goal was not to 'out-fight' Israel but to 'out-administer' the population.[55] Self-rule was a practice to dismantle the modality of control over society in the OPT.

Throughout my fieldwork and discussions with first intifada activists, and in reviewing the rhetorical devices used in the *bayanat* (communiqués) of the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada (UNLI), I noticed the recurrent use of military terminologies and references to war. I believe it is useful, therefore, to analogize processes of mass mobilization of the first intifada with war strategy drawing on Antonio Gramsci, paying particular attention to how society is understood. Organizers, activists, and intellectuals of the first intifada viewed each sector of society as playing a particular role that had both resistant and constructive dimensions: resistance by way of challenging the modality of control and demolishing colonial governmentality, and constructive in the practice of replacing colonial control with self-rule, what activists describe as exercising people's power on the ground.[56]

Commenting on Indian decolonization resistance, Gramsci wrote: 'Gandhi's passive resistance is a war of position, which at certain moments becomes a war of movement, and at others underground warfare. Boycotts are a form of war of position, strikes of war of movement.'[57] While 'war of movement', he writes, 'refers to a swift, frontal and direct attack on the enemy with the aim of winning quickly and decisively'.

> war of position involves a long, protracted and uneven struggle over the hegemony of the dominant group and its eventual replacement by the hegemony of the subordinate groups fighting for power and the revolutionary transformation of society. This is a war of retrenchment waged primarily through the institutions of civil society.[58]

Locating 'civil society' institutions in the OPT involves first conceptualizing and identifying the sectors of society and the modality of control over them. In the first intifada, accordingly, each sector of Palestinian society was assigned a particular tactic by the national movement in a multi-tactical strategy. Sectors where mass organizations and participation were strong provide an understanding of how society was conceptualized then mobilized in the struggle.

Included in nearly every *bayan* of the UNLI is a classification of the people. The classification starts with the *shabab* as the primary visible element in the resistance struggle, the workers (often referred to as the working class), the peasants, students, women, and merchants, and makes use of a glorifying language to urge each sector to step up in their mission. This conceptualization of society is also reflected in Palestinian scholarship,[59] wherein common understandings among

the political leadership and intellectual circles reflected the dominant ideology of Marxist and Third World dependency theory in analyzing society.

Following the Oslo Accords, the formation of the PA and indirect colonial rule, and the new political economy, such discursive formations disappeared from the political lexicon and scholarship, being replaced with parallel structural conceptualizations of Palestinian society. This new classification and scholarship were fashioned in accordance with a neoliberal framework including such a lexicon that included state-building, the private sector, businessmen and investors, elite and middle classes, civil society and NGOs, gender and development. The new modality of control, discursive practice, and structural shifts following the Oslo Accords reflect the ways in which popular participation experiences of the first intifada failed in the second and are failing in contemporary activism.

For Gramsci, the war of position takes place on an ideological front between dominant class hegemony and subordinate class counter-hegemony. As Clifford Geertz noticed, ideology is laden with cultural signs and symbols that play a key role in the psychosocial comprehension of the world.[60] In national ideologies, signs and thus significations are found in objects, causes, and ritualistic practices. In the OPT during the first intifada, enormous investment went into making use of symbolism, the power of which was strengthened because the Israeli military government banned any form of Palestinian nationalism or symbolism.

Palestinians capitalized on publicizing national signifiers, such as the map of Palestine, the Palestinian flag, pictures of Arafat and other PLO leaders, as acts of resistance. Methods of distributing these national signifiers included graffiti, paintings, and music. Displaying a Palestinian flag or even the mere colors of the flag was considered under Israeli military law a violation punishable up to one year in prison.[61] Practices such as reading banned books, participating in cultural events, and membership in labor unions were seen by Palestinians as satisfactory acts of resistance. After the formation of the PA, the majority of national symbols were declared nonthreatening to Israel and no longer banned. Strategies shifted from the first Intifada to the second until today with regard to cultural meanings and the use of national liberation symbols. The shift in the resonance of national symbolism was such that one activist commented: 'We were willing to die for having raised a Palestinian flag on a pole, where today it is everywhere and nearly meaningless.' A striking similarity can be seen in Frantz Fanon's discussion of national culture in the anti-colonial struggle:

