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**SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF ARABS
IN ISRAEL**

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A new contact situation between two societies almost always triggers social change, whether the new situation is perceived as threatening or as presenting expanded opportunities. The Arab minority in Israel is one of the fastest changing social groups in the Arab world today, because of the somewhat sudden and very intensive subjection of this predominantly peasant agricultural society to the rule of European Jewish Israeli society.

Not all members of a social group perceive a new contact situation in the same way. A people, a nation, a community, does not respond as a solid block or homogeneous body. Though they be commonly subjected to the new experience, differences in their history and previous class position lead various subgroups to respond to the new experience in different ways, using different strategies.

It is the contention of this paper¹ that the responses or "survival strategies" of rural Arab peasants in Israel fall into three patterns, depending on whether they were rich peasants, middle peasants, or poor landless peasants prior to the establishment of the Zionist state. The first part of the paper consists of a survey of the circumstances which led to the present contact situation, and an overview of the situation of the Arab minority in Israel. The second part consists of a description of the major survival strategies used by the various classes among the Arab minority in their attempt to cope with their new situation.

The roots of the present contact between Arabs and Jews in Palestine go very deep in the history of the area and of the two peoples. The Hebrews lived and ruled in the land known as Palestine for about 13 centuries beginning in the 12th century B.C. In 135 A.D. the Romans destroyed Jerusalem and turned Palestine into a Roman colony barred to the Jews. The Romans ruled the country for six centuries to be finally defeated by the Arab Moslem forces about the middle of the 7th century A.D. From that time up to 1948, Palestine was populated by Arab and Arabized populations and up to the beginning of the 16th century was ruled at different times by Moslem dynasties centered in Damascus, Baghdad or Cairo. In 1517 the Ottoman Turks conquered the area and their rule lasted for the next four centuries. The First World War ended the Ottoman rule and resulted in a British Mandate over Palestine which lasted up to the establishment of Israel in 1948.

The Zionist movement, which ultimately led to the establishment of the State of Israel, started originally among European Jews as a socio-political response to discrimination against Jews, practiced most strongly in Germany and Russia, and was part and parcel of the general European colonizing and nationalist spirit of the time. The Zionist plan of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine received its first official European recognition through the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in Britain. Thirty years later the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution accepting a scheme for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish states.

Palestinian Arabs opposed, from the very beginning, the establishment of an exclusively Jewish homeland in what they

considered to be totally their country. They expressed their opposition by many methods, including demonstrations and riots, which reached the dimensions of a national upheaval and resulted in bloody battles, especially in the 1936-1939 period. The 1948 war turned about a million Palestinians into refugees and temporarily curtailed their ability to resist. Palestinian resistance has reemerged since the mid-1960s in the form of armed guerrilla organizations and political associations.


The Arab Minority in Israel

About 170,000 Palestinians stayed in Israeli-occupied territory after 1948. About 30 thousand of these were refugees within Israel, having fled from one part of the state to another during the fighting. These, and their descendants, are still refugees within Israel living only a few miles away from their own homes. Several other thousands became refugees within Israel when the military authorities "for security purposes" expelled or relocated the people of some Arab villages like Iqrit, Sha'ab, Birwah, Bir'im, Umm al-Faraj and Majdal.

Since 1948 Israel has taken back only about 30 thousand Palestinians under the family unification plans. On the other hand, an unknown number of Bedouins and villagers from border areas were expelled by the Israeli authorities. And because of oppressive social, political and economic conditions, several thousand Palestinian Arabs have also left Israel permanently, mainly to Canada and the United States, and some to the Arab countries. Together, the number of those expelled and the emigrants is estimated to be larger than those repatriated.²

Social characteristics. The Arab minority in Israel consists of three religious groups. The Moslem group is the largest and forms about 70% of the total. Christians form about 20% and the Druze, a religious sect which broke away from Islam about a thousand years ago, form the other 10%. The three groups are very similar in culture, habits and customs, traditions and social structure—they share the same generalized Middle Eastern Arab way of life, except that a relatively larger ratio of Christians live in urban communities. The Israeli government, following the Ottoman *millet* system which is easily adapted to standard colonial divide-and-rule procedure, accords each religious group a separate status. The Druze were awarded favored treatment under the terms of an understanding between their leader and the Israeli authorities, according to which the Druze were subject to compulsory military service, and in return were excluded from the restrictions placed on other Arabs in Israel. Since the 1967 war, the Druze have been accorded a greater level of equality with Israeli Jews. Ranking second, Christians are accepted in the Israeli army if they apply, but the lowest-ranked Moslems, with the exception of some Bedouins, are not accepted at all. Both Christians and Moslems are subject to constraints on their physical movements and economic opportunities.

In contrast to the Jewish population which is 89% urban, and excluding the 66,000 Arab residents of the old city of Jeru-



salem who came under Israeli rule only after the 1967 war, the great majority (75%) of the Arabs in Israel live in rural areas, in 102 all-Arab villages. There are also about 45 Bedouin tribes, or, more correctly, remnants of tribes in Galilee and the Negev. The Bedouins who were nomads before 1948 have been forced to undergo a speedy sedentarization. This Arab rural population constitutes altogether about 40% of Israel's total rural population.

The Arab urban population equals about 25% of all the Arabs in Israel and about 3.6% of the total urban population in Israel. They live in two all-Arab towns, Nazareth and Shafa 'Amr, and in six mixed cities, Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and (the New City of) Jerusalem. The Arabs in these six mixed cities are generally not the original inhabitants but moved in after the 1948 war. They form small minorities and live in their own ghettos, which are generally old, rundown slums, or semi-slums.

In terms of geographical distribution, the 104 all-Arab towns and villages are concentrated in two major areas: Galilee, where about 60% of them live, and the Little Triangle which includes another 20%. The other 20% consist of some 10 thousand Bedouin in the Galilee and 20 thousand in the Negev and the Arabs in the mixed towns. Of these 104 towns and villages in 1968, two had municipal government, and 45 had village councils. The rest have no local governments, but government appointed *mukhtars*, or their own traditional sheikhs and heads of *hamulas*.*

The concentration of Arabs in these areas in the Galilee and the Little Triangle is being gradually diluted. British law (much of which is still in effect) and Israeli law enable the authorities to expropriate land for the sake of cultivation, development and construction. Using these laws, the Israeli government has expropriated Arab lands to establish new Jewish settlements in the heart of the solidly Arab areas of Israel. One of these settlements is the all-Jewish New or Upper Nazareth (*Natseret 'Alit*) just outside the all-Arab ancient city of Nazareth, and built on lands taken away from the people of Nazareth and the surrounding

POPULATION

Since 1948 the Arab minority has maintained a rate of natural growth of about 4% which is one of the highest in the world, and which has prevailed among the Palestinians since the 1920s. This is about twice the natural growth rate of the Jewish population and thus presents a potential threat to the Zionist character of Israel. This fast increase brought the number of the Arab minority to about 400,000 by 1971. The high natural growth rate, of course, means large families. Thus in 1968 the average size of Arab families in Israel was 5.8, and when singles are excluded the average becomes 6.2, as compared to 3.6 and 4.0 for Jewish families.³ The average age of the Arab population in 1967 was 20.9 and the median 14.8, as compared with an average age of 29.8 and a median of 24.7 for Israeli Jews. Thus, the ratio of children 4 years or under among the Arab population (21.0) is more than twice the ratio of the same group in the Jewish population (10.4). On the other extreme of the age distribution we find that the ratio of those over 45 years among the Arabs (12.2) is less than half the ratio of the same group among Israeli Jews (26.5).

*"Mukhtar," literally the "chosen one," is a headman chosen and appointed by the government while a sheikh is a traditional informal headman of a village or tribe. "Hamula" is the Arabic word for a level of organization below a tribe and above a clan.

Arab villages. The Jewish population of Upper Nazareth is now greater than that of the old Arab city. Similar cases are the Jewish settlements of Carmiel, Yudfat and Segev, all in Galilee and close to the original all-Arab villages.

In response to Israeli government offers to compensate the owners for the expropriated land, most Arab owners refuse, claiming that the compensation is too low compared to the free market land prices. By refusing the compensation they feel that somehow they still maintain the right to the land. Aside from the traditional peasant attachment to land, the reasons for this resistance are that they resent the government's policy of diluting the Arab concentration, and that their experience of being colonized for the last century have given land a special psychological, emotional and even mystical meaning for the Palestinians. There is also the strong feeling that sooner or later Israel will fall and the land will return to its lawful owners.

Land alienation & second class citizenship. Up to 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza strip, which have close to a million Arabs, the Arab inhabitants of Israel were almost totally isolated from the rest of the Arab world. They could not visit the Arab countries. No Arabic books, newspapers or magazines, or movies came into Israel. No postal or telephone services were in function between Israel and the Arab countries. The only means of communication was the radio, and there were not many of these in the Arab villages until the early 1960s. Almost all radio stations in the Arab countries and in Israel, starting in the early 1950s, had at least a weekly half-hour program of "messages to the absentees" (*rusail al-ghayibeen*). Through these programs Palestinians sent their greetings on the air to members of their families and kin across the border.

From the very beginning, the Arab inhabitants of Israel were treated differently from the Jewish inhabitants.⁴ The reasons that were, and still are, given by the Israeli authorities for the differential treatment of the Arabs are security of the state, and safety and protection of the Arabs themselves. The concentration of the Arab population was increased by the relocation of the people from dispersed villages to Arab centers. These areas of high Arab concentration were then placed under a special Military Government, and emergency laws enacted by the British Mandate authorities to fight Jewish terrorism in 1945 were revived by Israel and applied to the Arabs. The Arabs were made exempt from military service and excluded from all positions of responsibility, especially those related in any manner to the country's security.

