

# Gendered Youth / Occupied Lives

**Attitudes and Experiences  
of Palestinian Male and Female Youth in the  
West Bank, Gaza Strip and Arab Jerusalem, 2013**



**Rema Hammami**

Analytical Report I (Gender and Region)  
of the Institute of Women's Studies  
Gender Youth Survey 2013

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**Author:** Rema Hammami

**Editing and design:** C. Seitz

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Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit University

POB 14, Birzeit, Palestine

Telephone: +972 2 2982013 (In Arab world, please use international code 970)

<http://sites.birzeit.edu/wsi/jupgrade/>

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## Acronyms

AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
AWRAD	Arab World for Research and Development
IWS	Institute for Women's Studies
NGO	non-governmental organization
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council

## Introduction

This report is the first in a series to be published using the 2013 Gender Youth Survey data set undertaken by the Birzeit Institute of Women's Studies (IWS). The IWS Gender Youth Survey of 2013 aims to widen the understanding of youth experiences and attitudes in the occupied West Bank and Gaza from both a gender and geographic perspective. Youth as a social, cultural (and increasingly political) category have become the object of interest, speculation and policy (by government and donors) as well as targets of interventions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in both the occupied territories and the Arab region. The global interest in Arab youth began following the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent findings of the 2002 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) that focused on unemployment in the region and the need to create opportunities for future generations (Bayat 2005). Taken together, September 11<sup>th</sup> plus the AHDR put a problematic political focus on Arab youth as an allegedly dangerous generation turning towards fanaticism in the context of structural unemployment and lack of political voice (Swedenburg 2007). Less than a decade later, the leading role of youth in the Arab Spring initially put that earlier assumption to rest—and suddenly Arab youth were perceived as the hope for freedom and democracy throughout the region. Both views suggest the degree to which “youth” is an extremely politicized category that various actors and political forces imbue with different and often competing agendas. They also suggest the pitfalls of making simple assumptions about the category “youth” in any context (Swedenburg 2007).

In occupied Palestine, youth as a political category has also been through some major changes and reversals. The “*shabaab*” of the first Intifada was a political category that expressed the degree to which youth (particularly male youth) were perceived as the active and leading agents of national resistance (Petee 1994, Collins 2004). In the Oslo period, “youth” then turned into a social policy category, a social problem in need of interventions such as jobs or education (Bornstein 2001). In the second Intifada, “fighters” replaced “*shabaab*” as the main agents of resistance, perhaps suggesting that militarization creates political categories that overshadow the demographic or social dimensions of who fighters are (Bucaille 2006).

In all cases, what is clear is that the “youth” category in the occupied territories has overwhelmingly been defined in terms of the experiences, actions and problems of young men. Young women are statistically present in youth surveys and are measured equally with their male counterparts, but the overriding issues and perspectives that are focused on rarely capture the specific gendered experiences of female youth in comparison to male youth. Instead, female youth are usually studied as part of the category “women.” In reports focused on gender issues, if they appear it is as a demographic category—“young women,”—rather than being studied for themselves, as youth.

These distinctions and omissions are important. They are not only about definitions but how we produce knowledge that can result in marginalizing and hiding the experiences of whole social sectors. If young people are only understood from the perspective of young men, and if young women are only understood from the perspective of older women, then clearly the knowledge we produce both about youth and women is partial and problematic.





## Background to the Survey

This study aims to treat these omissions in the study of gender and youth in occupied Palestine. Its main issues and focus have developed from two main areas of research undertaken by the IWS over the past decade, as well as by a review of existing surveys on youth in the oPt.

First are a series of recently completed qualitative studies on gender and youth activism undertaken by IWS researchers. These seek to understand the gender and political dynamics of new formations of youth activism as they evolved in occupied Palestine since 2011.

Second are the major trends in gender relations uncovered by various studies undertaken by the IWS over the past decade. These have shown that there is clearly a shift among new generations away from the “male breadwinner model” of the household that marked their parents’ generation to an arrangement based on the aspiration (if not the actuality) of dual earning couples. Young women’s higher age at marriage, their (and to a lesser extent male’s) higher levels of educational achievement, and lower fertility rates are all indicators of a momentous shift in the organization of gender roles and relations in Palestinian households in comparison to the 1990s. These changes are responses to the profound and violent restructuring of Palestinian economic life over the second intifada. But they also all speak to how different generations of men and women in households across the oPt have had to adapt and restructure their ways of gender thinking and being in order to survive in the present, as well as to try and ensure a better life for their male and female children into the future.

Another issue that emerged from various IWS studies that helped frame this survey was the issue of geographic location as a main determinant of life experience and opportunities, and therefore of political and social perspective and aspirations. Israel’s spatial regime and the ensuing long-term separation of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem from each other has had a profound impact on shaping differential life-worlds of male and female Palestinians of all generations. In addition, long-term violence and insecurity and the way that it plays out differentially across these three regions has major impacts on the possibilities for young men and women (especially) to have access to public and civic life—both critical building blocks of active citizenry. Data produced by various research sources over the decade consistently shows that once you disaggregate by West Bank and Gaza, there are consistently wide differences in social indicators that can only be related to critical regional differences.

Finally, this survey was designed after reviewing the wealth of youth surveys that have been undertaken on Palestinian youth by various organizations over the past half-decade (AWRAD 2012, 2013; CDS 2009; NOREF/FAFO 2012; 2003, 2006; SHAREK/ UNDP 2009; SHAREK 2009, 2010, 2013). A few recurrent findings of local (and regional) youth surveys were of particular relevance. First of all was the gap between youth political aspirations, and the poor or alienating political fields they inhabited. Second was the growing importance of information technology and social media in youth social and political life. And finally was the increasing lack of ideological coherence in youth attitudes across the social/ political/ gender spectrum. While two decades ago one could assume some logical connection between a religious and socially conservative outlook (or its opposite), what we find among youth dispositions today is a much more complex matrix of positions that defy any clear categorization. This ideologically hybrid nature of contemporary youth dispositions potentially reflects the much more complex social, political and cultural contexts in which youth identities and subjectivities have been formed.

## Main Innovations of the IWS Gender Youth Survey

What is absent from the range of surveys on youth in the Palestinian context also played a role in informing the design of the IWS 2013 Gender Youth Survey, in particular the key issues of gender and region. Giving weight to these dimensions involves both conceptual challenges as well as technical issues of sample size and their distribution. The majority of surveys reviewed, while including an equal sample distribution between male and female, were limited both in their treatment of gender and by a standard sample size that only allows a primary level of comparison between male and female youth.


While the majority of surveys have been sensitive to showing the difference in experience and attitudes between male and female youth, on the whole the nature of the questions covered have been gender blind and have not been informed by the particular ways in which gender roles, norms and relations shape differential positions and outcomes across gender. For instance, in the treatment of civic or political activism, what is generally measured is the degree of participation between male and female youth (or attitudes towards political movements), without measuring how gender might differentially shape the possibility for differential levels of participation or of differential attitudes. The very possibility of access to public life (including political life and civic participation) is profoundly shaped by gendered norms, especially in relation to female youth. These norms are operative across the host of issues covered by youth surveys beyond political participation such as unemployment and job searches, use of information technology and leisure time, as well as educational choices and life priorities. Along with the gender-blind treatment of these issues, comes a general lack of treatment of social issues that have a direct link to gendered experiences and dispositions such as attitudes towards gender roles (in marriage, the workplace or political life). Rarely, if ever, do the reviewed surveys put any focus on these attitudes of male and female youth towards themselves and each other. Therefore they are unable to shed any light on perceptions and attitudes of youth towards the organization of gender roles and relations in their lives and among their generation in comparison to previous ones.

In addition, there is the problem of region. Technically, the sample size of all previous youth polls undertaken in the oPt allows for only two types of comparisons: between male and female across the entire occupied Palestinian territory; or between the West Bank and Gaza without disaggregating for gender. As such, the data that is produced can only shed light on gender difference among Palestinian youth as a unitary category but cannot tell us about the differences between male and female youth within Gaza, or within the West Bank. None treat Jerusalem as a distinct regional category, rather simply integrating it into the West Bank.

This raises the larger question of how we can use a unitary category of “Palestinian youth” in such a situation as the long-term spatial segregation and dismemberment imposed by Israel between West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. If, for almost two decades, youth across these three locations have lived in entirely separate spatial worlds that have increasingly become differentiated socially, politically and economically from each other, then it becomes crucial to account for these differences in our research strategy and analysis.

The IWS 2013 Gender Youth Survey was designed in response to these larger issues and gaps. As such the survey’s main distinctive features include:

- A sample size and frame capable of representing differential attitudes between male and female youth *within* and *across* the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza.

- 
- A conceptual approach that integrates gender difference as a crucial dimension shaping youth experience, attitudes and aspirations across social and political life.

Main thematic areas covered include:

- Education, aspirations and outcomes
- Civic life, culture and leisure (including issues of access and participation)
- Spatial mobility (both within immediate community and across the main regions of the oPt and beyond)
- Use of information technology and social media (including issues of access)
- Gender norms and roles (in marriage, economic and political life)
- Family life (perceptions of voice, support and Influence)
- Political efficacy (ability to influence political actors at various levels)
- Political participation/activism
- Assessments of youth movements
- Present and future priorities

The age definition for youth varies among social policy actors and has both research, legal, and political implications. The Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) uses the age category of 15-29 years old. The United Nations formally adopted 15-24 years old for its definition of youth. On the other hand, the Palestinian Ministry of Youth and Sports divides youth by age into three categories in line with different ministry activities and functions:

- Children (7-12 age category)
- Adolescents (13-17 age category)
- Youth (18-35 age category).

The IWS Survey uses the age category of 18-35 years old. This relatively older age category was selected because it marks the period of post-adolescence and the transition into young adulthood. Eighteen years of age increasingly marks the transition from schooling into either the labor force or higher education. The overall age period also covers major life transitions into marriage and family formation. As such, it marks the period of growing autonomy and independence from parents and natal families as well as the process of shaping new families. For the various issues addressed in the study, this period of increased personal autonomy/independence from parents and the transition to marriage and independent family formation was seen as crucial.