> The bourgeois leaders of underdeveloped countries imprison national consciousness in sterile formalism. It is only when men and women are included on a vast scale in enlightened and fruitful work that form and body are given to that consciousness. Then the flag and the palace where sits the government cease to be the symbols of the nation.[62]

The cultural signification of national symbols shifted from liberating icons to images claiming authority yet without actual self-determination or political independence. Today, most of the symbols used in demonstrations are directed outward beyond Palestine, in contrast to the first that were largely directed inward toward the local population. In making a contrast between the two intifadas' experiences, one activist said: 'In the first Intifada you barely heard any slogan or saw any graffiti written in English. Look what you see and hear today.' A similar process can be traced in the self-portrayal of the PLO leadership, where the revolutionary nicknames of Abu X, like Abu Jihad and Abu 'Amar were replaced by authoritative titles such as Minister and General. Such shifts in political culture marked a distinct shift from national liberation to 'state-building' endeavor.[63]

Commercial strikes as practiced in the first Intifada were fundamentally symbolic. The act of closing a shop in accordance with calls from the political leadership was part of a process of

delegitimizing the Occupation authority. Recognizing the PLO as the people's legitimate leadership in direct refusal of colonial rule was the underlying essence of these strikes, in a context also where Israel and other regional powers were still attempting to create or support alternative non-nationalist leaders.[64] By the second intifada, the goal of establishing a national authority in the OPT, however curbed in its ability to function as such, had been realized. Although the experience of the first intifada greatly informs the ways in which Palestinians conceive of resistance in the second intifada and today, acts such as workers' strikes no longer have symbolic significance. While strikes were supported at the outbreak of the second intifada, they were quickly abandoned after the first few months, and few alternative effective acts of civil disobedience were imagined in accordance within the new sociopolitical landscape in the OPT. Today, the notion of civil disobedience has largely disappeared from activists' rhetoric.

Civil disobedience activities, such as worker and commercial strikes, the refusal to pay taxes, and the boycotting of Israeli products also lost their economic impact on the colonial modality of control following Oslo. Since the occupation of 1967, for instance, the Israeli process of proletarianization of the Palestinians resulted in 120,000 workers from the OPT working for Israeli employers in 1988 and 160,000 by 1992. Palestinian workers were made into cheap laborers for the Israeli labor market. Though this offered some income to Palestinian families, it deepened the dependency relationship between the colonizers and the colonized and maintained the underdevelopment of the OPT. Palestinian workers were phased out with Israeli implementation of a closure regime around Palestinians that continues to accelerate in accordance with the logic of Oslo. By 1996, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel dropped to 26,000.[65] Unlike some other settler colonial contexts such as South Africa under Apartheid, where the native population was needed as laborers and thus was offered some form of welfare, the post-1990 political economy of the state of Israel no longer viewed Palestinians as a service for the colonial power but rather as a burden. By the time the second Intifada broke out, the resistance practice of workers' strikes had little impact on the Israeli economy, instead detrimentally affecting the Palestinians. The latter became replaceable with foreign workers mainly from Southeast Asia. Today, in contrast to the workers' strike, the PA calls on Israel to give more work permits to Palestinian workers and markets the increased number of work permits as an achievement.[66]

The tactic of refusing to pay taxes resulted in a similar fate. During the first intifada, it was considered a major tactic and described by Salim Tamari as a revolt of the petite bourgeoisie.[67] Because the PA now collects taxes, withholding them only weakens the PA's ability to provide services. Boycotting Israeli products, however, still remains a front where both symbolic and economic leverage can exist. Symbolically, it maintains its validity because it advocates an alternative policy of supporting Palestinian products and Palestinian self-sufficiency. Economically, the OPT are the largest 'foreign' market for Israeli products. Nonetheless, the ability to create Palestinian alternatives to Israeli products in the context of an entirely captive Palestinian economy is severely crippled.[68] Moreover, the creation of a dependent economic Palestinian class under the Oslo Accords and its economic arrangements (known as the Paris protocol of 1995) further hinders these efforts. Palestinian businessmen benefit from the economic relations between the PA and Israel and are materially disinterested in diminishing distribution of Israeli products in the West Bank and Gaza.

