

THE BECOMING OF RETURNEE STATES:

*P*alestine *A*rmenia *B*osnia

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**THE BECOMING OF
RETURNEE STATES:**

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1. Introduction: The Dialectics of State and Nation

Thierry Hentsch

The various contributions to this volume deal, each in its own way, with the dialectics of State and Nation. The State, as its very name suggests, can be easily identified: it has a concrete juridical definition, and is made up of three components, land, people, and effective government. But effectiveness is not dependent on legal or organizational devices and structures alone. Structures by themselves, while indispensable, are insufficient to command loyalty. At the very least, they would require time and continuity to do so. In other words, regardless of its contribution to building the Nation, the State cannot last, in the long run, without an intangible component, a symbolic glue. We might call it nation, society, culture (way of life). In this day and age especially, the Nation is something both wholly undefinable and indispensable to political cohesion.

The Nation-State is probably one of the most ambiguous concepts imaginable. If it means there should be parity between State and Nation, no State, of course, has ever satisfied such a requirement, nor does it today. This is due to many factors, first and foremost the simple fact that there is, generally speaking, no satisfactory definition of the Nation. Individual nations can only be concretely defined as unique historical entities, and preferably from within. The Nation is the expression of the modern collective self at the international level. Whatever objective elements may be invoked to define it, its definition is ultimately subjective. No one may tell a group of people that on objective grounds they do not constitute a Nation, if this group really believes itself to be one.

But what does it mean exactly to say that a Nation can only be defined from within if its members are not gathered on a common geographically territory? This is where the question of return and returnees becomes significant. This question highlights the difference between geopolitical entities (States) and intangible factors which nurture the feeling of belonging (Nations). And in turn this difference brings us to consider the clash between the civic and the ethnic concepts of Nation.

Although classical in the literature, these two closely related concepts are often misunderstood. In order to clarify the question, a brief historical reminder is required. Historically speaking, the modern concept of Nation evolved in the 18th century as a necessary means of legitimization of the new forms of power which emerged with the American and French revolutions. The French case is the clearest and had a broader impact at the international level, particularly, of course, in Europe. By beheading the king, the French revolutionaries left a vacuum that needed to be filled. Having lost its head the Nation, so to speak, took its place: head and body politic became one. A fiction, of course, but one that was absolutely necessary for the revolutionary power to exist.

The historic entity slowly built and strengthened by French kings was to become the new foundation of the republican legitimacy. From this necessity emerged the civic concept of the Nation. In his famous pamphlet, *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat? (What is the Third Estate?)*, published in January 1789, Sieyès already went so far as to equate the Nation with the Third Estate, that is, with the overwhelming majority of the people, or, even better, with all those who thought themselves equal citizens of the country, excluding only those who, refusing to relinquish the privileges of birth, excluded themselves from the new body politic. And, indeed, following Sieyès' line of thinking, the representatives of the Third Estate to the Estates General called into session by Louis XVI soon established themselves as the National Assembly.

Of course, as we know, this civic concept of the Nation, in the French case, had a strong historical basis. At the time, the so-called ethnic definition was not even thought of. It was only with the spreading of revolutionary ideas, together with the French armies, that the need emerged elsewhere in Europe to define a new basis for future Nations, as for example in Germany and Italy. In the case of these future new entities, history offered a weak foundation for the desired togetherness; the historical image was one of disunity and division rather than cohesion and unity. A new and somewhat perverse notion of the Nation thus came to the fore, based on the idea of *Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil)*. In this "ethnic" perspective, people sharing common ties of blood, language, territory and, sometimes, religion

should belong to the same country. This notion was perverse because it established an impossible model for most of the people of Europe (not to mention the world) to follow and led the strongest to military imperial politics. Besides, the idea of common territory did not apply to people characterized by their dispersion, for example the Jews, or scattered without continuity on a large scale, such as the Germans. The ethnic concept of the Nation together with the underlying idea that each Nation should have its State (the monstrous Nation-State) for almost half a century had catastrophic consequences in Europe and still has today in the eastern part of the continent and elsewhere in the world. Former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Armenia, Kurdistan, Israel and Palestine, various African countries — all offer strong examples of such man-made disasters.

Let us now, in light of what has been outlined so far, briefly review each of the three cases being presented here. Bosnia is the result of the disintegration of a multinational state the strength of which depended on two factors. One — the man Tito — obviously was due to disappear at some point; the other — the bipolar international system — looked deceptively perennial. In spite of his stature and all his efforts, Tito did not succeed in creating a Yugoslav nation nor even a viable, self-perpetuating federal state. Armenia is an attempt to construct or reconstruct a State on a national basis, which in turn has two elements: internal and external. The national image nurtured by each of these two groups, “homeland” and diaspora, do not coincide and at times conflict with one another. Palestine provides us with the most unusual case, where the so-called external nation attempts to consume and rule the internal society in order to construct the State.

We can see that these three examples generally conform to the model outlined in the beginning, that is, in the dialectics of or interaction between the two complementary and sometimes contradictory poles of Nation and State. Nevertheless, no historical case can be reduced to a mere theoretical concept where the phenomenon is only a pale reflection of the idea. In conclusion, each and every one of the cases presented here, while far more than a mere illustration of theory, suggests that greater attention should be given to the fundamental and complex relationship between the

Thierry Hentsch

intangible/emotional and geopolitical dimensions in the history of
modern State formation.

* * * * *

2. Return to Ararat: Diaspora and "Homeland" Armenians

Ronald Suny

The turn toward a less essentialist approach to nationality and nationhood has been helpful in documenting the making of nations. It seems apparent that a historical perspective of the role of intellectuals, activists, and politicians is even more instructive when discussing the establishment of diaspora communities. In an earlier essay on the Armenian diaspora, I proposed two possible meanings of the term. First,

as a simple declarative, diaspora can refer to anyone living outside their putative 'homeland.' Diaspora, Webster tells us, comes from the Greek term *diaspeirein*, to scatter, which in turn is related to *speirein*, to sow. Originally it referred to the dispersion of Greek communities outside Hellas and of the Jews from Palestine. But secondly, attributed to a self-conscious community, diaspora can be narrowed to refer only to communities formed to maintain a relation, whether real or imagined, with their homeland. Millions of people live outside their original ethnic homelands (some 60 million in the former Soviet Union alone and most of the Native American population), but diaspora in this second stricter sense means more than just exiles or emigrants and refers to those uprooted and resettled who continue to hold on to some reference to their land of origin. The idea of an original 'homeland', though not necessarily the legally constituted 'homeland' of the present, is fundamental to the process of forming cohesive and conscious diaspora communities. Whether a relationship with the existing 'homeland' is maintained or has been broken, whether that relationship and that "homeland" exists only on the level of myth, the acceptance or rejection of that presence very often becomes a key element in the construction of the diaspora community. A sense of loss, a longing to return, or an

acceptance of the impossibility of return can all contribute to the construction of a diaspora community.¹

Diasporas, formed as the result of conquest and forced migration, are much older than nation-states, but existence of the modern discourse of nations has created a new environment in which diasporas operate. The nation, particularly when linked to a state, makes claims on its dispersed members, either requiring moral or financial support or calling for return to the “homeland”. The contentment of diaspora communities to remain in the diaspora appears at times to present a challenge, even a threat, to the nation, but in other cases nation-states have come to coexist with the diaspora and even to benefit from its independence. The post-Soviet history of Armenia is a story of tensions and confusion between state and diaspora, particularly over the highly charged questions of what constitutes the nation, what are the qualities and requirements of membership, and who has the right to police the boundaries of the nation. Itself an act of imagination and intellectual and political construction, the diaspora, like the nation-state, has its own political salience, its own identity and interests, which states have been reluctant to acknowledge. Khachig Tololyan, editor of the new journal *Diaspora* has called diasporas “exemplary communities of the transnational moment” in history. Even as peoples struggle for nationhood both in their homelands and in the diaspora, existing nation-states are beginning to “confront the extent to which their boundaries are porous and their ostensible homogeneity a multicultural heterogeneity.” In the present context, “transnational communities are sometimes the paradigmatic ‘Other’ of the nation-state and sometimes its ally, lobbyist, or even, as in the case of Israel, its precursor.”² Given Tololyan’s point, it is likely that differences arise between state and diaspora over nation.

¹ Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp.213-214.

² Khachig Tololyan, “The Nation-State and its Others: In Lieu of a Preface,” *Diaspora*, 1, 1 (Spring 1991), pp.3-7.

The Armenian Diaspora

Armenians speak of the diaspora adopting the ancient Hebrew word *galut* into their *gaghut* (colony) and the Greek *speirein* into *spiurk* (diaspora) or *spiurkahaiutiun* (Armenian diaspora). Dispersion and exile have been a near constant in the two-and-a-half millennia history of the Armenians. Only once in their past was the entire Armenian plateau unified under a single Armenian ruler, and the division of the plateau by empires to the west (Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman) and to the east and south (Iranian, Arab) resulted in frequent dispersions of parts of the population. After the Seljuk invasions of the 11th century, Armenians moved in significant numbers, north into the Georgian kingdoms and south to form eventually the diaspora principality, later kingdom, of Cilician Armenia. The success of this migration and longevity of the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia transformed an exile realm into part of what many Armenians regarded as their core territory — a diaspora kingdom, you might say. From the disappearance of Armenian polities in the late Middle Ages (the last state fell in 1375), Armenians living outside the Armenian plateau benefited from greater mobility and relative security and prosperity (in Safavid Iran, Muscovite and Petrine Russia, Europe, India, Southeast Asia) and formed merchant networks, printed the first Armenian books and newspapers, and through the efforts of clerical scholars — most importantly, the Mekhitarist fathers in Venice and Vienna of the 18th and early 19th centuries — helped to generate a new national consciousness. For Armenians the diaspora was the source of wealth and ideas that stimulated organization and self-awareness within the homeland.³

When the “Armenian Question” was first raised in international diplomatic circles just over one hundred years ago, Armenians, whether in the diaspora or in the Ottoman and tsarist empires, had yet to formulate any political consensus on their future political existence. With no general agreement on whether Armenia

³ Fernand Braudel, *The Wheel of Commerce*, Vol. II, translated by Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp.122-123, 154-159.

would be an independent, sovereign state or autonomous regions within multinational empires, the national movement split between those radicals who favored an independent socialist state (Hnchaks) and the majority of political activists (Dashnaks and liberals) who pragmatically opted for autonomy. In the subsequent quarter century, as Armenian political life underwent a series of upheavals — massacres, revolutions in both Turkey and Russia, a genocidal campaign to eradicate the Armenians from their historic homeland — the leading political party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutiun or ARF), accepted the need for independence. With the end of the first world war, the Russian civil war, and the Turkish nationalist war, the only portion of historic Armenia under any kind of Armenian political control was the formerly Persian, later Russian corner of Transcaucasia that had come under Soviet power. A new diaspora had been formed of deported peoples from eastern Anatolia, as well as a relatively compact population of refugee Armenians in the Soviet republic. Soviet Armenia itself was made up of formerly diaspora Armenians from Turkey and the Middle East, Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Like Israel under the protection of the British mandate, a new Armenian national population was formed under the Soviet system, the cultural, political, and economic development of which differed greatly from that of non-Soviet Armenians. For the next 70 years, the Armenian Question was posed in a new form: was Armenia to be Soviet and tied to the fate of Communist Russia, or was it possible at some future moment for Armenia to be reunified and sovereign under another government?

