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PALESTINE 
PARTITION COMMISSION 



REPORT 



Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to Parliament by Command of His Mates ty 
October, 1938 



LONDON 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 
To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses: 
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2 ; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2 ; 
J 6 York Street, Manchester i ; I St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff ; 
80 Chichester Street, Belfast ; 
or through any bookseller 

I938 

-Price 5*. 6 J. net 

Cmd. 5854 



PALESTINE PARTITION COMMISSION 



Chairman : 

SIR JOHN WOODHEAD, K.C.S.I., CLE. 

Members : 
SIR ALISON RUSSELL, K.C. 
A. P. WATERFI ELD , Esq., C.B. 
T. REID, Esq., C.M.G. 

Secretary : 
S. E. V. LUKE, Esq. 



3 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page 

PREFACE 7 

CHAPTER I.— INTRODUCTORY 11 

CHAPTER II.— THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND .. ..15 

CHAPTER III.— GENERAL MATTERS. 

1. Boundaries .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..21 

2. Defence 22 

3. Population . . . . 22 

4. Population and Land Statistics . . . . . . . . 32 



CHAPTER IV.— THE BOUNDARIES OF THE ENCLAVE FOR 
THE HOLY PLACES AT JERUSALEM 
AND BETHLEHEM, AND OF THE 
ENCLAVE AT NAZARETH. 

1. The Boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . 34 

2. The Population and Area of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . 38 

3. The Boundary of the Nazareth Enclave . . . . . . . . 38 

CHAPTER V.— THE BOUNDARY OF JAFFA, INCLUDING 
THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TOWNS 
OF JAFFA AND TEL AVIV. 

1. The Boundary between the Towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv . . 40 

2. The Remaining Portion of the Boundary of Jaffa . . 44 

CHAPTER VI.— THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PROPOSED 
ARAB AND JEWISH STATES UNDER 
PLAN A. 

1. The Boundary along the Eastern Edge of the Maritime Plain 

between the Town of Tulkarm and the Jerusalem Enclave . . 45 

2. The Boundary along the Maritime Plain north of the Town of 

Tulkarm, across the Carmel Ridge and along the Plain of 



Esdraelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 

3. The Boundary along the Plain of Jezreel . . . . . . . . 46 

4. The Boundary in the Plain of Beisan . . . . . . 46 

5. The Boundary in the Jordan Valley . . . . . . . . 47 

6. The Boundary south of the Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . 47 



CHAPTER VII.— THE FIGURES FOR THE POPULATION 
AND LAND OF THE ARAB AND 
JEWISH STATES AND THE ENCLAVES 



UNDER PLAN A." 

1. Population .. .. ., .. .. .. .. ..48 

2. Land . . . . . . 50 

(C 31078) b2 



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Page 



CHAPTER VIII.— THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES AND 

' TRANSFER OF POPULATION . . . . 52 

1. Voluntary Exchanges of Land and Population . . . . . . 53 

2. The Possibility of the Transfer of Population 53 

CHAPTER IX.— THE JEWISH CLAIM IN REGARD TO 

JERUSALEM ... ., . ... ' ... 73 

CHAPTER X. — A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF PLANS A 
AND B. 

1. Plan A .. .. 81 

2. PlanB ... .. .. 89 

CHAPTER XL— PLAN C . . 99 

1. The Northern Mandated Territory . . 101 

2. The Southern Mandated Territory 105 

3. The Central Part of Palestine . . . . 107 

CHAPTER XII. — JEWISH PROPOSALS FOR THE JEWISH 

STATE (APART FROM JERUSALEM) .. Ill 

CHAPTER XIII— JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE MANDATED 

TERRITORIES UNDER PLAN C .. .. 116 

1. The Northern Mandated Territory 118 

2. The Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 

3. The Southern Mandated Territory . . ..... . . 120 

4. The Negative Policy of Control 124 

5. The Constructive Policy of Development . . . . . . . . 133 

CHAPTER XIV.— JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO THE MAN- 
DATED TERRITORIES UNDER PLAN C .. 141 

CHAPTER XV.— NAZARETH AND THE SEA OF GALILEE. 

1. Nazareth 148 

2. The Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) 149 

CHAPTER XVI.— THE PROVISION OF SAFEGUARDS FOR 
THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS AND 

RACIAL MINORITIES 152 

1. Religious Rights and Properties . . .. .. .. .. 154 

2. Nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 

3. Electoral System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 

4. Employment in the Public Services . . . . . . . . 156 

5. Religious Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 

6. Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 

7. Land .. .. 160 

8. Pious Foundations and Charitable Bequests . . . . . . 161 

9. Freedom of Conscience and the Free Exercise of the Activities 

of Religious Missions of all Denominations . . . . . . 163 

10. Foreigners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 

11. Orthodox Jewry .. 163 



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Page 

CHAPTER XVII. — INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. 

1. Railways . . . . . , . . . . . . . 166 

2. Ports . . . . . . .... 170 

3. Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services .. .. .. 171 

4. The Trans-Jordan Posts and Telegraph Department . . . . 175 

5. Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 

6. Industrial and other Concessions . . . . . .• 177 

CHAPTER XVIII.— FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS 

(PART I) . . . . . . 179 

CHAPTER XIX.— CUSTOMS. 

1 . The Economic Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 

2. The Administrative Aspect . . . . . . . . . 205 

CHAPTER XX. — PUBLIC DEBT AND OTHER FINANCIAL 

OBLIGATIONS 213 

1. The Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, 1942-67 215 

2. The Liability of the Trans- Jordan Government for their share 

of the Ottoman Public Debt .. .. .. .. .. 219 

3. The Rights of Public Servants to Pensions or Gratuities . . . 220 

4. The Liability of the Palestine Government under the Empire 

Air Mail Scheme .. .. . . 221 

CHAPTER XXL— FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS 

(PART II) 223 

1. Formula A 224 

2. Formula B 227 

CHAPTER XXII.— SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . 232 

1. The Size of the Proposed Jewish State . . . . . . . . 233 

2. The Attitude of the Arabs and the Jews . . . . 233 

3. The Arab Minority in the Jewish State 235 

4. Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 

5. Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 

6. Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 

7. Economic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23& 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 



NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY SIR ALISON RUSSELL . . 249 
NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY MR. REID . . . . . . 263 



(C31078) b 3 



6 



Page 



APPENDICES 

1. Policy in Palestine (Cmd. 5634) 282 

2. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — Plans B and C 290 

3. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — -Plan B . . 29 1 

4. Village sites in the vicinity of the Boundaries — Plan C . . 293 

5. The methods by which the Land and Population Figures used 

in the Report have been computed . . . . . . . . 294 

6. The Boundary of the Jewish State under Plan A in the vicinity 

of the Power Station of the Palestine Electric Corporation on 

the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami . . . . . . . . 295 

7. The Agricultural Absorptive Capacity of Galilee . . . . 295 

8. The Boundary of the Haifa Industrial Zone . . . . . . 297 

9. Declaration of the Kingdom of 'Iraq made on the occasion of 

the termination of the Mandatory Regime in 'Iraq . . 298 

10. Christian Religious Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 

11. Budgetary Forecasts : Reconciliation with Current Estimates 303 



MAPS 



1. 


Palestine Hydrographic Survey . . . . . . Opposite page 53 


2. 


The Commission's Tours 


At end 


3. 


Map of the Royal Commission's Partition Plan (reproduced 






from their Report) 


At end 


4. 


The Boundaries of Jaffa 


At end 


5. 


Jewish Land Holdings 


At end 


6. 


Trans-Jordan 


At end 


7. 


Map illustrating Jewish Proposals examined in Chapters IX 






and XII .... 


At end 


8. 


The " A " Plan of Partition 


At end 


9. 


The " B " Plan of Partition 


At end 


9a. 


The " B " Plan of Partition, showing Jewish Land 


At end 


10. 


The " C " Plan of Partition 


At end 


11. 


Map illustrating Jewish Proposals with regard to Jerusalem ~ 


In pocket 


12. 


The Proposed Boundary between Jaffa and Tel Aviv 


at end. 



Note. — The United Kingdom share of the cost of the Commission is 
estimated at ^5,639. The cost of printing and publishing this report is 
estimated by His Majesty's Stationery Office at ^1,020. 



7 



To the Right Honourable Malcolm MacDonald, M.P., 
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies. 



PREFACE 

1. We were appointed by your predecessor, the Right Honourable 
W. G. A. Ormsby Gore, M.P. (now Lord Harlech), in March last. 
Our terms of reference, which had been published in a White Paper 
(Cmd. 5634) * on the 4th January, were as follows — 

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in 
Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full 
liberty to suggest modifications of that plan, including variation 
of the areas recommended for retention under British Mandate, 
And taking into account any representations of the com- 
munities in Palestine and Trans- Jordan — 

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and 
Jewish areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently 
or temporarily under British Mandate which will — ■ 

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual estab- 
lishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab 
and Jewish States ; 

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs 
and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa ; and 

(c) enable His Majesty's Government to carry out the 
Mandatory responsibilities the assumption of which is 
recommended in the Report of the Royal Commission, 
including the obligations imposed by Article 28 of the 
Mandate as regards the Holy Places ; 

(ii) to examine and report on the economic and financial 
questions involved in partition upon which decisions will 
require to be taken, including — 

(a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between 
the various areas of the public assets and public debt of 
Palestine and other ' financial obligations legitimately 
incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the 
period of the Mandate ' referred to in Article 28 thereof ; 

(b) means to ensure that the financial obligations 
referred to above will be fully honoured in accordance with 
Article 28 of the Mandate ; 

(c) the administration of the railways, ports, postal, 
telegraph and telephone services ; 

(d) currency arrangements ; 

(e) customs administration and tariffs ; 



* Published in full as Appendix 1. 
(C31078) ~ b 4 



8 



(/) the budgetary prospects of the various Administra- 
tions to be established ; 

(g) the preservation of the rights of civil servants in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the 
Mandate ; 

(h) the treatment of industrial and other concessions ; 
(*) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and 

population, and the prospects of providing by works of 
land development room for further settlement to meet the 
needs of persons desiring to move from one area to another ; 

(j) the provision of effective safeguards for the rights 
of religious or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated 
to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection 
of religious rights and properties. 

2. Prior to our departure from London on the 21st April we 
held no meetings for the purpose of hearing witnesses, as we were 
anxious to defer the taking of evidence until we had had an 
opportunity of obtaining some personal knowledge of Palestine. 
For the same reason, it was not until some weeks after our arrival 
in Jerusalem on the 27th April that we held our first formal session. 
In the meantime we had been able to visit different parts of the 
country and to gain a general impression of its character which was 
of great value to us in our subsequent work. Indeed, we considered 
that the nature of our enquiry made it incumbent on us to obtain 
as thorough a first-hand knowledge of the country as time would 
permit, and during May and the first part of June we covered about 
5,000 kilometres (3,000 miles) in Palestine and Trans- Jordan. 
Our tours are shown on map 2. 

3. We spent nine days in Trans- Jordan during which we were 
able to obtain a general impression of the greater part of the cultivated 
zone. We welcome this opportunity of expressing our warm appre- 
ciation of the hospitality accorded to us by His Highness the Amir 
Abdullah and by the Trans- Jordan Government. We are also 
greatly indebted to the British Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir 
Henry Cox, for the excellent arrangements made for our tour, 
which enabled us to see so much of the country in the short time 
at our disposal. 

4. On our arrival in Jerusalem, we arranged for the issue 
of a communique announcing that persons who wished to appear 
before us would be free to choose whether they would be heard in 
public or in private, or partly in public and partly in private. We 
received, in fact, only two requests from witnesses who wished to 
be heard in public. Of the fifty-five sessions which we held in Jeru- 
salem for the purpose of receiving evidence, two were held in public 
and the remainder in private. On our return to London, we held 
nine further private sessions. No Arab witnesses came forward to 
submit evidence to us. 



9 



5. We left Palestine on the 3rd August, travelling via Haifa 
and Trieste, and resumed our sessions in London on the 15th August. 
Since our departure from Palestine violence has continued and 
intensified, and we have been keenly aware of the fact that we 
should be greatly to blame if any delay on our part were to prolong 
needlessly the present period of uncertainty. You, yourself, had 
also informed us that His Majesty's Government were most anxious 
to receive our report at the earliest possible moment. In these 
circumstances, we considered that delay would be avoided if we 
postponed for a later stage the examination of certain questions 
arising in connection with our enquiry. There are a number of 
matters which we have felt that we could not usefully discuss at 
this stage, either because to do so would involve needless delay 
without affecting the main conclusions of our report, or because a 
detailed examination could not be entered upon until the main lines 
of a partition scheme had been settled. The matters which we have 
left for consideration at a later stage include the following questions 
to which specific reference is made in the second part of our terms 
of reference — - 

(a) the allocation of public assets ; 

(b) currency arrangements ; 

(c) the preservation of the rights of civil servants. 



11 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

1. In this introductory chapter we give a synopsis, by reference 
to the succeeding chapters, of our report. 

2. After a chapter (chapter II) recording the chief events in„ 
and in connection with, Palestine since the publication of the Royal 
Commission's Report and a chapter (chapter III) dealing with certain 
general matters, we begin our enquiry, as our terms of reference 
direct, by taking into account the plan of partition outlined in 
Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission ; and for convenience 
we reproduce (as map 3) the map which the Royal Commission 
attached to their Report in illustration of that plan. But neither the 
map nor the brief description of the boundaries of the proposed 
areas given in chapter XXII, paragraph 20, of the Report, purports 
to do more than give a rough outline of the plan : in order to examine 
the Royal Commission's scheme demographically, that is, with 
reference to statistics of population and land, it is necessary to draw 
the proposed boundaries exactly, taking the Royal Commission's 
proposals as a guide. We cannot imagine, however, that the Royal 
Commission, if they had set themselves to the task of drawing 
precise frontiers for their proposed areas, would have ignored the 
important problem of defence ; yet when we ourselves examined 
the boundaries with this in mind we found it necessary to make 
considerable modifications in the outline of the Royal Commission's 
scheme, especially in the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave and 
Corridor (which hereafter we refer to as the Jerusalem Enclave), and 
in the boundaries on the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain and the 
southern edge of the Plain of Jezreel. These modifications were all 
made after consultation and in agreement with the military 
authorities, and we have no reason to suppose that the Royal 
Commission, if they had given a detailed description of their plan, 
would have chosen different boundaries. The resulting plan is 
shown in map 8. With a few exceptions, which are explained in 
chapters IV, V and VI, it merely reproduces the Royal Commission's 
plan as interpreted in the light of the advice which we have received 
from the military authorities from the standpoint of defence. We call 
this plan A. 

3. Chapters IV, V, VI and VII describe plan A in detail. 

In chapter IV we describe the modifications necessitated in 
the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave, and the boundary we 
propose for the Enclave at Nazareth. 

Chapter V deals with the boundary of Jaffa, which the 
Royal Commission proposed should be included in the Arab State, 
including the boundary between the towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv. : 



12 



4. In chapter VI we describe the boundaries between the 
proposed Jewish and Arab States along the Maritime Plain, across 
the Carmel Ridge and the Plain of Esdraelon, along the southern 
edge of the Plain of Jezreel, across the Beisan Plain, and northwards 
along the Jordan Valley. 

In chapter VII we give the figures of population and land 
for the Arab and Jewish States and the Enclaves under plan A. 

5. In chapter VIII we consider the possibility under plan A of 
voluntary exchanges of land and population and the prospects of 
providing, by means of land development, room for further settlement 
to meet the needs of persons desiring to move from one area to 
another. The conclusion we come to is that the possibilities under 
these heads are small. 

6. In chapter IX we examine the Jewish claim that at least a 
portion of the city of Jerusalem should be included in the Jewish 
State, and give our reasons for rejecting that claim. 

7. In chapter X, plan A is subjected to a detailed examination, 
and we proceed to explain the reasons which have led us to reach the 
unanimous conclusion that we cannot recommend the adoption of 
this plan. During the course of this examination a variant of plan A 
is considered, which we call plan B. The majority of the Commission 
are of opinion that plan B is also unacceptable ; one of the members, 
however, considers, for reasons explained in his note of reservations, 
that plan B is preferable to the plan put forward by the majority in 
chapter XI, which we call plan C. 

8. Chapter XI explains in detail plan C, which the majority of 
us put forward as the best scheme of partition which we have been 
able to devise. 

9. In chapter XII we consider proposals put forward on behalf 
of the Jews for the inclusion in the Jewish State of certain areas, 
apart from Jerusalem, for the extension of the Jerusalem Enclave 
so as to include the town of Hebron and the western shores of the 
Dead Sea, and explain the grounds on which we consider them 
unacceptable. 

10. In chapter XIII we consider under what conditions Jews 
should be allowed to acquire land in the areas which under plan C are 
retained under Mandate, and make recommendations for the develop- 
ment of those areas for the joint benefit of both Arabs and Jews. 

11. In chapter XIV we consider under what conditions immigra- 
tion should be permitted into the areas which under plan C are 
retained under Mandate. 



13 



12. In chapter XV we deal with certain matters of administra- 
tion relating to the Nazareth Enclave, and put forward proposals for 
safeguarding the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of 
Galilee (Lake Tiberias). 

13. Chapter XVI deals with the provision of effective safeguards 
for the rights of religious and racial minorities in the areas to be 
allocated to Arabs and Jews respectively, including the protection of 
religious rights and properties. 

14. Chapter XVII deals with internal communications (railways, 
ports, and posts and telegraphs), and with industrial concessions. 

15. Chapter XVIII deals with finance, and, after examining 
the budgetary prospects of the several areas under plan C, so far as 
it is possible to forecast them at present, concludes that it is not 
possible to recommend boundaries which will give a reasonable 
prospect of the eventual establishment of a self-supporting Arab 
State. 

16. Chapter XIX deals with customs policy and administration, 
and concludes that some form of customs union between the Arab 
and Jewish States and Mandated Territories is necessary to provide 
for the economic welfare of those states. 

17. Chapter XX is concerned with the public debt and other 
financial obligations of the Palestine Government, and the means 
of ensuring that these shall continue to be duly honoured. 

18. Chapter XXI examines a suggestion that advantage should 
"be taken of the proposed customs union to redistribute the net 
surplus customs revenue, after meeting certain common charges, 
between the three areas in such a way as to improve the position of 
the Arab State, without subjecting it to the necessity of external 
financial control. The conclusion is reached that, notwithstanding 
the advantages which an arrangement of this kind seemed to offer, 
including some reduction in the charges which partition must in 
any event impose on the British Exchequer, there are constitutional 
reasons which render it impossible to contemplate a customs union 
"between the Mandated Territories and the Arab and Jewish States 
except under conditions which would be inconsistent with the grant 
of fiscal independence to those states. 

19. In chapter XXII we summarize the main points which we 
think that His Majesty's Government will find it necessary to 
consider before deciding whether they can regard any plan of partition 
which we put forward as equitable and practicable. We conclude 
that, apart from the question whether plan C, which is the best plan 
that the majority of us have been able to devise, will be accepted by 
those concerned, the financial and economic objections to that plan, 



14 



without a customs union between the three areas, are so serious that 
we could not recommend it. If, therefore, we were to confine our- 
selves strictly to our terms of reference, we should have no choice 
but to report that we have been unable to recommend boundaries 
which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment 
of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. Rather than end our 
report with this merely negative conclusion, however, we have 
ventured to go further and put forward a suggestion for a modified 
form of partition, which we call economic federalism, which, while 
it withholds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States, 
seems to us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory 
basis of settlement, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to 
accept the very considerable financial liability involved. 



J 



15 



CHAPTER II 

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 

20. Before we proceed to consider in detail the schemes of 
partition to which reference has been made, we feel that it is desirable 
to refer briefly to the development of events since the publication 
of the Report of the Royal Commission in July, 1937. We do not 
feel called upon to furnish in this report anything in the nature of an 
historical introduction. The historical aspect of the present problem 
in Palestine has already been described in the first part of the 
Royal Commission's Report, and we shall therefore content our- 
selves with a short description of the immediate political 
background against which our enquiry has been carried out. 

21. The Royal Commission were appointed in August, 1936, as a 
result of the disturbances which had broken out in Palestine earlier 
in the year. They were required by their terms of reference to 
ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances, to enquire into 
the manner in which the Mandate was being implemented, and 
whether the Arabs or the Jews had any legitimate grievances in this 
respect ; and if any such grievances were thought to be well-founded, 
to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention 
of their recurrence. In their Report the Royal Commission reached 
the conclusion that the deadlock in Palestine was complete and that 
no measures which could be carried out within the framework of the 
Mandate would be effective in securing a permanent settlement. 
"A continuance," they wrote, " or rather an aggravation — for that 
is what continuance will be — of the present situation cannot be 
contemplated without the gravest misgivings. It will mean constant 
unrest and disturbance in peace and potential danger in the event of 
war. It will mean a steady decline in our prestige. It will mean 
the gradual alienation of two peoples who are traditionally our 
friends." 

22. In the light of these considerations, the Royal Commission 
concluded that a way out from the deadlock must be sought outside 
the existing Mandate : the gravity of the disease required a drastic 
remedy. On page 375 they wrote — ■ 

Manifestly the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or 
the Jews all they want. The answer to the question " Which of them in 
the end will govern Palestine ? " must surely be " Neither." We do 
not think that any fair-minded statesman would suppose, now that the 
hope of harmony between the races has proved untenable, that Britain 
ought either to hand over to Arab rule 400,000 Jews, whose entry into 
Palestine has been for the most part facilitated by the British Government 
and approved by the League of Nations ; or that, if the Jews should 
become a majority, a million or so of Arabs should be handed over to 
their rule. But, while neither race can justly rule all Palestine, we see 
no reason why, if it were practicable, each race should not rule part of it. 



16 



The Commission, while expressing the view that they would not 
be expected to embark on the further protracted enquiry which 
would be needed for working out a scheme of partition in full detail, 
felt that it would be idle for them to put forward the principle of 
partition and not to give it any concrete shape. In chapter XXII 
of their Report, therefore, they outlined a plan which conformed, 
in their view, to the principles which they had stated to be essential 
to any plan. " It must be practicable. It must conform to our 
obligations. It must do justice to the Arabs and the Jews." 

23. The Royal Commission's Report was published on the 
7th July, 1937. On the same day a Statement of Policy (Cmd. 5513) 
was issued by His Majesty's Government. This Statement contained 
the following announcement — 

In the light of experience and of the arguments adduced by the 
Commission, they [His Majesty's Government] are driven to the con- 
clusion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine, that these aspirations cannot be satisfied 
under the terms of the. present Mandate, and that a scheme of partition 
on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents the 
best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. 

The Report and the Statement of Policy were debated in the 
House of Lords on the 20th and 21st July, and in the House of 
Commons on the 21st July when the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies moved the following motion — 

That this House approves the policy of His Majesty's Government 
relating to Palestine as set out in Command Paper No. 5513. 

An amendment proposed by Mr. Winston Churchill was accepted 
by the Government, and the following motion was agreed to without 
a division — 

That the proposals contained in Command Paper No. 5513 relating 
to Palestine should be brought before the League of Nations with a view 
to enabling His Majesty's Government, after adequate enquiry, to 
present to Parliament a definite scheme taking into full account all the 
recommendations of the Command Paper. 

24. No time was lost in bringing these proposals before the 
League of Nations, and on the 30th July the Thirty-second (Extra- 
ordinary) Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission opened 
in Geneva for the purpose of hearing the representatives of the 
Mandatory Power. After a prolonged examination of the Accredited 
Representatives, the Commission, in a Preliminary Opinion sub- 
mitted to the Council of the League, expressed the view that " the 
present Mandate became almost unworkable once it was publicly 
declared to be so by a British Royal Commission speaking with the 
twofold authority conferred on it by its impartiality and its unanimity^ 
and by the Government of the Mandatory Power itself. . . . The 
Commission therefore considers that it is worth continuing the 
examination of the advantages and drawbacks of a new territorial 
solution." The Commission's Preliminary Opinion was presented 



17 



to the Council of the League on the 14th September, 1937, when the 
British representative sought the general authority of the Council for 
the procedure proposed by His Majesty's Government for the 
working out of a detailed scheme of partition. 

25. Such were the preliminary steps taken by His Majesty's 
Government to give effect to the policy set out in the Statement 
of Policy mentioned in paragraph 23. We must now describe 
the reactions of Arab and Jewish opinion to the Royal Com- 
mission's plan of partition. The Arab reaction was immediate 
and uncompromising. Arabs of all parties and shades of political 
opinion were unanimous in condemning the plan as inequitable and 
wholly unacceptable. In a published memorandum addressed to 
the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Arab Higher Committee, 
after examining the Royal Commission's scheme of partition in 
detail, expressed their unanimous rejection of the proposal, and 
announced that the only solution which they could regard as 
acceptable " must be based on the following principles — ■ 

(a) the recognition of the right of the Arabs to complete 
independence in their own land ; 

(b) the cessation of the experiment of the Jewish National 
Home ; 

(c) the cessation of the British Mandate and its replacement 
by a treaty similar to treaties existing between Britain and 
Iraq, Britain and Egypt, and between France and Syria, 
creating in Palestine a sovereign State ; 

(d) the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and 
of land sales to Jews pending the negotiation and conclusion 
of the treaty." 

More than a year has now elapsed since the Royal Commission's 
Report was published, but the Arabs remain inflexibly hostile to 
partition... During our stay in Palestine, no Arab came forward to 
submit eVKfcSSe or to co-operate in any way with us : the boycott 
was complete. 

26. The outburst of uncompromising disapproval which was 
the immediate result on the Arab side of the announcement of 
policy made by His Majesty's Government on the publication 
of the Royal Commission's Report was followed by an intensifi- 
cation of the Arab lawlessness which had continued sporadically 
since the end of the Arab general strike in the previous autumn. 
During the last days of July, and throughout August and 
September, a widespread campaign of murder and intimidation cost 
many Jews and Arabs their lives. The culmination of this campaign 
was reached on the 26th September, when Mr. L. Y. Andrews, the 
Acting District Commissioner, Galilee District, and his police 
escort were shot dead by unknown assassins in Nazareth. The 



18 



Palestine Government took immediate steps to deal with the 
situation. On the 1st October the Arab Higher Committee and all 
National Committees in Palestine were declared to be unlawful 
associations, and on the same day three members of the Committee 
and its Secretary were arrested and deported to the Seychelles. 
Shortly afterwards Haj Amin Eff. Al Husseini, the President of the 
Committee, who had been deprived on 1st October of his office of 
President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of membership of the 
General Waqf Committee, fled from Palestine to the Lebanon. On 
the 10th November, the Palestine Government announced that, in 
view of the continuation of the organized murder campaign in the 
country, it had been decided, in the interests of public security, to 
establish military courts by Defence Regulations under the Palestine 
(Defence) Order in Council, 1937. These courts came into being on 
the 18th November. In spite of these measures no improvement 
had taken place in the security position by the end of the year. 

27. The Royal Commission's proposals were received by the 
Jews with mixed feelings, and it soon became apparent that deep 
cleavages of opinion existed among the various Jewish parties, both 
in Palestine and elsewhere, as to the acceptability of partition in 
any form. The whole question was debated at length at the 
Twentieth Zionist Congress which was held at Zurich in August, 1937, 
and the resolution ultimately adopted by the Congress represented 
a compromise between the supporters and opponents of partition. 
The following is the text of this resolution — 

1. The Twentieth Zionist Congress solemnly reaffirms the historic 
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and its inalienable right 
to its homeland. 

2. The Congress takes note of the findings of the Palestine Royal 
Commission with regard to the following fundamental matters : first, 
that the primary purpose of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble 
and in its articles, is to promote the establishment of the Jewish National 
Home ; secondly, that the field in which the Jewish National Home was 
to be established was understood, at the time of the Balfour Declaration, 
to be the whole of historic Palestine, including Trans- Jordan ; thirdly, 
that inherent in the Balfour Declaration was the possibility of the 
evolution of Palestine into a Jewish State ; fourthly, that Jewish settle- 
ment in Palestine has conferred substantial benefits on the Arab 
population and has been to the economic advantage of the Arabs as a 
whole. 

3 . The Congress re j ects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission 
that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfilment. 
The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the 
rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate. 

The Congress rejects the conclusion of the Royal Commission that tte 
national aspirations of the Jewish people and of the Arabs of Palestine 
are irreconcilable. The main obstacle to co-operation and mutual 
understanding between the two peoples has been the general uncertainty 
which, as stated in the Report of the Royal Commission, has prevailed in 
regard to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Government, and 



19 



the vacillating attitude of the Palestine Administration ; these have 
engendered a lack of confidence in the determination and the ability of 
the Government to implement the Mandate. The Congress reaffirms on 
this occasion the declarations of previous Congresses expressing the 
readiness of the Jewish people to reach a peaceful settlement with the 
Arabs of Palestine, based on the free development of both peoples and 
the mutual recognition of their respective rights. 

4. The Congress condemns the "palliative proposals" put forward 
by the Royal Commission as a policy for implementing the Mandate, 
such as curtailment of immigration, fixing of a political high-level in 
substitution for the principle of economic absorptive capacity, closing of 
certain parts of the country to Jewish settlement, limitations on the 
acquisition of land, etc. Those proposals are a travesty of the Mandate 
and a violation of international pledges, and would prove destructive of 
the future ofgJ^TgNational Home. 

5. The Congress enters its strongest protest against the decision of 
His Majesty's Government to fix a political maximum for Jewish 
immigration of all categories for the next eight months, thus sweeping 
away the principle of economic absorptive capacity, in violation of Jewish 
rights and of the undertakings repeatedly given in this regard by 
His Majesty's Government and confirmed by the League of Nations. 

6. The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by 
the Royal Commission is unacceptable. 

7. The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations 
with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government 
for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State. 

8. In such negotiations the Executive shall not commit either itself 
or the Zionist Organisation, but in the event of the emergence of a. 
definite scheme for the establishment of a Jewish State, such scheme 
shall be brought before a newly elected Congress for decision. 

28. The League Council were informed in September, 1937, that 
the intention of His Majesty's Government was to appoint a further 
special body to visit Palestine and to submit proposals for a detailed 
scheme of partition. The terms of reference of the new Commission 
were announced on the 4th January, 1938 ; they were then published 
in a White Paper (Cmd. 5634), the full text of which is reproduced in 
Appendix 1. 

29. The new year saw no improvement in the state of public 
security in Palestine. Almost every day brought its record of 
murder, intimidation, and sabotage. In spite of several successful 
operations conducted in March against armed Arab bands, the 
situation continued to deteriorate, and on our arrival in Palestine 
on the 27th April, we found the atmosphere charged with intense 
hatred and bitterness. Against this dark background of racial 
hostility, violence and widespread disorder we conducted our enquiry. 
During the three months of our stay in the country, nothing occurred 
to relieve this tragic picture, and, indeed, when we left at the begin- 
ning of August, the tension between the Arab and Jewish com- 
munities was probably greater than it had ever been, as the result 



20 

of two terrible bomb explosions which had occurred in the Arab 
fruit market at Haifa during July. The following are figures of 
those who were killed or wounded as the result of acts of violence 
during the first seven months of the year ; these figures do not 
include the casualties suffered by armed Arab bands in encounters 
with military and police forces — 

Killed. Wounded. 

British — 



Police 


4 


10 


Military 


9 


38 


Civilians 


1 


1 


Arab — 






Police 


23 


33 


Civilians 


.. .. 190 


338 


Jewish — 






Police 


.. .. 21 


33 


Civilians 


68 


275 


Total .. 


. . 316 


728 



30. We feel that we may appropriately close this chapter with a 
tribute to the members of the administration, the judiciary, and the 
police for their forbearance in the face of provocation, and their 
courage and devotion to duty in the midst of ceaseless anxiety, and 
to the members of the British military forces who are discharging 
their duty with traditional coolness and restraint. 



J 



21 



CHAPTER III 

GENERAL MATTERS 

31. In this chapter we consider certain general matters with 
which it is convenient to deal at an early stage of our report. 

1. Boundaries 

32. Owing to the need of secrecy, it has not been possible to 
trace the boundaries of plans B or C on the ground, and accordingly 
we have not been able to include in our report a continuous written 
description of them in detail, except in regard to the boundary of 
Jaffa. The boundaries which we recommend have been shown on 
maps deposited with His Majesty's Government. These include an 
original copy signed by our Chairman and one certified copy. 

33. For the information of the public there are shown in 
Appendices 2, 3 and 4 lists of the village sites (that is, the sites on 
which the principal buildings of the village stand) in the vicinity of 
the boundaries showing in which state those village sites lie. As a rule 
the boundary follows village boundaries, but in some places, owing 
to reasons of defence or otherwise, it does not do so. 

34. If a scheme of partition is decided upon, the actual boundaries 
will have to be demarcated on the ground by a Boundary Commission. 
We think that this Commission should consist of two British officers, 
with a reference, in case of a difference of opinion arising, to a 
third British officer. In delimiting the boundary the Boundary 
Commission should adhere closely to the maps ; but they should be 
at liberty to make such small changes in the boundary as the economic 
or industrial or other requirements of the local inhabitants or the 
requirements of defence or the nature of the ground may, in their 
opinion, require. 

35. As a rule it is desirable that administrative boundaries, and 
still more inter-state boundaries, should not cut across the lands 
of a village. But, in drawing the boundary between the Arab and 
Jewish States, it may happen that defence requirements make it 
necessary to include part of the land of an Arab village within the 
Jewish State. We asked Government officers what view the villagers 
would be likely to take in such a case, and found them all agreed that 
the villagers would prefer that the boundary line should run through 
the lands of the village rather than that the whole of the village lands 
should be included in the Jewish State. We were told that the Arab 
villager would much prefer to retain a footing in the Arab State, 



22 



notwithstanding the risk of inconvenience which the severance of the 
village lands might cause him, and that, if the residential site of a 
village were included in the Jewish State, the villagers might even 
wish to transfer their houses to the part of the lands of the village 
in the Arab State. In drawing the boundary between the Arab and 
Jewish States we have therefore followed the defensive line in cases 
where it cuts through the lands of a village, and have not extended the 
boundary so as to include the whole of the village lands in the Jewish 
State. As regards villages on the boundary between the Arab State 
and an area to be retained under Mandate, the opinion of those we 
consulted was not unanimous, but the majority took the view that 
the villagers would prefer that the whole of the lands of the villages 
should be included within the Mandated area. In such cases, 
accordingly, we have followed the boundary of the village lands 
unless to do so involved the inclusion of a considerable population 
or area of land within the Mandated area. 

2. Defence 

36. Defence is an important factor in drawing the boundaries of 
a state, and it is one which we have borne in mind throughout our 
enquiry. In this matter the military authorities have been our 
advisers. We put the various plans before them and asked them, 
without accepting any responsibility for the plans themselves, to 
advise us on purely military grounds what were the most suitable 
boundaries for each from the point of view of defence. On this basis, 
they have given us advice which we have accepted in every case. 
In advising us on the suitability of a boundary from the point of 
view of defence, the military authorities have taken into account 
the following general considerations. Palestine is a small country 
about the size of Wales or Belgium. It is impossible to divide a country 
of its size and configuration into areas the frontiers of which, having 
regard to the conditions of modern warfare, will have any real 
military significance. No strategic line, judged by those conditions, 
exists west of the River Jordan. In these circumstances, the guiding 
principle which the military authorities have followed is whether a 
proposed boundary is tactically suitable for defence against a force 
armed with rifles and machine guns. 

3. Population 

37. The growth of population in Palestine since the War is the 
result of a combination of circumstances unique in modern history — 
an unusually high (though not unprecedented) rate of immigration, 
comparable with the mass immigration movements into Australia 
and New Zealand in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and an 
abnormally high (and possibly unprecedented) rate of natural 
increase in the existing indigenous population. 



23 



38. There are no vital statistics for Palestine under Turkish 
rule, but " there is no evidence that the population increased or 
diminished during the last two centuries."* If the numbers 
fluctuated, the fluctuations cancelled out. Since the War, the 
population has doubled, from about 700,000 in 1919 to an estimated 
total of just over 1,400,000 in the middle of 1938. Of this increase, 
migration accounts for about 300,000, and natural increase for the 
remainder ; and of this natural increase, that of the Arabf population 
has been about 355,000, that is, from about 635.000J in 1919 to about 
990,000| in 1938, an increase of nearly 56 per cent. The following 
table gives the official figures of the changes between the census of 
1922 and mid-1937, with estimates for 1919 and mid-1938.§ 



Year 


All 
Religions 


Moslems 


Jews 


Christians 


Others 


1919 


700,000 


568,000 


58,000 


74,000 


1922 


752,048 


589,177 


83,790 


71,464 


7,617 


1937 


1,383,320 


875,947 


386,08411 


109,769 


11,520 


1938 


1,415,700 


989,500U 


401,600 




24,600c 


1922-37 










Total Increase of 












population 


631,272 


286,770 


302,294 


38,305 


3,903 


Increase by migration 


281,339 


25,168 


245,433 


10,414 


324 


Natural Increase . . 


349,933 


261,602 


56,861 


27,891 


3,579 



It may be noted that the Arab population is predominantly rural, 
nearly 70 per cent, living in rural areas ; whereas the Jewish popula- 
tion is predominantly urban, 70 per cent, living in the four large 
towns of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jaffa, and 35 per cent, in 
the all- Jewish town of Tel Aviv alone. 



39. It is worth while to study the vital statistics for some expla- 
nation of this astonishing change in the Arab population since the 
war, which it is very unlikely that the authors of the Balfour Declara- 
tion or of the Mandate foresaw. The following tables, taken from 



* A. M. Carr-Saunders, " World Population," for 1936, p. 310. 
t The word " Arab " in this section is used in its strict sense, and not a 
equivalent to " non-Jew." 

% After allowing for some 35,000 Arab immigrants. 

§ The figures for 1922 and 1937 are from the Report by His Majesty's 
Government on Palestine and Trans- Jordan, 1937, p. 221, which adds : 
" The precision of these figures is not great." The 1938 figure is an unofficial 
estimate made for us by the Palestine Government : the 1919 figure is that 
used by Professor Carr-Saunders (" World Population," p. 307). 

|| This differs from the figure of 392,000 given in chapter VII, which makes 
some allowance for illicit immigrants. The estimate prepared by the Jewish 
Agency gives 416,000 ; the difference is probably due to the inclusion of a higher 
figure for illicit immigrants. 
.' % Including Christian Arabs. 

Including non-Arab Christians. 



24 



the Government's Annual Report on Palestine and Trans- Jordan 
for 1937 (Colonial No. 146), page 223, give the figures of birth-rate, 
death-rate, infant mortality and natural increase for all Palestine, 
excluding the nomadic population, since the census of 1922* : — 



ANNUAL RATE OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS PER THOUSAND 
OF SETTLED POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES, 1922-37 



Year. 


Birth-rate. 


Moslems. 


Jews. 


Christians. 


1922-25 average 


50 


09 


34 


81 


36 


37 


1926-30 „ . . 


53 


45 


34 


29 


38 


55 


1931-35 


50 


24 


30 


33 


35 


84 


1934 


46 


56 


30 


21 


33 


55 


1935 


52 


54 


30 


80 


35 


61 


1936 


53 


14 


29 


74 


. 36 


34 


1937 


49 


74 


26 


67 


33 


55 


Average 1922-37t 


51 


15 


32 


21 


36 


47 




Death-rate. 


1922-25 average 


26 


83 


13 


62 


16 


13 


1926-30 


28 


31 


11 


66 


17 


91 


1931-35 


25 


34 


9 


32 


15 


04 


1934 


26 


68 


9 


53 


16 


25 


1935 


23 


46 


8 


58 


13 


99 


1936 


19 


97 


8 


82 


12 


63 


1937 .. .... 


24 


82 


7 


78 


13 


91 


Average 1922-37f 


26 


14 


10 


78 


15 


89 



INFANT MORTALITY : DEATHS OF INFANTS UNDER ONE 
YEAR OF AGE PER THOUSAND LIVE BIRTHS, 1922-37 



Year. 


Moslems. 


Jews. 


Christians. 


1922-25 average 


190-39 


122-90 


144-35 


1926-30 


193-46 


95-83 


158-56 


1931-35 


166-41 


77-99 


136-28 


1934 . . . . 


175-15 


78-13 


152-39 


1935 


148-10 


64-15 


125-81 , 


1936 


136-15 


68-70 


113-72 J 


1937 


179-33 


57-20 


127-34"^ 



* Vital occurrences in Palestine are at present classified by religion only, 
t Not given in the Annual Report. 



25 



ANNUAL RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER THOUSAND 
OF SETTLED POPULATION BY COMMUNITIES, 1922-37 



Year. 


Moslems. 


Jews. 


Christians. 


1922-25 average 


23-26 


21-19 


20-24 


1926-30 „ 


25-14 


22-63 


20-64 


1931-35 „ 


24-90 


21-01 


20-80 


1934 


19-88 


20-68 


17-30 


1935 


29-08 


22-22 


21-62 


1936 


33-17 


20-92 


23-71 


1937 .. 


24-92 


18-89 


19-64 


Average 1922-37* 


25-01 


21-43 


20-58 



* Not given in the Annual Report. 



40. The comparative figures of natural increase for certain 
other countries may be noted : — - 



Non-European Countries 





Birth-rate. 


Death-rate. 


Natural 
increase. 


Low- 
est 


High- 
est 


Average. 


Low- 
est 


High- 
est 


Average. 


Average. 


Egypt* (1920-33) 


41-8 


45-7 


43-7 


24-9 


28-8 


26-5 


17-2 


Ceylon ( 1920-29) f 


36-5 


41-5 


39-2 


21-75 


31-5 


26-8 


12-4 


Formosa (1920-31)f 


38-75 


45-25 


42-1 


19 


32 


22-23 


19-1 


Japan (1920-33) f 


31-75 


35-25 


33-66 


17-75 


23 


20-3 


13-36 


India (1920-30) f 


32 


37 


34-4 


24 


31 


26-7 


7-7 



* " The Population Problem in Egypt." Wendell Cleland, 1936. 
t Calculated approximately from graphs in "World Population." 
Carr-Saunders, 1936, pp. 281, 262, 271. 



26 



Overseas Countries with Population of European Origin* 





1921-5 


1926-30 


1931. 


1932. 


1933. 


1934. 


1935. 


1936. 


U.S.A.— 






























Birth-rate 


22 


6 


1 a 
19 


/ 




A 


17-4 


16-4 










Death-rate . . 


11 


9 


11 


8 


11 


1 


1 A 

10 


9 


10 


7 










Natural 


10 


7 


7 


9 


6 


9 


6 


5 


5 


7 


6 


1 


6-0 




Increase. 






























Canada — 






























Birth-rate 


27 


1 


24 


1 




2 


22 


5 


20 


9 


20-4 






Death-rate . . 


11 


1 


11 


2 


10 


1 


9 


9 


9 


6 


9-4 






Natural 


16-0 


12 


9 


13 


1 


12 


6 


11 


3 


11 







10-6 


Increase. 






























Australia — 






























Birth-rate . 


23 


9 


21 





18 


2 


16 


9 


16 


8 


16-4 






Death-rate . . 


9 


5 


9 


3 


8 


7 


Q 
O 


O 


Q 
O 


A 

9 


9 


3 






Natural 


14 


4 


11 


7 


9 


5 


Q 

o 


q 
o 


n 
J 


A 

y 


7 


1 


7-0 


7-7 


Increase. 






























New Zealand — 






























Birth-rate 


22 


2 


19 


7 


18 


4 


17 


1 


16 


6 


16 


5 






Death-rate . . 


8-6 


8 


6 


8-3 


8 





8 





8 


5 






Natural 


13 


6 


11 


1 


10- 


1 


A 

9 


1 


8 


6 


8 





8-0 


7-9 


Increase. 






























South Africa — 






























(European 






























population). 






























Birth-rate . . 


27 


1 


26 


1 


25-4 


24 


2 


23-6 


23 


5 






Death-rate . . 


9 


7 


9 


7 


9-4 


10 





9 


4 


9 


7 






Natural 


17 


4 


16-4 


16- 





14 


2 


14 


2 


13 


8 


13-7 


14-8 


Increase . 






























Argentine — 






























Birth-rate . . 


32 


8 


30 


4 


28- 


7 


28 


1 


26 





25 


3 






Death-rate . . 


14 


6 


13 


5 


12- 


5 


12 





11 


7 


11 


7 






Natural 


18 


2 


16 


9 


16- 


2 


16 


1 


14 


3 


13 


6 


12-6 




Increase. 






































iH 


»^-^ 





















41 . Any conclusions based upon the vital statistics of relatively 
backward countries must be made with caution. But from these 
figures certain striking facts emerge. 

(i) The Moslem Population 

(a) The birth-rate is a long way higher than that of any other 
country given in the tables, and is probably among the highest in 
the world. 



* "World Population," p. 177. 



27 



(b) Unless the set-back in 1937 should prove to be significant 
of a change (which does not seem likely since it applies to the other 
religious groups also), there is no indication of any downward 
tendency during the period : the rate is fairly stable at a point 
just above 50. 

(c) The death-rate, though high, is not actually higher than that 
of Egypt and of other Asiatic countries on somewhat the same 
economic level. 

(d) Again apart from 1937, which shows an abrupt upward 
turn, there has been in the last ten years a gradual downward 
trend in the death-rate, and most notably in the rate of infant 
mortality. 

(e) As the result of the abnormally high birth-rate and the 
relatively low death-rate, the natural increase of the Arab population 
is abnormally high. 

42. Here, no doubt, lies the explanation, both of the change 
since the War from a stationary to a growing population, and of 
the abnormal rapidity of that growth. In part the change may be 
ascribed to the cessation, under British Mandatory rule, of the 
annual conscription of young men for military service in distant 
parts of the Turkish Empire — a service from which it is said that 
few ever returned. But the effect of a system of this kind upon 
vital statistics is apt, Professor Carr-Saunders thinks, to be over- 
estimated. Its abolition may have been followed by some rise, 
but not a large rise, in the birth-rate. 

43. It would seem that the growth of population must be due 
mainly to a lower death-rate, brought about, not so much by a change 
in personal habits (although in this region also the effect of education 
and advice by Government medical officers and clinics is beginning 
to be seen), as by general administrative measures, such as anti- 
malarial control, under an efficient and enlightened government. 
But whether these explanations fully cover the ground it is 
impossible to say without knowledge of the facts under the Ottoman 
regime. We thus have the Arab population reflecting simultaneously 
two widely different tendencies — a birth-rate characteristic of a 
peasant community in which the unrestricted family is normal, and 
a death-rate which could only be brought about under an enlightened 
modern administration, with both the will and the necessary funds 
at its disposal to enable it to serve a population unable to help 
itself. It is indeed an ironic commentary on the working of the 
Mandate, and perhaps on the science of government, that this 
result, which so far from encouraging has almost certainly hindered 
close settlement by Jews on the land, could scarcely have been 
brought about except through the appropriation of tax-revenue 
contributed by the Jews. 



2S 



44. How far the Arabs themselves have benefited, as a com- 
munity, from these vital conditions, is perhaps open to question- 
That the Arabs' standard of living is higher than before the War is, 
we think, certain, if the average condition of the whole community 
is considered (though it does not follow that a particular group, 
such as the Bedouin, have gained). That there is as yet no pressure 
on the means of subsistence is also, we think, proved by the steadily 
declining death-rate — unless the sharp upward turn in 1937 proves 
to be significant.* " If a population, which did not control births, 
had increased to the point where there was only just enough food 
to keep the members alive, it would show high birth- and death- 
rates running parallel. For, even if death from disease was controlled,, 
deaths would take place from lack of food."f On the other hand, 
it seems certain that the amount of land now under cultivation, by 
present methods and on present standards, is insufficient to support 
the same percentage of the total Arab population to-day as in 1922. 
This would in any case stem probable from the facts that since 1919 
(a) the total Arab population, of which the census of 1931 showed 
over 60 per cent, to be directly engaged in agriculture, has increased 
by about 360,000 persons, and (b) the amount of land available for 
Arab cultivation has been diminished by the purchase of about 
three-quarters of a million dunums by the Jews, on the greater part 
of which Arabs are not employed. But the argument cannot be- 
proved in this way without taking into account the amount of 
additional land, previously classed as uncultivable, which has been 
brought under cultivation since 1919, about which no precise informa- 
tion is available. Proof, however, appears to be forthcoming from 
the Report on the Census of Palestine for 1931, paragraph 259, 
which states that "it is thus clear that nearly a quarter of the 
agriculturists would be unable to maintain their present standard 
of life if they were unable to find a secondary means of subsistence." 
It is only reasonable to suppose that, as the non- Jewish population 
has increased since 1931 by nearly 150,000, the proportion of agri- 
culturists in this condition is nqpv considerably larger. " 



* Horowitz (Economic Survey of Palestine, Tel Aviv, 1938, page 34), 
ascribes this very marked increase in the death-rate in 1937 (experienced, in a. 
greater or less degree, by Moslems, Christians, and the smaller religious groups, 
but not by the Jews) to the depression, which in that year " began to be 
severely felt." No explanation is given in the official report on Palestine for 
the year : there was a certain increase in the number of deaths from epidemic 
disease, but not enough to account for the percentage increases. On the other 
hand, 1937 was a prosperous year for agriculture, and in so far as the Arab 
population is directly dependent on the produce of its own lands for subsistence, 
this might be expected to prevent any marked rise in the death-rate. But 
the rise in 1937 is noticeable chiefly in relation to 1936, when the rate was 
exceptionally low, for reasons which we do not know and which may have 
been only ephemeral. The 1937 figure is not so far above that for 1935 as to- 
justify us in drawing any positive conclusions from it. 

f Carr-Saunders, op. cit. p. 272. 



29 



45. As a rough check on this deduction, we have attempted 
to calculate the amount of land in Arab ownership, classed as 
cultivable, which is available on average per head of the existing 
Arab population who are actually engaged in and directly dependent 
upon pasture and agriculture. In the absence of an up-to-date 
census, the number of such persons can only be calculated indirectly. 
We have used two methods : first, to take the 1931 census figures, 
calculate the percentage of the Arab population belonging to the 
desired category in that year, and apply the same percentage to the 
estimated Arab population to-day ; secondly, to take the total 
rural population, as shown by the village statistics, according to 
the latest known date (1936), and deduct one-fifth as representing 
persons not directly dependent upon agriculture. The number of 
persons in the desired category is then divided into the total 
amount of Arab cultivable land. The first method gives an 
average of 10-5 dunums per head, or (allowing 4-75 persons per 
family) 49-87 dunums per family; the second, 12-2 dunums per 
head, or 57 '95 dunums per family.* These figures of 50 and 
58 dunums may be compared with those in the table used by the 
Director of Agriculture which is quoted in chapter VIII, 
paragraph 143, of our report. According to that table, the 
average " lot viable " for citrus and banana plantations is 
10 dunums; the average for fruit plantations 113 dunums; the 
average for taxable crop land, 140 dunums ; and the average for 
untaxable crop land, 400 dunums. Of the total Arab cultivable 
land about 2-4 per cent, consists of citrus and banana plantations ; 
about one-sixth of other plantations, about two-thirds of taxable 
crop land, and rather less than one-sixth of untaxable crop land. A 
sample holding, weighted in the same proportions as the categories 
into which the aggregate Arab land is actually divided, would work 
out at about 111 dunums. Making every allowance for the roughness 
of our method of calculation, it is apparent that the average holding 
of 50 or 58 dunums at which we have arrived is far below what the 
Director of Agriculture would regard as a reasonable "lot viable" 
for a parcel of land so divided between the several categories. 

46. If this argument is sound, then, subject to two qualifications, 
to be mentioned below, three conclusions follow, (i) First, that if the 
sources of present supplementary employment are cut off, even 
partially, the consequences for the Arabs affected will be serious, 
(ii) Secondly, that if the Arab rural population continues to increase 
at its present rate, the demand for such supplementary employment, 
and even the pressure to leave the land and seek for whole-time 



* The higher figure reached by the second method is probably due to the 
fraction of one-fifth deducted for persons not directly dependent upon 
agriculture being too high. No calculation of the true proportion is available 
for the Arab rural population : 20 per cent, is based upon Jewish economy 
(cf. the figures given in chapter XIII), and is probablv inappropriate to 
Arab conditions. 



30 



employment in the towns, will be intensified — quite apart from any 
further acquisition of land by the Jews, (iii) And thirdly, that since 
such employment can only be provided by capital, and, with few 
exceptions, capital is only likely to be invested in Palestine by Jews, 
the future for the Arab population is already menacing — unless Jewish 
immigration and Jewish imports of capital are allowed to continue. 

47. The two qualifications mentioned above are these. First, 
that there is no doubt that Palestine could support a larger 
agricultural population if better methods of cultivation were adopted, 
if the area under irrigation could be extended, and if markets for the 
increased produce could be found. But for these changes capital 
is needed, and this the Arab lacks. And in any case the changes 
involved can only take place slowly ; and meanwhile the population 
will be increasing — if no change takes place, the Arab population 
alone will have increased by 250,000 in ten years' time. The second 
qualification relates to the size of the family. Professor Carr-Saunders, 
speaking of the same problem in India, says : " Family limitation 
is the only way of escape." (" World Population," page 277.) 
And again, of another group of Asiatic countries he says, in words 
which may prove to be painfully applicable to Palestine : " It is an 
open question whether an increase will cease on account of a rising 
death-rate or on account of a falling birth-rate. This means that a 
very serious threat hangs over these countries, since a rising death- 
rate would imply not only much suffering but also the possibility 
of social retrogression." 

48. It may be argued that the proper conclusion to be drawn 
from these figures is that there is no room for any further Jewish 
immigration into Palestine at all : the whole country, not only the, 
land but the openings for urban employment, must all be reserved 
to satisfy the needs of the growing Arab population. We are aware 
that the Shaw Commission, reporting in 1930, recommended, and 
indeed thought it most important, that " the Government of Palestine, 
in deciding the rate at which newcomers are to be admitted to 
agriculture, should have regard to fye certain natural increase of the < 
present population " (Cmd. 5.530, gjfge 123). But whatever may have_J 
been the position then, we believe that to act in such a way 
to-day, even as regards agricultural settlement, and a fortiori as 
regards immigration in general, would be an unpractical and indeed 

a short-sighted policy. So far as settlement on the land is concerned, 
we are convinced that the only practical rule is to have regard solely 
to the population existing at any given date. The Arabs would be 
no better off with a larger population than to-day on the same amount 
of land, unless they learn to cultivate their land more intensively 
and unless in addition they can find supplementary employment in 
the towns. And neither of these two things can be brought about 
without the assistance of Jewish taxable capacity and Jewish capital. 
The alternative possibility of assistance by the United Kingdom 
Government may, we feel sure, be ruled out, for we cannot imagine 



31 



that, if Jewish immigration were to be completely closed down in 
Palestine, His Majesty's Government would be willing to provide 
funds from the British taxpayer's pocket for the sake of enabling 
a larger Arab population to support itself in Palestine. 

So far as concerns non-agricultural settlement, it would seem 
that economic conditions in Palestine are by now so closely bound 
up with Jewish immigration, both actual and prospective, that the 
Arabs in Palestine would be faced with the prospect of greater 
economic hardship if Jewish immigration should be completely 
closed down, than they would be even if it should be allowed to 
continue. 

(ii) The Jewish Population 

49. It is not necessary for our purpose to comment at any length 
on the Jewish figures, but the following points may be noted. 

(a) It is probably not generally realized that in the 15 years 
between the 1922 census and 1937 the increase of Jewish population 
by migration was less than the natural increase of the Moslem 
population, and that the total increase of the Jewish population is still 
less than the total increase of Arab (including Christian Arab) 
population. 

(b) The natural increase of the Jewish population in Palestine 
is, for a people who practise family restriction, abnormally high ; 
it is also believed to be higher than that of Jewish communities in 
other countries. This is no doubt in part accounted for by the 
peculiar age composition of the Jewish population. Young adults, 
including women of child-bearing age, form an unusually high 
proportion of the Jewish community in Palestine : according to the 
Statistical Year-book of the League of Nations, the percentage of 
the population in the age-group 15-45 is 56-7, as compared with 
47 for the United Kingdom, 46 for Canada, and similar figures for 
other established countries. Moreover, both this high proportion of 
persons in that age-group, in which the risk of dying is lowest, and 
the relative scarcity of infants and old people, which is typical of 
recent immigrant-communities, tend to keep the death-rate low. 

(iii) Trans-Jordan 

50. Unfortunately no figures of population or of vital statistics 
are available for Trans- Jordan. We do not know what the pre-war 
population of the area was, nor do we know with any precision what 
the population is to-day. It is usually estimated at about 325,000, 
and it is generally thought that there has been a gradual increase 
to that figure since the war. If that impression is correct, it would 
conform with what we should expect to find, prima facie, on the analogy 
of the Moslem figures in Palestine, that is to say, a high birth-rate, 
more or less stable, and a death-rate somewhat higher than in 



32 



Palestine (since the medical and administrative services in Trans- 
ordan, though efficient as far as they go, are certainly not so com- 
rehensive as in Palestine), but still such as to leave a certain margin 
of natural increase. But how large that margin is, and what exactly 
the figures of birth- and death-rate are, it is impossible to say. 

4. Population and Land Statistics 

51. At the time of the Royal Commission's enquiry no detailed 
statistics of either population or land were available. Since that date 
figures have been compiled, village by village, for the whole of 
Palestine except the Beersheba sub-district, and it is these figures 
which we have used in our report. The methods by which these 
figures have been compiled are explained in Appendix 5. We 
should emphasize that the figures for land and population which 
are given in the report are not strictly accurate, though sufficiently 
exact for our purpose. The figures for the Arab population relate 
to the middle of the year 1937 and those for the Jewish population 
to September, 1936 ; the difference in the dates is due to a 
difference in the method of compilation. The figures relating to the 
land and the ownership thereof show the position as it was on the 
1st April, 1935, with the exception of land planted with citrus ; 
the figures for the latter are based on an ad hoc survey carried out in 
the autumn of 1937. Excluding the Beersheba sub-district, the area 
of land transferred by Arabs to Jews between the 1st April, 1935, and 
the 31st May, 1938, is, according to the Land Registries, 84,477 
dunums. The village statistics give the total area of land in Jewish 
ownership in April, 1935, as 1,238,896 dunums. The area of land 
owned by the Jews at the end of May, 1938, was, therefore, about 
7 per cent, more than it was in April, 1935. The later figures could 
not be used because it was not possible to distribute the area 
purchased since April, 1935, among the different classes of 
cultivable land. 

52. Figures of population Mid land are not available for the 
Beersheba sub-district in the ' iine way as they are for the restjof 
Palestine. Beersheba is an eareensive area inhabited, except for the 
town of Beersheba, by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin. The 
figures for the nomadic population in the Census of 1931 were admit- 
tedly only approximate, as it was not possible to apply to them the 
procedure adopted in the case of the settled population, and it is, 
therefore, impossible to place full reliance on any figure which may 
be assumed for the population at the present day. For our purposes 
we have taken a figure of 60,000 as the population of the Beersheba 
sub-district. This population is entirely Arab. The area of the sub- 
district is estimated to be about 12,577,000 dunums (or nearly half 
the whole of Palestine). As the urban area alone has been surveyed, 
it is possible to estimate only very roughly the area of cultivated land : 
the estimates vary between 1 \ and 2 million dunums. 



33 



53. For the purpose of our report, except where it is expressly 
otherwise stated, we have treated the population as falling into two 
categories, Arabs and Jews. The Arab section includes persons who 
are not Arabs, but as nearly 98 per cent, of the non- Jewish popula- 
tion are Arabs, the use of the term Arab, which we prefer to that of 
non- Jew, generally causes no distortion of the picture. 

' 54. The unit of area in Palestine is a dunum. We have used this 
term in dealing with land areas. The unit adopted in all the figures 
given in the report is the metric dunum and not the smaller Turkish 
dunum. A metric, dunum is approximately equal to one quarter of 
an acre. 



(C 31078) 



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34 



CHAPTER IV 

THE BOUNDARIES OF THE EXCLAVE FOE THE HOLY 
PLACES AT JERUSALEM AND BETHLEHEM, AND OF 
THE ENCLAVE AT NAZARETH 

55. We are now in a position to proceed with our examination of the 
boundaries which would have to be adopted to give effect to the plan 
of partition put forward by the Royal Commission in chapter XXII 
of their Report. In this chapter we consider the boundaries of the 
Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves, which the Royal Commission 
recommended for retention under Mandatory administration. 



1. The Boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave 

56. Under Article 13 of the Mandate all responsibility in con- 
nection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in 
Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing 
free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites, and the 
free exercise of worship, was assumed by the Mandatory Power ; and 
under Article 28, in the event of the termination of the existing 
Mandate, the Council of the League of Nations is required to make 
arrangements for safeguarding in perpetuity the rights secured in 
Article 13. 

57. The Royal Commission's proposals in regard to the Holy 
Places are to be found in paragraphs 10 and 11 of chapter XXII of 
their Report — 

10. The partition of Palestine^ subject to the overriding necessity 
of keeping the sanctity of JeruMlem and Bethlehem inviolate and of 
ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. That, in the 
fullest sense of the mandatory phrase, is " a sacred trust of civilization " — - 
a trust on behalf not merely of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes 
in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places. 

11. A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with the execution 
of this trust as its primary purpose. An enclave should be demarcated 
extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, 
and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending to the 
north of the main road and to the south of the railway, including the 
towns of Lydda and Ramie, and terminating at the sea. 



58. The boundary which we propose for the Jerusalem Enclave 
(including the Corridor) is shown on map No. 10. 



35 



59. It will be noticed that the northern boundary under our 
proposals falls north of Ramallah, and not between Ramallah and 
Jerusalem as proposed by the Royal Commission. The reasons for 
this modification are two — 

(a) defence ; 

(b) the existence of the Palestine Broadcasting Station about 

one mile north of Ramallah town. 

60. It is clearly necessary that the boundary should be as satis- 
factory as possible from the point of view of defence, and we have 
been advised that a line between Ramallah and Jerusalem does not 
comply with this essential condition, for the following reasons. 
First, it is essential that there should be a landing-ground for aircraft 
in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and that the distance between the 
landing-ground and the frontier should be such as will enable the 
former to be assured of reasonable protection from interference from 
the neighbouring ' State. The landing-ground at Qalandiya — the 
only possible site for a landing-ground in the neighbourhood of 
Jerusalem — lies a short distance south of Ramallah, and a line south 
of Ramallah would not leave sufficient space between the landing- 
ground and the frontier. Secondly, the road from Ramallah to 
Latrun is considered an essential military line of communication for 
the defence of the Enclave. If the line were drawn south of Ramallah, 
this road would not be included within the Enclave. Thirdly, the 
high point of Beitunya occupies a dominating position and should be 
included within the Mandated area. The line north of Ramallah 
which we have adopted is one which the military authorities consider 
a suitable defensive boundary. 

61. As has been indicated, the broadcasting station is situated a 
short distance north of Ramallah. This site was selected a few years 
ago after a very careful examination of other possible sites in the 
neighbourhood of Jerusalem. At our request, the possibility of 
finding an alternative site nearer to Jerusalem was again explored, 
but with no success. The alternative sites all possess serious 
disadvantages as compared with Ramallah. It is obviously right 
that the Enclave should possess a suitable broadcasting station and 
that this station should be capable of being defended in an emergency. 
For this reason also we think it essential that the boundary should 
run north of Ramallah. 

62. The five Arab villages of Shuqba, Qibya, Budrus, Ni'lin and 
Deir Qaddis in the Ramie Sub-District obtain their water supply 
under a co-operative arrangement by pumping from a well situated 
in the village of Shabtin. Although defence requirements only 
necessitate the inclusion of the villages of Qibya and Budrus 
within the Enclave, we think it undesirable that these two villages 
should be separated from their water supply by an international 
boundary, and we consider that the proper course is to include within 
the Enclave all the six villages concerned. 



(C 31078) 



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36 



63. That portion of the northern boundary of the Enclave which 
lies west of the railway from Lydda to Haifa has been placed about 
one kilometre north of the road which runs from the civil airport 
(north of Lydda) to Jaffa and Tel Aviv. The object of this is to 
include in the Enclave and to exclude from the Jewish State the 
Arab villages of Salama, Al Kheiriya, Saqiya, Kafr Ana, and 
Al Yahudiya. The German colony at Wilhelma represented to us 
that they desired to be excluded from the Jewish State ; it has not 
been possible to accede to this request entirely, but the boundary 
proposed places the residential area of the colony within the Enclave. 
The civil airport, which is situated in the village of Al Yahudiya, 
falls within the Enclave. 

64. The southern boundary of the Enclave in the hills has been 
placed as near the railway as defensive requirements would permit. 
In the plains it has been drawn so as to include within the Enclave 
the military cantonments at Sarafand and the projected Royal Air 
Force base at Aqir. The Royal Air Force base is at present situated 
at Ramie. The landing-ground at Ramie is too small and in other 
ways unsuitable for use by modern aircraft. It is essential that the 
Mandatory Power should have a first-class air base if it is properly 
to fulfil the responsibility for the defence of the Enclave and the 
responsibilities which it is likely to assume by treaty for the defence 
of the states after partition. The Royal Air Force authorities have 
investigated very carefully the question of an alternative site to the 
existing one at Ramie, and the conclusion they have reached is that 
the Aqir site is the nearest site to Ramie which will meet present-day 
requirements. The Enclave boundary has therefore been drawn so 
as to include the projected air base at Aqir. 

65. The Royal Commission proposed that a narrow belt of land 
should be acquired and cleared on the north side of the town of Jaffa, 
and that this belt should form part of the Jaffa- Jerusalem corridor. 
We shall deal with this question of the boundary between the towns of 
Jaffa and Tel Aviv in chapter V, and it will suffice to say here thjlt 
we do not favour the proposal that these two towns should be 
separated by a strip of mandated teqfitory. 

66. The Royal Commission also proposed that a similar belt 
should be acquired and cleared on the south side of the town of Jaffa. 
In their view this belt would serve a double purpose. It would 
separate the town of Jaffa — which they proposed should form part of 
the Arab State — from the nascent Jewish town of Bat Yam (Bayit 
Vegan) and at the same time afford the Enclave access to the sea. 
As we shall explain in chapter V in considering the boundary between 
the towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, we do not regard the interposition 
of a narrow strip of mandated territory between an Arab town in 
the Arab State and a Jewish town in the Jewish State as a 
satisfactory method of preventing clashes between Arabs and 
Jews. We agree that the Enclave should have its own access 



37 



to the sea, but access by means of such a narrow strip would 
serve no useful purpose. We are of opinion that a wider strip of 
mandated territory should be interposed between Jaffa and the 
Jewish State. In our view the southern boundary of this strip of 
mandated territory should be the northern boundary of the village 
of Rishon le Ziyon, and this is the boundary which, subject to the 
two following provisions, we propose should be adopted. 

67. (i) The first of these provisions relates to the utilization of an 
area in the Jewish State south of the Enclave for the purpose of 
providing modern ranges for the military forces of the Mandatory 
Power. The range at present available within the Enclave at Jaffa 
is unsuited to modern requirements, and we have been advised that 
a project is under preparation for the construction of up-to-date 
ranges on the sand dune area on the coast south of the Enclave and 
north of the Wadi Rubin. It is clearly essential that the military 
forces of the Mandatory Power should have modern ranges available 
for their use. We suggest that, instead of the area required for 
these ranges being included in the Enclave, the Treaty between the 
Mandatory Power and the Jewish State should make suitable 
provision for the land required for these ranges being placed at the 
disposal of the Mandatory Power, (ii) The second provision relates 
to the need for the Mandatory Power to have the right to enter upon 
and use the area along the shores of the Jewish State as far south 
as the Wadi Rubin for military purposes in the case of an emergency. 
If the southern boundary of the Enclave is the northern boundary 
of the village of Rishon le Ziyon as we have suggested, the width of the 
bridge head position will be inadequate in case of an emergency. 
Here again, instead of extending the boundary of the Enclave further 
to the south, we propose that the treaty should contain a provision 
giving the Mandatory Power the right to enter and use the area in 
question for military purposes in case of an emergency. 

68. From the Jewish side it has been contended that the Enclave 
between Ramie and the sea is unduly wide and that in this area the 
Enclave should be limited to a narrow strip just wide enough to 
carry the railway and a road. The arguments urged in support of 
this proposal are that a wider Enclave will render communication 
between the northern and southern portions of the Jewish State 
unnecessarily difficult and will seriously interfere with Jewish urban 
development in the area south of Jaffa. We cannot agree with this 
contention. As the Royal Commission pointed out, the partition 
of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of keeping Jerusalem 
and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them 
for all the world. It is our considered view that, if the Mandatory 
is to be entrusted with this paramount obligation, the restriction of 
the Enclave between Ramie and the sea to a narrow strip only a few 
yards wide would seriously jeopardize the execution of that trust. 
In this matter, the necessity of protecting the Holy Places must 
override the needs of the Jewish State. 

(C 31078) c 3 



38 



69. It may be urged that the Enclave (including the corridor) 
covers an unnecessarily large area. To that we would reply that 
the boundaries of the Enclave, with the exception of a part of the 
northern frontier — see paragraphs 62 and 63 — have been determined 
solely with reference to the question of defence, and that if the 
Mandatory is to be entrusted with the protection of the Holy Places 
it is essential that the Enclave should have boundaries which are 
capable of being defended. 

2. The Population and Area of the Jerusalem Enclave 

70. The figures are as follows — 

Population 



Arabs 


Jews 


Total 


Urban . . 90,800* 


76,000* 


166,800 


Rural . . . . 120,600 


4,100 


124,700 


Total . . 211,400 


80,100 


291,500 


Land (in dunums) 






Arabs 


Jews 


Citrus Land 


37,900 


8,900 


Banana Plantations 


100 




Other Plantations 


184,500 


5,200 


Taxable Cereal Land 


502,300 


36,500 


Untaxable Cereal Land 


102,300 


1,100 


Total Cultivable Land 


827,100 


51,700 


Built-on Areas 


29,700 


7,800 


Uncultivable Land 


628,400 


19,200 


Total Landf 


1,485,200 


78,700 



3. The Boundary of the Nazareth Enclave J 

71. After discussing the Mandatory administration which they 
had proposed for the Holy Places at JeriSjsalem and Bethlehem, the 
Royal Commission went on to say (chapterKXII, paragraph 14) — 

We think it would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at 

large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee were also covered by this Mandate. 

We recommend that the Mandatory should be entrusted with the 

administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity 

of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias. 

We consider elsewhere (chapter XV) the question of safe- 
guarding the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of Galilee 
(Lake Tiberias) : here we are concerned only with the boundary to 

* Note. — The urban population consists of the population of the muni- 
cipalities of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahur, Ramie, 
and Lydda. 

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



39 



be adopted for the Nazareth Enclave. It has been suggested to us 
that the Enclave should include not only Nazareth itself but should 
be extended so as to include — 

(a) Kafr Kanna, the traditional site of the miracle in Cana of 
Galilee ; 

(b) Mount Tabor, the traditional site of the Transfiguration ; 

(c) the village of Yafa to the west of Nazareth, the population 
of which consists to the extent of almost one-half of Christians. 

The inclusion of these places would mean a considerable increase 
in the size of the Enclave, and we do not feel that we can support 
the proposal. We recommend that the Enclave should be limited to 
the area falling within the boundaries of the village lands of Nazareth. 
The population and area of the Enclave as thus denned are as 
follows — 

Arabs Jews 

Population 10,000 100 

Land (in dunums) : — 

Total cultivable land .. .. 6,700 100 
Total uncultivable land, includ- 12,700 — 

ing built-on areas. 
Total land* 19,400 100 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 

(C 31078) 



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40 



CHAPTER V 

THE BOUNDARY OF JAFFA, INCLUDING THE BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN THE TOWNS OF JAFFA AND TEL AVIV 

72. The Royal Commission recommended that the town of 
Jaffa should be part of the Arab State. We endorse that 
recommendation, though Jaffa, being situated in the Jerusalem 
Enclave, will thereby be separated from the rest of the territory 
of the Arab State. 

1. The Boundary between the Towns of Jaffa and Tel Aviv 

73. There are about 55,000 Arab residents in Jaffa and about 
16,000 Jews ; but the town is essentially Arab. Tel Aviv, which 
adjoins Jaffa on the north, has a population of about 140,000 and 
is entirely Jewish. The two form geographically a single town. 
The majority of the Jewish residents of Jaffa live near the boundary 
between the two towns. This boundary is a zigzag line running 
for the greater part through narrow streets. There has been for 
many years discord between the two towns and serious disturbances 
have taken place on the boundary. At present, the relations between 
the two communities are particularly strained. In the past, 
endeavours have been made to secure a better boundary between the 
two municipalities, but it has not been possible to reach agreement. 
The problem has now become the wider one of devising a suitable 
boundary, not only between the two municipalities, but also between 
the proposed Jewish State in which Tel Aviv will be situated and 
the Arab State of which Jaffa will be a part. 

74. The Royal Commission suggested that the boundary 
between the two towns should consist of a narrow belt of mandated 
territory, and that for this purpose a strip oXland along the boundary 
should be acquired and cleared. We havT^examined the problem 
presented by this boundary most carefulff in consultation with 
officers of the Palestine Administration, and the conclusion we have 
reached is • that a boundary such as that proposed by the Royal 
Commission would not be a suitable one. It would place the 
Mandatory Administration and its officials in a most difficult and 
embarrassing position should disturbances break out between the 
subjects of the two states. Indeed, in that event the position of 
the Mandatory police stationed in a narrow belt of territory between 
hostile parties intent on attacking each other might prove to be 
untenable. Again, such a boundary would render customs adminis- 
tration very difficult, indeed almost impossible, should the Jewish 
State and the Mandated area have different customs tariffs or other 



41 



divergent import and export systems.* In our opinion, the better 
course would be to have a road as the boundary between the two 
towns. For the purpose of maintaining law and order, and for 
general administrative convenience, this road must be as straight 
as possible. Down the middle of it a high iron railing must be 
constructed which would form the actual boundary and would be 
the joint property of the two states. At intervals where the 
boundary would cross important roads there would be gates to 
allow of the passage of traffic between the two towns. Such an 
arrangement would enable the police of each state to patrol the 
boundary and would provide a reasonably effective barrier between 
two potentially hostile communities. It would also enable traffic 
crossing the boundary to be controlled and would greatly facilitate 
customs administration. 

75. This arrangement may seem artificial, but it appears to us to 
offer the best solution of the problem — a problem which has some- 
times been described as insoluble — of drawing a boundary between 
Tel Aviv and Jaffa. We recognize that it is not perfect. In the 
event of disturbances no barrier could prevent shots from being 
fired from buildings on each side of the boundary road. The 
substitution of a wall for a railing would, it is true, prevent shots 
from being fired from street level, but would not prevent the 
throwing of bombs. Indeed, it would make the position worse, for 
bombs could be thrown over the wall by persons hidden from the view 
of those on the other side. It would doubtless also be possible for 
small articles to be smuggled through the railing, but again the provision 
of a wall instead of a railing would not wholly prevent the smuggling 
of such articles. Having regard to all the circmpstances, and after 
taking expert advice, we consider that a railing would be decidedly 
preferable to a wall. It is also true that persons intent on causing 
disturbances could evade any barrier by going round the end of it, and 
that smugglers could evade it by transporting goods by boat or round 
the end of the railing, but these possibilities of evasion do not diminish 
the necessity of special measures in the congested urban area. 

76. As regards the line which should be adopted as the boundary 
between the two municipalities, it has been suggested, on the part of 
the Jews, that the existing boundary, throughout its whole length, 
should be moved a considerable distance to the south. According to 
this plan the boundary would start on the seashore at a point 
north-west of the railway station (near the end of Az Zubeir 
Street) and would then take a south-easterly course via the Jaffa 
railway station and the German colony to a point on the eastern 
boundary of the Jaffa municipality, about one kilometre south of 
the road leading to the village of Salama and the civil airport 



* This argument will lose its force if the proposals in our final chapter 
(XXII) are adopted. 



42 



(hereafter called the airport road). The effect of adopting this 
boundary would be to transfer from Jaffa to Tel Aviv not only 
practically all the Jewish property in Jaffa, but in addition the 
following Arab areas — 

(i) Almost the whole of the Al Manshiya section of the town. 
This section is densely populated and is almost entirely owned 
and inhabited by Arabs. The important Hassan Bey Mosque 
is situated in this area. 

(ii) A large area of Arab land in the Saknat Abu Kabir 
Quarter. 

In terms of population it would mean transferring to Tel Aviv 
not only the Jewish population of Jaffa but also a large Arab 
population. 

77. A scheme has also been put forward on the part of the Arabs, 
the effect of which would be — 

(a) To transfer to Tel Aviv the northern portion of the 
Karton area, which is predominantly Jewish. 

(b) To retain in Jaffa the other Jewish areas of that town. 

(c) To transfer from Tel Aviv the following entirely Jewish 
areas — 

(i) an area along the sea shore north of the present 

boundary ; 

(ii) the Neve Shalom area west of Pinnes Street ; 

(iii) an area north of the airport road. 

In terms of population, it would mean that the Jewish population of 
Jaffa would be considerably increased. . J 

78. Both these schemes are clearly open to strong objection. 
The Jewish scheme involves the transfer of important Arab areas 
to Tel Aviv, while the Arab scheme involve a considerable increase 
in the Jewish population and property in j-'^fa. 

79. The boundary which we recommend is shown on map 12. 
The width of the boundary road would be 20 metres, except for the 
portion between the seashore and Hacarmel Street, where it would 
be 30 to 40 metres wide. 

80. Starting from the seashore, the boundary road runs 
eastwards for some distance along the present common municipal 
boundary and then, still proceeding eastwards, it cuts through the 
northern portion of the Al Manshiya section of the Jaffa muni- 
cipality. The effect of this is to transfer the Karton Quarter of 
Jaffa to Tel Aviv. It is estimated that, while the greater part of 
the property in the area transferred is owned by Arabs, the Jewish 
population exceeds the Arab population by three to two, the approxi- 
mate figures being 3,200 Jews to 2,000 Arabs . At present the Karton 



43 



Quarter forms a salient of the Jaffa municipal area, projecting 
into the Tel Aviv municipal area. We consider that it is essential 
to remove this salient in order to obtain a suitable boundary. 

81. On reaching Hacarmel Street, the boundary road turns 
southwards to Pinnes Street and then along that street to the 
railway line. The effect of this is to transfer the Neve Shalom area 
of Tel Aviv to Jaffa. The Neve Shalom area forms a salient pro- 
jecting into Jaffa, and although the population (about 5,400) and 
property affected are entirely Jewish, we consider that in order to 
obtain a suitable boundary it is necessary to remove this salient. 

82. After crossing the railway — a bridge will be needed at this 
point — the boundary runs southwards as far as the airport road and 
then turns eastwards along that road to the eastern boundary 
of the Jaffa Enclave. The effect of this is to transfer froi^ Jaffa 
to Tel Aviv — 

(a) The area known as the Florentine Quarter. This quarter 
is almost entirely Jewish, both as regards population and the 
ownership of the land. The population is estimated at about 
12,500 Jews. 

(b) The part of the Shapiro Quarter (Block 7060) which lies 
north of the airport road. This area carries a small population, 
partly Arabs and partly Jews, the ownership of the land being 
almost equally divided between Arabs and Jews. 

83. We consider that the railing need not, at first, be continued 
beyond the junction of the airport road and the eastern boundary 
of the Jaffa Enclave, though experience may prove that some 
extension is necessary. The cost of the road and fence is estimated 
at about £115,000. A detailed estimate has not been prepared and 
the figure given is therefore only approximate. The question how 
the money is to be provided for this and other necessary expenses 
incidental to partition will be considered in the chapter on Finance 
(chapter XVIII). 

84. The effect of our proposals would be the transfer of about 
15,700 Jews and about 2,000 Arabs from Jaffa to Tel Aviv, and of 
about 5,400 Jews from Tel Aviv to Jaffa. The population figures 
are, however, only approximate, precise figures not being available. 
We do not expect that the transfer of the areas we have recommended 
will give rise to any serious administrative difficulties. 

85. The line we have recommended will no doubt be criticized 
by both the Arabs and the Jews. On behalf of the Arabs it may be 
urged that the inclusion of the Florentine and part of the Shapiro 
Quarters in Tel Aviv will deprive the Jaffa municipality of an 
important area. Our answer would be that we consider it essential 
that, as far as other considerations permit, the boundary should be 
drawn so as to effect as large a reduction as possible in the Jewish 
population of Jaffa. 



44 



86. On behalf of the Jews it may be urged that the Jewish area 
of Neve Shalom should not be transferred to Jaffa. As we have 
said, we consider it essential that the boundary between Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv should be as straight as possible. If this essential condition 
is to be observed, it follows that the salient made by the Neve Shalom 
area must be removed. Again, in the rectification of the present 
unsatisfactory boundary, we consider it proper that the sacrifices 
involved should be shared as far as possible between the two muni- 
cipalities. It may also be urged that our plan retains in Jaffa the 
Jewish population and property south of the airport road. This 
is so. But we take the view that the existence of this Jewish 
population and property would not justify the substitution of a 
different boundary for the airport road. In the first place, the cost 
of constructing the boundary road — already considerable — would be 
largely increased, for it would be necessary to construct an entirely 
new road south of the Jewish property. In the second place, it 
would be impossible to provide a straight boundary without 
transferring further Arab land to Tel Aviv. 

87. We feel the less hesitation in recommending in this area 
boundaries which necessitate the inclusion of a considerable number 
of Jews in the Arab State and of Arabs in the Jewish State, because 
it is obvious that the transfer of an urban population from one part 
of a continuous built-over area to another is a very different matter 
from the transfer of an agricultural population to a completely 
different district. Given goodwill on both sides, the transfers 
could be arranged, if the inhabitants in question wish it, without 
much difficulty, and, we should hope, without hardship to the ' 
individuals concerned. 

2. The Remaining Portion of the Boundarjspf Jaffa 

88. The remainder of the boundary proposed for%affa is shown 
on map 4. From the airport road the eastern boundary follows the 
" Urban and Village " boundary, and on the south the town-planning 
boundary has been adopted. The proposed boundary includes a 
considerable area outside the present municipal limits of Jaffa town 
and therefore provides room for expansion. 



45 



CHAPTER VI 

THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE PROPOSED ARAB AND 
JEWISH STATES UNDER PLAN A 

89. In chapter IV we described the boundary for the Jerusalem 
Enclave and the Enclave at Nazareth, and in chapter V we dealt 
with the boundary of Jaffa, including the boundary between Jaffa 
and Tel Aviv. As has been explained in chapter I, the Royal 
Commission gave only a sketch map and a brief description of their 
proposed plan. But neither the map nor the description purports 
to do more than give a rough outline of the boundaries, and in order 
to examine the Royal Commission's scheme demographically, that 
is, with reference to statistics of population and land, it is necessary 
in the first place to draw their proposed boundaries more exactly, 
taking their outline as a guide. We shall then have plan A. In this 
chapter we deal with the remaining sections of the boundary between 
the Arab and Jewish States as outlined in the Royal Commission's 
scheme. The boundaries in these sections were made after 
consultation and in agreement with the military authorities, and 
we have no reason to suppose that the Royal Commission, if they 
had given a detailed description of their plan, would have chosen 
different boundaries. 