This report is the first in a series to be published using the IWS 2013 Gender Youth Survey data set. It provides an overview of the main findings by gender, comparing the three main regions: West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza. It aims to show how gender and regional difference are two crucial aspects shaping the differential life experience and perceptions of male and female youth in occupied Palestine. At the same time, it is only a descriptive statistical report that focuses on showing the main patterning of youth attitudes and experiences by gender and region across occupied Palestine. Future reports will provide more in-depth analysis and explanations of the various findings, as well as compare them to trends and findings in other Palestinian youth surveys.

## Methodology

The survey was implemented by Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD)

- Field work: 5-15 July, 2013
- Sample Size: 4,028 youth aged between 18-35 in the West Bank and Gaza
- Total Margin of Error:  $\pm$  1.5 percent
- Margin of Error for each gender/region group: 3 percent

A team of 40 field researchers, monitors and supervisors participated. Two-days of training took place for researchers (one in the West Bank, and one in Gaza) on the questionnaire. AWRAD utilized multiple field monitoring mechanisms including in-field monitoring, phone monitoring and statistical tests.

Data entry: AWRAD utilized SPSS as a package for data entry, cleaning, sorting and tabulation. Data entry experts put together a codebook reflective of the questionnaire, created a computer program and double-checked the data on paper before entering them into the computer program. The data entry process was supervised and monitored by data experts. All computer entries were checked against paper questionnaires to eliminate any discrepancies. The data files were checked and cleaned.

### Sample Distribution

Region (%)		Rafah	4.5	Merchant	4.4
West Bank	62	Gender (%)		Professional	1.1
Gaza	38	Male	52	Craftsman	3.6
District (%)		Female	48	Student	28.2
Jenin	6.7	Residence (%)		Housewife	19.6
Tulkarm	4.1	City	47.4	Trainee	1.3
Qalqilya	2.5	Village/ Town	33.1	Does not work; looking for a job	8.2
Nablus	8.5	Camp	19.5	Part time jobs	5.2
Salfit	1.8	Marital Status (%)		Work Sector(%)	
Tubas	1.2	Single	54.6	Government	21.5
Ramallah	7.4	Married	42.8	Private	66.9
Jerusalem	10.2	Other	2.6	Non-Governmental Organization	8.8
Jericho	1.2	Refugee Status (%)		Other	2.8
Bethlehem	4.6	Refugee	46.1	Income(%)	
Hebron	13.9	Non refugee	53.9	Good	19
Jabalya	7.4	Occupation (%)		Average	63.2
Gaza	13.3	Worker	11.5	Weak	17.7
Deir Albalah	5.5	Employee	16		
Khanyounis	7.3	Farmer	1		



### Sample Distribution in Raw Numbers by Region and Main Demographic indicators

	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	Total
<b>Sample Size</b>	1,684	330	2,014	4,028
<b>Sample size weighted for analysis</b>	2,088	409	1,531	
<b>Males</b>	51.1%	50%	53.9%	
<b>Females</b>	48.9%	50%	46.1%	
<b>Median Age</b>	25	26	25	
<b>Mean Years of Education*</b>	9-12	9-12	9-12	
<b>Marital status (Females)</b>	Single	Married	Single	
<b>Marital status (Males)</b>	Single	Single	Single	

## Executive Summary & Main Findings

### I. Education

#### Different Regional & Gender Levels of Attainment

A full 52% of male and 60% of female youth (aged 18-35) have completed or are attending university across the oPt. By region, Gaza male and female youth have the highest educational achievement levels; Jerusalemites the lowest. There is an approximate 20% less higher education achievement among Jerusalem female youth compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the oPt, and 26% comparatively lower levels of the same among Jerusalem male youth compared to their Gaza counterparts (and 16% in comparison to their West Bank counterparts). The data suggests that Israeli educational policies in Arab Jerusalem (such as restrictions on school building and the lack of licensing for Palestinian universities) have had a major impact on educational achievement levels for Palestinian Jerusalemites. Within all three regions, female youth have greater higher educational achievement than their male counterparts.


#### Higher Education: Family Financing, Limits to Choice of University Specialization, and Motivations for Choosing Eventual Specialization

Youth depend overwhelmingly on the family to finance their higher education, even more so female youth who have much greater obstacles in accessing employment in order to self-finance their higher education than their male counterparts. Across the oPt, 26% of males and 24% of females in or having completed higher education claim that they did not study their preferred specialization. Jerusalem youth of both sexes are the least likely regionally to pursue their main choice of university specialization. Among male youth across the oPt, low grades was the primary reason (at 41%) they did not pursue their preferred specialization; among female youth parental norms and preferences was the main reason (at 33%). Parental constraints on choice, though much higher for female youth, was also an issue for West Bank male youth, with 23% citing this as a main reason they did not pursue their preferred specialization.

The main reason youth gave for choosing their eventual university specialization was that it provided better chances of employment (at 37% among male and 33% of female youth). This was especially the case among female youth in Gaza (at 39%) where they have the highest rates of unemployment of any age or gender category in the labor force across the oPt. Females were also more likely to state that their choice was based on the fact that it was “socially appropriate”—a view highest among Jerusalem female youth (at 28% compared to 15% in Gaza and 19% in West Bank). While both male and female youth are mainly motivated by labor market concerns in their choice of specialization, clearly female youth choices are much more strongly limited by gendered norms.

### II. Civic/Cultural Life

Palestinian youth have very low access to civic/cultural activities regardless of region—although once again, Jerusalem youth are the most marginalized. Only half of male and a third of female youth surveyed had participated in any instance of a civic/cultural activity sponsored by a civic institution over the year previous to the survey. Participation in organized civic/cultural activities was highest for male youth in Gaza (55%), followed by males in the West Bank (at 48%). Among females, civic/cultural activ-



ity participation was also highest in Gaza at (41%) followed by the West Bank (35%). It was lowest for both genders in Jerusalem (30% among males and 23% among females).

Overall, the intensity of participation is low—slightly more than a third of males who undertook any participation in organized activities over the previous year did so on a weekly basis and less than a third of females who had any participation did so on a weekly basis. Female youth (with the exception of those in Jerusalem) tended to participate in activities on a monthly or seasonal basis. The lowest intensity of participation in civic/cultural activities was among female youth in Gaza (with 38% of those who participated in any activity only having done so seasonally).

Organizational frameworks for participation in civic and cultural activities were highly gendered. Sports clubs were the main venue for male youth to undertake cultural/civic activities in any region. Among female youth who undertook any activity, there was a much more varied picture, with social/cultural clubs being the main avenue for West Bank female youth (at 16%); sports clubs among Jerusalem females (at 11%) and social/cultural clubs being the primary outlet among Gaza female youth (at 27%).

Lack of time due to work, family duties or study was the main reason cited by the majority of male and female youth who did not participate in any organized civic or cultural activity the previous year. The overwhelming secondary reason was a lack of interest among respondents of both genders. A main gender difference arises in terms of greater numbers of females citing family objections as to why they did not participate in any activities (21% among Gaza females, followed by 8% in Jerusalem and 6% in the West Bank).

### **Public Leisure: Strong Regional and Gender Disparities**

The survey also assessed regional and gender differences in access to public leisure/culture activities (such as cinema and theater, the beach, a museum, art or book exhibitions). In every region, female access to public leisure was lower than that of males (with the largest gender gap in favor of males in the West Bank, at 13%). At the same time, West Bank males and females had the least participation in public leisure activities; 21% of males and 33% of females in the West Bank had not attended any activity over the past five years. Jerusalem followed, with 26% of female and 14% of male youth there not having attended any activities over the past five years. However, the aggregate regional findings are somewhat skewed due to the inclusion of “the beach” as a site of leisure activities—given Gazans’ ease of access to the Gaza shore in contrast to their West Bank counterparts who are blocked from access to the sea due to the multi-layered system of Israeli mobility controls. More than 90% of Gazan male and female youth had been to the shore over the past five years, while only approximately 7% of them had been to the cinema during the same period.

### **Mobility: Constraints Across Region Linked to the Israeli Mobility Regime, Mobility within Regions Linked to Gender Constraints**

In terms of mobility across historic Palestine, not surprisingly due to Israel’s siege of Gaza, youth in Gaza are the most constrained in mobility in comparison to youth in Jerusalem or the West Bank. Only 5% of Gaza male and 3% of Gaza female youth had visited Jerusalem or the West Bank in the past year while less than 2% of West Bank male and no West Bank female youth had visited Gaza in the past year. In addition, Gaza youth were less likely to have ever visited Israel/1948 areas<sup>1</sup> or a foreign country than their counterparts in the other two regions.

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<sup>1</sup> Palestinians commonly refer to the area of historic Palestine or what is now Israel as “the 1948 areas,” referencing the war in which they were expelled from those lands. Likewise, the survey used this terminology.

In terms of mobility *within* each region, due to family restrictions, female youth are much more constrained in their ability to move at will than their male counterparts. An overwhelming majority of male youth (83%) said they were free to go at will to the closest urban center, while only 22% of female youth said they were free to do the same (another 43% of female youth stated that they could go but only if accompanied by a family member). In addition, female youth are much less likely to have visited different locations within their region (in West Bank or Gaza) than their male counterparts.

### **Internet/Social Media: High Connectivity With Gender Gaps in Access and Intensity of Use**

Internet use among male and female youth is high (though an average 10% higher among male youth at 77% versus 66% among females). Male youth use the Internet slightly more frequently on average, with 77% of males versus only 62% of females using it daily. Males also have a more varied range of locations that they can access and use the Internet than do their female counterparts (with 33% of males using Internet cafes versus only 6% of females). For female youth, the home is the prime location for accessing the Internet but in comparison to male youth, they are less likely to have equal access to the Internet at home (only 76% of females who used the Internet at home stated they had equal access to it, versus 83% of males).

While an equally low 13% of males and female youth claim to have a blog, most male and female youth (90% and 80%, respectively) state they use Facebook, albeit noting a significant gender gap. For both genders, communicating with friends is the primary reason youth use Facebook (at 59% of males and 67% of females).