The Issue of Soviet Armenia

The choice for or against Soviet Armenia was a harsh and difficult one for most diaspora Armenians. Just under 50 percent of the world's Armenians lived in the Armenian republic, another 20-25 percent lived in other parts of what was the Soviet Union, and somewhere between one-third and one-quarter of all Armenians lived

in the diaspora outside the former USSR.⁴

The great majority of Armenians outside the “homeland” preferred some (or any) alternative to the often harsh “socialist” regime established in Erevan late in 1920. At least two distinct political discourses competed within the diaspora — a minority discourse accepting Soviet Armenia as the legitimate (or only possible) Armenian homeland, and the majority discourse rejecting it as a pseudo-state that could not embody Armenian national aspirations. Even while recognizing that without Soviet protection Armenians might have ceased to exist on any part of the Armenian plateau, most of the diaspora community maintained a political and cultural distance from their co-nationals inside the Soviet Union. The Dashnaksutiun, which had briefly ruled Armenia from 1918 to 1920, engaged at different times in more or less active resistance against the Soviet system and while by the 1970s the party had accommodated itself to the persistence of Soviet power, the legacy of antagonism never faded. Except for a small group of leftist sympathizers and those thousands who “returned” to Armenia after the Second World War, most diaspora Armenians accepted the fact that Armenia was a Soviet republic and tried to avoid the political difficulties this fact presented. Though more and more segments of the diaspora made their peace with “Armenia” as it existed, they never embraced the particular political form under which it was governed. Armenian “Zionism,” so to speak, always remained a minority movement, and until the advent of the Karabakh movement, the earthquake of December 1988, and the declaration of Armenian sovereignty and independence in 1990,

⁴ Reliable estimates of the diaspora population are not readily available.

Nikola Schahgaldian attempted a compilation in his dissertation:

	1926	1940	1976
Soviet Armenia	750,000	1,100,000	2,600,000
Remaining USSR	820,000	1,050,000	1,400,000
USA and Canada	120,000	200,000	500,000
Lebanon	50,000	110,000	250,000
Iran	140,000	130,000	180,000
France	35,000	70,000	150,000
Syria	115,000	100,000	130,000
Turkey	125,000	110,000	125,000

Nikola Bagrad Schahgaldian, “The Political Integration of an Immigrant Community into a Composite Society: The Armenians in Lebanon, 1920-1947,” Columbia University, Ph.D. in Political Science, 1979, p.47.

Armenians worldwide remained a fractured people, pulled further apart by the Cold War division of East and West.

Living among other dominant societies, diaspora Armenians have adapted to their environment in three ways. At one extreme, some reject as much as possible any involvement with the dominant culture and civilization and live almost entirely within the Armenian community. They feel their Armenianness as either something natural and non-chosen or as an obligation not to be questioned. The logic of this position would be *hairenadartsutiun* (return to the fatherland), but for the 70 years of Soviet power political differences with the Soviet regime kept many of these nationally conscious Armenians “in exile.” At the other extreme are those who have thrown off their ties to ethnic culture and acculturated or even assimilated into the dominant culture. Particularly among North American Armenians, where intermarriage has reached levels of 90 percent and the loss of the Armenian language is nearly complete, association with Armenians or identification with Armenia has been on a steadily accelerating decline. Many of these “Armenians” are already ceasing to be part of the community in any meaningful sense. In between these two poles are the majority of diaspora Armenians, who were involved both in community affairs and in the political and cultural world of the dominant society. In Nikola Schahgaldian’s useful phrase, “They consider Armenian ethnicity as a voluntary form of association that does not conflict with their economic, social, and political integration into the host countries.”⁵ It is from this group that the diaspora communities, with their roots both in ethnic solidarity and in the politics of accommodation with the larger non-Armenian world, found their principal leaders, intellectuals, and constituents.

Rather than reproduce here the history of the Armenian diaspora, let me note the stages through which the Armenian communities have passed from, roughly, 1920 to 1991. In the period between the two world wars, the victims of the Genocide reassembled their families and communities, built churches and cultural and political institutions, and established themselves as primarily middle-class communities principally in half a dozen countries (Lebanon and

⁵ Ibid. p.90.

Syria, France, Argentina, Egypt, Iran, and the United States). The first years after World War I were marked by migration from refugee camps into the towns of the Middle East and the cities of the United States and France, some movement to Soviet Armenia, and the relief efforts of various charitable organizations, Near East Relief and the League of Nations.⁶ The push of the Kemalist forces into Cilicia in 1922 ended any hope of retaining that region as an Armenian enclave under French protection, and with the stabilization of Atatürk's regime, supported both by Soviet Russia and the United States (after the Lausanne Treaty) Anatolian Armenians were forced to face a future of exile.

Assimilation or Community-Building

Some communities, notably in the United States, were relatively assimilatory. Second- and third-generation Armenians often did not speak Armenian, did not identify with the Armenian political parties, and increasingly did not attend the national church. Other communities, like those in Lebanon, successfully maintained Armenian communal identity. "The Lebanese Armenian community," writes Khachig Tololyan,

was a particularly successful story of the overcoming of intracommunal divisions. Both the active intervention of the Dashnaktsutium and the peculiar context of Lebanese communal politics worked to bring the bulk of Armenians in the country together around a shared political vision. Arab governments and their colonial masters (British and French) welcomed the Armenians' ability to care for themselves. The result in Lebanon (where the confessional state has always been weak) was the creation of Armenian enclaves with Armenian mayors in which the principal language of daily life is Armenian; where separate hospitals and old-age homes exist, as does an Armenian college; and where there are designated Armenian seats in Parliament, for which the dashnags [sic.] fight and usually win electoral battles against other factions.⁷

⁶ Fridtjof Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East* (New York: Duffield and Co., 1928).

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 141.

In Lebanon more than anywhere else community building was carried out by “an exile Government in the Armenian polity,” a political class that won loyalty by providing its constituents with services. Though it could not achieve its original goals of liberating and governing Armenia itself, the Dashnaksutiun carried out productive cultural work and political organization, “which preserves, invigorates and invents the concepts, narratives and symbols that empower exiles to live on as a collective, or at least to represent their situation as such to themselves and others.”⁸

But at the same time as new communities were being built after the dispersion, deep divisions fractured the Armenians. The divisions among Armenians predate the East-West conflict of the post-revolutionary years. For half a millennium, eastern Armenia (Persian, Russian, Soviet) and western Armenia (the Ottoman Empire) were separated by international borders, hostile political regimes, and frequent warfare. Eastern or transcaucasian Armenians developed their own dialects of Armenian, a closer relation to the central See of Echmiadzin, and cultural ties with Russia and northern Europe. Western or Turkish Armenians, on the other hand, lived in a significantly more repressive and insecure political environment, although they maintained some autonomy within the *Ermeni millet* under the rule of the Patriarch of Constantinople. They developed their own dialects or adopted Turkish and were culturally oriented toward Istanbul and southern Europe. Each community developed its own political and social elites, and through the 19th century, power in the community shifted from the old clerical leadership to the wealthy merchants and manufacturers (the *amira* and *sarafs* of Istanbul, the *mokalakebi* of Tiflis), who in turn were challenged, first, by the reformist intelligentsia and by the turn of the century by secular revolutionaries, the Hnchaks and, most impressively, the Dashnaks.

Once eastern Armenia came under the control of the communists, the territorial and political interests of Caucasian Armenians were subordinated to those of the Soviets. Because of Lenin’s support for the anti-imperialist struggles of the Muslim east,

⁸ Khachig Toloyan, “Exile Government in the Armenian Polity,” *Journal of Political Science*, XVIII, I (Spring 1990), pp.125-126.

Soviet Armenia soon gave up its claims to Turkish Armenia in the 1921 treaties of Kars and Moscow. Defeated and displaced by the Bolsheviks, the Dashnaksutiu opposed these “anti-national” policies and adopted a hostile stance toward the new regime. Until 1924, an exile government functioned in France, and after France’s recognition of the Kemalist republic, the Dashnaks maintained what was known as the *Patvirakutiun* delegation in Paris until 1965.⁹

The inability to reconcile differences within Armenian political circles on the issue of the homeland tore at the efforts to unify communities, even as those communities were rebuilding after the catastrophe of the Genocide. Through the 1920s and 1930s the political struggles were fought out in the major diaspora institution — the church. Even before Armenia had become Soviet, Armenians fought among themselves about political influence in parish councils. As early as 1919-1920, the Dashnaks ejected the old Ramkavar board of the Holy Cross in Los Angeles and refused to recognize the authority of the Primate in Worcester, Massachusetts.

A decade later, as Stalin carried out his brutal revolution from above in the Soviet Union, the new Primate of the North American Diocese, Bishop Ghevond Tourian, began a campaign against Dashnak influence in the Church. On July 2, 1933, the Bishop refused to speak at the Armenian Day celebration at the Chicago World Fair until the tricolor flag of the independent republic was removed. He wrote to the newspaper *Banvor* (Worker), that he considered the tricolor “a manifestation of revolt and disdain against the state organization of present Armenia.” A month later Archbishop Tourian was beaten by a group of young Armenians. The diocesan convention opened in New York City on September 1, and only a third of the delegates supported the Primate. Tourian and his faction retreated to the Hotel Martinique and refused to give up their control of the American Church. Catholicos Khoren in Echmiadzin, Soviet Armenia, ruled that Archbishop Tourian was his rightful representative, but many churches refused to recognize his ruling. On Christmas Eve, 1933, while the Primate was celebrating mass in the Soorp Khach Church in New York, he was knifed to death. Though the Dashnaksutiu officially denied any connection to the affair, nine

⁹ Ibid. p.139.

members of the party were convicted of the murder.¹⁰ The American Armenian Church was in *de facto* schism, and the trauma of the division reverberated through the communities and split friends and families. To this day, in most major American cities, Armenians still attend rival churches allied either to the Ramkavar or Dashnak parties, subordinate either to the Catholicos in Echmiadzin or to his rival in Antelias, Lebanon.

Pro-Soviet feeling in the diaspora reached its zenith during the Second World War. In its desperate struggle for survival the Soviet government quickly made a number of concessions to the Armenian Church, which became the major link between Soviet Armenia and the diaspora. Armenian diaspora and Soviet interests most completely coincided at the very end of the Second World War and in the brief interlude before the Cold War. Shortly after the Yalta Conference, the Soviet government initiated a campaign to encourage Armenian settlement in the Armenian republic and to recover Armenian irredenta in eastern Turkey. On June 7, 1945, Foreign Minister Molotov told the Turkish ambassador to Moscow that the USSR demanded a revision of the Soviet-Turkish border in the region of Kars and Ardahan. Stalin's policy reversed Lenin's agreement with Turkey to give up any Armenian claims against the new Kemalist state and removed one of the most serious impediments to the Soviet Armenian state's defense of Armenian national interests. This change in policy occurred almost simultaneously with the gathering of lay and clerical delegates to the congress in Echmiadzin to elect a new Catholicos (June 16-25). After his unanimous election, Gevork VI sent a letter to Stalin supporting the repatriation of diaspora Armenians and the return of Armenian lands in Turkey.¹¹

¹⁰ *New York Times*, September 5, 1933, p.E19; December 5, 1933, p.3; December 25, 1933, p.3; *Armenian Mirror-Spectator*, April 3, 1935. For an account sympathetic to the Dashnaktsutun, see Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp.358-375.

¹¹ An Armenian version of the letter can be found in K. Lazian, *Hayastan ev Hay tade* (Cairo, 1957), p.353; French translation in Claire Mouradian, "L'immigration des Arméniens de la diaspora vers la RSS d'Arménie, 1946-1962," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, XX, I (January-March 1979), p.80.

Political forces in the Armenian diaspora now possessed a powerful emotional issue to mobilize their communities. A novel opportunity had risen for the first time since 1920 to resolve the “Armenian Question” in both its territorial and demographic aspects with a single solution. Though Soviet policy was aimed more at weakening British influence in the Middle East than at justice for the Armenians, most of the diaspora parties — and religious organizations, with the exception of the Armenian Catholics, who remained silent on the territorial issue and actively hostile to emigration — fell in line behind the Soviet promise of a larger Armenian state. Pro-Soviet diaspora organizations, especially the Apostolic Church, organized repatriation drives, supported petitions for the return of Armenian territory to the USSR, and made appeals directly to the US State Department. Nearly 100,000 diaspora Armenians, mostly from the Middle East, migrated to Soviet Armenia.

Stalin’s policy backfired when both Turkey and Iran rejected Stalin’s demands and quickly gained the support of the United States.¹² The Cold War division of the world was established along the Arax River, the border between Soviet Armenia and Turkey. Those diaspora Armenians who had backed the Soviet position soon found themselves in the unenviable position of living in one political camp and supporting the policy of the other.