Military governors placed restrictions that reached deep into every aspect of the Arab minority's life. Most resented by Arabs was, and still is, restrictions on freedom of movement: Arabs need passes from the office of the Military Governor to travel even a few miles from village to village. The military administration was abolished in 1966, but the issue of passes to Arabs was not – it was handed over to the regular police force. Not every Arab now needs a pass to move around as was the case during the 1950s. However, a large number of young men and women, certainly all those accused of communist or Arab nationalist sympathies, are under some sort of restriction ranging from house arrest to needing a pass to enter the West Bank.

In other aspects of life, not at all related to security, Arabs are kept very much separate. A separate office for Arabs exists in every department and at every level of the government, from the special advisory office for minorities in the Prime Minister's office to separate Departments of Arab Affairs in more than a dozen ministries, all the way down to separate offices of all kinds

EDUCATION AND SCHOOLS

The Arab minority in Israel, even most of those now living in urban areas, came from rural areas of Palestine where educational facilities were very poor or non-existent during the Mandate days. In the area now populated by the Arab minority there were only 60 governmental primary schools and one secondary school in 1948. About half of the Arabs in Israel who were over 14 years of age in 1961 had never attended school, and only about 9% had any post-primary education. For Jews, the percentages were 12.6% and 45.5% respectively.

Since 1948, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of school-age children attending school. In 1968, 43% of the Arabs and 10.4% of the Jews had never attended school, while 12.8% of the Arabs and 50% of the Jews had some post-primary education. Although education is compulsory for all children aged 5 to 15, it is not as strictly enforced in the Arab sector as in the Jewish sector. Thus about 84% of Arab children from 6 to 13 years of age attended school in 1968, as compared to 98% of the Jewish children of the same age group. In the 14-17 year old bracket, the percentage attending school is 23% for the Arabs and 62% for Jews.

Educational facilities for the Arab minority are administered separately from the Jewish schools, although both are operated within the general framework of the public educational system. Some Arab students are enrolled in Jewish schools, but this is mainly in universities and vocational schools. A number of Arab middle-class children (about 13,200), especially in the cities and at the secondary school level, attend schools maintained by Christian missions, several of which are American.

at the local level in mixed towns. Children attend separate schools. Even the identity cards of the Arabs are easily distinguishable: they carry the letter (B).*

Economic conditions. Palestinian villagers before 1948 relied completely on agriculture. Each village used to be a more-or-less self-sufficient closed economic system. The poor worked for, or were retainers of, the landlords. Hardly anyone worked outside his own village, and no outsiders came to work in the village. Except for the landlords, rural people did not directly participate in the urban mercantile economy.

Since 1948, the Arab village has become part of the larger economic system of the whole country and the sources of livelihood are increasingly shifting from village to town.⁶ By 1961, 50.3% of all Arab breadwinners were working outside their regular place of residence. One reason for this shift was that the Arab population of Israel had lost at least 40% of their lands. Another reason was that, due to the tight economic situation during the first few years of the State's existence, the government bought up all the crops, to ration them out to the whole population, which left the farmer without his yearly supplies. Other reasons were the fast increase of the population; the availability of paid work in the Jewish towns; the improvement in agricultural tools and techniques which freed some of the labor power; and possibly the attractions of city life and the desire to free oneself from the control of parents and of rich landowners in the village.

As the number of the wage earning laborers from Arab

*The STATISTICAL ABSTRACT of Israel even breaks down the value of agricultural production by whether or not it comes from Jewish farms. Thus we find "Jewish" wheat and barley, potatoes and pumpkins straw and green manure.

As of 1961, a much higher ratio of Arab women (68%) than of Arab men (28%) had never attended school. Since then, a steady increase has occurred in the ratio of girls to boys in Arab schools, but the boys are still more than half. Schools are generally co-educational, but more than two-thirds of the teachers at all levels are men.

The language of instruction in Arab schools is Arabic, except in some missionary schools, but Hebrew is taught as a second language from the fourth grade. English and/or French are taught in high school. In Jewish schools Hebrew is the language of instruction, with French or English as a required language and Arabic as an elective language in high school.

A small number of Arab students are enrolled in predominantly Jewish institutions of higher education in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. When compared with about 27,000 Jewish students in the seven institutions of higher education in the country, or even with the 1,893 foreign students who attended these institutions in 1968, the number of Arabs in higher education is extremely small - less than one tenth of the ratio of Arabs in the total population. This ratio is shared by oriental Jews in Israel.⁵

ISRAELI ARABS IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, 1968

TYPE	Number	Students	Teachers
Kindergarten	159	9,243	
Primary	192	15,946	1,830
Secondary	15	2,909	170
Teacher-train.	1	316	
Hebrew Univ.	1	250	

villages increased, so did the need and the pressure to become organized or unionized. At the beginning, Arabs were not admitted to the Histadrut (Israel General Federation of Labor):

Because it was considered not merely a trade union, but an organization for the development of a Zionist socialist society, since the Histadrut was affiliated with the World Zionist Organization and promoted its aims including Jewish immigration and settlement in Israel, its leaders had felt that Arabs could not be expected to support the full program.⁷

The Arabs became organized in separate unions, the Israel Labor League controlled by the Histadrut, and the Communist-controlled Arab Trade Union Congress. Under pressure, the latter grew weaker and finally was disbanded, as the former became more closely associated with the Histadrut. Finally in April 1957, Arabs were admitted to full membership of the Histadrut. However, even today Arabs are still a differentiated group within the Histadrut, and there is still an Arab Department and an Arab Affairs Department. Arab members still do not support the Histadrut program and oppose what the Histadrut stands for, but have joined simply because the great majority of them consider the union card as merely a license to work in Jewish towns.

During the early post-1948 period it was taken for granted, both in theory and practice, that Arabs were paid lower wages than Jews. Officially Arab and Jewish wages and prices were equalized in 1952. In practice, however, even after the admission to full membership in the Histadrut, many Arab laborers still receive substandard wages because hiring and setting the wages are generally done through free-market bargaining between em-

ployer and employee, and Arab laborers cannot compete with Jewish labor at the same price. The Ministry of Labor and Public Works still maintains separate offices for Jews and Arabs. The justification usually given for this, and the similar practice by the Histadrut, is to protect and insure the rights of the Arab laborers, which would allegedly be hard to do in mixed labor offices.*

In 1968 there were in Israel 171,600 Arabs aged 14 and over. Of these 44.7% or 76,7000 were in the civilian labor force, i.e., they were either employed or actively seeking employment. The civilian labor force for Jews formed 54.4% for the same year. Thus the level of participation in the civilian labor force among Arabs is low, especially when we take into account that Arabs, with the exception of the Druze, do not serve in the Israeli armed forces. The low rate of participation is due to women generally not seeking employment outside their homes. Another factor is the traditional work ethic which requires older men to retire as soon as their male children are old enough to work and support the family. Yet another factor is that many older men hide the help they give their children on the farm for fear of their social security payments being discontinued. Of those Arabs in the civilian labor force, 7.3% were unemployed in 1968, as compared with 5.8% for the Jewish sector. About half (49.8%) of the Arab employees worked outside their regular place of residence.

The occupational distribution of Arab workers in 1967 showed that 35.6% were in agriculture, 20.6% in construction, 16.0% in industry, 13.0% in services, 7.9% in commerce, banking and insurance. The rest (6.7%) were distributed in all other fields. Compared to the Jewish population, Arabs are more heavily concentrated in peasant and proletarian occupations and have a smaller professional middle class.

Despite significant advancement in agricultural tools and techniques, Arab agriculture is still less developed and less productive than the Jewish sector. Thus with about one-fifth of the cultivated land area and one-fourth of the agricultural labor force, the Arab segment produced less than one-tenth of the farm output in the 1967 agricultural year. This is at least partly due to the dearth of irrigated land. Although the irrigated acreage cultivated by Arabs increased five-fold between 1948 and 1967, this amounted to only 10,000 acres out of 215,000 acres or less than 5% of the land cultivated by the Arabs, as compared to 410,000 irrigated acres out of the about 860,000 acres, or about 47% of the land cultivated by the Jewish sector.

Unemployment in the Arab sector is especially high among the better educated because:

In the Arab sector itself the demand for educated manpower is very limited, and as professional and administrative services are partly supplied by the Jewish sector, this leaves only the government services. However, the Arab youth looking for employment in government service in the Jewish sector faces at least the same handicaps as he does in the private sector, with various political and security considerations acting as handicaps. The main single occupation open to the higher ranks of the intelligentsia is therefore teaching, and in 1961 the Ministry of Education employed 1,400 of the 1,800 Arab young people employed by the government.⁹

Political institutions. Under British rule, as under Ottoman rule, there were no Arab Palestinian parties in the exact sense of the term. There were, rather, factions centered around self-appointed urban notables from big rich aristocratic families, such as the Husainis, the Nashashibis, the Khalidis, and abd al-Hadis. "There were no countrywide party elections, elected

congresses, or representative executive bodies. Membership tended to be determined by family ties rather than on an individual basis."¹⁰ Families, clans and whole villages were attracted to one faction or another by the reputation of the leader's family rather than his personal qualities or qualifications.

During the Mandate days, the rich, the educated, the notables, the absentee landlords, the leaders, the nascent bourgeoisie, every one that counted among the Arabs, lived in the cities such as Jerusalem, Jineen, Nablus, Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Acre. At the end of the 1948 war the first four of these cities were outside the Israeli territory. The others were within the State of Israel but were completely abandoned by the upper echelons of the Arab population. The whole educated class was gone, including all teachers and government officials. This meant that the Arab masses remaining in Israel in 1948 were left with virtually no leadership, political, religious or economic.