### **III. Attitudes Towards Gender Roles and Responsibilities: Support for Women's Economic versus Political Roles**

While both genders express relatively high support for women undertaking economic roles, there is also much lower support among both for women undertaking political roles. However, there is a gender gap, with young women across the regions favoring more rights to economic and political life than their male counterparts deem appropriate for them. Only 38% of male youth and 18% of female youth prefer that wives should focus on family life rather than work outside the home. At the same time, there is a gender gap, with 73% of females supporting women working outside the home under any circumstances while 48% (significantly less) of male youth stating the same (and 35% of males supporting women's right to work "only if it is necessary"). In addition, while 52% of female youth think it is appropriate for women to run a business (under any circumstances), only 32% of male youth share this attitude.

The low support for women's political activism represents a major reversal in attitudes compared to previous generations. In terms of women undertaking political roles, only 40% of female and 27% of male youth support women joining political parties (with 54% of males and 38% of females saying it's not appropriate under any circumstance). Not surprisingly, an even lesser 22% of male and 35% of female youth deem it appropriate that women lead political parties; only 23% of males and 38% of females find it appropriate that women run for political office. The latter findings concerning women's political roles show a sharp decline in support for women's participation in political life in comparison to the findings of various polls over the 1990s. It is not clear whether this is linked to general attitudes of disillusionment with the Palestinian political sphere generally among youth or whether it reflects a narrowing of support for women's participation in public life among them.





## Preferred Family Arrangements: Some Preference for Equality in Household Roles, but Strong Support for “Norms and Traditions”

Across the region, male and female youth prefer smaller families than they associate with their parents’ generation. Female youth have a greater preference for smaller families than male youth (with 46% of male and 55% of females wanting less children than was the norm in their parents’ generation). Both genders also prefer a more equal distribution of gender roles in marriage compared to their parents’ generation—although again more females than males express these sensibilities (by approximately 10%) and the desire for male involvement in housework and childrearing (by approximately 15%). At the same time, both genders would prefer wives to have a greater commitment to norms and traditions in comparison to the previous generation (34% of males and 33% of female youth state that they would want more commitment to norms and traditions than their parents’ generation while another 53% of males and 48% of females would want the same level of commitment as their parents’ generation).

## Feelings of Political Agency and Influence Extremely Low for Both Genders

Both male and female youth express an extremely limited feeling of political agency in their local communities that declines further still in relation to regional and national politics. At the community level, less than 5% of youth of both genders said they could positively affect any of the following: local civic/political leaders; the lives of citizens; the behavior of police and security services; and/or religious leaders. The group that youth felt most able to affect positive change (at 9%) was among local council members, and only among male youth.

Less than 3% of youth of both genders felt they could positively affect political leaders at the governorate and regional levels (the political leadership in West Bank versus Gaza).

## Political Activism

Approximately 1/3 of male youth (32%) but only 9% of female youth are members of political parties. In the two years preceding the survey, less than 50% of male youth in the West Bank and Gaza and only a fifth of female youth in both regions participated in any political activity held by different political institutions and movements. In Jerusalem, these numbers dropped to 1/3 of males and less than 10% of females.

Among males who had undertaken any form of political participation, 50% of them in the West Bank and more than 60% of them in Gaza had participated in an activity of a political party or its youth movement over the two years previous to the survey. In Jerusalem, the most common outlet for male youth political participation was the “Family Diwan” (at 22%) over the same time period. Female youth were much less likely to participate in activities of political parties and their youth groups—instead the main outlets for female political participation tended to be student councils and civil society youth initiatives.



Among youth of both sexes, the main reason cited for lack of participation in organized political activity was respondents’ lack of interest in politics (39% of males and 41% of females). However, secondary reasons tended to be gendered: female youth cited family refusal to let them participate (24% versus 4% among males) while male youth cited the potential dangerous consequences of political activism as the second main reason for their lack of political participation (19% versus 7% among females).

## Chapter I. Education

### Educational Achievement

*Main Findings: Gaza male and female youth have the highest educational achievement across the three regions, and Jerusalemites the lowest. Within all three regions, female youth have greater achievements in higher education than their male counterparts.*

A full 52% of male and 60% of female youth in the age categories 18-35 have attended or are attending university across the oPt. Gaza male and female youth have the highest level of post-secondary educational achievement of youth across all three regions—approximately 62% of youth of both sexes in Gaza have more than 12 years of education. West Bank female youth follow at 59% with higher education and West Bank male youth at 53%. Within the West Bank and Gaza, the educational levels between male and female youth are not dissimilar.



The most striking overall gap is between Jerusalem youth of both genders in comparison to their West Bank/Gaza counterparts. Jerusalem female youth on average have approximately 20% less achievement in higher education than do their counterparts in other regions, and Jerusalem male youth have 26% less achievement in higher education than do their Gaza counterparts (and 16% less in comparison to their West Bank counterparts). At the same time, Jerusalem youth of both sexes also have the greatest levels of *low educational* achievement, with 29% of males and 25% of female youth having nine years or less of education (in both cases, this is double or more the proportion of those with low educational achievement in other regions).

In all three regions, female youth either equal or out-do their male counterparts in educational achievement.






## Higher Education: Financing and Choice of Specialization




*Main Findings: Youth depend overwhelmingly on the family to finance their higher education; dependence on family financing for higher education is even greater among female youth.*

Of the male and female youth across the three regions who had more than 12 years of education, most stated that they were either currently or previously enrolled in university (52% of all male and 60% of all female youth). A main impediment to university access is financial and, in the past, households with limited budgets often prioritized investments in sons' higher education over daughters'. The survey asked youth who were currently attending university or had completed it what was their main source of funding for education.

In all three regions and across genders, financial support from the family was the main source for their education (with 70% of males and 81% of females citing family financial support as primary). Female youth in all three regions depended an even greater degree than male youth upon familial support for their higher education (77% of female youth in Gaza, and 88% in Jerusalem claimed their education depended primarily on family support). Gaza male youth were the least likely to cite familial support, with only 68% depending on the family for their education.



A large gender difference exists between the percentage of male youth who were able to self-finance their university education by working in comparison to females who did the same (16% of males versus 3% of females). Among male youth, 19% in the West Bank, 15% in Gaza, and 12% in Jerusalem self-financed their education through work. Among female youth, only 4% of West Bank, 4% of Jerusalem, and 3% of Gaza females did the same.




Female youth were more likely than their male counterparts to depend on scholarships, except in Jerusalem where a slightly greater number of males than females cited scholarships (10% of females versus 6% of males) as their main source of educational financing.

## University Specialization

*Main Findings: Among male youth, low grades were the primary reason given for not pursuing their preferred specialization; among female youth parental norms and preferences was the main reason.*




In terms of selection of university specialization 26% of males and 24% of females said they did not pursue the specialization they preferred. Again Jerusalem youth of both sexes stand out as the most disadvantaged. Forty-one percent of females and almost 50% of male youth in Jerusalem stated that the university specialization they undertook was not the one of their choosing. In comparison, one-third of Gazan youth (30% for both sexes) stated their specialization was not of their choosing. Gender-wise, in all cases, the data is surprising given that past studies have usually suggested that female youth have greater limits put on their choice of specialization. In this survey, the opposite is true. Within in all three regions, slightly more males than females claimed they did not study the specialization they aspired to (an overall 26% of males versus 24% of females). However, the subsequent question as to why respondents did not study their preferred specialization provides a more direct explanation as to if and in what ways gender is operative in limiting choice regarding university specialization.



The most common reason given among male youth for not studying their preferred specialization was inadequate grades, at 41% compared to 29% among females. Female youth more often said that parents did not think their specialization was appropriate, at 33%. Clearly, gender norms and constraints are much more active in shaping females educational choices in comparison to males. Fourteen percent of male youth claimed that parents prevented them from studying their desired specialization, as well.

Low grades was the main reason given by all males for not pursuing their preferred specialization—in Jerusalem as many as 50% of all male youth gave this reason, while in the West Bank approximately 40% of male youth ascribed their choice to low grades. Similarly, this reason scored highest among Jerusalem female youth at 40%—the highest of any female group in the sample. In contrast, for both Gaza (35%) and West Bank (31%) female youth, parental intervention was the primary reason they did not pursue their preferred course of study (in Jerusalem, only 10% of females gave this as the main reason). Among male youth, the second most important reason was financial, with 22% of West Bank males and 25% of Gaza males giving this reason.

## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives



Finally, distance from where the specialization is offered played a role for West Bank youth of both genders (18% males and 22% females), but in Jerusalem was a consideration only for female youth (at 20% of females compared to zero percent of males there).

## Reasons for Choice of Specialization

*Main Findings:* The main reason youth gave for choosing their eventual university specialization was that it provided better chances of employment. This was especially the case among female youth in Gaza.

In terms of the actual or eventual university specialization that respondents chose to study (regardless of whether it was their primary or secondary choice), the main reasons for its selection are highly but differentially gendered across the three regions. Across regions and for both sexes, the number

one reason given by youth for choosing their course of study was that it provided better chances of employment (at 37% of male and 33% of female youth).

However, this response was given the most (39%) in Gaza by female youth of all female youth surveyed and was slightly more prevalent than this response among male youth in any region—attesting to the fact that the dire economic circumstances in Gaza has emphasized the connection between university study choices to employment opportunities. Jerusalem once again stands out regionally, with the greatest proportion of female youth (28%) saying their choice was based on their course of study being socially appropriate, and the greatest proportion of male youth (19%) stating that their chosen course of study was their only option.

<b>Question: In terms of the specialization you eventually studied— what was the main reason you chose it?</b>						
	<b>West Bank</b>		<b>Jerusalem</b>		<b>Gaza</b>	
	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
<b>Better chance of employment</b>	38%	26%	34%	22%	37%	39%
<b>Topic interests me regardless of employment</b>	32%	36%	34%	33%	29%	28%
<b>It is socially appropriate</b>	10%	19%	14%	28%	10%	15%
<b>No other option</b>	17%	14%	19%	17%	17%	13%
<b>Other</b>	3%	4%	-	-	7%	4%


## Chapter II. Civic/ Cultural Life

*Main Findings: Only half of male and a third of female youth surveyed participated in any civic/cultural activity over the year preceding the survey. Participation in civic/cultural activities is lowest for both genders in Jerusalem.*

The survey sought to understand a range of dimensions related to social integration and civic engagement and how these are shaped by both gender and region. This particular area of the survey focused on participation in social, cultural and sports activities as important precursors to more political forms of social engagement and participation.