Irreconcilable Differences

By the late 1940s the dividing lines were drawn once again between Dashnaks on one side and anti-Dashnaks (Ramkavars, Hunchaks, neutrals [*chezok*]) on the other. As the Cold War grew colder, the Left, condemned as fellow-travelers, lost its influence among diaspora Armenians. Armenian “progressives” merged quietly with the surrounding Armenian communities. In the United States, the Ramkavars became the major political opposition to the Dashnaks; in Lebanon, both the Ramkavars and Hunchaks increased their popularity and effectiveness. The Dashnaktsutiun, on the other hand, became the beneficiary of renewed anti-Communist politics. In 1956, the party

¹² For a more detailed account of Soviet policy toward Turkey and the Armenian irredenta at the end of World War II, see Ronald Grigor Suny, “Return to Ararat: Armenia in the Cold War,” *The Armenian Review*, XLII, 3/167 (Autumn 1989), pp. 1-19.

maneuvered the election of the Primate of Aleppo, Zareh Payaslian, to the Catholicosate of Cilicia, and a *de facto* schism of the Armenian Apostolic Church was created both in Lebanon and throughout the diaspora. Dashnaks and their adversaries took to the streets of Beirut, gunning down their opponents. The elections of 1957, once again carried by the Dashnaks, led to more bloodshed, and as Lebanon went through a brief civil war in 1958 — in which the Dashnaks sided with the Christian forces in Lebanon, while the anti-Dashnaks gravitated toward the Muslims — another 60 Armenians were killed before a truce was arranged between the Hnchaks and Dashnaks.

Partisanship had always been an important part of the political culture of diaspora Armenians, but during the Cold War it further divided communities and even families into hostile, self-contained groups. Armenianness was reserved for members of one's own sub-community. Marriage or even communication across the divisional lines between the Dashnaks and anti-Dashnaks was almost impossible. Yet, even as each party and religious organization articulated its principal tasks as preservation of the culture and "holding on to our youth," the increasingly archaic concerns of the old leaders found less and less resonance in younger people. Conflict over support or rejection of the one Armenian "state" that existed reduced focus on other Armenian issues, most importantly the question of western Armenia. The Dashnaks, allied as they were in the Cold War with the anti-Soviet policies of the United States, were limited in their ability to criticize America's Turkish ally. The energy spent on intracomunal infighting was not available for the kind of earlier community building that had characterized the first decades of the post-genocide diaspora. As a result, younger Armenians either moved away from Armenian life into the dominant cultures or in extreme cases, as in the Middle East, demonstrated their rejection of the old politics with a new, violent commitment to the Armenian cause through terrorism.

Despite the intense conflicts that followed the global schism in the Armenian Apostolic Church, the lines of conflict among Armenians began to blur in the next several decades, from the 1960s through the 1980s. In part, this was the result of the post-Stalin reforms in the USSR, which permitted contacts between the diaspora and Soviet Armenia. In 1962, students from abroad began

studying in Erevan, and in April of that year Armenia allowed a limited repatriation of diaspora Armenians to begin. The Soviet government tried to lessen tensions with the diaspora by issuing a newspaper, *HayreDzain* (Voice of the Fatherland), especially for Armenians living abroad. Within the country, concessions to Armenian national feelings, the building of monuments to the Genocide and to the victory over the Turks at Sardarabad, greater freedom of expression and less overt antagonism toward the Dashnaksutiun, all contributed to a lessening of the hostility between diaspora sub-groups. Many now demanded greater cooperation between the political parties, joint social and cultural events, and the end of the religious schism. In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1960, the Dashnaksutiun, which shortly before had purged its more extreme conservative leaders, easily beat the anti-Dashnak coalition (Ramkavars, Hnchaks, and independents), but neither winners nor losers engaged in the kind of hyperbolic rhetoric that had characterized their contests in the recent past.

The movement toward greater unity, both within the diaspora and between the diaspora and Soviet Armenia, was greatly aided by the growing awareness of an old issue, now renewed and freshly articulated, that united all politically conscious Armenians – the Genocide of 1915. The spontaneous demonstrations of Soviet Armenians in April 1965, demanding recognition of the Genocide by their own government, and the continuing and intensifying campaign by official Turkish agencies to deny that a genocide had occurred stimulated greater interest in the issue. A new discourse around the Genocide developed, along with ritual observance on April 24, conferences and institutes for study of the Genocide, and political action to have European and American governments recognize the “forgotten Holocaust”. The Dashnaksutiun softened its anti-Soviet tone and argued once again that the main enemy was Turkey and that the principal task of the diaspora was raising the issue of Armenian irredenta and recognition of the Genocide. As a powerful mobilising theme, the Genocide resonated within broader discourses of ethnic self-assertion and the revival of attention to the Jewish Holocaust. Yet even as it brought Armenians of different political camps together, the inability of the political campaigns to effect any change in the attitude of the Turkish government — except to stimulate its efforts at denial — created a new militancy among radicalized young people in the

Middle East. Once again a strong sense that action must be taken before the “nation” disappeared led small groups of revolutionaries, influenced by the resistance movement of the Palestinians, to form the Armenian secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in 1975.¹³ Soon followed by other groups, the Justice Commandos and the Armenian Revolutionary Party, the “terrorists” assassinated both Turkish diplomats and officials as well as Dashnak political leaders. The shock value of the initial assassinations wore off quickly, and by the mid-1980s internal fighting within the organizations over tactics and personalities led to the decline of Armenian “terrorist” activities. Like the Cold War polarization on the issue of Soviet Armenia, so the harsh choice between politics and revolutionary warfare had divided Armenians rather than bringing them together around a common vision.

By the late 1970s, political developments in the Middle East made the future of Armenian communities increasingly precarious. Besides the civil war in Lebanon, repression in Syria and Turkey, and the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, a generally inhospitable environment for traditional Armenian business pursuits stimulated emigration from the region, primarily to the United States. By the 1980s, the two principal centers of Armenian life were the Soviet republic and scattered communities in California and other parts of North America. The one certainty for Armenians was that life within the borders of one or the other superpower was the best guarantee for the future. All that changed with the coming to power in Moscow of Mikhail Gorbachev, the rise of the Karabakh movement, and the subsequent collapse of the USSR.

Locals and Returnees

In a real sense the diaspora is caught between two desires — to remain part of the “nation” broadly defined; and to maintain its separate existence, not to merge completely by emigrating to the “homeland.” In the Armenian case, a small number of diaspora Armenians took the opportunity presented by the end of Soviet rule

¹³ In 1973, the 73-year-old Gurchen Yanikian, a victim of the Armenian Genocide, lured two Turkish diplomats to a meeting in Santa Barbara where he killed them. This event inspired younger Armenians to engage in “propaganda of the deed.”

and “returned” to Armenia. That “return,” of course, was physically real but in another sense metaphoric, for almost all of these “returnees” had never lived in Armenia and were from the western Armenia diaspora, not from Russia or eastern Armenia. They brought with them their western Armenian and diaspora ideas and preferences, which differed in many ways from the ideas and preferences of the locals. However, as they imagined themselves to be part of the same essential natural national community, the differences were thought to be superficial and transient. Underneath, they believed, all Armenians felt similarly about their nation, and once the artificial incrustations of the Soviet regime were removed, local Armenians would revert to their essential Armenianness. It could always be asserted that those Armenians who did not feel the “right” feelings about Armenia were not “real” Armenians anyway. Even if Armenians could not be expected to be united on the vital issues of political and economic reconstruction, it was assumed that they would share similar views at least on the fundamental issues, most importantly the Karabakh question and the Armenian Genocide. To be sure, most Armenians do hold the dominant views on these two issues. Those who deviated from the general consensus, including not only diaspora intellectuals but also the first president of the republic and some of his closest advisors, were fiercely accused of betrayal of the nation.

In the Zionist narrative of the Holocaust, the establishment of the state of Israel was justified and necessitated by the vulnerability of Jews in the diaspora. For many observers, only *aliya* (immigrating to Israel) could save them from physical destruction or assimilation. In the Armenian narrative of the Genocide, rather than the diaspora being vulnerable, it was the homeland itself that had been victimized, indeed emptied of Armenians, and occupied by their opponents. One argument for the need to hold Karabakh was expressed precisely in the conviction that Karabakh stood between Armenia and a second holocaust. Refuge for many Armenians was not in the Caucasus but in Los Angeles, and the returnees may have conceivably bumped into the tens of thousands of Haiastantsis who passed through the airport on their emigration out of the country. The racialized view of Turks and Azerbaijanis as essentially driven by enmity toward Armenians creates a heightened sense of endangerment for the isolated Armenian state. Here too parallels with Israel apply — the sense that they are

surrounded by enemies (Muslim in both cases) and that they are unable to rely on anyone but themselves.

Anti-Turkish feeling was usually higher in the diaspora communities, made up as they were of refugees from Turkey and their descendants, than in Soviet Armenia, whose people were not exposed to a steady diet of anti-Turkish propaganda. The Soviet media instead spoke of the amicable ties between the USSR and Turkey, played down the memory of the Genocide (at least until the late 1950s), and spoke *ad nauseum* of the “friendship of the peoples” of the USSR. *Druzhba narodov* was already in daily practice an empty slogan. In a political system where all politics were ethnicized, where being Armenian gave one advantages or disadvantages based on the republic in which one lived, *druzhba narodov* became the subject of derisive anecdotes. Radio Armenia asked, “What is *druzhba* ?” The answer: “It is when an Armenian takes the hand of a Russian who takes the hand of a Ukrainian who takes the hand of a Lithuanian and they all go off together to fight the Turks!”

The effectiveness of this Soviet propaganda is difficult to measure, but it is clear that within the population the memory of 1915 still was palpable. A large number of Soviet Armenians descended from Armenians displaced from Turkey. Towns and suburbs were named after the destroyed towns of Anatolia, often with the prefix *Nor* (new) attached (e.g., Nor Arapgir). And a popular discourse about Armenian victimization was maintained in poems, songs, and everyday conversations, even as it competed with Soviet rhetoric about rebuilding, restoration, and resurrection.

Anti-Turkish attitudes carried over to attitudes toward Azerbaijanis. The most characteristic view of Azerbaijanis was less that they were a physical danger to Armenians, given the presence of the Russians, but that they were a people of inferior culture. Resentment about Azerbaijani rule over Karabakh centered on the incongruity of having a more backward people ruling over a more developed people. Karabakh Armenians were also seen as inferior culturally to the Haiastantsis, a crude mountain people who were forgetting the Armenian language and traditions.

More than 70 years after the Genocide, Armenians in the diaspora tended to reduce local identifications and adopt a national Armenian identity. It is scarcely surprising then, that in Armenia itself national identity asserted itself even more strongly. In large part this was an unintended effect of Soviet nationality policy, which had created national republics, ethnically homogenized their territories, empowered their native intelligentsias and political cadres, and in general ethnicized politics. By the 1960s, nationalist expression had become more prevalent in literature and art. The massive demonstrations in Erevan on the 50th and 51st anniversaries of the Genocide (April 24, 1965 and 1966) were testimony to the power of the image of Armenian victimhood and the popular expectation that “Russia” would come to the aid of the Armenians. The demands were not anti-Soviet or anti-Russian but more traditionally a call on Moscow to help Armenians recover their “lost lands” (*mer hogher*) in Turkey and in Azerbaijan.