The Palestine Communist Party had been an illegal underground movement until World War II, when Jewish and Arab members split over the Zionist - Palestinian nationalist contradiction. After 1948, only some of the Arab leaders of the Communist Party, such as Tubi and Habibi, stayed in Israel. They were not, however, either important or popular at the time. However, when a non-Zionist Jewish faction was reunited with the Arab faction, the united Communist Party espoused the cause of the Arab minority, emerged as the sole advocate of Arab rights in Israel, and managed to win the loyalty and support of a significant part of the Arab masses.

In the new state of Israel, Arabs were given equal voting rights but were neither admitted to membership in Jewish parties nor allowed to form their own parties. Arabs were denied membership in Jewish parties for the same reason they were denied membership in the Histadrut; these parties espoused the Zionist ideology which by definition excluded the Arabs. The only party with both Jewish and Arab membership from the beginning had been the Communist Party, which also was the only party without a strictly Zionist ideology. MAPAM, a party with socialist claims, accepted Arab members only after 1954, but the number of Arabs in this party is still comparatively small.

All parties in Israel have strongly discouraged the formation of independent Arab parties. The same attitude has been taken by the Israeli government. The Zionist logic behind this attitude was summarized by Amnon Lin, chief of the Department of Arab Affairs in the Alignment:*

There is great danger in the very existence of an Arab party, not allied with any Jewish party. Experience in the Middle East shows that extremist elements always get the upper hand within a nationalist party; then they remove the moderates by labeling them 'traitors' ... a nationalist party which does not identify with the State is liable to bring disaster upon the Arab population in Israel.¹¹

In spite of this policy, some nationalist Arab elements attempted to establish independent Arab parties. Most important among these attempts was the movement called *Al-Ard* (The Land), which was organized by a highly respected Arab intellectual in Israel. *Al-Ard* and many other less successful attempts were firmly and quickly crushed by the Israeli authorities. Their leaders usually ended up in Israeli jails. Others escaped or were expelled to neighboring Arab countries.**

*The coalition of MAPAI, the ruling party since the establishment of the state, and Ahdut ha-Avoda parties.

** For the story of AL-ARD from the perspective of one of its founders see the review of Fouzi Al-Asmar's book TO BE AN ARAB IN ISRAEL in MERIP REPORTS No. 40.



Israelis and Palestinians today: occupation forces in Nablus.

The only thing approaching an Arab party still surviving in Israel today is *RAQAH*, the Arab faction of the Communist Party, which split again in 1965 over the national issue into *RAQAH*, with an over 70% Arab majority and the remainder non-Zionist Jews, and *MAQI*, with practically no Arab membership at all.¹²

Due to this process of weeding out the political leaders acceptable to and acknowledged by a large segment of the Israeli Arabs, "the struggle for the political leadership of the Arab population in Israel has had a unique character. Instead of being a contest between Arab personalities, it has become largely a struggle - in the name of the Arabs - between the Jews themselves for the sake of the Jews."¹³ In this struggle among Jewish parties for Arab votes, *MAPAI*, the ruling labor party, came up with a device which has been copied by the other Israeli parties. The device is to form "Arab lists," which are

essentially a parliamentary device established to catch the Arab vote with the help of the government machine. Two or three such lists exist at most elections and take into account the personal and family feuds and communal divisions of their electorate. The methods applied to the vote catching are a combination of pressure (often through the military government) or of favors - such as permits, jobs, licenses and land leases - being granted.¹⁴

To these methods may be added the use of family ties and cold cash. These lists are *ad hoc* groups and are totally inactive between electoral campaigns. Through this device, *MAPAI* usually gathers between half and two-thirds of the Arab vote, giving the Arab population four to five "representatives" in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) and giving the *MAPAI* four or five extra votes.

The Arabs who vote for these lists are fully aware that the Knesset members from these lists rarely if ever raise their voices in the Knesset, especially after they were obliged by *MAPAI*, in 1963, to vote for the continuation of the military administration in the Arab areas of Israel. The attitude toward the Knesset members from these lists - to be clearly distinguished from the Communist members who are highly respected - is manifested in cynical humor about them. Jokes are told about the problems these Parliamentary members have in using bathrooms or other modern facilities. Two jokes were especially popular: one about the Arab member who voted *yes* when Ben-Gurion raised his hand to scratch his head; the other about an Arab MP who during a Knesset debate addressed himself to the Prime Minister Golda Meir saying "Quiet, woman! *Men* are talking."

SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

The following description of the three types of survival patterns is derived mainly from the study of village populations and does not apply to the Bedouin communities in Israel nor to the Arab communities living in the mixed cities, which will be treated separately.

The traditionally conceived social structure of the village entails the pyramidal classification of the village people as a whole into *hamulas*, the people of each *hamula* into clans, the people of each clan into extended families, each extended family into nuclear families, and these into individuals. This classification does not, however, seem to be the main determinant of how individuals viewed the meaning of their lives in Israel — all the people of the same *hamula*, for example, do not perceive their situation in the same terms. The classification which better accounts for similarities in the perception of the situation is more along the lines of socio-economic classes which cut across *hamulas*. In other words, members who belong to the same class but to different *hamulas* have common perceptions of the situation, and consequently similar survival strategies. Below the *hamula* level the class lines do not cross the kinship group lines — all members of a clan, or an extended family, tend to belong to the same class. Each *hamula*, on the other hand, has one or more clans falling in each of the socio-economic classes. The exception to this is found in small *hamulas* which consist of less clans than there are classes.

There are three classes in a village: landlords or rich peasants, middle peasants, and landless or poor peasants. The major index of class membership appears to have been the amount of land which was owned by the members of each class before the 1948 Zionist-Arab war. Land at that time was the only significant source of income for the peasant villagers and it was the amount of land owned which allowed for the significant differences in the total style of life and world view among the three classes. This in turn resulted in differences in the way the different classes viewed the Jewish people, the Zionist movement, and Israeli occupation when it came.

At a higher level of social organization, namely, as the nascent Palestinian nation in the pre-1948 period, and now as an Arab minority in Israel, they all shared some common assumptions about and attitudes toward Israel and the Jews. These are the results of the common history and the common identifications described briefly in the previous section, which combine to put all three classes into one as Arabs, as opposed to Jewish settlers in Palestine. Some of these shared assumptions are: (1) that Arabs and Jews are two distinct peoples; (2) that the national interests of Jews and Arabs are contradictory; (3) that Israel is a Jewish state established by Jews and for Jews at the expense of the Arab people, and that Arabs are not wanted in Israel nor do they belong outside their own community; (4) that the Israeli policy is based on the intent of getting rid of them sooner or later; (5) that in case of the Israelis losing a war with the Arab countries, they would possibly kill all the Arabs in Israel; (6) that the existence of Israel is somehow unnatural, a freak of history, and is temporary; (7) that injustice has been done to the Arab people by the international community, especially the Western imperialists, at the hands of the Jews; (8) that some day things will return to normal, the injustice will be undone, Palestinians will return to their homes and Jews will continue to live in Palestine as an ethnic group but not in an independent state;

(9) that the Arabs in Israel are an integral part of a larger unit, the Arab nation, and that they are only artificially and temporarily separated from that larger unit.

These assumptions seem often to be unconsciously held, but they can readily be inferred from the observation of everyday behavior or conversations. To give only a few examples, one can hear the village people making such matter of fact statements as "When the refugees get back..." or "When the situation changes..." "When the problem is solved..." One can also always hear new prophecies about the coming of the end of Israel and every time they come close to the deadline, new prophecies appear extending the deadline for a few more years. Israeli Arabs refuse to buy, lease on long terms, or in any way make long term investments in lands or properties which once belonged to people who are now refugees outside Israel because, as they often put it, "What would you do when the rightful owner comes back?"

Landlords and rich peasants. Landlords and rich peasants owned most of the land in the village although they made up no more than 5 to 10% of the village population. Land ownership allowed for a style of life which was distinct from that of the other two classes. Generally, landowners considered themselves, and were considered by other villagers, the cream of the peasant society. As such they were leaders in all aspects of village life. As physical specimens they were considered the best— clean, pure, beautiful and to have that biologically aristocratic look about them. They were also supposed to be the descendants of "ancient good families", a fact which made them by birth decent and honorable. They were even supposed to be experts in every field of life and the rest of the villagers turned to them with every problem they encountered. Above all, they were rulers and manipulators of society, human relations managers, and served as judge, jury and law enforcement agents. They wielded considerable power over the lives of the other villagers and had the capacity to reward or punish them, sometimes even physically. These local despots, in turn, answered directly to the British government.

The landlords were above doing any physical or manual work. All the physical work was done by poor peasants, both in the fields and at home. The owners, as experts, supervised the work from a distance, telling the workers what to do and how to do it, what to plant and the right location and season for it, what to harvest, when, and how to rotate the crops, what to do with the crops and so on. When there was not much work in the fields, the poor peasants and their wives and children were turned into domestic servants and did most of the chores in the landowners' houses.

The hub of this class' activity was their guesthouse-men's club, called *diwan*, and the larger one called *sawya*, from which they ran the affairs of their *hamulas* and the village in general. This usually was a large room with carpets and mattresses on the floor for seating a large number of men during the day and sleeping a large number at night. Black coffee was kept hot and ready 24 hours a day, and food served at every mealtime to every one who happened to be there. This was the beating heart of the *hamula*, where men gathered every day, for most of the day, to drink coffee, chat, bring up their problems, discuss the weather, the crops, *hamula* affairs, village and world affairs.