1. The Boundary along the Eastern Edge of the Maritime Plain 
between the Town of Tulkarm and the Jerusalem Enclave 

90. The boundary in this section, according to the Royal Com- 
mission's outline, runs along the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain, 
that is along the base of the hills of Samaria. It also lies just east 
of the main railway line from Lydda to Haifa, which in this section 
runs close to the foot of the hills. The Jewish population and land 
are situated in the plain, while the population and land in the hills 
are entirely Arab. We have been advised that a boundary along 
the foot of the hills would not be a suitable defensive boundary for 
the Jewish State and that any defensive boundary in this area must 
be drawn some distance within the foothills. The boundary 
adopted has been drawn as short a distance within the foothills as 
military requirements would permit. This means the inclusion in 
the Jewish State of a number of Arab villages situated in the foothills, 
but we are satisfied that this is unavoidable if the Jewish State is to 
be provided with a suitable defensive boundary. 

91 . The boundary outlined by the Royal Commission places the 
town of Tulkarm in the Arab State. Tulkarm, which is an entirely 
Arab town with nearly 6,000 inhabitants and a centre of Arab 
nationalism, is situated just on the edge of the plain. We agree that 



46 



this town should not be included in the Jewish State. The main 
railway line (standard gauge) from Lydda to Haifa runs through 
Tulkarm, which is a junction for the narrow-gauge line to 
Nablus. It is clearly undesirable that a small section of the main 
line should pass through the Arab State at this point. It will 
therefore be necessary to divert the main line for a distance of about 
10 kilometres, provision being made for maintaining the connection 
with the narrow-gauge railway. We have been advised that the 
cost of the diversion is estimated at about £10,000 a kilometre ; the 
total cost will be about £100,000. The question how this expenditure 
should be met will be considered in chapter XVIII (Finance) . 

2. The Boundary along the Maritime Plain north of the Town of 
Tulkarm, across the Carmel Ridge and along the Plain 
of Esdraelon 

92. The boundary adopted in this section follows closely the 
boundary outlined by the Royal Commission. The boundary in 
the Maritime Plain north of the town of Tulkarm has not, like the 
boundary south of that town, been drawn inside the foothills for 
the following reasons — 

(a) the railway line is at a reasonably safe distance from the 
eastern edge of the plain ; 

(b) a boundary through the foothills would be more difficult 
to defend than that adopted, because of the broken nature of the 
ground and the presence of very dense olive groves ; j 

(c) in order to obtain a suitable boundary*l%iside the foot- 
hills it would be necessary to include in the Jewish State an 
Arab area almost as deep as the Jewish area to be protected. 

3. The Boundary along the Plain of Jezreel 

93. The boundary in the Plain of Jezreel as proposed by the 
Royal Commission runs along the southern edge of the plain at the 
base of a range of hills, the Mountains of Gilboa, which rise steeply 
to a height of 300 to 500 metres (about 900 to 1,500 feet). Jewish 
settlements lie at the foot of the hills, while the hills themselves are 
in Arab occupation. Here also we have been advised that a line 
at the foot of the hills would not be a suitable defensive boundary 
for the Jewish State. The line adopted on the advice of the military 
authorities runs along the crest of these hills. Here again the 
inclusion of a certain number of Arab villages in the Jewish State 
has been found to be unavoidable. 

4. The Boundary in the Plain of Beisan 

94. The boundary adopted in the Plain of Beisan follows closely 
the boundary outlined by the Royal Commission. 



47 



5. The Boundary in the Jordan Valley 

95. In paragraph 20 of chapter XXII of their Report the Royal 
Commission described the boundary of the Jewish State as crossing 
Lake Tiberias to the point where the River Jordan flows out of the 
lake, and then continuing down the river to a point a little north of 
Beisan. The boundary of Palestine in this area, however, runs, not 
across, but on the eastern side of the lake and then down the 
River Yarmuk to the point where that river joins the River Jordan 
at Jisr al Majami. The small triangle of territory which is thus 
excluded from the Jewish State by the Royal Commission's boundary 
contains a number of Jewish settlements, including the old-established 
colonies of Dagania A, Dagania B, Kfar Gun, Afiqim, and Dalhamiya, 
and over 50 per cent of the land is in Jewish hands. It would seem 
desirable to include this triangle in the Jewish State, in accordance 
with the principle on which the Royal Commission proceeded, of 
drawing the boundary between the Jewish and Arab States so as 
to include within the Jewish State the existing areas of Jewish 
land and settlement. 

96. The power-house and certain other works of the Palestine 
Electric Corporation on the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami are 
situated on the eastern side of the river and are therefore in Trans- 
Jordan territory. Only a small part of the electric energy produced 
by the Palestine Electric Corporation is sold to consumers in the 
Arab State outlined in plan A, by far the greater part being supplied 
to the consumers in the Jewish State. It has been suggested to us 
that in these circumstances the boundary should be modified so as 
to include the power-station within the Jewish State. We agree, and 
have modified the boundary so as to include within the Jewish State 
the land which the Corporation now hold on the Trans- Jordan side 
of the river. This matter is dealt with in detail in Appendix 6. 

The railway, which runs from Samakh at the southern end of 
Lake Tiberias south along the Jordan Valley to Beisan, and then 
west to Haifa, is situated entirely in the Jewish State, with the 
exception of a short length north of Jisr al Majami, where it passes 
through the land held by the Palestine Electric Corporation on the 
Trans- Jordan side of the River Jordan. It is clearly undesirable 
that this small section of the railway line should fall outside the 
Jewish State. This affords a further reason for the modification 
of the boundary dealt with in the preceding paragraph. 

6. The Boundary south of the Jerusalem Enclave 

97. In this section the boundary lies wholly in the Maritime Plain. 
The boundary adopted interprets as closely as possible the boundary 
outlined by the Royal Commission. 



48 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FIGURES FOR THE POPULATION AND LAND OF THE 
ARAB AND JEWISH STATES AND THE ENCLAVES UNDER 
PLAN A 

98. The Royal Commission were of opinion (page 385 of their 
Report) that it would greatly promote the successful operation of 
partition in its early stages, and in particular help to ensure the 
execution of the treaty guarantees for the protection of minorities, 
if the towns of Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Acre, situated within the 
boundaries of the Jewish State, were kept for a period under 
Mandatory administration. Although the period of this temporary 
Mandate was not specified, it was clearly the intention that these 
towns should ultimately pass under Jewish administration, and we 
have therefore, for the purpose of plan A, treated them as forming 
part of the Jewish State. 

99. The Royal Commission's plan also provided (page 381) for 
the union of Trans- Jordan and the Arab area in Palestine. For the 
purposes of considering the various plans of partition we have not, 
except where otherwise stated, included statistics relating to 
Trans- Jordan. 

1. Population 

100. The populations of the two states and the enclaves 
(Jerusalem and Nazareth) are as follows : — 



The Arab State 
(including the Beersheba sub-district) 





Arabs 


Jews 


Total 


Urban 


.. 136,500 


5,600 


142,100 


Rural 


. . 348,700 


1,600 


350,300 


Total 


. . 485,200 


7,200 


492,400 




The Jewish State 








Arabs 


Jews 


Total 


Urban 


77,500 


243,600 


321,100 


Rural 


. . 217,200 


61,300 


278,500 



Total 



294,700 304,900 



599,600 



49 

The Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclaves 



Urban 
Rural 


Arabs 
91,000 
. . 130,400 


Jews 
76,000 
4,200 


Total 
167,000 
134,600 


Total . 


. . 221,400 


80,200 


301,600 




All Palestine 






Arabs 

Arab State (including the 

Beersheba Sub-District) 485,200 
Jewish State . . . . 294,700 
Enclaves 221,400 


Jews 

7,200 
304 900 

80,200 


Total 
492,400 
301,600 


Total . 


.. 1,001,300 


392,300 


1,393,600 



Note. — The urban population is the population living within the 
municipal areas. 



101. The main facts which emerge from these figures are — 

(a) In the Arab State the number of Jews is only about 
7,000, or about 1 per cent, of the total population of the State. 

(b) In the Arab State nearly three-fourths of the total 
population live in rural areas. 

(c) In the Jewish State the Arabs are almost equal in numbers 
to the Jews and constitute 49 per cent, of the total population 
of the State. 

(d) In the Jewish State four-fifths of the Jewish population 
but only one-quarter of the Arab population live in urban 
(municipal) areas. The two towns of Tel Aviv (140,000) and 
Haifa (49,000) alone account for three-fifths of the Jewish 
population in the State. 



50 



2. Laud 

102. The distribution of the various classes of land in the two 
States and the Enclaves between Arabs and Jews is given in the 
following tables — 

The Arab State 
(excluding the Beersheba District) 





A 1. 

Arabs 


Jews 


Total 




(Dunums) 


(Dunums) 


(Dunums) 


Citrus land 


9fi ROfi 




97 QOft 


Banana plantations . . 


3,200 


200 


3,400 


Other plantations 


624,300 


2,800 


627,100 


Taxable cereal land . . 


1,785,600 


24,200 


1,809,800 


Untaxable cereal land 


604,900 


1,100 


606,000 


Total cultivable land 


3,044,600 


29,600 


3,074,200 


Built-on area 


37,100 


4,400 


41,500 


Uncultivable land 


3,926,200 


3,000 


3,929,200 


Total land* . . 


7,007,900 


37,000 


7,044,900 



As was explained in paragraph 52 of chapter III, only the urban 
area (the town of Beersheba) in Beersheba sub-district has been 
surveyed and hence figures corresponding to those given for the rest 
of Palestine are not available. The total area of Beersheba sub- 
district is 12,577,000 dunums ; the estimates of the cultivated area 
vary between \\ million to 2 million dunums. According to the 
Land Registration records the area of land purchased by the Jews is 
50,385 dunums. In addition 5,160 dunums were purchased before 
the War. The total area of land held by the Jews in the sub- 
district is therefore 55,545 dunums. There are no Jews settled on 
this land. 

The Jewish State 





Arabs 


Jews 


Total 




(Dunums) 


(Dunums) 


(Dunums) 


Citrus land 


78,600 


135,900 


214,500 


Banana plantations . . 


600 


800 


1,400 


Other plantations 


266,900 


61,900 


328,800 


Taxable cereal land . . 


1,700,200 


608,900 


2,309,100 


Untaxable cereal land 


185,300 


59,100 


244,400 


Total cultivable land 


2,231,600 


866,600 


3,098,200 


Built-on area 


31,700 


31,400 


63,100 


Uncultivable land 


1,591,400 


242,200 


1,833,600 


Total land* 


3,854,700 


1,140,200 


4,994,900 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



51 



The Jerusalem and Nazareth Enclave 





Arabs 


Jews 


Total 




(Dunums) 






Citrus land 


37,900 


8,900 


46,800 


Banana plantations . . 


100 




100 


Other plantations . . 


185,100 


5,300 


190 400 


Taxable cereal land . . 


508^400 


36^500 


544 900 


Untaxable cereal land 


102^300 


UOO 


103,400 


Total cultivable land 


833,800 


51,800 


885,600 


Built-on area 


34,500 


7,800 


42,300 


Uncultivable land 


636,300 


19,200 


655,500 


Total land* 


1,504,600 


78,800 


1,583,400 



103. The main points brought out by these figures are — 

(a) The amount of Jewish land in the Arab State is very 
small, being about 92,000 dunums, including the Jewish land in 
Beersheba sub-district. 

(b) The amount of Arab land in the Jewish State is very 
large, being about 3,854,000 dunums as compared with about 
1,140,000 dunums of Jewish land. 

(c) Land planted with citrus pays the highest rate of Rural 
Property Tax levied on any class of agricultural land, except 
banana plantations. The total area of such land held by the 
Jews outside the Enclaves is about 137,200 dunums and of this 
area 135,900 dunums are included in the Jewish State as com- 
pared with only 1,300 dunums in the Arab State. The total 
area of such land held by the Arabs outside the Enclaves is 
105,200 but of this area only 26,600 dunums are included in the 
Arab State as against 78,600 in the Jewish State. 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



52 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES AND 
TRANSFER OF POPULATION 

104. In this chapter we examine, with reference to plan A, the 
possibility of voluntary* exchanges of land and population and the 
prospects of making provision, by works of land development, for 
a larger population than exists to-day and thereby facilitating the 
transfer of persons who desire to move from one area to another. 

105. The number of Jews and the amount of Jewish Land in 
the Arab State under plan A are — 

Jews — 
Urban 
Rural 

Jewish land — 
Citrus land 
Other cultivable land 
Uncultivable land 



5,600 \ Q 



1,300 dunums 
28,300 „ 
7,400 „ 



37,000 



The figures for the Arab population and the Arab land in the 
Jewish State under plan A are — 

Arabs — 

Urban 77,500 \ 9Q . 7nn 

Rural 2 17,200 J /y4,/UU 

Arab land — 

Citrus land . . . . . . 78,600 dunums 

Other cultivable land . . . . 2,153,000 

Uncultivable land . . . . 1,623,100 



3,854,700 



* In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine (published 
in Cmd. 5634) it was announced that His Majesty's Government have not 
accepted the Royal Commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer in the 
last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area (Appendix 1). On 
behalf of the Jews it was also made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be 
opposed to the exercise of any degree of compulsion. 



53 ■ | 

These figures show that, while the Jewish minority in the Arab 
State is small, the Arab minority in the Jewish State is large. The 
Royal Commission foresaw that there would be a large Arab minority 
in the Jewish State, and in item (ii) (i) of our terms of reference we 
are directed to examine and report on — 

(a) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and 
population, and 

(b) the prospects of providing by works of land development 
room for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring 
to move from one area to another. 

1. Voluntary Exchanges of Land and Population 

106. From the figures given in the previous paragraph it is clear 
that there is little scope for the voluntary exchange of land between 
the Arabs in the Jewish State and the Jews in the Arab State, and 
little possibility of the voluntary exchange of rural population 
between the two states. 

107. In the Jerusalem Enclave there are 4,000 Jews in the rural 
areas and the total amount of land held by Jews is 78,800 dunums. 
We consider it unlikely that the Jews in the rural areas in the enclave 
will be desirous of moving from the enclave to the Jewish State. 
And even if they should be, the number of Jews and the amount of 
Jewish land in the enclave are too small for any arrangements for 
exchange of land between Arabs in the Jewish State and Jews in the 
enclave to have any appreciable effect on the minority problem in 
the Jewish State. 

2. The Possibility of the Transfer of Population 

108. The Royal Commission in their Report drew attention to 
the lack of adequate evidence on the question of the amount of land 
which could be made available for settlement by the execution of 
irrigation, water storage, and development projects in Beersheba, 
the Jordan Valley, and Trans- Jordan, where large areas of sparsely 
populated country exist which might be capable, if water were 
available for irrigation, of supporting a larger population ; and they 
recommended that those areas should be surveyed and an authorita- 
tive estimate made of the practical possibilities of irrigation and 
development . Investigation work estimated to cost £90,000* — £60,000 
in Palestine and £30,000 in Trans-Jordan — began in the early part 
of this year. The results of these surveys, so far as they had 
proceeded up to the end of July, 1938, are described in the following 
paragraphs. The sites of bores sunk in connection with the survey 
are shown on map 1 opposite. 



* Of this amount His Majesty's Government provided ^60,000. 



54 



Beersheba Sub-District 

109. As we have already stated in an earlier chapter, the Beersheba 
sub-district has an area nearly equal to that of the whole of the rest 
of Palestine. The greater part of this vast expanse of country, 
over 12J million dunums in extent, is an arid wilderness, roamed 
over by the Bedouin in search of pasture for their flocks. In the 
north and north-west, however, there are extensive undulating 
plains on which, when the rainfall permits, the semi-nomadic Arabs 
are able to raise substantial cereal crops. It is in the southern part 
of these plains, which may roughly be said to lie north-west of a line 
drawn from Al Auja to Kurnub, that the traces of ancient settlement's 
are to be found, and it was to this area that Sir John Hope Simpson 
referred when he wrote — 

Given the possibility of irrigation, there is practically an 
inexhaustible supply of cultivable land in the Beersheba area. 

Unfortunately the rainfall in this area is low, varying from 5 inches in 
the south to 10 inches or 12 inches in the extreme north and north- 
west, and so uncertain that it has been estimated that in a cycle of 
seven years a cultivable plot produces a good crop in two, some 
crop in three, and none at all in the other two years. In a year of 
good rainfall, however, it is calculated that from 1,500,000 to 
2,000,000 dunums are put under cultivation in this region, and, as 
will be seen from map 1, it is here that the bores made in connection 
with the survey have been sunk. 

110. The line between Al Auja and Kurnub corresponds approxi- 
mately to the 5 in. rainfall contour. South of this line the character 
of the country changes. It consists of a series of low ranges of 
rugged hills extending east and west, with undulating and irregular 
gravel plains between them. The lower slopes of the hills are usually 
boulder-strewn and covered with gravel, and, although here and 
there areas of wind-blown sand and alluvial deposits occur, they are 
isolated from each other. This area has not been tested for water as, 
even if water were found, the isolation of the individual patches of 
soil and their distance from markets make it exceedingly doubtful 
whether any part of it can ever be put to economic use. 

111. The following is a summary of the results of the bores 
sunk in the Beersheba sub-district to the end of August last, when it 
was found necessary in view of the risk of attack by Arabs — in July 
two attacks were made on boring parties in the Jordan valley 
resulting in loss of life — to close down all boring operations in 
Beersheba as well as in the Jordan Valley — 

(i) Thirteen bores have been completed. Only one, near Gaza, 
has proved successful. In eight, water has either not been found 
at all or found in such small quantities as to be useless for the 



55 



purpose of irrigation, and in one the water, although present in 
good quantity, is too saline (344 to 353 parts in 100,000) to be 
usable for irrigation purposes. In two other bores water, 
although present in fair quantity, is of a salinity higher than 
that (40 to 50 per 100,000) which has been accepted in the past 
in Palestine as the maximum for the cultivation of crops other 
than cereal crops. Experience in other countries, however, 
tends to show that it is impossible to lay down any absolute 
figure. The subject is now being investigated both in the 
laboratory and in the field, and until these investigations have 
been completed, it will not be possible to say whether the water 
from these wells will prove to be usable for irrigation or not. 
The remaining bore has been sunk, but has not as yet been 
tested for quantity or salinity. 

(ii) Eight bores are still in process of being sunk, and on 
these work has not proceeded far enough for any conclusions to 
be drawn. The well at Al Auja, however, presents points of 
some interest. Water has been struck at two horizons. At the 
first horizon the water is very saline, but the salinity of the 
combined water from the two horizons indicates that the water 
from the lower horizon is much sweeter than that obtained from 
the higher. If these indications are confirmed by the test about 
to be carried out, the upper horizon will be shut off and the 
boring continued through the lower strata. There is a hope that, 
at this well, water has been struck of useful quantity and quality 
and at a moderate depth. If this hope should be confirmed, it 
is proposed to sink a second bore to test the extent of the 
underlying water. 

(iii) In addition to the above bores, three wells were sunk a 
year or two ago in connection with the Water Resources Survey 
then being undertaken. In one of these bores no water was 
found and in two the water was too saline to be usable for 
irrigation. 

112. The results of the well-boring experiments in the Beersheba 
area are thus most disappointing. Of the 16 wells sunk only one, near 
Gaza, has proved successful, although it is hoped that the bore at 
Khan Yunis, now awaiting test, will also yield satisfactory results. 
But both these bores are situated in the coastal sand dune area 
where it was fairly certain from the outset that sweet water would 
be found in reasonable quantity. Of the fourteen wells further in 
the interior, twelve are complete failures and the possibility of 
utilizing the water of the other two, in view of its salinity, has yet 
to be proved. A final conclusion cannot be reached till the remaining 
bores have been completed, but the most that can at present be 
said is that the Beersheba area is not one in which it is possible 
to sink a bore at random and obtain sweet water. On the contrary, 
even when sites are chosen after prolonged geophysical experiments 



56 



and geological investigation, 75 per cent, of them prove a failure. 
The presence of abundant sweet water in the coastal sand dunes 
seems likely to be confirmed, and there is evidence that satisfactory 
water may be available in the vicinity of Al Auja. But in the 
greater part of the area there appears to be little hope of any 
improvement in agriculture by means of irrigation from wells. 

113. There are indications that, in the distant past, considerable 
areas in the close vicinity of the wadis in this region were irrigated 
by diverting the flood water of those wadis over the fields by means 
of weirs. It is proposed, as part of the general hydrographic investiga- 
tion, to construct one or two experimental works of this nature, 
and the necessary surveys were nearing completion at the end of 
August last. It is interesting to record that, on the site selected 
for one of these weirs, remains of a similar work of the Byzantine, 
or possibly Roman, period were found, which indicated clearly 
that at that period flood diversion works were a feature of the 
cultivation of this region. It cannot, however, be expected that 
such works could enable extensive additional settlement to take 
place in this area. 

114. Apart from the question of irrigation, consideration has 
also been given to the possibilities of improving agriculture in the 
Negeb by the adoption of dry-farming methods. As explained 
above, the existing cereal cultivation is wholly dependent on a low 
and variable rainfall : the object of dry-farming cultivation is to 
ensure, by deep ploughing, the maximum absorption of rainfall in 
the ground, and to prevent, by frequent loosening of the upper soil, 
the evaporation of the moisture so absorbed. The view has been 
expressed to us that dry-farming methods might very greatly reduce 
the proportion of years when the winter crops in this region are a 
partial or complete failure ; that it might increase the yield by as 
much as 25 per cent, or 30 per cent, in a good year ; and that it 
might make possible a very considerable increase of the area put under 
summer crops. These views must be largely speculative in the 
absence of a scientific investigation of the practical application of 
dry-farming methods in this area, and such an investigation would 
necessarily take some years to complete. The prospects of securing 
by this means an improvement of agriculture in the Negeb are, 
however, sufficiently hopeful to render the carrying out of an 
investigation desirable, and the Palestine Government decided in 
August to provide funds immediately for the establishment of a 
Dry-Farming Experimental Station. Owing to the state of insecurity 
in the sub-district, however, it has not so far been possible to make 
further progress with this scheme. In any event, until these 
investigations have been carried out it would be premature to 
assume that there is scope for additional settlement on any 
considerable scale in the near future. 



1* 

57 



The Jordan Valley south of the Sea of Galilee 
(Lake Tiberias) 

115. 

There may be something on the surface of another planet to match 
the Jordan Valley : there is nothing on this. No other part of our earth, 
uncovered by water, sinks to three hundred feet below the level of the 
ocean. But here we have a rift more than one hundred and sixty miles 
long and two to fifteen miles broad, which falls from sea level to as deep 
as 1,292 feet below at the coast of the Dead Sea, while the bottom of the 
latter is 1,300 feet deeper still* 

This is Sir George Adam Smith's description of the Jordan 
Valley, which is a part of that tremendous rift in the earth's surface 
which stretches unbroken from the Lebanons to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
In this chapter we are concerned only with that section, sixty-five 
miles in length, which lies between the southern end of the Sea of 
Galilee and the northern end of the Dead Sea. In this distance the 
bottom of the valley falls gradually from 600 feet to nearly 1,300 feet 
below sea-level. Through its midst flows the swift current of the 
River Jordan in its deep-cut and winding channel, the narrow fringe 
of luxuriant vegetation on its banks contrasting vividly with the 
barren valley and the parched hillsides. 

116. The section of the valley between Lake Tiberias and the 
Dead Sea falls naturally into two divisions. In the northern part, 
which lies between the lake and the southern end of the Beisan plain, 
the rainfall, though variable and precarious, may yet be sufficient 
in a good year for the cultivation of cereal crops without irrigation. 
Moreover, water is available for irrigation from the Jordan, the 
Yarmuk and the Wadi Araba. In this section, therefore, there is 
some settlement on both sides of the river. In the southern section, 
however, the rainfall is negligible and the depth below sea level so 
great as to render the summer climate intensely oppressive. In this 
section, settlement at present depends entirely on perennial springs 
or the few streams which break through the hills on one or other 
side of the valley. 

117. We shall consider separately the four possible sources from 
which the land of the Jordan Valley can be irrigated— 

(a) Wells on the western bank of the River Jordan. 

(b) Wells on the eastern bank of the River Jordan. 

(c) Small perennial streams on the eastern side of the Jordan 

Valley. 

(d) The Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan and the River 

Yarmuk. 

(a) Wells on the western bank of the River Jordan^ 

1 18. (i) One bore in the vicinity of Jericho and two bores in the 
valley north of the town have been completed. The bore near Jericho 



* The Historical Geography of the Holy Land. Chapter XXII. 

| The wells on the western bank of the Jordan are shown on map 1 . 



58 



was drilled to a depth of nearly 200 metres, at which point work was 
discontinued, no water having been found. In one of the bores north 
of Jericho the water is too saline to be suitable for irrigation. In the 
other the water is of a salinity higher than that accepted in the past 
as a maximum for the cultivation of crops other than cereals ; and, 
as in the case of the bores in the Beersheba sub-district, it will not be 
possible to say whether the water from this bore can be used for 
irrigation till the results of the investigations now being carried out 
are known. 

(ii) Two bores are under construction, but work was abandoned 
in July after both had been attacked by Arabs. 

(iii) In addition to the above bores, two wells were sunk a year 
or two ago. In one water was not found, but the other produced a 
good supply of water of a very fair degree of salinity. This is in the 
Wadi Fusail and is the northernmost of the bores in the Jordan 
Valley. On the evidence at present available, the prospects of 
irrigation from wells in this area cannot be considered to be hopeful. 

(b) Wells on the eastern bank of the River Jordan 

119. A number of wells have been sunk in an area north and 
south of the Jerusalem-Amman road on the east side of the river. 
On this bank of the river the prospects are better than on the western 
side, but the area which can be irrigated from these wells is not large. 
It is estimated at 10,000 dunums. 

(c) Small perennial streams on the eastern side of the Jordan Valley 

120. According to the Fiscal Survey Records the area registered 
as irrigated by these streams is 206,300 dunums, while the area 
recorded as irrigated seasonally is 87,700 dunums. The reason for 
the difference between these two figures is that, in some cases, the 
land is cultivated on a two-year rotation and in others on a three-year 
or four-year rotation basis. The methods of irrigation followed by 
the cultivator are capable of improvement, and, although the 
problem of reorganising the supply presents many serious difficulties, 
proper canalisation would no doubt enable considerable improvements 
to be effected in the use of the available water. In the absence of 
data relating to each stream, it is almost impossible to arrive at an 
estimate of the additional area which could be irrigated. It has been 
suggested that an increase of 20,000 dunums in the area irrigated 
annually might be obtained. 

(d) The Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan and the River Yarmuk 

121. From what has been said in the previous paragraphs it is 
clear that no substantial increase in the irrigated area in the Jordan 
Valley can be expected either from wells or from the better utilization 
of the water of the perennial streams. If large areas are to be 
brought under irrigation in the valley south of the Sea of Galilee, 
water must be obtained from the other sources mentioned above, 



59 



namely, the Sea of Galilee itself, the River Jordan and the River 
Yarmuk (the principal tributary of the River Jordan). There are, 
however, several difficulties in the way of the utilization of the water 
from these sources. The first arises out of the concession granted to 
the Palestine Electric Corporation. This corporation has a hydro- 
electric power station at Jisr al Majami, at the confluence of the 
River Jordan and the River Yarmuk, about six miles below the 
southern end of the Sea of Galilee. This power station was erected 
with the approval of the Palestine Government, and under the terms 
of the concession nothing can be done in the way of drawing off 
water from the Sea of Galilee, the River Jordan, and the River 
Yarmuk, which will diminish the supply of water below the quantity 
required for the generation of electric energy at the station. The 
flow of water available is not in excess of that required for the 
working of the existing plant, and hence this power station 
effectively prevents the carrying out of any scheme for the irrigation 
of land in the Jordan Valley which involves the abstraction of 
water from the Sea of Galilee or from the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers 
north of Jisr al Majami. We have been informed that the capital 
expenditure incurred on the construction of this power station was 
approximately £1,000,000. This figure affords some indication of the 
basis on which the Palestine Electric Corporation may be expected 
to claim compensation if, in order to overcome the difficulty, it 
were proposed to deprive them of their water rights at this place. 
It would be necessary to treat the whole of any expenditure on 
this account as non-effective, for it would not be safe to assume 
that any part of it could be recovered in the charge to be made to 
users of the water. 

122. The second difficulty is to be found in the absence of any 
agreement with the Government of Syria in regard to the allocation 
of the annual flow of the Yarmuk River between Palestine and 
Trans- Jordan on the one hand and Syria on the other. So long 
as that question remains undecided it would not be wise to embark 
on any large irrigation scheme based upon the utilization of the water 
of the Yarmuk River. 

123. A third difficulty arises out of the probable effect of the 
abstraction of a large volume of water from the River Jordan on the 
level of the Dead Sea, and the effect of a fall in the level of that sea 
on the working of the Palestine Potash Company, which has been 
given a concession for the extraction of salts and minerals from the 
Dead Sea. The sea receives the drainage of the River Jordan and 
of areas which discharge their waters directly into the sea. The 
evaporation from the surface of the sea is high and a state of approxi- 
mate equilibrium now exists. If water is taken from the River 
Jordan for irrigation and the inflow into the sea is thereby decreased, 
the level of the sea will fall below its present level until a new equi- 
librium level has been reached. The data available are, however, 



60 



not sufficient to enable the new equilibrium level, consequent on the 
abstraction of a given quantity of water, to be determined, and it is 
therefore not possible at present to estimate the effect of a fall in 
level, caused by the abstraction of water for irrigation, on the working 
of the Palestine Potash Company. It is, however, probable that a 
substantial fall created artificially by the use of water for irrigation 
would lead to a claim by the company for the reimbursement of 
expenditure (capital and recurring) incurred on account of the 
additional pumping costs and, if the evaporation pans had to be 
removed, the cost of such removal. 

124. There is a fourth matter which requires consideration in 
connection with the utilization of the water of the River Jordan 
for the purpose of irrigation. The Place of Baptism, situated on 
the River Jordan not far from Jericho, is a place of particular sanctity 
to the Christian communities and one which in normal times is 
visited annually by a considerable number of pilgrims. The abstrac- 
tion of a large volume of water from the Jordan for irrigation would 
decrease the flow of water at the Place of Baptism, and although the 
Christian community would doubtless not object to the water of the 
Jordan being used for an object so beneficial to the country as irriga- 
tion, Christian sentiment is obviously a factor which must be taken 
into consideration in determining the amount of water which can be 
abstracted. Here again data are not at present available for 
estimating what would be the effect of the abstraction of a given 
quantity of water on the level and appearance of the river at the 
Place of Baptism. 

125. A preliminary investigation has been made into the practical 
possibility, apart from the difficulties dealt with in the preceding 
paragraph, of an irrigation canal on the east side of the Jordan Valley. 
Such a canal would take off from the Yarmuk River some distance 
above its junction with the River Jordan at Jisr al Majami, and it is 
estimated that, on the basis of the present available discharge from 
the Yarmuk River, it would be capable of irrigating an area of about 
117,000 dunums. The total irrigable area on the east side of the 
valley, exclusive of the area now irrigated seasonally by water from 
the perennial streams, is put at about 280,000 dunums. It is 
estimated that, if the water supply for the canal could be augmented 
by a feeder from Lake Tiberias, it would be possible to irrigate the 
whole of this area of 280,000 dunums and yet leave a sufficient 
quantity of water to meet the needs of a canal on the western side 
of the valley. A preliminary investigation has also been made into 
the possibility of a canal on that side. This canal would take 
off from the southern end of Lake Tiberias, and it is estimated 
that it would command, in the plain of Beisan and the valley 
north of that plain, an area of about 70,000 dunums of cultivable 
land not irrigable from existing sources. Part of this area, about 
one-third, would be in the Jewish State under plan A. 



61 



126. The engineering problems are likely to be of some magnitude, 
for the canals, particularly that on the eastern bank, would have to 
negotiate broken country and would have to traverse streams coming 
down from the neighbouring hills. Until detailed investigations 
have been carried out, it is impossible to form an estimate of the 
cost of construction, but it would certainly be a very large figure, 
and might easily amount to several million pounds. Further, the 
success of every irrigation project depends upon the price at which 
water can be supplied to the cultivator, and it will be impossible to 
say that canals along the Jordan Valley will be a success until the 
cost is known, and it has been determined that water can be supplied 
at a rate which will enable the land to be cultivated at a profit. 

127. As has been pointed out above, the power-station at Jisr al 
Majami effectively prevents the carrying out of projects for high-level 
canals taking off from Lake Tiberias and the River Yarmuk north of 
that place. The construction of low-level canals taking off from a 
point on the River Jordan south of Jisr al Majami is held to be 
impracticable for the following reasons — 

(a) On the western bank such a canal would have to run 
about 48 kilometres (30 miles) in the trough of the river, merely 
gaining height, before it would command a single dunum of 
land. Even beyond this point the area commanded would not 
be large. The best land lies along the foothills and for the most 
part this would be too high to be irrigated from the canal. The 
irrigable area would not exceed 30,000 to 40,000 dunums. An 
area of this extent, situated at the end of the alignment, would 
be far too small to justify the construction of a canal nearly 
100 kilometres (about 62 miles) in length across most difficult 
country. Moreover, the broken nature of the country, through 
which it would pass, would not only give rise to grave engineering 
difficulties, but would also make the canal very expensive to 
construct and maintain. 

(b) A low-level canal on the eastern bank would be subject in 
genera] to the same disadvantages as a similar canal on the 
western bank. As contours are not available, it is not possible 
to estimate the area which could be commanded, but it is 
unlikely that it would amount to more than a fraction of that 
commanded by a high-level canal, and to irrigate this relatively 
small area a canal running the whole length of the valley to 
the Dead Sea would be necessary. 

128. The length of time which would have to be devoted to the 
various negotiations described in the preceding paragraphs, the 
uncertainty regarding their final outcome, and the impossibility of 
estimating in advance the total cost, both effective and non-effective, 
of the various methods of construction, render any discussion of the 
subject at this stage a matter of mere speculation. Until the various 



62 



enquiries and negotiations have been completed, it is impossible to 
come to a final conclusion as regards the practicability of major 
canal irrigation schemes along the Valley of the Jordan, or to 
determine the area of irrigable land. But taking the most optimistic 
view, the area of land that could be irrigated in addition to that now 
irrigated would be approximately 350,000 dunums. At a rate of 
30 dunums per holding — this is also considered to be an optimistic 
estimate — and 4-75 persons per family, the agricultural population 
for which provision could be made in the Jordan Valley south of 
the Sea of Galilee would be — 

350,000 4 „ 

— - X 4-75 = 55,416 

say 55,500 persons. 

Part of the irrigable area, however, falls within the proposed 
Jewish State under plan A. In considering the possibility of 
providing land for the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State, this 
must be excluded. With this modification the figure of 55,500 
becomes 51,800, say 52,000. Again, part of the irrigable area is 
cultivated at present by rainfall only, and the population supported 
on this cultivated but unirrigated portion should be deducted from 
the above figure of 52,000. An accurate figure for this population is 
not available, but for present purposes it may be roughly put at 3,000. 
With this reduction the figure of 52,000 becomes 49,000. 

129. If major canal projects proved impracticable, the only alterna- 
tive would be to pump water from the River Jordan. The high lift, 
the long distances to which the water would have to be carried in 
pipes, and the difficult and broken country over which it would have 
to be carried are serious obstacles to any schemes for irrigation by 
pumping from the River Jordan ; and the only part of the valley in 
which such schemes would appear to offer any hope of success is an 
area of about 1 18,000 dunums on the eastern bank of the Jordan lying 
north and south of the main road from Jericho to Amman. And here 
again the effect of pumping on the level of the Dead Sea and the level 
and appearance of the River Jordan at the Place of Baptism would 
have to be considered. 

Adopting the same basis of calculation as under the canalisation 
scheme, the additional agricultural population for which provision 
could be made by the irrigation of these 1 18,000 dunums would be — 

i^-°X 4-75= 18,683 
say between 18,000 and 19,000 persons. 

130. There is one other matter to which reference should be made 
in connection with irrigation schemes in the Jordan Valley : it is 
one which is relevant to all irrigation and land development schemes 
whether in the Jordan Valley or elsewhere in Palestine. It is the 



63 



question of markets for the crops produced. If the rate charged 
for the water is sufficiently low to permit of holdings being devoted 
entirely to the cultivation of cereals, the question of markets is not 
of fundamental importance. But if the rate renders such a holding 
unprofitable and requires the adoption of mixed farming, including 
the growing of more expensive crops such as vegetables and fruit, 
markets are of vital importance. Water pumped from the River 
Jordan would, we are advised, be too expensive to permit of the 
land of a holding being devoted entirely to cereals ; mixed farming 
would have to be adopted. For water supplied by gravity from 
high level irrigation canals it is not possible to forecast the economic 
rate which would have to be charged, but here again it is probable 
that mixed farming would be essential. In fact, with a holding 
as small as 30 dunums mixed farming is the only method of culti- 
vation which assures a livelihood to the farmer. Markets, therefore, 
would be a matter of great importance to large irrigation projects 
in the Jordan Valley. 



The Southern Part of the Beisan Plain 

131. A contour survey and a trial water settlement are being 
carried out in the Beisan Plain. It is hoped that as a result of 
this survey and settlement, it will be possible to effect economies in 
the use of water and to make a moderate amount of surplus water 
available for further development. It is difficult to estimate the 
additional agricultural population which the plain could then 
support ; but it is not likely to exceed about 4,000 persons, 



Trans- Jordan 

132. The land of Trans- Jordan falls into two zones, the cultivated 
or rain-fed zone and the uncultivated or dry zone. The cultivated 
zone is that in which the rainfall, in a normal year, is sufficient for 
the raising of cereal crops. These two zones are shown on map 6. 
The heaviest rainfall is experienced on the top of the Jordan escarp- 
ment, and the cultivated zone stretches eastward from this 
escarpment. The rainfall decreases rapidly towards the east, and 
the width of the cultivated zone in its widest part, that is in the north, 
is not more than 30 miles. This width decreases rapidly towards 
the south, and the zone ultimately tails out a short distance south of 
Ma'an into the southern desert. The area of this cultivated zone is 
about 7,700,000 dunums and that of the uncultivated zone about 
82,300,000 dunums. 

133. The fiscal survey of Trans- Jordan, which was completed 
about six years ago, was extended sufficiently far, both to the east 
and the west, to include land in the eastern desert and on the slopes 

(C31078) d 



64 



of the Jordan Valley which, though usually uncultivated, may be 
cultivated in years of exceptionally good rainfall. The total area 
covered by the fiscal survey was 10,000,000 dunums, and the 
cultivated zone of 7,700,000 dunums falls within this larger area 
covered by the fiscal survey. The area to which the fiscal survey 
extended falls into the following classes — 

(i) the cultivated zone 

(a) irrigated 260,000 dunums 

(b) vineyards 80,000 

(c) rain-fed cereals . . . . 4,150,000 

(d) uncultivable land including 

forests 2,800,000 

(*) the Shera 440,000 



Total .. .. 7,730,000 



(ii) land bordering the eastern desert 
and land of the Jordan Valley 
slopes 2,270,000 



Total .. .. 10,000,000 



134. Within the cultivated zone there is an area of 400,000 
dunums which is in a class by itself. This area is situated at an 
average altitude of 900 metres (nearly 3,000 feet) and possesses a 
rainfall adequate to ensure a good crop. The remainder of the rain- 
fed cereal area is not so favourably situated as regards rainfall and 
moisture. For instance, the crops in the Husn-Remtha Plain, east 
of Irbid, and the Madaba Plain, south of Amman, where the soil is 
very fertile, frequently suffer from inadequate rain and high 
temperatures, and in some years these adverse factors have a disas- 
trous effect on the crops. The Shera lies at the southern end of the 
cultivated zone and is used by the Howeitat tribe as their summer 
grazing ground. The land of the Shera rises from about 3,000 feet 
near Ma 'an to nearly 5,000 feet in the west and south, and it is only 
in the higher ground that the rainfall is at times enough for the 
cultivation of cereal crops. 

The land bordering the desert and along the Jordan Valley 
slopes only gives a crop in a year of exceptionally ample and reason- 
ably well distributed rainfall, and the percentage of crop failures is 
exceedingly high. 



65 



135. Land settlement statistics are available for an area of 
1,123,000 dunums comprising 80 villages. The whole of this area 
lies in the northern portion of the cultivated zone and it falls into 
three clearly distinguishable sub-areas — 





Total 
area. 


Cultivated area. 


Average area 
per landowner. 


Vines. 


Cereals. 


Vines. 


Cereals. 


Sub-Area A 


377,000 


39,000 


223,000 


5 


26 


B 


382,000 




261,000 




62 


c .. 


364,000 




314,000 




117 



Sub-area A is situated in the special area of 400,000 dunums 
referred to in paragraph 134 ; this sub-area has an adequate rainfall. 
The average landowner's holding is small, being only 31 dunums, of 
which 5 dunums are under vines ; 5 dunums of vines may be con- 
sidered as equivalent to 10 dunums of cereals and hence expressed in 
cereals the average holding is 36 dunums. 

In sub-area B the rainfall is less reliable, and the average holding 
(62 dunums) is larger than in sub-area A. 

In sub-area C the rainfall is much more precarious — the Husn- 
Remtha Plain referred to in the previous paragraph falls within this 
sub-area — and the average holding is again larger, being 117 dunums. 

The average holdings in the three sub-areas are not large ; if 
anything they appear to be on the small side and are certainly no 
more than reasonable subsistence areas. They do not point to the 
land being able to carry a much larger population ; on the contrary, 
they appear to indicate that there is a certain amount of land-hunger. 

136. Other facts also point to the existence of land hunger in these 
sub-areas. During the winter of the year 1937-38 applications were 
submitted by about 800 families living in 15 villages of the Irbid 
district — Irbid lies in the northern portion of the cultivated 
zone— for the settlement of land about 50 kilometres distant in the 
State Domain area bordering on the eastern desert. The authorities 
in Trans- Jordan are of opinion that the majority of the applications 
were genuine and that they are indicative of a desire to obtain 
additional land, so that in years of exceptional rainfall the applicants 
may be in a position to recoup themselves for losses incurred in 
years of poor harvests. 



(C31078) 



66 



137. The following wells have been sunk in the Trans- Jordan 
plateau ; they are shown on map 6 — 





Depth 


Depth to 






- Drilled 


Water 


Remarks. 




in Metres, in Metres. 


1. Irbid .. 


175 


— 


No water found. 


2. Remtha 


182 


— 


Ditto. 


3. Um Kundur . . 


60 


— 


Ditto. Abandoned owing 








to difficulties in boring. 


4. Zubayer Adwan 


175 


168 


Small yield, less than 2 cubic 








metres per hour. 


5. Teneib 


162 


152 


Ditto. 


6. Qatrane 


136 


114 


Small yield ; 1\ cubic metres 








per hour. 


7. Black Rock . . 


67 


— 


No water found ; drilling 








abandoned owing to boring 








difficulties. 


8. Ma'an >. . 


180 


12 


Drilled to a depth of 180 








metres ; drilling will be 








continued somewhat 








further ; the prospects of 








a useful yield of water are 








very small. 


9. Mafraq 


242 


195 


Drilled by the 'Iraq Petro- 








leum Co. ; tested at 64 



cubic metres per day. 

The results have been uniformly disappointing and there appears to be 
little likelihood of an extension of cultivation by irrigation. And in 
this connection it should again be remembered that it is not economic 
to grow ordinary cereal crops on land irrigated by water which has 
to be pumped : special crops must be grown on such land, such as 
vegetables and fruit, and special crops require an assured market. 

Funds have been provided for the sinking of some bores in 
the Shera country where there are prospects of finding water. These 
bores have not been sunk as yet because it was thought advisable to 
take up the Shera tests after work had been completed in the Jordan 
Valley. But it is unlikely, even if water should be found at 
reasonable depths, that this area will be capable of agricultural 
development. The topography of the country does not lend itself 
to irrigation from wells, and, although it may be possible to cultivate 
part of it, the main benefit accruing from the discovery of additional 
water sources will be an increase in the number of animals which can 
be supported on the grazing grounds. 

138. In our opinion, Trans- Jordan offers small scope for intensive 
settlement on the land. We do not suggest that it cannot carry a 
larger agricultural population than it does, but we are convinced 
that the additional agricultural population which the land can 
support is small. 



67 



139. Apart from the prospects of irrigation schemes in Beersheba 
and the Jordan valley, and of development in Trans- Jordan, there 
is also the possibility of settlement in other parts of Palestine to be 
considered, namely the hill country and the Gaza sub-district, 
that is, the maritime plain south of the proposed Jewish State. 



The Hill Country 

140. The Royal Commission, in summarising under six heads the 
general conclusions enunciated by their various predecessors as a 
result of their examination of the possibilities of further settlement 
on the land in Palestine (chapter IX, paragraph 10), stated the 
sixth of these conclusions as follows — 

(6) There is already congestion on the land in the hill districts. 

141. The Royal Commission's own conclusion, after seeing two 
of the most successful examples of Jewish settlement in the hill 
country, and hearing the evidence of the Jewish Agency, is set out 
in paragraph 153 of the same chapter as follows — 

Having regard to all the foregoing considerations and to the necessity 
of providing land for cultivators who may be dispossessed in order to meet 
the requirements of any adequate policy of afforestation, a subject with 
which we deal in a later Section, we are satisfied that there can be no 
expectation of finding accommodation for any large increase in the rural 
Arab population in the hills. We therefore have no hesitation in saying 
that at present, and indeed for many years to come, the Mandatory 
Power should not attempt to facilitate the close settlement of Jews in 
the hilly districts generally, though in the immediate neighbourhood of 
Jerusalem dairy and fruit farms might eventually prove self-supporting. 

142. Our own enquiries lead to the same general conclusion, 
that is to say, we are satisfied that, with the existing standard of 
cultivation and capital resources of the fellaheen, the land in the 
hill districts of Palestine is already congested. As an example, we 
give below the results of an investigation made, at our request, 
by the Director of Agriculture and Fisheries into the possibilities 
of closer settlement in the Hebron sub-district. 

143. For the purpose of this investigation the Director adopted 
the following areas as representing what in his view might be regarded 
as a reasonable lot viable appropriate to each category of land as 
given in the Rural Property Tax Ordinance — 

„ , ^ .... Lot Viable. 

Category. Description. Dunums 

1 Citrus 10 

3 Bananas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

5 1st grade irrigated land and 1st grade fruit plantation 50 

6 2nd grade irrigated land and 2nd grade fruit planta- 57 

tion. 

7 3rd grade irrigated land and 3rd grade fruit plantation 67 

8 1st grade ground crop land, 4th grade irrigated land 80 

and 4th grade fruit plantation. 
(C31078) d3 



68 



„ . j, .... Lot Viable. 
Category. Description. Dunums. 


9 


2nd grade ground crop land, 5th grade irrigated land 
and 5th grade fruit plantation. 


100 


10 


3rd grade ground crop land, 6th grade irrigated land 
and 6th grade fruit plantation. 


111 


11 


4th grade ground crop land, 7th grade irrigated land 
and 7th grade fruit plantation. 


133 


12 

9 


5th grade ground crop land, 8th grade irrigated land 
and 8th grade fruit plantation. 


167 


13 


6th grade ground crop land, 9th grade irrigated land 
and 9th grade fruit plantation. 


250 


14 


7th grade ground crop land (untaxable), 10th grade 
irrigated land. 


400 


15 


8th grade ground crop land (untaxable) 


400 


16 


Forest, planted and indigenous and uncultivable land 


400 



We are aware that Jewish authorities claim that in well-watered 
hill country, such as Galilee, 40 dunums will constitute a lot viable for 
a fruit plantation. But Dr. Ruppin informed the Royal Commission 
that for the hill districts he had as yet no data, and we believe that 
no experience has yet been gained of a fruit-farm of this size being 
operated successfully under such conditions. The more cautious 
estimate of the Director of Agriculture for an average fruit-farm in 
Galilee is, as stated in Appendix 7, 60 dunums, and this estimate 
conforms with the figures for a lot viable adopted by him for the 
survey of the Hebron sub-district as given above. We think that 
an estimate of 40 dunums must be regarded as based on assump- 
tions as to future methods of cultivation and marketing which 
at present are largely speculative, and we prefer to follow the 
Royal Commission who, in a slightly different context, considered 
(chapter IX, paragraph 53) — 

that, until the contrary is proved by experience and 
practical experiment, the Administration will be wise in 
adhering to their own definition. . . . 

W|ppropose, therefore, to adopt this method of reckoning in 
dealing with questions relating to the present standard of cultivation, 
without prejudice to the question what is the appropriate lot viable 
for land subjected to a higher degree of cultivation. 

-H4. For the purpose of this investigation the Director divided 
the sub-district into two portions which are considered separately. 

145. A. — The portion of the sub-district north of a line drawn from 
Ein Jidi along the northern boundaries of the villages of Yatta, Dura, 
Ad Daweima and Al Qubeiba to the boundary of the Beersheba sub- 
district. — This portion comprises a total area of 796,000 dunums, of 
which 441,500 dunums, or say 55 per cent., are uncultivable. The 



69 



total population is 52,200, of which 21,400 persons, or 41 per cent., 
live in the town of Hebron and its suburbs. The number of persons 
directly supported by agriculture is not known exactly, but is 
estimated at about 38,000. 

Applying the formula referred to above, the Director has advised 
us that the number of families who could be supported by this 
area without congestion is about 3,300, and the number of persons, 
assuming an average of five persons per family, is 16,500, that is, 
less than half of the number which is actually supported by agriculture 
on this area to-day. There is no reason to suppose that the classi- 
fication of land in the area, which has only recently been reviewed 
and brought up to date, is incorrect, or that the standard of cultiva- 
tion is in fact much higher than that which has been assumed for 
the purpose of the classification. The only reasonable conclusion 
is, therefore, that in this area there is already serious congestion on 
the land. 

This is not to say that there is no room for extending the 
cultivable area in this district by clearing and terracing, or that no 
provision could be made for closer settlement by the cultivation of 
crops which lend themselves to the more intensive utilization of the 
land, or by means of mixed farming. In the opinion of the Director, 
development in any of these ways might be possible, provided that 
adequate capital were made available, that satisfactory arrangements 
could be made for the marketing of the new crops, and that, for 
mixed farming, water could be provided for irrigation on economic 
terms. At the best, however, changes of this kind must be gradual 
and spread over a considerable time ; and even if they could be 
introduced successfully, it is extremely unlikely that they would do 
more than provide a reasonable level of subsistence for the existing 
Arab population. 

146. B. — The -portion of Hebron sub-district south of the line 
referred to in A. — This portion comprises an area of 1,262,500 dunums 
and carries a population of 24,000, of which 18,800 live in the four 
towns or large villages of Dura, Yatta, Adh Dhahariya and Ad 
Daweima. It is estimated that the population directly supported by 
agriculture in the area is between 17,500 and 20,000, the higher figure 
being more probably the correct one. 

Of the total area, 964,800 dunums, or 76 per cent., is classified 
as uncultivable, and the land generally is, both actually and 
potentially, much poorer than the northern portion under A. 

The theoretical lot viable for the various categories shows that 
the land should be able to support 3,647 families or 18,235 persons, 
of whom two-thirds would be dependent on holdings in the area 
classified as uncultivable. As pointed out above, it is probable that 
the existing population is already in excess of this number. 

(C31078) d 4 



70 



While something could be done to improve the land by terracing 
and similar methods, if sufficient capital were made available, the 
prospects of closer settlement depend mainly on the discovery of 
water in the area in large quantities. This, we are advised, is un- 
likely ; and, that being so, we cannot regard this area as holding 
out any considerable opportunity for additional settlement. 

147. We have not obtained similar information with regard to 
the hill country of Samaria and the rest of Judaea outside the 
Jerusalem Enclave ; but we have no reason to suppose that the 
conditions there are so different from those in the Hebron sub- 
district that we should be led to modify the conclusion reached 
by the Royal Commission with regard to the hill country of Palestine 
in general. 

148. As regards the hill country in the Jerusalem Enclave, we 
have already quoted the Royal Commission's observation that 
" in the immediate neighbourhood of Jerusalem (Jewish) dairy and 
fruit farms might eventually prove self-supporting." We have 
examined the prospects of such farms, and are satisfied that 
the prospects of additional settlement in the neighbourhood of 
Jcxusalem of persons dependent on this form of holding are incon- 
siderable. For the rest, our observations in the preceding paragraph 
apply to the hill country in the Jerusalem Enclave as well as to 
the rest of Judaea. 

Gaza Sub-District 

149. The total area of this sub-district, which stretches along 
the Mediterranean coast from the Ramleh sub-district in the north 
to the Sinai border in the south-west, and extends on the east to 
the boiders of the Hebron and Beersheba sub-districts, is 1,110,697 
dunums. The total population, including 858 Jews, is 100,250, of 
whom 39,500, or 39 per cent., live in the three towns of Gaza, Khan 
Yunis and Al Majdal and their suburbs. The agricultural population, 
of which a large part reside in the urban areas, was given in the 1931 
census as 67,200 ; but it has probably increased since, and may 
perhaps be put at about 72,000. 

The theoretical lot viable for the various categories of land under 
the Rural Property Tax Ordinance shows that the land should be 
able to support 9,173 families or 45,865 persons in all, compared 
with an actual population to-day of between 67,200 and 72,000, as 
estimated above. 

150. Of the total area of the sub-district, only 217,700 dunums, 
or barely 20 per cent., are classified as uncultivable, and most of the 
cultivable lands are of considerable value for agricultural purposes. 
By far the greater part, however, say 77 per cent., is farmed by 
primitive extensive methods with cereals ; and with such methods 
the agricultural population is already in excess of what the land can 



71 



support on a reasonable basis of subsistence. If closer settlement is 
to be carried out, irrigation is necessary. Irrigation in this sub- 
district is, of course, entirely dependent on underground water. 
There is evidence that, in a belt stretching parallel to the coast and 
having a width varying from about fifteen kilometres in the north to 
ten in the south near Gaza, there is generally a good supply of under- 
ground water. In regions east of this belt, the prospects of finding 
an adequate underground water supply are much less certain. 
While some bores in this area proved unsuccessful, others tapped 
good underground supplies. There are also certain areas, especially 
south of Gaza, where the salinity of the water is comparatively high 
and is therefore not suitable for certain crops, such as citrus. If, 
however, water of the right quality can be obtained over a sufficiently 
large area, it is believed that it would be possible to change a con- 
siderable proportion of this land from unirrigated extensive cereal 
farms to irrigated intensive plantations, or intensive mixed farming, 
for which the lot viable may be as small as ten to thirty dunums, as 
the case may be. 

151. Even, however, if water should be made available in sufficient 
quantities, the process of change in land utilization would at best be 
a slow one, and great caution would have to be exercised if the farmer 
is to be given a fair chance of success under the new conditions. In 
particular, before it is decided to grow deciduous fruits on a large 
scale, more experience is needed of their cultivation in Palestine, of 
the possibility of controlling certain serious insect pests, and of the 
availability of markets. As regards mixed farming, much valuable 
experience has been gained already by the operation of the Experi- 
mental "Organic Mixed Farm" attached to the Agricultural 
Research Institute of the Jewish Agency at Rehovot. But the 
question of markets still remains to be dealt with, and until this is 
solved we cannot assume with confidence that any large increase in 
the area under intensive cultivation in this sub-district will be 
possible. 

152. The conclusions reached in this chapter may be summarized 
as follows— 

(i) There is practically no scope for the exchange of land 
and population between the Arab and Jewish States or between 
the Jerusalem Enclave and the Jewish State (paragraph 106). 

(ii) The results of the well-boring experiments in Beersheba 
have been most disappointing. In the greater part of this 
area there appears to be little hope of any improvement in 
agriculture by means of irrigation from wells. This does not 
entirely exclude all prospect of closer settlement, but until 
further investigation into the possibilities of dry farming has 
been carried out it would be premature to assume that there 
is scope for settlement on any considerable scale in the near 
future (paragraphs 112 and 114). 



72 



(iii) In the Jordan Valley no substantial increase in the 
irrigated area can be expected either from wells or from the 
better utilization of the water of the perennial streams. If 
large areas are to be brought under irrigation, water must be 
obtained from Lake Tiberias, the River Jordan and the Yarmuk 
River. The problems to be solved before the construction 
of major canal irrigation schemes can be undertaken are 
difficult and complex, and their solution will involve lengthy 
investigations and negotiations. Even, however, if (a) these 
problems can be solved, (b) irrigation canals should be proved 
to be practicable, and (c) means can be found to finance the 
cost, which might amount to several million pounds, the 
additional agricultural population for which provision could be 
made, would not, on the most optimistic view, exceed about 
50,000 persons. If major irrigation canals should not prove 
feasible, the alternative would be to irrigate a much smaller 
area by pumping from the River Jordan. Again, taking an 
optimistic view, the additional agricultural population for 
which provision could be made by such a scheme would be 
between 18,000 and 19,000 persons (paragraphs 115-129). 

(iv) A moderate amount of surplus water can be made 
available for development in the southern part of the Beisan 
Plain. It is difficult to estimate the agricultural population 
which the plain could then support, but it is not likely to exceed 
4,000 persons (paragraph 131). 

(v) The question of markets for the sale of the agricultural 
produce is one of great importance to all large irrigation and 
land development projects, whether in the Jordan Valley or 
elsewhere in Palestine. Markets must be reasonably assured 
for the additional agricultural produce before schemes for 
bringing large additional areas of land under cultivation can 
be said to be practicable (paragraph 130). 

(vi) Trans- Jordan offers small scope for intensive settlement 
on the land (paragraph 138). 

(vii) The hill country in the Arab State cannot be regarded 
as holding out any considerable opportunities for additional 
settlement (paragraphs 147-148). 

(viii) In the Gaza sub-district intensive cultivation could 
be increased over a considerable area, provided water of the 
right quality and in sufficient quantity were obtained. The 
change from extensive to intensive cultivation would, however, 
at the best be a slow one, and great caution would have to be 
exercised if the farmer is to be given a fair chance under new 
conditions (paragraphs 149-151). 



73 



CHAPTER IX 

THE JEWISH CLAIM IN REGARD TO JERUSALEM 

153. The Royal Commission's proposals relating to Jerusalem 
have been severely criticized by Jews of all parties on the ground 
that they involve the permanent separation of Jerusalem from the 
Jewish State, and very strong representations have been made for 
the inclusion of part, at least, of the city within that state. The 
grounds on which this claim is based are set forth in the following 
extract from a memorandum we received from a Jewish source — 

There can be no question as to the necessity for entrusting the Holy 
Places of Jerusalem to the custody of the Mandatory Power as an inter- 
national trustee. Those Holy Places, however, are concentrated within 
the Old City and the need of a special regime for that part of the town 
cannot justify the exclusion of the whole of Jerusalem from the Jewish 
State. It has been truly said that Jewish Palestine without Jerusalem 
would be a body without a soul. Jerusalem has throughout the ages 
been the spiritual centre of the Jews, dispersed as they were over 
the face of the earth. ... It is a symbol of Jewish national 
life and practically synonymous in the minds of Jews with Palestine. 
Throughout the ages, Jews have persisted, in spite of all obstacles, in 
attempting to re-establish themselves in Jerusalem. In this latest phase 
of the Return to Zion, Jews have built the greater part of the new 
Jerusalem outside the city walls. This area outside the walls has a 
Jewish population of over 70,000, forming an almost compact unit : it 
includes the central Jewish National and religious institutions — the 
Jewish Agency and Zionist Organisation, the General Council of Palestine 
Jews, the Chief Rabbinate, the Hebrew University and the National 
Library and various foundations established by Jewish communities 
throughout the world. The separation of this Jerusalem from the 
Jewish State is an injustice to both. Apart from the special significance 
of Jerusalem, spiritual and political, the loss thereby entailed to the 
Jewish State in terms of population, economic position and taxable 
capacity would be irreparable. 

154. The city of Jerusalem within the present municipal 
boundaries falls into three sections— 

(a) the Old City, 

(b) the predominantly Jewish area, and 

(c) the area inhabited chiefly by Moslems and Christians. 

155. The Old City is situated within the city walls. In a.d. 135 
Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans and its site ploughed up. 
Only a few vestiges of ancient Jewish buildings remain : the walled 
City as it now stands is the work of the Roman Empire, the Crusaders, 
and the Moslems. 

156. The predominantly Jewish area, commonly referred to as 
the new Jewish Jerusalem, lies north-west of the Old City and on 
both sides of the main road leading to the Maritime Plain. The 
population of this new Jewish Jerusalem is about 72,000 persons, 
of whom 69,000 are Jews. 



74 



157. The area inhabited chiefly by Moslems and Christians lies 
north and south of the Old City and also forms a belt between the 
new Jewish Jerusalem and the Old City. The combined population of 
this area and the Old City is about 53,000 persons, of whom 24,500 
are Moslems, 21,500 Christians, and 7,000 Jews. Of the Christians, 
6,000 are neither Arabs nor belong to kindred races. 

158. Outside the municipal limits the more important Jewish 
suburbs are — 

(d) the area which lies west of the new Jewish Jerusalem and 
along the road from the city to Ein Karim ; 

(b) the Hebrew University area on the east of the city ; 

(c) the suburbs of Meqor Haiyim and Ramat Rahel to the 
south of the city. 

The Jewish population in these suburbs is about 3,000 persons. 

159. On the part of the Jews it has been suggested that the new 
Jewish Jerusalem, together with the western suburbs and an 
extension curving round the Hebrew University, should be included 
in the Jewish State. This area is shown on map 11. The population 
within this area is approximately 74,500 persons of whom 71,000 
are Jews. It has been further proposed that the Jewish area at 
Jerusalem should be connected with the Jewish State in the Maritime 
Plain south of Jaffa by a corridor. This corridor is shown on map 7. 
The population of the corridor is predominantly Arab with a very 
small number of Jews. 

160. The area proposed to be included in the Jewish State lies 
close to the Old City on the north and west and (though this is not 
brought out in map 1 1) is situated on rather higher ground than the 
Old City itself. It also borders on the Moslem cemetery at Mamilla, 
and includes within its boundaries a certain number of Christian 
churches, hospitals and schools, a monastery, an orphanage, and the 
British War Cemetery. Finally, it includes a part of the main road 
from Jerusalem to the Maritime Plain, and a further section of this 
road, nearly as far as Latrun, lies in the proposed Jewish corridor. 

161. It is clear that the partition of the city of Jerusalem, 
involving, as it does, the setting up of an inter-state boundary 
through the centre of the city, would give rise to administrative 
problems of great complexity. In the succeeding paragraphs we 
examine these problems at some length, and reach the conclusion 
that, although the difficulties are formidable, they are not altogether 
insuperable, and might not in themselves be a bar to the inclusion of 
a part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State, provided that reliance could 
be placed on the mutual goodwill and co-operation of the two 
adjoining communities. Unfortunately, past experience does not 
justify us in taking a hopeful view on this point ; and in reaching 
our final conclusion, therefore, we shall be unable to assume that 
these difficulties will be solved. But we have not been tempted to 



75 



attach undue weight to this argument, since, as will appear, we are 
forced to regard the political and religious objections to the Jewish 
claim as in themselves insuperable. 

162. Turning to the administrative problems, we deal first with 
that arising out of the maintenance of law and order. An inter-state 
boundary which cuts through the centre of a city must inevitably 
create difficulties in regard to police administration. In this 
connection, it has been suggested that if provision were made by 
which a member of the police force of either Administration was 
entitled, when " in hot pursuit " of an offender, to chase and arrest 
the fugitive on the territory of the other, and if extradition proceedings 
were made as simple as possible, the problems arising out of police 
administration would be satisfactorily solved. We agree with this 
suggestion so far as it goes, but the problem of the maintenance 
of law and order on a boundary running through Jerusalem could 
not be solved completely by arrangements relating to the hot pursuit 
of offenders and by the simplification of extradition proceedings. To 
our mind, the chief problem would be the prevention of breaches 
of the peace along the boundary between a population which, on 
one side, would be composed almost entirely of Jews, and on the 
other, very largely of Arabs. As we shall point out later in this 
chapter, the inclusion of part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State would 
be deeply resented by the Moslems. In such circumstances the 
maintenance of peace along a boundary running through the city 
and suburbs — along streets and across properties in private owner- 
ship — would be a most difficult task. Indeed the problem created 
by the setting up of such a boundary would be practically the same 
as that created by the contiguity of Jaffa and Tel Aviv {vide 
chapter V) and we are of opinion that it would have to be solved in 
the same manner, that is, by the construction along the boundary 
of a road with a railing down the middle. The construction of such 
a road through the centre of the city of Jerusalem would present 
much greater difficulties and would be a more disturbing and 
expensive operation than that proposed for Jaffa — Tel Aviv. 

163. In paragraph 295 of chapter XIV we recommend that, in 
order to interfere as little as possible with the freedom of movement 
between the Jewish and Arab States on the one hand and the 
Mandated Territories on the other, persons residing in those states 
should be free, subject only to the requirements of law and order, 
to enter the Mandated Territories for short or casual visits but should 
not be allowed to reside habitually therein without the permission 
of the Government. Under such a system a boundary running 
through the centre of the city would not, from the point of view of 
immigration, cause any administrative difficulty to the Mandatory. 
It is doubtful, however, whether the Jewish State would find it 
possible to adopt a regime as liberal as we propose, for presumably 
it would desire to exercise control over persons entering the Jewish 



76 



area in search of employment even of a casual nature. If such should 
be the case, a boundary running through the city along streets and 
across properties in private ownership would inevitably give rise 
to administrative difficulties, for it would be a boundary the crossing 
of which the Jewish State would find it extremely difficult to control. 

164. Again a customs cordon would be impossible on a boundary 
running through the centre of Jerusalem. It has been suggested that 
this difficulty would be overcome if the whole of Jerusalem, that is 
both the portion in the Jewish State and that in the Mandated area, 
were treated as a single unit for customs purposes. This would 
necessitate agreement between the two Administrations that the 
customs duties in this portion of the Jewish State should be the same 
as those in the whole Mandated territory. But there would still 
remain the question of determining the allocation between the 
respective Administrations of the customs duties collected on the 
boundaries. But none of these particular difficulties would arise if 
our proposals in chapter XXII with regard to customs should 
be adopted. 

165. Another set of administrative problems arises out of the 
fact that the water supply and drainage schemes have been designed 
and constructed as a single unit. The source of the water supply 
for Jerusalem is situated at Ras-el-Ain in the Maritime Plain, 
about 60 kilometres (38 miles) from Jerusalem, whence water is 
pumped to an overhead reservoir at Romema, about 800 metres 
(2,500 ft.) above sea-level, within the proposed Jewish area. From 
this overhead reservoir it is distributed by gravitation to the 
consumer. The works at Ras-el-Ain, the pumping stations and the 
pipe-line between Ras-el-Ain and Romema, and the overhead 
reservoir belong to the Palestine Administration, which is responsible 
for the supply of water to the reservoir at Romema. The distribution 
system, on the other hand, belongs to the municipality, and the 
latter body is responsible for the distribution of the water to the 
consumer. The financial arrangements are that the Government 
charge the municipality for water supplied at Romema, and the 
municipality charges the consumer for the water he uses. It is 
important to note that the pipes by which the water passes from 
Romema to the proposed Mandated area pass, and indeed must pass, 
through the proposed Jewish area. As regards the drainage system, 
the position, generally speaking, is that the drainage from that 
portion of the present municipal area which it is proposed should be 
included in the Jewish State, discharges through the drains in the 
Mandated area and the outfall is situated in this area. We do not 
suggest that the existence of these joint systems would create any 
insuperable administrative difficulty. Given goodwill and a desire for 
co-operation, agreements could be entered into for the working and 
maintenance of the joint systems. But, unfortunately, goodwill 
and co-operation cannot be assured, and the existence of these joint 



77 



systems would provide a fruitful ground for misunderstanding and 
friction between the Jewish municipality on the one hand and the 
predominantly Arab municipality on the other. 

166. We now turn to the political and religious objections to the 
proposal. As we have already said, the administrative difficulties, 
although weighty and serious, are, given goodwill, not insuperable, 
and in themselves might not be a bar to the inclusion of part of 
Jerusalem in the Jewish State. The political and religious objections 
are, however, of a much more serious character and are, in our view, 
fatal to the proposal that any part of Jerusalem should be included 
in the Jewish State. 

167. Jerusalem is sacred not only to the Jews but also to the 
Moslems and the Christians. Within the Old City is situated the 
Haram-esh-Sherif, an Islamic place of great sanctity and one which 
is reckoned next to the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina as an 
object of veneration to Moslems. Within the area of the Haram- 
esh-Sherif are the Dome of the Rock and the Mosque of Aqsa. The 
former is said to be the spot from which the Prophet Mahommed 
ascended to Heaven. Within the same area is also situated the place 
where, according to tradition, Mahommed's horse, Baruk, was stabled 
when the Prophet made his celestial journey from the Rock. The 
Haram area and the buildings on it have been in Moslem ownership 
for many centuries and are regarded as among the most treasured 
possessions of the Moslem world. 

168. Although on this point we have not had the opportunity of 
hearing the views of representative Moslems, we have been assured 
by persons well qualified to express an opinion that Moslems through- 
out the world would be most vehemently opposed to the inclusion of 
any part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State, that they would regard 
the establishment of a Jewish State overlooking the Moslem Holy 
Places as the first step towards the ultimate absorption of the Old 
City by the Jews, and that a decision to include part of Jerusalem 
with the Jewish State would inevitably lead to disorders of the most 
serious kind. 

169. We are aware that the Zionist organizations have, on several 
occasions, denied that it is the intention of the Jewish people to 
menace the inviolability of the Moslem Holy Places, and leading 
Jewish representatives assured us that there could be no question 
that it was necessary to entrust the Holy Places of Jerusalem 
to the custody of the Mandatory Power as an international trustee. 
But this does not prove that the view expressed in the preceding 
paragraph as regards the Arab attitude towards the proposal to include 
part of Jerusalem in the Jewish State is incorrect. In spite of all the 
denials issued by the Jews, the Arabs still believe that the Jews 
have designs on the Old City, and the Jewish claim for the inclusion 
of the new Jewish Jerusalem in the proposed Jewish State tends to 



78 



confirm them in that belief. Indeed, one leading representative of 
Orthodox Jewry informed us that in his view the Old City, with the 
exception of the Haram-esh-Sherif, should forthwith be included in 
the Jewish State, while another made the proposal that the Old City 
with the exception of the Christian and Moslem sacred places should 
form part of the Jewish State. And in this connection it should 
be remembered that the Wailing Wall, the last remaining vestige 
of the ancient Jewish Temple, forms part of the western boundary 
of the Haram-esh-Sherif, and that Jewry believes that, when the 
true Messiah comes, a Jewish Temple will once again be built on 
the ancient site. 

170. We ourselves are convinced that Moslems would resent 
most deeply the setting up of a Jewish State in close proximity to 
the Old City, and that they would regard such a State as the spear- 
head of a Jewish attack on the Old City itself. The consequences 
would be most serious. Feelings between Arabs and Jews would be 
still further inflamed and the maintenance of order between Arab and 
Jew in, and in the neighbourhood of, Jerusalem would become one 
of the most difficult of tasks. The presence of a Jewish area under 
Jewish rule in close proximity to the Old City would constitute a 
continuing incitement to breaches of the peace. 

171. To anyone who is disposed to think that this conclusion is 
based on exaggerated fears, we recommend a careful study of the 
detailed narrative of the events leading up to the outbreak in 
Jerusalem on the 23rd August, 1928, as given in chapter III of the 
Report of the Shaw Commission (Cmd. 3530), together with the 
following comment by that body, quoted from chapter IV, page 73 
of their Report — 

On the other hand, the Mufti or any educated Moslem might — 
genuinely and not without reason — have feared that, if at some future 
time the Jews became politically dominant in Palestine, they would not 
be content to leave the old Temple Area in Moslem ownership. No 
declaration by the Zionist Organization could remove such a fear ; the 
declared Zionist policy of non-interference with the Moslem Holy Places 
by no means commands, even to-day, the support of all Jews, many of 
whom as individuals desire to see the Temple of Jehovah rebuilt on its 
old site. Chief Rabbi Kook in his evidence before us expressed such a 
desire, but said that the event would not take place until the coming of 
the Messiah. Nor could the fear, if such be felt, be removed by the 
argument that Great Britain, as the greatest Moslem power in the world, 
would never permit interference with the Moslem Holy Places ; the Arabs 
might well contend that the position of Great Britain in Palestine is by 
no means necessarily more permanent than has been the rule of other 
great Empires over Jerusalem in the past. 

i 

This comment, though related to the possibility of Jewish 
political dominance as a result of the continuation of the Mandate, 
is still, in our opinion, applicable to the situation which would arise 
if, as a result of partition, a Jewish State were to be set up in such 
close proximity to the Old City. 



79 



172. But it is not only Moslem opinion which is to be considered 
in this matter. Jerusalem is also sacred to the Christian faith, and 
not only the Old City, within which stands the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre itself and the Way of the Cross, but also many places in 
the surrounding area, such as the Mount of Olives and the Sanctuary 
of the Ascension, the Garden of Gethsemane, Bethlehem and the 
Church of. the Nativity, the village of Bethany, the road to Emmaus, 
all places hallowed to the Christian by the most precious associations. 
It may be that many Christians, especially in this country, sym- 
pathize with the passionate longing of the Jews for Jerusalem and 
would be willing to see at least that part of the city which includes the 
modern suburb and the Hebrew University incorporated in the 
Jewish State, if that could be done by agreement and with goodwill. 
But we are convinced that the dominant desire of the whole body of 
Christians would be to preserve the peace of Jerusalem and to safe- 
guard the Holy City from any change which threatened to provoke 
hatred and bloodshed within its walls or in their neighbourhood. 
With this in mind, we believe that Christian opinion throughout the 
world, realising that such a step would provoke resentment and 
disorder, would be deeply grieved by a proposal to entrust a part 
of the city precincts to the control of the Jewish community. 

173. There is one other matter to which reference should be made. 
In a previous paragraph we have pointed out that the main road from 
Jerusalem to the Maritime Plain passes through the proposed 
Jewish area in Jerusalem and that a further portion of this road is 
situated in the proposed Jewish Corridor. But this is not all. 
The main road which runs north from Jerusalem to Ramallah and 
Nablus passes for a distance through the strip of land which it is 
proposed should be included in the Jewish State in order to place the 
Hebrew University in that State. In our view the inclusion of 
these main roads in the proposed Jewish State constitutes an 
important objection to the proposal that the new Jewish Jerusalem 
should be incorporated in the Jewish State. Moslems and Christians 
approaching the mandated Jerusalem and the Holy Places therein 
from the west and north would be required to pass through Jewish 
territory. Such an arrangement would inevitably give rise to 
incidents leading to disturbances of the peace. Again, if the main 
roads leading to Jerusalem pass through Jewish territory the 
Mandatory Power would be seriously handicapped in carrying out the 
trust of ensuring " free and safe access " to the Holy Places for all 
the world. 

174. We do not wish to be thought insufficiently appreciative 
of the profound significance of Jerusalem to Jewry. We have 
received exhaustive and eloquent evidence of the intensity of the 
devotion felt by Jews to the city throughout their history and of 
the unique position which it has occupied in their spiritual and 
political thought. We recognize, moreover, that modern Jerusalem 



80 



as the headquarters of the directing agencies of Jewish activity in 
Palestine is the centre of Jewish political and cultural life in the 
country to-day and that its exclusion from the Jewish State will 
deprive that state of a considerable population and a substantial 
source of revenue. After very earnest consideration of all the issues 
involved, however, we have no hesitation in concluding that, apart 
from the practical difficulties to which reference has been made, the 
religious and political objections to the Jewish claim must be held to 
be decisive. We feel convinced that the unique character of 
Jerusalem as the object of the affection and veneration of the 
adherents of three of the great religions of mankind must be recognized 
by its retention in trust for the world under Mandatory Government. 
We therefore recommend that, as proposed by the Royal Commission, 
the entire city should be included in the Enclave for the Holy Places 
at Jerusalem and Bethlehem and that no portion should be included 
in the Jewish State. Having reached this conclusion it is not necessary 
for us to consider further the proposed Jewish Corridor. If no portion 
of Jerusalem is included in the Jewish State there is no justification 
for such a corridor. 



81 



CHAPTER X 



A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF PLANS A AND B 



1. Plan A 

175. The figures of population and land for the Arab and Jewish 
States under plan A were given in chapter VII. For convenience 
they are repeated below — 



Urban 
Rural 



Total 



Population 

Arab State 
(Including the Beersheba 

sub-district) 
Arabs Jews Total 
136,500 5,600 142,100 
348,700 1,600 350,300 



Jewish State 



Arabs 
77,500 
217,200 



Jews 
243,600 
61,300 



Total 
321,100 
278,500 



485,200 7,200 492,400 294,700 304,900 599,600 



Lund 
(in dunums) 

Arab State 

(Excluding the Beersheba Jewish State 
sub-district) 

Arabs Jews Total Arabs Jews Total 

26,600 1,300 27,900 78,600 135,900 214,500 

Other cultivable 3,018,000 28,300 3,046,300 2,153,000 730,700 2,883,700 
land. 

Uncultivable land 3,963,300 7,400 3,970,700 1,623,100 273,600 1,896,700 



Citrus land 



Total land* 7,007,900 37,000 7,064,900 3,854,700 1,140,200 4,994,900 



Under Section (1) of our terms of reference we are required to 
recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas which 
will — 

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, 
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish 
States ; 

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and 
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa. 

It will be seen at once that, while the proposed Arab State complies 
with Section 1 (b), this cannot be said of the proposed Jewish State. 
The number of Arabs in the Jewish State is very large, being 295,000 
as against 305,000 Jews : that is, the Arabs constitute 49 per cent, 
of the total population in the Jewish State. The area of Arab land 
in the proposed Jewish State is also large : out of a total area of 
about 4,995,000 dunums the Arabs own 3,855,000 dunums, or over 
75 per cent. 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



82 



176. The Royal Commission recognized that the existence of a 
large Arab minority in the proposed Jewish State would prove a most 
serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of partition, 
and they contemplated that the problem created by this large Arab 
minority should be solved by the transfer to the Arab State of 
the greater part of the Arabs constituting that minority. It does 
not seem too much to say that the successful solution of this problem 
was a fundamental assumption in their plan ; and that, if it should 
appear that no such solution can be found, the greater part of the 
case on which their plan rests falls to the ground. It will be seen 
from the following analysis that in our opinion it is impossible to 
provide, by voluntary exchange or transfer, for the removal of any 
but a small fraction of the Arab minority in the Jewish State. 

177. As has been indicated in chapter VIII, the problem cannot 
be solved by an exchange of population and land. The small 
number of Jews (7,200) and the small amount of land (37,000 
dunums) held by Jews in the proposed Arab State render this 
solution impracticable. Nor is the possibility of a solution being 
found by the method of exchange increased by taking into account 
the number of Jews and the amount of Jewish land within the 
Jerusalem Enclave. Here again, the number of Jews in the rural 
areas and the amount of Jewish land are too small to make exchange 
a feasible proposition. 

178. If the problem cannot be solved by an exchange of land and 
population, can it be solved by a transfer on a voluntary* basis of 
the Arab population ? The answer to that question must also be 
in the negative. 

In the first place, even on the most optimistic basis land is not 
available for the resettlement of more than a fraction of the number 
of Arabs included in the proposed Jewish State, and it is mere specu- 
lation to assume that land will become available for even that 
fraction. To found a permanent policy on such speculative 
assumptions would be most imprudent. We have dealt with this 
question of land for resettlement in considerable detail in chapter 
VIII and need only repeat our conclusions briefly here — 

(a) As regards Beersheba, the conclusion we reached was that 
the results of the well-borings recently carried out furnish little 
hope of that sub-district being able, through irrigation, to 



* In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine (published 
in Cmd. 5634) it was announced that His Majesty's Government have not 
accepted the Royal Commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer in the 
last resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area (Appendix I). On 
behalf of the Jews it was also made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be 
opposed to the exercise of any degree of compulsion. 



83 



support a larger agricultural population than it does at present. 
This does not entirely exclude all prospect of closer settlement 
in this area, but until further investigation into the possibilities 
of dry farming has been carried out it would be premature to 
assume that there is scope for settlement on any considerable 
scale in the near future. 

(b) As regards the Jordan Valley, we pointed out that the 
solution — if a solution were at all possible — of the difficulties 
which will have to be overcome before major canal irrigation 
schemes can be undertaken, must inevitably involve negotiations 
and investigations extending over a considerable period of 
time, and that, even if such schemes were to prove practicable 
and satisfactory arrangements could be made to finance the 
cost (which might easily amount to several million pounds), 
the additional agricultural population which, on the most 
optimistic view, could be provided for was only about 49,000. 

(c) As regards the southern part of the Beisan plain, the more 
economic utilization of the water from the springs in this plain 
would make a moderate amount of surplus water available for 
development. It is difficult to estimate the additional 
agricultural population which the plain could then support, 
but it is not likely to exceed about 4,000 persons. 

(d) As regards the hill country in the proposed Arab State, our 
enquiries led us to the same conclusion as that reached by the 
Royal Commission, that is to say, that there is no room for any 
large increase in the rural Arab population in the hills. 

(e) As regards the Gaza sub-district, the conclusion we reached 
was that, provided water of the right quality and in sufficient 
quantity were obtained, intensive cultivation could be intro- 
duced over a considerable area. It was, however, pointed out 
that the change would at the best be a slow one, and that great 
caution would have to be exercised if the farmer is to be given 
a fair chance under the new conditions. 

(/) In regard to Trans- Jordan, we concluded that there was 
small scope for intensive settlement on the land. 

179. In the second place, even if it were possible to make land 
available for resettlement, it does not follow that the problem would 
have been solved, for it is unlikely that the Arabs themselves 
would be willing to leave their home lands and start life afresh in 
a new area. They have a deep attachment — shared by peasants 
all the world over — for their ancestral lands. The lands which 
they would be called upon to leave — the Maritime Plain, the plains 
of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan, the Huleh Basin and the hill 
country of Galilee — constitute the most fertile and best watered 
parts of Palestine. Even if lands were available for the resettlement 
of large numbers of Arabs in Beersheba and the Jordan Valley, 



84 



the lands to which they would be asked to migrate are situated in 
arid tracts where rainfall is scanty and uncertain and where crops 
will depend almost entirely on irrigation. Again, the plains have 
a warm but equable climate, and in the hills, while there is a greater 
range of temperature, the maximum temperature is a few degrees 
lower than in the plains. But the climate of the Jordan Valley 
south of the Sea of Galilee is tropical. The Valley is situated 
between 200 to 400 metres (600 and 1,200 feet) below sea level, and 
in summer the high air pressure and the excessive heat combine to 
produce most oppressive conditions. The Arabs dislike the climate 
of the Jordan Valley and would not willingly leave their homes 
in the healthy regions of the plains and the hills for the heat and 
discomfort of the valley. 