The Dissolution of the Soviet Union

By the time the Soviet Union disintegrated, Soviet Armenia had become in the imagination of almost all Armenians the national homeland, or at least the national core of a future expanded homeland. But those Armenians in the “actually existing homeland” were, as most visitors to Soviet and post-soviet Armenia discovered quickly (usually to their dismay), very different from the “nation-in-exile.” The first shock was that the long-expressed desire of the most militantly nationalist of diaspora Armenians, that is the “return” to Haiastan, appealed to very few in the diaspora. Only a few hundred emigrated to Armenia. The poverty, post-earthquake devastation, and mundane realities of demoralized and dispirited people radically departed from idealized images of Armenians carefully cultivated and maintained far from the homeland. In the first flush of independence — even before full independence was declared — homeland Armenians enthusiastically embraced the diaspora as wealthier compatriots from whom they expected material salvation and uncritical political support. The symbolic marriage of diaspora and homeland was the appointment of a California lawyer, Raffii Hovannisian, son of a prominent and patriotic diaspora historian, as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of independent Armenia. Hovannisian himself had noted the symbolism of his appointment: “It was a signal to all Armenians, wherever they live, whatever political

party they support, whatever religious denomination they belong to, that Armenia is one. It belongs to everybody, and every Armenian belongs to it.”¹⁴ His short tenure in office was equally emblematic. Hovannisian performed an important role in legitimizing Armenian statehood, securing recognition from the international community. But he carried the harder positions of the diaspora on Karabakh and the Genocide into his foreign policy. He broke with Ter Petrosian’s nuanced policy on Karabakh and called for recognition of its independence, even suggesting to Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger that if President Bush did not take “a more courageous stand, a more principled stand” on Karabakh, he could lose Armenian-American votes.¹⁵ But after Hovannisian took the bold and ill-considered step of speaking critically in Istanbul about Turkey’s human rights record (September 10, 1992), Ter Petrosian dismissed him.¹⁶ The differences between the views of the diaspora and the Armenian government were exposed for all to see.

In its earliest days the Armenian government toyed with the idea of Armenian citizenship for all Armenians abroad. But eventually that idea was dropped, and even dual citizenship was rejected. Raffi Hovannisian’s own efforts to gain Armenian citizenship were repeatedly frustrated, largely because he was unwilling to give up his American citizenship.

Interestingly enough, the current foreign minister, Vartan Oskanian, was granted Armenian citizenship after renouncing his American citizenship. The Armenians of the diaspora are in a sense members of the Armenian nation but not to be accorded automatic membership in the Armenian state. Though they are not permitted to

¹⁴ Tony Halpin, “The Face of Discord,” *Armenian International Magazine*, III, 10 (November 1992), p.12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p.10.

¹⁶ Though another diaspora Armenian, close advisor to the president Girair Libaridian, was asked to succeed Hovannisian, he declined the invitation, suggesting that a homeland Armenian be given the post. The next foreign ministers — Vahan Papazian and Arzumanyan were from Armenia. The current foreign Minister, Vartan Oskanian, is a diaspora Armenian but one who has chosen to become a citizen of the Republic of Armenia.

exercise political influence within Armenia, they are encouraged to participate economically and culturally. The principal vehicle for government outreach to the diaspora has been the Armenia Fund, a pan-national effort to raise money in the diaspora by appealing directly to individuals, rather than working through the well-established and highly partisan networks of the existing political parties, charities, and professional organizations. Raffi Hovannisian briefly headed this agency under the Kocharian government, but resigned after a few months in office under rather mysterious circumstances.

For its part, the diaspora has organized its own activities to aid Armenia, from earthquake relief beginning in December 1988, to setting up enterprises in Armenia, to creating the American University of Armenia. In an old Armenian tradition, wealthy Armenians such as Louise Simone, Hirair Hovnanian, and Kirk Kerkorian, have acted in similar fashion to the old *amira* of Istanbul, using their resources in the service of the national community. Recently Kerkorian's pledges of over \$100 million to build roads from Armenia to Iran and through Georgia to the Black Sea were touted as new evidence of the tight bond between diaspora and homeland.

Significantly, Kerkorian's intervention came after the fall of the Ter Petrosian government, which had found itself increasingly alienated from the diaspora, particularly from its more nationalist elements such as the Dashnaksutiun. On several fronts the distance was evident. Ter Petrosian refused to take a militant line on Karabakh; he would neither recognize its independence nor annex it to Armenia. Instead, he steadily maintained that Karabakh was an internal problem for Karabakh but one that concerned Armenia and the international community. Indeed, his fall from power was precipitated by his willingness to consider a compromise resolution of the issue that would have allowed Karabakh to remain within Azerbaijan although with complete self-rule. A second major issue that divided the diaspora from Ter Petrosian was the Genocide issue. Whereas for many diaspora intellectuals and politicians, the Genocide precludes a more friendly relationship with Turkey until Ankara is willing to recognize the crimes of 1915; the Armenian president attempted to uncouple the Genocide issue and improvement of Armenia's relations with Turkey. This led to an uproar in diaspora

circles, particularly after the Armenian Ministry of Education downgraded the teaching of the Genocide in state schools. The tensions were revealed at a conference organized in Erevan on the 80th anniversary of the Gen(April 1995), where the official governmental view was presented by Girair Libaridian and the discontent of many in the diaspora were expressed by Richard Hovannisian.

The Ter Petrosian government did not have a coherent policy toward the diaspora.¹⁷ It did organize a State Council for Relations with the Diaspora, but the agency had little resonance among Armenians abroad. Little attention was paid to the most proximate diaspora, that in former Soviet republics, particularly Georgia and Russia. With almost no meaningful political organizations, the post-Soviet diaspora remains vulnerable to governments with growing suspicions about Armenians. In Georgia, Tbilisi Armenians have been victimized by outlaw bands of Georgians who attempt to terrorize them into leaving the country and abandoning their coveted apartments. The Armenian government, its hands full with the Karabakh conflict, has assiduously avoided stirring up expectations of the Armenians who form a majority in the southern Georgian regions of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki. While the hostility of many Georgians has intensified because of the local Armenian support of the rebel Abkhaz in Abkhazia, Erevan has attempted to maintain good relations with the Shevardnadze government.

One of the most notable changes in Armenian politics after the fall of the Ter Petrosian government and the accession of Kocharian was the development of closer relations with the diaspora, at least with the most vocal elements. Kocharian re-legalized the Dashnaktsutiun, and shifted policy on Karabakh, Turkey, and the Genocide toward positions more in line with diaspora attitudes. Though these shifts should not be exaggerated, Kocharian's government certainly turned its face toward the diaspora, reversing Ter Petrosian's attitude. But the continuity in personnel and policies of the two Armenian governments has led to a growing criticism of the

¹⁷ Razmik Panossian, "Diaspora-Homeland Relations: The Role of the Diaspora in the New Armenia," lecture at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January 10, 1988.

new authorities by the old opposition, including the Dashnaksutiun, which remains a part of the coalition government.

One of the most important activities of the diaspora, particularly in the United States, has been political lobbying, an organized effort to keep the Armenian presence visible to people in power. First with the issue of genocide recognition, later in securing aid for Armenia, and finally to prevent aid to Azerbaijan, the American-Armenian lobbies have been extraordinarily successful. Their image in Washington is one of power and unity; the picture is less harmonious within the community. Yet on important occasions, such as the recent campaign to maintain Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act (passed by Congress and signed by President Bush in 1992), which prevents the granting of economic and military aid to Azerbaijan as long as it maintains its blockade of US humanitarian aid from delivery to Armenia, organizations ranging from the Armenian Assembly, the Armenian National Committee of America, and all major religious groups united in a successful effort to prevent the rescinding of this resolution. This success put the Armenians of the diaspora in opposition to policies of conservatives in Congress, the oil lobby, and the Clinton administration. While at times diaspora lobbying is about diaspora interests, in this case there was a clear coincidence of interest of the diaspora and the Republic of Armenia.

There are clear signs in Armenia that there are limits in the public mind on how influential the diaspora should be. The response to the arrest of Dashnak leaders was relatively restrained. The rejection of dual citizenship was popular. Raffi Hovannisian remains very popular, but less because of his diaspora background than because of the perception that he is relatively principled and "clean," i.e. not tied to domestic interests, local mafias, and corruption. The American University of Armenia has been viciously criticized by nationalist and old Communist elements. And the appearance of diaspora intellectuals and Western political advisors at a July 1997 conference at the American University of Armenia sparked hostile reactions both in the audience and in the press. The most dramatic signs of resistance to foreign influence (in this case not the diaspora) was in mid-1998 when the Kocharian government agreed to sell the Erevan Cognac Factory, an industry closely associated with national

pride, to Pernod-Ricard of France for \$30 million. The sale sparked the first major political crisis of the new government, as the opposition in parliament threatened a vote of no confidence. There were similar, although less intense, reactions to the sale of the Mars Radio-Electronics to a London-based Armenian businessman, Vach Manukian, and the Armenia Hotel on Erevan's central square to the Marriott Corporation.

Conclusion

What conclusions can we reach about diaspora-homeland relations from the Armenian case? First, diasporas and home states have different identities and interests. While they may both consider themselves to be part of a single nation, their actual lives, beliefs, and attitudes often diverge. Yet there is, secondly, interdependence between them. The homeland benefits from the material resource, skills, and networks of the diaspora; and the diaspora regenerates itself, finds purpose and a new coherence in its relationship with the homeland. Thirdly, the two parts of the nation, state/homeland and diaspora, enrich each other in a continuous, even contentious, dialogue about what is the nation, its past and future. While Armenians routinely call for unity and seldom find it, in fact it may be precisely in their disunity, their diversity, their contentions that they find new vigor and direction. To go back to where we began, if the nation is an imagined political community, the richness and variety of imaginaries only empowers the nation. Nationalists may disagree with this and seek an illusory unity and conformity, but the efforts to enforce such conformity may well kill the very thing — the nation — that nationalism seeks to nourish.

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3. Al-Mahallium wal 'Aidun: *Locals and Returnees* *in the Palestinian National Movement*

Roger Heacock

What distinguishes the Palestinian national movement after 1948 is, among other things, the fact that for a long time, and up to the present in some respects, the 'outside' was substituted for the 'inside'. The exilic community took upon itself to carry the (virtually total) burden of national consciousness and liberation. From the beginning of the Palestinian national movement in the aftermath of the Balfour declaration of 1917 and the creation of the British-administered Palestine mandate up to 1948, Jerusalem had been the headquarters of the movement, while the Palestinian villages provided many of its militants and fighters.¹¹ In 1948, following the Palestinian dispossession, it became materially impossible to undertake that responsibility within the newly created Jewish state which the Palestinian nationalists viewed as occupied Palestine.

This development was due to two main factors:

1. Palestinians remaining in the area that became Israel in 1948 were placed under military rule until 1965. They did not have the capacity to sustain a nationalist movement considered treasonous by the authorities of the state. The latter employed the methods of "segmentation", "dependence" and "co-optation"² to ensure the short- and long-term quiescence of this minority.

¹ Olivier Carré, *Le mouvement national palestinien* (Paris: Gallimard/Juliard, 1977), pp.66-76.

² Categories developed in Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State. Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin, Texas: Texas University Press, 1980), Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The national consciousness of these '1948 Palestinians' and its articulation by cultural and political elites have greatly developed since the decade which followed the *nakba*, particularly after the mid-1970s.

2. Palestinians in the remainder of rump Palestine came under Egyptian (Gaza Strip) or Jordanian (West Bank) control. The only possible base for a national movement (which would of necessity be based in the urban centers) to regain lost rights was the West Bank. In fact, the Egyptians never annexed the Gaza Strip, for both theoretical and practical reasons. A part of Palestine, it was brimming with dispossessed refugees, who would have constituted an unnecessary burden. Furthermore, the Strip had after all witnessed the brief and stillborn, but nonetheless significant experience of the "Government of all Palestine" established in Gaza City under Ahmad Hilmi Pasha. The West Bank, on the othand, was immediately, and by previous agreement between the Hashemite Emir 'Abdallah of Transjordan and the Zionist leadership, occupied and then annexed to Jordan. Two other factors, one psychological and the other ideological, likewise inhibited the short-term development of a Palestinian national movement in Palestine itself. These were the trauma of the 1947-48 *nakba* (disaster) with the expulsion from their homes of close to 1 million people, followed by the establishment of 20 official UN-administered refugee camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as a large number of unofficial ones, and the hegemonic role in the Arab world of unitary Arab nationalism at the level of the masses and politicized intellectuals. And finally, given the increasing importance of Cold War priorities, there was no question of building a Palestinian national movement in the West Bank. King Hussein of Jordan, who succeeded to the throne after 'Abdallah's assassination in 1950, vigorously repressed any such trend.³ As a result, the center of the Palestinian liberation movement (which was not primarily Palestinian nationalist at this point, but rather Arab nationalist) moved to the periphery of the area of so-called 'confrontation' between the Arabs and Israel.