As I have argued, the strong nostalgia for the first intifada among Palestinian activists is due in large part to post-Oslo shifts in the meaning and function of the modes of mass organizing associated with the first intifada. The representation of the first intifada as being a *shabab* intifada is a misleading perception. Mass participation included all sectors of society where each sector played a resistance role in dismantling the Israeli occupation modality of control. One of the mechanisms the state of Israel used to control the Palestinian population is the manipulation of local Palestinian cultural practices, primarily family, and kinship relations. The youth being predominantly visible

during the first intifada challenged that manipulation. Despite the desire among activists to reproduce an experience similar to the first intifada and the efforts made in the second intifada to replicate some of the first intifada tactics, the formation of the PA, the bantustanization of Palestinians in the OPT, and the hegemony of neoliberal economy and politics create impediments for the effectiveness of such replication.

The shifts in the political and social structure of the OPT in the post-Oslo period complicated the possibilities of mass participation in anti-colonial resistance. Among activists today, there is a strong anxiety about the lack of popular participation and an attendant nostalgia for and desire to reproduce the ethos of the first intifada. Understanding mass participation in the first intifada and its absence in the years following is not possible without acknowledging the dynamics of control used by the Israeli occupation. As the OPT continues to find itself embedded in new modalities of control and as forms of resistance respond to very different forms of occupation, nostalgia continues.

Notes on contributor

Ala Alazzeh is an Assistant Professor at Birzeit University in Palestine. He earned his Ph.D. from Rice University in socio-cultural anthropology. Recent work includes a co-authored monograph on Palestinian popular resistance under occupation, published by the Institute for Palestine Studies. His research interests include nationalism, resistance, violence, and colonialism.

Notes

1. Having a West Bank ID card, I could not conduct any fieldwork in Jerusalem or Israel proper because I am denied permits to enter those areas due to 'security' reasons. Neither could I access Gaza as it is besieged and isolated even for West Bankers. In addition, the West Bank checkpoint system is always a serious obstacle for anyone conducting research.
2. Lisa Taraki, 'Introduction', in *Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation*, ed. Lisa Taraki (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), xxi.
3. Omar Jabary Salamanca et al., 'Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine', *Settler Colonial Studies* 2, no. 1 (2012): 1–8.
4. Patrick Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.
5. Linda Tabar and Ala Alazzeh, *Al-Muqawamah al-Sha'biya Al-Filistiniya taht Al-Ihtilal: Qira'ah Naqdiyah wa-Tahlilyah* [Palestinian Popular Resistance under Occupation: A Critical and Analytical Reading] (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2014).
6. For a discussion on the distinctions among the different forms of coloniality in Palestine, see Lorenzo Veracini, 'The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 42, no. 2 (2013): 26–42, and Ilan Pappe, 'Revisiting 1967: The False Paradigm of Peace, Partition and Parity', *Settler Colonial Studies* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 341–51.
7. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996).
8. In the Oslo Accords, the official name used is 'Palestinian Authority' because the state of Israel refused the addition of the signifier 'national' to the name. This is but one example of how settler colonial practice functions to deny nationhood to the native population. See Haim Gerber's scholarship on how Israeli production of knowledge, scholarship, and historiography denies Palestinian nationhood. See also Patrick Wolfe's work on the fundamental logic of settler colonial projects to eliminate the native population, starting with the symbolic violence of denying them the ability to self-represent. Furthermore, during my fieldwork, the majority of activists questioned the political legitimacy of

the PA to represent all Palestinians; thus they refused to use the signifier 'national' for the authority institution but not for the Palestinian people. Haim Gerber, 'Zionism, Orientalism, and the Palestinians', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (2003): 23–41; Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism', 387–409.

9. Fida'i is an Arabic word for 'the one who sacrifices'. It was used by Arabs and mostly by Palestinians in the late 1960s and 1970s. I discuss the term in more detail below.

10. Lisa Taraki, 'Mass Organizations in the West Bank', in *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*, ed. Naseer Aruri (Belmont: AAUG Press, 1989), 431–63.

11. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Books* (New York: International Publishers, 1992).

12. See, for instance, Maureen Clare Murphy, 'Video: Israeli Army Violence Follows Funeral of Mustafa Tamimi, "martyr of popular resistance"', *The Electronic Intifada*, December 12, 2011, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/maureen-clare-murphy/video-israeli-army-violence-follows-funeral-mustafa-tamimi-martyr-popular (accessed September 2, 2013).