### Participation

Across the three regions, a total of 50% of male youth versus only 37% of female youth participated in any instance or type of civic/cultural activities over the year preceding the survey. However, participation was highly varied by region and gender.



Gaza male youth (at 55%) followed by West Bank male youth (48%) had the greatest rate of participation in civic and cultural activities, while Jerusalem female youth had the lowest (23%). Jerusalem male youth had a lower rate of participation in civic activities (at 30%) than did female youth in Gaza (at 41%).

### Frameworks for Participation


*Main Findings: Sports clubs were the main venue for male youth to undertake cultural/civic activities in all regions; they were also the main venue for female youth in Jerusalem. For young women in Gaza and the West Bank, cultural clubs/societies were the main venue for participation.*

Rather than asking about membership in civic and cultural organizations, the survey sought to assess participation in activities within organizational frameworks. The assumption was that, though youth may participate in activities offered by various institutional frameworks, this does not necessarily imply membership in them. Of those who claimed to have participated in any activity over the preceding year, the survey went on to ask within what organizational framework.






Of the organizational frameworks that youth who did undertake activities took advantage of, among males the primary one across all three regions was sports clubs (with 35% of male youth in the West Bank and in Gaza citing them, while in Jerusalem, though still the primary framework for males, only 25% of active male youth there had participated in sports clubs activities over the preceding year). Among female youth who undertook any activity, there was a much more variegated picture, with social/cultural clubs being the main avenue for West Bank female youth (at 16%), followed by charitable societies (at 14%).



In Jerusalem, sports clubs provided the main outlet for female youth who undertook any civic/cultural activities during the reference year (at 11%), followed by summer camps and charitable societies (both at 7%).




## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

In Gaza, social/cultural clubs were the primary source of activities for female youth over the reference year (at 27%), followed by a youth NGO or society at 23%. The latter organizational framework was an important avenue for Gaza youth in comparison to other regions, comprising the second most important framework for participation among male youth there (at 30%).


### Intensity of Participation

*Main Findings: Male youth tend to participate in civic/cultural activities on a weekly basis. Except in Jerusalem, female youth tend to have lower intensity of participation than their male counterparts—with the lowest intensity among Gaza female youth.*

While the levels of participation in civic/cultural activities were lower for female youth than their male counterparts, the intensity of participation was also weaker among females in comparison to male counterparts in the three regions. Weekly participation garnered the highest response among males (at 35% while seasonal participation was the highest response given by females at a similar 35%) Among male youth, it was Jerusalemites who were more likely to participate weekly in activities compared to their counterparts in the other two regions (at 49% compared to weekly participation among males in the West Bank and Gaza at 34%). The weakest intensity of participation among male youth was in Gaza at 42% of those who did undertake activities doing so on only a monthly or seasonal basis. Thirty-seven percent of West Bank male youth who undertook any activity only did so on a monthly or seasonal basis, while in Jerusalem, this was as low as 8%.



Similar to their male counterparts, Jerusalem females had the highest intensity of participation, with 41% undertaking activities on a weekly basis. West Bank females followed with 34% undertaking weekly activities and finally Gaza females at 27% undertaking activities on a weekly basis. Gaza and West Bank females are much more likely to participate only seasonally in activities in comparison to Jerusalem females and males generally.





## Reasons for Non-Participation

*Main Findings: Regardless of gender or region, lack of time is the main reason youth state for not undertaking civic/cultural activities, followed by lack of interest. However, for female youth in Gaza, parental restrictions on their participation are a significant factor.*

As stated earlier, except for Gaza males the majority of youth (50% of males and 63% of females) in all three regions did not participate in any civic/cultural activity over the reference year.

% Youth That Did Not Participate in Any Civic/Cultural Activity Over the Previous Year					
Male			Female		
West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
51.7%	69.7%	45.0%	65.3%	77.0%	58.8%

The main reason cited by youth for not participating in civic/cultural activities over the past year among both genders in all three regions was lack of time due to family duties, work or study. Among both genders and all regions, Jerusalem female youth most often (at 57%) cited this reason and Gaza females were least likely (at %36) to cite lack of time.



The second dominant reason youth gave for not participating in any activities was lack of interest. Here Jerusalem male youth came first (with 34% stating they had no interest) followed by Gaza and West Bank male youth (both at 29%). Among female youth, approximately 25% of female youth in Gaza and the West Bank gave “lack of interest” as the second most common reason for their lack of participation, while only 18% of female youth in Gaza offered this reason.

A main difference between male and female youth in all three regions is the higher percent of the latter who stated that family objections was a main reason why they did not participate in any activities. This was the highest among Gaza females (at 21%) followed by 8% of Jerusalem females and 6% of West Bank females. In contrast, only Gaza males cited this at all (at a low of less than 2%). That the activities were not available in their area was more often stated by males (though still at very low rates) but with one exception—10% of West Bank female youth gave this as a main reason for their non-participation in civic/cultural activities over the past year.


## Access to Public Leisure/Culture

*Main Findings: Visiting the beach was the main public leisure/cultural activity youth had undertaken over the past five years. There is a consistent gender gap in favor of male youth attending public leisure/culture activities across the regions.*



Attendance at public cultural/leisure activities was another area of access to public life/social integration measured by the survey. Public cultural activities (such as theatre, cinema, exhibitions etc.) are not only measures of cultural literacy but of degrees of social and civic engagement, access, and integration. Access to public spaces (such as the beach) indicates degrees of geographic and gendered accessibility to an important space of public leisure. Cultural activities are an important means of creating public forums outside the realm of political or family gatherings. They provide an indication of the degree to which communities across the oPt actually have a public sphere, as well as differences by gender in accessing it.

The survey asked male and female youth if they had attended any one of a range of culture or leisure activities (that take place in the public sphere) over the past five years. The wide timeline gave the greatest opportunity to capture the possibility of attendance—especially given that often these types of activities are not regularly available or not regularly practiced. In addition, the survey question differentiated between cultural performances that took place in the formal public sphere from those that take place in familial semi-public settings (such as weddings), excluding the latter.

In terms of overall access/attendance at public cultural/leisure activities there is a clear gender gap in Jerusalem and the West Bank, where a much higher percentage of female compared to male youth *did not attend any activity* over the past five years. However, the data related to Gaza is somewhat skewed because one of the activities mentioned is “visiting the beach”—a destination/activity much more accessible to all Gazans, who live on the coast, than West Bank residents who are restricted from the coast by Israel. Regionally, the West Bank seems to offer the least access to public cultural activities for youth of both sexes.




While the West Bank has the lowest rates of participation for both sexes, male youth attendance in every type of activity is higher than that of female youth. The number one destination/activity among youth of both sexes was “the beach,” at 54% of male youth and a markedly smaller proportion of 38% of female youth. Given Israel’s closure regime—in which the seashore is physically less than an hour away for most West Bank residents but politically and bureaucratically off-limits—the fact that so many West Bank youth have actually been to it was a surprise. The survey did not ask about the geographic location of “the beach” but from other questions in the survey, it is possible to extrapolate this. Among male youth in the West Bank, more had visited Israel/1948 lands (at 61%) than stated they had been to the beach in the past five years (at 54%), suggesting that the majority of male youth had been to the beach inside Israel/1948 lands. Similarly, among females, more had visited Israel/1948 lands (at 36%) than had



been to the beach (at 32%), leading to the same conclusion. The second most common destination was “popular arts performance” (usually connoting *dabke* or *zajjal*, traditional Palestinian arts) with 40% of male youth in the West Bank and 27% of female youth having attended one in the past five years (notably, a 17% gender gap favoring males). The least attended event in the West Bank among both sexes was “theatre performance” at 22% of male youth and 17% of female youth.


The sole similar pattern between Jerusalem and the West Bank was that, for both sexes, “the beach” was the number one response among public activities youth had attended over the past five years. Given its greater (bureaucratic/political) accessibility to Jerusalemites, who usually have blue identity cards allowing travel in Israel, the response rate was much higher (at 62% of female youth and 75% of male youth there). On the other hand, it is telling that 38% of female youth in Jerusalem and 25% of male youth there did not go to or have access to the beach over the past five years. In all other ways, however, the gender patterns of attendance in public cultural activities among Jerusalem youth is different than that of their West Bank counterparts. Youth of both sexes in Jerusalem have lower overall attendance rates in all of the activities (except for the beach) but there is less of a gender gap in attendance of all types of activities among them in comparison to West Bank youth. Among Jerusalem youth, “attending the cinema” ranks second (at 30% of females and 48% of males) as the activity they attended over the past five years, while “poetry readings/conference” scores the lowest (at 10% of female and 11% of male youth there).



## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

In Gaza, not surprisingly “the beach” is also the number one public space destination cited by both sexes, at rates higher than any other region (with 95% of male and 91% of female youth having gone to the beach in Gaza over the past five years). There is also a smaller gender gap in most of the activities (like Jerusalem) than in the West Bank. Overall participation rates are lower than in the West Bank (though higher than in Jerusalem); there is also a large divergence from the other two regions in the types of activities cited, with “poetry readings/conferences” the second most common activity among respondents of both sexes in Gaza over the past five years (at 34% among both sexes). This was followed by “book fairs/talks” (at 33% of both sexes in Gaza). And in stark contrast to Jerusalem youth, the cinema was the least most common activity among Gaza youth of both sexes (at 5% of female and 9% of male youth).