From 1948 to 1967, Israel and Jordan effectively suppressed any manifestations of Palestinian (or Arab) nationalism in the territories under their control. At the same time, many Palestinians within Israel and Jordan attempted to 'adapt' for the sake of survival,

³ Helga Baumgarten, *Palästina: Befreiung in den Staat* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991), p. 211.

i.e. to transform themselves subjectively into Jordanians⁴ or (a much trickier feat) Israelis.⁵ These attempts were unsuccessful, because of the dialectics of the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The Israelis were determined to stop any return of Palestinians to their villages. They considered such returnees to be hostile 'infiltrators', and dealt with them accordingly, by imprisoning and deporting, or if caught in the act of returning by killing them.⁶ Those who had remained were classified as a hostile minority and kept under military rule. As in 1956 during the Israeli-British-French military campaign against Egypt, they were placed under curfew and sometimes subjected to state violence (as, for example, in the case of the notorious Kufr Qasem massacre). The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan likewise suppressed any tendency to create a Palestinian resistance movement. Israel responded massively to isolated *fedayeen* (commando) actions over both the Jordanian (West Bank) and Egyptian (Gaza) borders. Control and suppression on the part of the Egyptian authorities was almost as strict, and little was done to prevent Israeli incursions causing loss of life not only among Palestinians but also among Egyptian soldiers. Autonomous activities on the part of Palestinians in Palestine, whether under Israeli or Arab control, were thus virtually eliminated. Israelization and Jordanization, although surface phenomena, were the order of the day.

The Culture of Resistance

The creation of a culture, and later an organization, of resistance after 1948 thus took shape on the outside, primarily in the neighboring Arab countries, and most notably in Egypt, the Gulf (especially Kuwait) and finally, Jordan. The Arab regimes never looked favorably upon the activities of Palestinians within their

⁴ Alain Gresh, *The PLO. The Struggle Within* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988), p. 26.

⁵ Elias Sanbar, *Palestine 1948. L'expulsion* (Paris and Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1984), pp. 211-212.

⁶ Ilan Halévi, *Question Juive: la tribu, la loi, l'espace* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981), p. 278.

countries,⁷ and did their best to maintain strict control over them. The Arab League in Cairo had a bureau for Palestinian affairs, headed by Dr. Ahmad Shuqeiri. Stridently anti-Israeli only in its rhetoric, it tried to keep tabs on the political activities of Palestinians in Egypt and elsewhere. When the Palestine Liberation Organization was created in 1964, it was intended to become an arm of Egyptian policy under President Gamal 'Abdel Nasser, and Shuqeiri was placed at its head. In the meantime, however, an alternative and, as it turned out, authentic, exilic national movement had been created, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, known until the present day by its acronym Fatah. This is the movement that came to symbolize and progressively to define Palestinian nationalist goals. It is therefore not surprising that its leader, Yasir Arafat, was elected in 1968 as Chair of the Executive Committee of the PLO. This was the crowning act in a process which had begun nearly two decades earlier.

The resistance movement which slowly emerged during the 1950s did so on the fringes of other organizations, first and foremost the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) in Cairo, of which Yasir Arafat was elected chairman in 1952. Many of the future leaders of Fatah and the PLO were present from 1952 to 1956 in Cairo or in Gaza, Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) and Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), for example. Together, they gradually developed the idea of what Fatah was later to become: an entirely independent, wholly Palestinian, purely nationalist movement in the diaspora, dedicated to regaining Palestine (later on, part of Palestine) for the Palestinians primarily through armed struggle (much later, through diplomatic means). They were inspired by Egyptian president Nasser in July 1956 when he nationalized the Suez Canal. But they were influenced even more by the example of the Algerian FLN (*Front de Libération Nationale*), whose armed struggle had begun in 1954. Early in 1957, the core group of future founders of Fatah left for various parts of the Arab world: Arafat and Abu Jihad went to Kuwait where they were later joined by Faruq Qaddumi (Abu Lutuf, until the present time the head of the PLO's political department, residing in Tunis, and an opponent of the Oslo accords). Youssef al Najjar, Kamal Adwan and

⁷ Gresh, *The PLO. The Struggle Within* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1988), pp. 25-26.

Abu Mazen went to Qatar, while Abu Iyad stayed in Gaza.⁸ By 1958, they had decided to call their embryonic movement *Harakat Tahrir Filastin* (*Fatah* being its reverse initials), and in 1959 they held a clandestine inaugural congress, bringing the movement officially into existence.

Once created, Fatah quickly went about seeking to rally Palestinians all over the Arab world and in the diaspora. This included the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but no particular preference was given to these Palestinian areas, indeed, it would appear that they were, if anything, relatively neglected by the recruitment drive.⁹ Commando raids by Fatah did not actually begin until January 1965, and these were mounted (usually in a not very effective manner) from Gaza, but also and mainly from the West Bank. The input of Palestinians living in Israel was totally ignored, since they had, in the dominant view of the diaspora organizations, become assimilated as de facto traitors, unless they left Israel. This was the view for a number of years thereafter. Even more inexplicably, the potential of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians was also marginal, unless they moved resolutely to join the resistance organizations, notably Fatah, which was at that time concentrated in and around Amman. But such a move meant leaving the homeland and, after the experiences of 1948 onward, many were reluctant to do so. The explanation for this attitude can only be found in the process of “substitutionism”: the Palestinian resistance had substituted itself for Palestine during this period. The phenomenon is clearly reflected in the articles of *Filistinuna*, the Fatah theoretical journal.¹⁰

After 1967

After the six-day war in June 1967, things shifted slightly. With the defeat of all of the Arab countries, the occupation of what

⁸ Abou Iyad, *Palestinien sans patrie: Entretiens avec Eric Rouleau* (Paris: Fayolle, 1978), p.51.

⁹ Carré, pp. 131-132.

¹⁰ Baumgarten, pp. 175-176. In explaining the ideological evolution of Fatah, the author places great emphasis on “the specific situation in which the Palestinian migrants had lived since 1948 in Kuwait” (p.176).

remained of Palestine, and the demonstration of Israel's overwhelming military superiority, the myth of Arab unity and Arab victory was destroyed. Arab countries such as Syria and Egypt became even less amenable to the launching of *fedayeen* actions from their soil, and the resistance movements gave somewhat greater attention to the establishment of clandestine bases and cells in the West Bank and Gaza. In the latter, resistance activities even escalated until they were severely repressed in 1970. Yasir Arafat himself, in the months which followed the occupation of the West Bank in June 1967, is known to have driven from Ramallah to Nablus, to Bethlehem and other towns, attempting to recruit for , and to have narrowly escaped capture. But the attempt to establish bases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was a brief one, stretching from June 1967 to March 1968, and thereafter "the role played by the occupied territories in the national struggle had become an adjunct to the political, military, and institutional base evolving in Arab exile."¹¹ If therefore, the main focus of activities in the period after 1967 was the neighboring Arab states, it was in part because "the leaders of the PLO were, understandably, not keen on seeing the emergence of local leaders on the West Bank."¹²

The PLO's first "Palestine National Congress" (PNC) was held in Jerusalem on May 28, 1964. Fatah was still not present except in the persons of a few individuals, Abu Jihad, Mohammed al Najjar and Kamal Adwan,¹³ the idea being to tap some of the means being put at the new organization's disposal. Shuqeiri (and Nasser) kept the Fatah representatives at arm's length. The answer then was to push for armed struggle, and their first action took place on January 1, 1965. This was the defining moment for Fatah, one which clearly made the movement's later evolution possible. Immediately after the six-day debacle, with the PLO discredited along with Arab regimes defeated in the 1967 war, Fatah moved to gain further ground. A meeting was

¹¹ Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 181.

¹² Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p.50.

¹³ Abou Iyad, p. 75.

held on June 12, 1967 in Damascus, where it was decided to resume armed struggle, taking advantage of the weakness of the Arab regimes. According to Abu Iyad, this was a key decision, one that would prove decisive in the long term:

[A] great fundraising campaign is launched, particularly among rich Palestinians from the Diaspora. Yussef el-Najjar, Kamal Adwan, Abu Mazen, Khaled el-Hassan are instructed to seek support from our sympathizers and our friends. Others are charged with requesting subsidies from oil-producing countries. We are no longer worried about compromising our financial autonomy, which we had until then jealously defended. We believe that the dramatic situation in which a large number of Arab regimes find themselves will make it impossible for them to place political conditions upon the assistance which they will grant us.¹⁴

Of course he - they - got it wrong. Financial dependence entails financial - and political - costs, and this was the beginning of the build-up of vested interests. A defeated regime is not necessarily a weak regime, as seen for example in the case of Iraq in 1991. Abu Iyad shows¹⁵ how interested in establishing strong financial ties some of the Arab states were, particularly oil-rich states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, whose king Feysal received Fatah's Abu Jihad with open arms and pockets. The increasing dependence on Saudi Arabia was in fact criticized in the late 1970s by West Bank elites,¹⁶ yet this essential point did not come up for discussion, certainly not between the 'outside' and the 'inside'. The reliance on Gulf oil money increased even more after the successful Palestinian-Jordanian defensive battle against the Israeli army at Karameh in 1968, the immediate result of which was a spectacular increase in the number of young Palestinians joining the *fedayeen* movement.¹⁷ The Gulf states feared the potential radicalization of Palestinians living within their

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 90.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 91

¹⁶ Sahliych, p. 71.

¹⁷ Sayigh, p. 207.

borders and elsewhere. They particularly feared the Marxist Palestinian groups.¹⁸ It can thus correctly be said that PLO dependence on donor states, what fashionable political analysis today calls *rentier* regime status, began just after the 1967 six-day war. It continues to this very day, and serves as a secondary causal factor in explaining the many twists and turns of PLO policies.

At any rate, in July 1968 the fourth PNC declared that the only way to liberate Palestine was through armed struggle. With this succession of developments, the Palestinian myth was born: that of salvation by the sword and by Palestinians themselves, albeit coming from outside Palestine to liberate their homeland and their hapless fellow Palestinians living under occupation. And among these outside Palestinians, those of Fatah enjoyed the political and financial favors of the Arab world at large, at least of those with the means to make a difference through their financial support. The so-called 'left' groups, foremost among them the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, managed to frighten the conservative oil kingdoms into the arms of Fatah by the very radicalism of their rhetoric. These regimes showered Fatah with financial and material support, because nothing scared them more than the threat of communist subversion. The ingredients of Palestinian autonomy in parts of the West Bank and Gaza were thus created in the combination of myth, the generous financial assistance, and the 40-year reign of the very same men who founded Fatah, minus those among them who were murdered by Israel, that is to say virtually all of them except Arafat and his sometime heir-apparent Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen).

In Jordan, the Palestinians came close to taking over the state in 1970, but were crushed before they could do so in what has become known as the Black September campaign, launched by King Hussein. At that point, the Palestinian leadership moved to Lebanon, where they set up "Fatah-land" (from the Israeli border to the southern outskirts of Beirut), and concentrated their political and military activities in that country and on the northern border of Israel. The 'inside' still had no significant role in the vision and the strategies of the PLO. Indeed, after the loss of its Jordanian base, the PLO leadership became openly fearful of "secessionist tendencies" in the

¹⁸ Abou Iyad, pp. 105-106.

West Bank.¹⁹ Whether it was a democratic, non-denominational state over all of Palestine, or the establishment of an ‘entity’ (perhaps a state) in the West Bank and Gaza, an idea adopted by some organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it would be achieved, according to the main thrust of the resistance ideology of the time, through armed struggle and diplomatic negotiations involving the PLO, Israel, and the great powers, mainly the US and the Soviet Union. There was absolutely no notion that the activities of the Palestinians under occupation would make a difference.