180. In the third place, it is in any event improbable that the 
Arab cultivator would be prepared to migrate in order to create 
space for the Jews. The gulf between the Arabs and the Jews has 
widened year by year. The Arabs look upon the Jews as foreigners 
invading their country, who are able and ready to spend money 
regardless of values if only they can acquire land occupied by Arabs on 
which to settle Jews. Further, they believe that the Jews intend to 
oust them from employment. They know that Jews settled on land 
belonging to the Jewish National Fund are prohibited by the terms 
of their lease from employing Arab labour ; they know of the 
pressure on Jewish employers to employ Jews and not Arabs ; and 
they know of the movement to intimidate Jewish farmers who 
employ Arab labour. Such being their feelings towards the Jews it 
does not seem likely that the Arabs would be willing to migrate in 
order to make room for the Jews. 

181. After studying the question with particular care, we have 
been forced to conclude, for the reasons given above, that the 
problem created by the large number of Arabs in the proposed 
Jewish State cannot be solved by means of either an exchange 
or a transfer of population. 

182. If this conclusion is valid, can the problem be solved 
by the exclusion from the proposed state of an area which is almost 
entirely Arab ? This question brings us to the proposed inclusion 
of Galilee in the Jewish State. But before we examine this proposal 
it will be convenient to deal with an area at the southern extremity 
of the proposed Jewish State. This area is almost entirely Arab 
in character and its exclusion from the Jewish State would effect 
a desirable though relatively small reduction in the number of 
Arabs in that state. 

183. The portion of the proposed Jewish State which lies south 
of the Jerusalem Enclave falls into two clearly distinguishable 
sections, a northern and a southern section. The dividing line 



85 



between these two sections runs from the Mediterranean Sea along 
the Wadi Rubin and then south of the villages of Al Qubeiba 
and Zarnuqa till it joins the boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave. 
The figures of population and land for these two sections are — 

Northern Southern 

Section Section 

Population— Arabs 4,700 18,100 

Jews 16,700 1,600 



Total .. 21,400 19,700 



Land (in dunums) 


Arabs 


Jews 


Arabs 


Jews 


Citrus land 


. . 13,500 


35,000 


14,600 


6,500 


Plantations 


2,000 


5,000 


7,600 


1,700 


Taxable cereal land 


. . 22,900 


5,000 


159,600 


17,500 


Untaxable cereal land 






200 




Total cultivable land 


. . 38,400 


45,000 


182,000 


25,700 


Built-on areas 


200 


5,000 


600 


200 


Uncultivable land 


. . 20,000 


20,500 


90,500 


900 


Total land* 


. . 58,600 


70,500 


273,100 


26,800 



The northern section is predominantly Jewish as regards 
population and, to a less marked extent, as regards ownership of 
land. The southern section is even more predominantly Arab. 
In this section the Arabs form 90 per cent, of the population and 
hold about 90 per cent, of the land. The southern section also con- 
tains an important Moslem place of pilgrimage — the shrine of 
Nabi Rubin — which in the autumn is visited by many thousands 
of Moslems. We are of opinion that the southern section should be 
excluded from the Jewish State. 



184. We now turn to Galilee. Sir George Adam Smith defines 
the historic Galilee as follows : — 

The natural boundaries of Galilee are obvious. South, the Plain of 

Esdraelon ; north, the great gorge of the Litany or Kasimiyeh, 

cutting off the Lebanon ; east, the valley of the Jordan and the Lake of 
Gennesaret; and west, the narrow Phoenician coast. This region coin- 
cides pretty closely with the territories of four tribes — Issachar, Zebulun, 
Asher and Naphtali. But the sea-coast, claimed for Zebulun and Asher, 
never belonged either to them or the province of Galilee ; it was always 
gentile.f 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 

f Chapter XX of " The Historical Geography of the Holy Land." 



86 



For our present purpose we use the word " Galilee " as referring 
to the area lying between the Mediterranean on the west, the 
escarpment overlooking the Huleh basin on the east, the boundary 
of Palestine on the north and the southern edge of the Galilee hill 
country on the south. The area is shown in map 9 and is described 
therein as " Galilee." Galilee is almost wholly in Arab occupation 
as the following figures show*— 





Arabs 


Jews 


Population . . . . . . . . 


88,200 


2,900 


juanu. aunumsj 


Arabs 


Jews 


Citrus land 


8,000 


Bananas 


100 




Plantations 


120,800 


2,100 


Taxable cereal land 


376,000 


8,000 


Untaxable cereal land 


97,300 


6,800 


Total cultivable land 


602,200 


16,900 


Uncultivable land, including built- 






on areas 


718,900 


19,000 


Total landf 


1,321,100 


35,900 



Of the Jewish population of 2,900, 2,000 live in the town of Safad 
and 250 in the town of Acre. Jews form less than 4 per cent, of the 
total population (apart from the towns only 1 per cent.) and they 
own less than 3 per cent, of the land. 

185. We are of opinion that Galilee should not be included in the 
Jewish State. Our reasons briefly stated are three. First, the 
population is almost entirely Arab and the land is almost entirely 
owned by Arabs. Secondly, the Arabs in Galilee are vehemently 
opposed to the inclusion of that area in the Jewish State ; they will 
certainly resist such inclusion by force ; and we see no justification 
for using force to compel this large body of Arabs in what is a purely 
Arab area to accept Jewish rule. Thirdly, we consider that it is 
likely that, even if their resistance should be effectively crushed, 
such pacification would be only temporary, and that this area, by 
reason of its purely Arab character and its comparative inaccessibility, 
would remain a " running sore " in the body of the Jewish State. 
We develop these arguments at greater length in the following 
paragraphs. 



* These figures do not include the population and land of the suggested 
Nazareth Enclave (see chapter IV). 

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



87 



186. The Royal Commission in their Report drew attention 
to the fact that the frontier they had proposed necessitated the 
inclusion in the Jewish State of the Arab area of Galilee, but they 
appear to have taken the view that, as the Arab inhabitants of 
Galilee had throughout the recent disturbances shown themselves 
less amenable to political incitement than those of Samaria and 
Judaea, where the centres of Arab nationalism were located, the 
inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State was not likely to lead to 
serious friction. Subsequent events have proved that this view 
was mistaken. It is true that during the series of disturbances up 
to and including those of the year 1936, the population of Galilee 
took little part in political activities, and that the disturbances in 
that district were largely confined to the towns of Acre and Safad. 
With the publication of the Royal Commission's Report, however, 
the situation rapidly changed. Since that date Galilee has been in a 
state of incipient rebellion. We do not wish to say anything which 
will encourage violence, but on this point we must speak plainly. 

We heard the views of officials and other persons well qualified 
by experience and knowledge of the country to speak of the probable 
Arab reactions to the inclusion of Galilee in the Jewish State, and 
they were all agreed that such a course would be followed by an 
intensification of the present disturbances. The evidence leaves us 
in no doubt whatever. We believe that a decision to include Galilee 
in the Jewish State would be followed by an increase in disaffection 
leading to open rebellion, and that the British Government would 
be faced with the ungrateful task of taking the sternest repressive 
measures in order to compel the Arabs of Galilee to accept Jewish 
rule. The maintenance of peace and order in that area would then 
become a military operation requiring a military occupation. 

187. It has been suggested to us that these are not matters 
which need concern the British people, since, once the Jewish State 
has been set up, it would be for the Jews to deal with Arab resistance 
within Galilee. We cannot agree with this view. 

(a) First, there must inevitably be a considerable interval 
between the announcement by His Majesty's Government of 
their policy and the setting up of an independent Jewish State, 
during which the British Government as Mandatory Power 
would remain fully responsible for security and order. It is 
not likely that Arab opposition would wait until the Jewish 
State had been set up before breaking out into acts of open 
resistance, and during the interval, therefore, the whole burden 
of suppressing this resistance would fall upon His Majesty's 
Government. 

(b) Secondly, the substitution of Jewish for British forces 
would not relieve the British Government of their responsibility 
for the policy which put the Jewish forces in a position to 
suppress the Arabs who resist that policy. 



88 



(c) Thirdly, there is the risk that the Jewish suppression of 
the Arabs in Galilee might lead to attacks on the Jewish State 
from outside. If this were to happen, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, by virtue of their treaty obligations to the Jewish State,, 
could not fail to become involved. 

188. We find it difficult to believe that public opinion in this 
country would support a policy which renders inevitable either the 
continued use of British forces or the use of Jewish forces to suppress 
a prolonged and resolute Arab resistance to the inclusion of Galilee 
in the Jewish State. 

189. In any event we doubt whether any military suppression of 
Arab resistance in this area would result in permanent pacification. 
Experience does not suggest that a large racial minority forming a 
homogeneous block in an isolated and compact area is likely to be 
prepared to acquiesce permanently in a foreign rule, imposed upon 
it by ruthless repressive measures. In our view, the inclusion of 
Galilee in the Jewish State would create a minority problem which, 
would endanger, not only the stability of that state, but the prospect 
of securing in the future friendly and harmonious relations between 
Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. 

190. In our opinion the reasons we have given for the exclusion 
of Galilee from the Jewish State are decisive. But it has been sug- 
gested that the exclusion of this area from the Jewish State wilt 
deprive that state of an area which offers considerable room for 
settlement by the Jews. Even if this were the case, we should 
still regard the arguments we have given as predominant ; but, 
in fact, the suggestion is exaggerated. We have examined this matter 
in detail in Appendix 7. For the purpose of estimating the additional 
population which could be settled on the land in Galilee, Jewish 
authorities have told us that they assumed that a suitable lot viable 
in the plains would be 25 dunums, and in the hills 40 dunums. They 
were, however, careful to explain that this estimate was based upon 
the hypothesis that the lands are " developed and fully utilized at the 
highest level of efficiency ", and that the hypothesis was " theoretical 
in so far as it disregards not only the factor of human inertia but 
also various difficulties of a financial, legal and political nature 
which may in practice have to be taken into account." For the 
reasons given in Appendix 7, we have been unable to accept 
the estimate of the appropriate lot viable on which they have made 
their calculations ; we consider it too optimistic. Instead, we have 
adopted an estimate suggested by the Director of Agriculture* 
and working on this basis we conclude that, provided that 
capital is available for the necessary works of development and 
that the difficult question of markets can be satisfactorily solved 
there would at best be room for only a moderate increase (say 
15,000 persons) in the agricultural population. 



89 



There is a considerable element of speculation in any calculation 
of agricultural absorptive capacity and we do not claim that the 
figure given in Appendix 7 is accurate. It would be subject to 
all the reservations made by the Jewish authorities, in regard to 
their own estimate, and moreover would depend (as, indeed, would 
their own calculation) on the willingness of all the landowners who 
possess surplus land to sell it. At best, therefore, it can only be 
regarded as largely theoretical, but we think it sufficient to indicate 
that Galilee does not offer great scope for closer settlement on 
the land. 

191. In any case, however, the process of change in land 
utilization must be slow, and at best it will be many years before 
it could be completed throughout the whole of Galilee. But during 
that time it must be expected that the demand for land to meet the 
needs of the Arab population will be increasing year by year as the 
population grows : indeed, as is brought out in Appendix 7, if the 
natural increase in the population should continue at the present 
rate, that in itself would be sufficient to absorb in about 10 years the 
estimated additional agricultural absorptive capacity consequent 
on the best possible utilization of the land. While we have 
recommended elsewhere (chapter XIV) that, in estimating the 
capacity of the land for absorbing additional immigrants, regard 
should be had only to the population existing at any given date, 
it is obvious that when the process of settlement is assumed to 
be spread over several years, the population to be taken into account 
will be larger and the amount of surplus land available for new 
settlers will be smaller each year. In estimating to-day what will 
be the scope for closer settlement in Galilee during, say, the next 
ten years, it is clearly necessary to take this fact into account. 

192. For these reasons we are unable to recommend the adoption 
•of the Royal Commission's plan, that is plan A. 

2. Plan B 

193. We now turn to consider the variant of plan A to which we 
referred in paragraph 7 of chapter I and which we have called 
plan B. Plan B, shown in map 9, may be described as plan A with 
the following areas excluded from the Jewish State — 

(a) Galilee; 

(b) the southern section of that portion of the Jewish State 
lying south of the Jerusalem Enclave. 

194. If the two areas mentioned in the preceding paragraph are 
excluded from the Jewish State, how should they be treated 
politically ? As regards the small section at the extreme south of the 
Jewish State there is no difficulty. It should be included in the Arab 
State. As regards Galilee, the question is examined in the succeeding 
paragraphs. 



90 



195. If Galilee is excluded from the Jewish State the possible 
alternatives are : (i) Arab control and (ii) Mandatory control. As 
regards the first alternative, the conclusion we have reached is that 
if the Jewish State is to be assured of adequate security against 
aggression it would not be possible to allow Galilee to pass under 
Arab control. 

(i) Possibility of Arab Control of Galilee. 

196. With the exclusion of Galilee the Jewish State, besides the 
coastal area including the Carmel Ridge, would consist of — 

{a) a strip of territory running east and west along the plains 
of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North), which at its narrowest 
part would be only about 15 kilometres (less than 10 miles) 
wide ; and 

(b) a second strip running north and south and including 
the greater part of the sub-district of Tiberias and the eastern 
part of the sub-district of Safad, which at its narrowest part 
would be between 7 and 8 kilometres wide (between 4 and 
5 miles). 

The Jewish State in these sectors of its territory would have little 
depth and would be most vulnerable to attack, for it would consist 
not only of a narrow strip surrounded by Arab States but would 
also be dominated tactically by the Arab State in the hills of Galilee. 
That the Jewish State would be so dominated by Galilee is clear 
from an examination of the physical features of the boundary which 
separates Galilee from the Jewish State. On the eastern boundary 
of Galilee, that is on the line east of the town of Safad, the dividing 
line between Galilee and the Jewish State would run at the base of 
a steep escarpment rising to a height of 2,400 feet at Safad. On 
the southern boundary the position would be similar. The Jewish 
State would be situated in the plain of Esdraelon and the boundary 
would run along the southern edge of the Galilee hills. The position 
may be summed up in this way. The boundary of Galilee where it 
marches with that of the proposed Jewish State would form a suitable 
defensive boundary for the protection of Galilee against an attack 
from the Jewish State, but would not constitute a suitable defensive 
boundary for the protection of the Jewish State if Galilee should pass 
under Arab control. 

197. Again, we have been assured by the military authorities 
that, in case of war, Haifa would be untenable if Acre were in 
hostile hands ; indeed, in their view, the defence of Haifa requires 
Acre to be in the hands of the power that holds Haifa. If, therefore, 
Haifa is in the Jewish State, Acre cannot be permitted to pass under 
Arab control. The reason for this is to be found in the relative 
positions of Haifa and Acre. Haifa is situated at the southern end 



91 



of the Bay of Acre, and the town of Acre at its northern end. 
The distance between the two places is only about 13 kilometres 
(8 miles), and guns placed at Acre would completely command 
Haifa. 

These are the reasons which have led us to the conclusion that 
Galilee could not be allowed to pass under Arab control. 



(ii) Possibility of Mandatory Control of Galilee. 

198. If then Galilee cannot be allowed to pass under Arab control 
it follows that if plan B is to be adopted it must remain permanently 
under Mandate. This proposition raises certain constitutional 
questions which require examination, (a) First, the Preamble to 
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations implies that in 
course of time the people of Palestine, like the other communities 
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, would be enabled to 
stand by themselves, and according to the Preamble to the Mandate 
for Palestine this Article is one of the two obligations on which the 
Mandate ;s founded. This obligation is towards the population of 
Palestine, the Arabs and the Jews, and it appears to us that the 
proposition that Galilee should remain permanently under Mandate 
would be inconsistent with the specific terms of Article 22 of the 
Covenant. It would mean that the Arabs of Galilee were to be 
prevented from acquiring their independence because the security 
of the Jewish State would thereby be threatened ; in other words, 
the Arabs of Galilee would be denied their independence in order 
to ensure the independence of the Jews. Such a state of things 
would, it seems to us, be difficult to justify, (b) Secondly, if as a 
result of partition, an Arab State were set up in another part of Pales- 
tine, the probability is that the inhabitants of Galilee would also 
sooner or later claim to be granted their independence, and, for the 
reasons given in the preceding argument, we think that it would be 
difficult to maintain a complete refusal of such a claim. But it would 
be impossible to concede the claim in regard to the whole of Galilee, 
for, as has been explained, the boundary between Galilee and the 
Jewish State could not be regarded as a suitable defensive boundary 
for the protection of the Jewish State in the plain against an attack 
from the Arab State in the hills. The utmost that could be conceded 
without endangering the security of the Jewish State would be the 
independence of an area lying west of a line drawn east of the town 
of Safad, north of a line drawn south of the Safad-Acre road, and 
east of a line drawn from Majd el Kurum to a point on the coast 
about 5 kilometres (3 miles) south of Ras an Naqura. According 
to the advice which we have received from the military authorities 
no line further south would afford a suitable defensive boundary 
against an attack from an Arab State in northern Galilee. Thus 
the area to which independence could be conceded would be less 
than one-third the size of Galilee. 



92 



199. But the question would then arise, how should the remaining 
area of Galilee, that is, the area between this defensive line and the 
southern edge of Galilee, be administered ? Should it be included in 
the Jewish State or retained under Mandate ? There are serious 
objections to either course. To include this Arab area within 
the Jewish State would be to reverse without any justification 
whatsoever the earlier decision to exclude it. On the other hand, 
to retain it under a permanent Mandate would be open to the objection 
stated in the preceding paragraph to the retention of Galilee as a 
whole under a permanent Mandate, and to the further objection that, 
sandwiched between a Jewish State and an Arab State, it would be 
tactically unsound. 

200. In our view the problems created by Galilee are in them- 
selves fatal to plan B. It appears to us to be fundamentally wrong 
that while the Jews in the plains to the south and east are given 
their independence, the Arabs in Galilee or any part of it should be 
denied their independence in order to ensure the security of the 
neighbouring Jewish State. Such a denial would certainly not lead 
to peace between the Arabs and the Jews. 

201 . Plan B is also, in our opinion, open to other grave objections 
with which we now deal. 



202. According to plan B the town and port of Haifa are in the 
Jewish State. But Haifa is far from being an entirely Jewish town. 
It is a " mixed " town in which the Arabs as well as the Jews have 
considerable interests. 

(a) The population of Haifa is divided almost equally between 
Arabs* and Jews ; if the suburbs in Haifa Bay are included, the Jews 
will be in a slight numerical preponderance. The inclusion of Haifa 
within the Jewish State would mean the bringing of about 50,000 
Arabs under Jewish rule. 

(b) The figures for the urban property tax payable in the year 
1938-39 are as follows— 



(i) Arabs* 37,800 about 30 " 

(ii) Jews (including certain im- 

portant trading concerns 
which contain a consider- 



(a) Haifa 



Tax Payable 
5 . Per cent. 



able non- Jewish element) . . 
(iii) Others, including the Govern- 
ment and the Municipality 



- 19,500 
£P. 127,000 



69,700 



tt 



15 
100 



55 



* Note. — The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as 
equivalent to " Non- Jew." 



93 

(c) The following figures show the distribution of municipal 
revenue between Jews and non-Jews. Figures are not available 
showing the Arab* share in the non- Jewish portion. 

1936-37 1937-38 





Jews 

•J 


Non- Jews 


Jews 


Non- Jews 




per cent. 


■per cent. 


per cent. 


per cent. 


Municipal property 










tcLX • • . . 


58 


42 


59 


41 


Slaughter fees and 










meat transport fees 


50 


50 


50 


50 


Intoxicating liquor 










licence fees 


64 


36 


64 


36 


Building permit fees 


77 


23 


72 


28 



(d) The land is distributed as follows — 

The The town planning 

municipal area {including the 

area municipal area) 

per cent. per cent. 

(i) Jews .. .. .. 43-8 64-6 

(ii) Arabs* 26-4 13-0 

(iii) Other owners includ- 

ing Government .. 29-8 22-4 

(e) The capital invested in buildings between the years 1930-31 
and 1937-38 (both inclusive) is approximately — 

£P. 

(i) Jews 7,657,000 

(ii) Arabs* 2,039,000 

(iii) Others 366,000 

Total .. .. £ P. 10,062,000 

(/) The approximate capital invested in industrial concerns, 
excluding the Palestine Electric Corporation, is — 

(i) Jewish, including one firm which 

has passed into British ownership, 
the management and staff re- 
maining Jewish . . . . . . about £P. 1,800,000 

(ii) Arab* . . . . ... . . „ 180,000 

(g) It is estimated that 60 per cent, to 65 per cent, of the import 
and export trade of the port is in Jewish hands and 40 per cent, 
to 35 per cent, in non- Jewish hands. Figures are not available for 
the Arab* share of the non- Jewish portion. 



* Note.— The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as 
equivalent to " Non- Jew." 



94 



(h) Lighterage work in the harbour is divided as follows — 

Arabs* . . 50 per cent, to 65 per cent., according to the 
season. 

Jews .. 50 per cent, to 35 per cent., according to the 
season. 

(i) The rich inshore fisheries at Haifa are worked entirely by 
Arabs. The number of fishermen is over 300. 

(j) According to the Census Report for 1931, nearly a quarter 
of the agriculturists in Palestine would be unable to maintain their 
present standard of life if they were not able to find a secondary 
means of subsistence (paragraph 259 of the Report on the Census) ; 
and it is probable that, with the large increase in the agricultural 
population during the last seven years, this proportion is even 
larger to-day. For persons in this category Haifa is an important 
source of supplementary employment : when Haifa is prosperous 
and the demand for labour active large numbers of Arabs from the 
surrounding country who find it difficult to support themselves by 
the produce of their lands come to the town to find employment. 
Further, Haifa may expand industrially. The southern pipe-line 
from the oil fields in 'Iraq terminates at Haifa, and we understand 
that a refinery, designed to treat not less than 2,000,000 tons of 
crude oil yearly, is to be erected there by the oil companies at 
a cost of about £5,000,000. The establishment of this refinery may 
be followed by the establishment of subsidiary industries, and if 
this should be the case the local demand for employment would 
expand considerably. The Jews have made it clear to us that once 
the Jewish State is set up, Arabs who are not citizens of that state 
will not be allowed to enter the Jewish State in search of employment. 
This would mean that Haifa would no longer be available as a field 
of employment for Arabs outside the Jewish State. The effect of 
this on the economy of the territories in which these Arabs reside 
would be serious. 

(k) Haifa is the only deep water port in Palestine. The Royal 
Commission were of opinion that, in the interests of Arab trade and 
industry, the Arab State should have access for commercial purposes 
to Haifa and recommended that the Jewish treaty should provide 
for the free transit of goods in bond between the Arab State and 
Haifa. Provision for the transit of goods in bond is a usual inter- 
national arrangement ; but it does not give the same sense of security 
as would be given by possession or (if possession cannot be granted) 
by the knowledge that the port is in the hands of impartial trustees. 
To assign the port at Haifa to the Jews is certainly not treating the 
Arabs and the Jews on an equal footing in the matter of facilities 
for trade. 



* Note. — The word Arab is here used in its strict sense and not as 
equivalent to " Non-Jew." 



95 



(Z) While Arab non-agricultural industry is at present only a 
small portion of the total non-agricultural industry of Palestine, its 
main hope of future expansion lies in Haifa. If Haifa is included in 
the Jewish State the prospects of the expansion of Arab industries 
will be remote indeed. 

203. In view of these facts, we are of opinion that there are 
serious objections to the inclusion of Haifa in the Jewish State. 
There are equally serious objections to its inclusion in the Arab 
State. It cannot be included in the Jewish State without detriment 
to Arab interests and it cannot be included in the Arab State without 
detriment to Jewish interests. The best course, if that should prove 
to be possible, would be to retain it under Mandatory control so 
that it can be developed for the benefit of both. 

(b) Population and Land 

204. If Galilee and the predominantly Arab area at the southern 
end of the Jewish State (paragraph 184) be excluded from that 
State, the population and land figures of the Jewish State become — 

Arabs Jews Total 

Population .. .. 188,400 300,400 488,800 
Land (in dunums) 

Citrus land .. .. 56,000 129,400 185,400 

Other cultivable land .. 1,391,400 694,600 2,086,000 

Uncultivable land .. 813,100 253,500 1,066,600 



Total land .. .. 2,260,500 1,077,500 3,338,000 



The number of Arabs in the Jewish State would still be large, 
being 188,000 as compared with a Jewish population of 300,000 ; 
that is the Arab minority would constitute 38 per cent, of the total 
population and would be equal to 62 per cent, of the Jewish 
population. The area of Arab land in the Jewish State would 
also be large, being 2,260,000 dunums as against 1,077,000 dunums 
of Jewish land ; that is, the Jewish State would contain twice as 
much Arab land as Jewish land. 

205. The Jewish State under plan B may be regarded for the 
sake of this present argument as falling into three parts : — 

(a) The part in the Maritime Plain south of Haifa and 
bounded on the north by a line running approximately east 
and west a short distance north of Zikhron Ya'aqov. 

Arabs Jews 
Population* 54,000 226,000 

(b) The town of Haifa. . . T 

v ' Arabs Jews 

Population* 51,000 48,000 

* The population figures are approximate. 
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96 



(c) The remainder, that is the portion which runs east and 
west from Haifa to Beisan and then north and south from 
Beisan to the northern boundary of Palestine. 

Arabs Jews 

Population* 83,000 26,000 

In the first portion the Jews are in a large majority, the Arabs 
forming only 19 per cent, of the total population ; and even if the 
town of Tel Aviv (140,000) be excluded, the Jews are still in amajority. 

In the second portion the Arabs and the Jews are almost, equally 
divided. 

In the third portion the Arabs are in a large majority, the Jews 
forming only about 24 per cent, of the total population. As we shall 
explain in chapter XII, we are of opinion that, if a plan of partition 
brings under the political domination of the Jews large numbers of 
Arabs in an area where the Jews are not already in a substantial 
majority, the operation of the plan will be violently opposed by 
the Arabs. Such a plan will not lead to peace. In our view the large 
Arab majority in this third portion constitutes a further objection 
to plan B. 

206. For all these reasons we find plan B no less unacceptable than 
plan A. 

207. The result of our examination of plans A and B may be 
summarized as follows — 

1— Plan A 

(i) The number of Arabs in the proposed Jewish State under 
plan A is almost equal to the number of Jews, the figures being 
295,000 Arabs as compared with 305,000 Jews. Further, the Arabs 
hold four-fifths of the land in the proposed State, 3,855,000 dunums 
out of a total area of 4,995,000 dunums. (Paragraph 175.) 

(ii) The problem created by the large number of Arabs in the 
Jewish State cannot be solved by means of either an exchange or 
a transfer of population. (Paragraph 181.) 

(iii) An area, predominantly Arab, at the southern extremity of the 
Jewish State should not be included in that state. (Paragraph 183.) 

(iv) Galilee should not be included in the Jewish State. The 
reasons why it should not be included are three. First, the population 
is almost entirely Arab and the land is almost entirely Arab owned. 
Secondly, the Arabs in Galilee are vehemently opposed to the inclu- 
sion of that area in the Jewish State ; they will resist such inclusion 
by force, and there appears to be no justification for using force to 



* The population figures are approximate. 



97 



compel this large body of Arabs, in what is a purely Arab area, to 
accept Jewish rule. Thirdly, its inclusion would create a minority 
problem which would endanger, not only the stability of the Jewish 
State, but the prospect of securing in the future friendly relations 
between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. (Paragraph 185.) 

(v) Galilee does not offer scope for the settlement of large num- 
bers of Jews on the land. At best, there is room for only a moderate 
increase (say 15,000 persons) in the agricultural population, and 
even this is dependent upon a change in land utilization, which must 
inevitably be slow. The natural increase in the population at its 
present rate is in itself sufficient to absorb in about ten years this 
estimated additional agricultural absorptive capacity. As the process 
of settlement on the land must inevitably be slow, it is necessary 
to take this fact into account in estimating the scope for closer 
settlement in Galilee to-day. (Paragraphs 190-191.) 

(vi) For these reasons the conclusion is reached that plan A is 
unacceptable. Plan B is then examined. 



2.— Plan B. 

(i) The predominantly Arab area at the southern end of the 
Jewish State should be included in the Arab State. (Paragraph 193.) 

(ii) If Galilee is excluded from the Jewish State the possible 
alternatives are (a) Arab control, and (b) Mandatory control. 
(Paragraph 195.) 

(iii) If the Jewish State is to be assured of adequate security 
against aggression, it would not be possible to allow Galilee to pass 
under Arab control. (Paragraphs 196-197.) 

(iv) The retention of Galilee under Mandatory control is open 
to the strong objection that it means that all or, at best, the majority 
of the Arabs of Galilee would have to be denied their independence 
in order to ensure the security of the Jewish State. (Paragraph 198.) 

(v) The problems created by Galilee are considered fatal to 
plan B. (Paragraph 200.) 

(vi) But it is pointed out that Haifa, the only deep water harbour 
on the coast of Palestine, is not by any means an entirely Jewish 
town and that the Arabs have considerable interests therein. The 
conclusion is reached that Haifa could not be included in the Jewish 
State without serious detriment to Arab interests and that, similarly, 
it could not be included in the Arab State without serious detriment 
to Jewish interests. It is suggested that the best course, if that 
should prove to be possible, would be to retain it under Mandatory 
control so that it can be developed for the benefit of both. 
(Paragraph 202.) 



(C 31078) 



e2 



98 



(vii) If Galilee and the area on the south were excluded from 
the Jewish State the number of Arabs in that state would still be 
large, 188,000 Arabs as compared with 300,000 Jews. The Arab 
minority would constitute 38 per cent, of the total population of 
the Jewish State and would be equal to 62 per cent, of the Jewish 
population. (Paragraph 204.) 

(viii) It is pointed out that in that portion of the Jewish State 
which runs from Haifa east to Beisan and then north to the Palestine 
frontier the Arabs are in a majority, the Jews forming only 24 per 
cent, of the population. The view (explained more fully in 
chapter XII) is expressed that a plan of partition, which brings 
under the political domination of the Jews large numbers of Arabs 
in an area where the Jews are not already in a majority, will be 
opposed by the Arabs and will not lead to peace. The inclusion of 
this area in the Jewish State is held to be open to the objection that 
the Arab majority will oppose it by force and that it will not produce 
peace. (Paragraph 205.) 

^--"(ix) The final conclusion is that plan B is also unacceptable. 



99 



CHAPTER XI 
PLAN C 

208. In the preceding chapter we gave the reasons why we find 
it necessary to reject the Royal Commission's plan in its original 
form, and why the majority of us consider that even the modified 
form of that plan, which we have called plan B, is unacceptable. 

209. We now put forward as an alternative plan C, which 
although certainly not perfect (for it is impossible, if for no other 
reason than the geographical distribution of the two races, to produce 
a perfect scheme), is the best which the majority of us have been 
able to devise. 

210. Before describing plan C, it is necessary to consider how far 
our terms of reference permit us to depart from the Royal 
Commission's plan. Those terms of reference direct us — 

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III 
of the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty 
to suggest modifications of that plan, including variation of the 
areas recommended for retention under British Mandate ... to 
recommend boundaries, etc. 

It has been suggested that the word " modifications " should be 
interpreted in a narrow sense, as meaning no more than changes of 
detail, and that your predecessor's intention was that the broad 
outline of the Royal Commission's plan should in any event be 
retained. We ourselves do not take this view of our instructions. 
It appears to us that the word " modifications " must be interpreted 
with reference to the words " with full liberty to suggest " which 
immediately precede it, and to the absence from our terms of 
reference of any direction to accept the Royal Commission's plan 
as indicating a just settlement between the claims of the two races. 

211. Indeed, the clearest indication of governing principles 
which we find in your predecessor's instructions to us is in the 
emphasis laid in paragraph (i) (a) and (b) of our terms of reference 
upon the need that the Arab and Jewish States which it is proposed 
to create should 

(i) possess adequate security ; 

(ii) be self-supporting ; and 

(iii) include the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises 
in the Jewish area and vice versa. 

We regard ourselves, therefore, as free to suggest any plan of partition 
which appears to us to be necessary in order to comply as far as 
possible with these governing principles. 



(C 31078) 



e3 



100 



212. No one who has spent three months of the past summer in 
Palestine, as we have done, can fail to have been profoundly conscious 
of the spirit of intense opposition to partition which permeates the 
Arab population. In dealing with a people who have no elected 
representatives, and with whom, moreover, it was impossible for 
ourselves to make any direct contact at all, the difficulty is to estimate 
how far what appears to be national action is really the outcome of 
deep-seated national feeling, and how far it is, so far as the fellaheen 
at least are concerned, an aitificial and temporary movement, 
fostered by propaganda and terrorism, and dependent upon the 
interested activities of a relatively small number of effendis of the 
politician class. It is perhaps needless to say that, before forming 
a considered judgment on this question, we have not let ourselves be 
prejudiced in eithei direction by the present campaign of terrorism. 

213. In our judgment, the recent events in Palestine do represent 
a genuine feeling among the Arab population of hostility to partition, 
a feeling of which the Royal Commission were clearly unaware when 
they put forward their plan, for it was not until the Report and the 
Government's proposals were published that the policy of partition 
found open expression. We believe that the position in Palestine 
may be fairly summarised thus. If a plan of partition is approved 
which brings under the political domination of the Jews large numbers 
of Arabs in an area where the Jews are not already in a substantial 
majority, the introduction of such a plan will be resisted by the 
Arabs with all the force at their command, in other words, by open 
rebellion, and will only be carried out if the resistance is suppressed by 
superior force. In view of recent experience, that will mean a military 
operation on a large scale. What forces will be required for the 
purpose, how long it will take to put down the rebellion, how much 
the doing so will cost, both in military charges and in indirect loss 
to the country, how many lives will be lost, and what will be the 
residue of bitter feeling against both the British and the Jews when 
order has at last been restored, are questions which we cannot attempt 
to answer. But that partition in this form will bring peace to 
Palestine we cannot venture to hope. 

214. But although we are satisfied of the existence of this wide- 
spread antagonism to partition, we do not consider it to be of such 
a nature as to oblige us to report that no plan of partition can be 
regarded as practicable. It is not within our power to produce a 
solution which we can feel confident will meet with acceptance by 
both sides : the gulf between their respective demands is far too 
wide for that. But it is our duty to put forward the best plan of 
partition that we can devise, and we do so, trusting that, if our 
proposals should be regarded as a reasonable attempt to do justice, 
within our terms of reference, between the claims of both parties, 
they may form the basis of a settlement which both Arabs and 
Jews will be prepared to accept, notwithstanding that they may 
disappoint the expectations which either party may have formed. 



101 



215. The plan which we put forward is as follows, the boundaries 
of the several territories being shown on map 10 — 

(a) The Arab State will be as proposed in plan B subject 
to the following modifications — 

(i) a slight alteration in the north-west corner along the 
Carmel Ridge ; and 

(ii) the exclusion of the Beersheba sub-district (except 
for a small area on the west) and the village lands of Rafah. 

(b) The boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave will be as 
proposed under plan B. 

(c) The Jewish State will consist of the coastal area 
between Tel Aviv and the Carmel Ridge, and of the portion 
south of the Jerusalem Enclave as proposed in plan B. The 
boundary will be as proposed in plan B throughout, except on 
the north, where it will be cut off from Haifa about 24 kilometres 
(fifteen miles) south of that town. 

(d) The whole of the territory, including Haifa itself, north 
of this line and of the northern boundary of the Arab State, 
will be retained under Mandate under conditions to be described 
later (chapters XIII and XIV). 

(e) The Beersheba sub-district (except for a small area on 
the west) and the village lands of Rafah will also be retained 
under Mandate under conditions to be described later (in the 
same chapters). 

216. For the purpose of this plan Palestine may be considered 
as falling into three parts, as map 10 shows : a northern part, to be 
retained under Mandate, and known as the Northern Mandated 
Territory ; a southern part, also to be retained under Mandate and 
known as the Southern Mandated Territory ; and a central part, 
consisting of all the territory between the other two, which will be 
made the subject of partition. We will now consider each part 
separately, and explain the reasons which lead us to our conclusions 
with regard to it. 

1. The Northern Mandated Territory 

217. In chapter X we have criticized, on various grounds, the 
proposals of plans A and B with regard to this part of Palestine. 
We recapitulate here the main points of the argument. 

(i) Haifa 

Haifa is a " mixed " town in which Arabs as well as Jews 
have considerable interests. Out of a population of about 
100,000, there are about 50,000 Arabs. It is the only deep-water 
port in Palestine : to assign it to the Jews is certainly not 
treating Jews and Arabs on an equal footing. It is already an 



(C 31078) 



102 



important source of supplementary employment to the large 
numbers of Arabs from the surrounding country who find it 
difficult to support themselves by the produce of their holdings 
of land ; and if it should expand industrially, as seems probable, 
its importance to the Arabs in this respect will increase. But 
if Haifa were included in the Jewish State, Arabs outside that 
state would no longer be allowed to enter it to seek employment, 
and the effect of this on the economy of the territories in which 
these Arabs reside would be serious. 

Haifa, therefore, cannot be included in the Jewish State 
without detriment to Arab interests ; equally it cannot be 
included in the Arab state without detriment to Jewish interests. 
It should, if possible, be retained under Mandatory control so 
that it can be developed for the benefit of both. 

(ii) Galilee 

It is impossible to put Galilee into the Jewish State without 
injury to the Arabs resident in that area, who form some 96 per 
cent, of the population and own about the same percentage of 
land. Nor can it be put into an Arab State without endangering 
the security of the Jewish colonies in the plains to the south and 
east of Galilee, which are overlooked by the Galilee hills. 

(iii) The Haifa Bay Plain, the Plains of Esdraelon, 
Jezreel, Beisan (North), and Huleh 

For the reasons given in chapter X, it is not possible to 
include these plains alone in the Jewish State ; nor could the 
whole area, including both Galilee and the plains, be assigned 
to the Arab State without serious injustice to the Jews and a 
violation of the charge to include the fewest possible Jews and 
Jewish enterprises in the Arab State. 

218. Nor is it right to overlook the position of the Christians 
(mostly Arabs) of whom there are about 30,000 in the northern area, 
outside of Nazareth (which would in any case be kept under Mandate) . 
They themselves did not give evidence before us, but representations 
have been made to us by those who were well qualified to speak on 
their behalf that they would prefer to remain under the British 
Mandate, rather than to be included in either a Moslem or a Jewish 
State. 

219. All these considerations point irresistibly to the conclusion 
that it is not possible to partition this northern section of Palestine 
without injustice to either Arabs or Jews. 

220. What then is to be the political future of this area ? If 
it cannot be partitioned, it must evidently remain under Mandatory 
control ; but for how long, and under what conditions ? 



103 



(a) We have already expressed the opinion, in chapter X, that 
a permanent mandate for Galilee, that is a mandate with no provision 
for its termination under any conditions, would be a violation of 
Article 22 of the Covenant. For the same reason we must exclude 
a permanent mandate for this larger area. 

(b) The Royal Commission recommended that before the four 
towns of Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Acre were included in the Jewish 
State, they should be retained for an indefinite period under a 
temporary Mandate (chapter XXII, paragraph 22 (iii) ) ; and it 
might be suggested that the area now in question should likewise 
be retained under temporary Mandate, without any attempt to 
indicate when or under what conditions the period of control should 
come to an end. 

We are convinced that this would be a profound mistake. 
Uncertainty as to the political future of Palestine has undoubtedly 
been from the outset one of the principal causes of the present 
unhappy relations between Arabs and Jews. What is needed is a 
clear statement of policy which shall enable both races to know as 
precisely as possible under what form of government the citizens of 
the new areas will live henceforth. The worst possible form of 
settlement would be one which left both Jews and Arabs in any part 
of Palestine uncertain whether in a few years time either of them 
may not be subjected against their will to the political dominance 
of the other. 

(c) For the same reason we are unable to accept a suggestion which 
has been made to us that an area in the north of Palestine should be 
retained under Mandate for at least ten years, after which the position 
should be reviewed in the light of the conditions then prevailing. 

(d) The solution which we recommend is that the Mandate for 
the northern section shall continue in being until the Jews and Arabs 
in the area agree to ask that it should be surrendered, and the area 
be given its independence, either as part of an existing Jewish or 
Arab State, or as a separate Palestinian State. By " agreement " 
we do not of course mean that there must be complete unanimity on 
both sides, but that both the Mandatory and the League of Nations 
must be satisfied that the greater part of the minority race are in 
agreement with the greater part of the majority race. 

221. The only reservation which we think it necessary to make in 
putting forward this solution relates to Haifa. We have reached the 
above conclusions with regard to the northern part of Palestine, 
including Haifa, on grounds which have nothing to do with defence. 
But to ignore the importance of Haifa from the standpoint of defence 
would manifestly leave the argument incomplete. Our terms of 
reference do not oblige or authorize us to take into account the needs 
of Imperial defence, but they do compel us to look to the security 
of the proposed Arab and Jewish States and of the Holy Places ; 
and in considering the political future of Haifa it is necessary 



104 



to bear this point in mind. It was assumed by the Royal 
Commission that Treaties of Alliance on the 'Iraq precedent 
should be negotiated between the Mandatory and the repre- 
sentatives of the new states (Chapter XXII, paragraphs 4-9), 
and should include Military Conventions dealing with the main- 
tenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of 
ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe-line and so 
forth. Assuming such treaties to be entered into, the Mandatory 
will have to undertake special responsibilities for the protection 
against external attack of the new States, as well as of the Mandated 
areas, including the Holy Places. We are advised by the military 
authorities that for the discharge of these responsibilities (i) Haifa 
is an essential part of the scheme of defence of the Holy Places and 
the central and southern parts of Palestine, as well as of the northern 
section ; (ii) it is essential that Haifa and Acre should be in the same 
hands ; and (iii) it is highly desirable that they should both remain 
under a permanent Mandate. The military authorities have also 
informed us, however, that they could not regard an arrangement 
under treaty with either the Arab or the Jewish State as satisfying 
the requirements of the situation in view of the special responsibilities 
which His Majesty's Government as Mandatory would have to 
undertake for the protection of Palestine, and especially of the Holy 
Places, and which profoundly distinguish our relations with Palestine 
from our relations with 'Iraq. 

222. So far as the immediate future is concerned, if plan C is 
adopted no difficulty will arise, since both Haifa and Acre will 
remain under Mandate — and presumably under a British Mandate— 
for an indefinite period, which will only be terminated when the 
two races which form the population agree to ask for their 
independence. We think, however, that, in view of the special 
importance of Haifa for the protection of the whole of Palestine, 
including the Holy Places, it should be laid down from the first that 
the grant of independence to the towns of Haifa and Acre with a 
suitable defensive boundary will always be subject to the condition 
that this can safely be done, having regard to the special respon- 
sibilities of the Mandatory for the defence of the Holy Places and 
the new states against external attack. 

223. We believe that the solution which we have proposed for 
the future of the northern part of Palestine will commend itself to 
impartial opinion as the only satisfactory way to deal with this 
area under a partition scheme. But a proposal to retain the area 
indefinitely under Mandate goes only a very little way towards 
providing for its political and economic future. There still remain 
such important and difficult questions as, under what conditions shall 
the Jews in future be allowed to immigrate into and acquire land in 
the area ; what steps, if any, shall be taken to protect the interests 
of the Arabs in the event of Jews being allowed to acquire land 



105 



therein ; what steps, if any, shall be taken by the Government to 
develop the land for the benefit of the Arabs as well as of the Jews ? 
A liberal and equitable settlement of these matters forms an essential 
part of our plan ; and we shall return to them in chapters XIII 
and XIV. 

2. The Southern Mandated Territory 

224. The Royal Commission suggested (chapter XXII, para- 
graph 22 (v) ) that, with a view to providing access for commercial 
purposes to the Red Sea for the benefit of both Arab and Jewish 
trade and industry, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf 
of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory administration ; and 
that the Arab Treaty should provide for the free transit of goods 
between the Jewish State and this enclave. The rest of the 
Beersheba sub-district they proposed to include in the Arab State. 

225. At the time when the Royal Commission reported, little was 
known of the possibilities of irrigation in the Beersheba area ; and 
in the absence of precise knowledge it was still permissible to let the 
imagination dwell on the thought of the " practically inexhaustible 
supply of cultivable land " in that area which might be developed, 
if water for irrigation could be made available. Under the Royal 
Commission's plan the development of the land in this area would 
be carried out by a Partition Department of the Palestine Govern- 
ment with the assistance of a grant from the United Kingdom 
Government (chapter XXII, paragraphs 44-46) ; and the Royal 
Commission evidently assumed that the assignment of the Negeb* 
to the Arab State under partition would constitute no hindrance 
to the execution of this project. Since the object of such develop- 
ment would be the resettlement of Arabs transferred from the 
Jewish State, whose departure would make room for additional 
Jewish immigrants, the effect of developing the Negeb would be 
indirectly beneficial to the Jews, even though the area were not 
actually included in the Jewish State. 

226. Since then, however, boring-tests have taken place, as has 
already been stated in chapter VIII of our report, with the most 
disappointing results ; and it is now clear that in the greater part 
of the area no improvement in agriculture which is dependent on 
irrigation can be hoped for. In any case, as we have pointed out 
in the chapter quoted, the Arab fellah is not likely to be willing to 
transfer from the comparatively prosperous and well-watered area 
of the Jewish State to settle in the uncongenial conditions of the 
Beersheba sub-district, with its heat, its low rainfall and scarcity of 
fuel, and its remoteness from any friendly neighbours. The oppor- 
tunities for the transfer of population to this area are therefore small. 



* We use the term " Negeb " merely as a convenient synonym for " the 
Beersheba sub-district," though we are aware that technically there is a 
certain difference in connotation between the two terms. 



106 



That being so, we feel that to include the Beersheba sub-district 
in the Arab State is to condemn it to perpetual poverty, for there is 
no doubt that the Arab State will not be able to afford money for 
its development, or to effect any substantial improvement in the 
present under-nourished condition of its Bedouin inhabitants. 

227. To include the Negeb in the Arab State now would, moreover, 
mean that the Jews would forthwith be precluded from all hope of 
settling in any part of this vast and sparsely inhabited area. Slender 
as the prospect of successful Jewish settlement therein may now seem 
to be, we think that there are large parts of the sub-district, now 
almost entirely unoccupied, which the Jews ought to be given an 
opportunity to develop forthwith ; and that, even as regards the 
occupied portion of the sub-district, it would be wrong to take such 
action as would exclude that prospect entirely until the tests 
now being undertaken and any further experiments which it may be 
decided to carry out have been completed, and the scope for closer 
settlement in that portion of the Negeb can be stated with greater 
precision than is now possible. If as a result of such investiga- 
tion the Government are satisfied that there are opportunities 
for additional settlement after reasonable provision has been 
made for the needs of the existing population, we think it only 
fair to the Jews that they should be allowed to share in such 
opportunities under conditions which will ensure that the rights of 
the existing inhabitants are not prejudiced. But for this purpose 
an ample supply of funds will be required. Money might be forth- 
coming from Jewish sources for a scheme of development which, while 
having for one of its objects an improvement of the conditions of the 
existing inhabitants, would also facilitate the settlement of Jews in 
the area. That would not be possible if the Negeb were included 
in an Arab State ; but it could be done if it were either retained 
under Mandate or included in the Jewish State. Since, however, 
there are at present no Jews at all in the area, the inclusion in the 
Jewish State of the 60,000 Arabs in the occupied portion of the 
Negeb would clearly be contrary to our terms of reference ; nor 
do we favour the inclusion in the Jewish State at this stage of what 
we have described above as the unoccupied area. It follows, there- 
fore, that if the Negeb is to be developed, as is desirable in the 
interests of both Arabs and Jews, it must be retained under Mandate 
for the present. 

228. Our recommendations for the political future of the country 
will follow in the next chapter, when we come to consider its economic 
development and the conditions under which Jewish settlement 
therein may be permitted. Here we need only say that we propose 
to apply to the Negeb the general principle that no independent 
State shall be set up in this area in opposition to the wishes of the 
minority, unless that minority is so small, either actually or relatively, 
or so situated territorially, that its wishes ought not to be allowed to 



107 



frustrate the wishes of the majority. This principle will, we hope, 
make it clear to the Arab inhabitants of the Negeb that there can be 
no question of their being placed under the political domination of 
the Jews against their will. 

229. Provision must, however, be made for the possibility that 
at some future date the Negeb, with the consent of the minority, 
may acquire its independence, or may desire to unite with the 
Jewish State, with which, however, it will have no direct contact 
by land. To meet this contingency, we think it necessary to 
draw the southern boundary of the Arab State along the boundary 
between the village lands of Khan Yunis and Rafah, north of 
the Palestine-Sinai frontier, and to include the village lands of 
Rafah (39,900 dunums with a population of 1,600 Arabs) in the 
Southern Mandated Territory, thus providing for direct access from 
this territory both to the sea and to the railway. 

230. As stated in paragraph 215 (e) above, the Southern Mandated 
Territory will include the whole of the Beersheba sub-district with 
the exception of a small area on the west. It will be seen from map 10 
that the existing boundary of the sub-district practically coincides, 
for some distance between Gaza and Khan Yunis, with the main 
railway line from Lydda to Kantara. A line running close to a 
railway is an unsuitable boundary between two states, and we 
have, therefore, thought it advisable to draw the western boundary 
of the Southern Mandated Territory further to the east in this section. 

3. The Central Part of Palestine 

231. It follows from what has been said above that in our judg- 
ment this is the only part of Palestine which, under present conditions, 
can be subjected to partition without injury to either Arabs or Jews. 
The basis of partition which we recommend under plan C for this 
central part is the same as for plan B, with the exception of the 
northern end of the coastal area and the Carmel Ridge. Here it 
will be necessary to draw two new boundary lines, one cutting off 
the Jewish State in the coastal area from the northern section, 
which is to be retained under Mandate ; and the other modifying 
the line between the Jewish State and the Arab State in the hill- 
country of Samaria. For the former we recommend a line drawn 
across the southern edge of the Carmel Ridge, from the coast north 
of the villages of Tantura, Bat Shelomo, Daliyat ar Rauha and Al 
Kafrin till it joins the boundary between the Jewish and Arab 
States as proposed under plan B. For the latter we propose a line 
striking in a north-easterly direction from the boundary between 
the Arab and Jewish States under plan B in the neighbourhood of 
the village of Kafr Qari to a point on the northern boundary of the 
Jewish State north-west of the village of Al Kafrin. 



108 



232. In chapter X, in the course of our criticism of plan B, we 
expressed the view that it was fundamentally wrong that, while the 
Jews in the plains to the south and east were to be given their 
independence, the Arabs in Galilee or any part of it should be denied 
their independence in order to ensure the security of the neighbouring 
Jewish State. But, it may now be asked, granted the validity 
of this argument against plan B, why does it not apply with equal 
force against plan C, under which it is proposed to deny the claim 
of the Arabs to be allowed to set up an independent Arab State in the 
whole of the northern territory, or at least (if on grounds of defence 
Haifa must be retained under Mandate) in the whole of the remainder 
of that territory ? 

This is an objection which calls for serious treatment, but we 
believe that the arguments which follow are sufficient to dispose 
of it. 

(i) Under plan B, the Arabs in Galilee — a purely Arab 
area — would be denied their independence in order that the 
Jewish state might be established in the neighbouring plains 
to the east and south. The wishes of the Arab majority were 
to be ignored, while the wishes of the Jewish minority were 
recognized. Under plan C the same problem arises, but the 
difficulty is met by refusing to give preferential treatment to 
either the majority or the minority ; both must remain without 
their independence until they can reach agreement. 

(ii) The Jews have entered Palestine under the most solemn 
assurances from the League of Nations and from His Majesty's 
Government in particular as the Mandatory Power. It has 
never been suggested that those assurances would be violated 
by the proposal to include in the Arab State a few thousand 
Jews, mostly in the town of Jaffa, who could if necessary be 
transferred or exchanged. But it would, in our opinion, be 
entirely inconsistent with those assurances to put under the 
political domination of an Arab State the 19,000 Jews living 
in the numerous settlements up and down the plains east and 
south of Galilee. 

For these reasons we conclude that the argument in question does 
not hold good against plan C. 

233. The argument for plan C may now be summarized as 
follows — 

(i) It is impossible, without injustice to either Arabs or 
Jews, to partition the northern territory. Nor can this territory 
be handed over intact to either side. 

(ii) It is also impossible to hand over the Negeb to the Jews 
without a violation of our terms of reference, while it would be 
unfair to the Jews to hand it over to the Arabs so long as there 



109 

remains any reasonable prospect of Jewish settlement taking 
place therein without prejudice to the rights of the existing 
inhabitants. 

(hi) Both the northern and the southern territories must 
therefore be retained under Mandate for an indefinite period. 

(iv) The only part of Palestine which can be partitioned is 
therefore the central portion, within which the boundaries 
of the proposed Arab and Jewish States and of the Jerusalem 
Enclave will be as on map 10. These boundaries will be identical 
with those in plan B, except as explained in paragraphs 229-230 
above. 

234. The resulting figures of land and population for the whole of 
Palestine are given below — 



Arab State 

Arabs Jews 

Population 444,100 8,900 

Land .. .. 7,329,700 63,800 

Jewish State 

Arabs Jews 
Population . . 54,400 226,000 
Land .. .. 821,700 436,100 

Mandated Territory 

(i) Jerusalem Enclave 

Arabs Jews 
Population .. 211,400 80,100 
Land .. .. 1,485,200 78,700 

(ii) Northern Territory 

Arabs Jews 
Population .. 231,400 77,300 
Land .. .. 2,730,500 677,300 

(iii) Southern Territory 

Arabs Jews 
Population .. 60,000 — 
Land .. 1, 944,500 (?) 55,500 

Total Mandated Territories 
Arabs Jews 
Population .. 502,800 157,400 
Land .. .. 6,160,200 811,500 



Total 
453,000 
7,393,500* 

Total 
280,400 
1,257,800* 



Total 
291,500 
1,563,900* 

Total 
308,700 
3,407,800* 

Total 
60,000 
2,000,000(?)*f 

Total 
660,200 
6,971, 700*f 



* Excluding roads, railways, lakes and rivers. 

f Excluding 10,577,000 dunums of desert in the Beersheba sub-district. 



110 



235. It will be noted that the Arab minority in the Jewish State 
under plan C, though considerably reduced, will still be substantial. 
We shall consider in chapter XVI the question of the provision of 
suitable guarantees for this and other minorities. While, however, 
we have no doubt that the Jews will be prepared to furnish full 
guarantees for the liberal treatment of the Arab minority, we consider 
that every effort should be made to encourage and assist the voluntary 
transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State. In chapter VIII we reached 
the conclusion that land is not available for the resettlement of 
of the large number of Arabs who would be included in the Jewish 
State under plan A, and we do not suggest that it would be possible 
to re-settle in the near future more than a fraction of the much 
smaller number who would be included in the Jewish State under 
plan C. There are, however, limited possibilities of resettlement ; 
moreover, as we shall show in paragraph 269 of chapter XIII, there 
is room for a very considerable increase in the number of settlers 
on the existing Jewish land in the Northern Mandated Territory, 
and it would appear that this might provide a means for facilitating 
the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish State. We consider that 
negotiations should be entered into with the Jews with a view to 
obtaining a definite undertaking from them to finance, within 
reasonable limits, the cost of such transfer and re-settlement in the 
Arab State or the Mandated Territories. As stated in chapter XVIII 
(Finance), we were given to understand by Jewish witnesses that this 
was a service which they were prepared to undertake. 



Ill 



CHAPTER XII 

JEWISH PROPOSALS FOR THE JEWISH STATE (APART 
FROM JERUSALEM) 

236. Before reaching our conclusions on plans A, B, and C as set 
out in the previous chapters, we had before us certain proposals 
made by the Jews for the modification of plan A and gave them 
our careful consideration. We have already dealt in chapter IX 
with the Jewish proposals relating to Jerusalem. In this chapter 
we deal with the remainder. It will be seen from map 7 and the 
description in the following paragraphs that some of these proposals 
are inconsistent with plan C : there is not, however, the same 
inconsistency with plan B. In any case we think it desirable to 
examine these proposals in detail. 

237. On behalf of the Jews it has been urged that the plan out- 
lined by the Royal Commission is open to the objection that the 
area of the Jewish State is too small. The following is an extract 
from a memorandum submitted to us by them — 

The possibilities of new agricultural settlement in this area (the 
Jewish State) are extremely limited. The major part of it is occupied 
by Arabs. The Royal Commission in assigning this territory to the 
Jewish State definitely envisaged the transfer of the bulk of that Arab 
population, if need be by compulsory means, as far as the plains are 
concerned. If, as would appear from the terms of the Secretary of State's 
despatch, the idea of compulsory transfer has now been abandoned, it is 
essential that it should be realized that the area in the Jewish State 
available for future Jewish settlement, limited as it is in any case, has 
suffered a very considerable further reduction. The narrow margin of 
land which may still be available for new Jewish settlement, must be 
considered in relation to the imperative need (a) of providing room in 
Palestine for large numbers of Jews who are facing ruin in Eastern and 
Central Europe, (b) of creating a broad agricultural base for the Jewish 
population of the State, and (c) comprising within its borders a population 
large enough to serve as a home market for its industries. 

238. In order to increase the size of its territory it has been sug- 
gested that the following areas should be included in the Jewish 
State as outlined by the Royal Commission (plan A) — 

(i) an additional area in the Gaza sub-district (under 
plan A only a small portion of the Gaza sub-district would be 
included in the Jewish State) ; 

(ii) a part of the Beersheba sub-district ; 

(iii) the southern portion of the Beisan Plain ; 



112 



(iv) an area on the eastern side of the River Jordan lying 
between the Yarmuk River on the north and a line opposite 
the southern edge of the Beisan Plain on the south, and bounded 
on the east by a line drawn in the hills overlooking the Jordan 
Valley. (This area is situated in Trans-Jordan.) 

For convenience of reference these areas are hereafter referred 
to as areas (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) respectively. 

Area (i) 

239. The figures for the population and land are — 

Population 

Arabs. Jews. Total. 
24,300 Nil 24,300 



Land (in dunums) 

Arabs. Jews. Total. 

Citrus land 7,000 200 7,200 

Other cultivable land 397,400 3,100 400,500 

Uncultivable land 55,800 — 55,800 



Total land* 460,200 3,300 463,500 



This area is predominantly Arab. The population (over 24,000) is 
entirely Arab, while the land is held almost entirely by Arabs, the 
Jewish land forming less than one per cent, of the total. This area 
could not, therefore, be included in the Jewish State without a 
violation of the charge in our terms of reference to include the fewest 
possible Arabs and Arab enterprises in that state. For this reason 
we are of opinion that it should not be assigned to the Jewish State. 



Area (ii) 

240. If area (i) cannot be included in the Jewish State, neither 
can area (ii), for the latter would then form a small island of Jewish 
territory entirely detached from the Jewish State. Under plan C 
this area is retained under Mandate and provision is made for 
Jewish settlement therein, if sufficient land should be available after 
the reasonable needs of the existing population have been met. 

Area (iii) 

241. This comprises the southern part of the Beisan Plain with 
an area of about 92,000 dunums, of which, by the middle of the 
present year (1938), the Jews had acquired about 17,000 dunums. 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



113 



The population consists of about 7,000 Arabs and about 200 Jews. 
It is an area which is capable of development. It contains a large 
number of springs, the water of which is at present not being used 
economically, and, as was explained in chapter VIII, the more 
economical use of this water would enable a somewhat larger area 
to be brought under irrigation. When we were examining plan B we 
gave considerable thought to the question whether this area should 
be included in the Jewish State. Our conclusion was that it should 
not, for the following reasons, be assigned to that State. First, it is 
undesirable that the town of Beisan, which is an entirely Arab town 
with over 3,000 inhabitants and a centre of Arab nationalism, should 
be included in the Jewish State. Secondly, as we have explained 
in chapter VIII, the amount of land available for the resettlement 
of Arabs wishing to transfer from the Jewish to the Arab State 
is very small, and this fact makes it desirable that this area 
should be retained in the Arab State in order to provide holdings to 
which, when developed, Arabs might transfer from the Jewish State. 
In so far as this object is fulfilled, Jewish settlement in the Jewish 
State is facilitated. 

Area (iv) 

242. The proposal relating to this area involves the extension of 
the Jewish State across the River Jordan so as to include within its 
boundaries a part of Trans- Jordan. We have decided against this 
proposal because — apart from the doubt whether the Government 
of Trans- Jordan would agree to the transfer to the Jewish State of 
this part of their territory — the military authorities have advised 
us that, in order to obtain a suitable defensive boundary for 
this area, it would be necessary to draw that boundary a very 
considerable distance inside the Trans- Jordan hills. This would 
mean the inclusion in the Jewish State, in addition to the sparsely 
populated lands in the valley, of a large number of villages in the 
hill country of Trans- Jordan, a country inhabited entirely by Arabs. 

243. The Royal Commission recommended that the boundary 
between the Arab and Jewish States should cross the Carmel Ridge 
in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road, and the boundary we 
have adopted under plans A and B, in accordance with the advice 
of the military authorities, runs just to the north of this road, the 
road itself being situated in the Arab State. It has been suggested 
on the part of the Jews that the boundary should be drawn south 
of this road, so as to include not only the road in the Jewish State 
but also the high points in the vicinity and to the east of the village 
of Umm Al Fahm. The reasons urged in support of this suggestion 
are, first, that the road is an essential line of communication between 
the Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime Plain, both of which are 
situated in the Jewish State under plan B, and secondly, that from 
the point of view of defence it is necessary to include within that state 



114 



the hills in the vicinity of Umm Al Fahm. We have not been able 
to accept this suggestion. The Megiddo road, that is the road 
running through the Musmus Pass to Hadera, although it is an 
important line of communication, is not the only road across the 
Carmel Ridge between the Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime 
Plain. There is another road about 13 kilometres (about 8 miles) 
to the north which leaves the Plain of Esdraelon a short distance 
north of the Jewish settlement of Yokneam and crosses the ridge by 
way of the Jewish Colonies of Bat Shelomo and Zikhron Ya'aqov. 
This road provides a good means of communication between the 
Plain of Esdraelon and the Maritime Plain. The country south of 
the Megiddo road is entirely Arab, and the adoption of a boundary 
which would include in the Jewish State the hills in the vicinity of 
Umm Al Fahm would not only mean the inclusion in that state of 
a considerable area of Arab land in the hills, but also the southern 
portion of the Plain of Esdraelon, an almost entirely Arab area. 
The Arab population which would be included in the Jewish State 
would be large. The village of Umm Al Fahm itself has a population 
of about 4,700, and the total Arab population affected would be 
between 10,000 and 15,000 persons. Moreover, we have been 
advised by the military authorities that the inclusion of the high 
ground round Umm Al Fahm is not essential for the defence of the 
Jewish State, and that a boundary drawn along the northern side 
of the Megiddo road gives the Jewish State a reasonably good defen- 
sive boundary. 

244. It has also been proposed that the Jerusalem Enclave 
should be extended to the south so as to include the town of Hebron, 
29 kilometres (18 miles) south of Jerusalem. For the Jews Hebron 
possesses great historical associations : it contains the burial place 
of the Patriarchs and was the first capital of King David. Hebron 
is, however, an important Arab town with a population of 20,000 
persons. There was a small Jewish population there before the 
disturbances of 1929, but the survivors have since been compelled 
to leave the town. To include Hebron in mandated territory would 
mean the extension of the enclave boundary southward by 14 kilo- 
metres (9 miles) and would deprive the Arab State not only of an 
important town but also of a considerable rural population. We feel 
that we should not be justified in proposing such a large addition 
to the enclave in order to include therein the Jewish sacred places at 
Hebron. Arrangements will be necessary for the protection of places 
sacred to the Jews in the Arab State and vice-versa, and the Jewish 
sacred places at Hebron will be covered by these arrangements. 

245. It has also been suggested that the following areas should 
be retained under Mandate — 

(a) the area, including Jericho, lying between the eastern 
boundary of the Jerusalem Enclave and the River Jordan ; 



115 



(b) a strip of territory along the western shore of the 
Dead Sea ; 

(c) the southern part of the Beersheba sub-district. 

Under plan C the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, with the 
exception of a small part on the west, will be retained under Mandate. 
This includes not only the area covered by (c) but also a part of (b). 
As regards (a) and the rest of (b), we have not found it possible to 
accept the suggestion that they should be retained under Mandate, 
which would mean the severance of the Arab area south of the 
Jerusalem Enclave from that north of it. 

The effect of plan C will be that the works of the Palestine 
Potash Company at the northern end of the Dead Sea will be 
situated in the Arab State and those at the southern end in 
Mandated territory. It has been represented to us that the whole 
of the works should be included in Mandated territory, one of the 
arguments used being the need of preserving the right of pre-emption 
in time of war of the products of the company under their concession, 
which the Mandatory Power now possesses by virtue of that concession. 
Under our proposals the benefit of this right will fall to be appor- 
tioned among the successor Administrations. We should not feel 
justified in recommending that the company's northern works should 
be included in Mandated territory on this ground, but we invite the 
attention of His Majesty's Government to the point in case it should 
be desired to make provision in the treaty with the Arab State for 
the right to pre-empt the company's products in time of war. 



116 



CHAPTER XIII 

JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE MANDATED TERRITORIES 

UNDER PLAN C 

246. The facts recounted in the previous chapters have compelled 
us to conclude that the central section is the only part of Palestine 
which can as yet be given its independence under a plan of partition, 
and that the rest of the country should still remain under Mandate. 
But what form should this Mandate take, and what provision, if any, 
should be made in it for Jewish immigration ? The Royal Commission 
recommended that the Balfour Declaration should not apply to the 
territory to be retained under Mandate under their plan : all the 
inhabitants of that territory should stand on an equal footing ; 
and the basis of the new Mandate should be simply the principle of 
good and just government without regard for sectional interests. 
But the area proposed to be retained under Mandate under the 
Royal Commission's plan was very much smaller than that 
proposed under plan C. Under the former the Mandated area 
(exclusive of the small enclave of Nazareth) was limited to 
the Jerusalem Enclave, whereas under the latter it includes not 
only that Enclave but also the Northern and Southern Mandated 
Territories. On the other hand, the area proposed for the Jewish 
State under the Royal Commission's plan was very much larger 
than under plan C. It is understandable that the Royal Commission 
should have felt that the obligations to the Jews under the Balfour 
Declaration did not require that any special provision should be 
made for Jewish immigration into the area retained under Mandate 
under their plan. But the position is different under plan C. It 
would seem, therefore, that, if the Royal Commission were right in 
regarding their plan as fulfilling the obligations to the Jews under 
the Balfour Declaration, suitable provision should be made under 
plan C for the continuation of Jewish immigration into a part, at 
least, of the areas to be retained under Mandate, provided that the 
rights and interests of the existing inhabitants are not thereby 
prejudiced. 

247. It is worth while to consider more closely what the Arab 
reactions to such a policy in the Mandated Territories are likely to 
be. The Royal Commission found that the causes of Arab discontent 
with the present Mandate were mainly three — (1) fear of political 
domination by the Jews ; (2) fear of economic domination by the 



117 



Jews ; and (3) desire for national independence and consciousness 
that it is because of the Jews that they are being denied it. Taking 
these points in order — 

(1) Under plan C the Arabs in the Mandated Territories will 
have a sure guarantee against the fear of Jewish political 
domination. It should be laid down in the clearest terms, and 
we think that the principle should be embodied in the Mandate 
itself, that the Arabs in the Northern and Southern Mandated 
Territories cannot be placed under Jewish rule without their 
own consent. In the Jerusalem Enclave the question will not 
arise, since the Mandate will be permanent. 

(2) The Arabs' fear of economic domination by the Jews is 
real and pertinent ; and our plan will not succeed unless we 
can devise measures which will remove it, or at least justify 
both His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations in 
feeling that there is no longer any reasonable foundation for it. 
Our proposals under this head will be set out later on in this 
chapter. 

(3) Under plan C the Arabs will be given the opportunity to 
set up an Arab State in as large a part of Palestine as can be 
assigned to them without injury to the Jews. And we are 
confident that no impartial person would think the Arabs 
justified in claiming sovereign rights over the persons and 
property of Jews who have settled in other parts of Palestine 
on the faith of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. 

We consider that, subject to the reservation in sub-paragraph (2) 
above, the Arabs, if they are prepared to accept plan C otherwise, 
would have no reasonable ground for opposing further Jewish 
immigration into the Mandated Territories. On the contrary, for the 
reasons given in chapter III in our discussion of the population 
problem, and further developed in chapter XXII, under the same 
head, we think that the Arabs in the Mandated Territories would be 
faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship if Jewish 
immigration should be completely closed down, than they would 
be if it should be allowed to continue under the conditions proposed 
in this chapter. 

248. We suggest that one of the advantages of plan C is that it 
presents a fresh opportunity to carry out on a smaller scale and, as we 
trust, in a more favourable atmosphere than before, the experiment, 
which the original framers of the Balfour Declaration must surely 
have had in mind, of seeking to build up, by the joint efforts of both 
Arabs and Jews, a single state in which the two races may ultimately 
learn to live and work together as fellow-citizens. Even to many 
persons to whom the thought of partitioning the Holy Land is 
abhorrent, it is hoped that such a policy will make an appeal ; and the 
British people will, we believe, be ready, notwithstanding their 
existing heavy burdens, to make such financial sacrifices as the policy 
may require of them if a peaceful settlement can thereby be secured. 



118 



249. We have said that, if Jewish immigration into the Mandated 
Territories is to be permitted to continue under suitable conditions 
after partition, it is essential that the causes of Arab fears of economic 
domination should be removed. For this two things are in our 
opinion necessary : a positive and constructive policy of develop- 
ment, designed for the direct benefit of the Arabs as well as of the 
Jews, and a negative policy of control over Jewish acquisition of 
land, which shall enable the Arabs to know precisely under what 
conditions further Jewish settlement in these territories may take 
place. It is not enough to rely upon generalities such as the words 
of the Balfour Declaration : the Arabs must be told in precise and 
unequivocal terms exactly what safeguards are proposed in order 
to protect them in future from the economic domination of the Jews. 

250. In our opinion immigration policy can only be determined 
in relation to Jewish acquisition of and settlement on the land. 
Accordingly we begin with the two latter questions and set out 
immediately below a summary of our recommendations under each 
of these heads, for the Northern Mandated Territory, the Jerusalem 
Enclave, and the Southern Mandated Territory respectively. In the 
succeeding paragraphs we shall explain and justify these recom- 
mendations ; and we shall then proceed in the next chapter to 
discuss immigration policy for the Mandated Territories. 

251. Our recommendations, then, are as follows — 

1. The Northern Mandated Territory 

(1) The Mandatory should be empowered under the Mandate, 
and should forthwith obtain statutory powers, to control (including 
power to prohibit), either generally or in any prescribed area, the 
transfer of land to — 

(a) any person or persons ; 

(b) any class or classes of persons ; 

(c) any company, corporation or other body of persons. 

This power of control should extend to sale, mortgage, gift, 
dedication of waqf of every description, lease and any other disposition 
of land except devise by a will. 

Land should be denned as including houses, buildings, and things 
permanently fixed on the land. 

(2) (i) The Mandatory should thereupon declare an area corres- 
ponding approximately to Galilee,* as defined in paragraph 184, a 
prescribed area for this purpose and prohibit therein — 

(a) the transfer of land by a non-Jew to a Jew ; and 



* Defence considerations were taken into account in drawing the boundary 
of Galilee as shown on map 9. It does not follow that precisely the same 
boundaries would be appropriate for the present purpose. 



119 



(b) the transfer of land to any company, corporation or other 
body of persons except with the prior approval of the Admini- 
stration. This approval would not be given unless the Admini- 
stration was satisfied that the land was being acquired by the 
company or other body as the case may be for a purpose other 
than Jewish occupation. 

(ii) After ten years this prohibition should be reviewed, but should 
not be withdrawn or relaxed in the area, or in any part of the area, 
to which it has been applied unless the Mandatory and the League 
of Nations are satisfied that Arab opinion in the area affected is in 
favour of such withdrawal or relaxation. It would be left to the 
Mandatory to decide how Arab opinion should be obtained. 

(iii) Jews should not be prohibited from residing in the prescribed 
area. 

(3) There should be no prohibition on the transfer of land to Jews 
in the urban area of Haifa (as defined in appendix 8) and in any 
other urban area which the Mandatory Government may from time 
to time declare to be a free area for this purpose. It is suggested 
that Tiberias should be declared such an area from the outset. 

(4) As regards the rest of the territory, the transfer of land to 
Jews should be prohibited save in the following cases — 

(a) transfers with the approval of Government for the 
consolidation of existing Jewish holdings, for facilitating 
irrigation of existing holdings, and for the parcellation into 
individual ownership of masha'a land held in common by Jews 
and Arabs ; 

(b) any other transfer respecting which the Government are 
satisfied — 

(i) that there are possibilities of closer settlement on the 
land to be acquired ; 

(ii) that adequate provision has been or will be made for 
the resettlement of the cultivators under conditions which 
will enable them to obtain a reasonable livelihood from their 
holdings, and that such provision will be carried into effect ; 
and 

(iii) that, save where the Government are satisfied that 
conditions make it impracticable, any surplus land or other 
benefits resulting from the promotion of closer settlement 
will be shared equitably between Jews and Arabs, if 
necessary in consideration of a contribution by Government, in 
conformity with the principle enunciated in paragraph 251 (5) 
below, towards the capital cost incurred by the Jews in 
developing the land or otherwise. 

(5) We recognize that the Government are already expending very 
considerable sums on agricultural services ; but we fear that these 
are not enough for the purposes we have in mind. We propose that 



120 



in addition, with the object of facilitating Jewish settlement, the 
Government should assist, and when necessary themselves undertake, 
an active programme designed to benefit both Arabs and Jews 
of (a) agricultural development, including drainage and reclama- 
tion of lands, provision of water if available, and construction of 
roads and bridges, and (b) of agricultural research, experiment and 
education ; and that for this purpose they should be prepared to 
spend additional sums up to a specified amount. 

(6) In so far as surplus agricultural land may be made available 
as the direct result of such development, the benefit therein should be 
shared equitably between both Arabs and Jews. 

2. The Jerusalem Enclave 

252. All the above recommendations apply to the Jerusalem 
Enclave, except that it is not thought that the Government will 
find it necessary to declare any part of this territory a prescribed 
area, in which the transfer of land to Jews shall be prohibited, and 
that the urban area of Jerusalem should be declared to be a free 
area from the outset for the purpose of paragraph 251 (3) above. 

3. The Southern Mandated Territory 

253. It is not easy to formulate precisely the lines on which 
development should proceed in this Territory, with a view both to 
the protection of the interests of the existing inhabitants and to the 
promotion of Jewish settlement therein. But broadly speaking we 
suggest that the Mandatory might proceed on the lines indicated 
below. 

254. For the purpose of facilitating Jewish settlement therein, 
we recommend that the Negeb be regarded as divisible into two 
parts, an Unoccupied and an Occupied area, which should be dealt 
with separately. The Occupied area would be that portion of the 
Beersheba sub-district which the Bedouin tribes are accustomed to 
cultivate and over which they claim tribal or hereditary rights of 
occupancy. The Unoccupied area would be the rest of the sub- 
district. The dividing line between the two might be roughly a line 
corresponding with the 5-in. rainfall contour and the change in the 
character of the country which we have described in paragraph 1 10 : 
it has been suggested to us that it would run more or less from 
Al Auja to Asluj and Kurnub. 

The Unoccupied Area 

255. The Unoccupied area has no settled inhabitants, though 
occasionally a few wandering Bedouin pass over it. It is desert, 
and desert it is likely to remain, unless Jewish enterprise and 
capital can develop it. This area, or any part of it which the 
Government are satisfied that the Jews have a serious intention of 



121 



developing, would be declared by Government to be a public 
domain, subject to the obligation to compensate any tribe or 
individual who may be able to satisfy the competent court that they 
have a right of occupancy therein. A lease of such part or parts of 
it as the Government may think fit would be granted by the 
Government to a Jewish company, financed entirely from private 
sources, which we suggest might with advantage be entrusted with 
the promotion of Jewish settlement in the Negeb generally. The 
lease would be free of rent, though taxation or royalties would be 
payable as usual in respect of the land or its resources, and would be 
for such period and subject to such conditions as the Government may 
determine, including (i) the repayment by the company of any 
expenditure incurred by the Government in payment of compensation 
for ownership or occupancy rights in the area covered by the lease, 
and (ii) such conditions as the Government may think fit to impose 
with a view to maintaining communications with the Gulf of Aqaba, 
and the right to construct or provide railways, roads or other forms 
of transport, either itself or by any person or body nominated by it. 
This will enable the Jews, should they think fit, to try, at least, to 
develop the Unoccupied area of the Negeb ; and this opportunity 
should not, we consider, be denied to them. This would still leave 
the way open to any other interested parties, for example, a 
mining company, to develop a part of the area under appropriate 
conditions. 

256. As regards the political future of the Unoccupied area, we 
see no difficulty in the ultimate grant of independence to this portion 
of the Territory, in which the number of inhabitants is at present so 
small as to be negligible, provided that in the meantime the Jews 
have taken advantage of the arrangements now proposed to settle 
therein in considerable numbers. 

The Occupied Area 

257. The Occupied area would be declared by the Government, 
under the powers recommended in paragraph 251 (1) above, to be for 
the time being a prescribed area in which Jews should be prohibited 
from acquiring land. Except for the urban area of Beersheba 
itself, we understand that no part of the Beersheba sub-district 
has been surveyed and settled. Steps should be taken to survey 
and settle this area as quickly as possible, staff and funds being 
provided for the purpose in addition to the normal provision for the 
completion of settlement proceedings in the rest of the Mandated 
Territories. We regard this as important, since until this work has 
been completed, no settlement of the Jews in this area can take place, 
and no steps can be taken to improve the standard of living of the 
Bedouin. We understand that it is estimated that the work of 
settlement survey north of 31° latitude, which roughly corresponds 
with the line of demarcation between the two areas as suggested in 



122 



paragraph 254 above, would take about years to complete, at a 
cost of about £P130,000. The declaration of the area as a prescribed 
area should remain in force until the survey is completed. 

258. It is most important that the goodwill of the Arabs should be 
secured in advance of any direct action for the purpose of facilitating 
Jewish settlement in this area, and with this object it is desirable 
that steps should be taken as soon as possible to explain the Govern- 
ment's policy clearly to the Bedouin tribes, and to obtain their 
general assent to the experiments which it may be desired to under- 
take before any general scheme of development can be put into 
operation. These experiments are of three kinds, water-boring tests, 
conservation of surface water, and an experimental dry farming station, 
and have already been described by us in the chapter dealing with the 
Possibility of Exchanges and Transfer of Population (chapter VIII). 
The nature and purpose of these experiments should be made clear 
to the Bedouin, and any suggestions which they may have to make 
should receive due consideration. They should be made to realize 
that, if the experiments are successful, it is they themselves who will 
be the first to benefit in consequence. This may take time, but we 
agree with the Royal Commission that it would be a mistake to 
proceed too hastily in this matter. The tribes cannot be expected 
to acquiesce very readily in a scheme which, if successful, will result 
in their being obliged to choose between leaving the country 
altogether, and adopting a settled life instead of their present 
semi-nomadic habits ; and they must be assured that they will be 
given every advice and assistance by Government in the process of 
accustoming themselves to the new mode of life which is offered 
to them. We think it justifiable to assume that in this way the 
goodwill of the tribes will be obtained ; the alternative action, 
which we recommend should be taken if this hope should not be 
fulfilled, is described in paragraph 262 below. 

259. When the goodwill of the tribes has been obtained, we think 
that the greater part of the experiments should be undertaken 
directly by the Jews, the programme being drawn up with the 
approval of Government. 

260. If these experiments show that closer settlement on the 
land is possible, the Government should make an estimate, in 
consultation with the Jews and with representatives of the local 
tribe or tribes, of the quantity of surplus land. In view of their 
exceptional poverty the local inhabitants should have the first 
claim to benefit by any improvements in cultivation which may be 
found possible as the result of these experiments and which will 
enable them to adopt a reasonable standard of life ; and the Arab 
claim under the principle of equitable sharing between Arabs and 
Jews, as proposed in paragraph 251 (6) above, should be deemed to 
have been discharged when reasonable provision has been made in 
this way for the needs of the existing inhabitants. 



123 



261. As soon as the Government are satisfied that the reasonable 
needs of the existing inhabitants have been or will be met, the 
prohibition on Jewish acquisition of land in this area should be 
withdrawn, and Jews should be permitted to acquire land in the 
area for purposes of settlement, subject to the approval of Govern- 
ment. The Government should be prepared to withdraw the 
prohibition gradually in respect of each section of the area as the 
settlement survey thereof is complete, provided that they are 
satisfied that Jewish purchases of land in that section will not lead 
to breaches of the peace. 

262. It remains to consider the possibility that the Bedouin will 
from the outset oppose any action which, though designed to benefit 
themselves in the first place, will ultimately facilitate the settlement 
of Jews in the Negeb. We do not think that the Government should 
allow their policy to be frustrated in this way by the unreasonable 
opposition of backward tribes, occupying an area which, if the 
experiments should indicate that a higher standard of cultivation 
is possible, will be in excess of their reasonable requirements. 
We think, therefore, that in that event the representatives of the 
tribes should be told that the Government are nevertheless deter- 
mined to carry out the experiments which they have in mind, but 
will do so themselves, the Jews not being allowed to participate 
at this stage, and that until the experiments are completed the 
area will remain a prescribed area, in which no Jew will be permitted 
to acquire or settle on land. Meanwhile the settlement survey will 
be carried out by Government as proposed. When the results of 
the experiments are available the matter will be reconsidered, and it 
may be hoped that, if these are favourable, the Bedouin will be ready 
to reconsider their attitude when it is explained to them that unless 
they do so they must not expect that money will be made available 
for improving their own position. 

263. As regards the political future of the Occupied area, we are 
of opinion that no independent state should be set up there in opposi- 
tion to the wishes of trie minority, unless that minority is so small, 
either actually or relatively, or so situated territorially, that its 
wishes ought not to be allowed to frustrate the wishes of the majority. 
In order that there may be no room for misunderstanding it should 
be made plain that the Occupied area will not be made an indepen- 
dent state if the majority of the Bedouin, assuming their numbers 
and territorial disposition to be much the same as at present, are 
opposed to that course. 

264. In any case we think it desirable that the Mandate for the 
whole Southern Mandated Territory should continue for at least 
ten years. 