The other aspect of public life the survey measured was degrees of access to more commercial sites. Youth were asked whether over the past year they had been to a café, restaurant or “*mntaza*” (public park/restaurant café). Access to these is often contingent on income, as well as gender. Across regions and genders, there was a surprisingly high proportion of male and female youth who had been to either a restaurant or *mntaza* over the past year. Only 3% of male youth and 10% of female youth across the regions had not been to either of these sites in the year. The proportion of male youth who had been to a restaurant ranged from 86% in Gaza to 95% in Jerusalem, while a range of 86% of male youth in Gaza to 88% in Jerusalem had been to a *mntaza*. Among female youth, the range was 71% in Gaza to 86% in Jerusalem that had been to a restaurant in the past year, and a range of 84% in Gaza to 82% in the West Bank had been to a *mntaza*.



Both restaurants and *mntaza*'aat are family-oriented public spaces, making them more appropriate for females. In contrast, one finds a very large gender gap in terms of access to cafes among youth. While classically, cafes were a male-only preserve in the oPt, over the past decade a growing aspect of youth culture here and across the region has been the emergence of the modern café—as mixed gender spaces that cater specifically to youth tastes (offering a new generation of narghileh, large screen T.V.s, contemporary music and wireless Internet). These tend to be youth spaces as opposed to family ones. Among males, the range who cited having gone to a café over the past year remained high (at 92% in Jerusalem and 88% in West Bank and Gaza). In contrast, the range was much lower for females at 25% of female youth in Gaza versus 40% of females in Jerusalem having gone to a café over the past year.

## Chapter III. Mobility

*Main Findings: Not surprisingly, the mobility of Gaza youth beyond their region is the most constrained in comparison to youth in Jerusalem or the West Bank. Only 5% of Gaza male and 3% of Gaza female youth had visited Jerusalem or the West Bank in the past year while less than 2% of West Bank male and no West Bank female youth had visited Gaza in the past year. In addition, Gaza youth were less likely to have ever visited Israel/1948 areas or a foreign country than their counterparts in the other two regions.*

However, in terms of mobility *within* each region, female youth are much more constrained in their ability to move at will than their male counterparts, due to family restrictions. In addition, female youth are much less likely to have visited different locations in their region than their male counterparts.

Israel's mobility regime has for more than a decade (or for Gaza, as far back as two decades) severely limited Palestinian mobility within and across the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem for all sectors of the population. Much of the human rights and policy research on the impacts of Israel's mobility regime on the population has tended to focus on three main areas: economic life, health and to a lesser extent, education impacts. In general, studies have not focused on the various gender dimensions of mobility restrictions, or on their effect on youth. While the larger Israeli-imposed infrastructure of physical and bureaucratic restrictions forms the context that determines the population's physical mobility, within these, age and gender are also operative—potentially providing for more access in some locations or further limiting access and mobility in others.

The survey looked at mobility and access across different spatial levels. Starting at the most immediate level in terms of the ability to leave the home, then to ever-widening spatial levels of movement: first within the immediate community (or to the nearest urban center); then within regions (West Bank and Gaza); followed by across regions; and finally, more globally—to Israel/1948 areas or other countries. In addition, the survey tried to understand the proximate causes for the lack of ability to move across these levels.

### Exiting the Home

The survey asked youth how many times they had exited the home over the past week in order to socialize/visit friends or relatives. The aim was to understand to what degree youth were free to leave the home in order to build social connections/relationships rather than to exit the home for purposes of work, education or health.

#### How Many Times Did You Leave the Home over the Past Week for Social Purposes? (by gender/region)

	Males			Females		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
0	9.7%	3.1%	10.3%	12.1%	3.6%	9.9%
1-2	32.0%	22.1%	30.1%	40.8%	34.5%	45.4%
3-4	31.0%	38.7%	28.3%	31.2%	39.4%	31.6%
5-6	13.8%	19.0%	14.1%	10.1%	18.2%	6.1%
7 or more	13.5%	17.2%	17.1%	5.8%	4.2%	6.9%

## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

Across regions, Jerusalem youth of both sexes had the highest mobility out of the home for social purposes (with the most common response being “3-4 times” a week for both sexes there). For Gazan and West Bank female youth, the most common response was “1-2 times” a week, with 45% of Gazan and 41% of West Bank females leaving the home only once or twice over the past week in order to socialize. Male youth in Gaza and the West Bank had only slightly more mobility than their female counterparts, with the most common response being that they exited the home 3-4 times in a week. However, no strong gender or regional pattern emerges from the data.

### Freedom to Move at a Community Level

Beyond the immediate home environment, youth were asked how free they felt to go the nearest urban center close to their home when they wished. There was a huge gender gap in favor of male youth across the regions who stated they were “free to go at will”. The range of female youth who felt that they were free to go to the nearest urban center at will was only 20% among Gaza females to 24% of West Bank female youth (with the female total at 22%). In comparison, the range for male youth was 87% in Jerusalem to the low of 80% among West Bank male youth (with the male total 83%).

#### How Free Are You To Go To the Closest Urban Center to Where You Live? (by female/region)

	FEMALE YOUTH		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Free to go at will	23.8%	23.6%	19.7%
Can go but only if accompanied by family members	36.2%	39.4%	48.8%
Somewhat free to go at will	31.3%	18.2%	22.9%
Not free to go at will	8.7%	18.8%	8.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

#### How Free Are You To Go To the Closest Urban Center to Where You Live? (by male/region)

	MALE YOUTH		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Free to go at will	79.5%	86.7%	85.4%
Can go but only if accompanied by family members	5.8%	2.4%	3.8%
Somewhat free to go at will	13.6%	10.9%	9.7%
Not free to go at will	1.0%	0%	1.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>



For female youth, the main obstacle in their freedom of movement was clearly gendered, with “parents/family members” being the main obstacle among female youth across all three regions (with a range of 59% in Gaza to 45% in Jerusalem and a total of 58%) followed by “the social environment” (at a range of 36% in Jerusalem to 26% in the West Bank and a total of 38%).

**What is the *Main Obstacle* for You to Freely Go to the Local Urban/Town Center? (by female/region)**

	FEMALE YOUTH		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
My parents/ family members	58.5%	44.8%	59.4%
The social environment	26.5%	36.2%	27.6%
The security environment	5.2%	12.1%	7.2%
Cost of transportation	6.8%	5.2%	4.4%
Other	3.1%	1.7%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%


For the much smaller proportion of male youth who were constrained in their ability to go freely to the closest urban center, the reasons were also gendered but linked to the security environment (at a range of 72% in Jerusalem to 17% in Gaza and a total of 31% compared to only 7% among females). “The security environment” as the obstacle to male and female youths’ free movement is clearly more prominent in Jerusalem than any other region.

**What is the *Main Obstacle* for You to Freely Go to the Local Urban/Town Center? (by male/region)**


	MALE YOUTH		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
My parents/ family members	28.6%	11.1%	47.0%
The social environment	7.1%	16.7%	6.0%
The security environment	38.9%	72.2%	17.1%
Cost of transportation	15.1%	-	17.9%
Other	10.3%	-	12.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

### Freedom to Move at the Regional and National Level

The next level of mobility covered by the survey only asked West Bank and Gaza youth about their ability to move within their home region and to the other regions over the past year. Less than 3% of female and male youth in Gaza had visited Jerusalem over the past year, while another 6% of male and 3% of female Gazan youth had visited the West Bank (separate from Jerusalem) during that period. But a gender gap emerged in terms of mobility within the Strip, with a much higher proportion of male versus female youth there having visited the southern Gaza Strip cities of Khan Yunis and Rafah than of their female counterparts.




In the West Bank, we find a similar pattern. Destinations that Israel limits access to (such as Gaza) were less visited for both sexes (although 40% of female and 43% of male youth from the West Bank had visited Jerusalem in the past year—most likely during the Eid holiday when Israel loosened access to the city). Mobility within the West Bank also exposes a gender gap in favor of males, with approximately 20% more West Bank male youth than female youth visiting other cities in the West Bank over the past year.



## National and International Mobility

In terms of mobility beyond their region of residence and across national and international borders, there was a clear gender gap. While 39% of male youth had in their lifetime visited areas inside the Green Line only 27% of female youth had done the same. Forty-six percent of males and 36% of females had visited an Arab country, while 11% of males and 6% of females had visited a foreign non-Arab country.



Regionally, Gazan youth are the most constrained in their overall mobility, regardless of gender. This question was not limited to the past year, asking about lifetime travel. Only 13% of male and 8% of female youth in Gaza have ever visited Israel/1948 areas; 38% of Gaza male youth and 28% of females have visited an Arab country; and 13% of male and 8% of female Gaza youth ever visited a non-Arab country.


Not surprisingly, Jerusalem youth of both sexes have the highest percent of cross-border mobility—not only into Israel/1948 areas but also to Arab and non-Arab countries. Overall, male youth in all regions were more likely to have visited Israel/1948 areas, Arab countries, and non-Arab countries, with the greatest gender gap found between West Bank male and female youth. Almost double the proportion of males to females had ever visited Israel/1948 areas (61% of males versus 36% of females) and a non-Arab country (12% of males versus 6% of females).

## Chapter IV. Use of Internet/Social Media

*Main Findings: Internet use among male and female youth is high (though an average 10% higher among male youth at 77% versus 66% among females). Male youth have a slightly higher frequency of Internet use as well as a more varied range of locations that they can access and use Internet than their female counterparts. For female youth, the home is the prime location for accessing internet and, they are less likely than male youth to have equal access to the Internet at home.*


### Use of the Internet

As various surveys over the past decade have shown, Palestinians and youth in particular have high level of access to the Internet compared to their regional counterparts. Approximately two-thirds (63%) of female youth and three-fourths (78%) of male youth surveyed claimed to use the Internet—meaning there is an approximate 10% gender gap favoring male youth in Internet use.



### Frequency of Use

Most male and female youth surveyed use the Internet daily (72% of males and 62% of females). In Gaza, a much greater proportion of male youths (74%) use the Internet daily than do their female counterparts (59%), creating the largest gender gap (of 15%) in all three regions in terms of frequency of Internet access.





## Main Place of Use


The location where youth access the Internet gives us some insight into why females' frequency of Internet use may be lower than that of males. For female youth, home is overwhelmingly the primary place they use Internet at 81% (with a range between Jerusalem females accessing Internet at home 86% of the time and West Bank female youth accessing the Internet at home 77% of the time). Although home is also the primary location where male youth access the Internet, it is at a significantly lower rate of 69% (between 75% among Gazan male youth and 60% among Jerusalem male youth).