In the meantime, on the inside, the 1970s, with Israeli occupation, brought grassroots mobilization, sponsored and encouraged largely by the indigenous Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), almost entirely Palestinian in its makeup, which achieved primacy during this period over a largely indifferent Fatah, as well as the other PLO factions. The Communists centered their activities on creating an indigenous and local base for the Palestinian national movement — a domestic, as opposed to diaspora resistance movement. Its advantages were also its disadvantages: it was highly trained in clandestine mass organizing; it was pragmatic and secular. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, the JCP had always called for the recognition of Israel and after 1967 the acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli and indeed the Arab-Israeli conflict. By 1973, it had combined this position with advocacy of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Yet at this point “the PLO had not yet discovered any political significance in the occupied territories”.²⁰

For most people, the JCP was not a solution, because of the conservative and religious nature of the society as a whole and because the PLO, despite its distance in the early 1970s, had rapidly gained ideological hegemony. Meanwhile, the PLO continued to view with concern and some alarm the rise to prominence of even the pro-

¹⁹ Gresh, p. 112.

²⁰ Sahliyah, p. 92.

PLO mayors elected by the largest West Bank towns in 1976,²¹ although Israeli repression (deposing and deporting some of them) combined with settler violence (the maiming of two mayors by booby-traps) contributed to the eclipse of their power within five years.

This was demonstrated as, despite all of its efforts, the JCP was progressively displaced by the PLO in general and Fatah in in the various social sectors where it had been dominant throughout the 1970s. The process was accelerated after September 1982, when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon culminated in the PLO's departure from Beirut (followed that same month by the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, for which Ariel Sharon, then Israeli defense minister, was found responsible by Israeli judges). At this time, the PLO lost its last bases on the Israeli border. The Palestinian military forces were moved to Algeria, South Yemen and similar remote places. The focus at this point clearly shifted to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But now the PLO was faced with a dilemma: how to bring the occupied territories into the picture without fundamentally losing part of its authority to the insiders. This is the kind of concern that had in the past been faced by other revolutionary movements and leaders, notably Lenin when he was in exile in Switzerland. But the difference here was that the PLO leadership could not travel back and forth from the outside to the inside. Delegating authority would probably mean alienating it for good, and this is something which, time and again, Arafat, followed by the other leaders, was unwilling to do. He sought a variety of solutions,^[rm1] and even the signature of a kind of condominium accord with King Hussein in 1985 for a measure of co-rule (condominium) between them, which meant in effect with Israel itself. But never was the inside empowered.

The Role of the *Intifada*

During the Palestinian uprising or *intifada* which began in December, 1988, the inside proceeded for a time to empower itself. The uprising took the Palestinian leadership by surprise, and quickly spun out of its control. They worked tirelessly to regain the upper hand,²² but even after the UNLU (United National Leadership of the

²¹ Rafik Halabi, *The West Bank Story* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1982), pp. 121 and 127.

Uprising) had been brought under the control of the PLO in Tunis through a process of constant communication, the weight of the inside played a major role in forcing Arafat to make his declaration of independence (November 15, 1988)²³ and, later, in establishing his negotiating strategy after the Madrid conference (October 1991). Indeed, the inside played such a major role in the negotiations which followed in Washington that the Oslo accords can be seen as a response of the outside to the challenge posed by the inside. It has also been interpreted as the result of the financial crisis occasioned in the PLO by the interruption of the Gulf States' assistance from 1990, something which doubtless played a role, albeit a modest one.²⁴ Israel was offered a variety of things it had not been able to obtain in Washington (most notably, the postponement of any discussion of Jerusalem and settlements to the final status negotiations, and no prohibition on settlement expansion during the interim period). This was an important factor in Rabin's decision to sign with his enemy, Arafat, and the PLO. The price paid was heavy in terms of serious errors on the part of the Palestinian negotiators, errors which could partly and perhaps largely have been avoided had there not been this fundamental ignorance and mistrust of the inside on the part of the outside.

Paradoxically, this continued and currently reinforced supremacy of outside figures comes at a time when diaspora concerns have all but been abandoned, notably the problem of the three and a half million Palestinian refugees and their right of return.²⁵ There is a

²² Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 191-192.

²³ Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, "The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians Under Occupation" in Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 198.

²⁴ For the political economy approach to contemporary developments in the region, and particularly with regard to the PLO, see Martin Beck, "Can Financial Aid Promote Regional Peace Agreements? The Case of the Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Mediterranean Politics* 2(2), (Autumn 1997), pp. 49-70. On the role of the withholding of Gulf oil revenues, see p. 63.

particular type of literature which is increasingly pointing the finger at Western aid-givers as being partly responsible for the PNA's rising authoritarianism and lack of accountability through their donor policies, which do nothing to help ensure the development of the institutions and practices of civil society and democratic institutionalization; in fact, the reverse is true. I personally do not think this is a recent trend but rather an ongoing reality, traceable through the European and American phase of influence back before 1991 to the period when the Gulf oil states were the main sponsors of the PLO.

The problem has persisted to the present time, through the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords, which must themselves be understood in large part as resulting from the single-minded pursuit by the PLO, then still based in Tunis, of recognition by the US and by Israel as a legitimate negotiating partner. At the time of the Madrid conference of October 1991, which inaugurated the drawn-out set of negotiations between Israel and her Arab adversaries, Washington had accepted Israeli demands to the letter and imposed them at the outset on the Arabs, especially on the Palestinians, now weakened by the consequences of the Gulf War. These demands included the rejection of a separate Palestinian delegation, of PLO participation, or of participation by Palestinians from Jerusalem or outside the occupied Palestinian territories.²⁶

Arafat thus succeeded in carrying out a historic 'diplomatic revolution' between 1991 and 1993. In exchange, it would seem, excessive concessions were made to Israel which have cast serious doubt on the viability of the coming Palestinian state. This is the view, for example, of one of the West Bank elites, attorney Raja Shehadeh,²⁷ whose writings are fraught with deep pessimism.²⁸ In his

²⁵ Lamis Andoni, "Extremism and the Prospects for Palestinian National Dialogue" in Muriel Asseburg and Volker Perthes, eds., *Surviving the Stalemate: Approaches to Strengthening the Palestinian Entity* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlag, 1998), p. 58.

²⁶ Camille Mansour, *Beyond Alliance: Israel and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.187.

view, “[t]here were good reasons to fear that if a deal was struck between the Israeli side and the Palestinians from within the Occupied Territories the organization outside would become redundant.”²⁹ In order to bridge the geographical gulf with the inside by convincing Israel to let the outsiders return, the interests of the inside (that is to say, of Palestine itself, and not only of the local refugee and non-refugee community) were probably sold short,³⁰ although the final verdict of history has not yet been cast.

When Arafat and tens of thousands of fellow outsiders (mostly PLO members and their families) returned to Palestine beginning in 1994, the outside and the inside together became involved in building the institutions of the PNA. By now, there are tens of thousands of people on the state payroll (including the security services). The exact relationship between outsiders and insiders is unknown. But at the highest level they are all outsiders: Arafat, Abu Mazen, Ahmad Qrei’ and Nabil Sha’th (the first two, founding members of Fatah, Qrei’ (Abu Ala’) the head of the Palestinian negotiating team in Oslo, and Sha’th a principal in the preparation of the Oslo-based Interim Accords on Palestinian Self-Governance.

²⁷ Raja Shehadeh, *From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-129.

³⁰ This is indeed the perception of the principal negotiator of the Oslo accords on the Israeli side, Yuri Savir: “...Arafat was sending us a definite message: the Washington talks would grind on endlessly, but in Oslo, where the PLO was officially represented, he was prepared to compromise.” Yuri Savir, *The Process. 100 Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 4. He also emphasizes the meticulous preparation of the Israelis at all levels and in every field (political, economic, security) during their negotiations on implementing the Oslo accords of September 1993. “The jockeying for position within the PLO was the main reason that Arafat stalled on choosing a delegation to the talks on implementing the agreement [signed in Washington on September 13, 1993]. Neither did the Palestinians do any serious preparatory work. The situation on our side was precisely the opposite.” (*Ibid.*, p. 81).

President Yasir Arafat's wife, Soha Arafat, made the point candidly in a 1998 newspaper interview, when she accused the President's close advisors (all of whom are returnees) of being corrupt and authoritarian, and thus tarnishing his image. At the same time she minimized the role in this respect of his government ministers (in their majority locals)³¹ because of their lesser importance in the decision-making process.³² The most notable instance of quarreling over patronage and pie-dividing in the area of international aid moneys and programs has taken place at the top, among returnees, for example between Nabil Sha'ath and Ahmad Qrei' before the latter took on his job as President (Speaker) of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). It is always Arafat who makes the crucial decisions³³ in his 'neo-patrimonial' style, aimed at maintaining a 'healthy' level of competition among his followers, while avoiding an explosion. At the next level, in the ministries, directors-general number 460, according to the archivist of the presidential office, when in fact there are closer to 1000. Up to 65 percent are outsiders, depending on sources. The same goes for the perhaps 2000 directors in the ministries. They dominate the executive branch. On the other hand, the inside heavily dominates the PLC, or parliament elected in 1996 (although the numbers vary depending on how many years of exile defines a person as a returnee rather than a local, there are by all counts well over fifty locals in the 88-member body.³⁴ But its head, Speaker Ahmad Qrei', a returnee who was elected to the PLC from Jerusalem and who for

³¹ Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC), "The Final List of the Palestinian Cabinet as announced by Tayeb Abdul Rahim, Presidential Secretary on August 9, 1998" (Jerusalem, 1998). According to this list, 17 out of 28 ministers and ministers of state are 'residents' while 11 are returnees (13 of 22 full ministers).

³² *Al Hayat* newspaper, London, December 14, 1998.

³³ Rex Brynen, "Buying Peace? A Critical Assessment of International Aid to the West Bank and Gaza", *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25 (3), (Spring 1996), p. 84.

³⁴ Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, *The Palestinian Council* (updated second edition), Jerusalem, 1998.

decades has controlled large portion of PLO finances, in turn heavily dominates that body.

Conclusion

It would appear that the struggle will continue between those two bodies, reflecting to a certain extent the clash of interests between the inside (and as it happens of the democratic and civil society striving to emerge) and the outside respectively (i.e., the legislative branch representing the inside, the executive branch the outside). If a prediction may be ventured (something very tenuous): as long as Arafat is there, the outside will tighten its grip. When Arafat retires or disappears from the scene, the inside will have a fighting chance (and I am speaking of a political fight) of prevailing in the succession struggle. Socially speaking, the Palestinian case resembles other examples of national and revolutionary movements coming to power, such as the Soviet or the Algerian cases, where the outside (Lenin and Boumedienne) took over after the struggle had been won. What distinguishes this case is the extraordinarily long period of struggle (over half a century), and the resulting fact that two cultures (the locals and the returnees) have emerged within a single nationality. And this breach will be long in healing.

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4. *Bosnia's Population Transfers*

By Karl Stuhlpfarrer¹

There is a wide range of views on the destiny of Bosnia's population and the causes of their present situation both inside and outside their country, but in discussing the future, two of these views seem to conflict the most. One identifies Bosnia's conflict as "the most tragic and the least necessary of all the conflicts which emerged from the wreckage of Socialist Yugoslavia", and maintains that from a rational perspective, the separation of the ethnic groups into distinct enclaves made no sense even "because the creation of ethnically homogeneous enclaves would entail such enormous personal, social and economic costs that it should be dismissed out of hand."² The other view, emphasizing the idea that separating the warring populations may be the best solution to many of the most intense ethnic conflicts, has been gaining ground "and...even events in Bosnia have supported this trend, as observers note that the more the warring groups have separated, the more peaceful their relations have become."³ Both views have been applied by rational individuals to social and political environments, and so we should seek out the reasons for the present situation of the Bosnian population, drastically transformed in the years following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and whether there did and does exist rational decision-making, where and on whose part.