124 



265. At the cost of some repetition, we will now explain the 
object and effect of these recommendations. 

4. The Negative Policy of Control 

On what we have called the negative, or control, side of 
future policy, the Jews will be prohibited from acquiring land and 
settling (but not from mere residence) in Galilee for a period of at least 
ten years from the date of partition. That, we feel sure, is a necessary 
measure of precaution if there is to be any chance of the new policy 
being accepted by the Arabs. Whether the Jews will ever be allowed 
to settle in Galilee or not will depend on whether experience shows 
that the various obstacles, human, financial and economic, to 
successful settlement in the hill-country, which the Jews themselves 
recognize to exist to-day, can be successfully overcome ; the need 
for markets, the uncertainty as to underground water supplies, the 
doubt whether certain new forms of cultivation will succeed in the 
hill-country, the doubts concerning the size of the appropriate lot 
viable, the difficulties of training cultivators in the new methods, of 
providing the necessary finance, of finding owners willing to sell to 
Jews ; and — perhaps most important of all — the doubt whether at 
best there will remain after a few years any surplus land in Galilee 
for new settlement if the natural increase of population continues at 
the present rate. And finally, even if it can be shown by experiment 
and by practical experience elsewhere that these obstacles, or most 
of them, can be successfully overcome, our scheme still provides that 
Jewish settlement cannot take place in this area without the consent 
of the Arab population of the area. We are convinced that nothing 
short of an absolute guarantee of this kind, in unequivocal terms, can 
remove the Arabs' suspicions of what the Government may intend 
to do when the initial period has expired. In the meantime it will 
be open to the Jews, by their attitude towards the Arabs elsewhere in 
Palestine, to convince the Arabs in Galilee that it is really to their 
interest to accept them as neighbours. 

266. As regards the rest of the Northern Mandated Territory 
and the Jerusalem Enclave generally, the effect of our recom- 
mendations is, broadly speaking, to confine* Jewish acquisition of 
land within three channels. To take the least important first, the Jews 
may, with the Government's approval, acquire land for the con- 
solidation of existing holdings, or for facilitating irrigation of existing 
holdings, or for the panellation into individual ownership of land in 
which the Jews have already acquired an interest, but which is held 
under the masha'a system in common ownership by a number of 
proprietors, some of whom are Arabs. The right to acquire land for 
these purposes is something which clearly cannot be expected as a 
general rule to prejudice the interests of the Arab cultivators, and 
cannot reasonably be denied to the Jews. Purchase would, of course, 
be subject in all cases to the willingness of the owner to sell, and 
to the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance, and the condition that 
Government approval must be obtained would be sufficient to ensure 
that the cultivator's interest was duly considered in any special case. 



125 



267. Before proceeding to discuss the other two means by which 
Jews may acquire land in the Mandated Territories after partition, 
we pause to consider the suggestion which has been made that all such 
acquisitions, except as provided for under the previous paragraph, 
should be prohibited for a certain period, in order to give time for 
the present bitterness of inter-racial feeling to die down. 

268. The total amount of land owned by the Jews in that part 
of the Northern Mandated Territory which consists of the plains to 
the south and east of Galilee (as defined by us for the purpose of 
plan B), or more exactly in the whole of the Territory except Galilee 
and the Haifa Bay area, is at present about 500,000 dunums, of 
which about 100,000 dunums are classed as uncultivable. The total 
Jewish rural population of this area as at September, 1936, is given 
by the Jewish Agency in the Census of Jewish Agriculture carried 
out in that year, as 13,275, of which the number of persons directly 
dependent on agriculture is 10,454, or 78-75 per cent. In addition, 
it is understood that a certain number of Arab cultivators remain 
in occupation of a part of this land, but we have no information 
as to their number and are unable, therefore, to take them into 
account in the following calculations. Nor have we taken into 
account therein the 100,000 dunums of land which are classed as 
uncultivable, although the proportion between uncultivable and 
cultivable land thus shown (1 : 4) is much higher than that which 
the Jews have told us that, for this part of Palestine generally, 
they usually assume to be, from its nature, utterly worthless for 
cultivation, even under the most efficient methods of husbandry. 
The average amount of cultivable land owned per head of the Jewish 

400,000 

agricultural population is, therefore, ^ = 38-25 dunums, and 

the average per family, allowing 4-75 persons per family, is 
181-7 dunums. The average amount of cultivable land per Jewish 
family is remarkably high, and indicates clearly that, after allowing 
for the existing Arab cultivators and for such portion of the land 
now classed as uncultivable as may prove to be cultivable, there is 
room for a very considerable increase in the number of Jewish 
settlers on the land already owned by them in this part of the 
Northern Mandated Territory, if the land proves capable of being 
developed to the standard which Jewish witnesses themselves have 
used in putting before us their estimate of the absorptive capacity 
of the district as a whole. That standard is as follows — 

Lot Viable in Dunums 
Non- 

Irri- Irri- Total 
gated gated 

For land in the Huleh Basin . . . . . . 25 — 25 

Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North) — 

(a) From S'deh Ya'akov to Ein Harod . . 10 50 60 

(b) From Ein Harod to Jordan . . . . 21 22 43 
Hills of Eastern Galilee . . . . — 40 40 



126 



In furnishing us with this estimate the Jewish witnesses were careful 
to point out that it was based " on the hypothesis that [the] agri- 
cultural resources [of the several areas], as at present known, are 
developed and fully utilized at the highest level of efficiency. This 
hypothesis is theoretical in so far as it disregards not only the factor 
of human inertia, but also various difficulties of a financial, legal 
and political nature which may in practice have to be taken into 
account." And they admitted that many of these factors were in 
practice already operating to prevent or delay closer settlement on 
the lands which the Jews had already acquired, and much of which 
had already been cultivated by Jewish settlers for a number 
of years. 

269. Notwithstanding these reservations, however, it does not 
seem unreasonable to apply those standards to the lands already 
owned by the Jews in this area, in order to calculate their absorptive 
capacity on the assumption that they will in time be developed and 
fully utilized at the highest level of efficiency, according to the 
calculations of the Jews themselves. Taking only the most conserva- 
tive estimate of lot viable (namely, 60 dunums of cultivable land) 
as applicable to the whole area, this would put the maximum 
absorptive capacity of these lands at 6,666-6 families, or 31,667 
persons, as against 10,454 persons in September, 1936, an increase 
of 21,213 persons. If we increase the figure of 31,667 in the 
proportion of 10,454 to 13,275 to allow for the resident non- 
agricultural population, we get a figure for the total potential 
rural population of 40,217 as against 13,275 in September, 1936, or 
an increase of nearly 27,000 persons. 

270. The increase in the Jewish agricultural population of all 
Palestine between 1931 and September, 1936, was 29,031*, or 
an average of 5,806 souls per annum. At this rate it might be 
expected that, even if all their colonizing energies were concentrated 
on these settlements, it would be four or five years before the Jews 
had utilized to their fullest extent the possibilities of settlement on 
the lands already owned by them in the Northern Mandated Territory. 
On these figures it might be argued with some plausibility that no 
further Jewish purchases of land should be permitted in any part 
of the Northern Mandated Territory for a period of say five years 
at least. No great harm, it might be said, could thereby be done to 
the Jews, who, according to the evidence, are not likely in any case 
to introduce during this period a larger number of agricultural settlers 



* Census of Palestine, 1931, Volume II, page 283, Table XVI, gives the 
total Jewish population dependent on agriculture as 26,939. According to 
the Jewish Agency's Census of Agriculture, the figure for September, 1936, 
was 55,370. It cannot be asserted that the figures are exactly comparable, 
but they are probably near enough for the present argument. 



127 



than could be settled on their existing holdings if these were fully 
developed according to the standards at which the Jews themselves 
aim ; and there would be much to be said for a pause or standstill 
of several years during which no further acquisition by the Jews of 
agricultural land whatever (save for the limited purposes mentioned 
in paragraph 266 above) would be permitted outside the Jewish State. 
This standstill would give time for the present bitterness of feeling 
between the two races to die down, and thereafter it would be possible 
to review the position in the light of current conditions and to decide 
— possibly in agreement with the Arabs, if goodwill should by then 
have been sufficiently restored — under what conditions further 
transfers of land to the Jews might take place. 

271. If our only object were to devise a scheme which would be 
likely to induce the Arabs to acquiesce in partition, there would 
no doubt be much to be said for this view, although even from that 
point of view we doubt if it would be as effective as might at first 
be thought. But that is certainly not the only criterion which we 
have to take into account in testing the merits of the various 
proposals which we have had under consideration. We are bound 
also to consider the effect on the Jews, whose claims to special 
consideration in the Mandated Territory under plan C we have 
already recognized, and we cannot feel that such a policy would do 
justice to their present desperate needs. If, in fact, it should be 
possible for them during the next few years to increase their past 
rate of agricultural settlement, by a rapid development of lands 
which are proved to be capable of closer settlement without injury 
to the existing cultivators, we do not think that they should be 
prevented from doing so on the ground that there may be still room 
for closer settlement ultimately on the lands which they already 
possess, but on which for one reason or another the process of 
utilization to the highest degree of efficiency is taking place more 
slowly. Again, it is a cardinal point of our proposals, as will be 
brought out later in this chapter, that Government would be 
justified in spending substantial sums on land development in the 
Mandated Territory after partition as part of a comprehensive 
policy the object of which shall be to benefit the Arab while facilitating 
Jewish settlement. But if there is to be no assurance of further 
Jewish agricultural settlement beyond what can be done on the 
land which the Jews already possess, it cannot be expected that 
His Majesty's Government will be willing to spend the United 
Kingdom taxpayer's money on the development of the land for 
the sole benefit of the Arabs ; the Jews obviously will not do so ; 
and it is quite certain that the revenues of the Mandated Territory 
alone will not be adequate for the purpose. Thus the Arab 
population would be deprived for the next five years at least, if 



(C 31078) 



F 



128 



not for ever, of opportunities for improving their standard of 
living which they might obtain if facilities for further Jewish 
settlement are granted how. 

272. A further, and in our opinion a most weighty objection to 
the policy of a five years' standstill, is that it would leave both Arabs 
and Jews once again in a state of complete uncertainty as to what will 
be the Government's policy and how it will affect their own position 
when the standstill comes to an end. We have already expressed 
the opinion in paragraph 220 that Palestine has suffered gravely 
in the past from this uncertainty as to the political future ; and 
we are convinced that its influence would be equally unhappy in 
this case, and that far from leading to appeasement, as the advocates 
of the policy hope, it would be more likely to keep alive suspicion 
and ill-will between the two races. 

273. For these reasons we reject the idea of a standstill, and 
consider that provision should be made for the acquisition of further 
land by the Jews in the Mandated Territories after partition, outside 
any prohibited area, subject to effective and clearly defined safe- 
guards in the interests of the existing population. Such provision 
will be made under two heads, Urban Areas and Rural Areas. 

(i) Urban Areas 

274. In considering the question of the effect upon the Arab popula- 
tion of Jewish immigration into Palestine, we think it important to draw 
a distinction between immigrants who are destined to be agricultural 
settlers, and other classes of immigrant. For the Jewish agricultural 
settlers, both men and women, judging by the examples of their work 
which we were able to see for ourselves, we have only admiration : 
their energy, self-sacrifice and enthusiastic devotion to the ideals 
they have set before themselves, are deserving of the highest praise. 
We know and appreciate the reasons which have led the leaders of 
the Zionist movement to insist upon the creation of a Jewish class 
of workers in the most strenuous manual occupations, and in agricul- 
ture particularly, as the necessary foundation of a healthy modern 
State. We are far from seeking to deny the wisdom of this policy, 
still less to suggest that it might now be modified. Nevertheless we 
think it important, in order to see the problem of Jewish immigration 
in its true perspective, to remember that, even in September, 1936, 
the total number of Jews directly dependent upon agriculture was 
only about 55,000 out of a total Jewish population on the same date 
of about 390,000, and that while the net number of Jewish immigrants 
recorded as having entered Palestine in the years 1932-6 inclusive 
is 172,651, the agricultural population increased during that period 
by only 29,000, or just over one-sixth of the total number of 



129 



immigrants (paragraph 270 above) . In other words, from the point of 
view of mere numbers, agricultural settlement is a comparatively 
unimportant side of immigration* although it is probably one of the 
major causes of the present hostility of the Arabs for the Jews. 

275. Far more important to Jewry, which is desperately anxious 
to find a refuge for the Jews who are being forced to leave their 
homes in Europe, is the right to settle in urban areas and therein to 
establish new industries with the help of such capital as they can bring 
into the country. The Jews themselves have told us that they cal- 
culate that for every Jewish immigrant settled on the land, two 
immigrants can be settled successfully in other occupations. We doubt 
whether any useful relationship can be established between the two 
classes in this direction, though, considering the relationship in the 
reverse direction, we think that the number of additional Jews 
who can be successfully settled on the land is to an important 
extent dependent upon the total number of Jewish immigrants who 
will provide them with an assured market. The number of persons 
who can be established in industrial and other occupations in Pales- 
tine depends upon other factors, principally the supply of capital, 
the skill and enterprise of the management and of the skilled personnel 
employed, the cost of living and the standard of living of the work 
people, the degree of tariff protection afforded, the extent and pur- 
chasing power of the domestic market, and the ability to compete 
in foreign markets — factors which it is quite impossible to assess. 
Admittedly the Jews who wish to establish new industries in the 
Mandated Territories will not be able to rely with confidence upon the 
same degree of tariff protection as they might do in an independent 
Jewish State, able to control its own fiscal policy, and in respect of 
this important factor, they may be handicapped. But in other 
respects their prospects of success would seem not to be markedly 
different from what they would be in a Jewish State, provided that 
they are allowed to acquire land in a suitable area with good access 
by rail and sea to the home and foreign market. We can see no 
good reason why the Arabs should oppose the acquisition by Jews 
of land so situated ; on the contrary there is every reason to suppose 
that the Arabs will benefit substantially from the additional demand 



* Going further back, we may compare the present figures with those for 
1922, when there were, according to the Statement of British Policy in Palestine, 
dated 3rd June, 1922, about 80,000 Jews in Palestine, " of whom about one- 
fourth are farmers or workers on the land." Thus between 1922 and 1936 

the agricultural population has increased by (55,000 — 80^000^ _ gg qqq 

4 

persons, out of a total increase of the Jewish community during the same period 
by (390,000 - 80,000 =) 310,000, or just over 13 per cent, of the total 
increase. 



(C 31078) 



130 



for employment which will be created if new industries are successfully 
established thereon. Indeed, we will go further, and say, for the 
reasons given in chapters III and XXII under the head of Population, 
that unless Jewish immigrant capital is encouraged in this way to 
enter the country and to be used for the development of Jewish 
industries in the Mandated Territories, the economic position of the 
Arab population outside the Jewish State is likely to be serious. 
To the prospects of benefits to the Arabs from this source we add one 
qualification. It is, of course, impossible to prevent Jewish employers 
from exercising a voluntary preference in favour of Jewish labour, 
though so long as the Arab standard of living and rate of wages is 
below that of the Jews (and while it should be the object of the 
Government gradually to raise the former, it will be a long time before 
they reach the Jewish level), the temptation to reduce costs by 
employing Arabs will be strong. But we assume that, in conformity 
with the principles of good and just government, the Mandatory 
Power will take strong measures against any attempt by Jewish 
organizations or individuals to prevent employers, by intimidation 
or picketing, from exercising their freedom of action in this matter. 

276. The area in the Mandated Territories which complies most 
fully with these conditions is, of course, Haifa. We recommend 
accordingly that a suitable industrial zone around the town itself 
should be prescribed by the Government as a free zone within which 
the transfer of land to Jews should be permitted. The limits which 
we would suggest for this zone are indicated in Appendix 8 ; but 
the Government should be prepared to vary them from time to time 
if necessary to meet industrial requirements. 

A similar zone should be prescribed around Jerusalem (for which 
we have not thought it necessary to suggest limits ourselves, except 
that we consider that it should be larger than the municipal area), 
and another, we suggest, around Tiberias. Power should be sought 
for the Government to prescribe such a zone for any other urban area 
which it may think fit, and to fix the limits and vary them from time 
to time. 

(ii) Rural Areas 

277. It is the acquisition of land by the Jews in the rural areas 
of the Mandated Territories, other than any prohibited area, for 
purposes not covered by the proposals in paragraph 251 (4) (a) 
above which is most likely to provoke suspicion and resentment 
among the Arabs ; and it is here, therefore, that the need is greatest 
for effective and convincing safeguards of the interests of the existing 
population. To this end we recommend that the Government 
should undertake the responsibility of satisfying itself, before giving 
its consent to any purchase of land by the Jews for such purposes, 
first, that the land is actually capable of closer settlement ; secondly 
that adequate provision has been or will be made for the resettlement 
of any tenant cultivators of the land under conditions which will 



131 



enable them to obtain a reasonable livelihood from their holdings, 
and thirdly, that, save where the Government are satisfied that 
conditions make it impracticable, any benefits resulting from closer 
settlement shall be shared equitably between both Arabs and Jews. 

278. So far as the Arab cultivators are concerned, we think that 
these safeguards should be effective. As regards the Jews, we believe 
that this part of our proposals is in general conformity with the 
Jewish Agency's own policy. In their Memorandum to the Royal 
Commission dated November, 1936, the Agency said — 

The Mandate requires the Administration of Palestine to encourage 
close settlement by Jews on the land, and to do so in co-operation with 
the Jewish Agency. The work about to be executed in the Huleh 
marshes provides a striking example of co-operation between the Govern- 
ment of Palestine and Jewish public bodies to the advantage of Jews and 
Arabs alike. The intensive development of the Beisan area may well 
be made to provide another. 

The possibilities of such co-operation are not exhausted by what is 
being done in Huleh and what can be done in Beisan. If development 
is vigorously pressed forward, the Jewish Agency believes that there will 
be found to be other parts of Palestine in which both Jews and Arabs 
would benefit by what may be described as a tripartite arrangement 
between the Government, the Jewish Agency and the Arab cultivators. 
The basis of such an arrangement might be that, as suggested above 
in the case of the Beisan region, the Jewish Agency would provide water 
in exchange for land, while the Government would take steps to procure 
the consolidation of holdings in order to facilitate irrigation and the 
orderly panellation of the area affected between Arabs and Jews. The 
essence of the scheme is that the Arab holding would be reduced in size, 
but increased in terms of productivity, by irrigation to be provided by 
the Jews. Thus land would be liberated for Jewish settlement, while 
the Arab cultivator, far from being prejudiced, would be left with a more 
productive holding than before. 

Without at this stage going more minutely into detail, the Jewish 
Agency believes that it is on some such lines as these that the land 
resources of Palestine could be developed for the benefit of Jews and 
Arabs alike. It is possible that for the purpose of ensuring the orderly 
execution of a development scheme having this end in view, it may be 
found necessary to regulate by agreement, in some appropriate manner, 
the channels through which land may be bought for Jewish purposes, 
or, again, it may be agreed to be desirable that there should be some 
understanding as to the areas in which the authorized land-purchasing 
institutions are from time to time to operate. Provided that a genuinely 
constructive policy is adopted and carried out, the Jewish Agency does 
not believe that there will be any insurmountable difficulty in agreeing 
upon arrangements which will satisfactorily safeguard all legitimate 
interests. 

The words in the middle of the second paragraph quoted above, 
" while the Government would take steps .... Arabs and 
Jews ", are somewhat obscure, but seem to imply that the Govern- 
ment would be expected in such a case to make use of the Land 
(Expropriation) Ordinance in order to compel an unwilling owner to 
sell his land. This difficult question is discussed by the Royal 
Commission in paragraphs 26 and 82 of chapter IX of their Report 
and is touched upon again in paragraphs 85-93 of the same chapter 



(C 31078) 



132 



in connection with a suggestion that public utility societies might be 
formed for developing large areas of land (500 dunums and upwards, 
as appears from paragraph 10 (5) (ii) of chapter XIX). They con- 
sidered that, with a view to the consolidation of holdings for the 
concentration of Arabs in one block, " recourse should be had, if 
necessary, to the Land (Expropriation) Ordinance and that scattered 
individual Arab holdings should not be allowed to interfere with the 
development of a scheme which has been proved to the satisfaction 
of Government beneficial to Jews and Arabs alike " (paragraph 82 
of chapter IX). The scheme for the formation of public utility 
societies included a proposal that Government should " acquire the 
land, when the price had not been fixed by negotiation, under the 
Land (Expropriation) Ordinance, and take such steps as might be 
necessary to consolidate holdings " (paragraph 85). After answering 
the objections which the Palestine Government had brought forward 
against the proposal, the Royal Commission observe (paragraph 93) — 

The political difficulties form part of the general picture of the 
administration of the country, and we do not underrate them. But we 
cannot blind ourselves to the fact that, if the Mandate is to continue and 
the Mandatory Power is to discharge its obligation, the pace of progress 
must not be determined by factious agitators. Where, then, the following 
conditions are fulfilled, 

(a) there is land available and a general willingness to sell, 

(6) it has been proved suitable for intensive cultivation, and 

(c) satisfactory financial arrangements can be devised, we do not 
think that such a scheme under Government supervision and control 
should be held up by calculated obstruction. 

We understand from these observations that the Royal Commis- 
sion were satisfied that, if a development scheme of substantial 
size and promising benefits to both Arabs and Jews was being 
obstructed by the refusal of a few isolated individuals to sell their 
holdings, and the other conditions mentioned were fulfilled, it was 
in the public interest that Government should have recourse to its 
powers of compulsory acquisition under the Land (Expropriation) 
Ordinance. We agree with this view, and recommend that, where 
these conditions are fulfilled, the Government should be prepared to 
use its powers under the Ordinance with such amendment as may be 
necessary to procure the consolidation of holdings in order to 
facilitate development by means of irrigation and otherwise, and the 
orderly parcellation of the area affected between Arabs and Jews. 

279. As is pointed out in paragraph 331, under the contract by 
which land belonging to the Jewish National Fund is leased to Jewish 
settlers, the lessee is required to execute all works connected with 
the cultivation of his holding only with Jewish labour. In that 
paragraph we recommend that the Jewish State should be required 



133 



to pass legislation providing that any contract or sale or lease for- 
bidding directly or indirectly the employment of persons of a.' 
particular race or religion shall be null and void. We suggest that 
similar legislation should be enacted for the Mandated Territories. 

5. The Constructive Policy of Development. 

280. We turn now to the positive side of our recommendations. 
The idea of a constructive policy of development with a view to 
facilitating Jewish settlement in Palestine is, of course, by no means 
new. Attention was first drawn to it by the Shaw Commission in 
their Report of March, 1930 (Cmd. 3530) on the 1929 disturbances. 
It formed the basis of the recommendations of Sir John Hope 
Simpson's Report of October, 1930, (Cmd. 3686) on Immigration, 
Land Settlement and Development. In the White Paper of 1930 
(Cmd. 3692, paragraph 22) His Majesty's Government expressed 
themselves " satisfied that, in order to attain these objects " (that 
is, to ensure that the position of the other sections of the population 
was not prejudiced by Jewish immigration, and to encourage closer 
settlement of the Jews on the land) " a more methodical agricultural' 
development is called for with the object of ensuring a better use 
of the land " ; and in his letter of the 13th February, 1931, to Dr. 
Weizmann, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, while 
emphasizing that it was to landless Arabs within a particular category 
that His Majesty's Government owed a special obligation, added — 
" The recognition of this obligation in no way detracts from the 
larger purposes of development, which His Majesty's Government 
regards as the most effectual means of furthering the establishment 
of a National Home for the Jews." While the White Paper made it 
clear that it was part of the general policy of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment that Palestine should be self-supporting, it was the intention 
of His Majesty's Government at that time (June, 1931) that the 
funds required for the purpose of giving effect to the policy of a 
more methodical agricultural development in Palestine should be 
found by means of a loan which Parliament would be asked to 
authorize the Treasury to guarantee. At the same time Mr. Lewis 
French was appointed Director of Development, with instructions 
to consider, inter alia, 

(i) the improvement and intensive development of land in 
the hills in order to secure to the fellahin a better standard 
of living without, save in exceptional cases, having recourse 
to transfer ; 

(ii) the feasibility and advisability of providing credits for 
Arab cultivators and Jewish settlers, and if so, the best methods 
of achieving this purpose ; and 

(iii) proposals for obtaining, irrigating and otherwise re- 
claiming land not at present cultivated or cultivated only to a 
limited extent. 



(C 31078) 



134 



But shortly afterwards the financial crisis supervened, and subse- 
quently, after reviewing the position in the light of financial 
conditions both in the United Kingdom and in Palestine, His 
Majesty's Government decided that, in the existing financial circum- 
stances, it was impossible for the British Government to make a 
contribution to land development in Palestine such as was envisaged 
in 1930. The financial position of Palestine itself was, however, 
felt to be sufficiently satisfactory to enable it to finance its own 
requirements. In addition, an extensive programme of public 
works was to be instituted by the Government of Palestine, including 
services, such as a survey of underground water resources and 
provision for the improvement of village water supplies, which 
could properly be classed as development services ; the cost of these 
works was intended to be financed to a large extent out of a loan of 
£2 millions to be guaranteed by the British Treasury. But that 
loan in its turn was never raised, and the services which were to 
have been financed in this way from loan funds were in fact financed 
out of the current revenue and accumulated surpluses of Palestine. 
As a result of this, and of the subsequent need to divert revenue to 
expenditure on public security, the Government of Palestine found 
themselves unable to provide funds for development purposes on 
any considerable scale ; and the various plans to which so much 
prominence had been given in 1930 have borne little fruit. 

281. The Royal Commission had no definite recommendations 
to make with regard to development under Part II of their Report 
(in which they assumed the continuation of an undivided Palestine 
under a single Mandate), except that they commended the prQposal 
for a Government contribution towards the cost of the Huleh 
Concession Scheme (chapter IX, paragraphs 120-124), and that, as 
stated in paragraph 278, they favoured the setting up, not necessarily 
with financial participation by the Government, of public utility 
societies for promoting closer settlement on areas of 500 dunums 
and upwards in the plains, and the use of the Land (Expropriation) 
Ordinance, if necessary, where a scheme, which satisfied certain 
specified conditions, was in danger of being held up by calculated 
obstruction (chapter IX, paragraph 93). But for the purpose of 
facilitating the transfer of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area, 
which they regarded as an essential step if the minority problem, 
" the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation 
of Partition," was to be solved, they recommended " the execution 
of large scale plans for irrigation, water-storage and development " in 
Trans- Jordan, Beersheba and the Jordan Valley (chapter XXII, para- 
graph 41), and the payment of the cost, which would be heavier than 
the Arab State could be expected to bear, from a grant which Parlia- 
ment should be asked to make for the purpose {ibid, paragraph 44). 
They made no attempt to estimate the cost of such schemes, but it must 
have been clear to them, from the estimates which had been supplied 
to them respecting the Huleh Scheme, that the cost was likely to 



135 



run into several millions of pounds* if the whole of the Arab population 
of the plains which were included in the Jewish State under their 
plan were to be transferred to the Arab State (ibid, paragraph 43). 

282. In chapter VIII we have given our reasons for thinking that 
the prospects of such transfer of population are remote ; that the 
conditions in the areas named by the Royal Commission are far less 
favourable for development and close settlement than the Royal 
Commission supposed ; and that even if development were to be 
undertaken successfully, it is unlikely that large numbers of Arabs- 
would be willing to leave their own homes, even in a Jewish State, 
and migrate to these new and, in their eyes, inhospitable districts. 
In so far as it may be possible to effect such transfers, we should, 
of course, welcome the doing so, for even under plan C there will 
still remain over 50,000 Arabs in the Jewish State, constituting a 
minority problem which will require the highest wisdom and courage 
on the part of Jewish statesmen to handle successfully. But we 
cannot agree with the Royal Commission that the cost of development 
for this purpose should fall on the United Kingdom Government. 
The benefit of such measures will accrue to the Jews even more 
than to the Arab State, since every Arab transferred from land in 
the Jewish State will make room for a new Jewish settler ; and the 
Jews themselves have told us that they would regard this as a far 
more suitable way of assisting the Arab State than the direct 
subvention recommended by the Royal Commission, and that 
they would be prepared to pay the interest and sinking fund on 
a loan to be raised for the purpose. 



♦Excluding Haifa and Galilee, the Arab population of the Jewish State 
as proposed by the Royal Commission may be put at about 150,000, or say 
30,000 families. But not all these families would be dependent on agriculture 
for their livelihood, and it is assumed that the number so dependent would not 
exceed 20,000. Mr. French estimated the cost of resettling an Arab family 
at 1931 prices at £P350 to £P400, or £P270 on developed land where flow 
irrigation was general, that is, where drainage and reclamation of land, 
development of springs, canalization, and construction of roads and bridges 
had already been provided by Government agency. Taking the higher figures 
(the lower figures are clearly inapplicable, unless the cost of development can 
be calculated separately) the cost of resettling 20,000 Arab families may be 
put at between £P7 and £P8 millions. It is true that the Royal Commission 
only recommended that a Parliamentary Grant should be made to meet the 
cost of the proposed irrigation and development scheme, but it is obvious that, 
f(5r the successful transfer of an agricultural population having no capital of 
their own, provision must also be made for settling each family in their new 
home and providing the necessary stock and equipment. Sir John Hope Simpson 
puts the cost of this at £P60 per family on average, and Mr. French accepted 
this figure and included it in his own estimate of the total cost of 
resettlement. In addition there would be the cost of settling the remaining 
10,000 families. We have no basis on which to calculate this cost, but it is 
unlikely to be less than /P100 a family, making a total of £P1,000,000 to be 
added to the above figures. Against this liability must be set the value of 
land owned by any of the persons to be resettled, but no figures are available 
by which the reduction on this account of the gross liability may be estimated. 



136 



283. It is clear from this summary of the past history of the 
question that in one form or another the idea of a costly programme 
of agricultural land development in Palestine, of which a great part 
would be financed from United Kingdom funds, has been a feature 
of British policy since 1930. This fact gives us greater confidence in 
putting forward our own proposals under this head. We defined 
those proposals in paragraph 25 1 (5) of this chapter. The obj ect which 
we have in mind is, broadly speaking, to ensure that, in the alloca- 
tion of the benefits resulting from development expenditure, the 
Arab shall not suffer in comparison with the Jew owing to his lack 
of capital. We take, as an example of what we have in mind, the 
Huleh Basin Scheme. Out of a total of 45,000* dunums within the 
Huleh concession area, 13,000* (instead of 10,000* under the original 
Concession) are to be reserved for the Arabs by whom they have 
hitherto been partially reclaimed. This land is at present flooded 
for half the year. In addition, the scheme makes provision for 
improving the position of the existing Arab cultivators on 55,000 
dunums outside the concession area, by substituting controlled 
irrigation for the present primitive arrangements. The part of the 
concession area, now covered by lake and marshes, which is to be 
reserved for Jewish colonization, is only 32,000* dunums. Thus, 
out of a total of 100,000 dunums to be benefited under the scheme, 
two-thirds will be in Arab ownership, and only one-third in Jewish. 
In this particular case no resettling process will be necessary : the 
surplus land will be land reclaimed from under water or marsh, 
instead of being made available by a process of " squeezing up " 
the existing Arab cultivators. It is not easy, therefore, to calculate 
exactly in what proportions the scheme will benefit Jews and Arabs. 
The Jews will receive 32,000 dunums of land which is entirely surplus ; 
the Arabs will have 55,000 dunums of existing holdings improved by 
an unknown percentage, and 13,000 dunums improved by at least 
100 per cent., and probably more. For these benefits the Jews 
will pay £900,000, including the cost of the concession, the Govern- 
ment £223,000f, and the Arabs nothing. 

284. The principle underlying this arrangement seems to us to 
be eminently sound. The Government, before approving any 
development scheme involving the acquisition of land in Arab 
ownership submitted to them.by the Jews, will first satisfy themselves 
that it will result in closer settlement becoming possible on the land 
to be acquired. They will then (unless the scheme is so small as to 
make these conditions impracticable) negotiate with the Jews 
(i) for the allocation between Jews and Arabs of the benefits to be 
expected from the development expenditure, on the principle that, 
over and above what is needed for resettling the existing cultivators, 

*After making allowance for roads, canals and irrigation works, 
f According to the figures given in the Royal Commission's Report, which, 
however, are subject to revision owing to later developments. 



137 



with their existing standard of living, a substantial share in any 
surplus land made available shall be assigned to the Arabs (whether 
to the existing cultivators, in order to improve their existing standard 
of living, or to others who are known to be landless or in greater need 
of additional land than the existing cultivators, would be a matter 
to be determined by the Government in each case, in consultation 
with both Jews and Arabs) ; and (ii) for the allocation of the cost 
between the Jews and the Government. For this and for the 
determination of the Arabs' share in the surplus benefits, no fixed 
rule can be laid down, but prima facie we see no reason why the 
precedent of the Huleh Scheme should not be followed as a general 
indication of what is equitable in such cases under both heads, 
although we have not in mind any schemes comparable in magnitude 
with the Huleh Scheme. 

285. This is the method of development, for the joint benefit of 
both Jews and Arabs, which we favour at this stage. But other 
methods are possible. In particular we would not wish to exclude 
the possibility that the Government may decide itself to undertake 
works of development, the benefits resulting from which would be 
allocated on the same equitable basis between Jews and Arabs, in 
return for an appropriate contribution by the former towards the 
cost. This, however, would be exceptional ; as a general rule we 
should expect that the initiative in a development scheme which 
was intended to benefit Jews as well as Arabs should be taken by the' 
Jews. The Government would normally, we think, confine its 
activities to services which would be intended primarily for the 
benefit of the Arab cultivators, such as (i) an enlarged programme of 
agricultural research and experiment and of instruction and 
education in agricultural matters, (ii) the construction of roads and 
bridges for linking up Arab villages with the main roads, (iii) the 
extension of the present agricultural development loan scheme* and 
(iv) the improvement of Arab marketing arrangements on the lines 
of the successful Jewish Co-operative Association, the Tnuva. 
Indirectly, however, such expenditure should facilitate Jewish 
settlement, since the better educated the Arab cultivator becomes in 
agricultural matters, the more quickly and willingly he will learn 
to adapt himself to the new conditions of intensive cultivation which 
it is necessary that he should accept if settlement of the Jews on the 
land is to be made possible. 

286. We do not wish it to be assumed, from the picture which we 
have drawn above of the possibilities of action under the policy advo- 
cated in this chapter, that we are satisfied that there is abundant 
scope for development of the land in the Mandated Territories with 
a view to close settlement thereon. Apart from the Huleh Scheme,, 
we are far from taking an optimistic view of the possibilities of 



*The present scheme is limited to ^P50,000, and to cultivators in the- 
hill-country. 



138 



additional agricultural settlement in those parts of the Mandated 
Territories to which our proposals apply. That, however, is not the 
attitude of the Jews ; and it is the Jews, and not the Government, 
who will take the initiative in setting these development schemes in 
motion. According to estimates given to us by Jewish witnesses, 
the absorptive capacity of the Huleh Plain, including the area to 
be developed under the Huleh Concession Scheme, is, in terms of 
agricultural population only, 39,000, and that of the Plains of 
Esdraelon, Jezreel and Beisan (North) 22,100, over and above the 
present total population of those areas ; besides these, allowance 
must be made for the possibilities of additional settlement in the 
Haifa Bay area and in the hills and upland country to the south and 
east of Galilee, for which separate estimates are not available. These 
figures are of course theoretical in the sense described in para- 
graph 268 of this chapter ; and we ourselves do not endorse them. 
But it is clearly proper to make provision under our scheme for the 
possibility that the Jews may be right, or even partially right, in 
their calculations, so long as it is understood that the Government 
accept no responsibility for any extravagant hopes that may be 
fostered thereby. 

287. There is one further point to which we must draw attention. 
Our proposals envisage close settlement resulting, as a rule, from 
large schemes of development, the benefits of which will, save when 
the Government are satisfied that conditions make it impracticable, 
be apportioned equitably between Arabs and Jews by the orderly 
panellation of the area affected (paragraph 251 (4) (b) (iii) above). 
In making this reservation we had in mind that in some cases the 
area developed would be so small that the apportionment of the 
surplus between Arabs and Jews would be impracticable. In 
such cases, in the absence of special arrangements, the whole of 
the surplus would go to the Jews, and there would of course be 
no contribution from public funds to the cost of development. But 
it is conceivable that the greater part of any development which 
may take place will be in this form ; if so, there is clearly a danger 
lest the policy of sharing the benefits equitably between Arabs 
and Jews should be frustrated. To prevent this we think that it 
should be laid down that, for the purpose of giving effect to that 
policy, the Government reserve the right to aggregate the value of 
the surpluses thus created by the Jews for their sole benefit, and at 
some suitable stage to require the Jews, as a condition of receiving 
Government approval for further transfers of land, to provide a 
proportionate amount of surplus land for the sole benefit of the 
Arabs. The Government on their part should be prepared to 
make an appropriate contribution, on the footing that the ratios 
of benefits for Arabs and Jews respectively, and of Jewish and 
Government expenditure respectively, shall be roughly the same 
under this system of aggregating a number of small development 
schemes as they would have been under a single large scheme. 



139 



288. All this will cost a great deal of money, and it will be clear 
from our later chapter on Finance that there is no possibility that the 
Mandated Territories will have any margin of revenue to spare for 
such a purpose : on the contrary, the indications are that from the 
outset they will be faced with a budgetary deficit of about half a 
million pounds, which can only be made good by a grant from 
the United Kingdom Exchequer. The cost of these development 
services, in so far as it is not borne by the Jews, must therefore fall 
wholly on the United Kingdom. But there are two conditions 
which we think it would clearly be proper to attach to any 
recommendation for the grant of assistance of this kind. 

(i) First, it should be clearly recognized that the sole 
justification for financial assistance from United Kingdom funds 
is the existence of our national obligations to the Jews. We have 
argued in this chapter that, since the creation of a Jewish 
State in the Maritime Plain under plan C, which is the best 
plan of partition that we have been able to devise, does not 
discharge those obligations, as assessed by the Royal Commission, 
in full, it is essential that provision should be made for the 
continuation of Jewish settlement after partition in that part 
of Palestine which we propose should be retained under Mandate ; 
that this will be facilitated if the Government declare it to be 
their policy to assist, and when necessary themselves undertake, 
an active programme of land development designed to benefit both 
Arabs and Jews ; and that this in turn will involve expenditure 
on an ample scale from the United Kingdom Exchequer. But 
the Arabs have no claim to benefit by this expenditure of their 
own right. The offer of that assistance must, therefore, be 
subject to the clearly expressed condition that the Arabs must 
abandon their present hostility and co-operate peacefully with 
the Government in the latter's policy of facilitating Jewish 
settlement, subject to the safeguards proposed, and to the 
further warning that the Government are in no way committed 
to continue this form of expenditure once they have decided 
that the possibilities of further Jewish settlement are exhausted. 

(ii) Secondly, Parliament cannot be asked to sign a blank 
cheque for this purpose. It is impossible to estimate in advance 
the amount of money which might be spent usefully in the 
ways we have suggested, and difficult to suggest any figure 
which shall be fair to all the parties concerned. It seems to 
us relevant, however, to point out that the recommendation 
of the Royal Commission with regard to expenditure on develop- 
ment for the purpose of facilitating the transfer of Arabs from 
the Jewish State — involving, as we point out in paragraph 281 
above, a charge on the United Kingdom Exchequer which 
might have run into several millions of pounds — was apparently 
accepted, among the other conclusions of the Commission, by 
His Majesty's Government in their Statement of Policy of 



140 



July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513) ; and that according to our proposals the 
Treasury should be under no obligation to accept this particular 
liability. In its place we recommend that the limits to which 
Parliament should be asked to commit themselves in respect 
of the whole of the Mandated Territories together, should be — 

(i) on non-recurrent expenditure, such as grants for 
development in whatever form in the Mandated Territories, 
including the Huleh Concession Scheme, a sum not exceeding 
one million pounds in the aggregate ; and 

(ii) on recurrent expenditure on agricultural services, 
including the acceleration of land settlement operations in 
the Southern Mandated Territory, as proposed in paragraph 
above, a sum not exceeding £75,000 a year for not more than 
10 years. 

The money would not, of course, be required all at once ; its 
disbursement would probably be spread over many years. 
In order to mark it out as distinct from the deficiency grants 
which will certainly be required to maintain the normal 
administration of the Mandated Territories, we suggest that it 
might be convenient that it should be shown under a 
separate subhead of the Parliamentary Vote. 



141 



CHAPTER XIV 

JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO THE MANDATED TERRITORIES 

UNDER PLAN C 

289. Having set out in the previous chapter our recommendations 
in regard to Jewish acquisition of and settlement on the land in the 
Mandated Territories, we come now to immigration policy. 

290. We are here concerned only with immigration into the 
Mandated Territories. It will of course be for the Arab and Jewish 
States to determine freely their own immigration policy ; but if the 
right of free access from those states into the Mandated Territories 
is granted as proposed in paragraph 295 below, we think that there 
should be a provision in the treaty with the Arab State that it shall 
control effectively immigration from outside the frontiers of what is 
now Palestine and Trans- Jordan, and that, if persons from outside 
those frontiers do in fact enter the Mandated Territories through the 
Arab State, the latter shall be responsible for their deportation. 

291. The general principles by which we recommend that 
immigration into the Mandated Territories after partition should 
be governed are as follows — 

(i) The Balfour Declaration should no longer apply. The 
object of establishing a national home for the Jews in Palestine 
should be deemed to have been fulfilled by the setting up of the 
proposed Jewish State, but in order toprovide-f or the immigration 
of as many Jews as possible, consistently with good and just 
government for the whole population, the Mandatory should 
continue to receive Jewish immigrants into the Mandated 
Territories or any part of them, either continuously or at inter- 
vals, as he may think fit, up to the point when he may decide, 
at his sole discretion, that this is no longer possible without 
injury to the rights and position of other sections of the 
population. 

(ii) The rate of such immigration should be decided by the 
Mandatory from time to time upon political, social, and psycho- 
logical as well as economic considerations. 

(iii) Among intending immigrants from outside what is now 
Palestine and Trans- Jordan, preference should be given to 
Jewish immigrants, permission to settle in the territory being 
given to persons of other nationalities only for exceptional 
reasons. 

(iv) Persons of whatever race habitually residing in the rest 
of what is now Palestine and Trans-Jordan should be free, 
subject only to the requirements of law and order, to enter the 
Mandated Territories for short or casual visits, but should not 



142 



be allowed to reside habitually therein without the permission 
of the Government. In deciding whether residence is habitual 
or not, the onus of proof should rest with the person concerned. 
Permission to reside habitually in the Mandated Territories 
should be granted to such persons within the limits of an 
" intra-Palestinian "* quota, to be fixed by Government at the 
same time and in the same manner as the quota for " extra- 
Palestinian "* immigrants, but without preference for either 
Arabs or Jews, save as provided in paragraph 295 below. 

(v) The Mandatory should have the right to grant to an 
intending immigrant permission to settle in the territory subject 
to the condition that, either for a limited time or indefinitely, he 
shall not without special permission reside in any specified part 
or parts of the territory, and to prescribe different conditions 
for the control of immigration into different parts of the 
Mandated Territories. 

(vi) Article 4 of the present Mandate (which provides for the 
recognition of an appropriate Jewish agency for the purpose of 
advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine 
in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish national 
home) should not be reproduced in the new Mandate, but the 
Mandatory should use his best endeavours to consult with 
representatives of both Arabs and Jews, as well as experienced 
opinion independent of the Government and of both races, before 
deciding on the application of these principles. 

292. We comment on these proposals in the order in which they 
are set out above — 

(i) It is quite impossible to foresee what additional number of 
Jewish immigrants it will be possible to receive into the Mandated 
Territories after partition, without injury to the rights and position 
of the rest of the population. The final decision on this question 
must rest with the Mandatory at his sole and absolute discretion, 
having regard only to the principles of good and just government. 
It may be that the closure of these territories to further immigration 
will be applied by degrees, one part being declared finally closed 
while another is still left open. But the time must come when the 
whole of the Mandated Territories will have to be closed to Jewish 
immigration, and it must be clearly understood that when this 
time has come all obligations of His Majesty's Government arising 
out of the Balfour Declaration will have been fully discharged. 

In accordance with our general desire that the Government's 
future policy in Palestine should be as free as possible from 
ambiguities, we think it important that, for the purpose of determining 



* We use these epithets for convenience to distinguish between (a) persons 
habitually residing within the frontiers of what is now Palestine and Trans- 
Jordan, and (b) persons habitually residing outside those frontiers. 



143 



immigration policy in the Mandated Territories, the phrase " rights 
and position of the other sections of the population " should be 
denned more precisely. We suggest that it should be understood 
to mean that further Jewish immigration ought not to be permitted 
if the Government aie' satisfied that the result would be to lower 
the general standard of living of the population existing at the time. 

There remains the exceedingly difficult, but vitally important 
question whether the phrase " rights and position " should include 
the right to have reserved for the existing agricultural population 
a margin of land to provide for the probable natural increase of that 
population. We have examined this question in chapter III, and foi 
the reasons given there we think that the only practical rule is to 
have regard solely to the population existing at any given date. 

293. (ii) This principle is a repetition of the Royal Commission's 
recommendation (chapter X, paragraph 73). 

294. (hi) and (v). We think it important that effective steps 
should be taken to prevent illicit immigration into the Mandated 
Territories from outside Palestine and Trans- Jordan, especially of 
Arabs, who are likely to be tempted to try to enter the Mandated 
Territories in large numbers in order to benefit by the development 
policy advocated in the preceding chapter. The Royal Commission 
had before them certain suggestions, designed to prevent illicit 
immigration, of which the most important, and the only one to 
which we think it necessary to make specific reference, was a 
proposal for the institution of a system of identity cards. On this 
they observed : " We are not sure on the evidence before us whether 
it is possible to enforce a system of identity cards. If the system is 
administratively possible, it is clear that the control of the police 
will be far more effective " (chapter X, paragraph 46). We think 
that every effort should be made to overcome the administrative 
difficulties to which the Royal Commission refer, and we trust 
that the Jews will be willing to co-operate in this task, since our 
proposals assume that it will be possible to lay down different 
conditions for the control of immigration into the Southern Mandated 
Territory on the one hand and the rest of the Mandated Territories 
on the other, and also to prevent persons in the Arab and Jewish 
States from residing habitually without permission in the Mandated 
Territories, and it is doubtful whether it will be possible to achieve 
either of these objects without an identity card system. 

295. (iv) In recommending the adoption of this principle we have 
been influenced mainly by the desire to interfere as little as possible 
with the freedom of movement between the Jewish and Arab States, 
on the one hand and the Mandated Territories on the other. So far as 
Jerusalem and Bethlehem are concerned, the right of free access 
thereto is, of course, a. cardinal feature of the Royal Commission's 



144 



plan, and it is essential that the ability of all the inhabitants of 
Palestine to visit those places freely should remain as far as possible 
unimpaired by partition. But there are other places in Palestine 
sacred to one or more of the three religions to which a similar right of 
access ought to be preserved. And in general it is clearly right, as a 
matter of principle and for the sake of friendly relations as well as 
business convenience, that every effort should be made to prevent 
partition from becoming a barrier cutting off the two races and the 
inhabitants of the different areas from easy intercourse with each 
other. This principle applies with 'special force to the Mandated 
Territories for a number of reasons. First, because of the size and 
importance of the areas which it is proposed under plan C to retain 
under Mandate, and of the number of places of religious significance 
contained therein ; secondly, because it would clearly be inconsistent 
with our conception of the necessity for retaining Haifa under 
Mandate that free access to it should be forbidden to either Arabs 
or Jews in the rest of Palestine ; and thirdly, because of the ad- 
ministrative difficulty of maintaining so effective a control along the 
frontiers of the Mandated Territories, where these march with those 
of the Arab and Jewish States, as to prevent the illicit entry of 
persons from those states. But the principle also applies to the 
Arab and Jewish States. Although we cannot expect those states to 
adopt a regime as liberal as that we have proposed for the Mandated 
Territories — -for instance the Jewish State would presumably not 
find it possible to admit Arabs from the neighbouring territories in 
search of casual employment — we trust that the regulations which 
they will apply to persons entering their own territory for short or 
casual visits will be as simple as possible. Indeed, a liberal system 
of border passes will be essential, for many Arab villagers will be 
left holding land across the border. 

296. There is, however, one matter in regard to entry into the 
Arab and Jewish States from the Mandated Territories with which 
we must deal. We refer to persons wishing to travel from one part 
of the Mandated Territories to another. As the three areas of 
Mandated Territory have no contact with each other, it will be 
impossible to pass from one to the other (except by sea) without 
crossing the territory of either the Arab or the Jewish State or 
both. We think it essential that provision should be made in the 
treaties with the new states that the right of free passage across their 
territories should be granted to persons residing in the Mandated 
Territories, subject only to the simplest possible form of passport 
or identity card. 

297. It is clear that these arrangements can be applied more 
readily and be made to work more efficiently if an identity card system 
can be introduced. It will then be the duty of every person who enters 
a territory under a different administration to obtain either, prior to 
his entry, from the proper authority in the territory in which he 



145 



habitually resides, or, immediately after his entry, from the proper 
authority in the territory which he enters, a temporary card, authoriz- 
ing him to stay in the country for a limited period only : if he fails to 
obtain such a card, or if, having obtained it, he exceeds the specified 
limit without further authority, he renders himself liable to immediate 
deportation, if not to some fine or other punishment as well. To 
complete the system, it would seem to follow that persons habitually 
residing in the new territories should also possess a card ; but it 
would seem scarcely necessary to insist upon this in the villages, 
where a stranger can easily be identified ; and it would probably be 
found sufficient to enforce the condition only in towns such as 
Jerusalem and Haifa which are frequently visited by strangers. 

298. The arguments against free access are — 

(a) That it will enable Jewish immigrants to enter the Mandated 
Territories in unlimited numbers, by way of the Jewish State. 

(b) That it will enable Arabs from the Arab State to enter the 
Mandated Territories in unlimited numbers and enjoy freely whatever 
advantages residence in those territories may offer as compared 
with their own countries : for example, employment in Haifa, 
better wages, and a share in the benefits of improved cultivation of 
the land as proposed in the earlier part of this chapter. 

(c) That such Arab entrants will quickly satisfy all demands 
for additional labour in such a town as Haifa, and will thereby 
virtually leave no room in the labour category for Jewish immigrants 
from outside Palestine. 

299. We do not deny the force of these arguments, but we think 
that they can all be met adequately by our proposal to distinguish 
between short and casual visits on the one hand, and habitual 
residence on the other, together with the arrangements we have 
proposed in chapter XIII for the control of Jewish acquisition of 
land. With this in mind, we consider the above arguments in 
order — 

(a) We see no reason why as many Jews as wish should not enter 
the Mandated Territories from the Jewish State, so long as they 
are not allowed to reside habitually there. This means that they 
are free to enter the territories for pleasure or on a friendly or business 
visit, or to seek casual and temporary employment ; but that if 
they attempt to convert a short or casual visit into habitual residence 
they may at any time be called upon by the police to return to their 
own state unless they can satisfy the court that they have not over- 
stepped the bounds prescribed by the law. Since the Arabs, whether 
in the Arab or the Jewish State, will have exactly the same right, 
neither race can reasonably complain of the other's privilege. 

(b) The answer to this argument is generally the same as that 
under (i). As regards claims to participate in the benefits to be made 
available to Arabs under the proposed land development policy, 



146 



obviously the Government will take steps to satisfy themselves that 
these are confined to persons habitually resident in the Mandated 
Territories. 

(c) This is the most serious objection to our proposals, and we 
do not deny that the effect will be to reduce the scope for Jewish 
immigration into the Mandated Territories from foreign countries. 
On the other hand, there is likely to be a number of openings which 
are better filled by Jews than Arabs ; there will probably be many 
employers who will give a voluntary preference to Jewish labour ; 
and among neutral employers such as the Government and the 
Municipality it will presumably be a matter of policy to give em- 
ployment in a recognized proportion* to persons of both races. 
All these matters will doubtless be taken into account by the 
Immigration authority in making up its quota. In any case we are 
satisfied that the balance of argument is decidedly in favour of the 
system we propose. 

300. As regards persons wishing to transfer from the Arab or 
Jewish State in order to take up habitual residence in the Mandated 
Territories, we should not expect permission to be given as a rule 
except for special reasons, and after taking into account the needs 
of Jews from abroad to enter under the extra-Palestinian quota. 
An exception, however, should be made in favour of Arabs wishing 
to transfer from the Jewish State, to "whom a preference should be 
given, in accordance with the policy embodied in paragraph (ii) (i) 
of our terms of reference, even over extra-Palestinian Jews, since 
the latter can just as easily enter the Jewish State in place of the 
transferred Arabs. 

301. (vi) With reference to the sixth of the general principles 
recommended in paragraph 291, we propose, following the suggestion 
on page 140 of Sir John Hope Simpson's Report of 1930, that the 
Government should appoint an Immigration Advisory Council, 
to include representatives of both Arabs and Jews, of commercial 
authorities outside the Government, and of representatives of the 
Migration Department of the Government, with a Chairman appointed 
by Government. This Council should advise the High Commis- 
sioner what number of immigrants should in their opinion be 
permitted to enter the Mandated Territories in each six-monthly 
period, in each of the categories specified in the Immigration 
Ordinance ; their report should take the place of the reports of the 
Jewish Agency. The final decision must, of course, rest with the 
High Commissioner. 

We think that it should be an instruction to the Advisory 
Council to take into account in preparing their reports (a) the 



* The difference in the standard rates of pay demanded by the two races 
will doubtless make it difficult in the future, no less than in the past, to employ 
equal numbers of both. 



147 



existence of Arab unemployment, and (b) the extent to which the 
acceptance of fresh immigrants possessed of private capital, or the 
effect of a liberal immigration policy on the minds of potential 
Jewish investors or donors of capital, may result in an increased 
demand for labour which would not be created unless immigration 
were permitted. 

302. It is, of course, out of the question to expect that the 
Government's immigration policy will always be so nicely calculated 
that it will never create unemployment. Human foresight being 
as fallible as it is, immigration policy is certain to result in alternating 
waves of boom and slump. That is not a sufficient reason for 
restricting immigration always to a point well foelow the current 
labour demand. In these matters statesmanship must be prepared 
to take certain risks, provided that there is reasonable ground for 
assuming that the underlying economic condition of the country 
is sound. 



148 



CHAPTER XV 

NAZARETH AND THE SEA OF GALILEE 

303. As regards Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) 
the Royal Commission stated as follows — • 

We think it would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at 
large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) were also covered 
by this Mandate. We recommend that the Mandatory should be 
entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to 
safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias. 

1. Nazareth 

304. The boundary which we recommend for the Nazareth 
Enclave has been described in chapter IV and is shown on map 8. 
In this chapter we deal with certain matters relating to the 
administration of this Enclave. 

305. Under plans B and C Nazareth falls within an area which 
it is proposed should be retained under Mandate. Under both these 
plans, therefore, the creation of an enclave at Nazareth is a matter 
which will not arise unless and until it has been decided to surrender 
the Mandate for the area surrounding it. But although this is the 
position, we have thought it desirable that we should make our 
recommendations in regard to its administration if the enclave should 
ultimately be created. 

306. On the establishment of the enclave we assume that it 
would be administered as a detached part of the Jerusalem Enclave. 
Its small size would, however, necessitate special arrangements 
in regard to certain matters. For customs purposes it would have 
to be treated as part of the neighbouring state, an annual payment 
being made by the Government of that state to the Mandatory 
Power representing the estimated net amount of customs duties 
collected on dutiable goods consumed within the enclave. The 
enclave would be too small to support its own postal, telegraph 
and telephone services, and it would be desirable that an agreement 
should be entered into by which these services would be provided 
by the neighbouring state. In paragraph 295 of chapter XIV, we 
drew attention to the desirability of preserving as far as possible the 
freedom of movement which now exists between one part of Palestine 
and another and to the need of maintaining unimpaired the freedom 
of access now enjoyed by the inhabitants of Palestine to places 
sacred to one or more of the three religions. These arguments would 
apply with special force to the small enclave round Nazareth, and 
we accordingly suggest that the arrangements we have proposed 
in that chapter for facilitating movement between the Jewish and 
Arab States on the one hand and the Mandated Territories on the 
other under plan C should be adopted for the Nazareth Enclave. We 



149 



should expect that the neighbouring state would be prepared to 
grant the same freedom of movement between the enclave and its 
own territory. Finally it would probably be desirable that the 
currency of the enclave should be that of the neighbouring state. 

# 

2. The Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) 

307. Under plan C the Sea of Galilee falls within an area which it 
is proposed should be retained under Mandate, and, as in the case 
of Nazareth, the question of special arrangements as proposed by 
the Royal Commission will not arise unless and until it is proposed 
to surrender the Mandate. Under plan B, however, it falls within 
the Jewish State. We propose, therefore, to make our recommenda- 
tions in regard to the Sea of Galilee in case it should become 
necessary to put them in force, either now or hereafter. 

308. The Royal Commission in their recommendations drew a 
distinction between Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee. In the case 
of Nazareth they proposed that the Mandatory should be entrusted 
with the administration of the territory, whereas in the case of the 
Sea of Galilee they did not recommend that the area should be 
administered by the Mandatory but proposed that the Mandatory 
should have full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and 
shores of the lake. We conclude that the Royal Commission did not 
contemplate the creation of an enclave covering the Sea of Galilee. 
Nor do we favour the creation of such an enclave. The lake 
is about 22 kilometres (14 miles) in length, and an enclave 
including it would occupy a considerable stretch of country. 
Moreover, enclaves of foreign territory within a state must of necessity 
give rise to administrative problems not always easy of solution, 
and the defence of such enclaves is a matter of particular difficulty. 
In our view the sanctity of the waters and shores of the lake could be 
protected by measures which do not involve the creation of an area 
under Mandate. 

309. A matter which has an important bearing on the protection 
of the sanctity of the waters and shores of the Sea of Galilee is 
article 8 of the concession granted to the Palestine Electric 
Corporation. According to this article it is lawful for the corporation 
to dam up the water in the lake to such a maximum level and to 
draw off water to such a minimum level as may be agreed upon 
between the High Commissioner and the corporation, and to conduct 
the water from the lake by means of a canal to the power house at 
Jisr al Majami. A dam has been built at the point where the River 
Jordan flows out of the lake, and in the year 1935, after prolonged 
discussion between the Government and the corporation, it was 
provisionally agreed that the maximum level should be fixed at 
201 metres and the minimum level at 204 • 5 metres below sea-level. 
The effect of fixing these limits is still being studied and in due course 
the provisional agreement will come up either for confirmation or 
alteration. 



150 



310. Article 8 of the concession refers to levels to be agreed upon 
between the High Commissioner and the corporation. If agreement 
is not reached, article 50 comes into operation. This article provides 
that in the case of disagreement the matter shall be referred to a 
board of arbitration consisting of one arbitrator nominated by 
Government, one nominated by the corporation and a third arbitrator 
agreed upon by the other two arbitrators or, failing agreement, some 
impartial person nominated by His Majesty's Principal Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. Provision is also made that, if the 
Government or the corporation should so require, the third 
arbitrator, to be a person not ordinarily resident in Palestine. 

Christian opinion attaches importance to the maintenance of 
suitable levels in the Sea of Galilee, and Christian religious sensi- 
bilities would be seriously offended if the maximum level were such 
as to submerge the sites closely associated with that religion, or if 
the minimum level were such as seriously to impair the natural 
beauty of the shores of the lake. 

The present Administration in Palestine — a Christian Adminis- 
tration — has not escaped criticism from the Christian communities 
for its attitude towards and its actions in regard to the level of 
the waters of the lake. A non-Christian state would be more 
liable to criticism in these matters and, if the lake were included 
within the boundaries of such a state, we recommend that that 
state should be required by treaty to refrain from agreeing, under 
article 8 of the concession, to any change in the maximum and mini- 
mum levels of the waters of the lake except with the prior approval 
of the League of Nations. Further provision would also be necessary 
in view of article 50, relating to arbitration. As has been explained, 
this article provides for a board of arbitration consisting of three 
arbitrators, one of whom is to be nominated by the government 
concerned. So long as the lake remains under Mandatory adminis- 
tration it is improbable that the arbitrators would fail to pay due 
regard to Christian opinion, but, if the lake were to pass under the 
control of a non-Christian state, there would be the danger that the 
arbitrators might give their award without sufficient regard for 
that opinion. To meet this risk it is suggested that the concession 
should be amended, by agreement or by legislation, so as to provide 
that the arbitration shall be conducted by a single arbitrator, to be 
appointed by the League of Nations, with instructions to have regard 
to Christian opinion in the matter. 

311. The risk of desecration is, however, not limited to changes 
in the levels of the waters of the lake. Changes and developments 
in other ways might seriously offend against Christian sentiment. 
To afford protection against such changes, we recommend that the 
state within the boundaries of which the lake is situated should by 
treaty be required — 

(a) to take powers to control changes in the existing amenities 
of the shores and waters of the Sea of Galilee ; 



151 



(b) to agree that no substantial change in those amenities 
shall be permitted without the prior approval of the League of 
Nations ; 

(c) to give every facility for the inspection at all times of the 
shores and waters of the Sea of Galilee by a delegate of the 
League who, if the League so determine, may be the Mandatory 
Power, with a view to making recommendations to the State 
and the League ; 

(d) to agree that, in the event of a difference of opinion arising 
between the state and the delegate of the League as to the 
desirability of any change in the existing amenities, such 
difference of opinion shall be submitted for the decision of the 
League, whose decision shall be final and shall be carried into 
effect. 



152 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE PROVISION OF SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RIGHTS 
OF RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL MINORITIES 

312. The Royal Commission, in paragraph 8 of chapter XXII 
of their Report, stated that the treaties to be entered into by the 
proposed Arab and Jewish States should include strict guarantees 
for the protection of minorities in each state, and item (ii) (j) of 
our terms of reference requires us to examine and report on the pro- • 
vision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious and racial 
minorities in the areas to be allocated to the Arabs and Jews 
respectively. 

313. When 'Iraq was released from Mandatory control, the 
protection of racial and religious minorities in that country was 
ensured by means of provisions contained in a declaration made by 
the 'Iraqi Government before the Council of the League of Nations. 
This declaration followed the general lines of that made by Albania 
when that country was admitted to the League, and the Albanian 
declaration was itself based upon the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919. 
In considering the measures which should be taken to secure the 
welfare of the minorities in the Arab and Jewish States we assume 
that the League of Nations will require declarations on the lines of 
that made by 'Iraq. We propose, therefore, to take the 'Iraqi 
declaration as a basis, and to consider the modifications which 
appear to be required in order to meet the situation in the proposed 
states. We have not worked these out in detail as we presume that 
the drafting of the declarations will be done by a committee of the 
League, as was done in the case of 'Iraq. 

314. The Articles of the declaration made by the Government of 
'Iraq (which are set out in full in Appendix 9) may, so far as they 
relate to minorities, be summarized as follows — 

(i) Article 1 provides that the provisions of the declaration 
shall be recognized as fundamental laws of 'Iraq. 

(ii) Article 2 (a) guarantees to all inhabitants of 'Iraq 
protection of life and liberty; (b) declares all inhabitants of 
'Iraq to be entitled to the free exercise, public or private, of any 
creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with 
public order or public morals. 

(iii) Article 3 deals with nationality. 

(iv) Article 4 provides — • 

(a) for the complete legal and political equality of all 
'Iraqi nationals ; 

(b) for an electoral system giving equitable representation 
to minorities ; 



153 



(c) that difference of race, language, or religion shall not 
prejudice any 'Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoy- 
ment of civil or political rights ; 

(d) for the free use by any 'Iraqi national of any language ; 

(e) for adequate facilities to 'Iraqi nationals, whose 
mother tongue is not Arabic, for the use of their language 
before the courts. 

(v) Article 5 grants to 'Iraqi nationals belonging to minorities 
the same rights as are enjoyed by other 'Iraqi nationals, to 
maintain, manage, control, and establish religious, charitable, 
social, and educational institutions. 

(vi) Article 6 (a) ensures to non-Moslem minorities the 
settlement of questions concerning their family law and personal 
status in accordance with the customs and usages of the com- 
munities to which they belong, and 

(b) provides for the League of Nations to be informed of 
the measures taken to give effect to (a). 

(vii) Article 7 (a) guarantees full protection and facilities 
to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious 
establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of 
minority religious communities. 

(b) gives those communities the right to establish local 
councils, subject to the supervision of Government, competent to 
administer pious foundations and charitable bequests, and 

(c) provides for the grant of facilities for the formation of 
new religious and charitable institutions. 

(viii) Article 8 provides that — 

(a) in areas containing a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi 
nationals whose mother tongue is not Arabic, provision shall 
be made in primary schools for instruction to the children 
of such nationals in their own language, it being understood 
that this provision does not prevent the 'Iraqi Government 
from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the said 
schools, and 

(b) in areas containing a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi 
nationals belonging to minorities, those minorities shall be 
assured of an equitable share in the public funds devoted to 
educational, religious, or charitable purposes. 

(ix) Article 9 provides that in certain districts the language 
of the majority shall be the official language side by side with 
Arabic. 

(x) Article 10 declares that the rights secured to minorities 
constitute matters of international concern and places them 
under the guarantee of the League of Nations. 



154 



315. There will be a substantial Arab minority, mainly Moslems 
and Christians, in the Jewish State under any scheme of partition. 
Under plan B it numbers about 188,000, and under plan C about 
54,000. On the other hand, the minority communities in the Arab 
State will be small in numbers, consisting almost entirely of Christians 
and Jews. 

316. Before proceeding to examine the various matters arising 
in connection with the protection of minorities in the Arab and Jewish 
States, it is right to state that we have received the most emphatic 
assurances from the Jews that they, who are only too f amiliar with the 
tribulations of life as a minority, will spare no effort to ensure the. 
well-being and happiness of the Arab minority within the Jewish 
State. The following is an extract from a memorandum we received 
from a Jewish source on the subject — 

The Jewish. State cannot rest content with establishing a formal 
equality of status between Jewish and non- Jewish citizens. At present 
two different standards of life co-exist in Palestine : that of the bulk of 
the Arab population and the higher one introduced by Jewish and other 
European settlers. It will be incumbent on the Jewish State in its own 
interests, as well as in those of the Arab population, to do what can be 
done in order gradually to bring about a greater measure of real equality 
in education and standards of life. 

1. Religious Rights and Properties 

317. Our terms of reference specifically mention the protection 
of religious rights and properties. The relevant articles of the 
'Iraqi declaration are Articles 2, 5, 7 and 8. 

The Royal Commission, in paragraph 15 of chapter XXII of 
their Report, recommended that the Mandatory should be charged 
with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, 
monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred 
to the Jews and Arabs respectively. Although in this regard the 
Christian communities are not mentioned, we assume that it was not 
the intention to exclude those communities from the benefit of this 
recommendation. It appears to us that it would be impossible for 
the Mandatory to fulfil such an extensive obligation in regard to 
religious endowments and properties situated in territories under the 
administration of independent states. Every mosque and grave is 
sacred to Moslems, every church to Christians, and every synagogue 
to Jews; and the proposal therefore means that the Mandatory 
would be responsible, for example in the Jewish State, for the 
protection not only of all buildings and places sacred by tradition 
to the Moslem and the Christian communities, but also of all places 
of worship used at the present time by those communities. In 
addition, the Mandatory would be responsible for the protection 
of waqf properties and Christian endowments. In our opinion it 
would not be proper to place such a burden on the Mandatory Power. 
To require that Power to undertake an obligation of this nature 



155 



would place not only it but the states, particularly the Jewish State 
in which the religious minority will be a large one, in a most difficult 
position. Complaints might be frivolous as well as numerous, yet 
on every occasion the Mandatory, if it were to fulfil its obligations, 
would be required to undertake an enquiry, either by the despatch 
of an officer into the state for the purpose of holding an investigation 
or otherwise. If it were satisfied of the reasonableness of the com- 
plaint, it would then presumably be obliged to take some kind of 
action to put the matter right. What form of action that could be 
if the state, in whose territory the claim arose, were to dispute 
the Mandatory's finding, it is not easy to see. We deprecate the 
imposition on the Mandatory of administrative responsibilities 
which it would find difficult to carry out and which would seem to be 
incompatible with the sovereign rights of the state concerned. 

318. We accordingly recommend that the protection of religious 
rights and properties in the Arab and Jewish States respectively 
should be assured in the same way as was done in the case of 'Iraq, 
that is, by inserting provisions in the declarations to be made by the 
Arab and Jewish States corresponding to those contained in the 
'Iraqi declaration. These provisions, subject to certain proposals as 
regards Moslem waqfs which we make in a later paragraph, adequately 
cover the ground and appear to be suitable for adoption by the Arab 
and Jewish States. We have been assured by the Jews that the 
Jewish State would be prepared to enter into undertakings corres- 
ponding to those in the 'Iraqi declaration for the benefit of non- 
Jewish religious minorities. 

2. Nationality 

319. The Royal Commission in their Report (chapter XXII, 
paragraph 32), made the following proposal as regards nationality — 

All persons domiciled in the Mandated Area (including Haifa, Tiberias, 
Safad, and the enclave On the Gulf of Aqaba, as long as they remain 
under Mandatory administration) who now possess the status of British 
protected persons would retain it ; but apart from this all Palestinians 
would become the nationals of the States in which they are domiciled. 

320. Under the Royal Commission's proposal a Palestinian 
habitually resident in the Jewish State would automatically cease 
to be a Palestinian citizen on the establishment of that state and 
would ipso facto become a citizen of the Jewish State. Similarly, 
a Palestinian habitually resident in the Arab State would ipso facto 
become a citizen of that state. 

321. An alternative to the Royal Commission's proposal would 
be an arrangement whereby a Palestinian would be allowed a period 
in which to elect whether he would or would not become a citizen 
of the state in which he habitually resides, it being made clear that if 
he elected not to do so, he would not be entitled as of right to remain 
in the state in question. Under such a scheme, while the option 



156 



period was running, a Palestinian who had not elected one way or 
the other would be considered to remain a Palestinian citizen, and 
at the expiry of the time-limit a Palestinian, who had not exercised 
his option, would be considered to have become a national of the 
state in which he habitually resides. 

322. We see no advantage in this alternative over the Royal 
Commission's proposal, which is in accordance with recognized 
principles, and we suggest that the latter be adopted, subject, of 
course, to the condition that a Palestinian who did not desire to 
become a citizen of the state in which he habitually resides, would 
be entitled within a reasonable period to opt for the citizenship of 
the other state or the Mandated area, it being made clear that on the 
exercise of the option he would not be entitled, as of right, to remain 
in the state the nationality of which he had declined. 

323. The provision relating to nationality in the 'Iraqi declaration 
would not be appropriate to the Arab and Jewish States. We 
suggest that the nationality provision be drafted in accordance with 
the Royal Commission's proposal. 

3. Electoral System 

324. Article 4 (2) of the 'Iraqi declaration provides that the 
electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to racial, 
religious, and linguistic minorities. As we have said, under any 
plan of partition there will be a substantial Arab minority in the 
Jewish State. We consider it desirable that this minority should 
be represented in the legislature in proportion to its numbers. We 
have been informed that this would be in accord with Jewish views 
on the matter. We suggest, therefore, that Article 4 (2) be amended 
so as to provide that, in the Jewish State, the electoral system shall 
be such as to guarantee that the Arab minority is represented in the 
legislature in proportion to its numbers. Similar provisions should 
be made for the Christian and Jewish minorities in the Arab State. 

We would also desire to see any substantial minority represented 
in the executive organs of the new states. We have been told that 
Jewish opinion would be in favour of such a measure in the Jewish 
State. We doubt, however, whether it would be feasible to insert 
a provision of this nature in a declaration dealing with the protection 
of minorities. 

4. Employment in the Public Services 

325. Article 4 (3) of the 'Iraqi declaration provides that differ- 
ences of race, language and religion shall not prejudice any 'Iraqi 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights, as, for instance, admission to public employment. This 
question of public employment will be one of considerable importance. 
The Jews have told us that in their view it will be incumbent on the 



157 



Jewish State to ensure that the Arabs shall be equitably represented 
in the public services and be given a fair share of the employment 
available on public works. But the Government of the Jewish 
State will be subjected to intense pressure to find employment for 
Jewish immigrants, and there is the danger that this pressure may 
prevent the Government from giving to the Arab minority its fair 
share in the available employment. We consider it important 
that the Arabs should be safeguarded in this matter, and we accord- 
ingly suggest that provision should be made in more specific terms 
than in Article 4 (3) of the 'Iraqi declaration for a guarantee that 
the Arab minority shall be equitably represented in the public 
services and be given a fair share of the employment available on 
public works. 

5. Religious Courts 

326. Under Article 6 of the 'Iraqi declaration an undertaking is 
given that as regards non-Moslem minorities, in so far as concerns 
their family law and personal status, measures shall be taken per- 
mitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the 
customs and usage of the communities to which these minorities 
belong. 

In Palestine matters of personal status are dealt with by the courts 
of the respective religious communities, and it is essential that this 
position should be maintained in regard to the minority communities 
in the Arab and Jewish States after partition. 

The Jews have told us that they contemplate that in the Jewish 
State the Moslem religious courts and the courts of the several 
Christian communities shall continue to exercise the same jurisdiction 
as at present. And we have been assured that it may safely be 
assumed that the Jewish State would be ready to undertake that no 
change of any kind should be made in the jurisdiction now exercised 
by any Moslem or Christian religious court, save at the instance of 
an overwhelming majority of the community concerned. 

We recommend that provision be made, similar to the first 
paragraph of Article 6 of the 'Iraqi declaration, in regard to the 
settlement of matters of family law and personal status in the 
declarations to be made by the Arab and Jewish States. 

327. Apart, however, from the general question of the main- 
tenance of religious courts for the minorities in the Arab and Jewish 
States, there are certain other questions which should be considered — 

(i) Appeals. — From the Moslem religious courts of first 
instance an appeal lies at present to the Sharia Court of Appeal 
at Jerusalem. It is possible that the Jewish State would be 
reluctant to allow appeals on the part of the members of so 
large a minority to be heard outside the state. It would be a 
convenient course, however, if it could be arranged that appeals 
should continue to be heard, at any rate for some time, by the 



158 



Sharia Court of Appeal at Jerusalem, but if experience showed 
that this course was unsatisfactory, it would be necessary for 
an appellate court to be established within the Jewish State. 
The Arab State would presumably have its own Court of Appeal. 
In the case of the Christian religious courts in both states the 
appellate authority for the courts of some of the communities 
is at Jerusalem, while for others it is outside Palestine. A list 
of these courts is given in Appendix 10. As regards the Christian 
appellate courts, we would suggest that the appellate position 
should remain unchanged. The appellate authority for the 
Rabbinical Courts is the Rabbinical Council. The number of . 
Jews in the Arab State will be small, and may be expected to 
decrease. It does not therefore seem necessary to set up 
a separate Jewish Court of Appeal in the Arab State, and 
we suggest that the Rabbinical Council in the Jerusalem 
Enclave should continue to be the appellate authority for the 
Rabbinical Courts in the Arab area after partition. 

(ii) Financial arrangements in regard to the Sharia Courts 
(the Moslem Religious Courts). — The financial arrangements in 
regard to the Sharia Courts differ from those governing the 
courts of other religious communities inasmuch as the expendi- 
ture in connection with these courts is borne by Government. 
Provision for this expenditure is included in the Govern- 
ment estimates and the receipts form part of the Government 
receipts. Further, officials of the Sharia Courts are eligible 
for pensions and gratuities under practically the same conditions 
as members of the public services. In fact the Sharia Courts 
in Palestine are a branch of the Judiciary. It is clearly 
desirable that partition should not introduce any change 
in the financial arrangements for the Sharia Courts in the 
Jewish State. We accordingly recommend that the Jewish 
State should undertake to provide funds for the maintenance 
of these courts within its territories. The expenditure on the 
Sharia Court of Appeal at Jerusalem is also borne by Government. 
If this court is retained as the Court of Appeal from the Sharia 
Courts in the Jewish State, that state would presumably make 
a contribution towards the cost of this appellate court. 

(iii) Appointment of Judges of the Sharia Courts in the Jewish 
State. — The position in Palestine is that the Supreme Moslem 
Council has the power to nominate and, after approval by 
Government, to appoint the President and Members of the 
Sharia Court of Appeal, the Qadis of the Sharia Courts and 
the Inspector of these courts. The Council also exercises 
disciplinary action, including dismissal, in respect of the staff of 
these courts, subject to Government being notified of the action 
taken. Arrangements will have to be made for the appoint- 
ment of the Judges for the Sharia Courts and for the 



159 



supervision of those courts in the Jewish State. We do not feel 
ourselves in a position to make any proposal as regards the 
form these arrangements should take, particularly as we have 
had no opportunity of learning Moslem views. The arrange- 
ments are clearly a matter for discussion between the Jewish 
State and representative Moslems within that state, and we 
suggest that they be formulated by a committee composed of 
an equal number of representatives of the state and of the 
Moslems within the state. In case of disagreement we propose 
that the matter be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by 
the League of Nations. 

(iv) Christian Religious Courts. — It is desirable that a court 
exercising jurisdiction in a state should itself be located within 
the state. On partition, however, it may not be possible to 
insist on this in all cases. We suggest that the following 
arrangements should, if possible, be made— 

(a) Where in a state there is a substantial body of 
members of the community but no religious court of that 
community, the religious authority concerned should be 
invited to establish a court in that state. 

(b) Where in a state the number of the members of a 
community is too small to justify the establishment of a 
religious court, the members should be treated as being 
within the jurisdiction of a court of the community to 
which they belong, situated in Mandated territory. 

Apart from this no change should be made in the present 
position in regard to the Christian religious courts of first 
instance. 

(v) Rabbinical Courts.- — The arrangements in regard to the 
Rabbinical Courts of First Instance in the Arab State should 
be the same as under the present Mandate. 



6. Language. 

328. Arabic will be the official language of the Arab State and 
Hebrew of the Jewish State. No language problem will arise in the 
Arab State, for there will be very few persons whose mother tongue 
will not be Arabic. In the Jewish State there will, however, be a 
large minority whose mother tongue will be Arabic and not Hebrew. 
Article 4 of the 'Iraqi declaration provides for the free use of any 
language in private intercourse, commerce, etc., and also for adequate 
facilities for nationals, whose mother tongue is not the official 
language, for the use of their language before the courts. Article 5 
gives the members of linguistic minorities the right to use their own 
language in their own schools. Article 8 provides that in areas 
containing a considerable proportion of such nationals, provision 



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160 



shall be made in primary schools for instruction to their children 
in their own language, it being understood that this provision does 
not prevent the teaching of Arabic being made obligatory in these 
schools. 

As regards schools, we consider it desirable that the Jewish 
State should be required to provide instruction in Arabic to children 
whose mother tongue is Arabic, not only in primary schools but also 
in secondary schools. 

We also consider it desirable that the Jewish State should 
undertake that, in areas where a considerable part of the population 
is Arab, the officials shall, subject to justifiable exceptions', have a 
competent knowledge of Arabic. This should offer no difficulty if 
the Arab minority is equitably represented in the public services. 

329. Subject to these changes we consider the provisions of the 
'Iraqi declaration suitable for the Arab and Jewish States. 

We have been assured by the Jews that they contemplate that 
(i) Arabic will have full recognition as the language of an important 
section of the citizens of the Jewish State, (ii) no attempt will be made 
to force Hebrew upon the Arab public, (iii) Arabs will be entitled to 
address the Government in Arabic and to receive replies in that 
language, (iv) official notices will be issued and official business 
transacted in Arabic in areas in which this is required for the benefit 
of the Arabic-speaking population, and (v), while a knowledge of 
Hebrew will ultimately be made a qualification for Government 
employment, this rule will not be enforced until the expiration of a 
definite time limit. We are glad to have these assurances. 



7. Land 

330. In regard to land, the 'Iraqi declaration affords no precedent 
for the protection of the Arab minority in the Jewish State. Under 
the Mandate the obligation, on the one hand, to encourage close 
settlement by Jews on the land and, on the other, to protect the 
rights and position of the Arabs has rendered the land problem in 
Palestine one of the most difficult with which the Mandatory has 
been called upon to deal. The first ordinance for the protection of 
the cultivators was enacted in 1920, and the law on the subject is at 
present contained in the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance. We 
nave been assured by the Jews that, although one of the paramount 
duties of the Jewish State will be the development of the land in order 
to find room for new Jewish settlers, existing cultivators will continue 
to be protected by legislation embodying the principles of the 
Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance now in force. This represents 
the best system of protection which the Palestine Government have 
been able to devise, though it is not suggested that its provisions 
are effective if a cultivator is willing to accept payment for waiver 
of his rights. We believe the Jewish State would desire to protect 



161 



the Arab cultivating tenants from being deprived of their holdings 
in order to find room for Jewish cultivators. But the pressure to 
provide land for additional Jewish settlers will be very great, and it 
is clearly desirable that the Jewish State should be placed under an 
international obligation to safeguard the interests of the cultivating 
tenants by legislation on the lines of the Cultivators (Protection) 
Ordinance. We accordingly suggest that a provision to this effect 
be included in the declaration to be made by the Jewish State. 

331. According to the terms of the contract by which land 
belonging to the Jewish National Fund is leased to Jewish settlers, 
the lessee is required to execute all works connected with the 
cultivation of his holding only with Jewish labour. The penalty 
for the employment of non- Jewish labour is the payment of com- 
pensation amounting to £P. 10 for each day such labour is employed 
and, when the lessee has contravened the provision three times, the 
Fund is entitled to require the surrender of the holding without 
paying any compensation whatever. The insertion of this clause is 
bitterly resented by the Arabs, and we consider that the Jewish 
State should be required to pass legislation providing that any con- 
tract or sale or lease forbidding, directly or indirectly, the employ- 
ment of persons of a particular race or religion shall be null and void. 

8. Pious Foundations and Charitable Bequests 

332. Article 7 of the 'Iraqi declaration reads as follows — 

1. The 'Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities 
and authorization to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other 
religious establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of 
minority religious committees existing in 'Iraq. 

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing 
councils, in important administrative districts, competent to administer 
pious foundations and charitable bequests. These councils shall be 
competent to deal with the collection of income derived therefrom and 
the expenditure thereof in accordance with the wishes of the donor or 
with the custom in use among the community. These committees shall 
also undertake the supervision of the property of orphans in accordance 
with the law. The councils referred to above shall be under the super- 
vision of the Government. 

These provisions appear to be suitable for the Arab and Jewish 
States, subject to one modification. The right of establishing 
councils should be a general right and should not be limited to 
important administrative districts. 

Moslem waqfs, however, raise certain questions which are 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 

333. Prior to October, 1937, when, in consequence of the 
disturbances, special arrangements of a temporary nature were 
made for the control and management of Moslem waqfs, the supreme 
authority in respect of waqf affairs in Palestine was the Supreme 



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162 



Moslem Council, an elected body, whose duties (in addition to those 
connected with the Sharia Courts) were the administration and 
control of Moslem waqfs and the approval of the waqf budget. 
Subordinate to the Council was the General Waqf Committee, the 
executive authority for the administration of Moslem waqfs. This 
Committee consisted of the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Director-General 
of Waqfs, all Mamours of Waqfs and one member from each of the 
local Waqf Committees. 