13. Rosemary Sayigh also makes this point about collective memory, where younger generations mark the starting point of their history not by their birth but by the Nakba Sayigh, *The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London: Zed Books, 2008).

14. http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/e19bab48–4a3d-46e4-9fb2-0670500caf92 (accessed August 7, 2013).

15. Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: lieux de mémoire', *Representation* 26 (1989): 7–24 (9–10).

16. Victor Turner, 'Social Dramas and Stories about Them', in *Performance: Media and Technology*, ed. Philip Auslander (New York: Routledge, 2003), 108–33.

17. Palestinian textbooks make little reference to the first intifada.

18. See, for example, 'About the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee', *PopularStruggle.org*, http://popularstruggle.org/content/about (accessed July 16, 2013).

19. Monika Palmberger, 'Nostalgia Matters: Nostalgia for Yugoslavia as Potential Vision for a Better Future', *Sociologija* L, no. 4 (2008): 255–70.

20. Annette Kuhn, 'Heterotopia, Heterochronia: Place and Time in Cinema Memory', *Screen* 45, no. 2 (2004): 106–14.

21. John Collins, *The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State of Emergency* (New York: New York University Press, 2004). The other five modes are victimization, guilt-shame, potential, testimonial, and empowerment.

22. The assumption in this argument is that occupation policies were not confronted before. I argue, however, that the first intifada's confrontation has a long history of organizing and resistance and the intifada transformed this history into routinized practice.

23. The stanza before this one is as follows: 'Swearing by my life, my honor, and my leaking blood, the voice of the intifada is higher [stronger] than the occupation.'

24. Anthropologist Sharif Kanaana pointed out that the backbone of the intifada, or its visible active members, did not coincide with any known social class or sole age category but rather an interface between two age categories – *awlad* and *banat* (boys and girls) of 6–13 years and shabab (young men and women) of 14–25 years. However, the children prefer to be described as shabab because of the empowering signification of the term. Kanaana, *Dirasat fi-l-Thaqafa wa-l-Turath wa-l Hawiya* [Studies in Culture, Folklore, and Identity] (Ramallah: Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2011).

25. Halim Barakat, *Al-Mujtama'a Al-'Arabi fi-l Qarn Al-'Ashreen: Bahth fi Taghir Al-Ahwal wa-l-'Alaqat* [Arab Society in the Twentieth Century: Research on the Transformations of Conditions and Relations] (Beirut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 2000).

26. Ibid.

27. In a similar fashion, over the last three years, many Arab journalistic accounts have framed the uprisings in the Arab world as a revolt against their father-figure leaders, mobilizing the notion of the 'death of the father' or the killing of the father, to describe the psycho-social transformations of Arab cultural values.

28. Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

29. Ibid.

30. Barakat, *Al-Mujtama'a Al-'Arabi fi-l Qarn Al-'Ashreen.*

31. Salim Tamari, 'The Transformation of Palestinian Society: Fragmentation and Occupation', in *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions*, ed. Marianne Heiberg and Geir Øvensen (Oslo: FAFO, 1993), 21–33.

32. Salim Tamari, *The Mountain Against the Sea: Studies in Palestinian Urban Culture and Social History* (Ramallah: Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2005).

33. Souad Dajani, 'The Changing Conditions of the Palestinian Family during the Intifada' (paper presented at The Changing Family in Middle East Symposium, Amman, 1989). Cited in Kanaana, *Dirasat fi-l-Thaqafa wa-l-Turath wa-l Hawiya.*

34. Collins, *The Intifada Generation,* 52.

35. Yoram Bilu, 'The Other as a Nightmare: The Israeli-Arab Encounter as Reflected in Children's Dreams in Israel and the West Bank', *Political Psychology* 10, no. 3 (1989): 365–89 (116).

36. Ted Swedenburg, 'The Palestinian Peasant as Signifier', *Anthropological Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (1990): 18–30.

37. Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services* (New York: Grove Press, 1992).

38. Salim Tamari, 'Israel's Search for a Native Pillar: The Village Leagues', in *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*, ed. *Naseer Aruri* (Belmont: AAUG Press, 1989), 603–18; Hazem Jamjoum, 'The Village Leagues: Israel's Native Authority and the 1981–1982 Intifada' (MA Thesis, American University of Beirut, 2012).

39. A song on 'the Intifada cassette' glorifies the act: 'It was the people of Obatia who exhausted the [occupation] army, the wetness of the electricity pole/Thus the traitors' destiny shall be.'