The newspaper, whenever it was available, was read in the men's house. This happened usually when the *sheikh* or one of his close relatives went to the city and brought back

the paper. These were important and serious occasions, because the paper and the visits of the *sheikh* or one of his relatives to the city formed one of the most significant connections with the outside world. The *sheikh* would talk about the city people he met and about his discussion of village affairs with the officials and about the market place and other places he had visited. The admiring villagers allegedly marvelled at the skill and knowledge of their leader. The paper was then read by one of the *sheikh's* sons or close relatives, who usually was the only person capable of reading or writing, having been sent to school for a few years in the city with the specific purpose of becoming a kind of "assistant to the *sheikh* for foreign affairs." The *sheikh* would comment on the items from the paper in light of what he had heard in the city and the village. Men would listen carefully and then ask many questions about the meaning and implications of what was said.

The only other contact that the villagers had with the outside world was also mediated by the *sheikh* and his close relatives. This channel was the guests who came to the *diwan* or *sawya*. The *sheikh's diwan* was the only place in each *hamula* equipped for, and economically capable of, receiving guests. Any stranger coming into the village, whatever his purpose, was automatically directed to the *diwan* to be entertained with the other men and maybe to sleep and eat. There were few days that the *diwan* did not seem to have at least one guest and sometimes there were up to 50 guests. Guests included personal acquaintances of the *sheikh's* family—the only ones who had friends from outside the village, peddlers of any kind, religious men foaming the countryside, tax collectors, stranded taxi drivers, merchants of cattle or other animals, a doctor brought specially to the village for an emergency, a variety of employees of the British mandate government, police officers, smugglers, British soldiers, Jewish tourists with maps and backpacks, Jewish boy scouts who were members of the pioneering youth organization, and on and on. The *sheikh* and his worldly well-informed close relatives would sit and chat with the guests, especially if these were very important such as police officers or government functionaries, while the other villagers listened, admired, and learned.

Due to their contacts with and knowledge about the outside world the *sheikh* and his close relatives served as mediators (*wastah*) between the villagers and the unknown world which started at the end of the village fields. Members of this class were the only ones in the village who knew how to talk to police officers or to any government officials, how to hire a lawyer, to locate a doctor's office, to sue someone in court, to deal with a bank, to bargain with merchants, to eat in a restaurant, to hire a taxi. They knew their way around the city; it was a familiar world to them, or at least they so convinced the villagers.

Due to these contacts with the outside world, and to their economic advantages, members of the rich peasant class were the innovators and the introducers of everything from the Western world. They saw what city people did and they imitated them. They admired and envied the city people and knew the rest of the villagers felt even more inferior toward the city people than they did. By borrowing and introducing what they saw as symbols of city life (*madani*), members of this class proved their superiority to the other villagers. Thus they were the first to let their children wear European style clothes, the first to bring radios into the village, the first to buy European-style furniture, books, newspapers, ready-made

shoes, fountain pens, wrist watches, alarm clocks. They were also the first, and for a long time the only, ones to send their children to schools in the city.

As heads of *hamulas* the identity of the rich peasants went much beyond the village. They identified themselves with heads of the other villages, with city aristocrats, with tribal chiefs and even with kings of Arab countries like Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, who themselves were not much more than tribal chiefs. This identification was with a class and a style of life; it was not by any means progressive Arab nationalism, since that would have meant also identifying with the peasants and the masses which they were not inclined to do. Up to the present, this class has never converted to Arab nationalism and neither Nasser nor Arafat has ever commanded their respect. Their loyalty is still with Hussein, the bedouin chief, aristocrat and king.

To the rich peasant class, the Jews always were and still are an ethnic and religious group which produced most of the prophets mentioned in the *Koran*. This was a group whom they could respect and get along with, had they—the Jews—stayed in their place, nice and peaceful, minding their own business like other ethnic or religious groups in the area, like the Druze, the Sharkas, or the Armenians. Each of these groups had had chiefs and heads who were respected and with whom they had dealt as equals. That also was the way they perceived and tried to deal with the leaders of the Jewish communities. And when the Jews started to become openly troublesome during the 1930's and 1940's they were not seen as an international political movement, as the Zionist organization. They were seen as a local ethnic-religious group which was getting aggressive, possibly encouraged by the British, those foxes who followed the policy of divide-and-rule, and always created conflict between the different ethnic-religious groups, using Druze against Shi'a, Maronites against Muslims. This time it was Jews against other Arabs.

Since it was defined as a local, not an international, issue, each village headman was believed to be able to arm the men of his *hamula* or village and take care of the Jews in his area. They



"In the idyllic Galilean village of Meiliya"—Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

knew how to do it, they thought. All they presumed they needed was to get to Amman, Beirut, or Damascus and get from the other Arab emirs, chiefs or kings some guns for their village men. It could even be done with sticks and stones. After all it was done before when members of other non-Arabic or non-Muslim groups in the area threatened the interests of the same village or tribal heads. The villagers bought a few rifles, one per family. These were of a wide variety, British, French, German. Canadian ones were, for some reason, especially popular. Some were so old that their origins were unknown. The chiefly families even got themselves some automatic weapons, of which they were extremely proud.

Whenever Jews were suspected to be in the area the village crier ran in the streets screaming, "Jews south of the village." or "Jews in such-and-such a location." The villagers took out their guns and ran in the specified directions, shooting at anything that looked suspicious. More villagers and farm animals than Jews got killed. Some villagers took advantage of the confusion to settle some old accounts with their fellow villagers. Everyone that died was, however, buried with a big celebration as *shaheed* ("martyr"). Only much later did some of the villagers start to wonder. The chiefly families with the expensive automatic weapons never ran to where the Jews were supposed to be—it was below their dignity. They gave instructions from their headquarters in the *diwan*. Their expensive weapons were later on turned over, almost unused, to the Israeli forces.

When the Israeli forces took over the villages, members of the chiefly families tried to stay on top in their villages. The Jews they had known before the establishment of Israel had been farmers, store keepers, traders, most of whom were oriental Jews who appeared as members of just another Middle Eastern religious or ethnic group. The Jews with whom they came in contact after the establishment of the State were soldiers, rulers, administrators, policemen, mainly of European origin, whom the rich peasants took to be simply another breed of foreign ruler, taking over from the previous foreign rulers, the Turks and the British. Neither of these had ever interfered in the internal affairs of the Arab village and had never disturbed or changed the ongoing system. They had ruled through the aristocratic and notable Arab families. But when the rich peasants tried to play this traditional role between the Israeli authorities and the village people, they were frustrated by both the ruler and the ruled. The Israeli authorities rejected their definition of the situation, refused to govern through them or to give them any authority over other villagers. The Israelis had a different philosophy and style of governing than the British, as their interests were different. They did not consider themselves foreign rulers but rather the rightful owners of the country. Security considerations did not allow them to let one class stand between them and the majority of the population. The fact that the Israeli authorities were aware that members of this class had been the leaders in the fighting against Zionist colonization was not conducive to trust and friendship.

Thus, the Israelis treated members of the rich peasant class in exactly the same way or at times somewhat worse than they treated everyone in the village. Worse yet, they changed the criterion by means of which an Arab endeared himself to the authorities and gained their help and support, the new criterion being the degree to which one was ready to

cooperate with the authorities mainly as an informant on other villagers. Some poor individuals who had been servants and hired hands all of a sudden became much more influential than their masters. Worse still for the rich peasants, members of the other two classes who did not mind physical work and did not mind working as laborers in Jewish towns started to draw better incomes than the landlords, and to gain economic, social and psychological independence from the landlord class.

All of this was humiliating and degrading to the landlords and they responded by refusing to accept the new reality: things could not continue like that; Israel is not permanent; the Arabs will win over the Jews sooner or later; and if man cannot change the situation, then God will—He could not possibly want it to stay this way. Meanwhile, they decided not to be part of what is happening, not to participate in the whole degrading affair, to dissociate themselves from it all, and to wait it out until the help arrived.

Since 1950, time has stood still for the rich peasants, economically, socially, and psychologically. For example, the *diwan's* furniture has not been changed or even fixed or cleaned since then. Their strange and outmoded goods are no longer sold in the market and no one would want to buy them: huge ornate beds, cupboards and dressers, massive wall mirrors, alarm clocks with bells mounted on the outside, faded framed pictures from days when most people did not know the existence of photography, overstuffed sofas, very old china, old-fashioned out-sized radios, and hand-cranked phonographs. Their clothes date from 1950, too, the older men wearing the traditional Arabic costume while the younger ones shift back and forth between a full Arabic costume and a combination of a European suit with Arabic headgear. The younger ones may take the headgear off during their infrequent visits to Jewish towns, carry it in a brown bag to put it on when they get to the outskirts of the village on their way back.

The village has changed from a self-contained subsistence to a cash economy. This has undermined the landowners' previously privileged position. As wages for labor have increased outside, the availability of poor peasants to work cheaply has declined. But the rich peasants have not changed their work ethic enough to work their own land or to do manual labor in Jewish towns. They have on many occasions approached the Israeli authorities for supervisory or white collar jobs for which they had no qualifications, and of course were either rejected or given temporary jobs until the Israeli authorities got what they wanted from them, such as the purchase of some of their land. The few agricultural crops they produced could not stand any competition against the cash crops produced by modern agricultural techniques in both Jewish and Arab towns. The only source of income left to them is to painfully sell off a few acres of land at a time—the sacrifice of their almost sacred patrimony. But more painful yet is that they have to sell it either to the Jews, which makes any Arab feel like a traitor, or to fellow villagers who were formerly poorer than them, which is extremely humiliating. The choice of the former alternative was usually done in secret and publically denied thereafter.