334. The revenue of the Waqf Administration is about £P.77,000 

a year. The chief item of revenue is a sum of £P.30,000 paid • 
annually by the Palestine Government on account of assigned 
tithes. Another important source of revenue, the collection of 
which is also in the hands of Government, is the registration fees 
charged in respect of the transfers of lands, the revenues of which are 
dedicated as waqfs. The Waqf Administration receives one half of 
the fees collected by Government under the Land Transfer Ordinance 
in respect of such lands. 

The Waqf Administration, besides being in general administrative 
control of waqfs, maintains certain mosques and shrines (including 
the Haram at Jerusalem), and its social activities comprise the 
management and upkeep of schools, an orphanage, and soup kitchens. 

335. We take the view that, after partition, it would be necessary 
to create in each of the states (Arab and Jewish) separate Waqf 
Administrations. In the Arab State the management and control 
of waqfs would, no doubt, be entrusted to a department of the 
Government. This would not, however, be possible in the Jewish 
State. In that state a Council would have to be created by the 
Moslem community of the State as contemplated in paragraph 2 of 
Article 7 of the 'Iraqi declaration. 

336. After partition the sum of £P.30,000 paid annually by the 
Palestine Government on account of assigned tithes will fall to be 
apportioned among the areas created by partition. Tithes have been 
commuted in Palestine, and an arrangement was reached in 1932 
whereby the Government pay to the Supreme Moslem Council 
■£P. 23,000 annually in lieu of the commuted tithes. This figure is 
made up of the average waqf tithe collections prior to the commuta- 
tion, and the apportionment of this sum among the areas will, . 
therefore, offer no difficulty. The balance of £P.7,000is an additional 
payment sanctioned as the result of an investigation made by 
a Committee appointed by Government. This amount cannot 
be identified with the tithes payable for any specific land and 
should be apportioned among the different areas in the same 
proportions as the sum of £P .23,000 is allocated. We recommend 
that the Jewish State should give an undertaking to pay its share 
of the sum of ^P.30,000 to the Council referred to in the preceding 
paragraph. The Jewish State should also give an undertaking to 



163 



pay to this Council one half of the fees collected under the Land 
Transfer Ordinance in respect of the transfers of lands, the revenues 
of which are dedicated as waqfs. 

337. Upon partition, the Waqf Authority in each area will 
administer its own revenue. But it may be that some contribution 
may be necessary to the Waqf Authority in the area retained under 
Mandate in connection with the support of the Haram Esh Sherif in 
Jerusalem or for other special interests of the Moslem community 
in Palestine. This is a matter which, we consider, should be settled 
by agreement among the representatives of the Waqf interests in 
the different areas in the light of the common interests of the 
Moslem communities. 

9. Freedom of Conscience and the Free Exercise of the Activities 
of Religions Missions of all Denominations 

338. Article 15 of Chapter II of the 'Iraqi declaration reads as 
follows — 

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of 
public order and morality 'Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee 
throughout its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free 
exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious 
missions of all denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions 
or of their members. 

We recommend that the declarations to be made by the Arab 
and Jewish States should contain a similar clause. 

10. Foreigners 

339. Article 8 of the Mandate is as follows — 

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of 
consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation 
or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine. 

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned 
privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously 
renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to 
their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities 
shall at the expiration of the Mandate, be immediately re-established in 
their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon 
between the Powers concerned. 

We draw attention to this Article of the Mandate. 

11. Orthodox Jewry 

340. We have received representations from Orthodox Jewry in 
which it has been impressed upon us that Orthodox Jews — 

(a) regard the State and Church as indivisible, and 

(b) consider it fundamental that the constitution of the Jewish 
State should contain provisions which will ensure that for all 



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164 



time the law of the Torah shall be the law of the state, or, as it 
was expressed in one representation which we received, " the 
state shall itself adhere to the cardinal requirements of the 
Torah." 

The anxieties which have led to these representations appear to 
be lest, unless the constitution ensures that the Jewish State is 
guided in all its activities by the law of the Torah, it should become an 
irreligious state in which Orthodox Jews will not be able to remain 
without serious prejudice to their religious beliefs and convictions. 
It is feared that, in matters of religion and personal status, the law . 
of the Torah will not prevail and that, in particular, marriages and 
divorces which are not in accordance with the Torah may be 
recognized. Anxiety has also been expressed lest the Jewish Sabbath 
should not be observed in public affairs strictly in accordance with 
the directions of the Torah, and lest the education imparted in the 
state schools should not be in accord with the " spirit and tradition " 
of the Torah. 

In one representation which we received it was suggested that in 
order to safeguard their position, Orthodox Jews, or any section of 
such Jews, should be guaranteed the right — to be exercised if they 
were not satisfied with the actions of the state — 

(a) tc set up their own schools, 

(b) to establish their own religious courts for the settlement 
of matters relating to religion and personal status, and 

(c) to adopt their own arrangements for burial and ritual 
killing. 

In another representation it was suggested that the constitution 
should provide that — 

(a) the written and oral Torah, as interpreted in the 
Rabbinical Codes, shall be the actual law of the State, and 

(b) the religious rights of Jewish minorities, who feel and 
who can legally prove that the law of the Torah is not duly and 
generally observed by the organic bodies of the state, shall be 
safeguarded by the grant of autonomous institutions. 

341. Article 2 of the 'Iraqi declaration guarantees to all inhabi- 
tants of the state the free exercise, whether public or private, of any 
creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with 
public order or morals, and Article 15 guarantees throughout the 
state, freedom of conscience and worship. We contemplate that these 
Articles shall be included in the declaration which the Jewish State 
will make before the League of Nations. Orthodox Jews will, 
therefore, be assured of complete freedom of conscience and the 
free exercise of their, religion, subject, of course, to the maintenance 
of public order, and will be entitled to regulate and control their 
religious affairs in accordance with their own views and beliefs. 



165 



342. But these guarantees to every group of nationals of complete 
freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion, subject only 
to the maintenance of public order, do not satisfy those Orthodox 
Jews who have urged their views before us. They desire something 
more. What they desire is that the constitution shall be so drafted 
as to ensure, not only that the law of the Torah shall prevail, but 
also that it shall never not prevail. In fact, what they desire is that, 
in matters which they consider vital to the Jewish religion, the will 
of the majority, if it does not coincide with the views of the Orthodox, 
shall not prevail. 

343. We do not propose to express any opinion as regards the 
matters raised by the Orthodox Jews. If a Jewish State is set up 
Jewish bodies and organizations will have opportunity to give 
expression to their views, while the constitution is being framed, 
and at that time Orthodox Jewry will be able to bring their 
influence to bear on the form of the constitution of the Jewish State, 
but it would not be proper for us to intervene in a matter which 
seems to us to be essentially one for Jews themselves to decide. 



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166 



CHAPTER XVII 

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. 
1. — Railways 

344. The railways administered and operated by the Palestine 
Railways Administration (a department of the Palestine Government) 
fall into the following sections— 

Length in 

kilometres. Gauge. 

{a) The El Kantara-Rafah Railway . . 203 Standard. 
(6) The Palestine Railway — 

(i) Rafah-Haifa (including the Beit 235 

Nabala siding and dual gauge 
length east of Haifa) 

(ii) Jaffa- Jerusalem .. .. .. 91-5 ,, 

(c) The Petah Tiqva Railway .. .. 6-5 

(d) The Hejaz Railway — 

(i) Haifa-Acre 18 105 cm. 

(ii) Haifa-Samakh . . . . . . 88 „ 

(in) Affula-Nablus-Tulkarm . . . . 98 

(iv) Nassib-Amman-Ma'an . . . . 323 

The El Kantara Railway belongs to His Majesty's Government 
and is situated in Egyptian territory. It is operated by the Palestine 
Railways Administration under a lease. 

The Nassib-Amman-Ma'an section of the Hejaz Railway is 
situated in Trans- Jordan but is administered and operated by the 
Palestine Railways Administration. The Railway connecting 
Al Hamma, the terminus of the Haifa-Samakh section, with Nassib 
is in Syria and is administered and operated by the Syrian 
authorities. 

The workshops for all the railways are located at Haifa. 
The branch line to Petah Tiqva is owned partly by the Palestine 
Government and partly by the residents of Petah Tiqva. 

345. The capital expenditure on the railways up to the end 
of March, 1938, by the Palestine Government was as follows — 

From loan From 
funds Revenue ' Total 

£P- £P- .£?■ 

El Kantara-Rafah Railway 3,000 18,000 21,000 

Palestine Railway .. 2,434,000 1,005,000 3,439,000 

Petah Tiqva Railway . . 55,000 — 55,000 

Hejaz Railway' . . . . 1,000 — 1,000 



Total . . £P.2,493,000 £P. 1,023,000 £P.3,516,000 



167 



346. The receipts and ordinary expenditure for the three years 
ending 1937/38 were as follows — 







Ordinary 








Receipts 


working 
Expenditure 




Net 

Receipts 




£P- 






£P- 


El Kantara Railway — 








1935-36 .. 


119,000 


111,000 


Surplus 


8,000 


1936-37 


181,000 


145,000 




36,000 


1937-38 .. 


109,000 


109,000 


— 




Palestine Railway — 










1935^36 .. 


589,000 


422,000 


Surplus 


167,000 


1936-37 .. 


717,000 


456,000 




261,000 


1937-38 .. 


479,000 


460,000 


it 


19,000 


Petah Tiqva Railway- 








1935-36 .. 


2,000 


1,000 




1,000 


1936^37 .. .. 


6,000 


1,000 


tt 


5,000 


1937-38 .. 


4,000 


1,000 


tt 


3,000 


Hejaz Railway — 










1935-36 .. 


103,000 


108,000 


Deficit 


5,000 


1936-37 .. 


101,000 


113,000 


it 


12,000 


1937-38 


81,000 


120,000 


St 


39,000 



. The ordinary working expenditure does not include debt charges 
or extraordinary expenditure from revenue but it includes contri- 
butions to the renewals fund of the Palestine Railway and the Special 
Fund of the El Kantara-Rafah Railway. 

The annual debt charges of the Palestine Railway amount to 
^P. 125,000, excluding contributions to the Sinking Fund*. If these 
are allowed for the net receipts become — 

Net receipts 
after allowing for 
debt charges. 

Palestine Railway. £P. 

1935- 36 Surplus 42,000 

1936- 37 „ 136,000 

1937- 38 Deficit 106,000 

347. The railways are suffering severely from road competition. 
The road from Jaffa and Tel Aviv to Haifa was opened in September, 
1937, and this is reported to have caused a considerable loss in 
revenue to the railway. Failing some measures of control and 
co-ordination, road competition is likely to increase throughout 
Palestine. 



* As the Palestine Railway makes provision for renewals through a 
Renewals Fund, it could not properly be 'charged in addition with Sinking 
Fund contributions on the loan. 



168 



348. Under plan C the railways are divided among the Arab and 
Jewish States and the Mandated Territories as follows — 

1. The Palestine Railway — 

(a) Rafah-Haifa. — This section is divided into six parts — 

(i) a short length of about 8 kilometres from Rafah north- 
ward, which is situated in the Southern Mandated Territory ; 

(ii) a length of about 80 kilometres in the Arab State ; 

(iii) a length of about 8 kilometres in that portion of the 
Jewish State which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave ; 

(iv) a length of about 17 kilometres in the Jerusalem 
Enclave ; 

(v) a length of about 70 kilometres in the Jewish State ; 

(vi) the remainder (as far as Haifa) in the Northern 
Mandated Territory. 

(b) Jaffa- Jerusalem — This section lies in the Jerusalem 
Enclave except for a short length, including Tel Aviv Station, 
in the Jewish State and another short length, including the 
terminal station at Jaffa, in the Arab State. 

2. The Petah-Tiqva Railway is wholly in the Jewish State. 

3. The He jaz Railway — 

(i) the Haifa-Acre and the Haifa-Samakh sections are in 
the Northern Mandated Territory ; 

(ii) the Affula-Tulkarm-Nablus section is situated almost 
entirely in the Arab State ; 

(iii) the Nassib-Amman-Ma'an section is in Trans- Jordan. 

4. The railway workshops are situated at Haifa in the Northern 
Mandated Territory. 

349. The volume of traffic carried by the various sections of 
the railways is very unequal — 

(a) On the Rafah-Haifa section, the northern portion from 
Lydda to Haifa carries a much heavier traffic than the southern 
portion from Rafah to Lydda. We have been furnished with a rough 
calculation distributing receipts and working expenditure for this 
section for the years 1936-37 and 1937-38 between these two 
portions. This shows that, for both years, there was for the northern 
portion an excess of receipts over working expenditure, and for the 
southern portion an excess of working expenditure over receipts. 
In fact, the line from a point a short distance south of Lydda north- 
wards to Haifa is the revenue-earning section of the Palestine 
Railways. 

(b) The traffic on the Nassib-Amman-Ma'an section is very 
small : there is a train — goods and passengers — three times a week 
from Nassib to Amman and once a week from Amman to Ma'an. 



169 



(c) The traffic on the section between Haifa and Samakh is light : 
with one train a day each way. Road competition is increasing 
with the improvement of the road down the Valley of Jezreel. 

(d) The line from Affula to El Mas-udiya near Nablus was 
closed in 1932 owing to the lack of traffic. It is still closed. 

(e) There is very little traffic on the line from Tulkarm to Nablus. 
There is an engine and a few wagons at Tulkarm and a train is 
run when there is a load. 

350. Under plan C the administration and operation of the Hejaz 
Railway presents no difficulty. The sections from Haifa to Acre 
and from Haifa to Samakh are situated in the Northern Mandated 
Territory and would be administered by the Mandatory. The 
Nassib-Amman-Ma'an section lies entirely in Trans- Jordan and the 
greater part of the Affula-Nablus-Tulkarm section falls in the Arab 
area. These sections would be administered by the Arab State, 
which would be free to keep them open or close them as it thought 
fit. The absence of workshops would not create any serious difficulty, 
for the state would be able to arrange for repairs being carried out 
either at the Haifa workshops or at those of the Syrian Railways at 
Damascus. The provision by the Arab State of the supervisory 
staff necessary to ensure the efficient working of these lines might, 
however, be inconvenient, and that state might prefer an arrange- 
ment by which the Mandatory administered these sections as its agents. 

351. Although short lengths of the Jaffa- Jerusalem section are 
situated in the Jewish and Arab States, the line should be operated 
throughout its length by the Mandatory Power, provision being made 
in the treaties with the Arab and Jewish States for the grant to the 
Mandatory Power of the necessary facilities for working the line in 
those states. 

352. The southern portion (Rafah to Lydda) of the Rafah-Haifa 
section runs for the greater part through the Arab State, small 
lengths lying in the Jewish State and in the Southern Mandated 
Territory. This portion is an important link' in the Mandatory 
Power's line of communication between the Jerusalem Enclave and 
the Suez Canal, and connects with the railway line belonging to His 
Majesty's Government which runs from Rafah to El Kantara on 
the Canal. It is run at a loss. According to the rough calculation 
referred to in paragraph 349, working expenses (excluding loan charges 
and extraordinary expenditure from revenue) exceeded the receipts 
in the year 1936-37 by about £P.5,000 and in 1937-38 by about 
£P.22,000. Including extraordinary expenditure from revenue, 
the estimated loss in the current year may be put at £P.35,000. As 
will be explained in the chapter on Finance and Budgetary Prospects 
(chapter XVIII) the Arab State will be faced with a large and con- 
tinuing deficit and will have to receive substantial assistance in some 
form or another from His Majesty's Government. The money for 



170 



the upkeep of the line, if it should continue to be run at a loss, must, 
therefore, in effect be provided by His Majesty's Government. In 
view of the importance of this portion of the railway as a line of 
communication for the Mandatory Power, we think that it would be 
more satisfactory that this portion (Rafah-Lydda), including the 
small section in the Jewish State, should remain the property of the 
Mandatory Administration, and that it should be administered and 
operated directly by that Administration, the Arab State being 
relieved of all financial responsibility in regard to it. Provision would 
need to be made in the treaties with the Arab and Jewish States for 
this purpose. The Mandatory Administration would then continue 
to administer the line from Rafah to El Kantara. 

353. As regards the northern portion, Lydda to Haifa, of the 
Rafah-Haifa section, we propose that the Mandatory and the 
Jewish State be charged with the administration and operation of the 
railway line falling within their respective territories. Some joint 
working arrangement in regard to locomotives, rolling stock and 
running staff would, however, be essential, since the distance from 
Lydda to Haifa is only about 100 kilometres, of which about 70 would 
be in the Jewish State, and Haifa is the station to and from which the 
majority, if not the whole, of the goods and passenger trains would run. 
We have left the working out of such an arrangement to be dealt 
with by railway experts. Repairs to engines and rolling stock 
belonging to the Jewish State could be carried out at the railway 
workshops at Haifa at the expense of the Jewish State. It would 
also be necessary to provide by agreement for the transit over 
the line in the Jewish State of engines and rolling stock belonging 
to the Mandatory and used on the line south of Lydda or on the 
Jaffa- Jerusalem section, which were being despatched to the Haifa 
workshops for repairs. 

354. The line from Lydda to Haifa, like the section from Lydda 
to Rafah, is an important line of communication for the Mandatory 
Power, for it is the line which connects Haifa, the only deep water 
port, with the Jerusalem Enclave. As we explained in Chapter XI, 
the military authorities attach the greatest importance to Haifa 
from the point of view of the obligations of the Mandatory Power 
to defend the Arab and Jewish States against external aggression 
and to safeguard the Jerusalem Enclave. The maintenance of the 
railway connection between Lydda and Haifa is, therefore, a -matter 
of importance to the Mandatory Power, and we suggest that the 
treaty with the Jewish State should require that state to maintain 
the line within its territory in good working condition. 

2. Ports 

355. We do not suggest any special arrangements for the adminis- 
tration of the ports. A port should be administered by the 
Government of the area in which it is situated. 



171 



356. In paragraph 31 of chapter XXII the Royal Commission 
wrote as follows — 

We should regard it as highly undesirable that the provision recently 
made for loading and landing goods at Tel Aviv should be expanded 
into a substantial harbour quite detached from Jaffa. If the need for a 
second deep-water port besides Haifa be established, we recommend the 
adoption of the plan for a joint port for Jaffa and Tel Aviv. In the 
event of Partition such a port should be controlled by a Joint Harbour 
Board, composed of representatives of the Arab and Jewish States and 
presided over by an officer of the Mandatory Government. 

We agree that, if the need for a second deep-water port besides 
Haifa be established, the construction of a joint port for Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv instead of a separate port at Tel Aviv would in many ways 
be desirable. The construction of such a joint port must, however, 
depend upon agreement between the Arab and Jewish States. 
Failing such agreement it would not be possible to prevent the 
Jewish State from constructing a separate deep-water port at 
Tel Aviv. 



3. Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services 

357. By far the greater part of the business of the Posts and 
Telegraphs Department of the Palestine Government has been built 
up out of current revenue surpluses. Out of a total expenditure on 
capital account of £P. 1,075,055, the amount defrayed from loan 
funds has been only £P.232,025 (£P.208,372 from the proceeds of the 
5 per cent, guaranteed loan, and £P.23,653 from Ottoman Public 
Debt Administration funds) ; and the amount of the public debt 
charges attributable to the Department is only £P.13,140 per annum. 
Until 1935 the aggregate revenue showed a net cash surplus over 
aggregate expenditure, including capital as well as recurrent expendi- 
ture, of over £P.300,000 ;* but in the last three years the trend has 
been reversed, as the following figures show : — 



Revenue. 




Expenditure. 






Recurrent. 


Capital. 


Total. 


£P. 


£P- 


£P- 




419,000 


311,000 


136,000 


447,000 


477,000 


352,000 


151,000 


503,000 


509,000 


429,000 


265,000 


695,000 


516,000 


413,000 


110,000 


523,000 



1935- 36 (actual) 

1936- 37 (actual) 

1937- 38 (actual) 

1938- 39 (estimated) 

This heavy capital expenditure in recent years has been due, we 
are informed, almost entirely to the expansion of services needed to 
meet the needs of a rapidly developing community. The earning 
capacity of the plant and buildings provided for these services may 
be expected to last for many years to come. 



* On a cash basis, without taking credit for interest on surplus balances, 
which are in fact treated by the Treasury as current revenue. 



172 



358. Since 1931 no part of the capital expenditure has been 
charged to loan funds, and the whole of the current year's expenditure 
of the Department, whether of a recurrent or a capital nature, has 
been treated as part of the expenditure of the year in the current 
budget, under one or other of the following heads — Posts and Tele- 
graphs ; Posts and Telegraphs Extraordinary ; and Public Works 
Extraordinary. In each of the three years 1935-37 the net result, as 
shown above, has been a deficit on the whole account ; and as in the 
two latter years the Palestine budget as a whole has shown a deficit 
in excess of the Post Office deficit, the effect has been during those 
years to meet the latter deficit out of the accumulated surplus 
balances of the Treasury in general. Now that these balances are 
becoming exhausted, it would seem that, if there is any likelihood of 
capital expenditure continuing on the recent scale, the policy will 
have to be reconsidered, for it is plainly impossible for a Government 
to continue indefinitely to meet from its current revenue relatively 
large capital outlays on a revenue-producing service such as the 
Post Office. 

359. Meanwhile, however, the service has been treated, for the 
purpose of the budgetary forecast made in chapter XVIII, as self- 
supporting over the whole of Palestine, after meeting the charges for 
public debt attributable to it, as noted above. But this will not be 
the case with each of the partitioned areas taken separately. Exclud- 
ing the debt charges (which, as proposed in chapter XX, will be paid 
like the rest of the financial obligations of the present Government 
out of a central fund), the effect on each area is estimated to be — 

Surplus* Deficit* 

Arab State — 20,000 

Jewish State 18,140 

Jerusalem Enclave . . . . 10,000 
Northern Mandated Territory. . 5,000 
Southern Mandated Territory. . — 

360. The division of the postal administration of Palestine — the 
Trans- Jordan administration is separate — into three distinct admini- 
strations, although it is certain to give rise to many matters of detail 
requiring adjustment and settlement, would not, we believe, present 
any insuperable administrative problems. But division into three 
small units must inevitably be accompanied by some loss in efficiency 
and by an increase in cost. It would be impossible for three small 
administrations to be run as efficiently and economically as a single 
administration. For instance, the introduction of international 



* Resulting in an estimated net surplus of £P.13,140, equal to the public 
debt charges, on the assumption that the service over the whole of Palestine 
is self -balancing after meeting all charges. 



173 



boundaries must tend to reduce expedition in the postal, telegraph, 
and telephone services between one place and another, and the crea- 
tion of three administrative units, instead of one, must inevitably 
lead to some increase in staff. The public service will, we fear, 
inevitably suffer some inconvenience ; and this will not be confined 
to persons resident in Palestine, but will extend to those wishing to 
communicate with Palestine from abroad. 

361. We do not propose to enter on an examination of the adjust- 
ments and agreements in regard to postal, telegraph and telephone 
matters which would be necessary if Palestine were partitioned. 
We should hope, however, that every endeavour would be made to 
maintain, as far as possible, charges at their present levels. At 
present, correspondence posted in any part of Palestine and Trans- 
Jordan for any other part is treated, as far as rates of postage are 
concerned, as inland correspondence. The rates of postage in 
the two countries differ slightly, but could be assimilated without 
difficulty if Trans- Jordan should be included in the Arab State. 
We should consider it unfortunate if the rate of postage for a letter 
from, say, Jerusalem in the Mandated Territory to Tel Aviv in the 
Jewish State or Jaffa in the Arab State were increased from the inland 
rate to the international rate. 

362. Palestine is at present a party to a number of contracts 
for the conveyance of mails and of telegraph agreements with other 
administrations, which it will be necessary for the successor 
administrations to take over and adhere to so long as they are valid. 

363. Our attention has been drawn to the Postal Union which 
has been established in Malaya. This Union is constituted by the 
Colony of the Straits Settlements and certain of the Malay States. 
The main features of this Union are as follows — 

(a) the constitution of a single postal area styled " Malaya " 
for the territories of the Colony and the States ; 

(b) the creation of a Postal Board consisting of the Director 
General of Posts and Telegraphs, of one representative of each 
administration and of four representatives appointed by the 
High Commissioner ; 

(c) each administration has the right to have its own stamps 
provided the word " Malaya " appears on postal stamps ; 

(d) the Director General (appointed by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies) is entrusted with the control of the postal 
departments of the administrations, including revenue and 
expenditure ; 

(e) each administration contributes to the cost of the 
headquarters organization in proportion to the revenue of 
its Posts and Telegraph Department ; 



174 



(/) each administration appoints and is in control of its own 
postal staff other than the senior staff, but the Director General 
controls, subject to the advice of the Board, the numbers of the 
monthly paid staff working in each administration and has 
power to transfer officers from one administration to another, 
subject to the approval of the administrations concerned; 

(g) the Director General deals with changes and transfers 
in the senior staff, and appointments and promotions in the 
staff are made by the High Commissioner on the recommendation 
of the Director General ; 

(h) all purchases and repairs for or on behalf of any adminis- 
tration are made by the central stores and workshops which are 
under the charge of the Director General. 

It would, we think, be conducive to efficiency and economy if 
the Mandated Territory and the states, on partition, were to form 
themselves into a similar union. 

364. Our attention has also been drawn to the policy of His 
Majesty's Government in regard to Imperial communications, as set 
out in the White Paper of April, 1938 (Cmd. 5716). We understand 
the position to be, in brief, that since the Imperial Wireless and Cable 
Conference of 1928 it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom to provide for co-operation among all the 
Governments concerned, in the Dominions, in India, and in the 
Colonial Empire, for the maintenance and development under 
British control of the overseas cable and wireless telegraph system 
of the Empire, operating through Cable and Wireless Limited, 
a British private enterprise working under quasi-public utility 
conditions. A settlement was made last spring, with the general 
assent of the Governments of the Dominions and of India, 
between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and 
Cable and Wireless Limited, as a part of which the Governments 
concerned were asked, in confirmation of the policy agreed in 1928, 
to accord their fullest support and co-operation to the company's 
system, thus enabling the company to provide with . greater 
confidence for the future development of its services. His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom as their special part in the 
settlement made certain financial concessions to the company, 
and acquired a substantial share-holding in it. In return Cable 
and Wireless Limited agreed to reduce ordinary rates within the 
Empire to a maximum of Is. 3d. a word, and this reduction took 
effect from the 25th April last. Cable and Wireless Limited are the 
only overseas communications company established in Palestine ; 
and Palestine,, in view of its special relationship with His Majesty's 
Government as the Mandatory Power, has enjoyed the benefit 
of this concession, and in return has subscribed to the general 
policy of His Majesty's Government, which may be described as 



175 



one of voluntary preference exercised in support of a common 
imperial objective. It may be taken for granted that, after partition, 
the Government of the Mandated Territories will continue to 
subscribe to the common policy ; but it would be open to the Arab 
and Jewish States as independent states to enter into different 
arrangements with other cable or wireless companies if they should 
choose to do so. Clearly in that event they would lose the benefit 
of the cheap Empire rate ; but that would not necessarily be an 
effective deterrent if a rival company were to offer them the same 
rate as at present, if not over the whole of the Empire routes, at 
least over those routes on which much the greater part of the 
present outward traffic of Palestine is carried. That is a possibility 
which must be taken into account. But the knowledge that they 
could reasonably anticipate a common policy of support for their 
services from the whole Empire was, we understand, a governing 
consideration in the grant of the lower rates by Cable and Wireless 
Limited last spring. We think that the observance of this common 
policy must be regarded as one of the obligations of the Palestine 
Government which it is necessary to preserve by treaty under the new 
conditions ; and we accordingly recommend that the treaties with the 
Arab and Jewish States should provide that those states shall 
continue to follow, in the matter of cable and wireless communi- 
cations, the policy enunciated in Cmd. 5716 which the Palestine 
Government have already accepted. 



4. Trans-Jordan Posts and Telegraph Department 

365. This is a comparatively small service, the gross cost of which, 
though it has risen by nearly 50 per cent, since 1932, is still only 
£F. 18,500 per annum. As is only to be expected when the undertaking 
is on so modest a scale, the service is not fully self-supporting. In the 
six years 1933-38, the total amount by which ordinary expenditure has 
exceeded, or is estimated to exceed, revenue is £P.2,498 ; while in 
addition there has been charged against annual revenue as part 
of the Trans- Jordan budget services, extraordinary expenditure 
amounting to £F. 17,580*. A more favourable picture is presented, 
however, if account is taken of the estimated value of services rendered 
by the Posts and Telegraph Department to other Government 
Departments, for which no payment passes in either direction. In 
the three years for which records are so far available these resulted 
in an average credit to the Post Office of about £P.2,200 per annum. 
We think the position may fairly be summed up by saying that, as 
at present constituted, the Department provides a service which is 
reasonably adequate for the needs of a poor country such as Trans- 
Jordan, and at relatively small cost to the state. But to bring it up 



* Including an abnormal item of £P.6,131 in 1935-36, being Trans- 
Jordan's share of the Haifa-Baghdad telephone circuit. 



176 



to the standard of the Post Office services as now provided in the 
area of the Arab State in Palestine, would involve considerable 
expenditure, both capital and recurrent, which it is not likely that the 
state would be able to recover from the consumer for a long time to 
come, if at all. 



5. Broadcasting 

366. The Palestine broadcasting station is situated at Ramallah, 
and will be included in the Jerusalem Enclave under our recom- 
mendations for the boundary of that area. Its capital cost was 
£P.34,472, made up of— 

£P. 

Site .. .. .. .. .. .. 725 

Buildings .. .. 5,346 

Equipment and installation .. .. 28,401 



Total .. .. .. £P.34,472 



Further expenditure amounting to £P.7,700 on the provision of 
improved accommodation for the studios in new premises is, we 
understand, in contemplation. 

367. The service is at present run at a loss of £F. 11,700, the 
figures being — 

Income, including ^P. 14,932 for wireless 

licence fees, less cost of collection . . . . 15,068 

Expenditure, including £P. 1,034 for interest 

on capital outlay and £P.2,300 for renewals 26,784 



Excess of expenditure over revenue . . ^P. 11,716 



The number of licences issued has been steadily increasing. On 

the 31st May, 1938, the total in issue was 32,547, distributed by 
races over the whole of Palestine as follows — 

Number. Percentage. 

Arabs .. 6,265 19-3 

Jews 24,253 74*5 * 

Others 2,029 6-2 

32,547 100 



The number of licence-holders in the Arab State is estimated at 
about 10 per cent, of the whole. Figures are not available for the 
distribution of holders between the Jewish State and the Mandated 
Territories. 



177 



368. It is probable that the Jews will wish to set up their own 
broadcasting service in the Jewish State ; and while the result 
must be to increase substantially the net cost of running the 
Ramallah station, we doubt if any satisfactory arrangement could 
be made for providing a Jewish service from Ramallah on agency 
terms. The Arab State will certainly not be able to set up its own 
station, but will probably object to contributing to the cost of that 
at Ramallah. 



369. Now that the Ramallah station has been provided, it is 
undesirable to close it entirely, notwithstanding the cost. But it is 
hard to believe that it would have been established at all for the 
benefit of the comparatively small number of listeners who reside in 
the proposed Mandated Territories. It does not seem satisfactory 
that the British taxpayer should be paying, on the one hand, through 
the deficiency grant-in-aid a considerable sum for the maintenance 
of this station in Palestine, and on the other hand, through the 
Parliamentary grant to the British Broadcasting Corporation, a 
very large sum (so we understand) for the provision of the Arabic 
broadcast service from Daventry. We suggest that further considera- 
tion might be given by His Majesty's Government to the possibility 
of reducing the total cost by amalgamating these services in some way. 



6. Industrial and other Concessions 

370. In paragraph 34 of Chapter XXII of their Report the Royal 
Commission wrote as follows — 

In the event of partition, agreements entered into by the Government 
of Palestine for the development and security of industries {e.g., the agree- 
ment with the Palestine Potash Company) should be taken over and 
carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. 
Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security 
of the Electric Power Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly 
guaranteed. 

And item (ii) (h) of our terms of reference directs us to examine 
and report on the treatment of industrial and other concessions. 

371. The following concessions have been granted by the 
Palestine Government — 

(a) Concessions which have been validated by Ordinance — 

(i) the Dead Sea Concession (the Palestine Potash 
Company) ; 

(ii) the Palestine Electric Corporation ; 

(hi) the Jerusalem Electric and Public Service Corporation ; 
(iv) the Auja Concession (the Palestine Electric Corporation). 



178 



(b) Concessions which have not been validated by Ordin- 



ance- 



(i) the drainage of Lake Huleh and the adjacent marshes 
(the Palestine Land Development Company) ; 

(ii) the Tiberias Hot Baths (the Hamei Tiberia Company) ; 

(iii) Lighthouses (Administration Generate de Phares de 
Palestine) ; 

(iv) El Hamma Mineral Springs (Suleiman Bey Nassif) ; 

(v) Bonded Warehouses (Levant Bonded Warehouse. 
Company) ; 

(vi) the Transit of Mineral Oils through Palestine and 
the Establishment of an Oil Refinery at Haifa (Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company) ; 

(vii) the Transit of Mineral Oils through Palestine (the 
'Iraq Petroleum Company). 

We understand that it is the intention to validate Concessions (vi) 
and (vii) by Ordinance. 



372. The concessions which will fall wholly within one of the 
states under either plan B or C are— 

Plan B. 
Jewish State 
Jewish State 



(a) the Auja Concession . . 

(b) the drainage of Lake 

Huleh and the adjacent 
marshes. 

(c) the Tiberias Hot Baths 



Plan C. 
Jewish State. 

Northern Mandated 
Territory. 



(d) the El Hamma Mineral 
Springs. 



Jewish State 
Jewish State 



Northern Mandated. 

Territory. 
Northern Mandated 

Territory. 



373. We consider that it will be necessary to deal with each 
concession separately, and when necessary to apportion the rights 
and duties under the concession between the several administrations ; 
and provision will then have to be made in the treaties that the 
several administrations will by contract or, if necessary, by legislation, 
give effect to the terms of the concessions so far as they are 
concerned. 



179 



CHAPTER XVIII 

FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART I) 

374. Our terms of reference require us to recommend boundaries 
for an Arab and a Jewish State, which, when set up, shall be self- 
supporting, and further to enquire into and report upon the budgetary 
prospects of the proposed new Administrations. The term " self- 
supporting " needs to be defined. The Royal Commission realized 
that the Arab State could not be expected to be self-supporting in 
the usual sense, for they recommended that that state should be 
granted assistance in two forms : a subvention of unspecified amount 
from the Jewish State, and a subvention from the Government of the 
United Kingdom consisting of a capital grant of £2 million in discharge 
of the British Government's present financial liabilities in respect of 
Trans- Jordan, which the Royal Commission proposed should be 
included in the Arab State. His Majesty's Government, in the 
Statement of Policy issued in July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513), made it clear 
that the Arab State would be able to rely on financial assistance on a 
substantial scale from both the United Kingdom and the Jewish State. 
We have assumed, therefore, that those facts should be taken 
into consideration in interpreting the meaning of the term 
" self-supporting " ; and that a plan of partition should not be held 
to be impracticable merely because the Arab State would be unable 
to support itself without subventions of the nature contemplated by 
the Royal Commission. 

375. The Royal Commission also realized that the revenue obtain- 
able for the upkeep of the Mandatory Government might prove 
insufficient for the normal cost of administration, and they expressed 
the belief that in that event Parliament would in all the circumstances 
be willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit. 

376. The figures given in this chapter will show that under 
plan C, and indeed under any Other conceivable plan of partition, 
the Arab State will be far from self-supporting in the strict sense, 
and further that the Government of the territories to be retained 
under Mandate will be unable to balance its budget without a very 
large amount of assistance from the Mandatory Power. In judging 
whether these deficiencies in plan C are such as to render the plan 
wholly impracticable, we consider ourselves entitled, for the reason 
given above, to some latitude in the interpretation of our terms of 
reference : in particular we shall think it relevant to consider to 
what extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the 
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and how far 
that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result of partition. 



180 



377. The figures given in this chapter are based on estimates 
furnished at our request by the Treasurer of Palestine. As far as 
the budgetary prospects of the new Administrations are concerned, 
the estimates do not profess to do more than indicate how much of 
the existing revenue and expenditure of the present Administration, 
as provided in the estimates for the year 1938-39, adjusted as 
described in paragraph 380 below, is attributable to each of the several 
areas. No allowance has been made for the possibility that the 
Palestine estimates on which these forecasts are based may have to 
be revised in the course of the year as the result of the continuation 
of the present disturbances. Nor is any allowance made for any * 
increase of expenditure directly consequent on partition, such as 
pensions of officers prematurely retired from service, or for such 
normal increases as pension charges and increments (both growing 
liabilities in a youthful administration) ; and, with only a few 
exceptions, which will be noted hereafter, nothing is allowed for 
savings in the cost of administration, including police, or for increase 
in revenue on the assumption that partition will be followed by peace. 
Nor has any allowance been made for the possibility of changes, 
either upwards or downwards, in the standard of social services or 
the scale of public administration generally, or in the rate and scope 
of taxation. Nor have we included in the budget of the Mandated 
Territories in particular the additional expenditure from public 
funds which would have to be incurred in those territories as the 
result of the development programme recommended in chapter XIII, 
since, although this is an item which must obviously be taken into 
account in weighing the cost of partition as a whole, We have recom- 
mended that it should be borne by His Majesty's Government 
as a separate charge. Further, the Treasurer has impressed upon us 
that even within these limits the estimates are only provisional since, 
for reasons of secrecy, he was obliged to prepare them himself, with 
the assistance of only one confidential officer in his own department : 
it was not possible for him to consult the spending or revenue- 
collecting departments on matters for which they would be mainly 
responsible. 

378. We draw particular attention to three points which affect 
the figures of net surplus or deficit for each Administration— 

(i) The principle on which the cost of debt service and of pensions 
has been apportioned between the several Administrations is 
explained in the chapter on Public Debt and Financial Obligations 
(chapter XX). The effect is to divide the cost equally between the 
three areas, the share of the. Mandated Territories being divided 
again equally between the Jerusalem Enclave and the Northern 
Mandated Territories. Since we propose that those liabilities should 
be met from. a common or central fund, there is no advantage in 
attempting to apportion the charges in detail, especially as the 
apportionment might well give rise to dispute, particularly as 
regards pension charges arising out of partition. » 



181 



(ii) No provision has been made in the forecast for the cost of 
defence, or for the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, which is regarded 
as a defence force. The reason for this is that it seems impossible 
at this stage to foresee how the defence of the two states will be 
provided, and what will be the cost to each state and to the Mandatory 
respectively ; and rather than insert a token or arbitrary figure it 
seems better to omit this item altogether, bearing in mind that if 
each state is to be set up with full sovereign rights, an unspecified 
amount must be added on this account to its estimate of budgetary 
expenditure. The defence of the Mandated Territories will naturally 
be entrusted to the British forces stationed in those territories. The 
question whether in the circumstances the British Treasury will 
desire that the budget of the Mandated Territories should include 
provision for a contribution to the Defence Votes of the United 
Kingdom on account of the service thus provided, the grant-in-aid of 
the Mandated Territories being increased by a corresponding amount, 
or whether they would be content to forgo any such contribution, 
is a matter of financial technique with which we need not concern 
ourselves. For the purpose of comparison with the budgets of the 
Arab and Jewish State, it is sufficient to omit any provision for defence 
in the forecast for the Mandated Territories, and to assume that the 
whole cost of the British troops in Palestine after partition, including 
the cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, will fall on United 
Kingdom funds. 

(iii) It will be necessary to make provision for expenditure to be 
incurred in giving effect to partition, of which the principal items 
we have noted are the cost of the boundary between Jaffa and 
Tel Aviv (estimated at £P. 115,000), and the cost of diverting the 
railway at Tulkarm (estimated at £P. 100,000). We see no alterna- 
tive but for this to be- met out of United Kingdom funds, and we 
have, therefore, shown £P. 250 ,000 (in round figures) on this account 
in the estimate of the cost to His Majesty's Government of plan C in 
paragraph 401 below. 

379. The most, therefore, that can be said of these estimates is 
that they give a picture in broad outline of the probable financial effect 
of partition on the several new Administrations, based on the 
existing standard of public administration in Palestine, but without 
making any provision for defence. 

380. As stated above, the existing estimates of revenue and 
expenditure of the present Administration have been adjusted in 
certain respects in order to produce figures of revenue and 
expenditure which may be regarded as "distributable"* between 



* The term " distributable " as used in this chapter is explained in 
Appendix 11. 



182 



the proposed new Administrations. A full explanation of these adjust- 
ments, with a statement showing how the " distributable " figures are 
reconciled with the figures in the latest revised estimates of revenue 
and expenditure for the current year, will be found in Appendix 11, 
which also contains a brief indication of the bases on which the 
apportionment of the main heads of charge between the several 
Administrations has been made. 

381. The following statement shows the estimated " distributable " 
revenue and expenditure for Palestine as a whole for 1938-39, together 
with the estimated distribution of revenue and expenditure between 
the several proposed Administrations — 



REVENUE 





Estimated 
Distributable 
Revenue. 




Distributior 


i between — 






(2) 

Arab 
State. 


(3) 

T «aix7i c r\ 
I CWlbJU. 

State. 


(4) 

T £^i"n col om 
J CI U a exit 11 J. 

Enclave. 


(5) 

Northern 
Mandated 
Territory. 


(6) 

Southern 
Mandated 
Territory. 


(7) 

Total 
Mandated 
Territories. 


Tax-Revenue — 






£P. 


£P- 


£P. 






Customs Duties (less Draw- 
backs and Refunds). 


1,815,000 


213,000 


850,300 


340,830 


392,870 


18,000 


751,700 


Other Tax Revenue 


985,000 


155,950 


396,520 


189,860 


233,770 


8,900 


432,530 


Other Revenue Receipts — 
















Recurrent 


865,000 


139,550 


224,440 


194,660 


302,600 


3,750 


501,010 


Non-Recurrent 


15,000 


2,250 


6,500 


3,000 


3,000 


250 


6,250 


Total Revenue 


3,680,000 
or say 


510,750 
510,000 


1,477,760 
1,478,000 


728,350 
728,000 


932,240 
933,000 


30,900 
31,000 


1,691,490 
1,692,000 



EXPENDITURE 





(1) 

Estimated 
Distributable 
Expenditure 


Distribution between — 


(2) 

Arab 
State 


(3) 

Jewish 
State 


(4) 

Jerusalem 
Enclave 


(5) 

Northern 
Mandated 
Territory. 


(6) 

Southern 
Mandated 
Territory. 


(7) 

Total 
Mandated 
Territories. 


A. Departmental Services . . 

B. Direct Departmental 

Supervisory Services. 

C. Pensions 

D. Public Debt and Loan 

Charges. 

E. Railways (net) 

F. Posts and Telegraphs (net) 

G. Central Administration 

H. Public Works Extra- 

ordinary. 

Total Expenditure (net) 


V 3,150,000 

72,775 
(a) 283,660 

86.000 

+ 13,140 
(surplus) 
134,000 
350,000 


£P- 

807,286 

24,258 
94,553 

5,000 

22,000 

37,810 
75,000 


653,754 

24,258 
94,553 

+ 50,000 

(surplus) 
+ 18,140 
(surplus) 
27,980 
150,000 


724,087 

12,130 
47,277 

91,000 

+ 10,000 
(surplus) 
30,770 
100,000 


£P- 

896,111 

12,129 
47,277 

40,000 

+ 5,000 
(surplus) 
34,280 
25,000 


£P- 
68,762 

— 
3,160 


£P- 

1,688,960 

24,259 
94,554 

131,000 

+ 15,000 
(surplus) 
68,210 
125,000 


4,063.295 
4,063,000 


1,063,907 
1,064,000 


882,405 
882,000 


995,124 
995,000 


1,050,337 
1,050,000 


71,922 
72,000 


2,117,383 
2,117,000 



i(a) Including ^P. 13, 140, being the share of debt charges attributable to Posts and Telegraphs. This item is balanced by the 
net surplus of ^P. 13, 140 showji under head F, the postal service for all Palestine being regarded as self-balancing, after debiting 
it with its share of the debt charges. 



SUMMARY 





All 
Palestine 


Arab 
State 


Jewish 
State 


Jerusalem 
Enclave 


Northern 
Mandated 
Territories 


Southern 
Mandated 
Territories 


Total 
Mandated 
Territories 


Revenue 
Expenditure 


£P- 
3,680,000 
4,063,000 


£P- 

510,000 
1,064,000 


£P- 
1,478,000 
882,000 


£P- 

728,000 
995,000 


£P- 

933,000 
1,050,000 


£P- 

31,000 
72,000 


£?■ 

1,692,000 
2,117,000 


Estimated Surplus 
or Deficit 


383,000 


554,000 


596,000 


267,000 


117,000 


41,000 


425,000 



The estimates of distributable revenue and expenditure for Trans-Jordan for 1938-39 are given below. A statement reconciling 
these figures with those of the published estimates, will be found in Appendix 1 1 . They excltide both the general and the specific 
grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom ; the expenditure met out of the specific grants, including (for the reasons explained in 
paragraph 454 in the chapter on Public Debt) the Trans- Jordan share of the Ottoman Public Debt ; and the cost of pensions 
(now ^P. 12,400) — 

Revenue . . . . . . £P.348,000 

Expenditure . . . . 404,000 



56,000 

If, therefore, Trans- Jordan should be included in the Arab State, account must be taken of these figures. This will mean that 
there will be included in the budget of the Arab State, besides the figures of revenue and expenditure given above, one third 
(£P.4,133) of the pension charge of ^P. 12,400, a corresponding sum being debited to the other two Administrations, for the 
reasons given in the chapter on Public Dept. In addition, for the reasons explained in the same chapter, the Trans- Jordan share 
of the Ottoman Public Debt (£P.31,073) will be shown, for convenience, as debited to the Mandated Territories (under the 
head of the Jerusalem Enclave) . The inclusive figures for all three Administrations will then become — 





Arab 


Jewish 


Mandated 




State 


State 


Territories 




£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


Revenue 


858,000 


1,478,000 


1,692,000 


Expenditure 


1,472,000 


886,000 


2,152,000 


Surplus 




592,000 




or Deficit 


614,000 




460,000 



186 

382. Thus, on the existing standards of public administration in 
Palestine, and without making any provision for defence, in the sense 
of the cost of military forces for maintaining internal security and 
resisting external aggression, the financial effect of partition will be 
that, in round figures — 

(a) The Jewish State alone of the new Administrations will 
be able to balance its budget, and that with the handsome 
surplus of nearly £P.600,000 per annum, equal to about 
66 per cent, of its estimated expenditure on the present basis. 

(b) The Mandated Territories will be faced with a deficit of . 
about £P.425,000 per annum, or £P.460,000 if Trans- Jordan 

is included in the Arab State, which will have to be made good 
by the Mandatory itself, out of United Kingdom Funds. 

(c) The Arab State, far from being able to balance its budget, 
will have an annual deficit of about £P.550,000, or £P.610,Q0O 
if Trans- Jordan is included, amounting to more than the whole 
of its estimated revenue, without Trans-Jordan, or 71 per cent, 
of the revenue if that of Trans- Jordan is included. 



383. These figures are not only extremely disquieting, but so 
startling that they may well provoke doubts of their accuracy, or at 
least of their relevancy to the present issue. These doubts may be 
examined under four heads — 

(i) First, it may be asked by those who have been aware that 
until recently Palestine was, with certain recognized exceptions, 
a fully self-supporting country, how it comes about that a net 
deficit of over £P.380,000 is shown on the budgets of the three 
successor administrations, taken together, although no allowance 
is made for expenditure on defence or for increased expenses due 
to partition. The explanation is that the financial position of 
Palestine has now changed for the worse, and that under present 
conditions it is no longer able to balance its budget. The following 
table shows the budgetary position for 1938, with the actual 
outturn for the years 1937 and 1936 and the average revenue and 
expenditure of the financial years 1933-36 — 



Palestine : Budgetary Position 



Revenue . . 
Expenditure 

Surplus 
or 

Deficit . . 



Average 
actual outturn 
1933/4-35/6 

. 5,069,527 



Actual 

outturn, 

1936-37 

4,640,821 



Actual 
outturn, 
1937^38 

4,897,356 



Esti- 
mates, 
1938-39 

4,520,145 



3,390,356 6,073,502 7,297,688 5,445,760 



1,679,171 — — 
— 1,432,681 2,400,332 



925,615 



187 



Included in the above are the 
attention may be drawn — 





/P 


Customs Duties . . 




Defence 


133,177 


.Police 


506,928 


Trans- Jordan Frontier 


188,938 


Force (gross) 




Public Works Extra- 


347,427 


ordinary 





following items, to which special 









2,019,479 


1,999,697 


1,900,010 


1 9Q7 AAA 






744,619 


941,975 


1,022,068 


189,201 


188,010 


203,954 


705,094 


1,614,885 


755,651 



It will be observed that from 1936 onwards the budget has not 
been balanced. The worsening of the position in the last three years 
has been due mainly to the increased cost of defence and police 
owing to the present emergency (the greater part of the extra pro- 
vision for Public Works Extraordinary in these years is on account 
of emergency services), and to a lesser extent to the decline in 
customs revenue consequent on the falling-off in immigration, 
accompanied by a decline in the importation of immigrants' capital, 
and the trade depression. 

The reduction in the estimated deficit and the apparent 
reduction in the cost of defence in the current year require explana- 
tion. The item " Defence " in previous years covers the excess cost 
of the Army troops stationed in Palestine and one half of the excess 
cost of the Royal Air Force stationed in both Palestine and Trans- 
Jordan, together with the capital cost of works services in Palestine 
for both Forces. By " excess " cost is meant the excess over the 
cost of such Forces at their normal stations. Since 1930 the Palestine 
Government has, by agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom, been liable in principle to repay these items 
to the Home Government, subject to their ability to pay, leaving 
the other half of the excess cost of the Royal Air Force, together 
with the capital cost of works services in Trans-Jordan, to be 
borne by the United Kingdom. Under this arrangement it has 
been decided not to call upon the Palestine Government to make 
any contribution to the United Kingdom on this account in 1938. 
The amount which would have been provided in the Palestine 
Estimates on this account in 1938, but for this relief, is £577,000*, 
but since the beginning of the financial year the number of troops 
stationed in Palestine has been increased, and considerable expendi- 
ture has had to be incurred on military works in order to cope with 
the disturbances. It can hardly be doubted that the excess cost 
at the present time is at a rate substantially in excess of £577,000 
per annum. If, therefore, in order to compare like with like, account 



* Civil Estimates of the United Kingdom for the year endin 31 March, 1939, 
CI. II, 9, Subhead H.l. 



188 

is taken of this item, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine budget 
for 1938 must be put at not less than £1,500,000 ; indeed if allowance 
is made for the additional emergency measures involving expenditure 
under other heads (Police and Public Works Extraordinary), the 
figure will more probably be not far short of £2,500,000. 

(ii) Secondly, many who had realized that the Jewish State 
was likely to be better off than the Arab State may be surprised 
at the vast difference in budgetary prospects between the two, 
notwithstanding the small size of the Jewish State under plan C. 
The explanation is that the per capita rate of contribution to tax- 
revenue among the inhabitants of the Jewish State, -of which the 
Jews form the great majority, is very much higher than that among 
the inhabitants of the Arab State, who are almost entirely Arabs, 
as the following table shows — 

Jewish State 

Total Revenue Total Tax Total Ex P endi ' 
Population. p . , , Tax Revenue. Expendi- ture 

Arabs. Jews. Total. uevenue - r er neaa - Revenue, per head. ture. per head. 

£P- £P- £P. £P. £?: £?■ 
54,400 226,000 280,400 1,478,000 5-27 1,246,820 4-44 882,000 3-14 

Arab State] 

444,100 8,900 453,000 510,000 1-12 368,950 0-81 1,064,000 2-35 

Mandated Territories 
502,800 157,400 660,200 1,692,000 2-56 1,184,230 1-79 2,117,000 3-20 

In other words, the taxable capacity of the proposed Jewish State 
is about 5£ times as high as that of the proposed Arab State. 

(iii) Again, it may be urged that the method of allocation 
may be open to challenge, since the Treasurer himself admits that 
his estimates are only provisional and liable to correction. We agree 
that the estimates are liable to correction on this account.' But 
whatever corrections it may prove necessary to make, we are con- 
vinced that they will not be of such magnitude as in the aggregate 
to modify the general conclusions to be drawn from the provisional 
figures. 

(iv) Lastly, it may be argued that these budgetary forecasts 
are mere academical exercises, and cannot be used as a ground for 
estimating the true budgetary prospects of the new Administrations, 
since they are admittedly based upon existing conditions and make 
no allowance for the changes which will take place after partition, 
especially if this leads to a restoration of settled conditions. ^For 
example, it may be said, the figure of £P. 1,815,000 which is taken as 
the estimated revenue from customs duties for the purpose of the 



f Excluding Trans- Jordan. 



189 



forecasts is based upon a state of trade depression and restriction 
of immigration which is necessarily accompanied by a curtailment 
of imports. But the restoration of order will presumably be followed 
by a revival of trade activities, and the setting up of the Jewish 
State by a large influx of new immigrants and capital, leading to an 
increase in the demand for imported goods and. an expansion of 
customs revenue. Again, the provision for police and prisons in 
the forecast of distributable expenditure is £P. 1,022,068, the same as 
that actually provided in the 1938 Estimates for Palestine to meet 
the requirements of the present disturbed condition of the country, 
and twice as much as the average expenditure on these services 
(£P.506,928) in the three years 1933/4-1935/6, when conditions may 
be said to have been normal. Surely, it may be said, it is reasonable 
to assume that, sooner or later, partition will lead to a return to 
normal conditions in Palestine, and a reduction of the present 
extraordinary provision under this head. Finally, it may be 
contended that, if the Arab State once acquires its independence, 
it will organize its administration on lines which are likely to be 
simpler and less costly, but not necessarily less satisfactory to 
the Arab population, than those followed by the Mandatory 
Government : in this way it should prove possible to reduce 
the cost of public services so considerably that, if order is restored 
and trade revives, a balanced budget may not be wholly out of 
the question. 

384. These are weighty arguments, and call for careful 
examination. 

(a) For the sake of the present argument, let it be conceded that 
the establishment of the Jewish State will be followed by a rapid 
influx of new immigrants, including the same percentage of persons 
with private capital as in previous years of active immigration ; 
and. that we may reckon on a consequential expansion of imports 
and a restoration of customs revenues for the whole of the successor 
states to the level of the average for the whole of Palestine of the 
three years 1933-36, (£P.2,406,738) or say £P.2,400,000 per annum, 
for the time being. But even if this increase could be relied upon, 
the benefit of the increase in customs revenue will, under a partition 
scheme such as our terms of reference contemplate, be limited to 
those states in "which immigration is taking place, that is, the 
Jewish State in the first place, and the Mandated Territories in so 
far as immigration into them may be permitted after partition, but 
will not extend at all to the Arab State, from which it must be 
assumed that Jewish settlers will be entirely excluded. The only 
benefit that the Arabs in that state will derive therefrom will be if 
the assumed prosperity of the Jewish State should result in an 
increased demand at higher prices for the agricultural produce of 
the Arab State. But even if this should happen — and it cannot be 
relied upon with confidence, because it may well be the policy^of 



190 



the Jewish State to satisfy this increased demand by an increase, 
under a protective tariff, in their own agricultural output, to be 
provided by additional Jewish agricultural settlements in their 
state — and even if it were assumed that the total customs revenue of 
the Arab State would increase, in a time of general prosperity, in 
the same ratio as we have suggested above for Palestine as a whole 
(that is from £P.1,800,000 to £P.2,400,000 or say by 33| per cent.)— 
a liberal estimate, considering how little the Arab fellah can afford 
to devote to the purchase of imported goods in comparison with 
the average Jew — the resulting gain in the revenue of the Arab 
State would be only £P.70,000 per annum. 

(b) It is not unreasonable to expect that the restoration 
of normal conditions should enable law and order to be maintained 
without the present high rate of expenditure on police services. 
But if account is to be taken of savings consequent on partition, 
account must also be taken of the consequential increase in expendi- 
ture. Pension charges are increasing rapidly, as is inevitable in the 
early years of any young administration ; and in addition to the 
normal increase, account must also be taken of the abnormal increase 
which will probably result directly from partition : as we shall see 
in chapter XX (Public Debt and other Financial Obligations), the 
Treasurer of Palestine, working on certain assuniptions, estimates 
the average cost of pensions over the first ten years after partition 
to be, for all Palestine, as much as £P.250,000 per annum, an increase 
of over £P. 175,000 on the provision in the 1938-39 Estimates. If 
independent Arab and Jewish States are to be set up, they must 
satisfy the League of Nations that they can provide for their own 
internal security, and for this purpose they must be able to maintain 
adequate military forces as well as police. The average cost of 
defence and police together per head of the population in 'Iraq, 
Egypt, Syria and Trans- Jordan, compared with the Arab State, is — 



'Iraq (1938) 

Egypt (1933-37, average) 
Syria (1933-37, average) J 
Trans- Jordan (1938) . . 
Arab State 
Jewish State 
Mandated Territories . . 



Defence, 

&>■ 

0-387 
0-137 



157 

0-175 

0-14 

0-393 

0-516 

0-75 

0-875 



Police. 



0-544 

0-312 

0-36 

0-493 

0-516f 

0-75t 

0-875f 



Total. 



0-22 
0-1* 



? 
? 
? 



* Trans- Jordan Frontier Force. f Police only. 

J Francs converted at 124 to the £. 



191 

If applied to the population of the Arab and Jewish States and of 
the Mandated Territories, these capitation rates would produce the 
following figures of total expenditure on police and defence together — 





Capitation 


Arab 


Jewish 


Mandated 




rate. 


State. 


State. 


territories. 




£P- 


£P- 




£P- 


'Iraq 


0-544 


246,432 


152,537 


359,148 


Egypt 


. . 0312 


141,336 


87,484 


205,982 


Syria 


0-36 


163,080 


100,944 


237,672 


Trans- Jordan 


0-493 


223,329 


138,237 


325,478 



as against an actual provision in the forecasts on account of police 
only, of £P.233,771, 210,430, 577,867, respectively. 



These figures suggest that, even after making provision for defence, 
there may be room for considerable saving on the cost of police and 
defence together in the Jewish State and in the Mandated Territories, 
but less so in the Arab State. And in each case allowance must be 
made for the probable extra cost of policing the frontiers. 

(c) It is one thing to build up an administration with a simple 
system of public services which will satisfy the needs of a population 
which has never known anything more elaborate and costly : it 
is quite another thing to expect that a newly created Government 
should abandon an existing system to which the public has become 
accustomed, and ask its citizens to accept instead something which 
is manifestly inferior, on the ground that it is the best that under 
the new conditions they can afford. Doubtless certain economies 
will be effected, under the pressure of circumstances, and it may 
well be that in certain respects the present standards can be lowered 
without real hardship to the public, though probably not without 
some loss of administrative efficiency. But there will be a limit to the 
possibilities of economies by this means, and at the utmost it could 
not be expected that the new Arab Government would do more than 
reduce the amount spent on social services in the Arab State to the 
rate per head of the population of expenditure on corresponding 
services in the neighbouring countries. We asked the League of 
Nations to supply us with information respecting the rate of 
expenditure on various services per head of population in 'Iraq, 
Egypt and Syria. In complying with our request they drew our 
attention to the need of caution in comparing financial data for 
different states owing to the variations in practice which may be 
followed in such matters as the division of activities between central 
and local authorities, the principle of gross and net accounting and 
the distribution of services between the various departments. The 
figures given below must be used subject to this reservation, and 
subject also to the qualification that expenditure on education and 
health services in particular appears to have doubled in 'Iraq and 



(C31078) 



H 



192 



nearly doubled in Egypt in the last five or six years, and to be 
still rising. Moreover it must not be readily assumed that a given 
rate of expenditure per head in a state with a population of over 
15 millions, such as Egypt, or of nearly 4 millions, such as 'Iraq, can 
be equalled in one with a population of less than half a million. 
Yet even so the figures are worth studying. 











Trans- 


Pales- 


Avab\ 




'Iraq. 


Egypt. 


Syria*. 


Jordan. 


tine. 


State. 


(Estimates for the year) 


1938 


1937 


1936 


1938 


1938 


1938 


Cost per head of popu- 












{?• 


lation of — 


£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


Education 


•177 


•258 


•07 


•087 


•23 


•243' 


Health 


•087 


•193 


•022 


•063 


•176 


•189 


Other General Civil 














Administration 














Services^ 


•425 


•655 


•42 


•52 • 


1-278 


•76 


Total 


•689 


1-106 


•512 


•67 


1-684 


1-192 



(*) Francs converted at 124 to the £. 
(t) Without Trans-Jordan. 

(+) Excluding (besides Health and Education), Defence, Police, Public 
Works, Public Debt, and Posts and Telegraphs. 



It will be seen that the rate per head of expenditure in the forecast 
for the Arab State in Palestine is high compared with 'Iraq, Egypt 
or Syria. Yet even if, to take the extreme case, the per capita rate 
of expenditure on education, health and other peace-time services 
in the Arab State could be brought down to the same level as in 
Syria (that is, £P.O -512 per head instead of £T.l ■ 192, a reduction to 
less than one half of the existing rate of expenditure), the total 
saving would be only about £P.308,000 per annum, and the budget 
would still be very far from being balanced. On the equity of an 
arrangement which would in effect require the Arab State to reduce 
its standard of social services so drastically, we shall have more to 
say later in this chapter (paragraph 398). We know of no precedent 
for a dependency being required to curtail its services permanently 
on such a scale, however extreme its financial difficulties. 

385. Our considered view is that it is not practicable to give a 
more precise estimate, for the purpose of our task, than the forecast 
given in the early parts of this chapter of the budgetary prospects 
of the several Administrations under plan C, excluding provision for 
defence. The indications are that there are prospects of considerable 
savings in the cost of police and defence together in the Jewish State 
and the Mandated Territories, and to a less extent in the Arab 
State ; but against these must be set an uncertain, but substantial, 
liability for pensions. 



193 



386. Since the majority of us are unable to support plan B, 
we do not think it necessary to set out in full or to comment in detail 
on the corresponding figures for that plan. It will be enough here 
to say that the general picture is very much the same, the financial 
position of the Arab State being rather worse than under plan C ; 
and our conclusions with regard to its financial aspects would be the 
same as under plan C. 

387. The situation under plan C is, therefore, that as a result of 
partition, and leaving out of account the cost of defence, while the 
Jewish State will enjoy a surplus of nearly £P.600,000 per annum, 
the Arab State will be faced with a deficit of about £P.550,000, or 
£P.610,000 if Trans- Jordan is united with the Arab area west of 
Jordan, and that even after making every allowance for a reduction 
of expenditure by the substitution of simpler standards of government 
it is impossible to look forward to a time when the Arab State will be 
able to balance its budget. The Royal Commission foresaw this 
possibility (though it must be remembered that they had not before 
them the forecasts which have been prepared for us, nor any estimate 
of the budgetary prospects of the new administrations), and made 
certain proposals to deal with the situation. We will now proceed to 
consider whether these can be regarded as furnishing a satisfactory 
solution of the problem before us. The Royal Commission proposed 
that financial assistance should be given to the Arab State in 
two forms — -(a) by a subvention from the Jewish State, and (b) by 
a capital grant of £2,000,000 from United Kingdom funds which 
Parliament should be asked to vote. 

(a) The Proposed Subvention from the Jewish State. 

388. The arguments by which the Royal Commission justified 
this proposal were that (i) the Jews would acquire a new right of 
sovereignty in the Jewish area; (ii) that street, cis the Royal Commission 
defined it, would be larger.than the existing area of Jewish land and 
settlement ; (iii) the Jews would be freed from their present liability 
for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that area. We 
find it difficult to subscribe to the first of these arguments since the 
Jew's would be entitled to retort that they are already paying for 
the right of sovereignty in the Jewish area by surrendering their 
claims under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate in respect 
of the rest of Palestine ; and that under the Royal Commission's 
proposal, therefore, they would be required to pay twice over. The 
second argument will have lost all its force under plan C, since under it 
the area of the Jewish State, though far larger than the land in Jewish 
ownership in that area, is no larger than the amount of land in Jewish 
ownership in the whole of Palestine. The case for a subvention, 
therefore, rests entirely on the third argument ; and we cannot say that 
we find it convincing. That a minority class or section of a nation 
should contribute to the national revenues far more largely than the 
rest of the community is by no means unusual ; but while the Jews 



(C31078) 



194 



would have no good ground of complaint of this process so long as 
they remain citizens of a united Palestine, it seems to us that they 
cannot reasonably be asked to continue to make the same contribu- 
tion after partition, unless partition gives them some uncovenanted 
benefit for which they may fairly be asked to pay. In this form the 
argument seems to us merely to repeat the first argument, which 
we have already felt obliged to reject. It is, of course, true that from 
the budgetary point of view the Jews in the Jewish State will be 
better off by being enabled, as a result of partition, to devote the 
whole of their tax-contribution to the benefit of their own citizens. 
But that seems to us to be simply one of 'the incidental advantages • 
of partition : apart from the first argument we can see no reason 
why the Jews should be required to surrender that advantage for 
the benefit of the Arabs. 

389. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews have welcomed the Royal 
Commission's suggestion. The Arab press has rejected with scorn 
what they describe as a bribe to induce them to assent to partition. 
The Jews told us in evidence that they would be willing to assist 
the Arab State in any constructive arrangement which is consistent 
with the dignity of both races, but they object to being required to 
pay an annual tribute simply as the price of partition. We under- 
stand that the kind of constructive arrangement which they have 
in mind is the payment of the annual charges on a loan to be devoted 
to the development of an area in the Arab State for the resettlement 
of Arabs from the Jewish State whose transfer would make room 
for more Jewish immigrants. We think that it would be unwise 
to require the Jewish State to make a direct subvention to the Arab 
State. The payment of the money would be likely to provoke . 
resentment and humiliation on both sides, while experience shows 
that such arrangements seldom endure for long, and cannot prudently 
be made the foundation of a permanent settlement. And in any 
case the deficit is far too large to be made good by any subvention 
which the Jewish State could reasonably be asked to make. 

390. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Royal Commission's 
idea of bridging the gap between the income and expenditure of 
the Arab State by means of a direct subvention from the Jewish 
State must be set aside as impracticable. The possibility that Jewish 
assistance may be provided in another and more constructive form 
will receive further consideration later in our report ; meanwhile, 
it will be enough to say that in the form which the Jews themselves 
suggested to us — that is, the development of land in the Arab State 
in order ultimately to facilitate Jewish immigration — we think that 
the possibilities are limited by the considerations indicated in 
chapter VIII of our report (The Possibility of Exchanges and 
Transfer of Population). In any case it cannot be expected that the 
increase in the taxable capacity of the Arab State which would 
follow therefrom would be so great as to make any appreciable 
reduction in the budgetary deficit of the Arab State. 



195 



(b) The Proposed Capital Grant from United Kingdom Funds. 

391. In making their second recommendation the Royal 
Commission had in mind the proposal that Trans- Jordan should be 
united with the Arab area west of the Jordan to form the Arab State, 
and that in consequence the United Kingdom would be relieved of 
its present liability to assist the Trans- Jordan Government with 
annual grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds, amounting on the 
average of the years 1921 to 1937 to £78,000 per annum excluding the 
Trans- Jordan share of the cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier Force.* 
The capital grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State which the Royal 
Commission proposed that Parliament should be asked to make in 
discharge of this liability would, if invested in trustee securities, 
produce an annual income approaching this amount. The Statement 
of Policy issued by His Majesty's Government in July, 1937 
(Cmd. 5513) confirmed the intention that the Arab State should 
receive financial assistance "on a substantial scale " from His 
Majesty's Government ; and we feel justified, therefore, in assuming 
for the purpose of our plan, that if Trans- Jordan should be included 



* The actual amount provided in United Kingdom Votes of Parliament 
for 1938-39 in respect of Trans- Jordan is considerably higher, as will be seen 
from the following statement : the provision for normal services is — 

£ 

(a) Grants-in-aid of expenses of local administration . . 90,000 

(b) Loan to enable the Trans- Jordan Government to meet their 

liability in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt settlement 31,009 

(c) Contribution towards the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier 

Force (shown as part of a total grant, under Subhead H.3 
of the Colonial and Middle Eastern Services Vote of 
£145,000) . . .. .. .. .. .. 33,397 

(d) Salaries and expenses of British Resident and Staff . . 8,040 

162,446 



In addition provision is made for the following special services — 
(e) Grant towards cost of improvement of roads . . . . 200,000 
(/) Grant-in-aid of the cost of hydrographic surveys in 

Trans- Jordan _ 21,000 

(g) Joint survey of the Trans- Jordan-Nejd Frontier .. .. 20,000 

241,000 



Under a standing arrangement the net liability of the Palestine Govern- 
ment for the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force is limited to one-quarter of the 
recurrent cost and the whole of the non-recurrent expenditure in Palestine, 
the United Kingdom being responsible for the rest ; the net liability of the 
Trans- Jordan Government is nil, as its gross share (one-sixth of the recurrent 
cost) is wholly covered by the credit to it of an equivalent sum out of the 
United Kingdom contribution. 



(C31078) 



196 



in the Arab State, assistance will be forthcoming from the United 
Kingdom Government to this extent, though not necessarily in the 
form proposed by the Royal Commission, which appears to us to be 
open to objection on more than one ground. This, however, will 
at best only make good the additional deficit in the budget of the 
Arab State created by the inclusion of Trans- Jordan : the. main 
deficit will still remain. 

392. We may now sum up the position as far as we have gone. 
Even after allowing for assistance from the United Kingdom • . 
Government to the extent recommended by the Royal Commission, 
the budget of the Arab State as forecasted under plan C will show 

a deficit of over £P.550,000 per annum. To balance the budget 
it is not possible, in our opinion, to look to a direct subvention from 
the Jewish State. We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that 
it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend 
boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual 
establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. 

393. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan 
C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve 
the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number 
of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable 
that state to balance its budget. 

# 

394. At the beginning of this chapter we observed that, in judging . 
whether this deficiency in plan C was such as to render the plan 
wholly impracticable, it would be relevant to consider to what 
extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the 
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and 
how far that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result 
of partition. 

395. We have already pointed out, in paragraph 383, that, in- 
cluding the cost of defence, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine 
budget in 1938 is not less than £P.1J millions, and probably nearer 
to £P.2| millions. Towards this the United Kingdom Government . 
is already contributing the whole cost of defence, and we under- 
stand that it is proposed, in addition, to ask Parliament to approve x 
a substantial contribution towards the abnormal cost of police and 
of other emergency services. We understand that present indications 
are that the total cost in 1938 to the United Kingdom taxpayer 
of the emergency in Palestine is likely to be of the order of 

millions, in addition to the normal provision for the Trans- 
Jordan Frontier Force, and for the various grants-in-aid of local 
revenue and other services in Trans- Jordan as mentioned. in the. 



197 

footnote to paragraph 391 above. It is worth while to compare 
these figures with the average corresponding cost for the three 
years 1933-35— 

Cost of Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the United Kingdom 

Average 





1933-35. 


1938. 




£ 


£ 


Defence and emergency measures 


28,166 


?2,500,000 


Trans- Jordan Frontier Force, grant-in-aid . . 


138,416 


145,000 


Trans-Jordan, grants-in-aid of local revenue 


53,461 


121,009 


Trans- Jordan, other services 


8,165 


249,040 


Total .. 


228,208 


3,015,049 



396. It is, of course, quite impossible to foresee how long these 
liabilities will continue to fall upon the United Kingdom Exchequer : 
everything depends upon the duration of the emergency and the 
form which it may take before order is restored. It is clear, however, 
that a settlement which involved a very considerable charge, of a 
continuing nature, upon United Kingdom funds might be worth 
while from the financial point of view alone if it were accompanied 
by the restoration of peace. 

397. We realize that at a time when the charges on the United 
Kingdom Exchequer are already exceptionally heavy, the Treasury 
may naturally be most reluctant to accept an additional liability 
which is not only burdensome in itself, but may be held to 
constitute a precedent of serious import for claims by other colonial 
administrations which may find themselves in financial distress 
hereafter. We submit, however, that there is a fundamental 
difference between Palestine and the Colonial Empire in general. 
When a colony is in financial difficulty, the Treasury is free to call 
upon it to reduce its standard of expenditure before it can be given 
assistance by the Mother Country. The process may be painful, but 
but it accords with accepted ideas of what is equitable between 
the head of a family and a dependant. Subject to this obligation 
to put its own house in order if required to do so, every colonial 
dependency or mandated territory has a well-recognized right to 
apply to the Government of the United Kingdom for assistance in 
time of financial stress. In Palestine alone of all our dependencies 
there exists the special relationship with the United Kingdom 
arising out of the Balfour Declaration, which we feel bound to take 
into account in considering whether we should be justified in recom- 
mending a plan of partition of which an essential feature is a heavy 
and continuing charge upon the United Kingdom Exchequer. 



(C31078) 



196 



in the Arab State, assistance will be forthcoming from the United 
Kingdom Government to this extent, though not necessarily in the 
form proposed by the Royal Commission, which appears to us to be 
open to objection on more than one ground. This, however, will 
at best only make good the additional deficit in the budget of the 
Arab State created by the inclusion of Trans- Jordan : the. main 
deficit will still remain. 

392. We may now sum up the position as far as we have gone. 
Even after allowing for assistance from the United Kingdom* . 
Government to the extent recommended by the Royal Commission, 
the budget of the Arab State as forecasted under plan C will show 

a deficit of over £P.550,000 per annum. To balance the budget 
it is not possible, in our opinion, to look to a direct subvention from 
the Jewish State. We are forced, therefore, to the conclusion that 
it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend 
boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual 
establishment of a self-supporting Arab State. 

393. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan 
C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve 
the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number 
of Jews, whose contributions to tax-revenue would alone enable 
that state to balance its budget. 

394. At the beginning of this chapter we observed that, in judging, 
whether this deficiency in plan C was such as to render the plan 
wholly impracticable, it would be relevant to consider to what 
extent Palestine is actually or potentially a charge upon the 
United Kingdom taxpayer under the existing Mandate, and 
Ilow far that charge is likely to be reduced or increased as a result 
of partition. 

395. We have already pointed out, in paragraph 383, that, in- 
cluding the cost of defence, the hypothetical deficit on the Palestine 
budget in 1938 is not less than £P.1| millions, and probably nearer 
to £P.2J millions. Towards this the United Kingdom Government . 
is already contributing the whole cost of defence, and we under- 
stand that it is proposed, in addition, to ask Parliament to approve x 
a substantial contribution towards the abnormal cost of police and 
of other emergency services. We understand that present indications 
are that the total cost in 1938 to the United Kingdom taxpayer 
of the emergency in Palestine is likely to be of the order of 
£l\ millions, in addition to the normal provision for the Trans- 
Jordan Frontier Force, and for the various grants-in-aid of local 
revenue and other services in Trans- Jordan as mentioned. in the. 



197 

footnote to paragraph 391 above. It is worth while to compare 
these figures with the average corresponding cost for the three 
years 1933-35— 

Cost of Palestine and Trans- Jordan to the United Kingdom 





Average 






1933-35. 


1938. 




£ 


£ 


Defence and emergency measures 


28,166 


?2,500,000 


Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, grant-in-aid . . 


138,416 


145,000 


Trans- Jordan, grants-in-aid of local revenue 


53,461 


121,009 


Trans- Jordan, other services 


8,165 


249,040 


Total 


228,208 


3,015,049 



396. It is, of course, quite impossible to foresee how long these 
liabilities will continue to fall upon the United Kingdom Exchequer : 
everything depends upon the duration of the emergency and the 
form which it may take before order is restored. It is clear, however, 
that a settlement which involved a very considerable charge, of a 
continuing nature, upon United Kingdom funds might be worth 
while from the financial point of view alone if it were accompanied 
by the restoration of peace. 

397. We realize that at a time when the charges on the United 
Kingdom Exchequer are already exceptionally heavy, the Treasury 
may naturally be most reluctant to accept an additional liability 
which is not only burdensome in itself, but may be held to 
constitute a precedent of serious import for claims by other colonial 
administrations which may find themselves in financial distress 
hereafter. We submit, however, that there is a fundamental 
difference between Palestine and the Colonial Empire in general. 
When a colony is in financial difficulty, the Treasury is free to call 
upon it to reduce its standard of expenditure before it can be given 
assistance by the Mother Country. The process may be painful, but 
but it accords with accepted ideas of what is equitable between 
the head of a family and a dependant. Subject to this obligation 
to put its own house in order if required to do so, every colonial 
dependency or mandated territory has a well-recognized right to 
apply to the Government of the United Kingdom for assistance in 
time of financial stress. In Palestine alone of all our dependencies 
there exists the special relationship with the United Kingdom 
arising out of the Balfour Declaration, which we feel bound to take 
into account in considering whether we should be justified in recom- 
mending a plan of partition of which an essential feature is a heavy 
and continuing charge upon the United Kingdom Exchequer. 



(C31078) 



198 



398. Further, it may be asked whether His Majesty's Government 
or the League of Nations would be content with an arrangement 
which would in effect compel the Arab State, as the result of par- 
tition, to carry out a drastic reduction in the existing standard of 
social services in Palestine. We can see no ground for imposing such 
a condition upon the Arabs unless it could be shown that the Arabs 
themselves had demanded their independence in the area which is 
offered to them, and were prepared to pay this price for it, with full 
knowledge of the consequences. But that, of course, is not the 
position. The Arabs demand the independence of Palestine, it is^ 
true, but not the independence of a separate Arab area in a par- 
titioned Palestine : on the contrary, all the indications point to 
their vehement opposition to independence limited to such an area ; 
and their opposition will not be decreased if independence is to be~ 
accompanied by a severe contraction of expenditure on such matters 
as health, education and other forms of public service. In this 
connexion we have not overlooked the questions put to your pre- 
decessor by the Permanent Mandates Commission (Minutes of Fifth 
Meeting of the Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session, pp. 44-5) and 
his answers, which showed clearly that he himself had every hope 
that the existing standard of social and educational services in the 
Arab as well as the Jewish State would be maintained .after par- 
tition. It is also relevant to point out that in dealing with the 
position of Trans- Jordan the Royal Commission observed that " the 
Mandate for Trans- Jordan ought not, in our opinion, to bejelin- 
quished without securing, as far as possible, that the standard of 
administration should not fall too low through lack of funds to 
maintain it" (chapter XXII, paragraph 26). They made no. 
explicit reference to this question in relation to the Arab area in 
Palestine, but the fact that they contemplated the payment of a 
subvention to the Arab State by the Jewish State suggests that they 
assumed that here also partition should not be allowed to bring with 
it an inevitable lowering of the standards of public service. 

399. If this argument is sound, and if we were right in holding, 
as we have done in paragraph 388, that the Jews cannot fairly be 
asked to come to the relief of the Arab State simply as the price of 
receiving sovereignty in their own state, then only one conclusion 
is possible. In the long run it is necessary to face boldly the 
question whether it is worth while for His Majesty's Government 
to bear the full cost, whatever it may be, of making good the- 
deficits of both the Mandated Territories and the Arab State after 
partition, rather than to abandon the idea of partition as imprac- 
ticable on this ground. In considering how this question «hou)d 
be answered, it is relevant, we think, to take into account the 
argument in the preceding paragraph as indicating that a part 
at least of the aggregate deficit represents a charge for which 
His Majesty's Government cannot easily escape a certain responsi- 
bility. But we do not put the case higher than this ; and the 



199 



real issue is clearly whether an annual charge on United Kingdom 
funds, which may at the outset be put in the neighbourhood of 
£1,250,000* (apart from the cost of defence), is in itself sufficient to 
render plan C (and, indeed, any other conceivable plan of partition) 
impracticable. The answer to this question can only be given after 
taking into account not only the present cost of Palestine to the 
British taxpayer, which we have indicated above, but also the 
consequences, political as well as financial, of the rejection of partition. 
The former it is neither within our terms of reference nor within our 
power to estimate, and we do not feel, therefore, that we can usefully 
express an opinion on the question of the practicability of plan C from 
this aspect. But as regards the latter, we offer the following 
observations. 

400. It is, we think, impbssible to make any estimate of the cost 
of any alternative to partition without knowing exactly what form 
the alternative is to take, and in particular what restrictions, if any, 
it is likely to impose on Jewish immigration. The whole of the 
financial and economic system of Palestine is so closely interwoven 
with the expectation of continued Jewish immigration, that any drastic 
interference with its flow must be expected to have far-reaching 
budgetary and other consequences, the gravity of which is likely, 
generally speaking, to be in proportion to the degree and duration 
of the interference. It would certainly not be prudent to assume 
that the cost of non-partition can be measured simply by the figures 
of distributable revenue and expenditure for all Palestine, on which 
our forecasts of the financial effect of partition are based, that is a 
deficit of £P.383,000, apart from the cost of defence. 

401. For this reason we feel that the only comparison that 
we can usefully make is with the cost of Palestine to the British 
taxpayer to-day, and this we have done in paragraph 395 above. 
It may, however, be relevant also to compare what the cost to the 
United Kingdom Exchequer is likely to be under plan C with what 
we calculate that it would probably have been under the Royal 
Commission's plan, if that could have been carried out in its entirety. 



* Made up as follows — 

£ 

Arab State (including Trans- Jordan) deficit . . . . 614,000 

Mandated Territories, normal deficit . . . . . . 460,000 

Mandated Territories, cost of special development pro- 
gramme, etc. (paragraph 288) including capital expen- 
diture at the rate of, say, ^100,000 per annum for 

10 years . . . . 175,000 



1,249,000 
or, say, 1,250,000 



200 



although the most important item in the latter calculation is 
highly speculative as no detailed estimates were worked out at the 
time; This may be shown in tabular form as follows — 

Royal Commission's 

Plan. Plan C. * 

Capital Recurrent Capital Recurrent 

£ £ £ £ 

i. Capital grant-in-aid of Arab 2,000,000 — — — 

State (on account of 
Trans- Jordan) . 

ii. Capital grants on account 4/5,000,000[| — — — 

of development in Arab 
State to provide for 
transfer of Arab minori- 
ties, say 

iii. Capital grants on account — — 1,000,000 — 

of development in Man- 
dated Territories. 

iv. Annual grants on account — — — 75,000* 

of development in Man- 
dated Territories and of 
cost of settlement survey. 

v. Annual grants on account — 267,000f — 460,000 

of deficit in Mandated 
Territories^. 

vi. Annual grants on account — — — 614,000 

of deficit in Arab State { 
(including Trans-Jordan) 

vii. Expenses of partition (say) 250,0001f — 250,000^ — 



Total— Capital . . 6/7,250,000 — 1,250,000 — 
Recurrent . . — 267,000 — 1,149,000 

* For 10 years {see chapter XIII, paragraph 288). 
f In respect of the Jerusalem Enclave only. 
{ Excluding cost of defence. 

|| See footnote to chapter XIII, paragraph 281. In order not to exaggerate, 
we have assumed that the gross estimated cost would be reduced by half from 
the proceeds of the sale of land by transferee owner-cultivators. 