## Where Do You Primarily Use the Internet? (by gender/region)

Place	Male			Female		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Internet cafe	7.7%	2.4%	5.4%	0.9%	0	1.0%
Work	17.5%	12.1%	11.1%	9.3%	3.8%	7.0%
School/ university	3.0%	3.2%	1.0%	5.9%	4.8%	1.3%
Public places	8.4%	22.6%	7.6%	7.1%	5.7%	7.5%
Home	63.3%	59.7%	74.8%	76.8%	85.7%	83.3%

Clearly, female youth are disadvantaged in their access to Internet in public locations with one exception—at school/university—where, given that they outnumber their male counterparts, female youth are more likely to access Internet there.

Access to Internet at home, however, is not simply a matter of physical availability, but also about whom has priority in using it. The survey went on to ask youth Internet users, whether the infrastructure for Internet existed in the home *and* whether they felt they had equal access to it in relation to other family members.




## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

While across regions and genders, 90% or more of all youth surveyed stated that they had an Internet connection at home, overall male youth said they had more equal access to the web in their homes. Seventeen percent of male youth claimed that, although there was Internet at home, they did not have equal access to it. By comparison, 24% of females claimed they had unequal access to the Internet at home (with 13% of female youth in the West Bank, 22% in Jerusalem and 23% in Gaza).


### Main Activities on Internet

Across all regions, “entertainment” was the main purpose youth gave for accessing the Internet (at 95% for males and 92% for females). Two notable exceptions were Gaza females, who primarily used the Internet for reading and knowledge, and West Bank males who primarily used the Internet for chat and communication.



### Social Media: Facebook

The vast majority of youth who use the Internet also have a Facebook page, although male youth in each region are more likely to have one than their female counterparts (90% of male youth versus 80% of female youth). West Bank males, at almost 94%, represent the highest proportion of Facebook users, and Gaza females at 79% represent the lowest.



The majority of youth (more than 59% among males and 67% among females) use Facebook primarily to communicate with friends; female youth in each region use it for this purpose more often than their male counterparts. However, a higher percent of male than female youth in each region use Facebook to make new friends—most notably in Gaza where 20% of males claim this is their main purpose versus 13% of females there. A much lower percentage of youth use it to follow politics: an average 3% of youth use Facebook primarily to follow political parties and figures, while a slightly higher average of 6% use it to follow political youth groups.

**Primary Purpose for Using Facebook Among Internet Users (by gender/region)**

Region	Male			Female		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Communicating with friends	69.0%	48.1%	52.8%	76.0%	65.6%	59.5%
Making new friends	13.3%	14.4%	19.9%	8.8%	8.9%	13.0%
Watch videos	1.8%	4.8%	5.6%	2.5%	5.6%	4.7%
Follow political parties/figures	2.7%	5.8%	4.3%	2.0%	2.2%	2.9%
Follow youth political groups	3.9%	7.7%	5.8%	2.7%	7.8%	4.3%
Follow advertisements	3.4%	3.8%	2.6%	3.1%	1.1%	4.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

In terms of the Facebook pages that youth primarily follow, the vast majority claim to follow entertainment pages (48% of males and 47% of females) although there are significant variations by region and gender. Jerusalem female youth are those most often following entertainment pages at 69%, followed by male youth in Jerusalem and the West Bank (at 54% among both). Gaza male and female youth, though still citing entertainment pages as the primary pages they follow, do so at much lower rates than youth in other regions (at 42% of male and 37% of female youth in Gaza).

The second most-frequently-followed category of pages is that of organizations, centers, and universities, (14% among males and 17% among females). These have the highest following among West Bank males at 12% and Gaza females at 20%. Male youth are much more likely to follow pages of official political parties, with 12% of male youth and only 2% of female youth following such pages. And finally, 7% of females versus only 1% of males follow pages about women’s rights and freedoms, with Gaza females (at 9%) and West Bank females (at 5%) are more likely to follow pages about women’s rights and freedoms than either their female counterparts in Jerusalem (at 3%).

**What Type of Facebook Pages Do You Primarily Follow? (by gender/region)**

	Male			Female		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Official political parties	9.9%	10.6%	14.5%	2.5%	1.1%	2.3%
Organizations, centers, universities	12.0%	10.6%	15.6%	13.7%	13.3%	20.6%
Women's rights and freedoms pages	0.8%	2.9%	0.9%	5.2%	3.3%	8.8%
Religious	2.4%	1.9%	2.6%	2.9%	2.2%	5.1%
Official youth movements in universities	4.4%	1.9%	4.5%	4.9%	1.1%	4.3%
Independent youth pages (political)	7.4%	7.7%	11.7%	4.9%	6.7%	4.9%
Entertainment pages	54.0%	53.8%	42.5%	53.5%	68.9%	36.8%
Poet and writers pages	5.0%	4.8%	4.6%	7.9%	1.1%	11.7%
Actors and singers pages	4.0%	5.8%	3.1%	4.5%	2.2%	5.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>



# Chapter V. Attitudes Towards Gender Roles & Responsibilities


*Main Findings:* While both genders express relatively high support for women adopting economic roles, there is much lower support among both male and female youth for women’s political involvement. This low support for women’s political activism represents a major reversal in attitudes compared to previous generations. However, a gender gap exists, with young women across regions favoring more rights in economic and political life than male counterparts deem appropriate for them.

The survey assessed a range of issues related to preferred gender roles, rights, and responsibilities. These included attitudes towards women’s rights in the family, the community, the economy, and political life. It also asked a range of questions regarding perceptions of the appropriate division of labor between male and female spouses in the home. Youth were also asked to compare their preferences towards roles and responsibilities of both genders with the preferences of their parents’ generation.

## Preferences Regarding Working Wives


Youth were asked about their preference regarding the role of wives in family life. The questions posed a range of options, with wives working outside the home versus wives not working outside but rather prioritizing family duties as the two extremes on a continuum of answers.

In terms of those who most strongly felt that wives should focus solely on family and raising children, there was a consistent gender gap between the sexes, with more male youth in every region preferring that wives not work outside the home (at 38% of male youth versus only 18% of female youth). The group most likely to support wives staying at home rather than working was Gaza male youth (at 41%)—this also being their strongest overall preference among the possible positions on this question. West Bank male youth were not far behind, with 37% stating they preferred wives stay at home rather than work. Jerusalem male youth were the least likely among males (at 28%) to have this preference. Looking at the gender gap, in Gaza and the West Bank, 21% more male than female youth prefer that wives stay at home rather than work; in Jerusalem this gap is substantial but only 13%.



## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

Except for among male youth in Gaza, across gender and region, most youth supported the statement that wives should be able to work outside the home as long as it didn't affect their family duties and responsibilities (36% of males and 46% of females). This was particularly the dominant view among female youth (ranging from 48% of Gaza females to 46% of West Bank females). In contrast, the range among males who gave this answer (though still the overall dominant answer) was 39% among West Bank and Jerusalem to 38% of Gaza male youth. Clearly, for the majority of youth (save for Gaza males) and especially among females, the dominant preference is that wives should be able to have both careers and family life.



The final two responses were at the other end of the extreme from “wives should focus on family and raising children” and instead posed wives working outside the home as an objective “right” or a choice that women should have the right to make alone. Youth of both genders (15% of males and 21% of females) were more likely to see women’s choice to work outside the home as a decision that women should have the right to make, rather than as an objective right (8% of males and 13% of females). Of the youth who gave this response, significantly more female than male youth supported the woman’s ability to choose: 11% more females than males in Jerusalem; 9% more females than males in the West Bank, but only 6% more females than males in Gaza.



Region	West Bank		Jerusalem		Gaza	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
I support her right to work	8.4%	13.5%	7.3%	12.7%	7.2%	11.8%
Whether she works should be her choice alone	15.3%	23.7%	18.8%	30.3%	13.5%	19.2%

## Attitudes to Women’s Economic Rights/Roles

When asked to choose the appropriateness of a range of economic or related roles for women, an overwhelmingly high percentage of female youth found it appropriate that women access higher education (93%); work outside the home (73%) and ask for their inheritance rights (87%). However, a smaller proportion found it appropriate that a woman run a business, at 52%.

Male youth were more reticent about the appropriateness of the all of the listed economic roles for women (save for access to higher education); 84% felt it appropriate for females to study at university, 48% felt it appropriate that females worked outside the home, 82% felt it appropriate women take their inheritance, and only 32% felt it appropriate they run a business. They were particularly reticent

about women working outside the home (with a range of 18% of Gaza male and 16% of West Bank male youth deeming it *inappropriate* for women to work outside the home) and about women running a business (with a range of 41% of Gaza and 30% of Jerusalem male youth deeming it inappropriate for women to run a business).



### Attitudes to Political Roles Appropriate for Women

Support among both male and female youth for women’s adoption of various political roles is dramatically lower than their support for women’s adoption of economic roles. On average, by region, Jerusalem youth of both sexes have the least conservative attitudes towards women’s political participation.

### Do You Think it Appropriate that Women Undertake the Following Political Roles? (by Gender, All Regions)

		Male	Female
<b>Join political party</b>	Appropriate	26.6%	39.7%
	Only if necessary	18.1%	19.9%
	Not appropriate	54.2%	38.1%
	Don’t know	1.1%	2.3%
<b>Lead political party</b>	Appropriate	21.9%	34.8%
	Only if necessary	17.2%	19.2%
	Not appropriate	60.1%	43.5%
	Don’t know	0.9%	2.5%
<b>Participate protests/ demonstrations</b>	Appropriate	19.9%	31.5%
	Only if necessary	20.1%	21.8%
	Not appropriate	59.2%	44.4%
	Don’t know	0.9%	2.2%
<b>Run for political office</b>	Appropriate	23.3%	37.5%
	Only if necessary	18.8%	19.4%
	Not appropriate	57.1%	40.5%
	Don’t know	0.7%	2.6%

Although female youth are slightly more supportive than their male counterparts of women's adoption of political roles, approximately one-third are opposed to women participating in the various categories of political life posed in the survey. For instance, 40% of West Bank, 37% of Gaza and 33% of Jerusalem female youth deem it inappropriate for women to be members in political parties. Not surprisingly, a slightly greater proportion of females in each region deem it inappropriate for women to nominate themselves for political office. The patterning of attitudes towards women's political roles is similar between West Bank and Jerusalem females (with the least reticence found towards women being judges, and increasingly greater reticence for political party membership, nominating themselves for office, leading a political party, and participating in demonstrations). In Gaza, however, the patterning of female youth attitudes is very different with the least reticence towards women's political party membership (at 37% deeming it inappropriate) and the most reticence towards women participating in demonstrations (at 47%). Gaza female youth are also the most reticent overall towards women being judges (at 44% deeming it inappropriate) compared to their West Bank counterparts (29% against) as well as their Jerusalem counterparts (23% against).