The former landlords' social life is restricted to interaction with each other and with a few older poor peasants who once were their servants and still have some loyalty toward them. They cannot make other people in the village interact with them the way they want and they refuse to change their

definition of the situation. Other villagers avoid interacting with them because they find the pose they strike, that of superiority and leadership, as outrageous, amusing, or at best pitiable.

The former landlords, however, continue to keep the *diwan* open, the coffee hot and ready, and the whole routine intact, as if the village men and the guests are about to arrive—but neither the village men nor the guests do any more because every villager now has a guest room in his house and can afford to feed and entertain his own guests, and because the landlords have lost all the leadership functions which used to attract the village men and the other guests to their *diwan*. Only members of this class still play the game by the old definitions: they treat each other as chiefs and leaders, and hold unreal conversations about topics that are irrelevant in terms of space, time or even function—about chiefs, emirs, or kings from the past, about their exploits in raids against other tribes, their generosity to their guests, their courage, and amusing anecdotes about their experiences. More important for the village, they refuse to participate in and even try to sabotage any new projects that are carried out for the improvement of the community. Their homes were the only ones without running water. The streets in their section of the village were not paved. And they were strongly opposed to bringing in electricity. The physical structures of their houses have changed very little and they continue to live in them in large extended families.

The former landlords have not accepted the idea of organized political parties as a legitimate way of running a country. They especially despise the communist party to which most of the village people belong. They get involved in politics only when one of the Zionist parties from the Jewish sector drafts someone from a chiefly family to run on a "list". In these cases they usually rally around the person, not the party or the issues.

The psychological health of the rich peasant class is just as poor as their avoidance-withdrawal response to their social and economic conditions. They do not act in their own self-

interest or in the interest of their community. They have sorely misappraised reality, such that their survival strategy is the least successful of the three patterns observed. More important for the the Israeli Arab community, however, is the realization by the poor and middle peasants that their traditional leaders are bankrupt and their traditional political forms have collapsed. The destruction of the old class system by Zionist occupation of Palestine has cleared the way for the emergence of new and as yet impermanent social forms out of the former poor and middle peasant and urban working classes.

Landless Poor Peasants. Landless poor peasants comprised about 10% of the village population. They depended for their meagre existence mainly on working for landlords. A large part of this work was usually in farming the land, but once a man of this class started working for a landlord, both he and all members of his family practically became the property of the employer and did what they were told to do no matter how demeaning the work was. They usually lived next to the animal shed in small shacks given to them by the landlords and generally ate leftovers from the landlords' meals. Poor peasants generally lived in small nuclear families because their style of existence did not allow for any larger units. Theirs were the only units where male children left home even before marriage, as soon as they became able to fend for themselves.*

Very often the poor peasants were not part of an integrated clan, and, although they identified with the *hamula* supporting them, they often carried a different last name. Members of the same clan lived dispersed in several villages according to available opportunities. Sometimes the outsider may have had to flee his original village for committing a crime. Others in this class were actually members of the *hamula* who had somehow ended up without any land, either because they or one of their recent ancestors were mentally retarded or were youngest among several brothers, or they were children of a wife other than the mother of all the other children, or for some reason that enabled others, usually other brothers, to cheat them out of their land. Whatever the reason for being reduced to this status, the results were very much the same: they were treated as less-than-human by others and were highly demoralized and dehumanized in terms of their own self-image and self-esteem. They were considered by others to be amoral, the conventional rules of human decency not applying to them. They were expected to live according to one single principle, and that was to obtain enough to eat and survive physically by any possible means. Even the most sacred thing in Arab culture, the honor of their wives and daughters, was not respected—their women usually became fair game to members of the landlord class. Like stray animals, poor peasants were sometimes teased and toyed with by children or even by adults of the other two classes. They seemed resigned to the definition, lived up to it, and generally clowned and shuffled their way through life, possibly feeling that they were really making fools out of the more privileged folk.

*There is some justification for concentrating on the male half of the society, namely that the focal point of the research was the response of Arabs to Israel and Jewish people, and in this respect it is men in the traditional Arab village society that come in direct contact with the world outside the village and translate it to the women. Research would probably show that changes among women are occurring more in response to the men's response to Jewish people rather than in direct response to influences from the Jewish people.



Palestinian peasants threshing wheat.

When the Arab-Zionist conflict started the poor peasants cared very little about the wider implications of the situation beyond their own personal life and safety. Any change could mean only improvement for them, as it presented new opportunities. Becoming refugees would have been an improvement; so would have been going to jail—any place where they could get food and hide their true identity would have been acceptable. The poor peasant men were the first to leave home and volunteer to join any group or organization fighting the Zionists—it gave them food, anonymity, and a sense of importance and personal value to do so. Some of them actually became famous heroes and martyrs, especially during the war with the Zionist settlers and the struggle against the British in the 1930s and 1940s. Others of them formed bands which roamed the countryside and terrorized the Arab villagers under the guise of Arab nationalism. They would set up their camps in the mountains near the villages and demand food, clothing, and other supplies, and hold their own courts which hung and shot villagers who refused to cooperate as traitors to the Arab cause.

When Israel took over, again poor peasants saw only new opportunities in the situation. They were the first to accept doing things that middle and rich peasants took longer to accept: They became informants to the Israeli authorities, which at the beginning involved mainly informing about smugglers from Arab countries, dealers in the black market, villagers with hidden weapons, villagers who had left the village and come back, refugees who secretly crossed the borders to find out what happened to relatives left behind, villagers who made negative statements about Israel or Jews, and so on. At the same time these same informants, under the protection of the authorities, did some smuggling and dealt in the black market.

The best reward the Israelis provided the poor peasants was the permission to go to Jewish towns. This gave them a short-term headstart in what was then a wide-open job market. At the beginning they went to towns like Acre, Haifa, Hidera, Ramat Gan and Jaffa, and roamed the streets asking for work. A true lumpen-proletariat had been created. At night they slept mainly in the ruins of the Arab homes bordering the Jewish section, in deserted mosques or in bus depots. Soon these bunking places became labor markets where employers came and announced what they wanted and asked who among this reserve army of the unemployed would accept the lowest wages. This usually resulted in physical fights among the workers and the employers got all the help they needed for minimal wages.

Being demoralized to start with and becoming more so due to this situation, the lumpen workers would accept any kind of work for any pay. Male prostitution became common, and they could be seen standing in groups in the middle of the street and bargaining over the price with a Jewish homosexual. Naturally these same bunking places became popular spots with female prostitutes of the city. It is ironic that for a while among the Arab laborers in Jewish cities the word "mosque" came to have the connotation of prostitution.

In the early years, the poor peasants-turned-workers returned to their villages quite often. Despite the low wages earned, they had the most cash of any group in the village and they tried to use this money to enhance their prestige in the village. They were not very successful, because the rest of the villagers knew how the money was earned and despised them for it. They used the money in ways that, instead of earning them respect, made them look ridiculous: they tried to imitate the rich but came out like caricatures of rich people. For example, they bought

neckties and showed them off to everyone in the village but had no idea how to use them. They bought radios but could not understand the classical Arabic used by the broadcasters and made fools of themselves misusing the terms they heard on the radio.

Failing to earn the rewards they wanted from the village people and drawn by the attractions of the city, gradually the workers' visits to the village became less frequent. At the same time, to gain access to what the city had to offer, they had to deny their identities and try to pass as Jews—as oriental Jews, of course. The group they emulated most were the ones they encountered on the streets of the city, young Moroccan Jews who are considered thieves, pimps, dope addicts, criminals and generally the lowest-class Jews by the European-dominated Israeli society. Thus the most successful among those young Arabs managed to successfully pass for the lowest class Jewish "criminals" in the city slums, turning into drug addicts, pimps, prostitutes and gamblers. The less successful ones were detected, beaten up, thrown in jail, and returned to the village to start all over again.

After an initial period, young Arabs in Israeli cities tended to specialize in working in cafes, restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, etc., rather than doing construction work like the majority of Arab laborers. The reason for this specialization is to avoid associating with other Arabs for fear of being recognized as Arabs. The major thing was to hide their identities and pass for oriental Jews. The experience of being detected as Arabs by neighbors, friends, landlords and girl friends is traumatic to persons trying to hide their identity. At some stage the frustration becomes intolerable and they attempt regaining their original identity by associating themselves and identifying with the most Arab among Arabs, i.e., the radical youth who usually belong to the Communist Party. When they return to the village they usually become professional party organizers, some leave to communist countries for training. Others live in their villages and commute to work in Jewish towns like other laborers. At this stage they generally earn the respect of the villagers by being mature, serious, strongly nationalist and anti-Zionist, generally more refined, more knowledgeable about the outside world, more courageous and outspoken than young men who have not gone through such experiences.



Arab welder in Kaiser automobile plant.

The pattern described here is a continuing process which almost all the young men of the poor peasant class go through. Many middle peasants who start work in the Jewish cities at a very early age go through the same process. There are always some young men from the village at each stage of this pattern. In its totality the whole process seems to function as a factory for the production of young nationalist or communist Arabs among the Israeli Arab minority.