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

I entirely agree with the idea that the conflict between the nations of the former Yugoslavia cannot be explained as a century-old

¹ The author wishes to express his gratitude to Natascha Vittorelli, who gathered the necessary information on Bosnian refugees in Austria.

² Jim Seroka, "Yugoslavia and Its Successor States" in Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis, *Developments in East European Politics*, (Houndmills and London 1993), pp.98-121, 117.

³ Chaim Kaufmann, ed., "When All Else Fails. Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security*, Vol.23, No.2 (Fall 1998), pp.120-156, 120.

traditional enmity. History and histories are rather told by political actors as a means of mobilizing people during periods of more intense struggle for a redistribution of wealth as compensation through the different stages of the social process of modernization.⁴ And in fact this was the case in the former Yugoslavia, where even the communist regime was rarely able to equalize the regional disparities between north and south on the economic and educational levels.⁵ During the 1980s, economic crises, the devaluation of the Yugoslav currency, and a growing dependency on foreign credits was leading to an ever greater fragmentation of internal markets and, simultaneously, was justifying nationalist legitimization of social action, which is, as we know from scholars of nationalism (Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm), characteristic for periods of social and economic uncertainty.⁶ The rapid change in the global political situation and the collapse of the communist bloc in eastern Europe hastened the delegitimization of Yugoslav socialism and raised expectations of an overall solution to the problem by the creation of independent national states.⁷

The Special Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

After the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is third largest in area and population of the newly independent countries in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. (Area: 51,129 square kilometers [FRY 102,173; Croatia 56,538]; population [1990] 4.366 million [FRY 10.471 million; Croatia 4.764 million). When Austria-Hungary occupied the country in 1878, Bosnia already had its present-day borders, and the multi-ethnic population was already living in an integrated way, as it did up until the beginning of the war in 1992. In

⁴ Marie-Janine Calic, "Der serbisch-kroatische Konflikt in Kroatien" in Michael Weithmann (Hg.), *Der ruhelose Balkan: Die Konfliktregionen Südosteuropas* (München 1993) (dtv 4612), pp.108-147, 146.

⁵ Marie-Janine Calic, *Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegovina. Ursachen – Konfliktstrukturen – Internationale Lösungsversuche* (Frankfurt am Main 1995) (Edition Suhrkamp 1943), p.31.

⁶ Calic (1993) p.146; Calic (1995) p.32.

⁷ Karl Stuhlpfarrer, "Die Auflösung der Sowjetunion und Jugoslawiens" in *Informationen zur Politischen Bildung*, No.3 (Wien 1992), pp.45-66.

1991, a majority, 44 percent, were Muslims; one third, 31 percent, Serbian; and 17 percent, Croat.⁸ To be a Muslim in Bosnia at that time did not necessarily mean being religious as well. Only 37 percent of the Muslims, who were officially recognized as a nation at the beginning of the 1960s, appear to have been religious at the end of the 1980s.

The political system in Bosnia changed remarkably after the election of November 1990, when the reformed Communist Party was defeated and ethnic parties received well over two thirds of all parliamentary seats. Ethnic partition arose in the summer of 1991, when the Bosnian parliament decided on the country's independence against the votes of Serbian members and a referendum was called, despite an electoral boycott by Serbian political forces. On May 22, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina became a member of the United Nations. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and when war broke out between Croatia and Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself neutral, and the government authorized potential recruits to refuse military service in the Yugoslav People's Army; this important force of governmental power became therefore ethnically purely Serbian.⁹

The war in Bosnia began in 1992, when Serbian troops surrounded the Bosnian capital Sarajevo on April 5. The bombardment destroyed the well-planned public transport system, political centers, religious and cultural institutions such as churches and libraries, and the great food-producing companies; civilian targets such as residential buildings were not excluded. In February 1994, the bombardment of a market place cost the lives of 68 persons.¹⁰

United Nations involvement in Yugoslav affairs began on September 25, 1991, when the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 713, expressing deep concern at the fighting in the former Yugoslavia and calling on all States to implement immediately a

⁸ Srecko M. Dzaja, "Bosnien-Herzegowina" in Weithmann (Hg.) (1993), pp. 149-175, 160; the percentage is taken from Calic (1995), p. 77.

⁹ Seroka (1993), p. 118.

¹⁰ Calic (1995), p. 107f.

“general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.”¹¹ This resolution in fact constituted a great advantage to those forces that controlled the stockpile of the former Yugoslav People’s Army — and this was not the Bosnian government. Furthermore, Muslims and Croats, who had cooperated initially, came into conflict over differing programs for organizing the political system, whether to build a centralized state as Muslims preferred, or create a federal state, as Croats wished. So year after year had to pass, and resolution after resolution had to fail. Partition programs were created, for example, by Vance-Owen in 1993, but were not accepted by the Serbs. The proposals were rejected because they were based on the 1991 census of a population of whom nearly half were no longer at their originally place of residence,¹² and because they did not take into consideration the problems of partitioning natural resources such as raw materials and production of electric energy.¹³

After the Washington accords for the creation of the Bosnian-Croat Federation in May 1994 and lengthy and difficult intervention, both peaceful and military in nature, the Dayton Agreement (Proximity Peace Talks Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, November 1–21, 1995) eventually stipulated the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the settlement of a interim-entity boundary line between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Dayton Agreement provided for a democratic constitution, free elections and other measures to ensure the independence and economic reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was a difficult task to reconcile the parties, because of the atrocities that had taken place during the war. And, while we know now that Jim Seroka was too pessimistic in 1993 when he thought reconciliation and democratic government among the ethnic groups in the near future “virtually impossible”, he was entirely

¹¹ *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*. UN Department of Public Information (1995).

¹² Calic (1995) p. 188f.

¹³ Calic (1995) p. 200.

justified in arguing: "The tragedies for Bosnia are that everyone has lost and that the seeds for conflicts in succeeding generations have now been sown throughout the region."¹⁴

The Program of Ethnic Cleansing

The policies of so-called ethnic cleansing divided the ethnic groups not only by territory, but also by reciprocal cruel experiences. Certainly, these groups share even now a common history, but from opposite sides and with opposing explanations of the events. Ethnic cleansing, or, according to the United Nations, "the elimination, by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory, of members of other ethnic groups",¹⁵ was carried out through a variety of methods: harassment; discrimination; beatings; torture; rape; summary executions; relocation of population by force; confiscation of property; and destruction of homes, places of worship and cultural institutions.¹⁶ These methods were directed mainly against the Muslim population, but Serbs and Croats were also victims of the expulsions.¹⁷ The actions were accompanied by the creation of hostile images to legitimize the objectives of the war, to motivate the military personnel, and to reduce the inhibition to kill.¹⁸ In August 1992, the special rapporteur of the UN Commission for Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, noted:

Rumors and disinformation are not only generally spread, but are also a main part of the problems of the present conflict in the Balkans, insofar as they contribute considerably to stirring up sentiments of hate and revenge, to spur on the desire for retaliation...Generally the population has no trustworthy and objective source of information at its disposal.¹⁹

¹⁴ Seroka (1993) p.119.

¹⁵ *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*, p.65.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p.65f.

¹⁷ Calic (1995), p.126.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p.109.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p.111; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3./4.4. 1993, p.17.

Ethnic conflicts have often not only caused violent clashes, but also resulted from them. It would almost seem as if national conflicts were orchestrated, a model of the classic Hollywood Western film genre, to terrorize and traumatize the local population in such a way that it would ultimately be homogenized by the expulsion of the unwelcome people. Ethnic cleansing therefore was not the consequence but the goal of the war, as Mazowiecki asserted.²⁰

A huge migration movement began. Already by June 1992, 1.4 million inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia had fled from their home areas. One year later, the number had grown to more than four million,²¹ two million from Bosnia-Herzegovina alone between April 1992 and the summer of that year.²²

Ethnic cleansing is directed against people and against the centuries-old cultural monuments created by them. There are three typical patterns of ethnic cleansing: pressure for expulsion; deportation and killing; and killing in order to speed up the expulsion, although not at all costs, as a planned genocide. Another tactic is the destruction of anything that can be used as a site for remembrance. In this way, not only will all cultural values of the other nations be destroyed, but also all signs of any multicultural cohabitation and cross-cultural cooperation and, eventually, even all objects relating to personal and collective identity.²³

Bosnian Refugees in Austria

In July 1992, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees formally requested Member States to extend "temporary protection" to persons in need of international protection as a result of the conflict and human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia. Austria granted temporary protection to those fleeing from Croatia in the autumn of 1991 up to February 1992, and from April 1992

²⁰ Calic (1995), p.121.

²¹ Ibid. p.119.

²² Ibid. p.120.

²³ Ibid. p.126ff.

onward to persons coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina seeking protection. Austria's spontaneous response to the urgent need of some 30,000 persons seeking protection between April and August 1992 can be considered temporary protection in the above-mentioned sense. Nevertheless, the treatment of Bosnian refugees at the Austrian border, regulated through several ordinances of the Ministry of Interior, created a danger of violation of the principle of non-expulsion (*non-refoulement*). An Austrian law regulating temporary protection came into force on July 1, 1993, stipulating "protection to persons fleeing from armed conflicts or events seriously endangering their security."²⁴

This Austrian law of 1993 permits temporary residence to the so-called *de facto* "refugees or Bosnian war displaced persons for a short period of time", which can be and has been prolonged several times, but at the same time those people had to renounce all advantages provided by the 1951 Convention on Refugees with regard to unlimited right to residence, free access to the Austrian labor market, and social security contributions.

At the end of 1993, approximately 70,000 Bosnian refugees were staying in Austria.²⁵ Other sources spoke of between 80,000 and 90,000 persons. There existed a permanent problem of coming and going, so that it was never really quite clear how many people there were. A great part of the displaced persons lived in provisional accommodations; only a few (600 between 1992 and 1994) were recognized as political refugees in the sense of the 1951 Convention.²⁶

²⁴ Taucher, Wolfgang: "Ausgewählte Fragen zur vorübergehenden Schutzgewährung im Völkerrecht anhand der Aufnahme von bosnischen Schutzsuchenden in Österreich" in *Austrian Journal of Public and International Law* 49, pp.227-247 (1995), p.246.

²⁵ Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Menschenrechte (BIM): "Repatriierung und Integration bosnischer Flüchtlinge. Eine Befragung bosnischer Vertriebener aus Zvornik im Jahr 1994" (Wien 1995/1998) p.3.

²⁶ "Integration bosnischer Kriegsvertriebener. Beamtenkonzept, vorgelegt für eine Bund-Länder-Konferenz" (Jänner 1994), 10pp., p.2.

Most of the refugees in Austria belonged to the Muslim Bosnian population. This is explained by the fact that Croats and Serbs could flee to Croatia or to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as they did in great numbers. In 1996 in Croatia, for example, there were 187,000 refugees; in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 450,000; less in Slovenia (24,000) and Macedonia (7,000). Meanwhile, approximately 700,000 Bosnians were elsewhere in the world, mainly in Western Europe.²⁷ But Austrians realized the fact that Bosnian Muslims were not very welcome in Croatia, where their stay was made as uncomfortable as possible in order to provoke the continuation of their flight.²⁸ Between 1992 and 1997, fewer than 3,000 Bosnian refugees emigrated from Austria, mostly to the United States (1,786) and Canada (412).²⁹

Returning Home

The possibility of the refugees returning to their homes in Bosnia depends on a wide range of factors, namely the situation in the countries of their temporary residence and the willingness of those countries to prolong their residence permits, and of course the situation in Bosnia itself. Theoretically, there should be no problem. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina as Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement is clear, in Article II/5 on Refugees and Displaced Persons: all refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. And further, it adds, to have their property restored or to be compensated for property which cannot be restored.

Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons repeats this constitutional regulation and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to develop, in close connection with asylum countries, a repatriation plan for the return of refugees and displaced persons. But already in 1996, those refugees

²⁷ United Nations High Commission for Refugees, "Positionen zur Repatriierung bosnischer Flüchtlinge" (Wien 17 Jänner 1996).

²⁸ "Integration bosnischer Kriegsvetriebener, p.9.