' f Including the cost of diverting the railway at Tulkarm, and the cost of 
the boundary between Jaffa and Tel Aviv. 

402. On the assumption that His Majesty's Government will decide 
not to reject partition as impracticable on financial grounds alone, if it 
should be desired to proceed with the policy on other grounds, we 
offer the following observations on the consequences of the grant of< 
financial assistance by the United Kingdom to the Arab State after 
partition — 

(i) First, we take it for granted that Parliament would in no 
circumstances be prepared to vote a fixed annual grant in perpetuity 
to a state which is completely independent and over which it has no 
financial control. The natural procedure in such a case would be to 
insist upon the exercise of Treasury control through the appointment 



201 



of a Financial Adviser to the Government of the state, whose 
approval would be required for (a) the annual budget, including the 
detailed estimates of the several Departments and proposals for the 
raising of revenue, (b) any services involving substantial expenditure 
which it may be desired to undertake in the course of the financial 
year and for which no provision was made in the approved estimates, 
and (c) the amount of the grant which Parliament would be asked 
to make in aid of the local revenue of the state. The Financial 
Adviser would in turn seek authority from the Colonial Office and 
Treasury, who in their turn would be responsible for submitting the 
necessary estimate to Parliament. The annual grant, to such amount 
as Parliament might approve, would then be paid to the account of 
the local Government in the form which is technically known as a 
grant-in-aid, the distinctive feature of which is that the expenditure 
therefrom is not accounted for in detail to the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General of the United Kingdom, though the latter is furnished 
by the Colonial Office with the audited accounts and with any report 
of the Director of Colonial Audit thereon, and that any balance of the 
sum issued which may remain unexpended at the end of the financial 
year is not liable to surrender to the United Kingdom Exchequer, 
though account would naturally be taken of it in estimating the 
next year's requirements. Such in brief is the present form of 
financial control in Trans- Jordan, which, as already stated, is in 
receipt of regular assistance from United Kingdom Parliamentary 
Votes (c/. Civil Estimates for 1938, Class II, 9, Sub-Head H.4), and in 
grant-aided colonies and territories in the Colonial Empire generally. 

(ii) It is obvious that such control is not consistent with 
independent sovereignty, and we have, therefore, given some 
thought to the possibility of an alternative arrangement. We have 
been unable, however, to find any which would be likely to satisfy 
the requirements of the Treasury and of Parliament, if the assistance 
were to be given in the form of a direct subsidy. At a later stage 
in our report (chapter XXI), we shall examine the possibility of 
giving such assistance in an indirect form, so that, while Parlia- 
mentary authority would be necessary for the amount to be provided 
in each year, the credit to be granted to the Arab State would be 
determined automatically as part of the constitutional relations 
between the new areas after partition. 



202 



CHAPTER XIX 
CUSTOMS 

403. Among the matters which we are directed to examine and 
report on are customs administration and tariffs. We shall consider 
these from two aspects, the economic and the administrative. 

1. The Economic Aspect 

404. The Royal Commission contemplated that " the Arab and 
Jewish States, being sovereign independent States, would determine 
their own tariffs " (chapter XXII, paragraph 28). They added that 
" it would greatly ease the position and it would promote the interests 
of both the Arab and Jewish States if they could agree to impose 
identical customs duties on as many articles as possible, and if the 
Mandatory Government, likewise, could assimilate its customs 
duties as far as might be with those of one or both of the two States. 
We regard it as an essential part of the proposed Treaty System 
that a commercial convention should be concluded with a view to 
establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of 
imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible interchange of 
goods between the three territories concerned " (ibid, paragraph 29). 

405. With the general principles stated by the Royal Commission 
we fully agree ; but their application raises a number of questions 
which call for careful consideration. It will simplify discussion if we 
examine the position of each of the three areas separately. 

(i) The Jewish State 

406. The development of the Jewish State will be principally in 
the form of industrialisation, and accordingly this state may be 
expected to pursue a policy of high tariffs, with adequate protection 
for-its nascent industries. As regards agricultural products, especially 
intensively grown farm produce such as fresh milk and butter, 
vegetables and fruit, the Jews will have a difficult choice to make 
between protection, in the interests of their agricultural settlers, and 
low prices, in the interests of their industrial population ; but wheat, 
of which the Jewish farmer in the coastal plain grows little, they will 
doubtless wish to buy as cheaply as possible. On the other hanti, it 
will be of the utmost importance to them to have an assured domestic 
market, without which as a basis for an export trade they cannot hope 
to provide employment for additional immigrants in the numbers at 
which they are aiming. In a memorandum submitted to us on the 
general question of the economic future of the Jewish State, Jewish 
witnesses said that what they " believe to be a practical possibility 
is that the Jewish State will supply the Middle Eastern market with 
a part of its general industrial requirements and the world market 



203 



with certain specialities. ... It is anticipated that the industrial 
development already noticeable will gain momentum with the growth 
of the home market for manufactured goods. . . . The expansion 
of the home market for local manufactures will, it is thought, create 
a broader base for the gradual development of an export trade in 
certain lines. But while it is anticipated that the production of 
manufactures for export will come in course of time to provide a 
fair amount of employment, industrial employment is not necessarily 
employment in industries catering "for and dependent upon the 
foreign market. The Jewish Agency believes that there is, and will 
be for some time to come, ample scope for the replacement in the 
home market of imported goods by locally produced manufactures, 
protected, where necessary, by tariffs." In the memorandum quoted 
by us in the chapter dealing with the Jewish proposals for the Jewish 
State (paragraph 237), responsible Jewish witnesses spoke of " the im- 
perative need .... of comprising within its borders " (that is the 
borders of the Jewish State) " a population large enough to serve as a 
home market for its industries." That memorandum was written 
with the object of proving to us that the area comprised in the Jewish 
State under the Royal Commission's plan, containing a population of 
about 600,000 persons already, was far too small for this purpose ; 
a fortiori, the Jews would regard the Jewish State under plan C, with 
its population of less than 300,000 and its area of about one-quarter 
the size of the Jewish State proposed by the Royal Commission, as 
altogether inadequate. It does not follow that plan C must be 
regarded as impracticable on this ground ; but it does follow that the 
Jewish State cannot hope to expand economically, and possibly 
cannot even survive, without a larger home market than can be 
provided by the population of the state alone. 

407. A responsible Jewish witness, whose opinion we had invited 
on the possibility of a customs union between the proposed Arab and 
Jewish States, told us that an examination of the economic structure 
of the Jewish and Arab areas respectively, as proposed by the Royal 
Commission, establishes that even under the present conditions of 
complete free trade the Arab area offers a relatively small market for 
the products, whether agricultural or industrial, of the Jewish area. 
He doubted whether, after political separation, trade between the 
two areas was likely to expand ; and he concluded that the possibility 
of an increase in such trade ought not to be a determining factor in 
considering this particular suggestion. On the other hand, he ex- 
pressed himself as having no fundamental reluctance to further the 
closest possible commercial relations between the Jewish State and 
the adjacent countries, including the Arab State. The question put to 
him related to the two states as proposed under the Royal Com- 
mission's plan, and he was not asked to consider the possibility of 
close commercial relations between the Jewish State and the 
Mandated Territories, on the assumption that a much larger and 
more important area might be retained under mandate as in plan C. 



204 



We do not, therefore, feel that his answer excluded the possibility 
that, if he had had plan C before him at the time, he would have 
recognised the advantage of a commercial agreement in some form 
between the Jewish State and the Mandated Territories, in view of the 
size and importance of the market offered by them to manufacturers 
in that state. 

408. As regards the Jewish State, therefore, the position may be 
stated thus. The creation of the Mandated Territories as' a separate 
political area has been found to be essential to any scheme of partition 
which we can recommend, upon grounds which in our opinion take 
precedence of all others. But the creation of those territories, with 
their prosperous and increasing Jewish population, as a separate 
tariff area, will be a severe blow to the economic prospects of the 
Jewish State. It is not, however, a blow which need be regarded as 
fatal to plan C, because it is possible to avert it by a customs agree- 
ment between the two areas. Such an agreement is, in our opinion, 
essential to the economic welfare of the Jewish State, if it is to provide 
room for large numbers of additional immigrants. 

Whether the need of the Mandated Territories for a customs 
agreement with the Jewish State is equally great, we shall consider 
in paragraphs 411-412 below. 

(ii) The Arab State 

409. Left to itself, the Arab State, with its predominantly agri- 
cultural population, may be expected to prefer a moderately low 
tariff, designed mainly for revenue purposes, but with at least as 
much protection as at present for its wheat, barley, olive oil, and 
perhaps one or two other agricultural products.* The Arab State, 
including Trans- Jordan, will have a large exportable surplus of 
wheat, and unless it can find a market for that surplus outside its 
territories, its economic situation will be serious, for the domestic 
consumers alone cannot absorb the quantity now produced. It may 
occasionally happen, as in 1937, that the Syrian wheat harvest 
fails while that in Trans- Jordan and Palestine is plentiful, and in 
such a year the Arab farmer would be able to sell his wheat at a 
good price in the Syrian market. But that would be exceptional. 
As a rule, he must find his market in the rest of Palestine. The 
produce is taken mostly to Haifa for marketing, but its ultimate 
destination we were not able to learn exactly, nor how its ton- 
sumption would be distributed between the Jewish State and the 
Mandated Territories under plan C. Similarly, as regards the other 
surplus agricultural produce, the Arab farmer must find a market 
in the rest of Palestine. 



* At present, the price of home-grown wheat in both Palestine and 
Trans- Jordan is maintained by a sliding-scale duty at a fixed price of 
£P.9 per ton. The prices of rye, and of wheat and rye flour, are similarly 
fixed by sliding-scale duties. Barley, tomatoes and potatoes are also 
protected. 



205 



410. We are satisfied, therefore, that to the Arab State under 
plan C, economic survival depends upon finding a market outside its 
borders. We do not go so far as to say that this market must 
necessarily include the area of the proposed Jewish State, with its 
population of 280,000 ; but we are satisfied that it must include 
the Mandated Territories, with their population of 660,000, and 
their important urban markets in Haifa and Jerusalem. A customs 
agreement of some kind between the Arab State and the Mandated 
Territories is, therefore, essential ; but we cannot say that such an 
agreement between the Arab State and the Jewish State is essential 
to the Arabs, though it may be an advantage to them. 

(iii) The Mandated Territories 

411. The interests of the Mandated Territories will be mainly 
agricultural, but Haifa is already an important industrial centre, and 
its industries are likely to expand, as we have seen (chapter X). 
In the matter of tariffs, the needs of the Mandated Territories 
would seem to be a compromise between those of the Arab State 
and of the Jewish State. They will wish to protect their agricultura- 
lists in the same way as the former ; but they will also be pressed 
by the Haifa manufacturers to afford a considerable measure of 
protection for industry, and they will probably find it possible to 
grant such protection for a number of articles without raising the 
cost of living appreciably for the fellah, who is too poor to buy 
many imported goods. 

412. Without more exact information than is available as to 
the distribution of markets it is not easy to speak with confidence ; 
but we are inclined to think that the Mandated Territories could, 
if need be, stand alone inside a customs frontier. As a matter of 
economic prudence, the Mandated Territories should find it to their 
advantage to have their trade with their neighbours hampered as 
little as possible by tariff barriers ; but their need of a customs 
agreement with either the Jewish State or the Arab State is almost 
certainly less insistent than the need of either of those states for an 
agreement with them. 

2. The Administrative Aspect 

413. We turn now to the administrative aspect of the question. 
We take it as axiomatic that in a country like Palestine, where the 
state boundaries would follow no natural frontier and would run 
mostly across dimcult hill country, offering golden opportunities to 
the smuggler, it will be to the interest of all three areas to eliminate 
customs control as far as possible, not only with a view to facilitating 
trade, but also in order to reduce the cost of administration and the 
loss of revenue from smuggling. Here again, however, the needs 
of the three states will be different : the prevention of smuggling, 
for example, will be of most importance to the Jewish State, with. 



206 



its presumably high tariff, and will hardly concern at all the Arab 
State whose duties are not likely to exceed those of its neighbours 
except, possibly, on cereals, a commodity not easily smuggled. 
Nor is the cost of administration likely to trouble the Arabs as much 
as the Jews, although the frontiers of their state are much more 
lengthy and difficult to control than those of the Jewish State. 
Here also the Mandated Territories are likely to find themselves 
in an intermediate position, being less likely to be troubled with 
inter-area smuggling than the Jewish State, but having long and 
difficult frontiers which it will be necessary, but costly, to control 
for revenue purposes. 

414. Assuming that some kind of customs agreement is desirable 
between each of the three areas, there are three forms on which 
it might be modelled : the Palestine-Syrian Agreement ; the 
Indo-Burma Agreement ; and the Belgium-Luxemburg Agreement. 

(a) The Palestine-Syrian Agreement 

415. Under this agreement, there is (save for certain commodities 
subject to local excise, and certain other articles mutually agreed 
upon) complete free trade between the two countries for goods 
manufactured in either country entering the other, whether or not 
the primary material used in the industry had been imported from a 
foreign country. The two countries are, however, free to fix their 
own tariffs on foreign goods ; so that the agreement can only 
benefit that country which is able to sell its products to the other 
more cheaply than the other can produce itself or buy elsewhere. 
The agreement also provides that imports into Syria of foreign goods 
on which the Syrian duty is lower than the Palestinian duty shall, 
on re-export from Syria into Palestine, be liable to the difference in 
duty between the Syrian and the Palestinian duties, and that the duty 
collected in Syria shall, on a certificate that the goods have been 
received in Palestine, be paid over to Palestine. A reciprocal 
arrangement is made by Palestine, and accounts between the two 
countries are balanced by monthly payments. It was hoped when 
the agreement was made that the provision for the entry into either 
country free of duty of goods manufactured locally in whole or in 
part from foreign material would be of considerable benefit to Pales- 
tine's young industries, but these hopes have not been fulfilled, and 
the agreement has proved to be of far greater benefit to Syria than 
to Palestine. 

(b) The Indo-Burma Agreement 

416. This agreement, made under the India and Burma Trade 
Regulation Order in Council, 1937, was designed to prevent the 
dislocation of trade which, if, after the separation of Burma from 
India, both countries were left free from the outset to fix their own 
tariffs, might be caused in the trade of the two countries which had 
hitherto passed freely from one to the other. It was recognized 



207 



that, notwithstanding the disturbance of their domestic economy, 
which might follow from the imposition of barriers on trade and 
immigration between the two countries, revenue requirements 
might be so strong as to induce them to impose duties on goods 
imported from each other. 

Accordingly it was decided, by agreement, to recommend that, 
for an initial period of three years, free trade between Burma and 
India should be continued, and the preferential position of India 
in the Burmese market and of Burma in the Indian market should 
be maintained. So the Order in Council which gives effect to the 
agreement maintains,- during the currency of the agreement, free 
trade between India and Burma, and provides that, during this 
period, neither country can, without the consent of the other, be 
deprived of the preferential position which each now enjoys for 
its produce or manufactures in the market of the other. But 
either country is free, as regards goods which are not produced or 
manufactured in the other country, to reduce or abolish its duties 
on foreign imports, after two months' notice. And either country 
is free to raise its duties against such imports if it wishes to do so. 
There is, of course, nothing to prevent the agreement from being 
renewed after the three years have elapsed, but that would only be 
possible by agreement between the two countries. 

(c) The Belgium-Luxemburg Agreement 

417. This agreement provides not only for complete freedom of 
trade, but for complete identity of tariffs, between the two countries. 

418. How then can the tariff needs of the three areas, as described 
in the earlier parts of this chapter, best be satisfied ? It is obvious 
in the first place that, assuming the states to be sovereign and 
independent, with the right to determine their own tariffs, this 
can only be done by agreements freely entered into on both sides, 
and subject to determination on specified terms. It would no 
doubt be possible, as in the case of the Indo-Burma Agreement, 
to provide in advance of the establishment of the new states 
that certain arrangements shall remain in force for a limited 
period, with the object of preventing immediate dislocation of trade 
and of giving the new administrations a lead in a desired direction. 
But such a period should preferably be short, and certainly could 
not be continued indefinitely without depriving the states of one 
of the chief characteristics of sovereignty, the right of fiscal self- 
determination. 

419. Secondly, if our analysis of the economic position of the 
Jewish State was correct, two things are necessary to satisfy its 
tariff needs : first, freedom of trade within as large an area as 
possible ; and secondly, an assured market within as large an area 
as possible. Neither condition alone will satisfy its requirements 
for the economic expansion at which it aims, it needs both. 



208 



420. That means that agreements between the Jewish State and 
the Mandated Territories on the lines of the Palestine-Syrian or the 
Indo-Burma models are not enough to provide for the economic 
expansion of the Jewish State. Under the former, the Jewish State 
could not hope to obtain protection for its own industries except as 
regards such articles as the Mandated Territories also produced or 
wished to produce ; while the latter would only be satisfactory 11 each of 
the areas concerned were content with the margin of preference already 
enjoyed by its manufacturers in the other area under the pre-separa- 
tion tariff : it is not appropriate to the needs of a state, such as the 
Jewish State, which intends to introduce immediately after partition 
a much larger degree of protection for its industries, and wishes that 
protection to extend over a larger area than its own state. And 
neither of these forms of agreement could give more than a temporary 
protection. Indeed nothing short of the Belgium-Luxemburg 
agreement, with complete free trade and with the assurance of a 
tariff that will give it an adequate measure of protection over the 
whole area covered by the agreement can really satisfy the needs 
of the Jewish State. 

421. The Arab State, as we have already seen, does not require 
any trade agreement with the Jewish State in order to preserve 
it from economic difficulties, but it does require an agreement with 
the Mandated Territories. Its special needs would probably be 
satisfied by an agreement on the Palestine-Syrian model; but on 
general grounds it would be better served by an agreement which 
got rid entirely of all customs barriers. 

422. The Mandated Territories on their part have no special 
need of a trade agreement with either of the states, although on 
general grounds it would be to their advantage to eliminate any causes 
of interference with trade and to escape the cost of a customs barrier. 
But the economic position of this area does not seem to be such that 
it would be justified, in the interests of its own inhabitants, in 
making any tariff sacrifice for the sake of agreement with either of 
the other areas. ' » 

423. So far as the Arab State is concerned, however, it would 
seem that the Mandated Territories would be making no sacrifice 
if they were to enter into a trade agreement with that state, and that, 
on general grounds, it would be to the advantage of both areas that 
such an agreement should be one which ensured complete freedom of 
trade and eliminated customs barriers. That can only be provided by 
an agreement on the Belgium-Luxemburg model, with complete 
identity of tariffs by agreement between the Arab State and the 
Mandated Territories. If tariffs are to be fixed by agreement, one 
side must obviously be prepared on occasion to give way to the other ; 
and it is probable that the Arab State will not be in a position to 
insist on its views prevailing over those of the Mandated Territories 
in a matter of this kind. But so long as provision is made in the 



209 



agreement for its being determined under certain conditions by 
either party, we do not think that this fact should be regarded as 
inconsistent with the fiscal independence of the Arab State. 

424. It would seem necessary, therefore, that it should be a 
provision of the Treaty with the Arab State that there shall be 
(i) identity of tariffs, and (ii) complete freedom of trade between the 
Mandated Territories and the Arab State, to continue indefinitely, 
subject to the right of the Arab State to give notice of termination, 
if it thinks fit, after not less than, say, ten years. 

425. This would dispose of the awkward question, whether Jaffa 
ought not to be treated for tariff purposes as part of the Jerusalem 
Enclave, notwithstanding that the tariffs for the enclave and the 
Arab State generally might not be identical (Royal Commission, 
chapter XXII, paragraph 29). If the suggested arrangement were 
carried out the question will not arise. 

426. Under this arrangement there would be no need of any 
customs control between the Mandated Territories and the Arab 
State, except for the purpose of statistical record with a view to the 
allocation of duty between the two areas. Even this, moreover, will 
not be necessary if it should be decided to allocate customs revenue 
in accordance with an automatic formula as suggested below. 

427. It remains to consider how the Jewish State should be 
provided for. We have said that the Government of the Mandated 
Territories would not be justified, against the interests of their own 
inhabitants, in making any sacrifice for the benefit of either the 
Jewish or the Arab State ; and the case against doing so will be 
still stronger if the Arab State is included with the Mandated 
Territories in a single customs union. On the other hand the value 
to the Jewish State of the market afforded by the two areas together 
will be pro tanto greater ; for, notwithstanding the remarks of the 
Jewish witness quoted earlier in this chapter, we think that the right 
of access to the Arab market after partition may be considered as 
potentially of some value. 

428. Such being the case, it seems only reasonable that the Jews 
should be asked to make some contribution in return for the 
advantages they will secure by joining the union formed by the 
other two areas. That contribution should, we think, be arranged 
in the following way. The whole of the customs duties of Palestine 
and Trans- Jordan should be collected by a single customs service, 
responsible to a central authority consisting of representatives of all 
three areas, and should be paid into a central fund under the control 
of that authority. Out of the fund would be paid the expenses of 
the central authority itself and of the customs service, and any other 
charges which it might be decided to meet from that source (as 
to which we shall have further proposals to make) ; and the residue 
should be apportioned between the several areas in accordance with 
an agreed formula designed to produce the desired result. 



210 



429. On this hypothesis, it would follow that, as with the Arab 
State, the Treaty with the Jewish State should provide for a customs 
union between the Jewish State and the Mandated Territories and 
(so long as the Arab State forms a customs union with the latter) with 
the Arab State, to continue indefinitely subject to the right of the 
Jewish State to give notice of termination after not less than ten 
years ; and that the fiscal policy of the union should be settled by a 
tariff board on which all three areas should be represented in equal 
numbers, the chairman being the High Commissioner himself or his 
nominee. Each of the areas would be bound by the treaty to give 
effect to the decisions of the board. 

430. At this point several objections may be raised on behalf of 
the Jews. 

First, it may be asked — if this agreement is as much in the 
interests of the Jews as is contended, why not leave it to them to 
press for it instead of forcing it upon them by treaty ? If they do 
so, that will be the test of their willingness to pay the price, whatever 
it may be, for the privilege of joining the proposed union. 

Secondly, it may be pointed out that the Jewish State repre- 
sentatives on the tariff board will always be liable to be outvoted, 
so that even within the area of this larger market, they will not be 
able to study their own interests. They will have to compromise with 
the other areas, and in the result the tariff policy of the proposed 
union cannot be expected to possess that flexibility and forcefulness 
which are essential to the rapid industrial expansion of the Jewish 
State. 

431. These objections cannot be answered without reference to 
the financial situation as we have described it in chapter XVIII. In 
that chapter we saw that it was impossible, whatever boundaries we 
might recommend, to set up an Arab State which should be self- 
supporting. In round figures, and without making any provision! for 
the cost of defence, the Arab State would be faced with a deficit of 
about £P.6 10,000 per annum, which would have to be made good by 
the United Kingdom, while the Jewish State would be in receipt of a 
surplus of about £P.600,000. In addition, the United Kingdom 
Government would be obliged, in accordance with recognized practice, 
to vote grants of £P.460,000 in order to enable the Government of the 
Mandated Territories to balance its budget. It is impossible to 
regard such a situation as satisfactory from the standpoint of the 
British taxpayer ; and we could not be content to omit from our 
plan any proposal which offered a reasonable opportunity for adjusting 
a financial balance so unfavourable to the United Kingdom. In 
chapter XVIII we gave our reasons for thinking that it was not 
possible to require the Jewish State to make a direct subvention to 
the Arab State, and we adhere to that conclusion. But those argu- 
ments do not hold good against a business arrangement such as we 
now propose, in which the contribution which the Jews would be asked 



211 



to make would be in consideration of value received, in the shape 
of the right of free entry to the market afforded by the Mandated 
Territories and the Arab State — a market in which they would 
otherwise be treated in the same way as any other foreign state. 

432. As regards the second objection, it would seem that from the 
tariff standpoint the development of Jewish industry is not likely 
to be seriously hampered by a customs union, for the following 
reasons — (a) In the interests of the Haifa industrial zone, the 
Mandated Territories might not be opposed in principle to a protec- 
tive tariff, (b) The fellaheen, who form the great majority of the 
population of the Arab State, are too poor to buy any but a very 
few imported articles, and would not be likely to suffer if a protective 
duty were imposed on many articles which the Jewish State would 
like to manufacture under protection, (c) The Arab State under a 
formula such as we have in mind for the allocation of revenue would 
have a direct interest in the prosperity of the Jewish State, and might 
be not unwilling to support Jewish policy designed to that end. 
(d) A protective tariff would be of little use to the Jewish manu- 
facturers so long as they have only a small domestic market and must 
rely mainly on exports. It is the large and assured home market 
that is essentia] to them if they are to expand their output. 

433. The objections which we have supposed to be put to us may 
also be answered in general terms. The Jews cannot, of course, be 
forced to enter a customs union against their will, any more than they 
can, presumably, be forced to set up an independent Jewish State 
against their will. But they can be told the terms on which 
His Majesty's Government are willing to introduce a plan of partition. 
In our opinion, one of those terms should be the provision in the 
treaty for a customs union between the three areas, subject to an 
apportionment of net surplus customs revenue in accordance with a 
formula to be agreed. The exact nature of the formula would, we 
suggest, be a matter for negotiation between His Majesty's 
Government and representatives of the Jews and Arabs ; but 
in chapter XXI below we have set out in detail the results of 
the particular formula which we worked out for our own guidance, 
and which seemed to us equitable. 

434. As will be shown in that chapter, we do not claim that, 
even with this formula, plan C is entirely satisfactory from either 
the financial or the economic standpoint. We can only say that 
in drawing the boundaries we have thought it right to give priority 
to political considerations, and that it is better that the Jews should 
suffer certain financial and economic restrictions than that large 
numbers of Arabs should be subjected to alien domination in a 
Jewish State. 

435. There remain, however, two important constitutional points 
which must be taken into consideration before the arrangements 
suggested in this chapter can be regarded as satisfactory. The first is 



212 



mainly a matter for the League of Nations. Article 18 of the present 
Mandate lays down the principle that there shall be no discrimination 
in Palestine against the nationals, companies, ships, aircraft, or goods 
of states-members of the League. If that Article were included 
in the new Mandate for the Mandated territories, it would be 
impossible for those territories to be included in the suggested 
customs union without the same restriction being applied to the 
whole area. The Royal Commission, however, took the view that 
the provisions of Article 18 are out of date ; and it is certain that 
the Jews, who have long pressed for an alteration of that Article, 
would hold that their industrial development in the new state was • 
being unfairly hampered if they are given no greater measure 
of freedom under the new conditions than the Palestine Govern- 
ment now possesses under the Mandate. It would therefore seem 
to be a necessary condition of the formation of a customs union 
including the Mandated Territories that under the new Mandate 
those territories should be given the same freedom as other 
countries to make their own commercial bargains with the rest of 
the world. 

436. The second point concerns His Majesty's Government only. 
If a customs union is to be formed between the Mandated Territories 
and the Arab and Jewish States under conditions which are to be 
consistent with the sovereign independence of those states, the 
Mandatory Government will be liable to have its fiscal policy dictated 
by a combination of the Arab and Jewish representatives, who will 
form a majority on the tariff board. In this respect the Mandatory 
Government could not claim greater privileges than the other 
members of the union if these are to be sovereign states : it could 
not be given a majority voting power without infringing the fiscal 
independence of those states ; and it could not claim the right to 
reject, for its own territory, a decision of the majority without 
conceding the same right to the others and thereby rendering 
impossible the operation of the common tariff scheme. Such an 
arrangement between a mandated territory and an independent 
foreign state or states would be, so far as we know, unique, and 
would give rise to constitutional difficulties which might be regarded 
as insuperable. In particular it would leave the financial position of 
the Mandated Territories precarious, since the policy of the tariff 
board might be in conflict with the revenue needs of the Mandatory 
Government, and the latter might therefore be obliged to ask the 
United Kingdom Government for a larger measure of financial 
assistance than would be necessary if the Mandatory Government 
were free to determine its own fiscal policy. 

We shall return to this difficult question in chapter XXI, when 
we examine the financial consequences of the whole scheme. 



213 



CHAPTER XX 

PUBLIC DEBT AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 

437. Our terms of reference require us to examine and report 
upon the economic and financial questions involved in partition, 
including — 

(ii) (a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between 
the various areas of the public assets and public debt of Palestine, 
and other "financial obligations legitimately incurred by the 
Administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate " 
referred to in Article 28 thereof ; and 

(b) means to ensure that the financial obligations referred 
to above will be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28 
of the Mandate. 

438. In this chapter we deal only with the public debt and other 
financial obligations of Palestine, leaving the allocation of public 
assets to be considered on a later occasion. 

439. Apart from certain minor items which we do not think it 
necessary to deal with now, the financial obligations with which we 
are concerned consist of four items only — 

(i) the Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, 
1942-47, of which the amount issued and outstanding is 
£4,475,000; 

(ii) the liability of the Trans- Jordan Government under a 
settlement reached with the Ottoman Public Debt Council, 
for its share of the Ottoman Public Debt and certain sums 
outstanding on this account under Article 55 of the Treaty 
of Lausanne ; 

(iii) the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities, 
of which mention is expressly made in Article 28 of the Mandate ; 
and 

(iv) the liability of the Palestine Government for a contri- 
bution towards the cost of the Empire Air Mail Scheme. 

440. The wording of our terms of reference implies that it was 
your predecessor's intention that both the public assets and the 
public liabilities of the Palestine Government should, in general, 
be taken over by the successor Administrations as a matter of 
principle, and that all that is required of us is to recommend an 



214 

equitable basis of apportionment, as far as apportionment may be 
necessary. That appears to us to be the right principle to apply 
in such a case, and to be in conformity with precedent (for example, 
the apportionment between the Governments of the Irish Free State 
and of Northern Ireland of public assets and liabilities relating to 
Ireland). It has been suggested to us, however, as an alternative, 
that, instead of regarding the existing Government as being taken 
over by the successor Administrations as a going concern, we should 
regard it as a concern to be wound up, the present Administration 
retaining full responsibility for the liabilities as well as full rights 
of proprietorship in the assets, which it will then sell to the incoming 
Administrations at an agreed valuation. We are not aware of any 
precedent for this procedure, which is, moreover, open to two 
obvious objections. First, the present Administration, the Govern- 
ment of Palestine, will cease to exist, and will, therefore, have no 
resources out of which to discharge the liabilities which it would be 
supposed to take over. In effect, the arrangement would result in 
transferring the liability to His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom ; but we see no good reason for this, and considerable 
objections to it. And secondly, the valuation of the assets would 
be likely to give rise to dispute between the parties, the one contending 
that the basis of valuation should be the present earning capacity 
or value as a going concern, and the other that it should be the 
original cost. Anything short of the original cost of any item provided 
out of borrowed monies would obviously mean a free gift by His 
Majesty's Government to the new Administrations, for which we 
can see no justification ; while if the original cost basis is accepted, 
there is little advantage in the " winding-up " procedure over that 
of the " going concern." We, therefore, recommend that the principle 
to be adopted should be that of the transfer to the new Administra- 
tions, in general, of the assets and liabilities of the existing Palestine 
Government. 

441. As regards the basis of allocation between the new Adminis- 
trations, the natural principle would be to relate the liabilities as far 
as possible to the physical assets acquired thereby, and to apportion 
both liabilities and assets between the several areas according to 
the distribution of the physical assets. The whole of the proceeds 
of the loan of 1927, with the exception of the cost of raising the 
loan itself, was devoted to the acquisition or provision of physical 
assets which can be identified, and as far as these liabilities are 
concerned, therefore, an apportionment in accordance with the 
aforesaid principle should not be difficult. But an apportionment 
of pension charges, particularly of charges arising directly out of 
partition, is a different matter, and is likely to give rise to disputes, 
which we should prefer to avoid if possible. We shall return 
to the question of apportionment of liability later in this chapter 
(paragraph 450), when we have considered how to provide means for 
ensuring that these financial obligations shall be duly honoured. 



215 

1. The Palestine Government 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, 1943-67 

442. This consists of £4,475,000 of 5 per cent, stock, of which 
the principal and interest are guaranteed by the Treasury under 
the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 1926 (16 and 17 Geo. V, 
chapter 62). The issue was made in London in November, 1927, 
at an issue price of £100 10s. Od. per cent. The prospectus stated 
that the stock would be paid off, at par, on the 1st November, 1967, 
but that the Palestine Government reserved to themselves the right 
to repay the loan at par on any half-yearly interest date on and 
after the 1st November, 1942, on giving three months' notice. The 
Palestine Government undertook to provide a sinking fund approved 
by the British Treasury as sufficient to provide for the repayment 
of the loan on the due date. The approved amount is at present 
£58,548 per annum ; and the amount accumulated, with interest 
to the 5th July, 1938, is in round figures £522,000. 

443. The object of the loan was to raise a sum not exceeding 
£4,500,000 of which part was to be spent on the construction of a 
harbour at Haifa, on the improvement of the port of Jaffa and on 
railway capital improvements and public works. Of the remainder, 
£1,000,000 was to be paid to His Majesty's Government for railway 
and other capital assets taken over by the Palestine Government and 
the balance was to be used partly to defray the cost of raising the 
loan and partly to repay money temporarily advanced and spent on 
railway equipment and improvement, on other public works, and 
on the acquisition of the Jaffa- Jerusalem railway. The following 
table shows the amounts authorized to be spent on these services 
by Parliament under the Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 
and the actual expenditure in accordance with a revised allocation 
as approved by the Treasury and the Secretary of State — 

Allocation Actual 

authorised expenditure 

by the to 

Act o/1926. 31/3/1938. 

Service. £P. £P. 

1. Railways 1,640,000 1,639,021 

2. Purchase of Railway and other Capital 

Assets from His Majesty's Govern- 
ment 1,000,000 1,000,000 

3. Harbour Construction and Port 

Improvements 1,115,000 1,489,032 

4. Public Buildings, Telegraphs and 

Telephones, surveys, minor works 
of development, and the raising of 

the loan . . 745,000 369,071 



£P.4,500,000 £P.4,497,124 



216 



The allocation of items 3 and 4, as finally approved by the 
Treasury and Secretary of State, was — 

£P- 

Item 3. Haifa Harbour Construction .. . . 1,210,412 
Jaffa Port Improvements . . . . 278,870 



1,489,282 



,, 4. Telegraph and Telephones . . . . 188,127 
Government Offices and Construction 

and Equipment of Printing Press . . 60,642 

Cost of raising loan . . . . . . 120,303 



£P.369,072 



444. The prospectus stated that the principal and interest and 
the sinking fund payments were secured upon the general revenu.es 
and assets of the Government of Palestine with priority over any 
charges thereon not existing at the date of the passing of the 
Palestine and East Africa Loans Act, 1926, namely the 15th December, 
1926. The prospectus went on to give the figures for the revenue 
and expenditure of the Palestine Government for the five previous 
years. 

445. It is necessary to consider (a) the position of those who lent 
the money to the Palestine Government ; (b) the position of the 
British Treasury as guarantors of the loan ; and (c) the question of 
finding means to ensure that the financial obligations thus legitimately 
incurred by the Palestine Government shall be fully honoured after 
partition. 

(a) The Position of the Lenders 

446. Those who subscribed their money for the loan did so on 
a two-fold security : the security of all the revenues and assets of 
the Palestine Government ; and the security of the Consolidated 
Fund of the United Kingdom under the guarantee of the British 
Treasury. It is true that the prospectus lays stress upon the nature 
and reality of the former ; but so far as the lender is concerned, it 
is difficult to deny that in this case the greater comprehends the less, 
and that few of the lenders are likely to have troubled themselves to 
consider what was the value of the former security, knowing that, 
whether it was good or bad, they were completely protected by the 
latter.* We do not think therefore, that the lenders of the money 



* We understand that the arrangements made by the Treasury and the 
Bank of England in the case of a loan guaranteed by the Treasury are such 
that, whatever happens to the borrower, there can be no default, even 
momentarily, so far as the lender is concerned : the Treasury guarantee 
operates automatically and instantly. 



217 



would have any equitable ground of complaint if the liability for 
the principal and interest of the loan were apportioned among the 
three Administrations, and in place of the security afforded by the 
revenues and assets of the whole of Palestine, there were substituted, 
for each portion of the loan, the security of the revenues and assets 
of one of the three Administrations. Nevertheless it may be said 
that technically there has been an alteration of the contract, which 
may necessitate legislation. We think that we may properly leave 
the question to His Majesty's Government. 

(b) The Position of the British Treasury 

447. On the other hand it is clear that the substitution for the 
original prior security for the loan of the several revenues and 
assets of the successor Administrations would substantially affect 
the position of the Treasury as guarantor. The security afforded 
by the revenues and assets of the Jewish State may be ample cover 
for the portion of the loan which is allocated to that state ; but it 
is obvious from the forecasts of the budgetary position of the Arab 
State and the Mandated Territories that neither of those Administra- 
tions would be able to meet, out of their own resources, any part of 
their liabilities in respect of the portions of the loan allocated to them, 
and that the whole cost, both of interest and sinking fund, would, 
therefore, fall on the United Kingdom Exchequer. In this respect, 
however, there would be no real difference between this particular 
liability and the other budgetary expenses which create deficits for 
both those Administrations ; and the effect of this particular trans- 
action would become merged in the general question of the financial 
effects of partition, which we discussed in chapter XVIII. If, 
however, it should be found possible to substitute for these separate 
charges some arrangement for the payment of the whole of the 
existing public obligations of Palestine out of a single central fund 
with priority over all other charges, that would obviously be 
preferable. Here again, however, the legal position would seem to 
require careful consideration by His Majesty's Government : since 
the suggested arrangement would involve the substitution of a 
new security for that upon which the Treasury were authorised to 
give their guarantee. 

(c) Means to ensure that the financial obligations of each 
Administration shall be duly honoured 

448. Fortunately the machinery for such an arrangement could 
be readily provided as a part of the scheme for a customs union which 
we have described in chapter XIX (Customs) ; and this arrangement 
would automatically provide the means to ensure that all the 
financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Palestine Govern- 
ment shall be duly honoured. The details of the arrangement are 
described more particularly in chapter XXI (Finance, Part II). 



218 



449. But while it would be possible in this way to ensure that' all 
the obligations in question are fully and promptly met, without calling 
upon the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom to meet any 
part of them under the Treasury guarantee, the arrangement for 
paying these charges out of a central fund does not in itself dispose 
of the question of apportioning the liability between the several 
new Administrations. There are two ways in which that question 
might be settled. One would be to make an exact apportionment 
of the several liabilities, on whatever basis might seem most appro- 
priate (e.g., in the case of public debt, on the basis of the situation 
of the physical assets acquired or provided out of the proceeds of 
the loan), and to take those liabilities into account in apportioning 
to each Administration its share of the net surplus of the central 
fund. The other would be to make no attempt to apportion the 
liabilities in detail, but to apportion the whole of the net surplus 
of the fund in accordance with whatever formula is decided upon for 
that purpose : in other words, to apportion the financial obligations 
in accordance with that same formula. 

450. The latter is simple and convenient, and gets rid of the 
difficult task of apportioning the various financial obligations in 
detail. We recommend that it should be adopted for all those 
obligations, with one exception. That exception is the liability for 
the Trans- Jordan Government's share of the Ottoman Public Debt, 
which, for the reasons given in paragraph 454, we think should be 
dealt with separately. 

451. To anticipate the arrangement described in chapter XXI, we 
may state here that the effect of that arrangement is to apportion 
all the liabilities in question, excluding the Trans- Jordan debt, in 
equal shares between the three Administrations ; and it is on this 
basis that the budgetary forecasts in chapter XVIII have been 
prepared. 

452. The Treasury have power, under section 25 of the Finance 
Act, 1934 (24 and 25 Geo. V, cap. 32), to guarantee the interest 
and sinking fund of a new loan to be raised for the purpose of redeem- 
ing before maturity a loan already guaranteed by them, provided 
that the amount required to pay the interest on the new, or conver- 
sion, loan is less than the amount payable for interest on the old 
loan, and that the Treasury are satisfied that the substitution of 
the guarantee of the conversion loan for that of the old loan will 
benefit the Exchequer. Inasmuch as the liability for the shares 
in the loan charges allocated to the Arab State and the Mandated 
Territories will fall, directly or indirectly, on the Treasury, it would 
seem that this is a case in which the Treasury would be empowered 
to guarantee a conversion loan, and would no doubt decide to do 
so if market conditions should permit. It is, of course, impossible 
to foresee what reduction in the Treasury's liability may be brought 
about in this way. 



219 



2. The Liability of the Trans-Jordan Government for their 
Share of the Ottoman Public Debt 

453. This liability consists of an undertaking by the Trans- 
Jordan Government under an agreement dated the 29th July, 1936, 
between that Government and the Ottoman Debt Council for the 
settlement of the liability of the Government of Trans- Jordan for 
its share of the Ottoman Public Debt under the Treaty of Lausanne. 
The agreement provides for the payment to the Ottoman Public 
Debt Council of twenty half-yearly instalments of £15,504 6s. 9d., 
payable at the end of May and November in each year beginning 
with 1936. Thus by the 31st March, 1939, six instalments will have 
been met. The balance outstanding after that date will be £217,061, 
and will be fully paid off by the 31st March, 1946. In order to enable 
the Government of Trans- Jordan to meet this agreed liability, it 
has been necessary to ask Parliament in each year to provide 
equivalent amounts, at the rate of £31,008 13s. Gd. per annum, 
by way of a loan-in-aid to Trans- Jordan. As stated on the face 
of the estimates,* the loan is to be upon terms to be prescribed by 
the Treasury, but we understand that so long as Trans- Jordan is 
in receipt of a grant-in-aid for ordinary purposes the question of 
prescribing terms is likely to remain in abeyance. 

454. If Trans- Jordan is included in the Arab State, it would be 
necessary, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, 
for arrangements to be made to treat this liability in the same way as 
the other financial obligations of the Palestine Government, that is 
for payment to be made through the proposed central fund, the 
effect being, as explained above, that the liability would be shared 
equally between the three Administrations. But we think that it 
would be difficult to justify the imposition of any share in this 
liability upon the areas which formerly comprised the territory of the 
Palestine Government, since that Government has already dis- 
charged its liability for its own share of the Ottoman Public Debt, 
and the effect of such an arrangement would, therefore, be to make 
the taxpayer in those areas make a second contribution to the 
Ottoman Debt Council. We, therefore, think that as a matter of 
equity this item must be treated separately. It would be possible 
to arrange for it to be paid out of the central fund notwithstanding, 
but debited wholly to the Arab State. But this would merely 
introduce an awkward complication into the formula which 
we propose in the following chapter for the allocation of the net 
surplus revenue of the central fund ; and the British Treasury would 
gain nothing thereby, since they would be obliged, under the same 
formula, to take account of this debit in etimating the amount of 
assistance to be given to the Arab State. We recommend, therefore, 
that this liability should be taken over directly by the British 



* Civil Estimates of the United Kingdom, 1938, CI. II. 9. Subhead H.4. 
(Colonial and Middle Eastern Services.) 



220 



Treasury, and either discharged by a lump sum payment, suitably 
discounted ; or met by direct payment of the outstanding instalments 
to the Ottoman Debt Council out of moneys which Parliament 
should be asked to provide for the purpose as required. In effect, nq, 
new liability will be imposed on the Treasury under this arrangement, 
since we can see no prospect whatever of the present Government 
of Trans- Jordan ever being in a position to repay the so-called loan 
now being made to them by the Treasury for this purpose : for all 
practical purposes it may be regarded as a free gift. 

3. The Bights of Public Servants to Pensions or Gratuities 

455. Article 28 of the Mandate reads as follows — 

In the event of the termination of the Mandate hereby 
conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of 
Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed 
necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of 
the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall 
use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, 
that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial 
obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of 
Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights 
of public servants to pensions or gratuities. 

456. The article does not define further the " rights of public 
servants to pensions or gratuities " ; but, following recent precedents, 
we conceive the term to mean (a) the right of public servants to be 
paid, fully and punctually, the pensions or gratuities earned by them, 
under their existing conditions of service, in respect of service in 
Palestine prior to partition ; and (b) the right to such additional 
payments, if any, as may be deemed fair and reasonable in com- 
pensation for their premature retirement from service by reason of 
partition or for any radical change in their conditions of service 
caused by partition. 

• 457. We do not propose at this stage to make detailed recom- 
mendations regarding the rights to be given to Palestine civil 
servants under head (b). In the meantime it will be enough to 
estimate the liability of the new Administration under both (a) 
and (b), and to recommend how means may be provided for meeting 
this estimated liability. 

458. The Treasurer of Palestine has furnished us with such an 
estimate, based on certain assumptions as regards (i) the average ages, 
salaries and length of service of the existing staff ; (ii) the proportion 
of such staff who will retire on partition ; and (iii) the rates of 
special compensation which will be payable to officers whose service 
in an Administration under the Mandatory Power is terminated or 
whose conditions of service in future are radically changed. We 
have not at this stage examined critically any of these assumptions, 



221 



and must not be understood to have accepted any of them, 
particularly the third. For our present purpose it is enough to 
accept the Treasurer's estimate as a rough indication of what the 
liability may be expected to be at its highest. The estimate is for a 
total average liability, on an annuity basis, over the first ten years 
after partition, of about £P.250,000 per annum, including the 
£P.72,800 now in course of payment. Under the arrangements 
which we have proposed already in this chapter, any part of this 
liability as it falls due will be met from the proposed central fund, 
and the net effect will be that each Administration will contribute 
one-third of the cost. In our opinion it is neither necessary nor 
desirable to attempt to apportion the liability upon any other basis. 

4. The Liability of the Palestine Government under the Empire 

Air Mail Scheme 

459. The Governments of Palestine and Trans- Jordan have 
agreed to participate in the Empire Air Mail scheme, under which 
all first class mail exchanged between participating countries is 
carried by air without surcharge. The scheme came into force in 
so far as Palestine and Trans- Jordan are concerned at the beginning 
of March, 1938, when the non-surcharge system was extended to 
the England-India-Malaya air route, and will continue in force for a 
period of 15 years from the 28th July, 1938, when the scheme was 
extended to Australia and came into full operation. 

460. Under the scheme, His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom have contracted to pay, under the authority of the Air 
Navigation Act, 1936, certain subsidies to Imperial Airways Limited 
in consideration of their undertaking to provide improved, accelerated, 
and more frequent services for the carriage of all first-class air mail 
as required by the scheme ; and in addition the company will 
receive, as remuneration for the carriage of mails, a minimum payment 
of £900,000 per annum during the period of the agreement. The 
general effect is that this payment, representing the postal contribu- 
tions of the United Kingdom and the other participating countries, 
will be made by His Majesty's Postmaster-General from the Post 
Office Vote, the amounts of the postal contributions .received by 
him from participating countries being brought to account as an 
appropriation-in-aid of that Vote. 

461. The Government of Palestine and Trans- Jordan have agreed 
to make a joint postal contribution of £P. 12,000 per annum for 
the whole period of the scheme, the Trans- Jordan share being 
assessed at £P.50 per annum. In addition, Palestine has agreed 
to make a special additional payment of £P. 1,928 per annum in 
lieu of the privilege of exemption from landing and housing charges 
at aerodromes in Palestine, which other countries have been required 
to grant to the operating company as a condition of participating 
in the scheme. 



222 



462. The total liability of the two Governments under the scheme 
is therefore ^P. 13,928 per annum, and we are informed that, as far 
as can be foreseen at present, this will continue unchanged for the 
whole period of 15 years from the 28th July, 1938. 

463. In our opinion this is a financial obligation legitimately 
incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of 
the Mandate, which must continue to be honoured after the surrender 
of the Mandate ; and we consider that the best means of ensuring 
that this shall be done is to provide for the payment of this amount 
from the central fund, as proposed in this chapter. 



223 



CHAPTER XXI 

FINANCE AND BUDGETARY PROSPECTS (PART II). 

464. In chapter XIX (Customs) we considered the possibility 
of a customs union between the Arab and Jewish States and the 
Mandated Territories, to be entered into by treaty for an initial 
period of ten years. The object of this union would be twofold : 
first, it seemed to us that without the assured market for their 
produce which the Mandated Territories would afford, the economic 
situation of the Arab state, and the prospect of economic expansion 
in the Jewish state, would be precarious ; and, secondly, we felt 
that the financial effects of partition, as disclosed in chapter XVIII, 
were so unsatisfactory that we ought to take advantage of any 
proposal which seemed to offer a prospect of improving the financial 
position of the Arab State, and therewith of reducing the liability 
of the British Treasury. The idea of a customs union seemed to offer 
such an opportunity, for it seemed to us that it would be fair and 
reasonable to require the Jewish State, in return for the advantages 
of an assured market in the whole of Palestine and Trans- Jordan 
which the scheme would offer them, to sacrifice some portion of the 
customs revenue contributed by the taxpayers in the Jewish State, 
with a view to rectifying, at least partially, the disparity between 
the budgetary prospects of the Arab and the Jewish States, and to 
agree to a formula for allocating the net surplus customs revenue 
between the three areas so as to produce this result. At the same 
time we observed that, whatever the exact formula might be, the 
financial situation might still be unsatisfactory, and in the last 
paragraph of the chapter we noted one particular factor in 
the scheme as outlined which, besides giving rise to possible 
constitutional difficulties, might jeopardize the financial position 
of the Mandated Territories. 

465. We will now consider the operation of a possible formula 
and then, in the light .of the financial results and of the possible 
consequences of the factor referred to above, estimate whether the 
proposed customs union can be regarded as affording a satisfactory 
solution of the financial difficulties of partition. 

466. We desire again to make it clear that the formula which 
we have tentatively considered should be regarded rather as a 
working hypothesis, intended to illustrate the financial effects of 
the customs union proposal, than as a considered recommendation. 
We presume that before any final arrangements are made, negotiations 
will take place with both Arabs and Jews. 



(C31078) 



i 



224 



1. Formula A 
467. The formula (A) then is as follows — 

(i) It would be provided by treaty, as an essential condition 
of the surrender of the present Mandate, that the area now 
comprising Palestine and Trans- Jordan should, for a period 
of at least ten years, form a single customs union, within which 
there should be complete and unfettered free trade. 

(ii) The tariff policy of the three areas forming the union 
would be determined by a central authority consisting of an 
equal number of representatives from each area, under the 
chairmanship of the High Commissioner or his nominee. 

(iii) Each of the areas would be bound by the treaty to give 
effect to the decisions of the central authority. 

(iv) The customs revenues of the whole union would be 
collected by a single customs service, responsible to the central 
authority, and paid into a central fund under the control of 
that authority. 

(v) Out of this fund there would be paid, by the central 
authority — 

(a) the expenses of the central authority itself ; 

(b) the expenses of the customs service ; and 

(c) the whole of the financial obligations of the Palestine 
Government, consisting of (1) the service of the public debt 
of Palestine, (2) the whole cost of any superannuation benefits, 
now being paid or falling due in future, attributable to 
pre-partition service in Palestine, and (3) the contribution 
of the Palestine Government, under its current agreement 
with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, 
towards the Empire Air Mail service. 

(vi) After these charges have been met in full, the net 
surplus revenue would be paid over by the central authority 
to the three Administrations in equal shares. 

(vii) Except as provided below, these arrangements would 
remain in force for ten years at least, and thereafter would 
continue subject to notice of termination by any of the three 
Administrations. But the principle of division of the net surplus 
revenue into three equal shares would be subject to review 
after not less than five years, and would thereafter take such 
form as might be agreed. 



468. The initial financial effects of this formula, using the figures 
given in the Treasurer's budgetary forecasts as shown in chapter 
XVIII, and assuming that Trans- Jordan will form part of the 
Arab State, are as follows — 



225 



(1) The Revenue of the central authority, based on the 
1938-39 Estimates, would be— 

(i) Customs Duties — £P. 

(a) Palestine (after allowing for drawbacks) . . . . 1,815,000 

(6) Trans- Jordan 136,000 

(ii) Total Revenue 1,951,000 

(2) The Expenditure of the central authority would be — 

(iii) Expenses of Customs Service — 

(a) Palestine 100,472 

(6) Trans- Jordan 27,984 

(iv) Charges for Public Debt — 

Palestine* 283,660 

(v) Pension Charges (payable in 1938) — 

{a) Palestine 72,775 

(6) Trans- Jordan 12,400 

(vi) Empire Air Mail Service . . . . . . . . . . 14,000 



(vii) Total Expenditure .. 511,291 



(viii) Net Surplus Revenue . . . . • 1,439,709 

of which one-third is 479,903. 

469. Each Administration would therefore receive £P.479,903, or 
say£P.480,000, as its share of the customs revenue of the union, in 
place of the share attributed to it in the forecast given in chapter 
XVIII. In addition it would be relieved of the cost of customs 
collection, public debt and other financial obligations included in 
the forecast. 

470. The consequential adjustments to be made in the budgetary 
forecast of each Administration would then be as follows — 

Arab State 

Revenue. 

(i) Customs — 

(a) Palestine 
(6) Trans- Jordan 



{ii) Total Revenue 



Expenditure. 

(iii) Customs Collection — 

[a) Palestine 

(6) Trans- Jordan 

(iv) Public Debt Charges — 

Palestine 

(v) Pension Charges— 

(a) Palestine 

(b) Trans- Jordan . . 



(vi) Total expenditure 
Total be- 



Shown in r . ... 

forecast of Formula A. ^ M V\ 

PlanC. orLoss{-) 

£P- £?■ 
213,000 
136,000 



349,000 480,000 +131,000 



12,188 
13,265 

94,553 

24,258 
4,133 



148,397 — +148,397 

lg of budgetary position . . . . +279,397 



* Including £P. 13, 140 for Post Office share of charges. 
(C31078) 1 2 



226 



Jewish State 

Shown in Gain (+) 

Revenue. forecast of Formula A. T „„y \ 

PlanC. orLoss\-). 

£P- £P. 

(i) Customs 850,000 480,000 -370,000 

Expenditure. 

(ii) Customs Collection 43,380 

(iii) Public Debt Charges . . . . 94,553 

(iv) Pension Charges 

(a) Palestine 24,258 

(b) Trans-Jordan .. .. 4,133 



(v) Total Expenditure 166,324 — +166,324 

Net worsening of budgetary position .. .. —203,676 

Mandated Territories 

(i) Customs . . ' 752,000 480,000 -272,000 

Expenditure. 

(ii) Customs Collection 44,904 

(iii) Public Debt Charges 

(a) Palestine . . . . 94,554 

(b) Trans- Jordan 31,073* 31,073 

(iv) Pension Charges 

(a) Palestine 24,259 

(b) Trans- Jordan 4,133 



(v) Total Expenditure .. .. .. 198,923 31,073 +167,850 

Net worsening of budgetary position .. .. —104,150 



471. The budgetary forecast for the several areas would then 



become : — ■ 

Arab State — £P. 

Net deficit as shown in Chapter XVIII 614,000 

Deduct total bettering of position as shown in paragraph 470 279,397 

Revised deficit 334,603 

Jewish State — £P. 

Net surplus as shown in Chapter XVIII 592,000 

Deduct net worsening of position as shown in paragraph 470 203,676- 

Revised surplus .. 388,324 

Mandated Territories — • £P. 

Net deficit as shown in Chapter XVIII 460,000 

Add net worsening of position as shown in paragraph 470 . . 104,150 

Revised deficit 564,150 



* The intention is, as stated in the chapter on Public Debt, that this 
item shall in future be debited to the United Kingdom Exchequer. But 
for convenience it is here shown as an item in the budget of the Mandated 
Territories, where it will, of course, go to swell the deficiency grant-in-aid. 



227 



472. But, though the position of the Arab State would thus have 
been substantially improved, its budget would still show a deficit of 
nearly £P.340,000 ; and before we could regard the proposed customs 
union as opening a way to a satisfactory solution of the financial 
difficulties of partition, it is necessary to consider whether any 
further means might be devised for balancing the budget without 
falling back on a direct grant-in-aid from United Kingdom funds, 
which, as we pointed out in paragraph 402, would necessitate 
Treasury control. The relief so far provided has been partly at the 
expense of the Mandated Territories, whose deficit (to be made good 
by the British Exchequer) has been increased by over £P. 100,000, 
but mainly at the expense of the Jewish State. The arguments in 
favour of this have been discussed in chapter XIX (Customs) ; 
and we do not think that they would justify an attempt to obtain 
a larger contribution from the Jewish State than is provided by the 
principle of dividing the net customs revenue into three equal shares, 
as suggested in the formula set out in paragraph 467 above. Any 
further relief to the Arab State must therefore be provided at the 
expense of the British Exchequer ; and the question is whether it 
will be possible to devise means of doing so which will be consistent, 
as a direct grant from the British Exchequer could not be, with the 
natural desire of the Arabs to be free from financial control and to be 
able to look forward to some improvement in their public services. 

2. Formula B 

473. We must admit that there is no really satisfactory solution 
of this problem. Nothing can wholly disguise the fact that now 
and so far as can be seen in the future, the Arab State will be unable 
to support itself out of its own resources. The best that we can hope 
to do is to suggest an arrangement which, assuming that it is desired 
to pursue the task of settlement along these lines, will fulfil the 
conditions indicated above in the manner least open to constitutional 
objection. With this object in view we would tentatively suggest 
that, while the Jewish share of the net customs revenue should 
remain at one-third, the other two-thirds should be treated as the 
joint shares of the Arab State and the Mandated Territories, and as 
such should be pooled and re-allocated between those two Admini- 
strations on the principle that, in addition to the Arab State's fixed 
share of one : third, there should be credited to that state a supple- 
mentary share calculated on a formula (B) which would be designed 
broadly so as — 

(i) to make good, up to an amount to be approved, the 
estimated initial deficit in the Arab State's budget in the first 
year after partition ; 

(ii) to provide for the abatement of the supplementary share 
by regular annual reductions until a point has been reached 
when it may be assumed that the budget has received the full 



(C31078) 



13 



228 



benefit of such economies in administration and such increase, 
if any, of revenue, as the Arab State may reasonably be expected - 
to make after partition ; • 

(iii) to provide for the additional abatement of the supple- 
mentary share by one-half of any amount by which the Arab 
State's one-third share of the net customs revenue in any 
subsequent year exceeds that share in the first year after 
partition. 

(iv) to provide for the increase of the supplementary share 
in any year by an amount equal to the excess of (a) one-third 
of the amount actually charged in that year to the central fund 
in respect of pension payments over (b) the amount which was 
taken into account, as representing the Arab State's share of 
such charges in the first year after partition, in estimating the 
initial deficit of the Arab State under sub-paragraph (i) above. 

474. Under this formula the Arab State would be given a revenue 
which, subject to the obligation to bring about as quickly as possible 
such reduction of expenditure and increase of revenue as it may 
reasonably be asked to make, should enable it to balance its budget 
so long as the net customs revenue for the union remains at its present 
level. If that level falls, the Arab State will of course be worse off, 
but it cannot expect to be guaranteed against all contingencies ; 
and it may be noted that the level of customs revenue which has been 
used for the purpose of these budgetary forecasts is abnormally 
low. If, however, the net customs revenue of the union increases, 
owing to an expansion of trade and prosperity in the rest of Palestine, 
the Arab State would be able to look forward to a share in that 
increase, whereas without a customs union its prospect of any 
considerable increase in revenue and prosperity within its own 
borders is, as we have seen, very remote. While the state would 
still be unable to balance its budget from its own resources and 
would have to rely upon outside assistance, that assistance would 
be given in accordance with a definite formula and under conditions 
which, we should hope, would free it from the necessity of submitting 
to financial control by a foreign state. Since the various accounting 
adjustments to be made between the Mandated Territories and the 
Arab State under formula B would be purely automatic, it would 
not seem to be necessary that the Arab State should be required 
under this arrangement to submit to any form of financial control 
by the Treasury, whether by the appointment of a Financial Adviser 
or otherwise. 

475. In addition, the machinery proposed will enable the central 
authority to meet all the financial obligations of the Palestine 
Government out of the central fund, as recommended in chapter XX 
(Public Debt). Special provision will, however, have to be made to 
make good to the Arab State the loss of revenue from which it would 
otherwise suffer as the result of charging to the central fund the 



229 



cost of any further pension charges which may become payable on 
account of pre-partition service with the Palestine Government, in 
excess of the amount of such charges of which account will have 
been taken in estimating the initial deficit in the Arab State's budget 
under sub-paragraph (i) of formula B. Since the effect of this will 
be to throw upon the Arab State a charge which it is not within 
its power to control or avoid, it is only fair that account should be 
taken of it in determining the amount of the supplementary share. 
Sub-paragraph (iv) of the formula is designed to give effect to this. 



476. So long as it is necessary for His Majesty's Government 
to ask Parliament to vote a grant-in-aid of the Mandated Territories 
for the purpose, inter alia, of enabling the Government of those 
territories to pay over to the Arab State the appropriate share of 
customs revenue under the formula, the arrangement will come 
under the notice of Parliament each year, and Parliamentary 
authority for each year's payment to the Arab State will be required, 
no less than if Parliament were asked to vote a grant direct to that 
state. We understand, however, that an arrangement of this kind, 
involving a financial commitment extending over a series of years, 
would require in addition the authority of a specific statute. 



477. The effect of formulas A and B together may be stated 
concisely thus. In the initial year, the liability of the British 
Exchequer will be reduced from about £1,250,000 to £1,075,000*. that 
is, by about £175,000 per annum. In the future, other things 
remaining equal, then under formula B for each increase of £P. 100,000 
in the net surplus revenue of the central authority due to expansion 
of revenue from the customs union, so long as the Arab State is in 
receipt of any supplementary share — 

the Arab State will retain 

m 100,000 , p1ftfifift 
£P. — g — = £P. 16,666 

the Jewish State will retain 

^lOWOO _ lf 33333 

the Mandated Territories will retain 

(1 + i) X £P- 100,000 = £P.50,000. 

478. To the Arab State and the Mandatory Power, therefore, 
the formula offers substantial attractions. The former may look 
forward to some expansion of revenue, beyond that attributable 

* Made up of (i) grant-in-aid of Mandated Territories (a) to meet their 
own normal deficit under formula A, ^564,000, and (b) for the supplementary 
share of the Arab State under formula B, ^334,000, total ^898,000, or, say, 
^900,000 ; and (ii) grants for development in the Mandated Territories, 
^175,000. 

(C 31078) 1 4 



230 



to the modest resources of its own territory, proportionate to and. 
dependent upon an increase in the prosperity of the whole of Palestine. 
The latter, besides the saving of £175,000 per annum dating from 
the initial year, will have a similar interest in the general growth of 
prosperity in Palestine, and in addition may look forward to some 
relief, from the same source, in the burden of supplementary 
assistance which under formula B it will provide for the Arab State. 
Too much importance must not be attached, however, to the figures 
we have given. It must be remembered that the formula A is put 
forward as a working hypothesis ; and while we think that it repre- 
sents the utmost that the Jewish State could fairly be asked to 
contribute in return for the right of joining the proposed union, 
we fully realize that in the course of negotiation some other basis 
of contribution may be agreed upon, the financial results of which 
would differ from those that we have indicated in this chapter. 

479. On the other side of the account there must be set the 
following drawbacks — 

(i) The future advantages offered to the Arab State and the 
Mandatory Power are likely to be provided chiefly at the expense 
of the Jewish State, by which the greater part of the assumed 
increase in customs revenue is likely to be contributed ; and it 
is not possible to foresee how long the formulas will continue to 
operate equitably as between the Jewish State and the rest of 
Palestine, after making due allowance for the benefit to the 
former of an assured market in the territories of the latter. 

(ii) The financial position of the Arab State therefore will 
still remain precarious. After five years it may be necessary to 
modify formula A to the advantage of the Jewish State ; and 
after ten years the Jewish State may give notice to put an end 
to the customs union altogether. In either event it is likely 
that the British Treasury will be asked to come to the rescue, 
and to make good the consequential loss to the Arab State ; 
and allowance must be made for this risk in estimating the value 
of the formula to the Treasury. 

480. But a more serious difficulty lies in the fact that, as was 
noted at the end of chapter XIX, the scheme of a customs union is 
open to constitutional objections. If each of the states-members 
of the union was financially self-supporting, we are inclined to think 
that these need not be regarded as insurmountable, although we 
know of no precedent for an association of this kind between a 
mandated territory and a foreign state. But the fact that one of 
the members will be financially dependent upon the United Kingdom 
Government is, we fear, a fatal objection ; for we cannot suppose 
that His Majesty's Government would acquiesce in a scheme winch 
would deprive them of the right to insist on any changes in that 



231 



member's fiscal policy which they may think necessary on revenue 
grounds as a condition of their continuing to vote a grant-in-aid to 
make good the member's budgetary deficit. 

481. Our conclusion on the matters discussed in this chapter and 
in chapter XIX is, therefore, as follows — We find that a contribution 
such as might under formula A be made by the Jewish State in return 
for the advantage of joining a customs union with the Mandated 
Territories and the Arab State, will be of considerable benefit while 
it lasts to both the Arab State and consequently to the British 
Exchequer ; but the exact amount of this benefit will depend upon 
the formula ; and it cannot be assumed that formula A will neces- 
sarily be adopted. Moreover, the benefit is liable to be modified 
after five years, and to be withdrawn entirely after ten. And 
finally, while the Arab State cannot hope for economic survival, 
nor the Jewish State hope for economic expansion, as independent 
states without an assured market in the Mandated Territories, there 
are constitutional objections to a customs union between them and 
the Mandated Territories, which in view of the financial dependence 
of those territories on His Majesty's Government appear to us to 
be decisive. 

482. We find ourselves unable, therefore, to recommend a customs 
union under these conditions between the Mandated Territories and 
the Arab and Jewish States, which will leave unimpaired the 
sovereign rights of those states in the matter of fiscal policy. If 
partition is carried out, a customs union in some form between the 
Arab and Jewish States and the Mandated Territories would seem to 
be necessary to preserve the economic stability of the former and to 
provide the latter with scope for economic expansion ; but the form 
of union would have to be one in which the will of the Mandatory 
was enabled to prevail on questions of fiscal policy ; and that would 
not be consistent with the proposed grant of independence to the 
two states. 



232 



CHAPTER XXII 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 

483. In order to explain the form in which we shall present our 
conclusions, we find it necessary to say what, in our view, was 
intended by our terms of reference. Those terms of reference require 
us first to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish 
States and Mandated areas which will comply with certain specified 
conditions ; and secondly to examine and report on the economic 
and financial questions involved in partition. _ In your predecessor's 
despatch of the 23rd December, 1937, to the High Commissioner, 
covering our terms of reference, it is expressly said that our functions 
will be " to act as a technical Commission, that is to say (they) will 
be confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the 
practical possibilities of a scheme of partition ; " and again " to 
submit to His Majesty's Government . . . proposals for a detailed 
scheme of partition." After setting out our terms of reference the 
despatch goes on to indicate that it will be for His Majesty's Govern- 
ment to decide whether, as a result of our investigations, a scheme 
of partition is equitable and practicable. We ourselves are nowhere 
directed to report upon the equity or practicability of partition in 
general. The majority of us have interpreted these directions to 
mean — 

(i) that His Majesty's Government desire us in any case to 
produce the best scheme of partition that we can ; but in so far as it 
may fail to satisfy any of the specified conditions, or may seem to 
be impracticable, to say so and give our reasons ; 

(ii) that we are not directed, or entitled, to call in question the 
equity or morality of partition as a general principle. We 1 were 
appointed as a technical body, and we conceive that we shall best 
assist His Majesty's Government if we are careful not to let our views 
on technical matters be coloured by any views that we may have 
formed as individuals on the question of principle involved. 

Further, we wish to emphasize that the question of practicability 
is one of degree, on which it is not possible to express a final 
opinion without taking into consideration other matters, such as the 
consequences oi rejecting partition and the equity and practicability 
of any alternative solution, which were left outside our terms of 
reference. 

484. In chapters XI, XIII and XIV, we have described, under 
the title of plan C, the best plan of partition which we have been 
able to devise. We will now summarize, under different heads, the 
chief points which in our opinion His Majesty's Government will 
have to take into account in deciding whether this plan can be 
regarded as equitable and practicable or not, and will indicate our 
views on each. 



233 



1. The Size of the Proposed Jewish State 

485. The Permanent Mandates Commission in their Report to the 
Council of the League on the work of their Thirty-second (Extra- 
ordinary) Session expressed the opinion that — 

Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs 
of as small a number as possible o'f the places to which they attach 
particular value, either because they are their present homes or for 
reasons of religion. And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should 
be sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view 
of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic 
development, and consequently of dense and rapid settlement .... 

The facts adduced in our report show that these objectives are 
irreconcilable. If the Arabs are to be deprived of the smallest 
possible number of their homes, and if the fewest possible Arabs 
are to be included in the Jewish State, as our terms of reference 
direct, the Jewish State cannot be a large one, nor can it contain 
areas capable of development and settlement in the sense which 
the Permanent Mandates Commission evidently had in mind. Does 
this fact alone render the plan impracticable ? We think not, so 
long as provision can be made for the continued immigration of Jews, 
subject to control, into the greater part of those areas which we 
propose should be retained under British Mandate, and for the develop- 
ment of those areas with a view to Jewish settlement therein, also 
under control. But this will necessitate heavy expenditure from 
public funds on development and other services in the Mandated 
Territories, and this expenditure (which we suggest should be 
limited to sums not exceeding £1 million on non-recurrent services, 
and not exceeding £75,000 per annum for 10 years on recurrent 
services) can only be provided by the United Kingdom Government, 
since the Government of the Mandated Territories will be unable 
anyhow to balance its budget. The effect of this will be considered 
below as part of the general problem of finance under partition. 

The size of the proposed state as a factor limiting the domestic 
market open to Jewish manufacturers will be considered separately 
in paragraph 494. 

2. The Attitude of the Arabs and the Jews 

486. We have said that in our opinion there is a deep-seated 
hostility to partition in any form among the Arab population of 
Palestine, and that we are convinced that the plan recommended by 
the Royal Commission would lead to an outbreak of general rebellion 
which could only be put down by stern and perhaps prolonged military 
measures. But what will be the Arabs' reaction to plan C we do 
not know. Of the official witnesses whose opinions we sought on 
plan C shortly before we left Palestine at the beginning of August, 
one took the view that, no matter what plan was adopted, it would 
be resisted by the Arabs with violence. None was prepared to say 



234 



that the Arabs would acquiesce willingly in the plan. Their 
evidence was given in camera and in such a form that it would be 
undesirable to attempt to convey their views by brief selected 
quotations ; but the general impression that we received from the 
evidence of those whom we examined on plan C was that, while 
none of the witnesses was optimistic, some at least would not exclude 
the possibility of a settlement on these lines: We realise, however, 
that if they were consulted again to-day, they might take a more 
pessimistic view. Unfortunately, no Arab came before us to state 
the Arab view, and although plan C demands of the Arabs much less 
sacrifice than the other plans which we have considered, we think 
the only prudent conclusion is that, until plan C is published, it 
is impossible to say what the Arabs' attitude towards it will be. 



487. The resolutions of the Twentieth Zionist Congress at Zurich 
in August, 1937, include the following passages — 

The Congress rejects the assertion of the Palestine Royal Commission 
that the Mandate has proved unworkable, and demands its fulfilment. 
The Congress directs the Executive to resist any infringement of the 
rights of the Jewish people internationally guaranteed by the Balfour 
Declaration and the Mandate. 

The Congress declares that the scheme of partition put forward by 
the Royal Commission is unacceptable. 

The Congress empowers the Executive to enter into negotiations 
with a view to ascertaining the precise terms of His Majesty's Government 
for the proposed establishment of a Jewish State. 

In such negotiations the Executive shall not commit either itself 
or the Zionist Organisation, but in the event of the emergence of a definite 
scheme for the establishment of a Jewish State, such scheme shall be 
brought before a newly elected Congress for decision. 

The Jewish Agency more than once urged that we should take 
them into our confidence in order to ensure that any plan which 
we might put forward should be such as they would be able to 
recommend for acceptance by the Zionist Congress, and they con- 
tended that the wording in your predecessor's despatch " after 
consultation with the local communities " implied that this was 
the intention of His Majesty's Government. We were unable to 
accept this view. If it had been possible to consult representatives 
of Arabs as well as of Jews, in the hope of producing a scheme which 
was likely to be acceptable to both parties, such consultation in some 
form might have been thought desirable. But as matters stood, 
that was impossible, and we felt that in the circumstances consulta- 
tion as desired by the Jewish Agency would do more harm than 
good. We, therefore, confined our consultations with the Jewish 
Agency to asking, both orally and in written questionnaires, for their 
opinion on any matter on which we felt that it would be of assistance 
to us. These matters did not include the detailed proposals under 
either plan B or plan C, either as regards the boundaries of the several 
areas or the development, with a view to Jewish settlement therein, 



235 



of the areas to be retained under Mandate. In evidence we were 
told that the Jews would not be prepared to accept a plan which 
gave them a state inadequate for their needs, and in particular 
none that did not include Haifa, Galilee, and part of Jerusalem. It 
would seem, however, that their final decision must depend upon 
what alternative His Majesty's Government may be prepared to offer 
them in the event of their declining partition ; and until that is 
known it seems to the majority of us premature to advise you 
what that decision is in our opinion likely to be. It is not easy to 
see, however, how the establishment of a self-supporting state in 
either the Arab or the Jewish area can be regarded as practicable, 
whether from the administrative or the political standpoint, if the 
community concerned should refuse to accept the offer of independ- 
ence under such conditions. 



3. The Arab Minority in the Jewish State 

488. The Royal Commission assumed that provision would be 
made for the transfer of the greater part of the Arab population in 
the Jewish State, if necessary by compulsion under a scheme to be 
agreed between both states. But in his despatch of the 23rd Decem- 
ber, 1937, your predecessor made it clear that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment have not accepted the proposal for compulsory transfer ; and 
we have found it impossible to assume that the minority problem 
will be solved by a voluntary transfer of population. It is largely 
because of the gravity of the situation that would thus be 
created that we have felt obliged to reject the Royal Com- 
mission's plan, under which at the outset the number of Arabs in the 
Jewish State would be almost equal to the number of Jews. But, it 
may be said, if it is wrong in principle to put nearly 300,000 Arabs 
against their will under the political domination of the Jews under 
the Royal Commission's plan, how can it be right to do the same 
with 50,000 Arabs under plan C ? The ethics of this question are 
certainly very difficult to determine. Pushed to its logical extreme, 
the argument would obviously rule out all possibility of partition, 
since it is impossible to draw boundaries in such a way as to include 
no Arabs at all in the Jewish State. But it is inconceivable that 
either the Royal Commission in advocating partition, or His Majesty's 
Government in accepting it as the best and most hopeful solution of 
the problem, regarded this fact as in itself a fatal objection to any 
partition scheme ; and indeed our terms of reference imply that 
His Majesty's Government were prepared for the inclusion of Arabs in 
the Jewish State, and vice versa, albeit the fewest possible. It would 
seem to be recognized, therefore, that the question is one of degree, 
rather than of principle ; and from that standpoint we feel that we 
should not be justified in rejecting plan C solely on the ground that it 
necessitates the inclusion of some 50,000 Arabs in the Jewish State. 



236 



4. Defence 

489. The Jewish State under plan C, though small, is compact, 
and is as easily defensible as any state could be into which Palestine 
might be partitioned. But the military authorities have impressed 
upon us that no boundary can be found west of the Jordan which 
affords a satisfactory strategic line, judged by the conditions of 
modern warfare. The most that can be done under any partition 
scheme is to find a line which is tactically defensible against rifle and 
machine-gun fire ; and it is only from this point of view that the 
boundary under plan C can be regarded as providing adequate 
security for the proposed areas. The only real security for any 
partitioned area in Palestine is to live at peace and in friendship with 
its neighbour. At the outset of our enquiry we felt reasonably 
hopeful that it might be possible to provide a plan of partition 
which would bring about this result ; but the events of recent months 
must clearly be taken into account in considering what the result 
is likely to be of putting any scheme of partition into actual operation. 

5. Administration 

490. It may be taken for granted that services which can be 
wholly partitioned, such as education, will give less value for the 
money spent than before ; and that services which provide com- 
munication between or through the partitioned areas, such as 
railways, posts and telegraphs, will, taken as a whole, be less efficient 
as well as more costly. As regards personal freedom of movement 
between the several areas, even under the conditions which we 
recommend in chapter XIV, some restriction on those who are now 
Palestinian citizens will be inevitable ; and the inconvenience and 
expense, both to the individual and the state, of any system of 
control will be considerable. Finally, the separation of the Jerusalem 
Enclave from the other two areas of Mandated Territory by the 
Arab and Jewish States will give rise to administrative inconvenience. 
These difficulties are not, however, insuperable, and cannot be said 
to be sufficient in themselves to make plan C impracticable. 

6. Finance 

491. This is a major difficulty. In chapter XVIII we found that 
it was impossible, whatever boundaries we might recommend, to set 
up an Arab State which should be self-supporting. The forecast 
made for us by the Treasurer of Palestine, which we accept, 
with certain adjustments, as the nearest approach that it is 
feasible to make to an estimate of the budgetary prospects 
of the several Administrations under plan C, shows, in round 
figures, and without making any provision for the cost of 
defence, deficits of £P.610,000 per annum for the Arab State 
(including Trans- Jordan) and of £P.460,000 per annum for the 
Mandated Territories, but a surplus of £P.600,Q00 per annum for the 



237 



Jewish State. We have found that it is not possible to call upon the 
Jewish State for a direct subvention to the Arab State, and neither 
practicable nor equitable to set up an Arab State with a budget 
so very far from being balanced. We conclude that, if partition 
is to be carried out, there is no alternative but that Parliament 
should be asked to provide, in some form, sufficient assistance to 
enable the Arab State to balance its budget. 

492. In addition, of course, the United Kingdom Government 
would be obliged, in accordance with recognized practice, to assist 
the Government of the Mandated Territories to balance its budget, 
including say £175,000 per annum for the cost of the development 
services in those territories referred to in paragraph 288. 
Altogether this would mean that partition would cost the United 
Kingdom taxpayer say £1,250,000 per annum without including 
any provision for defence. On the other hand, the Jewish State 
would-be able to look forward to an annual surplus of say £P.600,000 
apart from the cost of defence. Broadly speaking, the result would 
be much the same under any conceivable plan of partition. 

493. Manifestly, such a position would be highly unsatisfactory 
to the British Treasury. But before deciding that this conclusion 
renders partition wholly impracticable, it is necessary to take 
into account the cost of Palestine to the British taxpayer under 
existing conditions. In the judgment of the majority of us, the 
cost of partition cannot rightly be compared with an estimate of 
what the financial position of an undivided Palestine might be, 
assuming the restoration of peace and normal conditions. Doubtless 
it would be possible to obtain peace in Palestine to-morrow under 
certain conditions ; but whether those conditions are such as would 
not involve a complete change in the financial and economic structure 
of Palestine, necessitating a drastic curtailment in the present standard 
of public services, if the budget is to be balanced, is quite another 
matter. The only valid comparison, therefore, is with the cost to the 
United Kingdom under existing conditions. This may be taken to be 
in the neighbourhood of £2| to £3 millions in 1938 ; and while it is 
impossible to foresee how long our liabilities will continue at this 
rate, it is clear that the substitution for the present position of a 
plan which involves, apart from the cost of defence, a continuing 
annual payment from the British Exchequer of sums amounting 
even to as much as £1,250,000, should not necessarily be ruled 
out on financial grounds, if in other respects the plan should appear 
to be practicable. If, however, this were voted subject to the usual 
conditions of financial control applicable to a grant-aided dependency, 
the Arab State could not be called independent, and we have been 
unable to devise any means of overcoming this difficulty if the 
assistance is given in the form of a direct subsidy. 



238 



7. Economic Interests 

(i) Tariffs and Customs Administration 

494. In considering the boundaries of the proposed areas under 
our terms of reference we have found the creation of the Mandated 
Territories as a separate political area to be essential to any scheme of 
partition which we could recommend. But the creation of those 
territories as a separate tariff area will be a severe blow to the 
economic welfare of the Jewish State, which, if it is to provide work 
for additional migrants in large numbers, must expand industrially, 
and cannot hope to do so without an assured market larger than can 
be provided by the population of that state alone. The economic 
survival of the Arab. State also depends upon its finding a market 
outside its territory for its agricultural products, in particular wheat, 
of which it has a large exportable surplus. We conclude that a 
customs agreement of some kind between either state and the 
Mandated Territories is essential, and that as far as the Jewish 
State is concerned, nothing short of a complete customs union, with 
both free trade and identity of tariffs, will really satisfy their require- 
ments, while between the Arab State and the Mandated Territories 
a similar arrangement, though not essential, is very desirable. 
It is true that the tariff requirements of the Arab and Jewish States 
are likely to be fundamentally different, the Arab State, with its 
predominantly agricultural population, being likely to prefer a 
moderately low tariff for revenue purposes, with at least as much 
protection as at present for its cereals and other agricultural 
produce, while the Jews may be expected to pursue a policy of high 
tariffs for the protection of their industries, and to wish to keep the 
price of wheat, if not of agricultural produce generally, as low as 
possible. Nevertheless, we feel that there is sufficient common 
ground between the two states and the Mandated Territories to 
make the operation of a common tariff practicable ; and that in 
any case the needs of both states in this respect are so' urgent that 
there is no other way by which the economic survival of the one or 
the economic expansion of the other under plan C can be assured. 

495. Further it seems to us that a customs union would give an 
opportunity to relieve, if only partially, the financial strain which 
would be imposed on His Majesty's Government as the result of 
partition. We consider that the provision of an assured market 
for the Jews in the rest of Palestine would justify the payment 
by them in return of some special revenue contribution to be 
credited to the Arab State, thus reducing the call by that state on 
the British taxpayer. Working on a formula which we have described 
in chapter XXI, and using the figures given us by the Treasurer for 
the budgetary forecasts shown in chapter XVIII, we find that this 
arrangement might be expected to reduce the net charge on the 
United Kingdom taxpayer by about £175,000 in the first year, that is. 



239 



from about £1,250,000 to about £1,075,000. This credit would 
be provided partly at the expense of the Mandated Territories, 
whose deficit (to be met from the British Exchequer) would be 
increased by over £P. 100,000, but mainly at the expense of the 
Jewish State, which, however, would still be left with a surplus 
of about £P400,000, apart from the cost of defence. 

496. The Arab State's position would be improved by a corres- 
ponding amount, but it would still show a deficit of £334,000 ; and 
the only way in which we can suggest that this might be met is 
by an arbitrary redistribution of the customs revenue representing 
the joint shares of the Arab State and the Mandated Territories 
in such a way as to make good the deficit at the expense of the 
latter. This would, of course, mean a corresponding increase in the 
grant-in-aid to be made by the United Kingdom to the Mandated 
Territories, but the formula which we have suggested in chapter XXI 
(formula B, paragraph 473) provides for the possibility of gradual 
reductions in this supplementary charge as the net surplus revenue 
from the customs union increase. 