Those who complete this cycle tend to marry women from the cities such as Nazareth or Acre, who themselves are usually of lumpenproletarian origin. These young men want to avoid being rejected by the village fathers who still continue to evaluate their daughters' prospective husbands by family status rather than by personal characteristics. These young men usually take a sour grapes attitude and let it be known that they consider themselves too sophisticated for the village women, and marriage to the city woman usually enhances a worker's prestige in the village:

After returning to their village, the young men usually try to pull members of their extended family together, and try to induce in them self-respect and a sense of personal worth. In particular the older "uncle Tom" type members of the family are usually bought new respectable clothes and supplied with whatever they need, especially cigarettes and coffee, in order to stop them from degrading themselves in front of others to obtain what they want. As a result, formerly poor peasant families have generally become much more solid and integrated units than they ever were before, and the line between the middle and the lower peasant classes is fast disappearing.

Middle peasants. Middle peasants traditionally formed the backbone of the village community and of Middle Eastern society in general. They were the classical traditional Middle Eastern peasants whose style of life represented the Arab world to the outside. Before the establishment of Israel, they usually owned enough land to barely make a living for their large families. They dedicated their lives to working the land and considered it undignified to work for anyone else or do any other kind of work besides farming. They formed about 60 to 70% of the Arab population in pre-1948 Palestine and their ratio among the post-1948 Israeli-Arabs became larger still when many rich educated city people left the country during the war.

The survival strategy of this class to life in Israel is the predominant one and is the only one that is usually noticed by an outsider visiting Israel. It is also the economic and material aspect of this pattern for which Israel, in the 1960s, liked to claim credit. In the long run, the other two strategies of peasant survival are likely to disappear as the children of formerly rich and poor peasants adopt the middle peasant pattern. It is an index of the extent to which Israeli occupation has homogenized peasant society and dismantled its institutions.

In the Mandate period, Palestinian peasants were generally poor; theirs was an economy of subsistence. Each family produced hardly more than it needed for its own consumption. Anything in excess of that was bartered for the few necessary "luxuries" the villagers allowed themselves—tea, coffee, sugar, or new dresses for the women. Cash was so scarce that whole villages took to the mountains when the word spread that the tax collector was coming to the village to collect the head tax imposed by the Mandate authorities.

With the establishment of Israel, Jewish immigrants flooded the country and many new needs were created. The government,

the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut were busy creating housing for the thousands of new immigrants. The introduction of European capitalism also required the building of industries. The State could not support its fast-increasing population from agriculture since the whole area of the State was very small. Roads and highways were badly needed. All this needed laborpower, mainly unskilled laborpower for construction, which the Jewish sector could not by itself supply. Because of the simmering hostilities between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, every Israeli capable of carrying arms was employed in the armed forces rather than in the civilian labor force. The settlers in the agricultural border settlements did both: they farmed and fought, according to the need of the moment. But the same could not be done by industrial and construction workers in the urban areas.

The Arab minority offered a large supply of unemployed laborpower: the Arabs did not belong to the armed forces, and a large number of them had no land left on which to work. Even those families that kept their lands had many spare adult males, as dry farming required only a few months of work out of the whole year. At the same time, Arab villages had reached a state of near famine because the war had interrupted all productive activities in agriculture. Those who had managed to plant were not able to harvest their crops because they were afraid to go out to the fields, or because the crops were stolen before they ripened, or because the crops were destroyed by the war, or because the land was taken over by the Israeli authorities.

Thus, Arab labor was badly needed in the Jewish sector and Arab laborers had no alternative but to go to Jewish towns and cities to get work. Areas of Arab concentration were placed under a military regime which imposed emergency regulations on them: Arabs needed passes to get from place to place, especially to enter Jewish towns. The rules were strictly enforced and punishment for violations was severe. The Israeli military regime took full advantage of this critical situation: passes to places of work and the withholding of them were used very effectively as positive and negative rewards. The threat of being denied a pass to a place of work was one of the most effective tools used to tame, subjugate and break down any form of resistance among the Arab minority in Israel. Ultimately every Arab who needed a job badly enough—and most of them did—declared explicitly or implicitly his loyalty to the State of Israel and got his pass.

Since that time huge (by pre-1948 standards) amounts of money have come into the Arab villages from wage labor. At first the money was used to achieve and further traditional goals and to compete with relatives, neighbors or members of the next *hamula* along lines decided by traditional Middle Eastern values, as summarized in the Arabic saying: "When a peasant becomes rich, you can be sure what he'll do: get himself another wife, get his son a wife or add another room to his house." Some of the Arab villages have been almost completely rebuilt and greatly expanded since 1950. Bride-prices sky-rocketed from a few Israeli liras to about IL.10,000. Brides started to demand one kilogram of gold jewelry before the wedding day. Villagers filled their homes with cheap colorful objects such as artificial flowers, plastic dishes, framed pictures, brightly designed wall rugs, clothes, stained glass windows, and transistor radios.

Gradually, however, the attraction of these material possessions began to fade and new priorities emerged. As the Arab villager started to get used to the idea of cash in his pocket, as he became more exposed to the culture and values of the Jewish

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Thus, Arab labor was badly needed in the Jewish sector and Arab laborers had no alternative but to go to Jewish towns and cities to get work. Areas of Arab concentration were placed under a military regime which imposed emergency regulations on them: Arabs needed passes to get from place to place, especially to enter Jewish towns. The rules were strictly enforced and punishment for violations was severe. The Israeli military regime took full advantage of this critical situation: passes to places of work and the withholding of them were used very effectively as positive and negative rewards. The threat of being denied a pass to a place of work was one of the most effective tools used to tame, subjugate and break down any form of resistance among the Arab minority in Israel. Ultimately every Arab who needed a job badly enough—and most of them did—declared explicitly or implicitly his loyalty to the State of Israel and got his pass.

Since that time huge (by pre-1948 standards) amounts of money have come into the Arab villages from wage labor. At first the money was used to achieve and further traditional goals and to compete with relatives, neighbors or members of the next *hamula* along lines decided by traditional Middle Eastern values, as summarized in the Arabic saying: "When a peasant becomes rich, you can be sure what he'll do: get himself another wife, get his son a wife or add another room to his house." Some of the Arab villages have been almost completely rebuilt and greatly expanded since 1950. Bride-prices sky-rocketed from a few Israeli liras to about IL.10,000. Brides started to demand one kilogram of gold jewelry before the wedding day. Villagers filled their homes with cheap colorful objects such as artificial flowers, plastic dishes, framed pictures, brightly designed wall rugs, clothes, stained glass windows, and transistor radios.

Gradually, however, the attraction of these material possessions began to fade and new priorities emerged. As the Arab villager started to get used to the idea of cash in his pocket, as he became more exposed to the culture and values of the Jewish

ROLE OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY

Some observers have talked about the rapid decline of the extended family in the Israeli-Arab villages since the establishment of Israel.¹⁵ This is a more superficial than authentic basic change in the social structure. The extended family unit is not now and never was the minimal unit in the Middle Eastern social structure. Middle Eastern people perceive the extended family as consisting of smaller units similar to nuclear families and those consisting of individuals. The system is capable of "fission and fusion" at these levels all the way down to the individual. It is true that the physical layout of a Middle Eastern village traditionally corresponds very closely with the map of the kinship system in the village and that members of an extended family tended to live in the same house or compound. If one were to make physical residence within the same house or compound the major criterion in the definition of an extended family then the observer would be justified in saying that the extended family structure in the Israeli Arab village is falling apart. This writer, however, would contend that physical residence is not now and never was a major criterion for the existence of the extended family in the minds of Middle Eastern people themselves.

The socio-psychological reality of the extended family as well as of the hamula is derived not from common residence but from the feeling of identification with and responsibility for the well being of all the members of that unit, a sense of obligation to give moral, emotional, financial and physical support to all members of the unit. The ultimate test for the existence of the extended family as a unit is not where the different members live but whether or not the members of that unit will pull back together and act as a unit to defend and support each and every member of that unit in the case of conflict with other units at the same level, in this case members of other extended families from the same clan.

If this definition of extended family is accepted then the present writer would maintain the view that the extended fami-

ly unit in the Israeli Arab villages has become much stronger rather than weaker during recent years. Previously many extended families, especially from the poor and middle peasant classes, collapsed because of extreme constraints. Old parents, uncles and aunts who owned no land, and female and young dependent siblings were heavy burdens, which many young male adults forsook, in favor of their own and their children's survival. This situation has changed with the arrival of the welfare state. Dependent children are subsidized by the government, dependent adults receive social security and welfare payments, many women have entered the labor market, and anyone willing to work can earn enough to support his family. Under the new condition no one has to dissociate himself psychologically from his relatives for economic reasons.

Another reason which previously induced some people to dissociate themselves from relatives and which has since disappeared is that previously all those who did not have enough land depended on other members of the hamula for their living. Such people quite often dissociated themselves from members of their extended family when these came in conflict with richer or stronger extended families of the hamula. The newly achieved economic independence of the previously poor is enabling members of this group to stick by their relatives in conflict with the rich and they even seem to enjoy defying the authority of their previous benefactors.

In addition, the general enhancement in the sense of self-respect of many village people, especially the young, due to economic independence, Arab nationalism, education, improved health care and so on, is making many young men willing to fulfill what they consider their obligations toward their close relatives. Finally, since one's prestige and self image are so tied up with one's family, pulling together and strengthening one's extended family becomes a method of social climbing, of improving one's prestige in the society.

population, and as he came to realize that Jewish people looked down on him, his definitions started to change. More money, time and effort was dedicated to the improvement of agricultural production. The model which the peasant tried to copy was the Jewish farmer. Modern agricultural machinery was bought. The use of fertilizers and insecticides became quite common. Farmers became more efficient and started to turn toward the production of cash crops. Arab farmers became specialized in the production of crops which require a lot of work by hand but command high prices, such as tobacco, sesame seed and olive oil. These improvements have not brought the Arab farmer to the same level of productivity as the Jewish farmer, but did add a lot to the prosperity of the Arab village. The middle peasants, especially the ones with less land, also started to use their newly acquired money for the education of their children. At the present time most of the educated class in the Arab villages come from the middle peasant rather than the rich peasant class, in contrast to the days under British rule. Parents who never learned how to read or write show great pride in their sons who have become teachers in the village school or have acquired some sort of white collar employment.