²⁹ Republik Österreich, Kodydek/Pichler 1998, "Auswanderung von De-facto-Flüchtlingen aus Bosnien-Herzegowina aus Österreich, 1992-1997.

wishing to return to their homes faced a huge problem. Ethnic cleansing was still in force and discrimination against minorities was common, as observed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.³⁰

And so the High Commissioner's proposals in January 1997 for a first stage return clearly accepted the results of ethnic cleansing, for they supported the return of Bosnian refugees mainly in areas of corresponding ethnic home areas. This was a shift away from the position paper of a year before, in which the Commissioner stated: "The people want to return mainly to such areas where the majority come from their national group, but it is not to be permitted that the ethnic separation which began during the war, will now in peace be completed [translated from German]."³¹

Returning home to Bosnia presents not only the problems of housing, restitution of lost property and job security, nor the problem of conquering the fear of renewed repression and violence. It is mainly a problem of gaininformation in a foreign world and – by European standards – far away from home. For that reason a new radio station was born in Vienna on December 4, 1998. Over a network of Austrian, Italian and Bosnian radio stations, Radio 1476 transmits information on public offices, citizenship and other matters concerning the return to the Muslim-Croat Federation.³²

But returning to the home area presents another problem as well. There can be a great difference between real conditions at home and returnees' expectations and desires. Assessing this problem was the main objective of a survey carried out in 1994, of 887 persons who had fled to Austria from the district of Zvornik, now part of the Republika Srpska.³³ Belonging to the more than 90 percent Muslim

³⁰ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, International Ausgabe, 7.1.1998, basing itself on the *Annual Report 1997. Human Rights Developments in 1996*. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. (Wien 1997).

³¹ UNHCR, "Position zur Repatriierung bosnischer Flüchtlinge" (Wien 17.1.1996).

³² *Der Kurier*, Wien, 1.12.1998.

³³ BIM (1995/98), p.5.

cultural community,³⁴ even there, in temporary exile, one could observe the growth of Islamic consciousness when compared with pre-war data.³⁵ Nearly all of the people of Zvornik surveyed declared themselves ready to return, but only to an independent undivided Bosnia; only one half would return to a Bosnia under international administration, and under no circumstances did they declare themselves prepared to return to a divided Bosnia.³⁶ It is quite characteristic how deeply rooted in these people is the memory of a real or imagined peaceful coexistence of all nationalities in Bosnia prior to the war. And so the level of willingness expressed, to cooperate and live together with other nationalities after their return to Bosnia is very high, although this willingness was more evident towards non-Serbian sectors of the population. Eighty percent of those surveyed were ready to live together with Romany (gypsies), 70 percent with Croats, but only one third of them would accept to coexist in the future with Serbs.³⁷

Not all of those surveyed shared this opinion. The younger they were, the less they were willing to cooperate with Serbs, the weaker their readiness to return and the better their chances of a job in Austria,³⁸ although a great number of Bosnians have no other choice but to accept illegal work.

³⁹ Integration of some Bosnian refugees into Austrian society is not the main strategy of official representatives, but the Ministry of Interior estimates that in the long-term, approximately 15,000 displaced Bosnians will remain in Austria.⁴⁰ So it seems that rather

³⁴ Ibid. p.17.

³⁵ Cohen, Leonard J., "Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation" in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No.3 (1997), pp.481-499.

³⁶ BIM (1995/98), pp.27-30.

³⁷ Ibid. p.38f.

³⁸ Ibid. pp.32, 49, 64.

³⁹ Ibid. p.96ff.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 71.

than in Bosnia, multinational cohabitation with Bosnian Muslims will be reconstructed in the western European countries, especially in regions where a certain percentage of Muslims are already living, as in Austria for example, in Vienna and Vorarlberg, the region nearest to Switzerland. Particularly in Vienna, the acceptance of immigration for demographic reasons is higher than in other Austrian regions.⁴¹

Another important element in reaching decisions is the economic situation of Bosnia itself and the cost of war damages, which were estimated at between 50 and 70 billion dollars.⁴² No less significant is the weight of loss of life. As early as July 1994, 143,000 people had died in the war and 166,000 had been wounded. The infrastructure of the country was heavily damaged, average earnings per capita had declined from \$2,000 before the war to \$350 at its close. If not completely destroyed, industrial production was no longer significant. More or less the whole Bosnian economy had ground to a halt.⁴³ Ethnic cleansing and ethnic separation had brought about economic separation and an inevitably new social division of labor. Perhaps for certain people or groups, the dissolution of the previous coexistence would lead to a temporary advantage sometimes, but at the same time it had destroyed the high standards of economic values and professional skills.

The Dayton Agreement therefore set out the "Priority Reconstruction Program" in which more than 50 countries, 30 international organizations and more than 400 NGOs in three years, 1996 to 1999, were to mobilize approximately \$5.1 billion for the reconstruction of the Bosnian economy. In fact every year since 1996 they have spent approximately \$1 billion. The reconstruction program made it possible to repair the infrastructural damage in a relatively short time, and to renew a relatively dynamic economic life based on a new currency. But there are two remaining problems not yet resolved:

⁴¹ Werner Holzer, Rainer Munz, *Wissen und Einstellungen zu Migration ausländischer Bevölkerung und staatlicher Ausländerpolitik in Österreich* (Wien 1994).

⁴² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Internationale Ausgabe, 29.12.1998, p.11.

⁴³ Calic (1995), p.238.

the unequal distribution of foreign investment and foreign aid to the two parts of Bosnia, and the problem of an economy based mainly on foreign aid.⁴⁴

Based on the present analysis, two immediate conclusions regarding the restructuring of a Bosnian nation may be advanced: 1. Part of that restructuring is taking place in exile, even as a certain degree of rebuilding proceeds in the land of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and 2. The imaginary (multi-ethnic, multi-religious) Bosnian nation, even as it has died in fact, lives on in a portion of the people's collective imagination.

Rather than defining an ethnic group by its common language, I agree with the concept advanced by Max Weber, which seems more adaptable to historical research than other concepts. Weber claimed that ethnic groups are human communities which trust in their common origin although they are not necessarily in kinship relation to each other, and thus form a community based on memory, but distinguishable from other ethnic groups also by everyday life and behavior (food, clothing, housing, gender specific division of labor). Large or small, bound to an ethnic sense of collective honor, those groups are pathetically proud of their real or imagined power, and convinced of the excellence of their own customs while simultaneously believing in the inferiority of other ethnic groups.⁴⁵

Therefore, I agree with the following definition of "nation", which is witty as well as wise, i.e. that it is formed by a group of persons united in a common error regarding their past and a common dislike for their neighbors, representing themselves continuously in a real or symbolic meeting of commemoration and reinforcement.

From this point of view, the concept of national identity covers a wide variety of phenomena, which have to be analyzed not as static peculiarities of nation-states but as an expression of dynamic cognitive and emotional relations between groups and between

⁴⁴ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Internationale Ausgabe, 29.12.1998, p.11.

⁴⁵ Weber, Max: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen 1980), pp.237ff and 244.

individuals and groups. Individuals interact in families, at school, via mass media and in many other everyday situations and thus learn for themselves and teach others not only how to manage their daily lives but how to integrate what they have learned into group-dominant concepts of space and time.

Other nations have similar fantasies. What makes these phenomena difficult to understand is that some elements change rapidly, while others remain rigidly static. And we should discuss this experience particularly where it affects our sense of history. This happens when groups of people are forced to emigrate or to immigrate and bring or take away with them complex fantasies about their group history. This would mean focusing historical research on cognitive mapping more than in former times. It would have to include not only present abilities in local or world orientation in space but also in historical interpretation through time.

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5. Conclusion: Evaluating the Model

Roger Heacock

The returnee State model is new in the historical and political literature, and, in the opinion of the co-authors of this work, who participated together in a panel at the American Historical Association's annual meeting in Washington, DC devoted to the subject, it adds an important conceptual dimension to the proliferating literature on nationalism, national movements, and the transition to statehood.

By introducing the concept and applying it to specific cases, one can distinguish more clearly between the processes of history on the one hand, and of memory on the other, in the projection and establishment of nation-States during the twentieth century. Whereas *memory* designates in this context an imagined collective experience to which people have no direct connection at the outset because of its remoteness in space or, more often, in time, *history* is the actual collective experience of people themselves or known others within the community. A historical experience does not in this sense apply back beyond the generations with which a society which living at a specific time has had immediate contact.

Returnee States are those which have been or are in the process of being created, and in which a significant portion of the society involved is returning to the site of the State-in-the-making (before or after its actual creation) from a period of exile which has marked them. If the "return" is to a "remembered" land and not to a historical one, then it is not a returnee State, but a settler State. This is not a matter of legitimacy but of typology. Israel is not, within the present definition, a returnee State but a settler State, because it is memory rather than history which plays the major role in the movement towards the appointed-adopted homeland. The success of the State-building venture is a matter entirely independent of its classification. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, examined here, demonstrates that a State which is based on lived experience (and thus on history) is not necessarily a successful one, while Israel, with its half-century of existence based on a discontinuous memory of

something projected into the distant past, has been an undoubtedly successful case of settler State-building.

The model is then a useful one because it permits to refine the typology of contemporary States, and at the same time to seek out points which various members of the set have in common as well as those which distinguish them. Each one of the authors has set about defining the experiences and the prospects of the peoples under consideration, and thus creates a vivid and dynamic picture of them. The differences between them may at first appear to be more significant than their similarities. They are not in immediate contact with one another (although there are significant Bosnian and Armenian communities in Palestine) and their lived and remembered experiences are contrasting.

Nonetheless, the three cases discussed in the present work are similar in a variety of ways. The Palestinian, Armenian and Bosnian peoples have struggled in the immediate past, for varying lengths of time, with those who negated their collective existence as well as their right to statehood and who set about doing so with techniques known as genocide (the Armenians were the first victims of it in the twentieth century, the Bosnians were some of its potential victims at the end of the century), attempted ethnocide (i.e., the physical dispersion and intellectual negation of a people by another or others, a fate which befell the Palestinians after 1947) and ethnic cleansing (of which the Bosnians, the Armenians and the Palestinians were all victims during the twentieth century).

It is certain that the disasters which befell these peoples were in part a function of their dream of establishing an independent State. In the Armenian and Palestinian cases, the State to be established was a returnee State, to which a portion of the exiled community wanted to return through the act of setting it up; Bosnia became a returnee State as a result of the assault on the Bosnians and their dispersion, on the part of Serbs and Croats backed by their respective existing States.

The authors of these pages are of the opinion that the returnee states model is particularly relevant in the modern world, dominated for the past four centuries by a largely western authority, be it epistemological, cultural or political. Such a situation is in the long

term intolerable, and the millions and millions of minds and bodies that would free themselves from that long bondage are seeking to return to their states, whatever may be the state in which they discover them upon their return.

In the same vein, the model tends towards universality, not limiting itself to the particularly crass cases of mass expulsion or murder (such as those described in these pages). Most of the countries of the world were until recently colonies, and even though in most cases, the colonizer did not have the courage and ruthlessness of some historical conquerors, they did force or permit large numbers of a narrow indigenous elite to emigrate for their studies, for professional reasons, or fleeing for their lives. These elites, or portions of them, duly made their way back to the homeland upon its accession to independence, and it is the dialectic which ensued between them and the vast majority who had remained, which to a great extent has defined the politics of independence.

The last two points are linked and represent the underlying thesis of this volume: the returning elites of newly independent states are themselves heavily imbued with the four centuries of European hegemony in all fields, and they bring this heavy baggage home with them upon their return. The resulting disarray and the clashes which ensue from it make up a major portion of the history of the contemporary world, and lend all of its value to the paradigm of the returnee state.

The hope of an eventual internal reconciliation in the wake of the return and its ensuing clashes rests, we believe, upon the ability of those who enact them to recognize in some way the profound forces at work, which they embody. This hope is certainly utopian, but, the authors believe, realistic, and one upon which the dynamics of future history must be based if radically opposed subjectivities are to be subsumed in a complex global polity essential to moving beyond a period of crisis and stagnation.

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