40. Lori Allen, 'Getting by the Occupation: How Violence Became Normal during the Second Palestinian Intifada,' *Cultural Anthropology* 23, no. 3 (2008): 453–87.

41. Taraki, 'Introduction.

42. Penny Johnson, 'Living Together in a Nation of Fragments: Dynamics of Kin, Place, and Nation', in *Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation*, ed. Lisa Taraki (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 51–102.

43. Lamis Abu Nahleh, 'Six Families: Survival and Mobility in the Time of Crisis', in *Living Palestine: Family Survival, Resistance, and Mobility under Occupation*, ed. Lisa Taraki (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 103–84.

44. Kanaana, *Dirasat fi-l-Thaqafa wa-l-Turath wa-l Hawiya,* 430–2.

45. In English, it is often translated as holy war fighter. In Palestine, however, the word is also used for national secular fighters until the late 1980s with the emergence of the national religious movements.

46. *Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah* (Islamic Resistance Movement) was established in 1987 during the start of the first intifada. They were inspired by Muslim Brotherhood ideology combined with Palestinian nationalism. *Al Harakat al-Jihād al-Islāmi fi Filastīn* (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) formed in the early 1980s, inspired by the Iranian revolution.

47. Anthropologist Ted Swedenburg wrote that mass participation in the first intifada produced a romanticized notion of 'the people' in the OPT, yet he did not offer further articulation on this idea. Swedenburg, 'The Palestinian Peasant as Signifier'.

48. See Reuven Pedatzur, 'More than a Million Bullets', *Haaretz*, June 29, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/more-than-a-million-bullets-1.127053 (accessed October 15, 2014).

49. See http://www.aljazeera.com/photo_galleries/middleeast/2010103132115872256.html (accessed October 8, 2013).

50. Baumgarten 2006.

51. Jamil Hilal, *Idaʾah ʾala Maʿziq Al-Nukhbah Al-Siyasiyah Al-Filistiniya* [Highlighting the Dilemma of the Political Palestinian Elite] (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2013).

52. Linda Tabar and Ala Alazzeh, *Al-Muqawamah al-Shaʾbiya Al-Filistiniya taht Al-Ihtilal.*

53. Taraki, 'Mass Organizations in the West Bank'; Mary Elizabeth King, *A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolence Resistance* (New York: Nation Books, 2007).

54. Linda Tabar and Ala Alazzeh, *Al-Muqawamah al-Shaʾbiya Al-Filistiniya taht Al-Ihtilal.*

55. Naseer Aruri, 'Dialectics of Dispossession', in *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*, ed. Naseer Aruri (Belmont: AAUG Press, 1989), 1–48.

56. Ibid., 38; Salim Tamari, 'The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie – Urban Merchants and the Uprising', *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, ed. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (Birzeit: Birzeit University and Praeger Publishers, 1990), 159–73.

57. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Books*, 481.

58. Dominic Strinati, *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture* (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 157.

59. See, for example, Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (Birzeit: Birzeit University and Praeger Publishers, 1990); and Aruri, 'Introduction', among many others.

60.   Clifford Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
61.   Hallaj, Muhammad Hallaj, 'Palestine: The Suppression of an Idea', *The Link: Americans for Middle East Understanding* 15, no. 1 (1982): 1–13.
62.   Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 204.
63.   Jamil Hilal, *Al-Nitham Al-Siyasi ba'ad Oslo: Dirasa Tahlilyah Naqdiyah* [The Palestinian Political System after Oslo: A Critical Assessment] (Ramallah/Beirut: Muwatin, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy and Institute of Palestine Studies, 1998).
64.   Since the early 1970s, there were several attempts to bypass the PLO and create an alternative co-opted leadership in the OPT; Israel, for instance, attempted to erect a leadership of collaborators and Jordan attempted to do the same through traditional family structures.
65.   Leila Farsakh, *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation* (London/ New York: Routledge, 2005).
66.   As of 2013, sixty to seventy thousands of Palestinians work inside Israel.
67.   Tamari, 'The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie'.
68.   Samia Botmeh, 'The Palestinian Development Model and Strategies of Change in the OPT' (Palestinian Center for Policy Research & Strategic Studies, Masarat conference, Palestine, 2013).