Critical for the material, social and emotional aspects of the middle peasants' survival strategy is the way they define

improvement or progress for themselves. They do not see it in a revival of the past. They do not see it in turning to terrorism, nor in blindly assimilating to the Jewish society. Perhaps partly inspired by the Israeli example, they see "improvement" as education and social change and new types of political organization. They do not see this kind of improvement as a monopoly of Israel or the West, where one cannot "improve" without becoming Jewish or European — they do not call it modernity or Westernization. They call it *tagaddum*, literally "moving forward." In doing so they are building new social structures parallel to those in the Israeli society, enhancing the Arab cause by becoming progressive Arab nationalists.

This philosophy is being carried out at all levels of organization. At the individual level a strong work ethic is emerging and is summarized in the often-heard phrase, "no shame in working." This is, of course, quite different from the old work ethic when one proved his worthiness by not having to work. The most often mentioned cause for working hard is "to give my children the education I did not have. I don't want my children to grow up ignorant like me. Look at me, I cannot read the paper, I don't even know what is going on in the world around me. Look at the Jews, all they have achieved is because of education."

This writer feels that the relationship between the generations of Israeli Arabs is not understood properly by most observers. Most posit a great deal of conflict between the old and the young in the village. Thus Weingrod²⁶ states that the extended family has been "weakened considerably" and adds that "conflicts between generations are also typical, as the youngsters actively contest for control of the village."

Anyone visiting the village can easily see that a group of young men are emerging as the new leaders and they are taking over all the responsibilities from the older traditional land owner-leader. But a closer look would show that the significant dimension in the struggle is class and not age. It is not the children or grandchildren of the old traditional leaders who are actively contesting for control of the village from their parents or grandparents. Nor are the new emerging young leaders competing with their own parents or grandparents because the latter never were nor ever aspired to be leaders. The contest is between the old from one class, the previously upper land owning class, and the young from the middle peasant class, with the former steadily losing out. The casual observer may not realize how much harmony, sympathy, and understanding there is between the different generations of the same class. The young among the former landlord class do strongly support the leadership of their parents and grandparents, and these continue to prepare the young of their class for future leadership and other village people notice the continuity across the generations and cynically remark *Farkh el-butt awam*, which literally means "a baby duck is a good swimmer," and is used to mean "like father like son."



Lower middle Palestinian peasants.

As for the middle peasants there are, between young and old, easily noticeable differences in clothes, hair style, education, sophistication in politics and world affairs, amount of exposure to the outside world, knowledge of the Hebrew language and many other observable items. But "different" does not necessarily mean conflict or even lack of unity. Psychologically and emotionally the old and the young of this class are together, they support and identify with each other; they complement each other. The old are trying to do all they can to give their children an education. And when these children emerge as leaders, in whatever field it may be, the parents are happy and support them. The young leaders are the fulfillment of the dreams of generations of poor, hungry and oppressed peasants.

Tears come into the eyes of older men when they see the young men who are their children walking in the street looking clean and healthy and with heads raised like decent self-respecting human beings, and the old men with great satisfaction remark: *Mithl awlad el-umara*, "They look like the sons of chiefs."

General economic prosperity, economic independence of the young, access to education and to means of communication are thought to create disruption and gaps between the young and old. Such has not been the case in Israeli-Arab villages: many previously disrupted families have been brought back together and psychological and emotional bonds have been strengthened. Many a father has had the chance to realize his dream: to retire and have his grown children carry the load and support him. Many a young man has had the chance to live up to the Middle Eastern and Moslem image of the ideal man—one who takes good care of his parents and his women folk.

The middle peasant survival strategy has also led to changes in inter-*hamula* relationships in the village. Such anti-social acts as stealing for economic gain or for spite, vengeful destruction of property, killing of animals, chopping down of orchards, and burning of ripe crops of members of other *hamulas* have virtually come to a halt. Different *hamulas* are ignoring their traditional conflicts and cooperating on projects that benefit the whole village, such as paving the streets, bringing running water and electricity into the village, and building a new school. This is not done through the village council. Members of the village council in Arab villages are of the same caliber as Arab members of the Knesset and are selected through a similar process. Thus council members usually command little respect or trust among their subjects. They are mainly the traditional family heads and are less concerned with such projects as running water and electricity than with the traditional concerns of their *hamulas*. Even if they cared they generally lack the education and the information to organize and carry out such projects.

The ones who have the necessary elements of enthusiasm, dedication, education and integrity are usually disliked by the Israeli authorities and political parties because these also tend to be communist, nationalist, fiercely independent, anti-establishment young people. The new type of young Arab leaders almost always combine these characteristics, because in order to be a trusted leader one has to prove that one has not "sold out" to the government authorities or to the Israeli parties. On the other hand, Israeli authorities are suspicious of all Arabs in Israel and follow a general policy that tries to prevent independence among Arabs. A Jew in Israel can get by with being anti-establishment, but not so with an Arab — an anti-establishment Arab is equal to an anti-Israeli Arab as far as the Israeli authorities are concerned. The result is simple — if one is liked by the Arabs one is hated by the Israelis and vice versa. These conditions slow down change and progress in Arab villages. The Israeli authorities are not interested in initiating costly projects in the Arab villages. To the contrary, they oppose those initiated by Arabs because they are opposed to the only type of leadership acceptable to the Arab minority. Most Israeli-approved projects take place during election years through the support of political parties including the ruling party, but at the initiative of the Arab people, in clear attempts to become "as good as the Jewish towns."

The Israeli-Arab conflict generated the creation of new and meaningful levels of identification among the Arab population. In addition to a much stronger identification with the village as

a whole, the Israeli-Arabs see themselves as a distinct group in Israel and reach out to embrace the whole Arab nation. It is an axiom of Middle Eastern social structure that activation of any level of identification brings around conciliation between the units at the lower levels for the purpose of strengthening the higher level unit. This capacity for "fission and fusion" has been an integral characteristic of Middle Eastern social structure. This development of inter-*hamula* harmony and cooperation has been enhanced by the friendships which emerge among young men from different *hamulas* when they work in the same Jewish town under adverse conditions and have no one else to turn to except each other. Another factor is the emergence of new membership groups which cut across the *hamula* lines, such as political parties, labor unions, schools and clubs.

All these factors have resulted in more interaction, communication and cooperation among the different *hamulas* of the village, especially among the young. This has given some observers the impression that the traditional *hamula* structure in the village is disappearing. In fact, however, the *hamula* structure is not disappearing and will continue to exist as long as it serves important needs of the people.*

The Middle peasant strategy is one of "hostile competition" with Israeli society¹⁷ and includes elements clearly borrowed from Israel and from the Western world in general for the purpose of competing with and ultimately overcoming the lender of these items. It also includes some elements revived from previous stages of the Moslem-Arab culture, which are used for the purpose of distinguishing themselves from the group with whom they are competing and as expression of nationalist sentiment.

This manifests itself in a revived interest in and glorification of ancient Arab history; a revival of names of culture heroes from pre-Islamic or early-Islamic eras; a flood of nationalistic Arabic poetry from the pens of Hebrew University-educated youth, a return to the use of the Arabic headdress among the Arab leaders of the communist party, and other symbolic gestures of defiance of the Zionist concept. Thus, the third stage in the middle peasant survival strategy which has come to predominate among the Arabs in Israel is the emergence of a sense of community and identity at a level above that of the *hamula* or village, i.e., of nationalist and class solidarity.

Survival strategies of non-peasant Arabs. The survival strategies described thus far apply to villagers who form the great majority of the Arabs in Israel. They apply less well to the former nomadic bedouin tribes of the Negev and the Galilee, and to the residents of the "mixed" cities like Acre, Haifa and Jaffa. Although no special effort was made to study the survival strategies of these groups, a few remarks about them are appropriate.

The response of the bedouin tribes may well be quite different from what was described for the villagers. Nomadic bedouins are supposed to be fiercely independent, and their sense of identity and loyalty were structurally confined to the borders of the tribe. The idea of Arab nationalism presumably did not make

*Despite all the apparent harmony, the "hamula" structure and divisions are still as real to the minds of the village people themselves as they ever were. If one wanted to see how the divisions along "hamula" lines can be immediately revived and put into action, all one would have to do is to visit any of the Arab villages a few days before the elections for the village council when the interests of the "hamula" take precedence over the interests at higher levels.

much sense to them, nor did they identify with the Arab minority in Israel—when the Zionists won, they accepted the *fait accompli* without resistance. Their young men—whose traditional avocation was warfare—volunteered for the Israeli army, and most of the tribes have asked to become, and actually became, subject to the draft just like the Jewish citizens of the country. The more crucial factor in their response to living in Israel is not the clash of identities or loyalties experienced by the peasants, but rather the fact that they are being forced to change from a nomadic style of life to a settled agricultural one.