497. The same formula provides also for the possibility of the 
Arab State sharing, to some extent, in any increase of customs 
revenue arising from an expansion of trade and prosperity in the rest 
of Palestine. One of the main arguments against partition is, we 
think, the fact that, under any plan of partition which is based 
on the inclusion in the Arab State of the fewest possible Jews and 
Jewish enterprises and on the creation of a Jerusalem Enclave and 
Corridor, the greater part of the Arab wealth of Palestine is 
necessarily left outside the Arab State (whether in the Jewish 
State or the Mandated Territories) ; that state is therefore found to 
be singularly lacking both in natural resources, in created assets, 
and in inherited wealth, and is likely to remain a very poor country. 
Its relative backwardness will become still further marked if as a 
result of the development proposals in plan C the material conditions 
of the Arabs in the Mandated Territories should be substantially 
improved. Any arrangement, therefore, which holds out to it the 
possibility of some increase of revenue which it will not have to 
receive in the form of a subsidy from a foreign Power, with its 
necessary accompaniment of financial control, is to be welcomed. 
Under this arrangement there would seem to be no need for any 
such control : the settlement of accounts with the Arab State under 
formula B, as set out in chapter XXI, would be automatic. 
It seems to us, therefore, that an arrangement of this kind would 
go a considerable way towards solving the financial difficulties 
inherent in partition, while at the same time providing the necessary 
economic stability for both the Arab and Jewish States. 

498. Unfortunately, however, we have found ourselves unable, on 
constitutional grounds, to recommend a customs union except under 
conditions which would ensure that in tariff policy the wishes of 
the Mandatory should prevail ; and as this would be inconsistent 



240 



with the grant of fiscal independence to the Arab and Jewish States, 
we have been obliged to abandon the idea of a customs union between 
independent states as a solution of the financial and economic 
problems of partition. 

(ii) Reactions on the rest of Palestine of the Immigration policy 
of the Jewish State 

499: This is an aspect of partition under plan C to which we 
think it necessary to draw special attention, both for its economic 
and financial consequences. The economic future of the Jewish 
State, depending as it will upon a unique combination of economic, 
political, racial, and emotional factors, is exceptionally difficult to 
foresee. Jewish witnesses have agreed with the suggestion that, if 
the Jewish State should adopt an active immigration policy, it 
must expect to encounter set-backs and to pass through periods 
of depression, but our impression is that they were inclined 
to under-estimate the violence of the economic fluctuations to 
which the Jewish State is likely to be exposed when as an 
independent state it takes over full responsibility for immigra- 
tion. The same witnesses, anxious to explain to us the future 
policy of the Jewish State on this subject, assured us that " the 
volume of immigration to be admitted at any given time will, so 
far as immigrant workers are concerned, fall to be determined by 
reference to the openings for employment that are in sight and to the 
resources available for financing such employment." We do not 
doubt that such will be the intention of the leaders ; but we feel 
considerable doubt whether they will be able to maintain so rigid 
a line in the face of the urgent pressure that will be brought to 
bear upon the newly-formed state to receive the hundreds of 
thousands of distressed Jews who will be demanding a refuge in 
the Jewish State as a national right. 

500. It is true that, once the Jewish State has been set up, 
these matters will become a Jewish responsibility entirely ; indeed, 
it is one of the special attractions of partition that this controversial 
but crucially important subject will henceforth be dealt with by 
the Jews themselves. But this argument assumes that the Jewish 
State alone will stand the risks, as it will be entitled to the benefits, 
associated with an active immigration policy. Under whatever 
conditions a Jewish State might be set up, it is doubtful whether 
experience would prove this assumption to be well-founded. But 
under plan C, in which a customs union between the three areas is 
essential, with all the financial and economic associations which that 
involves, it is certain that the Administrations of the Arab State 
and the Mandated Territories could not view with indifference the 
possibility of an economic collapse in the Jewish State, and that if 
such an event were to happen, both the economic systems and the 
budgets of those areas could not fail to suffer gravely from the 
consequences. 



241 



501. The case then is this. If a Jewish State is set up, with full 
responsibility for immigration policy, the risk of an economic 
depression in Palestine of exceptional gravity must, in our opinion, 
be acknowledged. The same Jewish witnesses argued that, even so, 
depressions do not last, for ever and that it is reasonable to expect 
that the Jewish State will ultimately recover its prosperity, as other 
countries have done ; and in any case the Jewish community would, no 
doubt, consider that the political advantages will outweigh the risks, 
however great. From the point of view of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, however, the question is whether the risks to the Arab 
population, to the Administration of the Mandated Territories, and 
to the British Government in the background, are so great as 
to render it inadvisable to proceed with partition. As far as the 
Arabs are concerned, the answer would seem to be that, if they are 
likely to suffer from a depression in the Jewish State, they are likely 
also to benefit when that state is prosperous ; indeed, that is a part 
of the case for the formulas proposed in chapter XXI. And if it is 
thought probable that the general economic trend of the Jewish 
State will be towards greater wealth and prosperity as time goes on, 
the Arabs are likely to gain rather than lose in the long run by close 
economic association with the Jewish State. Much the same argument 
applies to the Government of the Mandated Territories and to the 
British Government. Neither can expect to enjoy the benefits 
which the proposed formulas would bring without being prepared to 
accept the attendant risks. But the risk does not depend wholly upon 
the acceptance of those formulas, though its consequences would be 
intensified if they are accepted. The risk is, in our opinion, inherent, 
to a greater or less degree, in any form of partition. Before deciding 
whether plan C or any other plan of partition is practicable, His 
Majesty's Government must ask themselves whether they are pre- 
pared to enter into an arrangement under which communities, for 
one of which they must accept full, and for the other a partial, 
financial responsibility, are liable to have their economic and financial 
systems injuriously affected, at any rate temporarily, by a policy 
pursued by a neighbouring state, for reasons which are primarily 
racial, and over which His Majesty's Government will have no 
control. 



(iii) The need of Part-time emplpyment to supplement agricultural 
earnings in the Arab State 

502. In chapter X, we noted the importance of Haifa as 
providing a source of supplementary employment for fellaheen, 
whether normally resident in the Mandated Territories or the Arab or 
Jewish States, who were either landless or unable to earn an adequate 
livelihood from their lands. But Haifa is not the only source of 
such employment at present. All along the coastal plain, the demand 
for extra labour in the citrus-groves during the picking season from 
October to April attracts casual labour from many Arab villages. 



242 



lEven now, notwithstanding partisan attempts to banish all but 
Jewish labour from the Jewish plantations, the r.elative cheapness 
of Arab wages* leads to a considerable demand by Jewish employers 
for Arab labour ; and it must be remembered that of the total amount 
of citrus land in the proposed Jewish State, about 56,000 dunums 
are owned by Arabs. Jewish witnesses have, told us that immigration 
of casual Arab labour will not be permitted into the Jewish 
State. How many of the Arabs who find casual employment in the 
orange-groves are residents of villages which will tall outside the 
Jewish State we cannot say ; no statistics are available. But we 
think that it is not an exaggeration to say that many Arab villagers 
outside that state will after partition find themselves and their 
families deprived of an important subsidiary means of livelihood, 
"the loss of which will have a serious effect on their economic position. 

* • (iv) The Growth of Population 

503. We have seen in chapter III that, owing to the abnormally 
high rate at which natural increase has been taking place in the 
Arab population under the Mandatory administration, it can already 
be said that the economic position of that population will be menaced 
in the future unless one or other of the following developments 
should take place : an increase in the standard of cultivation, 
•enabling a larger population to be maintained on the land ; an 
increase in industrial activity, providing opportunities for secondary 
employment ; a limitation of the size of the family ; or migration. 
Under partition, the economic situation of the Arab State will 
continue to be subject to the same threatening conditions ; and 
the possibility of relief from either of the first two quarters mentioned 
will be reduced. The opportunity of finding secondary employment 
in the Jewish State will be denied to them ; and the chances of 
improvement in the standard of cultivation will be remote, for the 
funds that would be needed to bring about such improvement will 
no longer be available. Nor is it likely that the size of the family 
will be limited, or that the rate of natural increase in the population ; 
of the Arab State will be reduced by any marked rise in the 
death-rate due to a material lowering of the standard of adminis- . 
trative services. If, indeed, the Arab State were obliged to rely 
entirely upon its own resources, and no migration were to take place, 
a rise in the death-rate might be expected to occur in due course 
owing to pressure on the means of subsistence. But before that 
happens it is probable that increasing pressure will drive the surplus 
population to rely more and more upon the neighbouring Mandated 
Territories to provide relief in the form of supplementary employ- 
ment, the amount of which from time to time will in turn depend, 



* In March, 1937, according to the Government Wage-rate Statistical 
Bulletin No. 3/1937, the wages of permanent Jewish workers in orange 
groves were 200-300 mils per day, as against 150-200 mils per day for Arabs. 



243 



first' upon the amount of capital introduced by Jewish immigrants 
into those territories, and secondly, upon the fluctuations between 
prosperity and depression brought about by Jewish immigration 
policy in general (see paragraph 499.) 

504. From these observations the following conclusions emerge — 
(a) There is no reason to suppose that the present high rate 
of natural increase of the Moslem population will diminish 
in the Arab State after partition, unless a rise in the death-rate 
should be brought about by positive starvation. 

(6) Owing to this continued increase in the population, the 
• economic situation of the Arab State, if left entirely to its own 
resources, would become increasingly serious as time goes on. 

(c) This makes it all the more necessary to provide 
opportunities for supplementary employment for the surplus 
Arab population in the Mandated Territories. 

(d) But such employment can only be provided in sufficient 
quantity through the importation of Jewish capital, brought by 
Jewish immigrants, into the Mandated Territories. It is a 
matter of urgent interest, therefore, to the Arabs themselves 
that such immigration should be permitted, and even encouraged, 
subject, to control as proposed in chapters XIII and XIV. It 
seems safe to say that the Arabs outside the Jewish State would 
be .faced with the prospect of greater economic hardship, if the 
development of the Mandated Territories were to be checked 
by a closing down of immigration, than if immigration should 
be allowed to continue, subject to the conditions proposed in 
those chapters. 

(e) As pointed out in paragraph 501, the economic inter- 
dependence of the Arab State and Mandated Territories with the 
Jewish State, which will inevitably continue under partition, is 
liable to cause painful reactions in those areas when the 
inevitable periodic set-backs occur in the economic cycle of the 
Jewish State. The greater the economic dependence of the 
Arab State on the Mandated Territories, the more serious the 
effect of such set-backs is likely to be for the Government of 
the latter, and through them for the United Kingdom 
Government itself. 

505. Taking all these matters into account, we should, if we were 
to adhere strictly to our terms of reference, have no alternative 
but to report that we are unable to recommend boundaries for the 
proposed areas which will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual 
establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. But 
we do not believe that it would be in accordance with your wishes, 
or with the public interest, that we should end our enquiry with a 
merely negative conclusion. We propose, therefore, to carry the 
matter a step further, even though by doing so we exceed in one 
respect our terms of reference. 



244 



506. We, therefore, now suggest that, rather than abandon the idea 
of partition altogether as impracticable, His Majesty's Government 
might think it well that, as a condition of the' surrender of the 
existing Mandate, not to be altered hereafter without the approval 
of the League of Nations, the proposed Arab and Jewish States 
should be required to enter into a customs union with the Mandated 
Territories, on the following terms — 

(i) The customs service for the whole of Palestine should be 
administered by the Mandatory Government. 

(ii) The fiscal policy of the customs union should be deter- 
mined by the Mandatory as he thinks fit, after consultation 
with representatives both of the Arab and the Jewish States, 
and after taking into account the interests (a) of all the areas 
comprised in the union, and (b) so long as any deficiency grant 
continues to be made by the United Kingdom Government to 
the Administration of any part of Palestine, of the United King- 
dom Exchequer. It would be implicit in this arrangement that 
the Mandatory should not direct the fiscal policy of the union 
so as to give preferential treatment to British trade. 

(hi) In other respects the financial arrangements between the 
several areas should be as proposed under formulas A and B in 
chapter XXI, subject to such modifications, if any, as may be 
decided upon in the course of negotiations between His Majesty's 
Government and the Arab and Jewish representatives. 

507. States established under these conditions, deprived of the 
right to settle their own fiscal policy, would certainly not be sovereign 
independent states, in the sense contemplated by the Royal Commis- 
sion. Nor could we regard even an arrangement on these lines as 
wholly satisfactory to His Majesty's Treasury, for the calculations 
we have made are in any case speculative ; the duration of any 
formula which may be agreed upon must be regarded as uncertain ; 
and in any case the amount which Parliament would have to be asked 
to vote as a deficiency grant to the Mandated Territories (including 
what we have called the "supplementary share" of the Arab 
State) would be in excess of £1,000,000 to begin with. The best 
that we can hope for is, as pointed out in chapter XXI, to find 
an arrangement which will enable these deficiency grants to be 
provided in the manner least open to constitutional objections. 
Such an arrangement will undoubtedly intensify the risk, described 
in paragraph 500, that an economic depression in the Jewish State, 
caused by Jewish immigration policy, may spread to the Arab State 
and Mandated Territories, with serious results to their financial and 
economic systems. But that risk, to a greater or less degree, must 
be accepted if partition is to be proceeded with at all : it cannot be 
eliminated entirely. Subject to these reservations, however, we 
think that the financial and economic needs of the Arab and Jewish 
States may now be said to have been provided for satisfactorily ; 



245 



and we should be prepared with the aforesaid reservations to 
report, that the boundaries which we have recommended under 
plan C will give a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment 
of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. It would then 
p remain for His Majesty's Government to consider whether, if the 
plan of partition which we have put forward should in other respects 
appear to them equitable and practicable, it is better to accept the 
financial liability involved than to reject partition entirely in favour 
of some other alternative. 



508. We add two brief comments before concluding this part of 
our report — 

(i) If His Majesty's Government should decide that an 
arrangement of this kind offers a satisfactory means of 
overcoming the financial and economic difficulties of partition, 
it is tempting to go further and provide a similar solution 
for certain of the administrative difficulties which we have 
noted in the course of our enquiry. If inter-area communi- 
cations — railways, posts and telegraphs (including telephones) — 
were reserved for administration by the Mandatory, at any 
rate for a period of say five years in the first place, there is no 
doubt, we think, that the public would be better served than 
if they were split up among the three Administrations. We 
realise, however, that, for political reasons, broadcasting could 
not be made a reserved service, except by agreement between the 
States concerned. 

(ii) If any term were needed to describe the constitutional 
procedure which we have suggested, it might be " economic 
federalism " ; and that, in fact, was the term used of a some- 
what similar scheme by a Jewish witness who had made a 
special study of this subject. The same witness, when asked 
why he was not content that the states should be set up under 
partition and then left to form an economic federation if they 
wished, replied : "I am convinced . . . that that would be 
a policy of suicide. The first thing that would inevitably 
happen would be the pull of the Arab State towards Damascus 
and Baghdad instead of towards Jerusalem and Haifa. It is 
inevitable." That is a pregnant comment. We are far from 
wishing to hinder a movement in the direction of closer union 
between the Arab State and the other Arab countries ; but we 
are convinced that if that should come about it will be to the 
interest of the Jewish State that room should be made for them 
to be included in the same political and economic circle. It 
seems to us to be one of the advantages of the plan we have just 
proposed that, if the political outlook for such a development 
should be favourable, but it should be thought prudent to move 
tentatively in the matter and to encourage the parties to enter 
as a first step into an economic agreement, such an arrangement 



246 



will be far easier to bring about if the areas comprising Palestine 
and Trans- Jordan are already grouped together in a customs 
union than if they had been economically isolated. There is 
force in the criticism that has often been made against partition 
that, considered merely as an abstract policy, it is retrogressive. 
Whether economic federalism will lead ultimately to political 
federation we cannot venture to prophesy ; but that it should 
do so would not be altogether surprising ; and we think that 
meanwhile both Jews and Arabs may be disposed, after the 
weary and bitter struggle of the past year, to look with some 
favour on a plan which provides that in one respect at least, 
if only in the form of a customs union and a common system 
of communications, Palestine shall still remain whole and 
undivided. 



CONCLUSION 

509. We can now sum up the position. The question whether 
partition is practicable involves considerations of two kinds : 
practical and political. The former concern chiefly finance and 
economics ; the administrative difficulties are great, but they 
cannot be called insuperable, if the will to find a solution is present. 
But the financial and economic difficulties, as described in this 
chapter, are of such a nature that we can find no possible way to 
overcome them within our terms of reference. Rather than report 
that we have failed to devise any practicable plan, we have proposed, 
in paragraph 506, a modification of partition which, while it with- 
holds fiscal autonomy from the Arab and Jewish States, seems to 
us, subject to certain reservations, to form a satisfactory basis of 
settlement, if His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept the 
very considerable financial liability involved. 

There remain the political difficulties. We cannot ignore the 
possibility that one or both of the parties may refuse to operate 
partition under any conditions. It is not our duty, as a fact-finding 
Commission, to advise what should be done in that event. But 
there is still the possibility that both sides may be willing to accept 
a reasonable compromise. We cannot feel confident that this will 
happen, but we put forward the proposals in this chapter in the 
hope that they may form the basis of a settlement by negotiation. 



247 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

510. From the officers of the Palestine Government, and particu- 
larly from the Heads of those Departments with which our enquiry- 
was especially concerned, we received every assistance. Our numer- 
ous requests for information must have involved a large volume of 
additional work, much of which of necessity could only be done 
by the Heads of Departments in person, at a time when all officers 
in Palestine were working under conditions of great stress. We 
appreciate greatly the promptness and readiness with which our 
requests were complied with. We are also indebted to the military 
authorities in Palestine for their valuable assistance. The most 
complete arrangements were made for our tours and we desire to 
express our thanks for the ready help and co-operation which 
all officers extended to us on these occasions. 

511. We are very grateful to the police and military authorities 
for the measures which they took for our protection, and without 
which it would not have been possible for us to have toured the 
Districts with safety. Our police escort, which was in constant 
attendance, rendered excellent service. 

512. We desire to make specific mention of those officers who 
were attached to us during our visit : Mr. D. G. Harris, Com- 
missioner on Special Duty, whose constant help and advice were 
of the utmost value to us ; Mr. H. Player, who was responsible 
for the arrangement of our tours and who most efficiently discharged 
his duties as a member of our staff ; and Mr. M. G. Ionides, 
Director of Development in the Trans- Jordan Government, who 
accompanied us throughout our tour in Trans- Jordan. 

513. Our two reporters, Mr. C. W. Dawson and Mr. F. E. 
Dawson, had to work at high pressure and their speed and accuracy 
greatly assisted us in our work. 

514. We are very grateful for the assistance rendered to us by 
Mr. W. W. Clark and Miss I. G. Campbell, the members of our 
office staff who accompanied us from England. They discharged 
their duties, which throughout entailed working very long hours, 
with great efficiency and to our entire satisfaction. Miss M. 
Ruthven, who joined our office staff on our return to London, was 
of great assistance in dealing with the large amount of typing 
which had to be done. 



248 



515. Finally, we desire to place on record our appreciation of 
the services of Mr. S. E. V. Luke of the Colonial Office, who acted 
as Secretary to the Commission. He had to bear an exceptionally 
heavy burden, and our special thanks are due to him. Knowledge, 
tact and devotion to duty are to be expected of a Secretary, and 
Mr. Luke possesses all these in abundance ; but in him we found 
also an ability and judgment which have been of the greatest value 
to us throughout our enquiry. 



J. A. WOODHEAD (Chairman), 

ALISON RUSSELL (Subject to 
the reservations in the Note 
below), 

A. P. WATERFIELD, 

T. REID (Subject to the 
reservations in the Note 
below) 



S. E. V. LUKE, 

Secretary 

19th October, 1938. 



249 



NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY SIR ALISON RUSSELL 

1 . For the following reasons it seems to me that plan B is to be 
preferred to plan C. By the terms of our reference we are required 
to take into account the plan of partition outlined by the Royal 
Commission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications of that 
plan ; and it is submitted that plan B is more in accord with the 
plan of the Royal Commission ; that it makes much less complete 
changes ; that it is more likely to secure peace ; and that it is more 
equitable and practicable than is plan C. 

2. Our terms of reference commence as follows — 

Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III of the 
Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest 
modifications of that plan, including variation of the areas recommended 
for retention under British Mandate, 

4t $ * * £ $ lie 

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas 
and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under 
British Mandate which will — 

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, 
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States ; 

(6) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and 
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa. 



3. The Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the 
Council of the League contained the following conclusion — 

Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs 
of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach 
particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons 
of religion. And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be 
sufficiently extensive, fertile and well situated from the point of view 
of communications by sea and land to be capable of intensive economic 
development, and consequently of dense and rapid settlement .... (a). 

4. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Ormsby Gore, 
now Lord Harlech) stated before the Permanent Mandates Com- 
mission that — 

.... the basic principle of any partition scheme would be to leave 
as few Jews as possible in the Arab State ; indeed, even under the 
proposals of the Royal Commission, that seems to be the main basis 
upon which it has acted, and would, I believe, be the only possible basis 
on which a frontier could be drawn. But, however you draw that frontier, 
it is inevitable that there will be a large Arab minority in the Jewish 
State. . . .* 



(a) Policy in Palestine, January, 1938 (Cmd. 5634), Appendix 1. 
* id., Appendix 1. 



250 



5. The Royal Commission stated — 

The natural principle for the partition of Palestine is to separate 
the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those 
which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs.* 

The Royal Commission drew their map so as to include the areas 
in which the Jews have acquired land and settled. (Map 3.) 
It will be observed that this map did, in fact, include areas which, 
are mainly or wholly occupied by Arabs. 

6. As regards the establishment of the Jewish State, there are 
two principles to be considered, and these principles often conflict — 

(a) that the Jewish State should contain such areas as afford 
a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with 
adequate security, of a Jewish State ; 

(b) that the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises 
should be included in the Jewish State. 

The problem is this — 

(a) if the areas allotted to the Jews are to afford a reasonable 
prospect of the eventual establishment of a Jewish State, then 
those areas must of necessity include areas which are wholly or 
mainly occupied by Arabs ; 

(b) if areas which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs 
are not to be included in the Jewish State, then no Jewish State 
can, in my opinion, be established. 

It is a question of degree and whether in each case : — 

(a) the establishment of a Jewish State, or 

(b) the exclusion from the Jewish State of areas wholly or 
mainly occupied by Arabs, 

is to be the governing factor in deciding whether an area is or is not 
to be included in the Jewish State. 

7. It is not possible to understand the position in Palestine 
without a knowledge of the historical events which have led to that 
position. Those events have been finally recounted in the Report of 
the Royal Commission. It is essential to bear in mind the Jewish, 
support which was given to the Allies in the Great War, and that the 
Jews have expressly been declared to be in Palestine " as of right and 
not on sufferance."f There are 400,000 Jews in Palestine, one 
third of the total population. 



* Report of the Royal Commission, page 382. 
t June, 1922. Cmd. 1700, page 19. 



251 



8. As regards the Arabs, the Royal Commission wrote — 

Their co-operation was unquestionably a factor in the success of the- 
campaign which culminated in the capture of Jerusalem on the 9th. 
December, 1917, and in the final expulsion of the Turkish forces from 
Palestine in the following autumn. The open revolt of the Sheriff 
moreover, had a marked effect on the wavering sympathies of other 
Arab tribes than those of the Hedjaz. It was the Sherif's own people, 
however, who bore the brunt of the actual fighting. The Arabs of Palestine 
did not rise against the Turks, and, while some Palestinian conscripts 
deserted, others continued fighting in the Turkish army. But it must 
be remembered that to revolt in the desert was far easier than to revolt 
in a country still in Turkish hands and subject as the British invasion 
proceeded to increasingly rigorous treatment. As it was, the Turks 
were seriously embarrassed by their inability to count on the loyalty 
of the population ; and within their lines the Syrian nationalists were 
engaged in active sedition for which some of them paid the price on the- 
gallows.* 

As regards the Jews, the Royal Commission wrote— 

The fact that the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917 in order to 
enlist Jewish support for the Allies and the fact that this support was 
forthcoming are not sufficiently appreciated in Palestine. The Arabs do 
not appear to realize in the first place that the present position of the 
Arab world as a whole is mainly due to the great sacrifices made by the 
Allied and Associated Powers in the War and, secondly that, in so far 
as the Balfour Declaration helped to bring about the Allies' victory, it 
helped to bring about the emancipation of all the Arab countries from 
Turkish rule. If the Turks and their German allies had won the War, 
it is improbable that all the Arab countries, except Palestine, would now 
have become or be about to become independent States. f 

9. Partition is an attempt to do justice between the conflicting 
claims of different nationalities ; and under our terms of reference 
it was clear from the first that any plan of partition must necessarily 
involve the inclusion of minorities in the states to be created. It 
does not seem, therefore, that it is admissible for the Commission to 
consider whether, as an abstract principle, it is or is not just in any 
circumstances to subject any minority to any majority without the 
consent of that minority. 

10. The Commission have been appointed to gather " the 
necessary materials on which, when the best possible scheme has 
been formulated, to judge of its equity and practicability. "J 

11. (a) As regards plan A, I agree that that plan cannot be 
adopted. 

(b) As regards plan C — 

(i) Instead of the partition of Palestine into an Arab State,, 
a Jewish State, and an Enclave safeguarding the Holy Places,. 

* Report of the Royal Commission, page 21. 
f Report of the Royal Commission, page 24. 
X Policy in Palestine, January, 1938, (Cmd. 5634), Appendix 1. 



252 



the figures of population and land for the areas under plan C 
are as follows — 

Land in 

Population. dunums. 

Jewish State 280,400 1,257,800* 

Arab State 453,000 7,393,500* 

Three Mandated Territories . . 660,200 6,971,700*t 

(ii) The Arabs decline to discuss partition in any form. 

(iii) In my opinion, an offer to the Jews of a state of the 
size proposed in plan C does not comply with the obligations 
to them. 

(iv) Our terms of reference instruct us to take " into account 
the plan of partition outlined in the Report of the Royal Com- 
mission, but with full liberty to suggest modifications of that 
plan." It is not suggested that these modifications must be 
confined to no more than matters of detail ; but to cut out 
three-fourths of the entire Jewish State, as that state was 
proposed in the Royal Commission's plan, cannot, in my opinion, 
be held to be a " modification " of that plan within our terms of 
reference. I do not feel that it is necessary for me to criticise 
plan C in detail. 

(c) As regards plan B — 

Having regard to our terms of reference and to all the 
circumstances which we have to take into account, it is con- 
sidered that plan B is, for the reasons hereafter appearing, 
much more in accord with the plan proposed by the Royal 
Commission, and also that it may be held by some of the 
authorities concerned in the matter to be a more equitable and 
practicable plan of partition than is plan C. 



: 12. The figures of population and land in the Jewish State 
under plan B are as follows — 

Arabs. Jews. Total. 

Population .. .. 188,400 300,400 488,800 

Land (in dunums) — 

Citrus land . . . . 56,000 129,400 185,400 

Other cultivable land .. 1,391,400 694,600 2,086,000 

Uncultivable land .. 813,100 253,500 1,066,600 



*Totalland .. 2,260,500 1,077,500 3,338,000 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 

t This estimate does not include 10,577,000 dunums of desert land in the 
Southern Mandated Territory. 



253 



13. The differences between plan B and plan C can be seen on 
comparing maps 9a and 10. They may be summarized as follows — 

(a) Under plan C, the Galilee highlands, the Huleh Basin, the 
Beisan area, the Plain of Jezreel, the Plain of Esdraelon, and Haifa 
and the surrounding areas, are excised from the Jewish State as 
proposed by the Royal Commission, and are to be a Mandated area 
until such time as the Arab and Jewish inhabitants agree to some 
other form of government. All the evidence in our possession 
points to the conclusion that it will be some time before such an 
agreement can be arrived at, and the Mandate may be considered 
as a continuing Mandate. 

(b) Under plan B, those areas, with the exception of the Galilee 
highlands, are to remain in the Jewish State. The Galilee highlands 
only are to be constituted a Mandated area. 

(c) The Sharon Plain area of the Jewish State is the same in 
plan B and plan C, save that, as maps 9a and 10 show, a small 
triangular area in the north-east is included in plan B and excluded 
from plan C. This small triangular area in plan B has the better 
military boundary : it would have the effect in plan C of making an 
awkward salient. 

(d) The area of the Jewish State south of the Jerusalem Enclave 
is the same in both plans. 

(e) Apart from the Southern Mandated Territory, and apart 
from the small triangular area mentioned in (c), the Arab State is 
the same in both plans. 

(/) The Jerusalem Enclave is the same in both plans. 

(g) As regards the Negeb. 

This has been divided into two areas : the Unoccupied area and 
the Occupied area. I agree with what is proposed for the Unoccupied 
area ; but, for reasons given in paragraph 18 I consider that the 
Occupied area should form part of the Arab State. 

14. Plan B is now to be considered. It. is shown on map 9a. 

15. As regards the Galilee highlands. 

(a) It will be observed that the whole of the Galilee highlands 
are cut out from the Jewish State as proposed by the Royal Com- 
mission, and constituted a Mandated area. I have great doubt 
whether the cutting out of more than one-third of the entire Jewish 
State as proposed by the Royal Commission's plan, without sub- 
stituting any other substantial area in compensation, can properly 
be considered a " modification " of that plan ; but here what has 
been called the second principle is encountered. In the Galilee 
highlands so excised there are 88,200 Arabs and 2,900 Jews ; and 
of these 2,900 Jews, 2,000 live in the town of Saf ad, and 250 in the town 



254 



of Acre*. I feel driven to the conclusion that this area cannot 
properly be included in the Jewish State, and should form a Mandated 
area. This mandate would no doubt be a continuing mandate in 
the same way as the mandate dealing with this area under plan C. 
It is not desired to write anything which may be deemed to 
encourage resistance on the part of the Arabs, but it is Considered 
that in these mountainous regions the Jewish State would find 
it difficult to enforce order without employing means which could 
not be approved. 

(b) Palestine has been searched for areas which, if allotted to 
the Jewish State, might in some measure replace the Galilee 
highlands, but, save in the empty desert, every area is inhabited 
by Arabs, with few Jews or none ; and such areas could not properly 
be included in the Jewish State. I regret it, but the facts are so. 

16. As regards the Huleh Basin, the Beisan area, the plain of 
Jezreel, the plain of Esdraelon, and Haifa and the areas surrounding 
it (in this paragraph for convenience called " these areas ") — 

(a) as shown on map 9a, these areas are to form part of the Jewish 
State in plan B. These areas are substantially as proposed by the 
Royal Commission, except that they are slightly increased by 
including an area to the east of Lake Tiberias, and an area to the 
south of the Hejaz Railway. 

(b) The figures of population and land for these areas are as 
follows— 





Arabs. 


Jews. 


Total. 


Population 


132,900 


74,300 


207,200 


Land (in dunums) — 








Citrus land 


500 


3,600 


4,100 


Other cultivable land . . 


835,900 


485,200 


1,321,100 


Uncultivable land 


584,300 


154,500 


738,800 


fTotal land 


, 1,420,700 


643,300 


2,064,000 



It is clear that, while there is a preponderance of Jews over Arabs 
in the whole Jewish State as proposed by plan B (300,400 Jews and 
188,400 Arabs) there is at present a considerable preponderance of 
Arabs over Jews in these areas. We are informed, however, that the 
Jews are ready and waiting to bring in very great numbers of 
immigrants into these areas. These immigrants will be employed 
on military and police duties, in making roads, in reclaiming land, 
in afforestation, and the like, pending their settlement on the land 
or their employment in urban occupations. 

* These figures do not include the population and land of the suggested 
^Nazareth Enclave [see chapter IV). 

f Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 



255 



(c) In plan C, as shown on map 10, in addition to the Galilee 
highlands, the whole of these areas has been cut out of the Jewish 
State as proposed by the Royal Commission. Here the two principles 
are clearly shown in conflict, and it is to be decided whether — 

(a) the establishment of a Jewish State, or 

(b) the exclusion from the Jewish State of areas wholly or 
mainly occupied by Arabs, 

is to be the governing factor in deciding whether these areas are or 
are not to be included in the Jewish State. If these areas, in addition 
to the Galilee highlands, are to be excluded from the Jewish State, 
then about three-fourths of the entire Jewish State as proposed by 
the Royal Commission's plan are to be cut out of that state. To 
reduce the area of the Jewish State as proposed by the Royal Com- 
mission's plan to one-fourth of its original area cannot, it is sub- 
mitted, be considered as a '.' modification of that plan," however 
widely our terms of reference may be construed. 

(d) The Royal Commission's plan was based, as they themselves 
state in chapter XXII of the Report, upon what they called the 
natural principle for the partition of Palestine, namely, the separation 
of the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from 
those which are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs. Map 9a shows 
how this principle applies in plan B. 

(e) It is to be observed — 

(i) In these areas 643,300 dunums are owned by Jews : a 
much greater area than the area, 436,100 dunums, owned by 
Jews in the whole of the proposed Jewish State under plan C, 
though, of course, the latter contains a large area of citrus land. 
It is not, in my opinion, conceivable that the Jews will agree 
that these considerable areas of land actually owned by them 
should be excluded from the Jewish State. 

(ii) These areas contain in all 2,064,000 dunums,* of which 
643,300 dunums are actually owned by Jews ; and the total 
area of the Jewish State under plan C is 1,257,800 dunums,* 
of which 436,100 dunums are actually owned by Jews; the 
proportion in each case is thus nearly the same, namely, 
one-third. 

(iii) The total area of the proposed Jewish State under plan C, 
1,257,000 dunums* (including both Arab and Jewish land), is 
very little greater than the area of the land actually owned by 
the Jews in the Jewish State under plan B, 1,077,500 dunums.* 

(/) As regards the possibilities of additional agricultural settlement 
in these areas. As has been stated in paragraph 286, according to 
estimates given to us by Jewish witnesses, the absorptive capacity 
of the Huleh Plain, including the area to be developed under the 



* Excluding roads, railways, rivers and lakes. 
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256 

Huleh drainage scheme is, in terms of agricultural population 
only, 39,000, and that of the Plains of Esdraelon, Jezreel and 
Beisan (North) 22,100 over and above the total present population 
of those areas. Besides these, allowance must be made for additional 
settlement in Haifa Bay area and in the hills and upland country 
to the-south and east of Galilee for which separate estimates are not 
available, but which must amount to a considerable number. We 
do not take such a favourable view of the possibilities as do the Jewish 
witnesses, and it is a matter which is beyond my knowledge, but 
I agree with the Director of Agriculture when he writes— 

I do not think too much importance should be attached to any 
estimates at the present time as they doubtless depend largely on the 
interpretation by individuals as to what is or may be cultivable, and 
these figures may be subject to considerable modification when proper 
soil surveys of the land have been undertaken. 

The Jews take a sanguine view, and we have seen ourselves the 
work which has been done by them in Palestine. Jerusalem 
developed ; Haifa developed ; Tel Aviv created on a piece of sand, 
a feat which the Royal Commission rightly describe as startling ; 
the maritime plain, which was only sparsely populated and only 
thinly cultivated, now turned into a rich province, thickly populated, 
green, and flourishing ; Esdraelon, stated by the Royal Commission 
to have been for the most part marshy and malarious, now drained 
and supporting healthy agricultural communities ; and the settle- 
ments showing irrigated plantations, hillsides cleared of rocks and 
planted with vines, and the uncultivable hilltops planted with 
trees. It has been alleged that the Jews have acquired the best land 
in Palestine. It does not appear to me a fair statement. That 
much of the land now in possession of the Jews has become the best 
land is a truer statement. The Royal Commission described the 
position at the end of the War as follows — 

The population, still overwhelmingly Arab in character, eked out a 
precarious existence mainly in the hills. On the plains, where life and 
property were less secure, such irrigation works as had existed in ancient 
times had long disappeared. Oranges were grown round Jaffa, but most 
of the maritime belt was only sparsely populated and only thinly 
cultivated. Esdraelon for the most part was marshy and malarious.* 

It was impossible not to be impressed when inspecting some of the 
bare rocky places where Jewish settlements have been or are in course 
of being made. Such remarkable efforts may well disturb statistics. 

(g) As regards the question of Jewish settlers replacing Arabs in 
these areas. In the despatch dated the 23rd December, 1937, from 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner 
for Palestine (published in Cmd. 5634)f it was announced that His 
Majesty's Government had not accepted the Royal Commission's 
proposal for the compulsory transfer in the last resort of Arabs 



* Royal Commission Report, page 6. f Appendix 1. 



257 



from the Jewish to the Arab area. On behalf of the Jews it was also 
made clear to us that Jewish opinion would be opposed to the 
exercise of any degree of compulsion. No large scale voluntary 
transfer appears to us to be possible. But it seems to me that a 
movement, considerable if slow, of Arabs who possess capital would 
take place from these areas into the Galilee highlands, into Arab 
Palestine, and into the great areas of the other Arab States. An 
experienced official who came before us stated that the effect of 
offering Arabs high prices for their land would be that they would 
take the money and would emigrate and buy land in Trans- Jordan, 
and that this would be done gradually. I cannot share the view that 
it is always necessary to treat the Arab as if he were a person unable 
to look after his own interests. As has been said in paragraph 179 
the Arab has a deep attachment to his ancestral lands, and so far 
as I can judge, he is not less shrewd than a peasant in any other 
country ; and the peasant, as a rule, has a very lively sense of his 
own advantage. It does not appear to me that to permit an Arab 
to sell his land for three or four times its value, and to go with the 
money to a different part of the Arab world where land is cheap, can 
be said to " prejudice " his rights and position within the meaning 
of Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine. Indeed, the attempts 
that have been made to prevent the sale of land by Arabs have 
been resisted. It is right, however, that the greatest care should be 
taken to ensure that, on a sale of Arab land, Arab tenants should 
be provided with sufficient land on which to live, as prescribed by 
such legislation as the Cultivators (Protection) Ordinance. 

(h) It is urged in paragraph 205 that the inclusion of these 
areas in the Jewish State would be opposed by the Arabs and that it 
would not lead to peace. But as has rightly been said, paragraph 220, 
uncertainty as to the political future of Palestine has undoubtedly 
been from the outset one of the principal causes of the present 
unhappy relations between Arabs and Jews ; and what is 
needed is a clear statement of policy which shall enable both races 
to know as precisely as possible under what form of Government 
the citizens of the new states will live. It seems to me that it is of 
the utmost importance to get the maximum certainty over the 
maximum area as rapidly as possible. In the Jerusalem Enclave 
different considerations as to immigration of Jews and Arabs arise, 
and as regards the Jerusalem Enclave I agree with what has been 
proposed. But in these areas it is essential that decisions should be 
clean cut. Any scheme for " facilitating Jewish settlement " in the 
Northern Mandated Territory (within which territory these areas are 
proposed to be included under plan C), no matter what provisions 
are made for safeguarding the Arabs ; or for the acquisition of 
land by the Jews for the consolidation of existing holdings ; or for 
purchasing or leasing land with the permission of the Mandatory 
Power ; or for reviewing the position after ten years, or the like, will 
be regarded by the Arabs as mere subterfuges for the purpose of 



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258 



bringing in further Jews, so that ultimately the whole area will 
become Jewish ; and, encouraged by the result of their efforts, the 
Arabs will continue strenuously to resist the further immigration 
of the Jews into these areas. The only hope of peace seems to me 
to be a clean-cut decision as to the areas in which Jews can own or 
lease land, and as to the areas in which they cannot own or lease 
land at all. This decision being made and enforced, it is hoped that 
the position will be recognized and peace gradually ensue ; but if 
the matter is left in doubt, then, in my opinion, there is little or 
no hope of matters settling down. If that is so, then there is a greater 
chance of peace if these areas are to be within the Jewish State 
than if they are to be included in an entity with such an uncertain 
political and practical future as is proposed for the Northern Mandated 
Territory. 

(i) No further land in the Mandated area of the Galilee highlands 
should be sold or leased, either directly or indirectly, to a Jew or any 
Jewish body. No further Jews should be admitted into the Mandated 
area of the Galilee highlands for the purpose of cultivating land. 
The small areas in the Mandated area of the Galilee highlands 
already owned by Jews might be allowed to be cultivated by the 
Jews at present upon those areas ; but no additional Jews to be 
admitted upon those areas, which could well be used for the purpose 
of exchange with areas held by Arabs in the Plain of Esdraelon. 

As regards the entry of Jews into the Arab State or Arabs into 
the Jewish State, that will form a question for the states to determine 
when they are set up. Until the Arab State is set up, no further land 
in the area proposed to form the Arab State should be permitted to 
be sold or leased, either directly or indirectly, to a Jew or any Jewish 
body. Until the Jewish State is set up, no further land in the area 
proposed to form the Jewish State should be permitted to be sold or 
leased, either directly or indirectly, to any Arab or Arab body living 
or carrying on business outside that area. 

- (j) The question of a defensible boundary of these areas is 
discussed in paragraphs 196 to 197. It is not always clear to me 
whether the defensible boundary is for defence against a force armed 
only with rifles and machine guns ; or is for the Jews against an 
attack by the Arabs, or for the Arabs against an attack by the Jews, . 
or for the Mandatory Power against or in accord with the Arabs or 
Jews ; or whether the topographical features of the country only were 
being considered ; or whether the combatants were assumed always 
to be on an equal footing as regards personnel and equipment ; or 
whether foreign powers were envisaged as taking part in the matter. 

It is not possible for me to express an opinion on these military 
matters, but I venture to agree with the opinion of the military 
authorities expressed in paragraph 36 that it is impossible to divide 
the country into areas which, having regard to the conditions of 
modern warfare, have any real military significance. 



259 



It is clear that Arabs in the highlands have a better defensible 
boundary than Jews in the plains ; but it would seem that the ques- 
tion of equipment must also be considered. The Arabs, if they can 
be formed into a state, will have little money to spend on armaments ; 
whereas the Jewish State, if it were attacked by the Arab State, 
could no doubt command trained troops led by experienced army 
officers, and aided by the resources of modern military equipment, 
such as aeroplanes, heavy guns, and mechanized transport. Hitherto 
the Jews have defended their settlements with success, and there is 
no reason to suppose that they would be less successful in the future. 
In any case the question of a defensible boundary for the Jewish 
State should not be an argument to deprive the Jewish State of an 
area which the Royal Commission considered should be allotted 
to them, if the Jewish State feel that they are quite competent to 
defend that boundary. The evidence is that the Jews have no 
fear at all that they would not be able to take over the security of 
any area handed over to them. 

(k) As a reason for excluding these areas from the Jewish State 
and making them a Mandated area, it has been urged in paragraph 
198 that it would be unfair to deny their independence to the Arabs 
of Galilee in order to secure the safety of these areas of the Jewish 
State ; but, in my opinion, the position is precisely the same 
under plan C, and I find it difficult to accept the arguments adduced 
in paragraph 232. Under plan C the Galilee highlands are no less 
a homogeneous area almost entirely inhabited by Arabs, and their 
claim to independence is no less and no greater than under plan B ; 
nor could their claim be any the more easily resisted because the 
safety of a Mandated area is concerned instead of the safety of a 
Jewish area. The question of a defensible boundary is also dealt with, 
paragraph 197 ; but if Haifa is to remain under Mandate, as pro- 
posed in paragraph 221, then the military authorities advise that 
an additional defensible boundary, about half-way across Galilee, 
will be necessary for its safety. The remaining part of the Galilee 
highlands would be so small as to be incapable of being made into a 
state or part of a state. 

(I) It has also been suggested in paragraph 220 (d) that the 
Northern Mandated Territory might, with the joint consent of the 
Arabs and Jews, become some form of independent territory ; or 
even, with the like consent, become part of an existing Jewish or 
Arab State. So distant a hope should not be an argument to deprive 
the Jewish State of areas which the Royal Commission considered 
should form- part of that state. 

17. As regards the town of Haifa. The figures of population 
and land are set out in paragraph 202. It may perhaps be added 
that, according to Jewish estimates, many of the Arab buildings 
erected in and after 1933 were intended to be and were in fact 



(C31078) 



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260 



leased to Jews. It is estimated that in the autumn of 1937 as many 
as 14,000 Jews were living in Arab-owned houses, while only a few 
hundred Arabs were living in Jewish-owned houses. 

It is suggested, paragraph 203, that the proper course is to 
retain- Haifa in Mandated Territory so that it can be developed 
for the benefit of both Arabs and Jews. It is said that the town 
cannot fairly be made part of the Jewish State because, among other 
things, a number of Arabs come to Haifa from other parts of Palestine 
to seek employment. But if Arabs of the Arab State are to be 
allowed freely to compete for employment there, as indicated in 
paragraph 295 (i), the result of the competition of unlimited supplies 
of cheap labour would have an unfortunate effect on the labourers 
of that town. 

Another reason given in paragraph 202 why Haifa should not 
form part of the Jewish State is that it is the only deep-water port 
in Palestine. The Royal Commission stated that, as Haifa was 
the only existing deep-water port on the coast, they considered 
that, in the interests of Arab trade and industry, the Arab State 
should have access to it for commercial purposes. They recom- 
mended that the Jewish treaty should provide for the free transit 
of goods in bond between the Arab State and Haifa. This 
recommendation should be carried into effect. 

The town was expressly included in the Jewish State by the 
Royal Commission's plan, and, taking that plan into account, it does 
not appear to me that any reason of which the Royal Commission 
were unaware has been shown for excluding it from that state. 

From a military point of view it is necessary that Acre should" be 
in the same hands as Haifa, or in friendly hands. If Haifa is to be 
in Jewish hands that condition would, it seems to me, be satisfied 
by Acre being under the Mandatory Power. The question of Galilee 
has already been dealt with in paragraph 15. 

It is proposed by the Royal Commission that Haifa should be 
kept for a period under Mandatory administration. But it is sub- 
mitted that any such temporary mandate would give rise to doubt 
and trouble ; and that when the rest of the Jewish State is ready to 
be brought into existence, Haifa and its environs should form part 
of it. ' 

All the necessary naval and military facilities in Haifa and 
throughout the Jewish State will be willingly afforded by the Jews 
to the Mandatory Power by treaty. 

18. As regards the Negeb. This forms the Southern Mandated 
Territory under plan C, and in that plan it is divided into two areas : 
the Unoccupied area and the Occupied area. 

(i) As regards the Unoccupied area. I agree with what is pro- 
posed, but I can only regard the development of this area as doubtful. 
Even if water could be found there, which so far as our information 



261 



goes can only be regarded as a remote possibility, the great cost of 
using it for irrigation purposes would seem to deny a successful out- 
come. I agree that the Jews should be given the opportunity of 
attempting this development : they have done many remarkable 
things in Palestine. But in any case, the question of this desert 
should not be counted in judging the equity and practicability of any 
plan of partition. 

(ii) As regards the Occupied area. I consider that this area 
should form part of the Arab State. The proposals contained in 
paragraph 257 seem to me to present administrative difficulties. 
Again, a Mandate established " with a view both to the protection 
of the interests of the existing inhabitants and to the promotion of 
Jewish settlement therein," would be regarded with the deepest 
suspicion by the Arabs. And I doubt whether the Jews would be 
prepared to undertake " the greater part of the experiments in 
development " so that the local inhabitants should have the first 
claim to benefit by any improvements in cultivation which may be 
found possible as a result of these experiments and which will enable 
the local inhabitants to adopt a reasonable standard of life. Progress 
in this area must be slow ; and the unrestricted reproductive 
capacity of the Bedouin Arabs would keep pace with the benefits 
conferred on them by Jewish industry. It is submitted that if this 
area became part of the Arab State, Jewish immigration for develop- 
ment purposes, by permission of the state, would be more likely to be 
successful than under a Mandate with a political future which, in 
spite of the assurances which it is proposed to give, will, I fear, 
appear to the Arabs to be uncertain. 

19. The financial and budgetary prospects are dealt with in 
chapter XVIII and especial reference to plan B is made in para- 
graph 386. ' It is submitted, however, that there is no sufficient reason 
why the Arabs of Palestine should be considered as entitled as of right 
to that high cost of social services which they have enjoyed as a result 
of Jewish immigration and which has resulted in such rapidly 
increasing Arab population. It seems to me that the Arab State 
might reasonably be satisfied with the standards of Trans- Jordan 
and the neighbouring Arab States. 

20. In dealing with the general question of partition, a great 
deal of emphasis has been placed upon the Arab resistance. It is 
necessary, in my opinion, not to allow judgment to be determined 
solely by a consideration of what the Arabs may do, without also 
considering what the Jews may do. The evidence given us shows that 
during the troubles the Jews have behaved themselves extraordinarily 
well ; that they have received a great deal of provocation from the 
Arabs and that, as a whole, they have not countered that provoca- 
tion ; and that their discipline in obedience to their leaders argues 
well for the success of the Jewish State in any contention with the 



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262 



Arab State. It is clear that the restraint shown by the Jews is due 
to no fear of the Arabs. I was impressed with the manly bearing 
of the youthful Jews, though some shewed traces of an arrogance 
" which seemed to suggest that they felt themselves to be members 
of a superior race destined before long to be masters of the country." 
The Jews number at present 400,000, one-third of the entire popula- 
tion of Palestine. They are the modern and progressive part of the 
population ; and, as a very experienced witness warned us, if they 
feel that the pledges which have been given definitely to them are 
to be torn up, they would resent any provocation from the Arabs 
and might take the law into their own hands, and that the result 
might be a kind of civil war which would give rise to a position many 
times worse than the present position. 

21. Finally, in coming to a conclusion on plan B, paragraph 11 
and map 9a should once more be considered. I regret that plan B 
can only offer to the Jewish State an area so small (considerably 
smaller than the county of Norfolk) and so inconvenient, but the 
facts as to the Arab population which I have set out above appear 
to me to be inescapable. As regards the Arabs, they should reflect 
on the immense areas of land over which Arabs have obtained 
sovereignty as the result of the Allied success in the Great War, to 
which the Jews contributed in no small measure. 

22. Subject to the above, I am and have been in accord with the 
Chairman and my colleagues on this Commission. I should like to be 
allowed to say how greatly I have appreciated their patience and 
consideration. 

ALISON RUSSELL 



19th October, 1938 



263 



NOTE OF RESERVATIONS BY MR. RED) 

The scheme for confining the Jewish State to the part of the 
Maritime Plain indicated in plan C seems to be the least objectionable 
that can be devised under our terms of reference. We were directed 
to include as few Arabs and enterprises owned by Arabs in the 
Jewish State as possible and vice versa. Plan C, however, may 
be at variance with our terms of reference, inasmuch as 821,700- 
dunums of land owned by Arabs is included in the Jewish State. 
This is nearly 70 per cent, of the total area of that state, 1,257,800 
dunums. Incidentally, it is nearly double the area of land, 436,100 
dunums, owned by Jews in this proposed Jewish State. Whether 
the inclusion of 54,400 Arabs in the Jewish State with its total 
population of 280,400, of whom 226,000 are Jewish, is in accordance 
with the terms of reference referred to above is not easy to decide, 
as a definite formula was not laid down therein. In fact, it is not 
possible to set apart an area for a Jewish State which is Jewish, 
both as regards population and enterprises. I was forced by our 
terms of reference to search for a Jewish area where the population 
at least was predominently Jewish ; and the only possible place to 
find such an area large enough to form the territory even of a 
miniature state, was that part of the Maritime Plain set aside as 
the proposed area of the Jewish State under plan C. 

2. That plan of partition, however, is in my opinion imprac- 
ticable, as is the scheme set out in plans A and B. The criticisms 
applicable to plan C apply also as a rule to them, but with greater 
force. We have devised and tested several plans of partition on 
communal lines and I cannot envisage any scheme which would 
not be even more defective and lead to stranger results than that 
set out in plan C, whatever formulae were laid down in our terms 
of reference. 

3. Our task was to devise the best possible scheme of partition 
and then to state if, in our opinion, that scheme was practicable. In 
giving reasons for my conclusions on this subject I have deemed it to 
be my duty to state the relevant facts and opinions, my own included, 
necessary to enable the implications of the proposal to partition 
Palestine according to plan C to be realized. 

Absence orConsent 

4. In the Statement of Policy of July, 1937, His Majesty's 
Government expressed a hope that it would be possible to give effect 
to a scheme of partition which might secure " an effective measure 
of consent on the part of the communities concerned." This refers 
to the consent of both Arabs and Jews. In my opinion no plan of 
partition of the Government of Palestine into three administrations 
would be practicable without the consent of both Arabs and Jews. 



264 



From the evidence, oral and written, placed before us by Jews, it is 
clear that many Jewish associations and individuals are opposed 
to partition of any kind. Even the views of those Jews willing to 
discuss partition, as expressed at Zionist assemblies, to us and else- 
where, indicate that Jews would not accept such schemes as those 
set out in plans B or C, which would reduce the area assigned by the 
Royal Commission for a Jewish State. If so, this would seem to 
make both impracticable. The Jews concerned are highly developed 
politically and otherwise, and it is not clear how partition could be 
justly imposed upon them. , 

5. From the statements placed before us, oral and written, and 
judging by the violent opposition shown by the Arabs to partition 
since the policy of partition was announced, it is clear that the Ara*b 
community, who form about two-thirds of the population of Pales- 
tine, would not accept either of the schemes B or C proposed. This 
also makes both impracticable in my opinion and also any scheme 
of partition. Here again the people concerned are not primitive folk. 
A distinguished Jew, Lord Samuel, speaking with a knowledge of 
Palestine such as only the holding of high office for several years in 
that country can give, said in the House of Lords in July, 1937, " The 
Arabs are intensely aware of their history — that they acquired great 
territory, built up a remarkable culture and gave to the world one 
of its greatest civilizations." 

6. Proof of Arab opposition to, and of the probability that the 
Arabs would violently resist the enforcement of, any scheme of 
partition and that their resistance would continue even if the scheme 
were implemented, is afforded by the fact that no witness suggested 
that partition would be peaceably accepted by the Arabs. Below 
are given selections from views expressed to us in Palestine by persons 
whose opinions it would be rash to disregard, owing to the witnesses' 
impartiality and long experience or special knowledge of Palestine 
and of its communal problems. 

7. One witness stated to us early this summer, " When partition 
goes through you will have to have a barbed wire right round it 
.... with pill boxes every half kilometre .... Hostility in 
our lifetime there will be." This witness also said that the Arabs 
would not submit to Jewish rule. 

8. Another witness said, " There would be a violent reaction to 
anything which gives any part of Palestine to the Jews." He did 
not think that any of the plans of partition discussed by us with 
him would promote peace.* He gave as his own opinion and that 
of others whom he consulted, people like himself in intimate daily 
touch with political realities in Palestine, that the Arabs could not 
be conciliated as long as there was any question of setting up a Jewish 



* Only certain officials were shown proposed plans of partition. 



265 



State and that if a plan similar to plan C were implemented, anything 
up to open rebellion would occur. He thought that if Galilee were 
excluded from the Jewish State that would not prevent even its 
inhabitants from rebelling against partition. He envisaged strife 
between the Jewish and Arab States. 

9. Another witness, speaking as early as last June before the 
Arab rebellion had fully developed, said, " From the very moment 
a report in favour of partition, with His Majesty's Government's 
acceptance of that report, comes out, you will get in this country 
accelerated rebellion which will gradually rise to an absolute cres- 
cendo when you put your boundary commission on the spot to 
demarcate. If you include Galilee in the Jewish State I think it 
is certain to add more fuel to the flames." He said that all classes 
of Arabs oppose proposed Jewish rule and that they would oppose 
partition by " force of arms," and that, even if both Arabs and Jews 
got people to come forward to take up the task of governing, " it 
would not work properly." 

10. Another witness said that even if only a small Jewish State 
were set up on the Maritime Plain, the Arabs " would just bide their 
time, that is all." 

11. Another witness said, " There is really no hope in my view 
of the Arab ever accepting partition . . . any form of partition." 
Another said, " I think that the Arabs will oppose any scheme of 
partition." Another, speaking with prescience last June, said that 
the Arabs would not accept the fait accompli if partition were imple- 
mented and : " I believe the opposition will become more serious," 
and that the Jewish " State would be a disaster for the Jews rather 
than for the Arabs." 

12. Another witness, when asked if the Arabs would not acquiesce 
after a period of forcible repression, said, " It is just like pressing 
down a rubber ball ; when you take the pressure off, the rubber 
ball resumes its natural shape." Also — " It would be reasonable to 
say that any attempt to put any one of these plans (of partition) 
into execution against the wish of one or other or both parties would 
result in disorders of not less extent than at present and probably 
greater." Also — ■" Failing agreement between the parties, no plan 
of partition can materialize unless the Power implementing the plan 
is prepared to take the most sweeping and vigorous measures to- 
enforce it, amounting to large scale and lengthy operations, in fact 
possibly to an occupation for a number of years." Again — " Unless 
there is a spirit of consent on both sides you cannot effect partition." 

13. Some of these witnesses said that the C plan of partition 
would produce less resistance than others ; only one suggested that 
after compulsion, but without force, " in the long run " the Arabs 
might acquiesce in it. 



266 



None of the witnesses in the above category suggested that 
the Arabs would consent to partition or accept quietly the fait 
accompli, if partition were implemented. These statements give a 
balanced view of the written evidence referred to. They all tend to 
indicate that partition would not produce peace, but that was the 
tenor of the evidence, while there was absence of evidence to the 
contrary. 

14. Coming now to Jewish views, Lord Samuel said with 
prescience in July, 1937, in the House of Lords, " The Arab national 
movement ... is not to be disposed of easily and lightly, simply 
by using the strong hand and applying methods of coercion." 

In September, 1938, a group of about twenty leading anti- 
partitionist Jews holding responsible public and private positions in 
Palestine, sent us a memorandum in which they stated, referring to 
the hope that the policy of partition would restore peace — " This 
sanguine assumption has already proved to be baseless." Again — 
" Arab resistance to Jewish colonization will have a far wider scope 
for effective action following partition and will gravely threaten the 
tiny, new Jewish State from the very commencement." "The 
British garrison will be compelled to participate in the defence of 
the newly created frontiers." " The Jewish State will have to 
maintain an army which is estimated at a minimum of 30,000 men." 
The Jews generally recognize frankly that they must have armed 
forces and they envisage Arab hostility if a Jewish State is set up. 
A large association of anti-partitionist Jews from many countries 
sent us a memorandum stating, " The establishment of the 
sovereign States, a Jewish and an Arab one, is an utterly imprac- 
ticable proposal, and would mean the perpetuation of murder and 
warfare on the holy soil, with the most tragic consequences for Jew 
and Arab in Palestine and elsewhere." 

15. The predictions of the witnesses quoted, who spoke in May 
and June, 1938, have been generally vindicated by events. Their 
predictions might prove to be wrong in the future ; but it is much 
more likely that they would prove to be right. I have quoted them at 
some length because their views coincide with mine and because 
I desire to show that my views are not merely those of a single 
individual equipped with the experience of a brief three months stay- 
in Palestine. My views are similar to those held by persons best 
qualified by real knowledge to give sound advice on the subject. 
In my opinion the C plan of partition would not bring peace before 
or after its implementation. I cannot envisage any other plan of 
partition which would not be more defective than plan C in this 
respect. . 

16. Apart from opinions, it is a fact that the announcement 
of a policy of partition, whose main object would be to secure peace, 
turned the disorders which followed the rejection of the proposal 



267 



to set up a Palestine legislative council, into a national Arab rebellion 
in Palestine which was assisted by Arabs resident in certain countries 
outside Palestine. It would seem to be contrary to commonsense 
therefore to imagine that the acceptance or implementation of the 
C plan of partition would restore peace, that the " wound " of 
partition, as the Royal Commission called it, would be healed by 
driving home the weapon that caused the wound. Our report states, 
" If a plan of partition is approved which brings under the political 
domination of the Jews large numbers of Arabs in an area where 
the Jews are not already in a substantial majority, the introduction 
of such a plan will be resisted by the Arabs .... by open 
rebellion." I agree, but I think that the Arabs would also resist by 
force partition according to plan C. 

Absence of Equity 

17. But, it may be urged, the Mandatory Power should not 
yield to, but should crush, internal rebellion and Arab resistance 
from outside Palestine as well, drive partition through and restore 
peace by force. If the scheme of partition set out in plan C were 
obviously just, there would be some grounds for the adoption of 
such a course. If not, and if the attempt is made to implement 
that plan, resistance is likely to be in proportion to the sense of 
national wrong felt by the rebels and the protracted sequel to be 
generally disastrous to Arab, Briton and Jew. 

18. His Majesty's Government, moreover, has announced that 
it will not implement a scheme of partition until it is assured that 
such scheme is equitable and practicable. One responsible witness 
said that it was not a reasonable proposition to cut out the Maritime 
Plain and set up a Jewish State there regardless of the fact that the 
majority of the people in Palestine are Arabs, and that it. was not 
fair to set up a small non-Arab State against the will of the population 
of the whole of Palestine. Another said that to force Jewish rule 
on Arabs in the Jewish State " is immoral." 

19. From a respected Jewish source a memorandum came to us 
stating that sovereignty in a Jewish State " could not, unhappily, 
be said to be derived from the consent of the governed." It then 
quoted President Wilson's words, " Peoples and provinces are not 
to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were 
mere chattels or pawns in a great game." 

20. It is clear that no Arab, Jewish or other body in Palestine 
asked for partition. The Royal Commission did not submit their 
policy or plan of paitition for the views of people in Palestine whose 
criticisms would have been invaluable. The Commissioners them- 
selves put forward the policy admitting that their scheme was 
tentative and not worked out in detail. We have now worked out 



268 



in detail plan C, which appears to me to be the best possible geo- 
graphical scheme of partition, and it seems likely that the people of 
Palestine, who never asked for partition, and have had ample time 
to think about the policy of partition, would reject this scheme. 

21. Under the scheme a small part of Palestine would be set 
aside for the Jewish State ; but it is the richest Arab and Jewish 
part, the area most favoured by nature, by reason of its fertile soil, 
good rainfall and abundant underground water resources. Land 
planted with citrus in bearing is most valuable being worth several 
hundred pounds per acre. In recent years the Arabs have increased 
their citrus-planted land six-fold and they own about half the 
citrus-planted land in Palestine. Almost forty per cent, of the 
total citrus land owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish 
State. Partition would deprive Palestine for ever of a large part of 
its best territory, with its wealth, revenues and population, Arab and 
Jewish. Abraham Lincoln denied the rights of States desiring partition 
to secede from a Federation ; but here the proposed Jewish State 
would be abstracted from a unitary State, probably against the 
wishes of the whole people of Palestine. If their votes were taken 
on plan C, possibly the majority against the proposal, reckoning 
Arab and Jewish votes, would approach to 100 per cent. 

22. The establishment of the Mandate and the validation 
therein of the national home or foyer is a fait accompli. It honoured 
a promise made in the stress of war. But the proposal to partition 
the country is quite another matter, a revolution that should not 
be carried out by trustees, without the consent of the people of 
Palestine, who are not primitive folk devoid of political consciousness, 
incapable of making a decision on this subject. 

23. The Arab residents in this tiny Jewish State, which would 
be about as large as an English county, a little over 300,000 acres 
in extent, would, if the state were set up, be forced to change their 
nationality, or to leave their homes and occupations there, unless 
they became citizens of the State. There would be about 
54,400 Arabs within the State and nearly a million in other parts of 
Palestine united in their detestation of Jewish rule. It would not 
appear just to these people whose ancestors have lived in Palestine 
for thirteen centuries, that 54,400 of their number should be placed 
by their trustees under the rule in the Maritime Plain of Jews, 
nearly all of whom immigrated from overseas into that Plain during 
the last eighteen years. Others besides Palestinian Arabs, Christian 
Arabs included, and Jews might object to the proposed scheme of 
partition. Even if Great Britain were at peace with other nations, 
but still more at a time when she might be involved in war, the 
hostility of the people of Palestine created by partition and of 
sympathizers with them from outside Palestine might cause 
difficulties serious or otherwise. 



269 



24. The removal of part of Palestine from the rest cannot be 
justly carried out against the wishes of, and without consulting, 
the whole population of Palestine, merely because in that part there 
is a preponderance of Jews. The partition envisaged is not morally 
strengthened by the fact that Arabs own 821,600 dunums of land 
as against 436,200 dunums owned by Jews in the proposed Jewish 
State. 

25. It was necessary to give a defensive boundary on the hills 
for the railway and for the proposed Jewish State. For this and 
other reasons the eastern frontier was pushed inland away from the 
coast where the Jews have settled, with the result that villages 
entirely owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish State. 
Out of the many Arab villages included in this area, I have selected 
fourteen in one of which there are about thirty-one Jews. In it 
and the other thirteen there are about 6,000 Arabs. These villages, 
Arab according to the population or the property test, are to be 
included in the Jewish State. 

26. As a further example of the strange results that would 
follow the adoption of plan C, the case of Tulkarm may be mentioned. 
It is a centre of Arab nationalism and, mainly for this reason, was 
excluded from the proposed Jewish State, though its exclusion would 
entail a diversion of the railway line costing the British taxpayer 
£100,000. But most of the land belonging to the townsmen of 
Tulkarm would be in the Jewish State and the town is the market- 
place for many Arab villages to be included in that state. When 
international boundaries separate the Arab people of these places 
from their village lands and from their political and social centres, 
the Arabs will not consider the procedure to be just. They would 
ask why their friends and fields should suddenly be placed in a 
foreign land. 

27. On the eastern boundary of the proposed Jewish State this 
unavoidable separation of Arabs from their lands by the proposed 
frontier north of Tulkarm would frequently be caused. The Arabs 
who would thus be separated from their land will not see any justice 
in our demarcation of boundaries. These people would have the 
problem of living in one state with their little bits of land close by 
in another state. They would probably be compelled by force of 
circumstances to sell their land in the Jewish State. 

28. The Arabs in the Jewish State will almost certainly not be 
an assenting contented minority, and one can imagine the political, 
social and economic results of partition for them. On the other hand, 
one can foresee the disastrous strife in store for the Jews, whether 
they finally subdue their Arab subjects and neighbours or not. 
Here, as in other parts of Palestine, the British are likely to be drawn 
into the conflict permanently or sporadically, under their treaty 
obligations with the two States. Hitherto the British have been 



270 



what a witness called the " whipping boy " in politics between 
Arab and Jew. After partition, and indeed before it could be 
implemented, they would probably be unfortunate soldiers fighting 
in the communal war for one side or the other. The Arabs are very 
politically minded and the flaws in a policy which seems to them to 
be crudely unjust, would be exposed by educated Arabs who know 
how to think politically, to the League of Nations and to the 
Parliament and Government which will have to justify a policy of 
partition. 

29. Reliable witnesses assured us that the Arabs to be placed 
in the Jewish State would fight and that they would be assisted by 
Arabs from outside that state. In my opinion this view can be 
safely accepted. If partition is to be implemented it will be 
necessary to provide for this contingency on the borders of the 
Jewish State as well as for similar contingencies elsewhere in Palestine . 
from the time the policy is officially adopted till it is implemented 
by crushing resistance. Even if the military and police forces could 
crush Arab opposition, the trustees of Palestine, the League and 
British Government have to consider the cost in reputation to them- 
selves and in lives and wealth to all concerned. In my opinion 
plan C is here again impracticable because the British people would 
not tolerate the injustice and waste of life and property entailed 
in driving through it or any more defective plan of partition. 

30. Proceeding to other aspects of the subject, one notes that 
the Royal Commission gave great prominence to the aspirations of 
the Arabs to independence. These aspirations do exist and have 
been voiced by Arab political leaders. But in my opinion, based 
on that of persons with greater knowledge than mine, the chief 
incentive to Arab unrest is the fear of the economic and political 
domination of the Jews. They detest the idea of Jewish rule and 
therefore detest partition. Their economic fears require explanation. 

31. The Jews are steadily purchasing, with funds donated gratis 
by world Jewry, the land of Arabs, even at the present time when an 
Arab risks assassination if he sells his land to Jews. We are authori- 
tatively informed that in future such land will generally be paid for 
from Jewish national funds. Arabs know from experience that land 
so purchased becomes Jewish for all time, that it cannot be leased 
to any non- Jewish tenants, and that a clause in the leases forbids the 
employment of non- Jewish labour on such land. Moreover, in non- 
agricultural industries owned By Jews, employers who might desire 
to employ cheap Arab labour, are persuaded, often very effectively, 
not to do so. And if the rates of wages for each community were 
effectively made the same by legislative enactment, the Arab worker 
might lose his main claim to obtain work in the majority of such 
Jewish concerns, save in Arab areas where it would be prudent to 
have a mixed labour force. 



271 



32. Probably nothing has produced more communal ill-will in 
Palestine than this Jewish system of economic penetration. It 

. affects all classes, but especially the mass of Arab workers. The 
Jews tell us that there would be no economic discrimination against 
Arabs, in the proposed Jewish State, but, even with the best inten- 
tions, they would be faced with the claims of the unfortunate, 
persecuted Jews of Europe seeking refuge, land and work in Palestine. 
The Jews candidly stated to us, " We should be untrue to our trust 
if we employed Arabs, because our primary purpose is to employ 
Jews." The laws of the state might be equitable, but it would be 
too much to expect a Jewish government to force Jews to employ 
Arabs at the same wages as those paid to Jews. 

33. The Arab land owner who sells his land to the Jews generally 
secures a very high price. The Jews do not buy land for the ex- 
tension of the National Home on commercial principles and need not 
do so. With loss of Arab ownership the right to work on the land 
even of Arab tenant or owner cultivator may disappear. The Arab 
or other tenant in the Jewish State could retain his right to work on 
a lot viable if he appealed to the provisions of the Protection of 
Cultivators Ordinance, assuming that this Ordinance were retained. 
But if he forgoes his right for a cash consideration or other cause, 
he quits the land also. The Arabs are at present, even under British 
rule, being slowly " squeezed out " of the land as the local phrase 
expresses it. Some witnesses predict that the Arabs in the Jewish 
State would sell their land and that Arab workers there would become 
a proletariat and try to drift into the Mandated Territory in search 
of a living. 

34. The livelihood of thousands of rural Arab workers living 
in the hills outside the Jewish State would also be jeopardized by 
the creation of that state. A leading Zionist Jew with exceptional 
knowledge, speaking of the orange groves in the Maritime or Coastal 
Plain in a large part of which it is proposed to set up the Jewish State, 
said to us — 

In the orange districts during the high season of harvests 
you will find tens of thousands of Arabs going in and earning 
a great deal ; in fact it constitutes a very substantial part of 
their wealth. 

We have also been authoritatively informed by Jews that once the 
Jewish State is set up no Arabs will be allowed to enter it from outside 
to work for wages. And it is not only in respect of the great citrus 
industry, but in other occupations also, that the Maritime Plain 
enables Arabs from the hills to eke out at present an existence by 
earning wages in that Plain. 

35. There is grim competition in Palestine not only for land 
but for work ; and the setting up of a Jewish State in the Maritime 
Plain would be a serious blow to the large Arab proletariat in the 



272 



hills, for whom no system of unemployment benefit exists now, 
or would be possible after partition in the insolvent Arab State or 
Mandated Territories unless the British taxpayer met the cost. 
A scheme which threatens thousands of Arabs with destitution by 
removing from their native land one of its chief centres of employment 
is imprudent and would be difficult to justify. 

36. Poverty is the root cause of much of the discontent in 
Palestine. An experienced witness said to us, " The most serious 
problem in Palestine is land hunger." In the Statement of Policy 
of His Majesty's Government in 1930 it was alleged that 29-4 per 
cent, of Arab families in the villages were landless. The accuracy 
of the figures was challenged and no reliable figures exist on the point. 
But it is certain that there is in town and country a large class of 
landless Arabs. There probably was even before the Jews began 
purchasing land on a large scale after the war. Moreover, the number . 
of Arabs with holdings too small to support those dependent on them 
is large. With a rapidly rising population the economic problem of 
the future inhabitants of Palestine is a serious matter. The majority 
of us have decided that Haifa will be needed to supply work to some 
of the Arabs living outside that town. But the setting up of a Jewish 
State would be a serious blow to Arabs from the hills who now earn 
wages also in the area proposed for the Jewish State. In August, 
1938, in the eighteen Arab towns for which rough, approximate 
statistics were kept, about 65 per cent, of Arab workers were 
unemployed. There were no figures available for the rural villages. 
The figure quoted referred to abnormal times, but it reveals a state 
of affairs which is most serious. There was Jewish unemployment 
at the same time, the figure for May, 1938, being 11,000 wholly and 
9,000 partially unemployed. If a Jewish State were set up, the 
Arab proletariat might well be driven by want to seek food and wages 
in the Mandated Territory and thus become a burden on the British 
taxpayer. Some witnesses thought this would happen ; others did 
not. Jewish enterprise in Palestine has increased the wealth of the 
country enormously. The Arabs have benefited thereby ; but the 
two races are now in competition for land and labour, the needs of 
both being great in the extreme. Partition in my opinion would not 
solve this difficult fundamental economic problem of Palestine ; 
it would possibly make the problem insoluble, except by continuous 
subsidies from the British taxpayer. 

37. Continuing the examination of plan C, it will be observed 
that the majority of us propose that Haifa should be a Mandated 
territory. In my opinion no Mandatory could undertake responsi- 
bility for the security of Palestine, partitioned or otherwise, if this 
town, its environs and port were in the possession of a foreign State. 
If the Haifa town area be excluded from the rest of the Northern 
Territory, it transpires that in this area, north of the proposed 



273 



Jewish and Arab States, there are 180,000 Arabs and only 29,000 
Jews : 2,715,000 dunums of land owned by Arabs as against only 
675,000 dunums owned by Jews. If the Galilee hill area be omitted, 
there would be left 83,000 Arabs and only 26,000 Jews, while the 
land owned by Arabs would be 1,375,000 dunums as against 639,000 
owned by Jews. Yet, it is proposed to make the whole of this 
northern area, not part of the Arab State, but Mandated Territory. 
It is stated in chapter XI that the whole northern area could not be 
assigned to the Arab State without serious injustice to the Jews 
and a violation of the charge to include the fewest possible Jews 
and Jewish enterprises in the Arab State. I agree. But it is proposed 
to set up a Jewish State where there are 54,400 Arabs and 821,700 
dunums of land owned by Arabs, as against 226,000 Jews and only 
436,100 dunums of land owned by Jews. Surely what is sauce for 
the goose is sauce for the gander. 

38. Even if the unique principle of disintegrating a country 
without the compelling necessity of force majeure, by selecting 
bits of it where the numbers of one community or its property 
exceed greatly those of another community of fellow citizens, 
without consulting the whole people, is to be adopted as a guide to 
dismemberment, it should be consistently followed. We are not 
dealing here with primitive people but with Arabs who can think 
politically and would almost certainly resist discriminating and 
indefensible treatment, even in the detested panellation of their 
native land. 

39. Moreover, the Arabs will see, in the scheme of immigration 
proposed in this northern territory, the intention of establishing 
there in the future a Jewish State when the Jews by extending towns 
where they would be allowed to reside and by other settlement in the 
area become a majority. The clause stating that this cannot occur 
until most of the minority race agree to it, will not inspire any 
confidence in people whose native land would have been disin- 
tegrated by then, without consulting the people of Palestine, under 
a disruptive scheme of partition based largely on the counting 
of heads communally and the value and extent of property of each 
community in selected places. 

40. Somewhat similar criticisms apply to the southern area, 
which is also to be Mandated Territory, though it is overwhelmingly 
Arab. It must not be thought that I am opposed to further Jewish 
immigration. What I urge is that, if the C plan of partition were 
adopted, it would be a great obstacle to the equitable settlement 
of this immigration problem. Immigration is one thing ; immigra- 
tion which may culminate in periodical additions to the Jewish State 
is quite another thing. 

' 41. Passing now to an examination of the three administrations 
to be set up under plan C, the plain fact emerges that, granted peace, 
a solvent independent Jewish State could be set up at once. That 



274 



would be an irrevocable act unless, owing to conquest of that state, 
or the consent of its Government, it ceased to exist. Mandated 
Territories rendered insolvent permanently by the abstraction of the 
area of the Jewish State from the whole, would be set up, financed 
by the British taxpayer. Lastly, on the unlikely assumption that 
the Arabs would co-operate in setting up their state, there would be 
an insolvent Arab State also living on the British taxpayer. 

42. Our terms of reference requested us to devise Arab and 
Jewish States in which there would be " a reasonable prospect of the 
eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting 
Arab and Jewish States." But this Arab State would not be self- 
supporting even if peace were established in Palestine ; it would 
probably become more and more insolvent as time went on owing to 
increase in population, natural poverty, and to the destitution caused 
in it by partition. This administration would not be a state as 
long as its existence depended on annual British subsidies. 

43. It would be politically difficult to set up a Jewish state and 
to postpone the setting up of an Arab State till it could be self- 
supporting, that is, indefinitely. So, to get over this difficulty a 
revolutionary departure from the ordinary, essential principles of 
granting British subsidies to an insolvent country is recommended. 
It is proposed to set up a quasi-independent, insolvent Arab State 
without control of its administration by the subsidizer. 

44. The proposed Arab State would contain less than half' the 
Arab population of Palestine. There would be in it some 9,000 
unfortunate Jews under the rule of Arabs resenting partition. 
The Jewish State would contain little more than half the Jews in 
Palestine. Jewish and Arab minorities would be protected by the 
written undertakings suggested in chapter XVI. It need not be 
assumed that these clauses would prove to be more effective than 
similar clauses have proved to be elsewhere. There are no sanctions 
for breach of them, nor could external sanctions be easily devised 
to curb the actions of sovereign Arab or Jewish States. Our terms 
of reference have indeed led to strange results. Any attempt to 
partition Palestine on communal lines is bound to lead to strange 
results. 

45. Our terms of reference did not prohibit us from considering 
whether a scheme of partition were equitable or not. The equity of 
a scheme is a vital, relevant factor in testing its practicability. In 
fact, in chapter X our report applies the equity test to plans A and B. 
I, in turn, apply it to plan C. I am not trying to show that partition 
is in principle inequitable or bad. The partition of Scandinavia 
into Norway and Sweden was equitable as far as I can recollect, 
and it was carried out peacefully with the consent of the two peoples 
concerned. 



275 



46. Before passing to some concrete aspects of the problem 
I would quote here the words of Burke — 

It is with the greatest difficulty that I am able to separate policy 
from justice. Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society; 
and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under 
the suspicion, of being no policy at all. 

In my opinion the C scheme of partition, and others more defective 
still, would be an eminent departure from justice, and therefore 
impracticable. 

Absence of Security 

47. The problem of defence that would be created if plan C 
were implemented would be very difficult. A distinguished Jew, 
Lord Reading, speaking in the House of Lords in July, 1937, said — 

Of all the dangerous places in which to set up an unsupported, 
inexperienced State, I wonder whether at the present moment you could 
find a more perilous spot than the eastern end of the Mediterranean. 

The defence against a large Power or Powers of the new Jewish 
State, even if, as is unlikely, it were at peace within, and on its 
frontiers with the Arabs after partition had been implemented, 
would need the protection of naval, air and land forces. These 
could only be supplied in the main by Great Britain whose commit- 
ments overseas are already considerable. 

48. Foreign policy and defence are interconnected and, while 
the sovereign Jewish State could create international conflict by its 
foreign policy, Great Britain would have to accept the military 
consequences. Great Britain has taken this risk elsewhere, but 
before taking it in the case of the proposed Jewish State, it would 
be necessary to ask why the risk should be taken and it would be 
difficult to give a satisfactory answer. If the Jewish State surren- 
dered the control of its foreign policy constitutionally and in fact 
to the British Foreign Office, that state would become what the 
proposed Arab State would be, a state only nominally independent. 
Similar difficulties would be created in respect of the proposed 
Arab State, except that it would be a bankrupt depending for its 
very existence on the British Mandatory and therefore not likely 
to have an independent foreign policy. 

49. Coming to the purely executive side of the defence problem, 
I quote some remarks made to us by witnesses whose views and 
knowledge cannot be brushed aside, views which I accept. The 
opinion reiterated was that the only defensive boundary for Palestine 
is the present one. Additional boundaries within Palestine would 
entail for Great Britain far more burdens than she can bear, in my 
opinion. The additional boundaries under plan C would exceed 
300 miles. It seems to me that — 

(a) Partition is impracticable, because it is not possible to 
set up a truly defensive boundary. 



276 

(b) No scheme of partition can be implemented militarily if 
the division of races is such that Great Britain would have to 
go and help both sides. 

(c) Unless people are prepared to accept boundaries as a 
basis on which both parties try to live together, they are only 
boundaries topographically. 

A group of Palestinian Jews holding very responsible positions 
wrote to us — 

The complications resulting from the creation of at least three 
different kinds of administrative territory with numerous corridors and 
enclaves must immediately exercise a fatal effect on public security. 

Our task was to propose the creation of two states possessing 
adequate security. As this is not feasible, in my opinion, partition 
is also impracticable on this ground. 

50. In my opinion, Arab and Jew, in spite of the communal 
rancour roused by the proposed policy of partition, can co-operate 
in Palestine and live at peace with each other, but the first essential 
to the restoration of peace is the abandonment of all schemes for 
carving up the country by artificial boundaries, of plans for its 
dismemberment and the logical sequel thereto, removal of Arabs 
from their homes and occupations to make room for Jews. These 
schemes seem to me to be unjust, unwise and impracticable. 

Dismemberment 

51. Coming now to civil administration, it will be seen from the 
map illustrating plan C that that scheme would establish for the 
governance of the little country of Palestine an administrative 
labyrinth. The British Mandatory Government would control an 
enclave stretching from the Jerusalem environs to the sea. But 
it would also rule two additional blocks of territory in the north 
and the south from which it would be separated by the proposed 
Arab and Jewish States. The Jewish State is broken into two blocks 
by the Jerusalem enclave. The Arab State is also in two blocks, 
one of which, its chief town and port, Jaffa, is an enclave within the 
Jerusalem enclave. But these seven blocks of land are not the only 
sub-divisions under our plan. The Northern Mandated Territory 
is to be sub-divided administratively into three portions with regard 
to the vital problem of purchase of land by Jews, namely into the 
Haifa area, the Galilee hills and the Galilee plains. The Southern 
Mandated Territory is to be sub-divided into two areas, the occupied 
and the unoccupied, again with reference to the same vital problem. 
Furthermore, the Noithern or Southern Territories or parts thereof 
may under the C scheme develop in future into additions to the 
Jewish or Arab States or into States neither Jewish nor Arab. This 
would involve the creation of further enclaves of Mandated Territory 
at places like Haifa and Nazareth. Truly, the disintegrating policy 
of partition would lead to strange results. 