Male youth are even more conservative towards women's political roles than their female counterparts. And West Bank male youth are relatively the most conservative towards women's political participation out of male youth in all regions. On the basic issue of political party membership, 60% of West Bank and 46% of Jerusalem male youth deem it inappropriate for women (Gaza male youth falling in between).

Males in all three regions have the greatest reticence towards women acting as political leaders (65% West Bank, 58% Gaza, 48% Jerusalem) and participating in demonstrations (63% West Bank, 57% Gaza, 47% Jerusalem). When asked about women being judges, similar to Gaza female youth, Gaza male youth are the most likely of their peers to deem this as inappropriate (at 54% of Gaza males versus 38% of Jerusalem and 48% of West Bank male youth).


### Preferred Family Arrangements/Gender Roles and Rights

*Main Findings: Across the regions, male and female youth prefer smaller families to their parents' generation with female youth more often preferring smaller families than male youth. Both genders also prefer a more equal distribution of gender roles in marriage compared to their parents' generation. At the same time, both genders would prefer wives to have a greater commitment to norms and traditions than the previous generation.*


#### Family Size

There is a significant gender gap in male and female youths' preferences for family size compared to their parents' generation. Given the decline in fertility levels across occupied Palestine over the past 15 years, it is safe to say that youth assumed that their parents' generation had larger numbers of children than present norms. As such, when asked to compare with the previous generation, youth were being asked if they wanted similarly large, even larger, or smaller families than was the norm. In this instance, 46% of male youth and 55% of female youth preferred to have less children than their parents' generation, while 35% of the former and 33% of the latter wanted a similar number of children than their parents' generation..

In Gaza and the West Bank, approximately 10% more female than male youth preferred fewer children than their parents' generation. In the West Bank, 58% of female youth versus 48% of male youth wanted a smaller number of children than their parents' generation. In Gaza, 55% of female versus 46% of male youth preferred fewer children than their parents' generation; in Jerusalem the gap was smaller, with 40% of female and 35% of male youth preferring fewer children than their parents' generation.



In Jerusalem, both male and female youth tended to want to keep family size the same or larger than their parents' generation, with 64% of male youth and 68% of female youth wanting the same number or more children than the previous generation. Most Gaza males (at 53%) also preferred the same or more number of children as their parents' generation.



### Gender Roles in Marriage

Youth were asked a series of questions about their preferences concerning gender roles and responsibilities in marriage. Again these questions were asked indirectly by asking them to compare themselves with their parents' generation. The questions were posed to young women in terms of preferences for themselves; for young men, the questions were posed in relation to what they preferred for their actual or future wife.

In all three regions, the majority of male and female youth wanted an extension of rights for wives in marriage compared to their parents' generation and a more equal distribution of gender roles in marriage. On only one issue did they tend to prefer the same values as the previous generation—on the issue of wives' commitment to "norms and traditions," with 53% of males and 48% of females wanting the same level of commitment and 29% of the former and 38% of the latter wanting more commitment to norms and traditions than their parents' generation.

In the West Bank, despite the overall desire among youth to expand wives' rights in marriage, a large gender gap existed (averaging 15% across the various indicators), with females wanting a greater expansion of these rights than did males.

**For female youth: Compared to your mother’s generation, what would you prefer for yourself in your married life?**

**For male youth: Compared to your parents’ generation, what would you prefer for your wife in your married life?**

	West Bank		
		Male	Female
<b>Financial independence</b>	more	49.3%	64.9%
	the same	41.4%	30.7%
	less	8.8%	3.2%
<b>Control over family income</b>	more	49.3%	64.9%
	the same	41.4%	30.7%
	less	8.8%	3.2%
<b>Role in major family decisions</b>	more	48.9%	62.9%
	the same	43.9%	32.8%
	less	6.5%	3.8%
<b>Emotional support from spouse</b>	more	58.9%	70.2%
	the same	37.4%	27.5%
	less	3.4%	1.2%
<b>Spouse participating in housework</b>	more	46.6%	69.9%
	the same	41.0%	25.8%
	less	11.7%	3.4%
<b>Spouse participating in child-raising</b>	more	51.3%	71.8%
	the same	38.6%	25.5%
	less	9.2%	2.1%
<b>Commitment to norms &amp; traditions</b>	more	36.1%	33.0%
	the same	52.3%	48.5%
	less	11.1%	17.7%

In Jerusalem, the pattern was similar to that in the West Bank, with a slightly higher (approximate 17%) average proportion of female youth wanting more of an expansion of their rights in marriage than their male counterparts.

**For female youth: compared to your mother's generation what would you prefer for yourself in terms of your married life?**

**For male youth: in comparison to your parents' generation what would you prefer for your wife in your married life?**

		Jerusalem	
		Male	Female
<b>Financial independence</b>	more	48.5%	66.7%
	the same	42.4%	30.9%
	less	7.3%	0%
<b>Control over family income</b>	more	46.7%	67.9%
	the same	46.7%	29.7%
	less	5.5%	0%
<b>Role in major family decisions</b>	more	50.9%	67.3%
	the same	44.8%	29.1%
	less	3.0%	0.6%
<b>Emotional support from spouse</b>	more	67.3%	74.5%
	the same	29.7%	21.2%
	less	1.8%	0%
<b>Spouse participating in housework</b>	more	56.4%	68.5%
	the same	35.2%	24.8%
	less	7.3%	3.6%
<b>Spouse participating in child-raising</b>	more	54.5%	69.1%
	the same	38.8%	25.5%
	less	5.5%	2.4%
<b>Commitment to norms &amp; traditions</b>	more	50.3%	49.7%
	the same	43.0%	38.8%
	less	5.5%	10.3%

In Gaza, the gender gap was slightly smaller, with an approximate average of 12% of female youth preferring an expansion of their rights and duties in marriage compared to their male counterparts.

**For female youth: compared to your mother’s generation what would you prefer for yourself in terms of your married life?**

**For male youth: in comparison to your parents’ generation what would you prefer for your wife in your married life?**

		Gaza	
		Male	Female
<b>Financial independence</b>	more	44.4%	61.5%
	the same	47.5%	35.2%
	less	7.5%	2.5%
<b>Control over family income</b>	more	38.2%	54.1%
	the same	50.5%	40.5%
	less	11.0%	4.7%
<b>Role in major family decisions</b>	more	47.2%	64.2%
	the same	45.4%	33.3%
	less	6.8%	1.7%
<b>Emotional support from spouse</b>	more	65.0%	73.4%
	the same	32.1%	24.3%
	less	2.3%	1.2%
<b>Spouse participating in housework</b>	more	60.0%	72.9%
	the same	34.5%	24.9%
	less	5.2%	1.5%
<b>Spouse participating in child-raising</b>	more	61.7%	72.0%
	the same	33.5%	26.3%
	less	4.6%	1.3%
<b>Commitment to norms &amp; traditions</b>	more	30.0%	30.8%
	the same	55.3%	49.4%
	less	14.5%	19.5%

Overall, more Jerusalem youth of both genders than other regions (at 50% of both sexes) preferred that wives have more of a commitment to norms and traditions than did their parents’ generation.



## Chapter VI. Feelings of Influence/Agency

*Main Findings: Both male and female youth express an extremely limited feeling of political agency in their local communities, which declines yet further in relation to regional and national level politics.*

As previous surveys of youth have found, male and female youth have a low sense of their political agency or efficacy. This survey asked a series of questions about youth’s perceptions of their own political influence on various actors, at both the local community level, within their region of residence, and ultimately at the national level.

Male youth most often responded that they have no influence at all over the various actors in their community—a response that tends to be higher in Gaza than in the other two regions. It is primarily in relation to influencing other youth that one finds male youth with a strong sense of being able to influence others in their community (19% of West Bank and 9% of Gaza male youth said that they have “a lot” of influence on youth in their community) while this response is much lower among Jerusalem youth, with only 5% feeling they have a lot of influence over youth in their community.

Influence/ local community level	Degree	Male		
		West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Decisions of local leaders	a lot	5.5%	4.2%	2.9%
	somewhat	30.4%	20.6%	19.6%
	not at all	62.4%	66.7%	76.2%
Life of residents	a lot	6.1%	3.6%	3.9%
	somewhat	33.4%	25.5%	24.1%
	not at all	58.8%	63.0%	70.9%
Behavior of police/security forces	a lot	2.2%	0.6%	2.3%
	somewhat	11.6%	6.1%	7.6%
	not at all	84.0%	84.8%	88.4%
Opinions of religious leaders	a lot	2.5%	0.6%	2.7%
	somewhat	12.7%	11.5%	12.4%
	not at all	82.0%	77.0%	82.3%
Opinions of youth	a lot	10.2%	4.8%	8.7%
	somewhat	33.8%	22.4%	25.3%
	not at all	54.7%	63.6%	64.1%
Actions of local government	a lot	6.1%	3.6%	3.2%
	somewhat	23.0%	17.0%	11.7%
	not at all	68.8%	70.9%	82.3%

Among female youth across the regions, the sense of being able to influence actors in their community is consistently even lower than among their male counterparts. Like their male peers, female youth responded that they were more able to influence youth in their community “a lot” than any other target, but still only 3% of female youth in Gaza and the West Bank and only 1% in Jerusalem felt this way.

## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

Local community level	Degree	Female		
		West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Decisions of local leaders	a lot	2.1%	1.2%	1.6%
	somewhat	18.8%	7.9%	10.7%
	not at all	77.2%	74.5%	83.7%
Life of residents	a lot	2.3%	1.2%	1.8%
	somewhat	18.7%	9.7%	13.1%
	not at all	77.2%	73.3%	81.6%
Behavior of police/security forces	a lot	1.1%	1.2%	0.5%
	somewhat	8.5%	2.4%	6.2%
	not at all	87.3%	81.2%	89.0%
Opinions of religious leaders	a lot	0.8%	0.6%	1.3%
	somewhat	9.6%	3.6%	6.0%
	not at all	86.0%	80.0%	87.0%
Opinions of youth	a lot	3.5%	1.2%	3.2%
	somewhat	16.0%	5.5%	13.1%
	not at all	78.6%	78.8%	77.7%
Actions of local government	a lot	2.1%	1.2%	1.8%
	somewhat	10.2%	1.8%	7.2%
	not at all	85.6%	81.8%	85.7%

The already very low sense of political influence/agency that youth express in their immediate communities diminishes further when they are asked about their feelings of influence at the governorate, regional, and national levels. Among male youth, those stating that they have “a lot” of influence on any level of political life or among actors beyond their community never rises above 4%.

### Feelings of Influence at the Governorate, Regional and National Levels (males by region)

		Males		
		West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
Actions of government in your governorate	a lot	1.8%	1.2%	1.8%
	somewhat	9.8%	7.9%	8.1%
	not at all	85.9%	83.0%	87.7%
Actions of national leadership in your region	a lot	2.5%	0.6%	3.1%
	somewhat	10.4%	9.1%	10.9%
	not at all	84.6%	83.0%	83.8%
The rights of Palestinians generally	a lot	2.8%	0.6%	4.4%
	somewhat	17.9%	4.8%	15.0%
	not at all	76.3%	86.7%	76.8%

And among female youth, those who express a strong sense of ability to effect political life or actors beyond their community never rises above 2%.

### Feelings of Influence at the Governorate, Regional and National Levels (females by region)

	Female			
		West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
<b>Actions of government in your governorate</b>	a lot	0.8%	--	1.0%
	somewhat	5.6%	1.8%	6.0%
	not at all	91.0%	81.2%	87.3%
<b>Actions of national leadership in your region</b>	a lot	0.7%		0.9%
	somewhat	5.6%	1.8%	6.4%
	not at all	90.3%	82.4%	88.1%
<b>The rights of Palestinians generally</b>	a lot	1.7%	--	2.6%
	somewhat	9.7%	3.6%	12.5%
	not at all	84.5%	79.4%	79.8%


## Chapter VII. Political Activism

*Main Findings:* Approximately one-third of male youth but less than 10% of female youth are members of political parties. Over the past two years, less than half of male youth in West Bank and Gaza and only a fifth of female youth in both regions participated in any political activity undertaken by a range of institutions and movements. In Jerusalem, these proportions dropped to one-third of males and less than 10% of females having participated in any form of political activity.

Among males who had undertaken any form of participation, 50% of them in the West Bank and more than 60% of them in Gaza had participated in an activity of a political party or its youth movement over the two years prior to the survey. In Jerusalem, however, the greatest outlet for male youth political participation had been the “Family Diwan” over the same time period. Female youth were much less likely to participate in activities of political parties and their youth groups—instead the main outlets for female political participation tended to be student councils and NGO youth initiatives.

Given the low level of feelings of political agency among youth, it is surprising that so many of them are in fact political party members. More than a third of Gaza males (35%) and another 30% of West Bank male youth belong to political parties, while only 16% of Jerusalem males are members. By region, party membership is highest in Gaza at 35% of male and 9% of female youth there and lowest in Jerusalem (with 16% of males and 3% of females being members of political parties). But in line with the negative attitudes towards female political participation, a much lower percent of female than male youth are political party members across the three regions (9% of female youth in Gaza and the West Bank and only 3% of female youth in Jerusalem).

**Political Party Membership**



### Political Participation


Beyond political party membership, youth were asked whether they had participated in activities organized by political structures and movements over the two years prior to the survey. The structures included political parties and their youth movements, student councils, independent youth movements, NGO youth initiatives, family diwans/hamula, local councils and other political organization and/or movement. The question sought to measure the degree to which male and female youth participated in these activities versus actual membership in these structures.

**Over the Past Two Years Have You Participated in Any Activities Sponsored by the Following Organizations? (by gender and region)**


	Males			Females		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza
<b>Yes to at least one activity</b>	46.8%	30.3%	47.6%	21.4%	9.1%	20.8%
<b>No to all</b>	53.2%	69.7%	52.4%	78.6%	90.9%	79.2%

Less than half of male youth in the West Bank and Gaza participated in any activities by any organizations in the two years previous to the survey, as did less than a third of male youth in Jerusalem. Among female youth, participation was even less, with one-fifth of females in Gaza and the West Bank and less than 10% of Jerusalem female youth having taken part in any activity of this range of political organizations over the previous two years.

Among males who had participated in any activity, political parties combined with their youth movements was the main outlet.



The form of male youth participation is highly variegated by region. In both Gaza and the West Bank, the most common response was participation in an activity held by a political party (at 35% in Gaza and 28% in the West Bank). In contrast, only 12% of male youth in Jerusalem had participated in a political party activity over the same period. The second highest response among male youth in Gaza was participation in a youth group of a political party (at 28%), while in the West Bank “family diwan” came in second for males at 26%, followed by youth group of political party (at 22%). Clearly, in both the West Bank and Gaza, more male youth participated in activities organized by political parties or their youth movements (accounting for 63% of the responses among male Gaza youth and 50% among their West Bank counterparts). In stark contrast to this was the situation among male youth in Jerusalem, who most frequently participated in the “family diwan” at 22%.





Female youth political participation in all frameworks is dramatically lower and markedly different than that of male counterparts. In addition, it is highly variegated by region. Similar to their male counterparts, Gaza female youths’ primary form of participation was in political party activities (at 10%), but the second most common form of participation was in NGO youth initiatives (at a similar 10%). In the West Bank, NGO youth initiatives were the primary outlet for females (at almost 10% of respondents) followed by student councils (at 9%) and then political party-sponsored activities at 8%. And in Jerusalem, where female youth had the most limited levels of participation by gender and region, student councils were the primary outlet (at only 4%) followed by NGO youth initiatives at less than 4%.

### Main Political Activity

While the previous question assessed the range of possible activities that youth had been involved in over the previous two years, a follow-up question assessed which one of these was their main focus of involvement.

When male respondents (who had participated) were asked to specify the main focus of their political involvement (instead of simply saying what activities they had participated in), a significant shift became apparent. Although the activities of political parties and their youth movements (combined) remained number one for both Gaza and West Bank males, their significance fell from 63% to 51% for Gaza male youth and from 50% to 33% for West Bank youth. What increased in significance in these two cases was the role of “family diwans,” now the second most common focus for political participation at 16% of male youth in Gaza and 19% in the West Bank. In Jerusalem, “family diwan” is by far the most common main focus for political engagement among male youth, with 42% of those having any participation at all saying this was the main form it took.




## Gendered Youth/Occupied Lives

Among female youth, in both Gaza and Jerusalem, student councils are the main focus of political participation (at 24% of the former and 47% of the latter). In contrast, “political parties and their youth movements” are the main focus of Gaza females (at 33% combined) while student councils are second at 18%. Another significant gender difference is the degree to which NGO-led youth initiatives are more important as primary outlets for females than males. This category never rates above 10% among male youth as their primary form of participation, albeit constituting the main outlet for 23% of Gaza female, 19% of West Bank, and 13% of Jerusalem female youth.

### Physical Versus Virtual Participation

*Main Finding: Male and female youth in Jerusalem are much more likely to describe their participation in political activities as “virtual” rather than based on physical participation, in comparison to their counterparts in West Bank and Gaza. Female youth are also more likely to describe their political participation as taking place primarily through virtual media than do male youth.*

Respondents who did participate in an activity over the past two years were asked to describe to what extent their participation was “physical” or “virtual.” Here a very clear regional difference appeared, with both male and female youth in Jerusalem more likely to describe their participation as *virtual* than youth of both sexes in the other two regions. One-fifth of Jerusalem males described their participation in political activities as primarily virtual while less than 7% of West Bank and 10% of Gaza male youth did so. And while females across the regions were more likely than males to describe their participation as only virtual, in Jerusalem 33% of female youth described their participation as primarily virtual.






## Reasons for Lack of Participation


Main Findings: Among youth of both sexes the main reason cited for lack of participation in organized political activity is respondents' lack of interest in politics. However, secondary reasons tend to be gendered: female youth cite family refusal to let them participate while male youth cite the potentially dangerous consequences of political activism as the second main reason for their lack of participation.

For the majority of youth of both sexes who *did not* participate in any organized political activity over the previous two years (55% of males and 82% of females),

“Lack of interest in politics” was the primary reason cited by both sexes across all regions. The range who gave this answer among female youth was 45% in the West Bank and 38% in Gaza, while among males, the range was 43% in the West Bank and 38% in Jerusalem and Gaza. From then on, however, the reasons become gender-differentiated. Among females, the second highest reason given was “my family won’t let me participate,” which was highest among Gaza females at (26%) and lowest among Jerusalem females at 19%.



The third most common reason given by female youth was that the existing groups don’t meet their needs or interests (15% among West Bank females, 10% among Gaza females) while among Jerusalem females the third most common response was not knowing how to participate (at 10%).



Among male youth, secondary reasons cited for non-participation include the probability of danger involved, the second most common reason cited by males in Gaza (23% and Jerusalem (25%) but significantly lower among West Bank males (at 13%). Instead, the second most common reason cited by West Bank male youth for non-participation was that the current groups and activities do not meet their needs and interests (at 21%), which was the third most-cited reason by Gazan and Jerusalem males (at 15% among both).

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