Urban dwellers. The Arab people in the "mixed" cities in Israel are perhaps having the most difficult time making a satisfactory response to life under the new conditions. One reason is that all the leaders, the educated, the bourgeois and professional classes among the city people left the country during the war. Those remaining in the cities were the very poor, the old, the physically or mentally handicapped and others unable to flee. They did not form a community but rather a conglomeration. A second factor is that Arab nationalism started, and has always been strong, among the city dwellers. The 1947-48 war started in the cities and the city people were most directly involved in it. They also fought not just against impersonal Zionist forces but also against Jewish people who had lived in the same city and even same neighborhood for a long time. The result of the war was, therefore, more a personal defeat for them than for other Arab groups. In spite of all this the dwellers in the "mixed" cities are the ones who have the greatest contact and interaction, in their daily lives, with the Jewish people and consequently are the ones most subject to hostilities and discrimination. Because they live in cities which are mainly Jewish, they are considered by the Zionist government to be potentially the most dangerous among all Israeli Arabs. Consequently, they have always been subject to the greatest amount of surveillance and security restrictions. It is no wonder that almost all the Israeli-Arabs who were discovered to belong to the Arab organizations came from the cities rather than the villages.

The claim is sometimes made that the more any two mutually hostile groups are exposed to each other the less will be the hostility and the more the understanding and the harmony. The examples usually given come from Western experiences of racial integration. This view is too simplistic to apply to the Israeli-Arab case. In Israel increased interaction has almost invariably resulted in increased hostility, at least on the side of the Arabs involved in the interaction.¹⁸ Again, many Israelis had hoped that as more Arabs became educated in Israeli schools and colleges the hostility of the Arab minority would decrease. On the whole, the higher the education, and the more the exposure to the Jewish community a young Arab has, the greater his or her nationalist, anti-Israeli sentiments are. The Arab students at the Hebrew University form perhaps the most homogeneously nationalist anti-Israeli group among the Israeli-Arabs. "Arab intellectuals in Israel are intensely politically minded, smarting under the injustice (real or imaginary) of the present and passionately eager for a different future..."¹⁹ The unemployed among the intellectuals are naturally the most outspoken in expressing their dissatisfaction.

In other words, mass education at all levels in the State of Israel has raised a growing group of Arab high school or university graduates, dissatisfied and ready to criticize the State and its Government for nationalist or communist promises. Those who are unemployed, either by force of circumstances or personal choice, are even more inclined to extremism in their political attitudes.²⁰

ARAB AND PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

An incipient Arab nationalism existed among Palestinian peasants during the Mandate period in the anti-imperialist struggle against the British and other European Mandate powers. There was also an incipient Palestinian nationalism in the anti-colonialist struggle against the Zionists. The latter fizzled out among Israeli Arabs after the exodus of their compatriots from Palestine in 1948. It has re-emerged since 1956 among Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries as a result of the disillusionment with the Arab countries' and their leaders' inability to solve the Palestinian problem, the discrimination against them, and the refurbishing of Palestinian social institutions in the camps, especially with the growth of political organizations related to the guerrilla movement.

Strictly Palestinian nationalism has not caught on very strongly among the Arab minority in Israel, probably because they did not share the same experiences with the refugees. Arab nationalism, on the other hand, never disappeared from among the Arab minority in Israel, and has become a more popular strategy for responding to life with the Israeli Jewish people in an imposed Zionist state. Israeli Arabs, especially middle peasants, have always thought of themselves as part of an Arab nation with which they strongly identify. From 1953 on, Nasser represented that nation for them. Even after the 1967 defeat and in 1969-70 when the research for this study was conducted, the Arab minority's hero was still Nasser and not Arafat. Since Arab nationalism has always been suppressed in Israel, it has resurfaced mainly in the form of communism, as it was only in the communist party that the Arab cause found support and nurturance in Israel. The experience of middle peasants and poor peasants becoming proletarianized as a result of their work in Israeli cities has contributed significantly to their attraction to the communist organization.

From conversations with Arabs in the West Bank and individuals from Arab countries resident in the United States, this author believes that Arab nationalist sentiments are generally stronger among members of the Arab minority in Israel than any other group in the Arab world. Every oppressed minority has a strong psychological need to identify with a larger group to which it can anchor itself in the struggle against the oppressors and as a defense mechanism against feelings of inferiority and insecurity. This identity can be used as a weapon with which to aggravate, offend, and to hurt the other group psychologically. More crucial, the Arab minority in Israel is not a party to the conflicts among the different Arab countries or to internal class antagonisms, which make them emphasize a local brand of nationalism at the expense of an overall Arab nationalism. And more crucial still, as Israel has constantly weeded out naturally-emerging leaders who are acceptable to a large number of Israeli Arabs by preventing them from forming their own political parties or expelling them from the country altogether, the Israeli Arabs have been forced to look to leaders in other Arab countries.

In short, Arab nationalism among the Israeli Arabs is a reaction to their life with people with whom they do not and can not identify, in a state which was imposed on them. They reject the degradation of the second-class citizenship to which Zionism, by definition, assigns them. The message they express by their nationalism reads something like this: "We refuse to accept your definition of the situation; we are as good as you, and one day we will defeat you on your own terms, using your own methods and techniques."

Those intellectuals who find employment may not be much happier than the unemployed. The great majority of those employed work for the Government, mainly in teaching. Although they suffer from the same injustices, the fear of losing their jobs stops them from voicing any criticisms or opinions of their own. This usually results in their avoidance of situations where political issues may be discussed which in turn leads to their almost total isolation from the rest of the community. Members of the community on the other hand respond by considering such individuals as cowards or even accusing them of having "sold out."

CONCLUSION

Though the majority (about 70%) of Arabs in Israel have survival strategies which are relatively successful, one cannot conclude that they are reconciled to or are living in harmony with the Zionist state. Rather, the continuous feeling of hostility and competition between the two peoples; the ever-present threat of war; the on-going class struggle in the village; the perpetual suspicion and insecurity; the continuous exposure to a people who consider them inferior and a hated enemy; the overpowering and infuriating support of the West—and of the United States in particular—for Israel; all these and many other stressful factors are taking their toll of wear and tear on the Arab population in Israel.



Palestinian before an Israeli military court.

EDITOR'S NOTE

During one generation of existence as an oppressed minority in Israel, and despite internal class contradictions, the Palestinian Arabs developed survival strategies which made possible their continuance as a people. Under Israeli rule, their social and class structures have been disrupted and transformed, and since the 1973 war are undergoing even more dramatic changes.

Before 1967, "the Arab population" in the words of former Israeli general M. Peled, "which suddenly found itself included in the borders of Israel, remain(ed) a dumb, silent and obedient minority" (see excerpts from Peled's analysis below). The Israeli methods which produced such a "safe" minority have been intensified with the rise of the Palestinian resistance, the increase in Palestinian minority restiveness, and the increase of anti-Israeli political incidents and violence. However, these old Israeli mechanisms of oppression which include ghettoization, restrictions on movement, harassment and disbanding of political and cultural organizations,

deportation of leaders, extensive use of informers and secret police agents, and the imposition of military rule, have not rooted out opposition nor reproduced the old passivity in the Arab minority. Indeed, the continuing Israeli treatment of the Arab minority as an inferior people, and as a threatening and hated enemy have instead increased the reciprocal suspicions and hostility on the part of the Arabs. The anger created by this discrimination may prove to be the basis for continuing the struggle against Israeli oppression in the future.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 This study is based on one year of anthropological field work done in Israel from July 1969 to July 1970 and was supported by a National Institute of Mental Health Research Fellowship. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1974 annual meeting of MESA. During the year in Israel the author stayed and did most of the research in one village where he had previously taught grade school for three years. In addition to participant observation, he carried out an intensive demographic and statistical survey of the whole village, and held a 2-3 hour structured interview with 118 men who formed all the adult males of one hamula. The interview schedule included a battery of psychological tests and demographic check lists. The same schedule was used for interviews with about a hundred workers in Jewish towns from other villages. He spent several days with Arab workers in Jewish towns, and collected several life histories.
- 2 Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, ed. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE (Evanston, 1971) p.161.
- 3 Demographic data used in this paper, unless otherwise cited, is derived from the 1969 Statistical Abstract of Israel, which treats "non-Jews" as a separate population category.
- 4 For a complete exposition, see Sabri Jiryis, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (Beirut, 1969); and John Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation," in I. Abu-Lughod, TRANSFORMATION...
- 5 Edwin Samuel, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY IN ISRAEL (New York, 1969) p.105.
- 6 Jacob Landau, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (London, 1969) p.19; Abner Cohen, ARAB BORDER VILLAGES (Manchester, 1965) pp. 19-41; Don Peretz, ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINE ARABS (Washington, 1956) pp.90-139.
- 7 Peretz, p. 129.
- 8 Peretz, p.127.
- 9 S.N. Eisenstadt, ISRAEL: SOCIETY (New York, 1967) p.401.
- 10 Don Peretz, et.al. A PALESTINIAN ENTITY? (Washington, 1970) p.1
- 11 Amnon Lin, as quoted in Landau, p.74.
- 12 See Landau, esp. Chap.4 on Arab nationalist movements in Israel.
- 13 Landau, p.187.
- 14 Eisenstadt, p.402.
- 15 Henry Rosenfeld, "Processes of structural change within the Arab village extended family," A.A., 60:1127-39.
- 16 Alex Weingrod, ISRAEL: GROUP RELATIONS IN A NEW SOCIETY (New York, 1965) p.70.
- 17 See G. Devereux and E.M. Loeb, "Antagonistic acculturation," A.S.R., 8:133-48.
- 18 For a comprehensive study, see Sharif Kanaana, "Modernization, Identity and the Arab minority in Israel," a paper given at the Vth International Congress of Social Psychiatry in Athens, September 1-7, 1974.
- 19 Landau, p.48.
- 20 Landau, p.43.

منشورات جامعة بيرزيت

أسابيل تكيف العرب في اسرائيل



بقلم

شريف كناعنه

دائرة علم الاجتماع وعلم الانسان

في جامعة بيرزيت