277 



52. It is hardly necessary to explain in detail the administrative 
complications which the C scheme of partition would cause even if 
there were friendly relations between the peoples of the three 
administrations. There would be great difficulties created for people 
separated by state boundaries from their lands, those needing pass- 
ports, border passes, or identity cards for journeys, especially in the 
case of poor and illiterate people. A person travelling from Haifa 
to the southern boundary of Palestine on the main coast line, in a 
railway journey of 133 miles, would pass through six blocks of 
territory, no two contiguous blocks of which would be ruled by the 
same Government. 

53. The difficulty of preventing and detecting crime would be 
great, where escape across a state boundary near at hand to the 
criminal would be so easy, and an efficient system of inter-state 
extradition could not function unless there were inter-state accord. 

54. If different customs duties, quotas, or bounties existed for 
different parts of Palestine, the customs administrative problem 
would be truly formidable if smuggling were to be prevented with 
tolerable efficiency. But it is proposed to overcome this difficulty 
by a customs union. I do not think that this is feasible. 

55. A system of communications by rail, road, and wire exists 
which, like other branches of administration, was devised for all 
Palestine. To allocate equitably the thoroughfares, rails, marshalling 
yards, workshops, telephone and telegraph wires, and the capital and 
debts connected therewith, the staffs who would not, perhaps, 
desire to continue their service in foreign states and the pension 
rights of those staffs, between three administrations would be 
a most difficult task. If the division were carried out it would render 
administration most difficult and expensive. Incidentally, the 
Palestine railways, now running at a loss, would, save in the Jewish 
State, be insolvent after partition and would have to close down 
unless the British taxpayer met the deficit. 

56. The administrative upheaval in all directions would be great ; 
before initiating it the objective must be worth while and it does not 
seem to be so. However, the civil administration could, if peace 
prevailed, function, regardless of expense and exasperating incon- 
veniences. But why should this administrative labyrinth be created ? 
The answer is, the immediate object would be to set up a Jewish 
State, for the proposed Arab State would be a state only in name. 
In my opinion it is not a practicable proposal to break up the 
administration of Palestine into three units in the manner proposed 
in the C plan of partition for such an objective. The main object 
of partition was to secure political peace by setting up two sovereign 
states and Mandated Territory ; its result, if the C plan were adopted, 



278 



would almost certainly be the opposite of this. Partition, if so, 
would not only be an enormous obstacle to the efficient government 
of the small bits of territory concerned, but also, in my opinion, the 
chief obstacle to the restoration of peace. The problems of Palestine 
are too complex and intangible to be settled by carving out blocks 
of territory and population in the manner proposed. 



Absence of Solvency 

57. Budget estimates for Palestine in the future can be of little 
value unless it be assumed that peace is restored. Rebellions have 
no respect for financial estimates, destroy revenue-producing 
activities, impede the tax collector and cause new and unexpected 
objects of expenditure. There are in chapter XVIII financial 
estimates for partitioned Palestine based on the assumption that 
peace were restored. In my opinion peace will probably not be 
restored until the policy of partition is abandoned. But, on the 
assumption that peace were restored and, in my opinion, it can be 
permanently secured, I put forward a possible average budget 
estimate for unpartitioned Palestine. It was made in consultation 
with competent advisers for average times, not for periods of boom 
caused by large imports of Jewish capital or otherwise, and allows 
for the economic havoc wrought up to August, 1938, by the rebellion. 
It assumes the absence of a catastrophic slump in industry^ My 
figures are net, the gross figures include such items as gross' Post 
Office receipts, etc. 

Average net revenue. Average net expenditure, 

£P. £P. 

3,750,000 Recurrent .. .. 3,200,000 

Special .. .. 100,000 

Extraordinary . . 250,000 

To meet deficits on 

Railways, etc. . . 200,000 



Total .. .. 3,750,000 

These figures are obtained without allowing for enhanced taxation 
and without reducing any current service except that of police.* 
At present the cost of police exceeds £1,000,000 a year, a sum about 
twice the normal cost of this service before the recent disturbances 
began. Even in the troublous year 1936 -7 the actual expenditure 
on police and prisons was only /P.744,619. In my estimate I have 
allowed a sum of £P.800,000 under this head ; but further reductions 
would be possible if peace were permanently secured, while revenue, 

* The figures given in chapter XVIII were based on the Government 
estimates for 1938-39, and anticipate a deficit for all Palestine of ^P.365,000. 
But these estimates included provision of £P. 1,022,068 for police and prisons. 



279 



especially customs revenue, might considerably exceed my estimate 
in such circumstances. My estimate of average revenue is conserva- 
tive for a peaceful Palestine. It thus transpires that if Palestine 
were not partitioned, and if peace were restored, the country could 
probably meet the full cost of its civil administration. Its military 
defence in normal times would probably cost about £300,000 per 
annum. It would not be excessively optimistic to hope that the 
country could meet that expense, too, if the Mandatory did not 
agree to meet it, by gradual reduction in expenditure on police and 
by increase in revenue if peace were permanently secured. 

58. My colleagues in their estimates for partitioned Palestine 
do not allow for reduction in the police vote, but state that special 
expenses caused by partition would absorb any savings likely to 
occur in this item. Before adopting the C plan of partition it would 
be well to contrast the balanced budget set out above, omitting 
military expenditure with the budgets of the three administrations 
envisaged after partition which also omit not only British military 
expenditure but also the military expenditure of the Arab and 
Jewish States. The Jewish State, if peace prevailed, would have in 
respect of civil administration a surplus and the other two adminis- 
trations would be insolvent, their combined annual deficit on civil 
administration alone being about £P. 1,000,000 a year. If Trans- 
Jordan were added to the Arab State the deficit would be greater 
still. Comparison of the unfortunate financial position of the 
Palestine Government to-day during rebellion with that of the 
three Governments to be set up under plan C, functioning in peace, 
on the assumption that rebellion had ceased, does not seem to me 
to serve any useful purpose. The proper comparison is between 
the finances of a peaceful Palestine undivided and a peaceful Palestine 
partitioned into three administrations. I have given the salient 
figures in each case. The figures given in our report for a partitioned 
Palestine are probably as reliable as any others that can be envisaged 
and they deal a staggering blow to the policy of partition. A huge 
annual deficit in the case of two administrations would be created 
by partition and it would probably be permanent, for the taxable 
capacity of the proposed Arab State and Mandated Territories is 
poor and inelastic. The deficit might well increase in the future. 
Should this price be paid for partition in the hope that peace, 
justice and good government would be secured thereby in Palestine ? 

59. A customs union is proposed in our report as an economic 
necessity for the Jewish State and the need of free trade within 
Palestine is stressed. But if partition does not take place, existing 
free trade and fiscal union within all Palestine will continue. Before 
destroying this unity one must see some probable advantage and 
I can only see economic, fiscal and other disasters if partition under 
plan C is adopted. If the Jews or Arabs are to accept by treaty 
a customs union as a condition precedent to partition, it is unlikely 



280 



that any Arab body would agree to this union, if by rejecting it, 
partition could be avoided . The Jews tell us that they would desire 
to have complete fiscal freedom in a Jewish State and they too would 
probably reject the idea of a customs union. Even if it were formed 
at the outset it would scarcely be permanent as the Jewish State's 
economic position would be quite different from that of the other 
two Governments. 

60. But a further blow to the independence of the two states 
is proposed by the suggestion to set up a customs board selected 
by the three administrations whose decisions all three Governments 
would normally accept. It is difficult to see how any Government 
could surrender its responsibilities to a board composed of representa- 
tives of three Governments in a matter vitally affecting its economic 
welfare. Such an arrangement is not likely to be permanent. But 
combined with this is a proposal that the actual collection of customs 
revenue should not be carried out by each of the three Governments, 
but by the Mandatory. He is also to have the final voice in respect 
of Customs policy as long as Great Britain grants subsidies. And 
the customs revenue is to be pooled amongst the three Governments, 
not according to the region paying the duties, but on the principle 
of sharing according to needs, the Jewish State thus giving grants 
indirectly to the other two Governments. Finally, as all these 
devices would not make the budget of the Arab State balance, it 
is proposed that an additional sharing-out of the shares taken -from 
the Jewish State should be made between the Mandatory Power 
and the Arab State, to the latter's advantage. These devices for 
reducing the deficit of the proposed Arab State at the expense of 
the Jewish State do not seem to me to be practicable. The Jews, 
in my opinion, would not consent to such a scheme, even if they were 
able to meet the cost of it after providing for their own armed 
forces. The overburdened British taxpayer is also not likely 
to consent to subsidize two Governments doomed to insolvency 
without good reason. The immediate object gained would be the 
setting up of a puny Jewish State. It is not easy to see how this 
token state could be of any conceivable use to the Jews, while it is 
easy to realize that its existence might be a permanent source of 
fiscal and political discord in Palestine and in places interested in 
Palestine. In my opinion the establishment of such a state would 
prove disastrous for the Jews. 

61. The British taxpayer would have to face the combined 
deficit in the civil administration of the Arab State and Mandated 
Territories. But he would also have to face the military expenditure 
involved in defending all three areas. In my opinion, protracted 
rebellion would be the sequel to partition. If so, the cost of defence 
would be enormous. One well-informed witness states to us on this 
point, " There might be no limit to the cost." In my opinion, on 
financial grounds alone any form of partition of Palestine is 
impracticable. 



281 



Conclusion 

62. It may be said that one cannot make an omelette without 
breaking eggs, but it would not be easy to discover an omelette in 
any possible scheme of partition. Finally, in my opinion, if plan C 
were adopted, it would not and could not be implemented. 

63. In stating that partition is impracticable I am in accord 
with nearly 100 per cent, of non-Arab and non- Jewish persons in 
Palestine, in direct contact with the problem, who by experience 
and impartiality are best qualified to judge. Probably most Arabs 
in Palestine and certainly many Jews in Palestine are of the same 
opinion. I am not a lonely recusant flying in the face of the facts 
or of the evidence. 

64. I regret that I felt bound to disagree with the opinions of 
my colleagues and to write this lengthy memorandum ; but the 
matter is of great importance and I had to place my dissentient 
views fairly fully on record. My conclusions are purely negative, 
but our terms of reference compelled us to devise a scheme of 
partition and then to state if it were impracticable. In my argument 
I have adhered strictly to the mission I undertook, made use of the 
freedom to judge which was a condition of acceptance of that 
mission, and have not put forward any solution as an alternative to 
partition. 

T. REID 



19th October, 1938 



282 



APPENDIX 1 



POLICY IN PALESTINE 

Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner 

for Palestine * 

Downing Street, 

23rd December, 1937. 

Sir, 

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom have had under consideration the Statement of Policy in 
Palestine issued in July last (Cmd. 5513), and the conclusions to be drawn 
from the resolutions on the subject which have been passed first by the House 
of Commons and subsequently by the Permanent Mandates Commission and 
the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations. A memorandum contain- 
ing relevant extracts from the Statement of Policy, and the resolutions in 
question, and containing also extracts from Ministerial statements, is enclosed 
for convenience of reference. 

2. I feel that it is necessary to emphasize certain implications of the 
acceptance in principle by His Majesty's Government of the recommendations 
contained in Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission,! and to dispel 
if possible, the uncertainty which appears to exist in some quarters with 
regard to the course of action which His Majesty's Government have in view. 

3. In the Statement of Policy His Majesty's Government have expressed 
their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Royal 
Commission and their opinion that a scheme of tripartite division is the best 
and most hopeful solution of the problem. In view of the public attention 
that has been devoted to criticism of certain features of the tentative plan of 
partition which is outlined in Part III of the Report of the Royal Commission, 
I' wish to make it clear that His Majesty's Government are in no sense 
committed to approval of that plan, and in particular that they have not 
accepted the Commission's proposal for the compulsory transfer in the last 
resort of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area. » 

4. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the discussions at Geneva 
justify the undertaking of the further investigations required for the drawing 
up of a more precise scheme expressed in greater detail. The final decision 
cannot be taken in merely general terms, and the further enquiry will 
undoubtedly provide the necessary materials on which, when the best possible 
scheme has been formulated, to judge of its equity and practicability. 

5. As you are aware, it has been announced that a further special body 
will be appointed to visit Palestine, and to submit to His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, after consultation with the local communities, proposals for a detailed 
scheme of partition ; and that it will be the task of this body to advise in due 



* Published separately as Cmd. 5634. \ Cmd. 5479. 



283 



course as to the provisional boundaries of the proposed Arab and Jewish 
areas and of the new British Mandated area, and also to undertake the financial 
and other enquiries for which the Royal Commission recommended that a 
Financial Commission should be appointed. The functions of this new body 
will be to act as a technical Commission, that is to say, its functions will be 
confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the practical 
possibilities of a scheme of partition. 

6. The terms oi reference of the technical Commission will be as follows : — 

" Taking into account the plan of partition outlined in Part III of 
the Report of the Royal Commission, but with full liberty to suggest 
modifications of that plan, including variation of the areas recommended 
for retention under British Mandate, 

And taking into account any representations of the communities in 
Palestine and Trans- Jordan — 

(i) to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish 
areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily 
under British Mandate which will — 

(a) afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, 
with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States ; 

(b) necessitate the inclusion of the fewest possible Arabs and 
Arab enterprises in the Jewish area and vice versa ; and 

(c) enable His Majesty's Government to carry out the Mandatory 
responsibilities the assumption of which is recommended in the 
Report of the Royal Commission, including the obligations imposed 
by Article 28 of the Mandate as regards the Holy Places ; 

(ii) to examine and report on the economic and financial questions 
involved in partition upon which decisions will require to be taken, 
including — 

(a) the allocation so far as may be necessary between the various 
areas of the public assets and public debt of Palestine and other 
' financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration 
of Palestine during the period of the Mandate ' referred to in 
Article 28 thereof ; 

(6) means to ensure that the financial obligations referred to 
above will be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28 of the 
Mandate ; 

(c) the administration of the railways, ports, postal, telegraph 
and telephone services ; 

(d) currency arrangements ; 

(f) customs administrations and tariffs ; 

(/) the budgetary prospects of the various Administrations to be 
established ; 

(g) the preservation of the rights of civil servants in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 28 of the Mandate ; 

(h) the treatment of industrial and other concessions ; 

(i) the possibility of voluntary exchanges of land and population, 
and the prospects of providing by works of land development room 
for further settlement to meet the needs of persons desiring to move 
from one area to another ; 

(j) the provision of effective safeguards for the rights of religious 
or racial minorities in the areas to be allocated to Arab and Jews 
respectively, including the protection of religious rights and 
properties." 



284 



7. If, as a result of the investigations of the technical Commission, which 
will undoubtedly occupy many months, a scheme of partition is regarded as 
equitable and practicable by His Majesty's Government, it will be referred to 
the Council of the League for consideration. If the scheme is approved by 
the League Council, a further period will be required for the establishment 
of new systems of government under mandate in the areas concerned and, if 
the necessary consent is forthcoming, for the negotiation of treaties with a view 
to the eventual establishment of independent States. It may also be necessary, 
in the light of the Commission's report, for His Majesty's Government to give 
further consideration to the suggestion of the Permanent Mandates Com- 
mission that the Arab and Jewish areas should be administered temporarily 
under a system of " cantonisation " or under separate mandates. It is 
obvious, therefore, that, for some time to come, any action taken will be 
only of an exploratory nature. 

8. I will communicate with you further in due course on the subject of 
the personnel of the Commission and its procedure. 

I have, etc., 

W. ORMSBY GORE 

High Commissioner, 

General Sir Arthur Wauchope, 

G.C.M.G., K.C.B., CLE., D.S.O., 

etc., etc., etc. • 



Summary of recent Statements and Resolutions 

1. Statement of Policy. 

In the Statement of Policy of July, 1937 (Cmd. 5513) it was stated that 
His Majesty's Government had been driven to the conclusion " that a. scheme 
of partition on the general lines recommended by the Commission represents 
the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock " ' 

" His Majesty's Government, therefore, propose to take such steps as are 
necessary and appropriate .... to obtain freedom to give effect to a scheme 
of partition, to which they earnestly hope that it may be possible to secure an 
effective measure of consent on the part of the communities concerned." 

2. Parliament. 

The House of Commons, on the 21st July, 1937, passed a resolution to the 
following effect : — 

" That the proposals contained in Command Paper No. 5513 relating 
to Palestine should be brought before the League of Nations with a view 
to enabling His Majesty's Government, after adequate enquiry, to present 
to Parliament a definite scheme taking into full account all the recom- 
mendations of the Command Paper." 



285 



3. Statements by Mr. Ormsby Gore before Permanent Mandates Commission. 

" What I ask is that you should advise the Council that, in the light of our 
experience and our knowledge of Palestine, a solution on the lines of partition 
should be explored as the best and most hopeful solution of what the mandatory 
Power is itself convinced is, in fact, a deadlock. I do not ask you to approve 
a scheme of partition, or to settle these questions of defence, minorities, &c. 
All I ask you is to recommend that the door should not be closed to a solution 
by partition. I ask you to open the door and not to close it. I do not ask the 
Mandates Commission to commit itself finally, but to allow the mandatory 
Power to explore the solution which it thinks best in the circumstances, and to 
produce for the League in due course a more definite scheme for your later 
consideration." (Minutes of Thirty-Second Session, pp. 37-38.) 

* * * * 

" It was his belief that, in view of the actual wording of the Royal 
Commission's report, and in view of the mandatory Power's declaration that 
a deadlock had arisen and that its hopes of seeing Palestine evolve into a 
self-governing State, where Jews and Arabs would have reconciled their 
differences, had not been fulfilled, and in view of the fact that neighbouring 
Arab States had intervened, and in view of all the efforts sincerely made to 
work the mandate as drafted, he was satisfied that no British Government 
could administer Palestine on the basis of the existing mandate without 
considerable alterations." (Minutes, p. 169.) 

# * * * 

" The idea that it would be open to the United Kingdom or any other 
Power to carry on the existing mandate was an idea in which he hoped the 
Mandates Commission would not take refuge. He said frankly, not speaking 
for himself, but speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, that 
the prospects of carrying on indefinitely on the terms of the existing mandate 
seemed to His Majesty's Government to be a commitment involving repression, 
involving continual friction and hostility between each of the two races, on 
the one hand, and the Administration on the other, as well as between the 
two races themselves, in a manner which could not inure to the advantage 
of any one of the three parties concerned — or, for that matter, to the credit 
of the mandate system or of the League itself. 

. " Mr. Ormsby Gore was satisfied that a new solution — a political solution, 
as he had described it — of the problem of Palestine must be explored in the 
interests of the future peace of Palestine, and, further, in the wider interest 
of the future relations between the Jews and the world of Islam, for the benefit 
of the suffering Jews in Europe, as well as for the benefit of the peace of the 
world. It was in the light of these broad political considerations that he came 
before the Mandates Commission, not as an administrator, but quite frankly 
as a politician, to say that, in his opinion, and in the opinion of His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom, it was essential that a solution of what 
they regarded quite definitely as a deadlock should be explored." (Minutes, 
pp. 184-185.) 

" [Mr. Ormsby Gore] had certainly had no intention of conveying the 
impression that the Balfour Declaration was not still a binding obligation on 
both the League and the United Kingdom. Obviously, like the mandate, it 
was still a binding obligation, and would remain so until replaced by an inde- 
pendent Jewish State. It was only if the suggested plan of partition were 
accepted, and eventuated in the creation of a Jewish State, that the Balfour 
Declaration would reach its fruition and cease to be binding. Similarly, the 
mandate was binding until it was replaced by another regime in Palestine." 
(Minutes, p. 182.) 



286 



" The Mandates Commission would see that the solution recommended 
by the Arab Higher Committee implied : first, the retention by the Arabs 
of the right to complete independence in their own land, which they described 
as the whole of Palestine ; second, the cessation (whatever that meant) of 
the experiment of the Jewish National Home ; third, the cessation of the 
British mandate and its replacement by a treaty similar to those existing 
between the United Kingdom and Iraq, the United Kingdom and Egypt, 
and France and Syria, constituting Palestine a sovereign State ; and, fourth, 
the immediate cessation of all Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews 
pending the conclusion of the treaty. That solution, Mr. Ormsby Gore wished 
to say, quite frankly, was unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government if 
it were for the whole of Palestine." (Minutes, p. 191.) 

* * # * 

" I take it that the basic principle of any partition scheme would be to 
leave as few Jews as possible in the Arab State ; indeed, even under the 
proposals of the Royal Commission, that seems to be the main basis upon 
which it has acted, and would, I believe, be the only possible basis on which a 
frontier could be drawn. But, however you draw that frontier, it is inevitable 
that there will be a large Arab minority in the Jewish State, and it is therefore 
politically wise, and indeed necessary, that special provisions should be made 
for the legitimate safeguarding of the interests of that minority. And again, 
on the other side, though an appreciable number of the Christians will be in 
the proposed British mandatory enclave, there will be, in the proposed Arab 
State, however you draw that frontier, a considerable number of Christians." 
(Minutes, p. 37.) 

* * * * 

" Therefore, I grant that provisions for safeguarding minorities will have 
to be made over and above the ordinary provisions which are made in the 
ordinary minorities treaties operating under League auspices in many countries 
in Europe. ... I see no reason why, in the case of Palestine, we should be 
strictly limited to the kind of procedure which operates in those European 
States." (Minutes, p. 37.) 



4. Permanent Mandates Commission. 

The Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council of the 
League on the work of its Thirty-second (Extraordinary) Session contains the 
following conclusions : — 

" The Commission therefore considers that it is worth continuing the 
examination of the advantages and drawbacks of a new territorial solution. 
It appears quite natural and legitimate that the mandatory Power, rightly 
anxious to give satisfaction to the conflicting aspirations of Arabs and Jews 
in Palestine, and having failed to do so by the institution of a common adminis- 
tration for the whole territory, should be empowered to contemplate in some 
form or other the establishment of a regime in which these aspirations would 
each be satisfied in a part of the territory. 

" This satisfaction cannot, of course, be complete. For the Arabs, any 
partition must necessarily involve the abandonment of a fraction of what they 
consider to be their hereditary patrimony. For the Jews, it could involve, 
together with a restriction of the scope of their national home, already limited, 
as they allege, by the exclusion of Trans-Jordan in 1922, a fresh reduction in 
its capacity of absorbing population. 



287 



" Any solution to prove acceptable should therefore deprive the Arabs 
of as small a number as possible of the places to which they attach particular 
value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion. 
And, further, the areas allotted to the Jews should be sufficiently extensive, 
fertile and well situated from the point of view of communications by sea and 
land to be capable of intensive economic development, and consequently of 
dense and rapid settlement. ... 

" The Commission would be failing in its duty if it did not draw the Council's 
attention to the delicate problem of the transfer of populations from one 
territory to the other which might be necessary if there was a partition. In 
order to guarantee that the advantages of such a transfer should outweigh 
the disadvantages, particular care would have to be given to ensure that it was 
carried out with the greatest fairness. 

" As regards the proposal to withdraw the Holy Places from the 
domination of Arabs and Jews and place them under a special rrgime, the 
Commission thinks that such a step could not but be of advantage to general 
peace, provided that this regime was based on Article 28 of the present 
mandate. ... 

" While declaring itself favourable in principle to an examination of a 
solution involving the partition of Palestine, the Commission is, nevertheless, 
opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent 
States. ... 

" The Commission therefore considers that a prolongation of the period of 
political apprenticeship constituted by the mandate would be absolutely 
essential both to the new Arab State and to the new Jewish State. This 
apprenticeship might be carried on in one of two forms." 

" Provisional cantonization " and " Two Mandates " are then discussed. 

5. Extracts from the Speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the 
98th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, on the 14th September, 
1937. 

" I would remind the Council that the Balfour Declaration itself had a dual 
character. On the one hand, it provided for the Jewish national home, on the 
other it laid down the condition that nothing should be done which might 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish communities 
in Palestine or the rights or political status enjoyed by Jews elsewhere. 

" It is clear that under these provisions a twofold task was imposed upon 
the mandatory Power. It was under an obligation to further the establish- 
ment of the Jewish national home, and at the same time it was bound to do 
its best to guide the country as a whole along the path towards full nationhood. 
Indeed, the development of self-governing institutions is one of the objects 
specifically prescribed in Article 2 of the mandate. 

" At the time when the mandate was drawn up by our predecessors it was 
clearly not contemplated that these two obligations would prove mutually 
incompatible. . . . No one, least of all the mandatory Power itself, or the 
Council of the League, who approved the form of the mandate, anticipated 
that the future would be entirely free from difficulties. But it was hoped 
that the two races in Palestine would so adjust their national aspirations as 
to render possible the establishment of a single self-governing commonwealth 
under a unitary Government. This hope has, unfortunately, not been fulfilled. 
The reasons for its non-fulfilment are admirably set forth in Chapter 20 of 
the report of the Royal Commission. . . . Stated briefly, their conclusion is 
that the attempt has failed, not from any fault on the part of the Adminis- 
tration, or from any hesitation in applying the mandate, but because the 
conflict between Arab and Jewish political aspirations, which was inherent 
in the situation from the first, has tended to be confirmed by certain provisions 



(C31078) 



288 



of the mandate itself. It has, moreover, been intensified, not only by the 
estranging forces of conditions inside Palestine, but perhaps even more by 
external factors beyond the control of the British Administration in Palestine. 

" These external factors fall into two main sections. Firstly, there has 
been a growth of anti-semitism, and the development of new economic and 
social conditions, in certain European countries, which have resulted in 
increased desire on the part of the Jews, and increased pressure on His 
Majesty's Government to find room in Palestine for largely increased numbers 
of Jewish refugees. Secondly, there has been the growth of Arab nationalism 
throughout the Arabic-speaking countries and their increasing concern in the 
future political destiny of Palestine. 

" I am anxious to avoid over-statement, but I do wish to say, with all 
the emphasis in my power, that these new factors, which no one could have 
foreseen when the mandate was drawn up and approved by the Council, have 
transformed the whole situation and have created a new set of conditions 
under which the policy which was contemplated some two decades ago, and 
which we have done our utmost to carry out ever since, has become definitely 
unworkable. . . . 

" That is the situation in which His Majesty's Government come to 
the Council to-day. Palestine is a mandated territory administered by Great 
Britain on behalf of the League. The Palestine problem is not merely one 
that concerns Arabs and Jews, or one for which His Majesty's Government 
alone is required to find a solution. It is a problem that concerns the League 
as a whole. The mandatory Power can take no steps towards the modification 
of the mandatory regime without the authority of the League. His Majesty's 
Government clearly cannot proceed to work out the details of any scheme 
of partition, such as has been suggested by the Royal Commission, unless 
they are assured that they have the general approval of the Council in embark- 
ing on this task. It is for that general approval that I ask to-day. • 

" My colleagues will have seen the statement of policy issued by His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at the time of the publication 
of the Royal Commission's report. In that statement the opinion was 
recorded ' that a scheme of partition on the general lines recommended by the 
commission represents the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock.' 

To that opinion we adhere All I ask at this stage is that His Majesty's 

Government shall be given authority to proceed forthwith to work out the 
details of such a scheme, if possible in co-operation with representatives of 
both Jews and Arabs, it being understood that no scheme will be put. into 
effect without further reference to, and approval by, the Council. 

' ' The procedure that His Maj esty ' s Government have in mind, if the Council 
give their general approval to the policy which I have outlined, is to appoint 
a further special body to visit Palestine, to negotiate with Arabs and Jews 
and to submit to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposals 
for a detailed scheme of partition. It would be the task of this body to advise, 
in due course, as to the provisional boundaries of the proposed Arab and 
Jewish States and of the new British mandated area, and also to undertake 
the financial and other enquiries for which the Royal Commission recom- 
mended that a financial commission should be appointed. 

" At a later stage, a final and detailed boundary demarcation commission 
would need to be appointed 

" In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, 
partition is the only ultimate solution. It alone admits of the fulfilment 
both of Article 22 of the Covenant, which contemplates independence as the 
goal of all territories in the category of ' A ' mandates, and of the obligation 
to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people. 

" What His Majesty's Government contemplate is not a dual but a tripartite 
division of the country, for they take it from the terms of Article 28 of the 
existing mandate that it is the intention and wish of the League that the 



289 



Holy Places, including the Christian Holy Places, should remain permanently 
under League supervision and control. The vast majority of the Christian 
Holy Places are in the three cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth. 
The two latter are almost entirely Christian towns. In the old city of Jeru- 
salem and its immediate environs are not only many historic religious sites, 
but the religious settlements of many faiths. We think it will be in accordance 
with the wishes of the vast majority of States Members of the League that, 
when contemplating the ultimate establishment of Jewish and Arab States in 
.the Holy Land sacred to all three religions, these religious sites and institutions 
should be placed permanently in the care of a Power acting on behalf of and 
responsible to the League as a whole for what must always be a sacred 
trust. . . 

6. Council of the League. 

The Council of the League, on the 16th September, 1937, adopted the 
following resolution : — 

" In view of the United Kingdom Government's statement of July, 1937- 
concerning the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Palestine ; 

" In view of the preliminary opinion given to the Council by the Mandates 
Commission ; 

" In view of the statement made by the Representative of the United 
Kingdom at the Council meeting of September 14th, 1937, and the discussion 
on the status of Palestine which took place at the same meeting ; 

"Having regard to the intention expressed by the United Kingdom 
Government of pursuing the study of the problem of the status of Palestine 
while concentrating on a solution involving partition of the territory ; 

" Recalling the assurances given in that connection by the Representative 
of the United Kingdom on the subject of immigration ; 
" The Council : 

" Agrees to the United Kingdom Government's carrying out the aforesaid 
study and taking such steps as it may entail ; 

" And, while pointing out that the Mandate of July 24th, 1922, remains 
in force until such time as it may be otherwise decided, defers consideration 
of the substance of the question until the Council is in a position to deal with 
it as a whole and in the meantime entirely reserves its opinion and its decision." 

7. Assembly of the League. 

The resolution adopted by the Assembly on the 30th September, 1937, 
reads as follows : — 
" The Assembly, 

" Having noted the activity of the mandatory Powers, the Permanent 
Mandates Commission and the Council concerning the application of the 
principles laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant and in the texts of the 
mandates : 

" (a) Renews the expression of confidence in them voted by previous 
sessions of the Assembly, and pays a tribute to the results they 
have achieved thanks to a close and frank co-operation which it is 
essential to maintain ; 

" (b) Expresses its conviction that the problem of Palestine, which is 
at present before the Council, will be equitably settled, account being taken 
to the fullest possible extent of all the legitimate interests at stake." 



290 



APPENDIX 2 



FLANS B AND C 

List showing the village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between 
the Jerusalem Enclave on the one hand and the Arab and Jewish States on 
the other — 



Village sites in the 
Jerusalem Enclave. 

Salama. 

Al Kheiriya. 

Saqiya. 

Kair 'Ana. 

Al Yahudiya. 

Wilhelma. 

At Tira. 
Beit Nabala. 
Shuqba. 



Shabtin. 
Deir Qaddis. 
Shilta. 
Saffa. 

Beit Ur at Tahta. 
Ein Arik. 
Ramallah. 
Surda. 

Beitun. 
Deir Dibwan. 
Mukhmas. 
Jaba. 
Hizma. 
Anata. 
Isawaiya. 
Al Elizariya. 
Abu Dis. 
Sur Bahir. 
Beit Sahur. 
Beit Fajjar. 



Nahhalin. 
Wadi Fukin. 
Allar. 

Beit Nattif. 

Zakariya. 

Burei j . 

Mughallis. 

Idhnibba. 

Jilya. 

Shama. 



Village sites in the Arab or Jewish 
State as the case may be (that is, 
outside the Enclave). 



Tel Litwinsky. 



Rantiya. 
Al Muzeiri'a. 
Quia. 

Rantis. 
Abud. 

Deir Abu Mash'al. 

Jammala. 

Deir Ammar. 

Kharbatta. 

Bil'in. 

Kafr Niima. 
Deir Ibzi. 
Ein Qinya. 
Mazra'a al Qibliya. 
Abu Qashsh. 
Dura al Qar. 
Ein Yabrud. 
Rammun. 



Al Khan al Ahmar. 



Arab Ibn 'Ubeid (Deir Mar Saba). 

Ash Shuyukh. 
Si'ir. 

Beit Immar. 
Al Jaba. 
Surif. 

Kh. Umm Burj. 
Ajjur. 

Tall as San. 

At Tina. 

Al Kheima. 

Al Mukheizin. 

Qatra. 

Al Mughar. 



291 



Village sites in the 
Jerusalem Enclave. 

Aqir. 
Ni'ana. 
Bir Salim. 
Abu Al Fadl. 
Sarafand al Amar. 
As Safiriya. 
Beit Dajan. 
Yazur. 

Bayit Vegan. 



Village sites in the Arab or Jewish 
State as the case may be (that is > 
outside the Enclave. 

Zarnuqa. 

Rehovot. 

Beer Ya'aqov. 

Rishon le Zion. 
Nahalat Yehuda. 



APPENDIX 3 



PLAN B 

(a) List of village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the Jewish 
State and Galilee (Mandated Territory) — 



Village sites in the Jewish State. 

Qadas. 

Mallaha. 

Al 'Ulmaniya. 

Marus. 

Ammuqa. 

Qabba'a. 

Fir'im. 

Ja'una. 

Rosh Pinna. 

Al Qudeiriya. 

Ash Shuna. 
Yaquq. 

Hittin. 

Nimrin. 

Tur'an. 



Ein Mahil. 
Dabburiya. 
Iksal 
Yafa. 

Kefar ha Horesh. 
Illut. 

Beit Lahm. 
Ramat Hasafon. 
Kufritta. 
Qiryak Bialik. 



Village sites in Galilee 
(Mandated Territory). 

Al Malikiya. 

Deishun. 

Alma. 
Dallata. 



Safad. 

Akbara. 

Farradiya. 

Al Mansura. 

Mughar. 

Ailabun. 

Bu'eina. 

Uzeir. 

Kafr Kanna. 
Mash-had. 
Ar Reina. 

Nazareth. 



Saffuriya. 
Shafr 'Amr. 



Ar Ruweis. 
Ad Damun. 
Al Birwa. 
Al Judeida. 
Al Makr. 
Al Manshiya. 
Acre. 



(C31078) 



292 



(b) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the 
Arab and Jewish States — 

(i) in the section which lies north of the Jerusalem Enclave — 



l/ill/jcp, sitas tin. th.p. 1 ' pi9)%$h 5stct,tp, 


Village sites ifi the Avab St&te. 


Al riawati. 


Al Ghazzawiya. 




Bcisan. 


i.an asn oiiaun. 


xil /\blii ctiJ._y ct. 


Faqqu'a. 


Jalbun. 


Deir Abu Da'if . 




"Roif Onarl 
-DclL V^UdU.. 


Arabbuna. 


J_/Cll VjrildiZdld, 




Arrana. 


Sandala. 


J alama. 


Zir'in. 


Muqeibila. 


Amila. 


Zububa. 


±vn. J-«iaa. 




An Naghnaghiya. 


Ein al Mansi. 


Arab rsanina (Kit. al Mansi). 


Al Lajjun. 


Jrxl lVlu.oii.CJJ.lIct. 




iYi Uoiil Uo . 


Ai Hairm. 


Umrci al Fah.m. 


Al Buteimat. 


Ar'ara. 


Qannir. 


TTa-fr Oan* 
iYeUX v^dXl. 


Ori vat Ada. 


Karkur. 


A 

Wadi Ara. 




Bacja al Gharbiya,. 




j att. 




ZsClLd. * 




A 4-4-il 
At til. 


fl'i mm 


A-JOJ. Cti VJTJJ. U3 Li 11 , 


vjli LI WClxS-Ct. 




luixarrQ. 


irtan. 




Far'un. 


onuia. 


At Taiyiba. 


At Ras. 


TCafr Qiir 
xvciir o ui . 


r alama. 


Kafr Jammal. 


Jaiyus. 






Azzun. 


Habla 


Kafr Tulth. 


Kafr Bara. 


Sannirya. 


Kafr Qasim. 


Mas-ha. 


Zawiya. 


Majdal Yaba. 


Rafat. 




Deir Ballut. 


Al Muzeiri'a. 




Quia. 


Rantis. 



(ii) in the section which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave— 
Village sites in the Jewish State. Village sites in the Arab State. 

Zarnuqa. Al Mughar. 

Al Qubeiba. Yibna. 



293 



APPENDIX 4 



PLAN C 

(a) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the 
Northern Mandated Territory on the one hand and the Arab and Jewish 
States on the other — • 



Village sites in the Northern 
Mandated Territory. 

Al Bawati. 

Tall ash Shauk. 
Faqqu'a. 

Axabbuna. " 

Sandala. 

Zir'in. 

Affula. 

Kh. Lidd. 

An Naghnaghiya. 

Arab Baniha (Kh. al Mansi). 

Ghaba al Fauqa. 

Ji'ara (Bennir). 

Ar Rihaniya. 

Umm az Zinat. 

Ijzim. 

Ein Ghazal. 
Kafr Lam. 



Village sites in the Arab or Jewish State 
as the case may be {that is outside the 

Northern Mandated Territory). 

Al Ghazzawiya. 

Beisan. 

Al Ashrafiya. 

Jalbun. 

Deir Abu Da'if. 

Beit Quad. 

Deir Ghazzala. 

Arrana. 

Jalama. 

Muqeibila. 

Zububa. 

Ein al Mansi. 
Al Lajjun. 
Al Kafrin. 
Daliyat ar Rauha. 



Bat Shelomo. 
Shefeiya. 
Al Fureidis. 
Tantura. 



(b) List showing village sites in the vicinity of the boundary between the 
Arab and Jewish States — 

(i) in the section which lies north of the Jerusalem Enclave — 

Village sites in the Arab State. 
Al Kafrin. 



Village sites in the Jewish State. 



Khubbeiza. 
Umm ash Shauf. 
Qannir. 
Giv'at 'Ada. 
Karkur. 



Qaqun. 



Irtah. 
Far'un. 
At Taiyiba. 



Falama. 
Jaiyus. 



Al Buteimat. 

Kafr Qari. 

Wadi Ara. 

Baqa al Gharbiya. 

Jatt. 

Zeita. 

Attil. 

Deir al Ghusun. 

Shuweika. 

Tulkarm. 

Shufa. 
Ar Ras. 
Kafr Sur. 
Kafr Jammal. 

Azzun. 



(C31078) 



L*2 



294 



Village sites in the Jewish State. 
Habla. 
Kafr Bara. 
Kafr Qasim. 

Majdal'Yaba. 



Village .sites in the Arab State. 
Kafr Tulth. 
Sannirya. 
Mas-ha. 
Zawiya. 
Rafat. 
Deir Ballut. 



Al Muzeiri'a. 

Quia. Rantis. 

(ii) in the section which lies south of the Jerusalem Enclave — 
Village sites in the Jewish State. Village sites in the Arab State. 

Zamuqa. Al Mughar. 

Al Qubeiba. Yibna. 



APPENDIX 5 
(Chapter III, paragraph 51) 



THE METHODS BY WHICH THE LAND AMD POPULATION FIGUEES 
USED IN THE REPORT HAVE BEEN COMPILED 

1. Population 

(i) The Arab rural population. — The approximate percentage increase in the 
Arab rural population of each of the • seventeen sub-districts between the 
date of the Census in 1931 and the middle of 1937 was first calculated from 
the vital statistics. The percentage figure for the sub-district as so calculated 
was then applied to the Arab rural population of each village in that sub- 
district as determined at the Census of the year 1931, and the resultant figure 
was adopted as the population of the village at the middle of the year 1937. 
This method takes no account of inter- village migration, with the result that 
the population of some villages may be over-estimated and that of others 
under-estimated. 

(ii) Jewish rural population.- — The figures adopted for the Jewish rural 
population are those given in the survey of the population of the Jewish 
settlements carried out by the Jewish Agency in September, 1936. 

(iii) The Arab and Jewish urban population. — The figures adopted for the 
Arab and Jewish population of certain large towns are those given in 
estimates of such population in the middle of 1937, made by the Office of 
Statistics of the Palestine Government. 

2. Land 

The figures relating to land, with the exception of citrus land, have been 
extracted from the tax distribution lists prepared under the Rural Property 
Tax Ordinance and other tax records. They show the position as it was on j 
the 1st April, 1935, when the rural property tax first became payable. A 
special survey of citrus land was made in the autumn of 1937 ; the figures of 
citrus land are those given by this survey. 

Unleased State Domain has been classified as Arab where it is situated 
in Arab villages and as Jewish where it is situated in Jewish settlements. 
Metrouke land, that is common land over which the public as a whole 
exercises rights, has been classified according as the public which enjoys 
its use is Arab or Jewish. 



295 



APPENDIX 6 ' 
(Chapter VI, paragraph 96) 

THE BOUNDARY OF THE JEWISH STATE UNDER PLAN A IN THE 
VICINITY OF THE POWER STATION OF THE PALESTINE 
ELECTRIC CORPORATION ON THE RIVER JORDAN AT JISR AL 
MAJAMI 

The power station, of the Palestine Electric Corporation at Jisr al Majami 
on the River Jordan is situated on the eastern side of the river and is in 
Trans-Jordan territory. 

The area of the land held by the corporation on the Trans- Jordan side 
of the river is 6,000 dunums. 

It has been suggested to us that, in order to ensure the safety of the 
power station, it would be necessary to establish a belt of agricultural 
settlements on the east of the station and that for this purpose an area 
(50,000 dunums) of Trans- Jordan territory, lying west of a line drawn from 
the bridge at Ash Sheikh Hussein across the River Jordan near Beisan to 
El Hamma on the River Yarmuk, should be included in the Jewish State. 

We agree that the boundary should be modified so as to include the power 
station in the Jewish State, but consider that the area to be transferred 
from Trans-Jordan to the proposed Jewish State should not be larger than is 
absolutely necessary. In agreement with the military authorities the con- 
clusion we have reached is that the boundary of the area of 6,000 dunums 
which the corporation now hold on the east side of the River Jordan should 
become the boundary between Trans- Jordan and the proposed Jewish State. 
From the point of view of defence it is not considered essential to detach a 
larger area from Trans- Jordan. 



APPENDIX 7 
(Chapter X, paragraph 190) 

THE AGRICULTURAL ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF GALILEE 

1. Galilee, as it has been denned in paragraph 184 of chapter X of our 
Report, includes two plains, the coastal plain between Acre and the northern 
boundary of Palestine, and the Battauf plain north of Nazareth. The rest 
of the area is hill country. 

1. The Acre Plain 

2. This area is fertile and the coastal strip has good underground water 
supplies. The Director of Agriculture is of opinion that, if capital is available 
and the important question of markets is satisfactorily solved, there are 
considerable possibilities of development by intensive cultivation. Jewish 
authorities, in furnishing us with an estimate of agricultural absorptive 
capacity, assumed that the whole of the cultivable land of this area 
could be irrigated and that the farm unit could be as small as 25 dunums. 
But, as they themselves admit, their estimate of the amount of land that can 
be irrigated is based upon a theoretical computation which may not prove to 
be accurate. Moreover, their estimate of a farm unit of 25 dunums is based 
upon the experimental " Organic Mixed Farm " at the Rehovot Agricultural 
Research Institute. This " Organic Mixed Farm " is, however, still in the 
experimental stage and we believe that very few, if any, such farms have 
been established. Further, the success of the small " Organic Mixed Farm " 
as a means of establishing a large number of persons on the land is dependent 
upon a solution of the problem of markets. The Director of Agriculture 
takes a more conservative figure for the farm unit and, subject again to 



296 



the proviso that the question of markets has been, solved, proposes a unit of 
30 dunums in one half of the area — the strip along the coast— and 70 dunums 
in the other half. In estimating the possibility of further settlement in Galilee 
we propose to adopt the Director's unit figures. 



2. The Battauf Plain 

3. This area is also fertile but is subject to flooding during seasons of 
heavy rainfall. The Director of Agriculture considers that with suitable 
drainage works, which would be costly, it would be possible to increase the 
productivity of this plain ; for this area he suggests a farm unit of 70 dunums. 



3. The Hill Country 

4. The Director of Agriculture takes the view that, provided the 
problem of markets is solved, and provided capital is available for terracing, 
levelling and "other reclamation works, this area could be planted extensively 
with fruit trees, and that if, in addition, underground water were discovered, 
certain areas could be utilized for the cultivation of vegetables and fodder 
crops. He is of opinion, however, that the whole area cannot be brought under 
cultivation. Afforestation is of great importance in the hill areas in order to 
prevent soil erosion, and he takes the view that an area of 220,000 dunums 
should be excluded as forest reserves. Moreover, the hills are in parts wholly 
rocky and uncultivable ; such areas are estimated at about 185,000 dunums. 

5. For a fruit plantation in this hill country^the same Jewish authorities 
estimate that a lot viable is 40 dunums. But they admitted before us that 
they had had no experience of a fruit farm of this size -being operated success- 
fully. The Director of Agriculture takes a more conservative estimate of 
60 dunums, and we propose to adopt this figure. 

6. We are now in a position to form an estimate of the agricultural 
absorptive capacity of Galilee on what we regard as an optimistic basis— 

(i) The Acre Plain. 

Area . . . . . . . . . . = 158,400 dunums. 

Deduct — 

Uncultivable area . . . . ... . . 15,700 



71,350 dunums at 30 dunums per farm unit 
71,350 dunums at 70 dunums per farm unit 

(ii) The Battauf Plain. 

Area = 41,339 dunums at 70 dunums per farm 
unit. 

(iii) 



The Hill Country. 
Total area 
Deduct — 

Forest reserves 
Uncultivable area 



142,700 
2,378 farm units. 
1,019 

590 



= 1 105,162 dunums. 



Dunums. 
220,000 
185,000 



405,000 



700,162 

700, 162 dunums at 60 dunums per farm unit = 1 1,669 farm units. 
We assume that a family consists of 4-75 persons.* 

* The census of 1931 showed that the average household in Palestine 
consisted of 4 • 5 persons (Vol. I, page 32) : for the sub-districts of Acre, Safad 
and Nazareth the average figure was somewhat higher, and we have, therefore, 
adopted 4-75 for our present purposes. 



297 



The agricultural absorptive capacity of Galilee then becomes : — 
(2,378 + 1,019 + 590 + 11,669) X 4-75 = 74,366 persons. 

The present total population of Galilee is 91, 104 persons. If it be assumed 
that 65 per cent.* of tnis population is supported primarily by agriculture, 
the present agricultural population is 59,218 persons. On the assumption, 
therefore, that the land is fully developed under the most favourable conditions, 
the additional agricultural population which Galilee can support is (74,366 — 
59,218) = 15,148 persons. The natural increase in the Arab population of 
Palestine as a whole may be taken at 2-5 per cent, a year. Assuming that 
this rate holds good for Galilee, the yearly increase, due to natural causes, 
of the agricultural population in this area is therefore 
59,218 n „ 

— jqq- X 2'5 = 1,480 persons a year. 

The additional agricultural population which Galilee can support, if the 
land is fully developed under the most favourable conditions, will be therefore 
absorbed by the natural increase of the existing population in about ten years. 



APPENDIX 8 
(Chapter XIII, paragraph 251 (5) ). 



THE BOUNDARY OF THE HAIFA INDUSTRIAL ZONE 

We suggest that the following boundary would be suitable — 

A line starting from the sea shore south of the town of Acre where 
the Na'amin river flows into the sea, along that river until it meets the 
boundary of the lands of the village of Emeq Zevulun, along the eastern 
boundary of the lands of that village till it meets the boundary of the 
lands of. the village of Kufritta, along the northern and eastern boundaries 
of that village till it meets the boundary of the lands of the village 
of Ramat Hasafon, along the eastern boundary of the lands of that 
village till it meets the boundary of the lands of the village of Kefar 
Hassidim, along the eastern and southern boundaries of that village till 
it meets the boundary of the village of 'Isfiya, along a line drawn from 
the junction of the boundaries of Kefar Hassidim and Tsfiya to the 
south-west corner of the lands of the village of Yajur, along the western 
boundary of the lands of the villages of Yajur and Nesher, along the 
western boundary of the lands of the village of Balad esh Sheikh till it 
meets the southern boundary of the lands of the village of Ahuzat 
Sir Herbert Samuel, along the southern boundary of the lands of that 
village, and then along a line drawn to the sea south of the settlement of 
Neuhardhof. 

We do not, of course, rule out the possibility that the line we have proposed 
may from the outset require some modification. 



* The figure of 65 per cent, has been calculated from Table XVI of Vol. II 
of the census of 1931. It represents the percentage which the total number 
of earners and their dependents under class A, sub-class 1, Order 1, Pasture 
and Agriculture (excluding Forestry and Agricultural machines service) in 
the three sub-districts of Acre, Saf ad, and Nazareth bore to the total population 
of those sub-districts at the census of 1931. 



298 



APPENDIX 9 
(Chapter XVI) 



DECLARATION OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ MADE 
ON THE OCCASION OF THE TERMINATION OF THE 
MANDATORY REGIME IN 'IRAQ. 



CHAPTER I 
Article 1. 

Protection ol Minorities. 

The stipulations contained in the present chapter are recognised as 
fundamental laws of 'Iraq, and no law, regulation or official action, shall 
conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or 
official action now or in the future prevail over them. 

Article 2. 

1. Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all 
inhabitants of 'Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race 
or religion. 

2. All inhabitants of 'Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether 
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not 
inconsistent with public order or public morals. 

Article 3. 

Ottoman subjects habitually resident in the territory of 'Iraq on 
August 6th, 1924, shall be deemed to have acquired on that date 'Iraqi 
nationality to the exclusion of Ottoman nationality in accordance with 
Article 30 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty and under the conditions laid down m 
the 'Iraqi Nationality Law of October 9th, 1924. 

Article 4. 

1. All 'Iraqi nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy 
the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or 
religion. 

2. The electoral system shall guarantee equitable representation to 
racial, religious and linguistic minorities in 'Iraq. 

3. Differences of race, language or religion shall not prejudice any 
'Iraqi national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, 
as for instance, admission to public employments, functions and honours, or 
the exercise of professions or industries. 

4. No restriction will be imposed on the free use by any 'Iraqi national 
of any language, in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press 
or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings. 

5. Notwithstanding the establishment by the 'Iraqi Government of Arabic 
as the official language, and notwithstanding the special arrangements 
to be made by the 'Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of the present Declara- 
tion, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish languages, adequate 
facilities will be given to all 'Iraqi nationals whose mother tongue is "not the 
Official language, for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, 
before the courts. 



299 



Article 5. 

'Iraqi nationals who belong to racial, religions or linguistic minorities will 
enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other 'Iraqi 
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage 
and control at their own expense, or to establish in the future, charitable, 
religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, 
with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely 
therein. 

Article 6. 

The 'Iraqi Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem 
minorities, in so far as concerns their family law and personal status, 
measures permitting the settlement of these questions in accordance with the 
customs and usage of the communities to which those minorities belong. 

The 'Iraqi Government will communicate to the Council of the League 
of Nations information regarding the manner in which these measures have 
been executed. 

Article 7. 

1. The 'Iraqi Government undertakes to grant full protection, facilities 
and authorisation to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious 
establishments, charitable works and pious foundations of minority religious 
communities existing in 'Iraq. 

2. Each of these communities shall have the right of establishing councils, 
in important administrative districts, competent to administer pious founda- 
tions and charitable bequests. These councils shall be competent to deal 
with the collection of income derived therefrom, and the expenditure thereof 
in accordance with the wishes of the donor or with the custom in use among 
the community. These communities shall also undertake the supervision of 
the property of orphans, in accordance with law. The councils referred to 
above shall be under the supervision of the Government. 

3. The 'Iraqi Government will not refuse, for the formation of new 
religious or charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which may 
be guaranteed to existing institutions of that nature. 

Article 8. 

1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which 
are resident a considerable proportion of 'Iraqi nationals whose mother 
tongue is not the official language, the 'Iraqi Government will make provision 
for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools instruction 
shall be given tp the children of such nationals through the medium of their 
own language ; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the 
'Iraqi Government from making the teaching of Arabic obligatory in the 
said schools. 

2. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of 
'Iraqi nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these 
minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application 
of sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, 
Municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or charitable purposes. 

Article 9. 

1. 'Iraq undertakes that in the liwas of Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk and 
Sulaimaniya, the official language, side by side with Arabic, shall be Kurdish 
in the qadhas in which the population is predominantly of Kurdish race. 

. In the qadhas of Kifri and Kirkuk, however, in the liwa of Kirkuk, 
where a considerable part of the population is of Turcoman race, the official 
language, side by side with Arabic, shall be either Kurdish or Turkish. 



300 



2. 'Iraq undertakes that in the said qadhas the officials shall, subject to 
justifiable exceptions, have a competent knowledge of Kurdish or Turkish 
as the case may be. 

3. Although in these qadhas the criterion for the choice of officials will 
be, as in the rest of 'Iraq, efficiency and knowledge of the language, rather 
than race, 'Iraq undertakes that the officials shall as hitherto be selected, so 
far as possible, from among 'Iraqis from one or other of these qadhas. 

Article 10. 

The stipulations of the foregoing articles of this Declaration/ so far as 
they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities are 
declared to constitute obligations of international concern and will be placed 
under the guarantee of the League of Nations. No modification will be 
made in them without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of 
Nations. 

Any Member of the League represented on the Council shall have the 
right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of 
infraction of any of these stipulations, and the Council may thereupon take 
such measures and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective 
in the circumstances. 

Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of 
these articles between 'Iraq and any Member of the League represented on 
the Council shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under 
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Any such dispute 
shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be 
final and shall have the same force and effect- as an award under Article 13 
of the Covenant. 



CHAPTER II. 
Article 11. 

Most-favoured-nation Clause. 

1. Subject to reciprocity, 'Iraq undertakes to grant to Members of the 
League most-favoured-nation treatment for a period of ten years from the 
date of its admission to membership of the League of Nations. 

Nevertheless, should measures taken by any Member of the League of 
Nations, whether such measures are in force at the above-mentioned date or 
are taken during the period contemplated in the preceding paragraph, be of 
such a nature as to disturb to the detriment of 'Iraq the balance of trade 
between 'Iraq and the Member of the League of Nations in question, by 
seriously affecting the chief exports of 'Iraq, the latter in view of its special 
situation reserves to itself the right to request the Member of the League of 
Nations concerned to open negotiations immediately for the purpose of 
restoring the balance. 

Should an agreement not be reached by negotiation within three months 
from its request 'Iraq declares that it will consider itself as freed, vis-a-vis of 
the Member of the League in question, from the obligation laid down in the 
first sub-paragraph above. 

2. The undertaking contained in paragraph 1 above shall not apply 
to any advantages which are, or may in the future be, accorded by 'Iraq to 
any adjacent country in order to facilitate frontier traffic, or to those resulting 
from a customs union concluded by 'Iraq. Nor shall the undertaking apply 
to any special advantages in customs matters which 'Iraq may grant to goods 
the produce or manufacture of Turkey, or of any country whose territory 
was in 1914 wholly included in the Ottoman Empire in Asia. 



301 



Article 12. 

Judicial Organisation. 

A uniform system of justice shall be applicable to all, 'Iraqis and foreigners 
alike. It shall be such as effectively to ensure the protection and full exercise 
of their rights both to foreigners and to nationals. 

The judicial system at present in force, and based on Articles 2, 3 and 4 
of the Agreement between the Mandatory Power and 'Iraq, signed on 
March 4th, 1931, shall be maintained for a period of 10 years from the date 
of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League of Nations. 

Appointments to the posts reserved for foreign jurists by Article 2 of the 
said Agreement shall be made by the 'Iraqi Government. Their holders 
shall be foreigners, but selected without distinction of nationality ; they must 
be fully qualified. 

Article 13. 

International Conventions. 

'Iraq considers itself bound by all the international agreements and 
conventions, both general and special, to which it has become a party, whether 
by its own action or by that of the Mandatory Power acting on its behalf. 
Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements 
and conventions shall be respected by 'Iraq. throughout the period for which 
they were concluded. 

Article 14. 

Acquired Rights and Financial Obligation. 

'Iraq, taking note of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations 
of September 15th, 1925 :— 

(1) Declares that all rights of whatever nature acquired before the 
termination of the mandatory regime by individuals, associations or 
juridical persons, shall be respected. 

(2) Undertakes to respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever 
nature assumed on 'Iraq's behalf by the Mandatory Power during the 
period of the Mandate. 

'Article 15. 

Freedom of Conscience. 

Subject to such measures as may be essential for the maintenance of 
public order and morality, 'Iraq undertakes to ensure and guarantee through- 
out its territory freedom of conscience and worship and the free exercise of 
the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all 
denominations, whatever the nationality of those missions or of their members. 

Article 16. 
Final Clause. 

The provisions of the present chapter constitute obligations of international 
concern. Any Member of the League of Nations may call the attention of the 
Council to any infraction of these provisions. They may not be modified 
except by agreement between 'Iraq and the Council of the League of Nations 
acting by a majority vote. 

Any difference of opinion which may arise between 'Iraq and any Member 
of the League of Nations represented on the Council, with regard to the 
interpretation or the execution of the said provisions, shall, by an application 
by such Member, be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of Inter- 
national Justice. 



302 

The undersigned, duly authorised, accepts on behalf of 'Iraq, subject to 
ratification, the above provisions, being the declaration provided for by the 
resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of May 19th, 1932. 

DONE at Baghdad on this thirtieth day of May, 1932, 

in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of 
the League of Nations. 

(Signed) Noury Sa'id. 

Prime Minister of 'Iraq. 



APPENDIX 10 
(Chapter XVI, paragraph 327) 



CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS COURTS 



The Eastern (Orthodox) Community- 

A. Appeal 

B. First Instance 



Latin (Catholic) Community — 

A. Appeal 

B. First Instance . . 



3. Gregorian Armenian Community- 

A. Appeal 

B. First Instance 

4. Armenian (Catholic) Community- 

A. Appeal 

B. First Instance 



Jerusalem. 

1. Jerusalem for — 

Jerusalem District. 
Ramie sub-district. 
Gaza sub-district. 

2. Haifa (for the town). 

3. Acre (for sub-district as well 

as the villages of the 
Haifa sub-district) . 

4. Nazareth for — 

Nazareth sub-district. 
Tiberias sub-district. 



Jerusalem. 

Jerusalem for — 

Jerusalem and Southern 
Districts, and Nablus 
and Tulkarm sub- 
districts. 

Nazareth for — 

Haifa, Acre, and Jenin 
sub-districts, and all 
Galilee sub-districts. 



Jerusalem. 

Jerusalem, for Palestine. 



Beirut (Lebanon). 
Jerusalem, for Palestine. 



303 

5. Syrian (Catholic) Community — 

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Beirut (Lebanon) . 

B. First Instance . . . . Jerusalem, for Palestine. 

6. Chaldean (Uniate) Community — 

This community has no ecclesiastical representation in Palestine. 
Cases of personal status are referred to the Courts of the Greek Catholic 
(Melkite) Community. 

7. Greek Catholic (Melkite) Community — 

A. Appeal .. .. .. .. Jerusalem. 

B. First Instance . . . . . . 1. Jerusalem, for the Jerusalem 

and Southern Districts. 

2. Haifa. 

3. Acre. 

4. Nazareth. 
-5. Tiberias. 

8. Maronite Community — 

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Bkirky (Lebanon) . 

B. First Instance . . . . . . Jerusalem for Palestine. 

9. Syrian Orthodox Community — 

A. Appeal . . . . . . . . Horns (Syria) . 

B. First Instance . . . . . . Jerusalem, for Palestine. 

10. Coptic Community — 

Cases are heard by the Courts of the Eastern (Orthodox) Community. 

11. Abyssinian Community — 

This Community was administered hitherto by the Coptic Patriarch 
(Cairo) through the Coptic Bishop of Jerusalem. The number of its adherents 
being very limited, they have had no known cases of personal status hitherto. 



APPENDIX 11 



BUDGETARY FORECASTS : RECONCILIATION WITH CURRENT 

ESTIMATES 

I. Palestine 

1. The forecasts given in chapter XVIII are based on the published 
Estimates of Palestine for the year 1938/39. In this appendix we give a 
brief explanation of the main causes of difference between the estimated 
figures and the figures of " distributable " revenue and expenditure used 
in the forecasts. By " distributable " figures we mean the figures under each 
head of revenue and expenditure for all Palestine after such adjustment as 
may be necessary to arrive at the appropriate amount in each case which 
falls to be distributed between the post-partition areas. 



304 



Revenue 

2. The following table gives the estimated revenue for 1938/39 according 
to the published estimates under each of the main heads ; the " distributable " 
figure for each head ; and the difference between the two. 



Tax Revenue — • 

(i) Customs Duties 

(ii) Excise Duties 

(iii) House and Land Tax, Tithes, 

Animal Tax, Urban and 
Rural Property Tax 

(iv) Licences and Stamp Duties 

(v) Fees for Registration of 

Companies and Partner- 
ships, and Registration of 
Land 

Total Tax Revenue 
Non-tax Revenue — 

(vi) Other fees 

(vii) Posts and Telegraphs 

(viii) Port and Marine 

(ix) Rent on Government Pro- 

perty, Interest and 
Currency Profits, etc. 

(x) Miscellaneous receipts and 

reimbursements, fines and 
forfeitures 

(xi) Grants-in-aid and other 

grants from the United 
Kingdom 

(xii) Non-recurrent items (land 

sales, adjustment of 
items overpaid, etc.) 



(1) 

Estimated 
Revenue, 
1938-39. 

£P- 

1,900,010 
340,000 



399,000 
163,700 



(2) 

Distribut- 
able 
Revenue. 

£P- 
1,815,000 
340,000 



385,000 
158,000 



(3) (4) 
Difference 
between 
(1) and (2). 
+ 

— 85,010 



.14,000 
5,700 



135,500 170,000 34,500 



2,938,210 2,868,000 



309,400 
516,350 
125,350 



308,000 
120,000 



212,100 163,000 



220,125 190,000 



176,710 — 



1,400 
516,350 
5,350 



49,100 



30,125 



176,710 



21,900 31,000 9,100 



43,600 883,745 



Total non-tax Revenue . . . . 1,581,935 812,000 

Total Revenue 4,520,145 3,680,000 — — 

Net difference between (1) and (2) . . 840,145 

3. This difference between the current estimates and the distributable 
figure is accounted for as follows — 

(i) The main cause is the fact that certain items are shown in the 
former in gross but in the latter as net. Thus the figures in the estimates 
are swollen by the gross receipts from posts, telegraphs and telephones 
(off-set on the expenditure side by the gross cost of the Posts and 
Telegraphs Department). Again the figure for Customs duties in the 
current estimates is the gross receipt, off -set on the expenditure side by 
the amount estimated to be repayable in drawbacks and refunds. This 
cause accounts for a difference of ^P. 604, 850, made up of — 

£P- 

(a) Posts and Telegraphs . . . . . . . . . . 516,350 

(6) Drawbacks and Refunds of Customs duty . . . . 88,500 



604,850 



305 



(ii) The next important difference is the omission of all grants and 
grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds, accounting for ^P. 176,7 10, 
made up of — 

(a) Grant-in-aid of Trans- Jordan Frontier Force . . . . 148,000 
(6) Grant-in-aid of Hydrographic Survey . . . . 27,000 

(c) Grants from Colonial Development Fund . . . . 1,710 

176,710 

(iii) There remains a difference of ^P. 58, 585 spread Over a number of 
heads, as shown in the table in the preceding paragraph, and caused by 
the necessity of making allowance for the effect of various existing ten- 
dencies, some indicating a prospective fall in revenue, such as the appre- 
ciable fall in rents in the four large towns, by which the receipts from 
urban property tax will be affected, and some pointing in the opposite 
direction, such as the fact that over the next few years the annual 
assessment to rural property tax will be augmented by the inclusion 
of newly planted citrus land, as the period of exemption from payment of 
tax at the higher rate expires. 

The sum of these three items is equal to the difference between the 
two sets of figures, ^P. 840, 145. 

4. For the purpose of allocating the distributable revenue between the 
several areas, all available sources of information, consistent with the need 
for secrecy, were drawn upon. The yield of direct taxation, and a number 
of other miscellaneous items, can be allocated in accordance with the known 
origin of the receipt ; but the allocation of the proceeds of indirect taxation 
requires to be specially explained. For this purpose, the population was 
divided into a number of categories, based upon locality, race, social habits, 
and earning power, and an average daily wage was applied to each category. 
The necessary information was derived partly from the Village Statistics, 
partly from data obtained in the Census of 1931, and partly from estimates 
furnished by the Jewish Agency. The total of the products of the number 
of households in each category multiplied by the corresponding basic wage 
was assumed to give the purchasing power of the population in each category. 
Each of the main items in the list of import and excise duties was then analysed 
upon certain assumptions as regards the preferences and purchasing power of 
consumers according to the various categories, and the estimated yield of 
duties distributed in accordance with the results of the analysis between the 
several areas. In the absence of any ground for assuming a special racial or 
social preference, the yield was distributed in accordance with the ratio of 
general purchasing power indicated by the distribution of the several categories. 
It is interesting to note that according to these tables the purchasing power 
of the Arab State works out at about 23 per cent, of the purchasing power 
of all Palestine, whereas the estimate of the total amount of revenue, tax- 
revenue, and customs revenue, respectively, allocable to that state is only 
13-8 per cent., 13-2 per cent., and 11-73 per cent., respectively, of the total 
distributable amounts in each case. 

5. The value of the figures prepared by the Treasurer of Palestine, as a 
guide in estimating the probable revenues of the proposed new states, depends 
on the assumptions — 

(a) that the existing system and rates of taxation will continue ; 
(6) that the distribution of population will remain unaltered ; 

(c) that economic conditions in the proposed new states will be 
unaffected by partition ; and 

(d) that the ability of the Jewish and Arab States to collect revenues 
will be the same as that of the existing Administration. 

In other words, this analysis of revenue assumes that partition amounts to 
no more than the drawing of a series of lines on the map of Palestine. 



306 



6. It must also be borne in mind — 

(a) that any shifting of the Jewish population from the Arab State 
or the Mandated Territories to the Jewish State will increase the tax- 
paying capacity of the Jewish State and reduce that of the Arab State 
and the Mandated Territories ; and 

(6) that the figures of estimated non-tax revenue receipts of the 
proposed states and the Mandated Territories largely depend on the 
provision to be made for expenditure for services in respect of which a 
large part of these receipts is specifically collected. 



7. 



Expenditure. 





(1) 


(2) 






Distribut- 




Estimates ableexpen- 




1938/39. 


diture. 




£P- 


£P- 


A. Departmental Services ~\ 






B. Direct Departmental Super- > 


3,437,577 


3,150,000 


visory Services J 






C. Pensions 


72,775 


72,775 


D. Public Debt and Loan Charges 


283,660 


283,660 


E. Defence and Trans- Jordan 


208,954 




Frontier Force 






F. Railways (net) 


67,000 


86,000 


G. Central Administration 


130,032 


134,000 


H. Public Works Extraordinary . . 


755,651 


350,000 


I. Posts and Telegraphs 


490,111 


+ 13,140 






(surplus) 



(3) 

Difference between 
(1) and. (2). 

+ 



19,000 
3,968 



£P- 
287,577 



208,954 



405,651 
503,251 



Total 

Net amount by which distri- 
butable expenditure falls 
short of the current year's 
estimates is therefore 



5,445,760 4,063,295 22,968 1,405,433 



1,382,465 



8. Details of Heads A and B are given below — 
Head of Expenditure. 
(1) District Administration 
(.2) Judicial Department 

(3) Customs, Excise, Trade and 

Ports 

(4) Department of Health 

(5) Department of Education . . 

(6) Department of Agriculture 

and Fisheries 

(7) Department of Forests 

(8) Department of Antiquities . . 

(9) Department of Lands and 

Surveys 

(10) Department of Police and 

Prisons 

(11) Department of Migration . . 

(12) Department of Public Works 

(13) Public Works Recurrent 

(14) Printing and Stationery 

(15) Civil Aviation 

(16) Miscellaneous 



187,550 
121,376 


187,550 — 
121,376 — 




276,762 
245,646 
326,406 


188,262 — 
240,000 — 
310,000 — 


88,500 

. 5,646 
16,406 


194,700 
25,668 
24,217 


184,000 — 
25,668 — 
24,217 — 


10,700 


140,669 


140,669 — 




1,022,068 
41,599 
112,334) 
344,800 J 
31,966 
18,071 
323,745 


1,022,068 . — 
41,599 — 

¥ 449,554 — 

31,966 — 
18,071 — 
165,000 — 


7,580 
158,745 


3,437,577 


3,150,000 


287-,577 . 



307 



9. The difference between distributable expenditure and the amounts 
provided under each head in the current year' estimates may be explained 
shortly thus- — 

(i) As explained under Revenue, the cost of the Posts and 
Telegraphs Department is shown in the Palestine Estimates 
in gross, but in the distributable figures the cost of the service 
is netted, on the assumption that revenue and expenditure will 
exactly balance, after meeting the Post Office share of the public 
debt charges (^P. 13, 140). In fact the estimates provide for a 
small surplus of £P.26,239 in the current year, after meeting the 
estimated expenditure on capital account in full, but without 
providing for the Post Office share of public debt charges, which 
in the Palestine Estimates is provided as part of the cost of 
Public Debt and Loan Charges in general (Head II of Palestine 
Estimates) . In the figures of distributable expenditure the full 
cost of public debt and loan charges is shown under Head D, 
including the Post Office share (^P. 13, 140), and accordingly 
it is necessary to show a surplus of ^P. 13, 140 under Head I 
(Posts and Telegraphs) in order to balance this amount. The 
netting of the Post Office figures therefore accounts for £V. 

(^P.490,111 + 13,140)= 503,251 

out of the difference between 'the distributable expenditure and 

the estimates for the year. 

(ii) The Estimates provide only a token sum of ^P.5,0Q0 
for Defence (for the reason given in chapter XVIII), but 
£P. 203, 954 for the gross cost of the Trans- Jordan Frontier 
Force, although the net liability of the Palestine Govern- 
ment is limited to one-quarter of the recurrent cost of the 
Force, and the whole of the capital cost in Palestine, the rest 
being financed by a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom. 
As explained in chapter XVIII, nothing is included in the figures 

of distributable expenditure on account of Defence, including £P. 

the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force ; and the grant-in-aid has 

also been excluded. This accounts for . . . . . . . . 208,954 

(iii) Under Head A is included in the current Estimates 
£P.88,500 for the payment of customs drawbacks and refunds of 
duty, an item which, as explained in paragraph 3(i) above, is 
netted in the distributable figures. Under Head A (6) is 
also included £P.50 for expenditure from a Colonial Develop- 
ment Fund grant which is omitted from the distributable figures £V. 
on both sides of the account .. .. .. .. .. 88,550 

(iv) There remain differences under two heads of expenditure £P. 

Head H— Public Works Extraordinary 405,651 

Heads A and B — Departmental Services (net) . . . . . . 176,059 

which represent non-recurrent or abnormal services for which 

it is not thought necessary to make special provision in the 
figures of distributable expenditure. 

Of the total provision £P.755,651 for Public Works Extra- 
ordinary in the 1938/39 Estimates, ^P. 194,962 is on account of 
revotes and ^P.228,776 for the continuation of works in progress. 
Of the balance of ^P. 331, 913, at least half is for Police and 
Prisons, and may be classed as emergency measures. Before 
1935 the average expenditure on Public Works Extraordinary 
was only about ^P. 150,000 a year. A large reduction below the 
present rate of expenditure may be expected under normal 
conditions. — 

Total difference 1,369,325 



308 



10. The following notes explain the basis of apportionment between the 
several areas of the distributable expenditure under each head — ■ 

(i) Heads A and B, Departmental Services 
The apportionment is based on returns submitted by each of the Depart- 
ments concerned. 

(ii) Heads C and D, Pensions and Public Debt 
These are regarded as financial obligations common to the whole of 
Palestine ; and for the reasons explained in chapter XX, no attempt has 
been made to apportion them, in the case of pensions, in relation to service 
in or for the several areas, or, in the case of loan charges, in relation to the 
assets created out of the proceeds of the loan. It is proposed that they should 
be paid as an undistributed liability out of a common central fund. The 
effect of this will be to distribute the cost between the several areas in the 
same proportion as the distribution of the net surplus revenue of the' central 
fund. According to formula A proposed in chapter XXI, this will be in equal 
shares between the three areas ; and for the purpose of the budgetary fore- 
casts made in chapter XVIII this basis has been followed for expenditure 
under both these heads. The share of the Mandated Territories has, for 
convenience, been divided equally between the Jerusalem Enclave and the 
Northern Mandated Territories. 

Under Head D is shown the full amount of public debt and loan charges, 
including both the share of the Posts and Telegraphs Department (^P. 13, 140) 
and the Railways share (^P. 124, 760, being interest and management charges 
on ^2,480,105 stock of the 5 per cent. Guaranteed Loan, but no part of the 
sinking fund) . 

(iii) Head E, Defence 
For the reasons given in chapter XVIII, no account has been taken of 
the future cost of defence in the budgetary forecasts of the proposed areas. 

(iv) Railways 

The estimated loss on working (excluding the cost of debt) has been 
revised and is now found to be as follows — 





Surplus + 


Capital 


Total. 




or 


Expen- 


Surplus. 


Deficit. 




Deficit — 


- diture. 








£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


£P- 


Arab State (Lydda-Rafah section 










and portion of Hejaz Railway) 


-25,000 


15,000 




40,000 


Jerusalem Enclave (Jaffa-Jerusa- 










lem section) 


-46,000 


10,000 




„ 56,000 


Northern Enclave (Hejaz Railway) 


-40,000 






40,000 


Total Mandated Territories 


-86,000 






96,000 


Jewish State (Haifa-Lydda 










section) 


+80,000 


30,000 


50,000 





50,000 136,000 

Net Total Deficit .... 86,000 

For the reasons given in chapter XVII, it is thought that the public service 
will be best served if the Mandatory Government takes over direct respon- 
sibility for the Lydda-Rafah section of the line in the Arab State : accordingly 
in the apportionment of charges ^P. 35, 000 has been added on this account 
to the deficit falling on the Mandated Territories, leaving the Arab State with 
a -deficit of £P. 5,000 in respect of the portion of the Hejaz Railway in 
Trans-Jordan. 



309 



The net result is — 

Arab State 5,000 deficit 

Jewish State . . . . . . . . . . 50,000 surplus 

Mandated Territories 131,000 deficit 

(v) Head G, Central Administration 
This has been distributed in proportion to the total expenditure in each area. 

(vi) Head H, Public Works Extraordinary 
The allocation is a rough estimate of probable requirements. 

(vii) Head I, Posts and Telegraphs 
It is estimated that the service in the Arab State will involve a deficit 
of £P.20,000, without allowing for debt charges. The total Post Office share 
of debt charges is estimated to be distributable thus — ■ 



Arab State 2,190 

Jewish State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,550 

Jerusalem Enclave . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,150 

Northern Mandated Territory 2,250 



Total 13,140 



The service is deemed to be self-balancing over the whole country, after 
meeting the debt charges in full : so that the transfer of the debt charge to 
Head D leaves a surplus of ^P. 13, 140 to be apportioned between the several 
areas, which has been taken into account in estimating the outcome for 
each area. 

11. It is recognized that the figures of distributable expenditure are to 
some extent unreal, because (i) by the time the new Administrations have been 
set up, the amount of distributable expenditure will probably be found to 
have been under-estimated on account of normal increments and pension 
charges, etc. ; (ii) no provision has been made in the forecasts for the 
additional expenditure directly attributable to partition ; (iii) no provision 
has been made for defence ; and (iv) above all no provision has been made 
for the risks of economic and other disturbances initially attendant on the 
introduction of partition. Nor can it be said with any confidence that the 
adjustments in the economic system which will inevitably be caused by 
partition will be without a permanent effect on the budgetary prospects of 
the several areas, and particularly of the Arab State. 

12. To sum up, assuming that peace will be restored and the necessary 
economic adjustments are safely carried out, the forecasts allow a considerable 
margin for improvement. But if disorders should continue, or if partition 
proves to have a serious and far-reaching effect on the economic structure 
of all or any of the new areas, it is probable that the budgetary position of 
the areas affected will be considerably worse than the forecasts suggest. 



II. Trans-Jordan 

13. The Trans- Jordan Estimates for 1938-39 are — 
Revenue — £P. 

i. Local Revenue (including Posts and Telegraphs) . . . . 348,292 

ii. Grants and Grants-in-aid from United Kingdom funds . . 148,025 



iii. Total Revenue 



496,317 



310 



Expenditure — £P. 

iv. Ordinary Expenditure (including Posts and Telegraphs and 

^P. 12,400 for pensions and gratuities) .. .. .. 374,641 

v. Extraordinary Expenditure, other than that met out of 

specific grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41,970 

vi. Expenditure met out of specific grants (Trans- Jordan 

Frontier Force ; Trans-Jordan share of Ottoman Public 
Debt ; Hydrographic Survey ; and expenditure from 
Colonial Development Fund grants) . . . . . . 93,025 



vii. Total Expenditure 509,636 

14. For the purpose of estimating the effect on the budgetary position 
of the Arab State, if Trans- Jordan and the Arab area west of Jordan should 
unite to form a single Arab State, it is proposed to exclude, on the revenue 
side, the whole of item (ii), on the assumption that assistance will no longer 
be provided direct by the United Kingdom to an independent State, and, on 
the expenditure side, the whole oi item (vi) on the assumption that — 

(a) the question of responsibility for the Trans- Jordan Frontier 
Force will be considered as part of the general question of defence of 
the new states, for which no provision is being made in the present 
budgetary forecasts ; 

(6) the Trans- Jordan share of the Ottoman Public Debt will be taken 
over direct by His Majesty's Government, for the reasons given in 
chapter XVIII ; and 

(c) the Arab State will not, for the present at least, be able to make 
special provision from within its own resources for financing services 
such as the Hydrographic Survey, for which grants have hitherto been 
provided by His Majesty's Government. 

(d) It is also proposed to take out the cost of pensions from item (iv) 
(^P. 12,400), and to charge this to the central fund as proposed in 
chapter XX (Public Debt). 

15. The net effect will be to add to the budget of the Arab State — 

On the revenue side . . . . . . . . . . . . 348,292 

On the expenditure side (£P. 509,636-93,025-12,400)= . 404,211 



(C 31078) 10,000 10/38 



THE COMMISSION'S TOURS 



MAP No, 2. 



Scale t: 1,000,000 

Kilometre^ S 10 20 30 

■ ■ ■ 1 u . I 



40 
_i 



JO Kilometres 



Tyre 



Has an NaQnra mfm^^f 



33i 




Tarsbiha 



Acne 



HAIFA 



At Ram* JlSaTad^P 

Xs^id al Kurum 

Caperflaum 



Cosh Pinna 



far J? afiaf Ya'oab 

~ -1* 



l 4, 



. Shifo 'Amr 



Lata ^ Huri¥i 



Biayimina 



Hud era 



Ghabifbib' 



R 1 A 




V 



32^ 



Sh. Muwan 
TEL AVIV i 

JAFFA^^™ 
Bat Yam 



Al Majdal 




Rafaii 



31' 



v 



30° 




" K — o Tam-id 



Survey of Paitttf/te, JAfia J93B, 



Ordnance Snrvty, I938l 



MAP OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION'S PARTITION PLAN 
(REPRODUCED FROM THEIR REPORT) 



MAP No. 3 



IWILE& 20 IO 



Scale 



20 



Railways 
Hosds 



— + 



■y- 





















: .v ., y-j,, ■• , : 



















T 

it, A 



.v.:-.-.-!'-!. 



fad 



('■■■:. 


> 


Act;e 


• ■:/•:v:x■x■x■■■■ 























i , T/'ber/3s 



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Nazaretl 



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(ArFA 



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„•::.: 

■•:■>.: 



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urns 




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+ 

\ 

\ 

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0.R.924. 



War Office,!^ 
Printed at O.S, 1938. 



THE BOUNDARIES OF JAFFA 




JEWISH LAND HOLDINGS map No. s. 




Aitttir Mf Mrtm,, J»7. i : 750,000 OrctndFi h Starve JftH, 



rqAMS-joftoAH snow i na cultivated 

AND DESEfcT ZONE 



KSiftT NHL 




S T ft I A 



\ 



V 



\ 



t* 

5 



i 



JERUSALEM ®, 



SYRIA 



TRANS ^ JORDAN 



i =1.000.000 



FISCAL SURVEY 1 



CULTIVATED 
ZONE. 



1 IRftlD 

2 flEMTHA 

4 IABAYIR AD WAN 

6 OAT RAN E 

7 BLACK &OCK 
fl MA AN 

9 MAFRAK 



© 



LO 



TAFI LE 



< 

a. 



PETS A 



/ 



^ j MAAK,r.Hi 



/ 




AOA&A \ 



Printed at Q.S. 193&. 



MAP ILLUSTRATING JEWISH PROPOSALS EXAMINED IN CHAPTERS IX. and XIL 

MAP No, 7 



SOUTHERN PALESTINE 




TuniurQ, . 



Biny-fufilm 



Mt,tt, f rr 





tfntm , 



Jinm 



KABLUE 



ARAB STATE JAFF. 



TEL A VI V^i^T^^] ]\ 



f0 » «3 



2faj'j'( Vf,fiJi * ITaza^Kgi^ Da/a 
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ERRITORY 




-i a 

Sib.i it i ■ f *»■ ■ * 1 ink 



Hadaba 

_ j-a - 



if* 



***** 

■ ■ 



MAN DATE O 
TERRITORY 




-IS 11 



fi/mrir of Pat eft Int. Jaffa IffSt, 



KUcnulrES 10 5 (I 



Salt l:7S£>,0M 
14 20 



JO 

_l 



5D Kitofnclrtfi 



THE A PLAN OF PARTITION 



MAP No. 8, 



SOUTHERN PALESTINE 









LEBANON 



P^£J' Qutritr-a 



Ton* 



rAK£ 



■+- 



31* 




OF 

Aotftf a l 



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/f IE r 



jl tr 



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1 " ■ __ _ „ » J ■ 









if 

* hi , p 



i- p ■ -i i h ■ 



Jfusi 30' 



IJtnin 



NAjyLu; 



AH A3 STATE 



TEL AVIV, 




ARAB / SlWTEl 




Hit* ti^t Ziyfn |J 



M villa I 



,1 T ■ 



ft a j- 



:ARAB 

■ 
+ 
i 



la 




3^ 



JE^ALEM 



I Pillule. 




=■-1 j'^qLpVmflrff 



Si. 



; * 




Estate v 



S I N A L 



i!S! 

■I 



34 30' 



■ - ■ ^ - ^ ■ 







Scale l:75rt,0A& 
io za 



i2 



J 



THE B PLAN OF PARTITION 



MAP No. 9. 




Avivtj/ of PvitiTinf. Jaffa i$$? r 



KAomtlm 10 S 

■ 



i 



Scak ItSO,000 

JO JO 



, THE B PLAN : SHEWING JEWISH LAND 



MAP No. 9a 




f*PVU *J fojwtintr Jajfa 1*37. 



KUCHrttlrtft ID 5 

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Ordnance Sarvty r 193E. 



THE C PLAN OF PARTITION 



MAP No. 10. 




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